Presidential Commission on Good Government vs Sandiganabyan 455 SCRA 526

FACTS:
 Atty. Estelito Mendoza was the Solicitor General until 1986.
 Afterwards, Mendoza resumed his private practice of law. He appeared as
counsel for Lucio C. Tan, et. al. before the Sandiganbayan involving civil cases of
sequestration of properties allegedly ill-gotten wealth.
 When he was still SolGen, he advised the Central Bank on how to proceed with
the liquidation of General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK).
 GENBANK was later bought by the ALLIED Bank owned by Lucio Tan, et. al.
 In other words, Mendoza then defended the interest of the government thru the
Central Bank and Lucio Tan at the present case.
 PCGG filed a Motion to Disqualify Atty. Mendoza citing:
o Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in the said service

ISSUE: W/N Atty. Mendoza should be disqualified/inhibited to appear as counsel for

Lucio Tan under Rule 6.03

RULING:
No, Atty. Mendoza is not disqualified. Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility retained the general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase 'investigated and passed
upon with the word 'intervened. It is, therefore, properly applicable to both 'adverse-
interest conflicts' and 'congruent-interest conflicts.
In the case at bar, it does not involve the 'adverse interest aspect of Rule
6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he
acted as Solicitor General in the case involving GENBANK and later as counsel of
respondents Tan, et al. who bought GENBANK in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil Case
Nos. 0096-0099 before the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue of
whether there exists a 'congruent-interest conflict sufficient to disqualify respondent
Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, et al.
The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of
'matter referred to in the rule and, second, the metes and bounds of the
'intervention made by the former government lawyer on the 'matter. 
Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the 'matter which was the subject of
intervention by respondent Mendoza while he was the Solicitor General. Mendoza was
then advising the liquidation. The Court ruled that this advice given by respondent
Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the 'matter contemplated by
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is
clear as daylight in stressing that the 'drafting, enforcing or interpreting government
or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts
which do not fall within the scope of the term 'matter and cannot disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act
of respondent Mendoza falls within the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No.
342. Be that as it may, the said act of respondent Mendoza which is the 'matter involved
in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely different from the 'matter involved in Civil Case No.
0096. Again, the plain facts speak for themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza
had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also
given that he did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The 'matter
where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on
the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the
necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The
subject 'matter of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to
but is different from the subject 'matter in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096
involves the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied
Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. 
Lastly, the Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a
truncated reading of the rule on the official independence of lawyers in the
government service. According to Prof. Morgan: 'An individual who has the security of
knowing he or she can find private employment upon leaving the government is free to
work vigorously, challenge official positions when he or she believes them to be in error,
and resist illegal demands by superiors. An employee who lacks this assurance of
private employment does not enjoy such freedom. He adds: 'Any system that affects the
right to take a new job affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit on the ability to
quit inhibits official independence. The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor
General, the office once occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed
that the position of Solicitor General should be endowed with a great degree of
independence. It is this independence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend
acquittal of the innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to refuse to
defend officials who violate the trust of their office. Any undue dimunition of the
independence of the Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.