2ND INTERNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE - III

Symbiosis Law School

Pune
2ND INTERNAL ASSISMENT
OF
POLIICAL SCIENCE – III

TOPIC: US and its Policy towards

Middle East
SUBMITTED BY:
NUPUR JHOD
ROLL NO. 209
PRN NO.:- 15010125209
NO. OF WORD:- 5,437

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ABSTRACT

The United States of America assumed a critical part in the Middle East amid the second part
of the Twentieth century. The United States has utilized its energy to protect its national
advantages in the Middle East. The consequences of U.S. remote approach in the Middle East
have fluctuated, and made new companions and adversaries. This is intrinsic in the
conflicting interest the United States seeking after in the locale. This postulation will address
the period in the wake of the Cold War. In this period United States confronted a changing
key reality; a Middle East without the vanishing Soviet Union's impact. Joined States has
sought after various national interests amid the most recent decade of the Twentieth century,
some more indispensable than others. The reason for this postulation is to look at if post Cold
War United States remote arrangement endeavors in the Middle East has served the United
States national interests. This examination will be finished by investigating the United States
remote approach exercises to secure its national advantages, characterized by the National
Security Strategy, in the area.

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INDEX

Sr. Topic Page Sign

No. No.
1. Abstract 2
2. Index 3
3. introduction 4
4. Analysis
a. US SECURITY POLICY IN MIDDLE
EAST
5-12
b. POSITED US INTERESTS TO THE
REGION
i. Oil
ii. The Potential US Military Role
c. IMPLICATIONS OF POLICIES

5. Conclusion 13-14
6. References 15

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INTRODICTION
Foundation By the mid 1850s United States' exchange the Middle East had turned out to be
sufficiently generous for the U.S. to endeavor to get a business arrangement with the Persian
Empire. Exchange with the area did not increment amid the following four decades since the
neighborhood populace was not significantly awed with American business, political, and
religious thoughts. In the 1930s the United States assessed the importance of the Middle East
as a land bridge among three continents. At this time the increasing importance of the
region’s contribution to the world supply of oil was becoming apparent as well as the Middle
East’s proximity to the Soviet Union1U.S. interests in the Middle East were minimal before
World War II since it was considered a region dominated by Britain and that U.S. did not
have much to gain from the region. Some private individuals and groups, such as protestant
missionary bodies, had clearly defined interests in the region, as did the Zionists who were
working for the creation of a Jewish homeland. During World War II (WW II) the United
States and its European allies recognized the long-term strategic value of the region’s oil
resources. They found how essentially basic petroleum was to doing combating a propelled
conflict. Meanwhile they comprehended that Middle East oil could serve European after war
recovery. World War II unquestionably was the extremely important occasion for the United
States concerning its interests in the Middle East. Three rule issues were to effect American
remote approach in the Middle East for the straggling leftovers of the Twentieth century. The
key issues were the Arab-Israeli conflict, the centrality of Middle East oil, and the Soviet
Union's hazard to the United States and its accomplices. This hypothesis will now address the
fundamental establishment of these three issues.

1
A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington D.C.: The White House)

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ANALYSIS
The United States has for some time been included in the Middle East, and its part has just
developed since the finish of the Cold War. However as opposed to Europe, another district
of longstanding interest, or Asia, where the United States arrangements to "rotate" in the
years to come, exchange relations and social ties stay frail, and the locale's military power
minor. Amid the Cold War, the Middle East's vitality supplies and a few socialist inclining
administrations rendered it a player in the US-Soviet chessboard. In the 1990s the United
States extended its security nearness in the locale to contain Saddam Hussein's Iraq and the
administrative administration in Iran. In the meantime, Washington occupied with an
enthusiastic and maintained, at the end of the day unsuccessful, push to achieve peace
amongst Israel and its Arab neighbors. Taking after the 9/11 assaults, US contribution
became much more prominent. The United States developed counterterrorism participation
with longstanding partners like Egypt and Jordan and pushed to set up more broad ties with
heretofore dismissed or ill-disposed administrations, similar to Yemen and Libya. Most
significantly, obviously, in 2003, the United States attacked Iraq and, in this manner, set off
an uprising that prompted to a maintained US nearness in the nation until the finish of 2011.
And then, just as US forces departed Iraq, the so-called “Arab Spring” shook the region,
toppling longstanding US allies in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen and creating civil wars in
several countries, most notably Syria. Although the Obama administration resisted a large-
scale US military commitment in the region, after the 2014 Islamic State advances in Iraq, it
began air strikes against Islamic State forces and stepped up its efforts to work with regional
allies and local partners against the group. Today’s posited US interests in the Middle East
can be broken down into five areas: ensuring the free flow of oil; preventing nuclear
proliferation; fighting terrorism; maintaining the security of Israel; and promoting
democratization. Iran, the Islamic State, and al-Qa’ida at times pose real threats to these
interests, but we argue that the threat they represent is often overstated and that many US
interests in the region stand little risk of disruption. In fact, it is our allies’ own problems that
present a bigger concern, and the Arab Spring and subsequent civil wars brought many of
these into the forefront. The US approach to managing these problems has generated many
benefits, including deterring and disrupting foes and successfully reassuring allies. However,
it has at times exacerbated internal problems and contributed to anti-Americanism. To protect
its interests, the United States should try to contain the violence in Iraq and Syria, weaken the

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Islamic State, and reenergize its efforts to promote peace between Israel and the Palestinians.
Washington should likewise perceive the points of confinement of its energy as it tries to
secure its interests in this turbulent district. The rest of this exposition is partitioned into four
sections. Segment one depicts the variety of US security duties to states in the Middle East,
extending from formal military understandings to more logical revelations of intrigue.
Segment two evaluates the set US interests in the area, showing the contentions to their
significance and bringing up issues about the legitimacy of a hefty portion of the avocations
on which they are based. It additionally surveys the dangers to these interests and assesses
which speak to the most troubling cases. Segment three endeavors to organize US interests
and examines those over which the United States can apply important impact. The article
finishes up in area four by displaying the ramifications of this dismemberment and the
proposals for strategy.

US SECURITY POLICY IN MIDDLE EAST

The United States keeps up a scope of security connections in the Middle East. These
incorporate resistance participation understandings, basing and get to rights, the
prepositioning of hardware, and other "hard" types of collaboration. Furthermore, the United
States has made talk responsibilities to a few of its partners (and express and verifiable
dangers to its adversaries) and satisfies the part of real arms provider to the district. These
relations are especially broad with conditions of the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, and Israel.

The US basing system in the Middle East is very broad. Notwithstanding taking the US
nearness in Afghanistan good and gone, the United States positions various bases, Forward
Operation Sites (FOS) and Cooperative Security Locations (CSL) and compels along the Gulf
littoral, and in addition in the eastern Mediterranean and along the Horn of Africa. Albeit
exact numbers are rare because of the political sensitivities of the host countries and
consistent changes in the specifics of basing as operational needs differ, US military
destinations in the district number in the handfuls. Among the real US army bases situated in
the CENTCOM Theater are Kuwait's Camps Arifjanin and Buehring alongside Camp as
Saliyah in Qatar. The US Air Force also maintains installations in Kuwait, UAE, and Qatar.
In 2015, the US Air Force also began deploying air assets from Incirlik Air Force Base in
Turkey.2 Additionally, at any given time as many as two of the Navy’s three forward-

2
Jeff Schogul, “F-15Cs deploy to Incirlik to protect Turkish airspace,” Air Force Times, November 6, 2015

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deployed aircraft carriers are also deployed in the region.3 The conversion of one of the
Navy’s oldest transport ships in 2012 into a floating forward base marks the introduction of
yet another basing platform in the region.4 Taken together, this arrangement provides the
United States the ability to deploy forces at or near a wide range of potential crisis points.
This basing network is reinforced by several thousand troops deployed in various states
throughout the Persian Gulf. The United States also retains several dozen personnel in Oman
and an advisory presence in Saudi Arabia. As such, the US will continue to maintain a strong
military presence in the region for the foreseeable future.

Further south, Bahrain is home to the American Fifth Fleet and, like Kuwait, is a “Major
Non-NATO Ally,” enabling it to buy advanced American weapons systems. The United States
has supplied Bahrain with surplus military equipment and helped Bahrain expand its air and
coastal defenses.5 Bahrain also provided basing and other support for US operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Likewise, the US positions a few air protection frameworks in the nation,
which additionally works as the base for the Integrated Missile Defense Center. The United
States prepares substantial quantities of Emiratis and other Gulf understudies in the UAE, and
there is an extensive push to create and bolster the nation's flying corps. In the 1990s, the
United States conveyed a huge number of troops to Saudi Arabia, essentially to guard the
area against Iraq, however pulled back in 2003 after the fall of Saddam Hussein.

States in the Middle East additionally fill in as significant buyers of US military hardware. In
2011 Saudi Arabia consented to buy more than eighty F-15SA warrior flying machine and
redesign its current armada of seventy F-15s, alongside aerial and air-to-ground bundles. The
$29.4 billion deal was the biggest of its kind to a solitary beneficiary. As of late the UAE,
however far littler than Saudi Arabia, consented to buy more than ten billion dollars of US
gear, including up to 80 F-16s.

The United States additionally appreciates significant exchange associations with a few
Middle Eastern states, however these are typically overshadowed by US exchange association
with more progressed industrialized economies in Europe and Asia. In 2012 (the most recent

3
Joshua Stewart and Sam Fellman. “Pentagon: US Navy Carrier Fleet Cut to One in Gulf.” Defense News,
February 6, 2013
4
Thom Shanker “Floating Base Gives US New Footing in the Persian Gulf,” New York Times, July 11, 2012
5
“Bahrain: Reform, Security, and US Policy.” “US Relations with Bahrain.” Fact Sheet, Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs, January 13, 2012

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year for which information is accessible), the United States sent out very nearly a quarter
century dollars of merchandise to the UAE and a quarter century dollars to Saudi Arabia. The
United States imported right around fifty-six billion dollars in merchandise, essentially
petroleum, from Saudi Arabia and billions more from other Gulf States (the figure changes
significantly relying upon the cost of oil). Israel traded more than twentyseven billion dollars
to the United States.

POSITED US INTERESTS TO THE REGION

US leaders have declared a range of vital (and not-so-vital) American interests in the Middle
East. These have varied by administration and historical era, but they have long included
ensuring the free flow of oil and maintaining Israel’s security. The United States has also
expressed a strong desire to prevent further nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, and since
9/11, placed particular emphasis on counterterrorism. In addition, Washington has
demonstrated an episodic commitment to the spread of democracy in the region. This section
describes these interests, examines questions concerning their validity, and surveys potential
threats posed to them.

Oil
Ensuring the free flow of oil represents perhaps the most constant, and many would say the
most important, US interest in the Middle East. Since at least the 1970s, America’s key
strategic interests in the region have involved not only securing easy access for itself but also
guaranteeing an open and secure market for Japan and Europe. Middle East countries,
especially the states of the Persian Gulf, are key oil producers, exporting far more than they
consume. In 2015, Persian Gulf states produced almost thirty percent of total world oil
production, with the United States receiving roughly twenty-one percent of its imports from
the region in the first six months of 2015.6 Europe, China, and Japan all also depend on oil
imports for their energy needs. One common myth is that the country of origin of the oil is
what matters most. Iran has often been referred to as a major supplier of particular European
or Asian countries. In 2011, for example, Italy and Spain together imported over ten percent
of their oil from Iran.7 In reality, however, oil is a global market—who supplies whom at any
given moment matters far less than the overall supply and demand, which is what sets the
6
“Monthly Energy Review October 2015,” US Energy Information Administration, ; “2015 Crude Oil Imports
from Persian Gulf Highlights,” US Energy Information Administration
7
“Iran Oil Exports: Where Do They Go,” The Guardian, February 6, 2012

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overall price. Thus, Iran’s value to a particular economy depends largely on how much oil it
contributes to the global market. The stability or instability in a particular country
consequently matters equally for the whole world based on how much oil they use for their
overall economy. It is possible that the Gulf may, in the near future, play a lesser role not
only for US energy interests but also in world oil supplies.

The Potential US Military Role

To protect against Iran or another hostile power, the United States requires military access to
a range of countries—to protect states from conventional attack and to deter Iran should it go
nuclear. To react immediately, the United States would need a presence in the Persian Gulf
comparable to what it has today. To be able to react relatively quickly, the United States
would need basing and access privileges and prepositioning, enabling a rapid deployment in
the event of a crisis. Given internal instability and the vagaries of local politics, Washington
also values diverse basing, allowing it to pick and choose as necessary ensure backups should
a regime turn against the United States. This basing and access is also important for
contingencies outside the region. For example, bases in the Middle East provide partial
support to the campaign in Afghanistan. Similarly, America’s ability to strike at the Islamic
State depends on ongoing access to regional bases and a continued naval presence in the
region. Defeating or downgrading IS does not require a heavy US combat presence, however.
Rather, the US should encourage, empower, and equip regional partners to confront and
destroy the organization and restore the territorial integrity of Iraq and Syria. This may
require limited numbers of trainers and special operations forces, but not large numbers of
conventional combat troops. Alliances between the United States and countries in the region
also enhance deterrence. Many US allies, particularly the smaller states of the Persian Gulf,
but also Jordan and even Saudi Arabia, have weak conventional military forces. 8 An alliance
with the United States enables them to resist pressure from hostile neighbors while
simultaneously providing protection from outright invasion. So should Iran threaten the Gulf
states with military force or increased subversion, the presence of American troops is a
visible symbol that the United States will aid its allies in resisting Tehran. The United States
pays a price for its willingness to use its military to deter and repel regional aggressors in the
Middle East. Even putting aside the 2003 war in Iraq as a policy approach unlikely to be

8
The problem for many of these states is not just their small size but the overall skill levels of their militaries. In
many cases they possess state-of-the-art arsenals, and regional predators’ forces are weak, but US allies are
unable to leverage the systems they own.

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repeated, the human cost can be considerable. Limited US uses of force and deterrence
attempts may involve casualties comparable to the deterrence and coercion campaign of 1990
and 1991, after Iraq invaded Kuwait. Over 100 Americans died in combat in the 1991 Gulf
war, and almost 500 were wounded—small figures compared to previous and subsequent
wars, but nevertheless considerable given the limited long-term strategic results.9 The
financial costs are difficult to determine precisely, but are large by any measure. Much of the
size of the US military is determined by multiple contingencies as well as domestic concerns,
so part of the air, naval, and ground presence in the region would have been developed and
maintained for other reasons. Furthermore, the US role in the region increases the risk of
local “free riding” off the American security guarantee. The wealth of the Gulf states, and
even their purchase of massive stocks of the most advanced aircraft, has not directly
translated into military power. This weakness is due in part to the assumption that they can
rely on the United States as a security guarantor and thus do not need to take the politically
painful steps to dismiss incompetent generals, implement conscription or otherwise expand
their militaries and reduce coup-proofing measures to increase effectiveness.10

Deep anti-Americanism can weaken the stability of US allies in the region. The peacetime
US military presence remains unpopular, and was a source of controversy in Saudi religious
circles in the 1990s. The regional US military role is still a concern, though it represents a far
less emotive issue today as concerns like the Syrian civil war have risen to the fore. Even so,
however, radical groups, including those linked to al-Qa’ida but also those with Iranian
support, are quick to deride any form of cooperation with the United States as a sign of the
regime’s fundamental illegitimacy. In their eyes, US troops often represent the highest form
of betrayal. And, indeed, the US presence is a visible sign that US allies are not able to ensure
their own security, a potential humiliation. The most important current US military role is in
fighting the Islamic State. This involves a mix of forces to help arm and train local allies
combined with regular airstrikes against Islamic State forces and leaders. The United States
also helps manage the broader air campaign of its many allies, including both Arab and
European states.

9
“Why US Casualties Were Low,” USA Today, April 20, 2003.
10
Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East,” International Security, Vol. 24, no. 2 (Fall 1999), 131-165.

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IMPLICATIONS OF POLICIES
Despite the fact that perceiving that US impact in the Middle East is frequently, best case
scenario constrained, the above investigation recommends a few arrangement changes for the
United States. To start with, there is little requirement for a huge sending of US powers given
the ordinary shortcomings of potential foes yet the United States will need a huge air part and
some unique operations compels in the area to contradict the Islamic State. In the meantime,
keeping up a system of bases, prepositioned hardware, and get to assertions, both help with
US discouragement and in this manner make Iran more averse to undermine any arrangement
and empower the United States to send rapidly ought to prevention fizzle or ought to a
sudden possibility happen requiring the utilization of military resources from the area.
Likewise, Washington ought to keep on emphasizing upkeep and co-ordinations and in
addition arms deals, as these capacities give it extensive impact over united employments of
compel. The uplifting news is that without precedent for some years there gives off an
impression of being solid local support for US security nearness. On the off chance that
anything, numerous Gulf nations might want to see the US extend its military affirmations to
the locale. Washington ought to oppose the allurement to do a gigantic development, be that
as it may, and concentrate on the more constrained capacities important to battle the Islamic
State and other prompt dangers. Rather, the US ought to use its current commitments to
guarantee our partners are pulling their own particular weight. Second, an in the background
approach speaks to the most profitable strategy for securing the greater part of US interests.
Basing and get to understandings, as opposed to troop organizations, can be low-profile.
Counterterrorism collaboration is both stealthy and does not include a huge US impression.
Given the disagreeability of the United States, majority rule government advancement is
additionally best done off camera. A position of safety on democratization is worthwhile as it
diminishes the danger of a US-Saudi break on this issue. Moreover, a higher profile has not
demonstrated to essentially help expert majority rule compels in the district. Definitely, the
United States will be accursed for not forcefully supporting majority rule government, but
rather given that doing as such would most likely have little effect and may be
counterproductive both for the collusion as a rule and for democratization itself, it is best to
blunder in favor of alert. Third, reenergizing the Middle East peace handle speaks to
fundamental stride both for Israel's security and for US interests. Counterterrorism and
general collaboration with the United States both are influenced contrarily by the proceeded
with territorial and overall antagonistic vibe toward Israel. This threatening vibe would not

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vanish with a Palestinian state, but rather it would be decreased. For Israel's purpose, weight
that could lead it to wind up distinctly an outsider would lessen, as would the expenses and
dangers natural in its continuous control of the Palestinian domains. Fourth, to additionally
decrease the peril from remote warriors going to Syria, a few stages are fundamental past
battling the Islamic State. These incorporate expanding group engagement endeavors to
prevent potential contenders from going to Syria; working more with Turkey to upset travel
courses; enhancing de-radicalization projects to "turn" returning warriors into insight sources
or make them more averse to take part in viciousness; and maintaining a strategic distance
from cover indictment endeavors.

Most critical, security administrations must be appropriately resourced and sorted out to deal
with the potential peril. Moreover, the United States must perceive that its general capacity to
impact a few dangers to its interests stays restricted. A hefty portion of the perils to the area
are not manageable to the best instrument of US impact—overpowering ordinary compel—
and some include complex political flow that will frequently challenge weight from
Washington. Specifically, a few states in the area are currently or at danger of being fizzled
states. Given solid hostile to US supposition and frequently restricted interests, Washington
can do little to adjust this circumstance; however it can get ready for the result. Washington
ought to plan for a time of delayed insecurity, alongside the likelihood that the inevitable
victors may demonstrate antagonistic to US interests. Such a methodology is not just
reasonable and insightful, it is maintainable. In a period of compelled assets, the assignment
for America's pioneers is to create a national security procedure that will ensure US interests
in the Middle East while being reasonable in the long haul. Given the complexities of the
district, the potential for the Middle East to suck in further American military strengths and
assets will dependably be there. An economical national security will be one that watchmen
against this ever-introduce threat while as yet ensuring US interests. Part of having a feasible
national security implies abridging inadequate or less essential commitments as well as
getting our partners to accomplish more. Uplifted uncertainty among the Gulf States coming
from Iran's developing impact and the ascent of the Islamic State mean the US may, in any
event for the time being, end up in the uncommon position of turning down solicitations from
provincial partners to expand its security impression in the locale.

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CONCLUSION

The potency of the United States as a catalyst for peace in the Middle East, however, can be

disputed.  Certainly the obstacle thwarting the United States gospel of peace is the insecurity

of the Middle Eastern countries to trust the U.S., and each other.  According to Richard Burt,

"Only when local states feel confident of U.S. reliability and secure against Soviet threats,

will they be willing to take necessary risks for peace"(Wells, 7).  President Reagan sought to

form consensus with certain countries including Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and

Israel.  Unfortunately, however, this becomes an unlikely venture for Arab countries because

of the longstanding U.S. support for Israel.  Arab nations have viewed the United States only

as an "accomplice"(Security 7) to Israel in its political decisions.  The Arab perception that

Israel could lobby tremendous U.S. military and economic support agitates these countries

even more and assuredly weakens the United States role as a mediator / policy implementer.

The US still had certainly made progress in the advancement of the Arab-Israeli peace

process; however, no major investment was made to amend the lurking strife in the Gulf
Region.  Many historians condemn the lack of U.S. strategy and action to maintain peace in

this unstable region.  The United States devoted most of the foreign policy effort to

establishing peace between Israel and its adversaries instead.  It appears, however, that not

much could have been done in order salvage the reckless Gulf region.  This demonstrates the

fact that long-term interests of the United States are threatened just as much by Soviet

aggression into the Middle East as local rulers who only represent their class interests and

present "United States as an accomplice in oppressive internal policies"(Wells, 9).  Such is

the situation that developed in the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Persian Gulf War.

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What the United States, and the world community, should be working toward is a
peaceful region united for the common purpose of economic prosperity.  The countries of
the Middle East are rich with resources.  The money earned from oil is tremendous.  If the
region were able to stabilize politically and militaristically, the region would
boom.  However, this concept often eludes the leaders who are too busy trying to plot the
demise of their neighbors.  If they simply realized that all would gain from peace, there is
no telling how much the countries could prosper.  Once the United States could create a
stable environment it would be able to offer suggestions of how to capitalize on their
missed opportunities.  This however, it’s easier said than done since the United States
presence is not always welcomed with open arms and many of the countries in the region
cannot see eye to eye on anything.  Yet it still does give something to work toward.  What
the U.S. should work toward then is to let the region prosper on its own without political
interference and a minimal military presence.  The country cannot and does not want to
remain a police force in the region.  It costs too much and puts lives at risk.

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