b) Attorney-Client Privilege
919
(1) BARTON v LEYTE ASPHALT & MINERAL OIL
CO., 46 PHIL. 938 (1924)
BAR QUESTION: When a letter subject of a
specific performance was offered in evidence by
the attorney for his client B, the counsel for A
announced that he had no objection to the
introduction of this carbon copy in evidence if
counsel for B would explain where this copy
was secured. B informed the court that he
received the letter from his former attorneys
without explanation of the manner in which the
document had come into their possession. A’s
lawyer then made an announcement that
unless his counsel explained how the letter
came to the B’s possession, he proposed to
object the letter’s admission on the ground that
it was a confidential communication between
client and lawyer. The trial judge excluded the
letter. Should the letter be excluded?
ANSWER: NO. When papers are offered in
evidence a court will take no notice of how they
were obtained, whether legally or illegally,
properly or improperly; nor will it form a
collateral issue to try that question. Even
supposing that the letter was within the
privilege which protects communications
between attorney and client, this privilege was
lost when the letter came to the hands of the
adverse party and it makes no difference how
the defense acquired possession. The law
protects the client from the effect of disclosures
made by him to his attorney in the confidence
of the legal relation, but when such a
document, containing admissions of the client,
comes to the hand of a third party, and reaches
the adversary, it is admissible in evidence.
(2) ORIENT INSURANCE v REVILLA, 54 PHIL.
(1930)
BAR Q: In an action by ABC against XYZ, the
latter then required the former to produce the
letter subject of said action, however, the ABC
offered as evidence only a part of the letter
which is relevant to the urging of the complaint
and argued that other than that cannot be
presented as they are privileged in nature
between attorneys and their clients. XYZ
requested that the entire document should be
exhibited, in conformity with the rule that when
part of a document is offered in evidence, it
waives the privilege and the entire document
must be presented. May the request of XYZ be
granted?
ANSWER: YES. Jurisprudence provides that the
introduction in evidence of part of a paper
writing by one party waives privilege as to other
parts of the same writing. Here, ABC already
offered a part of the letter as evidence, this
constitutes a waiver. XYZ is entitled to use other
parts of the same writing so far as relevant to
the issues in the case. Hence, its request may be
granted.
(3) UPJOHN COMPANY v U.S., 449 U.S. 383
(1981)
BAR Q: U Co.’s counsel sent a questionnaire to
all foreign managers seeking detailed
information concerning such the questionable
payments subject of a case to certain foreign
government officials. Based on a report
voluntarily submitted by U Co. disclosing the
questionable payments, the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) began an investigation to
determine the tax consequences of such
payments and issued a summons demanding
production of the questionnaires and the
memoranda and notes of the interviews. U Co.
refused to produce the documents on the
grounds that they were protected from
disclosure by the attorney-client. Are the
questionnaires covered by attorney-client
privilege?
ANSWER: YES. The communications by U Co.’s
employees to counsel are covered by the
attorney-client privilege insofar as the
responses to the questionnaires and any notes
reflecting responses to interview questions are
concerned. The notes and memoranda sought
by the Government constitute work product
based on oral statements. If they reveal
communications, they are protected by the
attorney-client privilege. To the extent they do
not reveal communications they reveal
attorneys' mental processes in evaluating the
communications.
(4) PEOPLE v SANDIGANBAYAN, 275 SCRA 505
(1997)
BAR Q: Atty X has been Y’s counsel for the
latter’s previous criminal charges. Another case
was filed for falsification of judicial records Y. It
was then that X offered to testify as a state
witness against his client Y, claiming that the
latter contrived and induced him to have the
graft case dismissed on the ground of double
jeopardy by having him and X prepare and
falsify the subject documents. But the
Sandiganbayan denied the motion on the
ground of attorney-client privilege. Is
Sandiganbayan correct?
ANSWER: NO. The privilege applies only if the
information was relayed by the client to the
lawyer respecting a past crime. The reckoning
point is when the communication was given,
not when the lawyer was made to testify. The
attorney-client privilege cannot apply in these
cases as the facts thereof and the actuations of
both respondents therein constitute an
exception to the rule.
(5) MERCADO v VITRIOLO, 459 SCRA 1 (2005)
BAR Q: X filed a disbarment case against Atty. Y
for maliciously instituting a case for falsification
of public document against her based on
confidential information gained from their
attorney-client relationship. X alleged that said
criminal complaint disclosed confidential
information relating to the dismissal of the
annulment case filed by X’s husband. Atty. Y
maintained that the 2 certificates of live birth
are public documents in no way connected with
the confidence taken during his engagement as
counsel. Did Atty. Y violate the rule on attorney-
client privilege communication?
ANSWER: NO. On the rule on attorney-client
privilege, the factors essential to establish the
existence of the privilege: (1) There exists an
attorney-client relationship, or a prospective
attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason
of this relationship that the client made the
communication; (2) The client made the
communication in confidence; and (3) The legal
advice must be sought from the attorney in his
professional capacity. Here, X failed to attend
and testify in the hearings at the IBP as to the
specific confidential information allegedly
divulged by Atty. Y without her consent. The
mere relation of attorney and client does not
raise a presumption of confidentiality. The
burden of proving that the privilege applies is
placed upon the party asserting the privilege.
(6) REGALA v SANDIGANBAYAN, 262 SCRA 124
(1996)
BAR Q: PCGG filed a case against A, B and firm C
for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth. D, a lawyer
from firm C, was excluded on the condition that
he will disclose the identity of the principals.
Other lawyers from firm C requested PCGG to
grant them the same treatment. But the
lawyers from firm C will not disclose the identity
of their clients. Is this covered by the lawyer-
client confidentiality privilege?
ANSWER: YES. As a general rule a client's
identity is should not be shrouded in mystery
but there are exceptions which include the
following: 1. Client identity is privileged where a
strong probability exists that revealing the
client’s name would implicate that client in the
very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s
advice. 2. Where disclosure would open the
client to civil liability, his identity is privileged. 3.
The content of any client communication to a
lawyer lies within the privilege if it is relevant to
the subject matter of the legal problem on
which the client seeks legal assistance. The
present case falls under the first and third
exceptions.
c) Physician - Patient Privilege
(1) LIM v COURT OF APPEALS, 214 SCRA 273
(1992)
BAR Q: H filed an annulment case against W
alleging that W is suffering from a mental illness
called schizophrenia “before, during and after
the marriage and until the present.” During
trial, H’s counsel requested Dr. A’s testimony as
expert witness. W’s counsel objected on the
ground that the testimony sought to be elicited
from the witness is privileged since the latter
had examined the W in a professional capacity
and had diagnosed her to be suffering from
schizophrenia. Can Dr. A testify?
ANSWER: YES. In order that the privilege may
be successfully claimed, the following requisites
must concur: 1.The privilege is claimed in a civil
case; 2.The person against whom the privilege
is claimed is one duly authorized to practice
medicine, surgery or obstetrics; 3.Such person
acquired the information while he was
attending to the patient in his professional
capacity; 4.The information was necessary to
enable him to act in that capacity; and 5.The
information was confidential, and, if disclosed,
would blacken the reputation of the patient. In
this case, Dr. A was presented and qualified as
an expert witness in a civil case. Her expert
opinion excluded whatever information or
knowledge she had about W which was
acquired by reason of the physician-patient
relationship existing between them. As an
expert witness, her testimony cannot then be
excluded. Thus, Dr. A can testify.
d) Priest/Minister - Penitent Privilege
e) State Secrets
(1) BANCO FILIPINO v MONETARY BOARD, 142
SCRA 523 (1986)
BAR Q: The Monetary Board (MB) closed down
BF Bank (BF). BF petitioned for the production
of documents and tapes supposedly necessary
for the preparation of BF’s case, but MB did not
want to give BF copies of these documents.
Among BF’s allegations was that the Central
Bank governor had some shady dealings and
decisions, that’s why they say the MB is trying
to suppress the production of these documents.
MB on the other hand invoked Secs. 13 and 15
of the Central Bank Act that holds liable
members of the MB who discloses information
of a confidential nature about the discussion or
resolutions of the MB. They also invoked Rule
130, Sec. 24 (e): A public officer cannot be
examined during his term of office or
afterwards, as to communications made to him
in official confidence, when the court finds that
the public interest would suffer by disclosure.
Also, MB claimed that the "public interest"
requirement for non-disclosure is evident from
the fact that the statutes punish any disclosure
of such deliberations. Can the MB hide behind
the privileged communication rule?
ANSWER: NO. Under Rule 130, Sec. 24(e), the
privilege communication rule is intended not for
the protection of public officers but for the
protection of public interest. Where there is no
public interest that would be prejudiced, this
invoked rule will not be applicable. In the case
at bar, MB was not able to establish that public
interest would suffer by the disclosure of the
papers and documents sought by BF. Neither
will it trigger any bank run nor compromise
state secrets. Therefore, MB cannot hide behind
the privileged communication rule.
2) SENATE v ERMITA, 488 SCRA 1 (2006)
BAR Q: The Senate Committee sent a letter to
the Executive Department Heads and AFP heads
to appear before the Senate. Later on, EO 464
was enacted and it provides that the various
Executive Dept. Heads and AFP personnels
cannot appear before any hearing without
consent of the President. A, now invoke EO 464,
stating that he cannot appear in the Senate by
virtue of EO 464. Was A covered by executive
privilege?
ANSWER: NO. EO 464 provides that an AFP
personnel or Executive Dept. Head may not
appear in the Senate provided that there is a
reason for the non-appearance. In this case,
mere invocation of EO 464 does not suffice,
there must be a legitimate reason not the heed
the call of the Senate.
f) Parental and Filial Privilege (§25, Rule 130)
(a) Art. 215, Civil Code
(1) PEOPLE v INVENCION, 398 SCRA 592 (2003)
BAR Q: X was charged with rape before the RTC
of Tarlac for allegedly raping his 16-year-old
daughter Y. Prosecution presented several
witnesses among whom is Z, half-brother of Y
and son of X. Z testified that, before the end of
the school year in 1996, while he was sleeping
in one room with his father X, sister Y, and two
other younger brothers, he was awakened by
Y’s loud cries. Looking towards her, he saw his
father on top of Y, doing a pumping motion.
After about two minutes, his father put on his
short pants. X attacks the competency and
credibility of Z as a witness. He argues that Z, as
his son, should have been disqualified as a
witness against him. Is Z disqualified from
testifying against his father?
ANSWER.: NO. Jurisprudence provides that in
Section 25, Rule 130 the rule on filial privilege,
this rule is not strictly a rule on disqualification
because a descendant is not incompetent or
disqualified to testify against an ascendant. The
rule refers to a privilege not to testify, which
can be invoked or waived like other privileges.
In this case, Z was not compelled to testify
against his father; he chose to waive that filial
privilege when he voluntarily testified against X.
Z declared that he was testifying as a witness
against his father of his own accord and only to
tell the truth.
g) Newsman’s Privilege
 (1) IN THE MATTER OF FARBER, 394 A.2D 330
(1978)
BAR Q: A was a reporter for the New York
Times. A’s investigation into the criminal activity
of B contributed to B’s prosecution and
subsequent trial for murder. The court in the
murder trial ordered A to produce materials
compiled in his investigation into B. A declined
to produce his investigative materials and was
charged with contempt of court. A was found
guilty of contempt, sentenced to jail, and
appealed. Did the court err in finding A guilty of
contempt?
ANSWER: No, the court did not err because the
state constitutional guarantee of a criminal
defendant's right to confront witnesses
prevailed over the state statute granting
privilege to newspersons regarding their
sources of confidential information. There is no
present authority in this Court either that
newsmen are constitutionally privileged to
withhold duly subpoenaed documents material
to the prosecution or defense of a criminal case
or that a defendant seeking the subpoena must
show extraordinary circumstances before
enforcement against newsmen will be had.
h) Trade Secrets
1) AIR PHIL CORP. v PENNSWELL, INC. (13
DECEMBER 2007)
BAR Q: A filed a petition to compel P to disclose
the chemical components and ingredients of
products (lubricants) bought by the former from
the latter. The problem rooted when Air Ph.
discovered (allegedly) that some of the
lubricants it brought from P were identical in
composition and constitution (antifriction
lubricants) - although they have different
names. Because of the alleged discovery, A.
refused payment of the said products. P
thereafter filed a complaint for collection of
money. Now, A is asking the court to compel
the P to provide the chemical components and
ingredients for comparison, to determine
whether fraud was committed by the
respondent. Is correct to compel P to disclose
the chemical components of the lubricants it
bought from the latter?
ANSWER: NO, the chemical compounds sought
after are considered as confidential. Trade
secrets may not be the subject of compulsory
disclosure. By reason of [their] confidential and
privileged character, ingredients or chemical
components of the products ordered by this
Court to be disclosed constitute trade secrets
lest [herein respondent] would eventually be
exposed to unwarranted business competition
with others who may imitate and market the
same kinds of products in violation of
[respondents] proprietary rights. Being
privileged, the detailed list of ingredients or
chemical components may not be the subject of
mode of discovery under Rule 27, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court, which expressly makes
privileged information an exception from its
coverage.
PART TWO
I. Admissions and Confessions
A. Admissions Against Interest a) §§26 and 32,
Rule 130 b) §13, Rule 132
(1) People v. Paragsa, 84 SCRA 105 (1978)
BAR Q: In a rape case by M against B, the latter
claims he and M were sweethearts; that on the
day of the incident, it was M who invited him to
the latter's house where they had sexual
intercourse and it was consensual. These
statements were substantially corroborated by
two witnesses. However, M did not bother to
rebut the testimony of B and his witnesses to
the effect that the accused and M were actually
sweethearts; and that they had had two
previous sexual communications. Whether guilt
beyond reasonable doubt was established to
warrant the conviction of the accused?
ANSWER: NO. The rule allowing silence of a
person to be taken as an implied admission of
the truth of statements uttered in his presence
is applicable in criminal cases. But before the
silence of a party can be taken as an admission
of what is said, it must appear: (1) that he heard
and understood the statement; (2) that he was
at liberty to interpose a denial; (3) that the
statement was in respect to some matter
affecting his rights or in which he was then
interested, and calling, naturally, for an answer;
(4) that the facts were within his knowledge;
and (5) that the fact admitted or the inference
to be drawn from his silence would be material
to the issue. all the requisites of admission by
silence all obtain in the present case. The
silence of M on the facts asserted by the
accused and his witnesses may be safely
construed as an admission of the truth of such
assertion. Therefore, the accused shall be
acquitted.
(2) RUFINA PATIS FACTORY v ALUSITAIN, 434
SCRA 491 (2004) BAR Q: In a labor case, thr
NLRC decided in favour of A, giving weight to
A’s sworn statement that he actually retired in
1995, and that the documents were so he could
receive the benefits from SSS. The NLRC also
took into account his daughter’s sworn
statement corroborating the same. R Factory
contends that the separation letter was not
given weight and affidavit of separation made
by A, choosing instead to give credence to A’s
self-serving statement and the daughter’s
corroboration. Is R Factory correct?
ANSWER: YES. An admission against interest is
the best evidence which affords the greatest
certainty of the facts in dispute, since it’s based
on the presumption that no man would declare
anything against himself unless such declaration
was true. The disserving quality of the
admission is judged as of the time it is used or
offered in evidence and not when such
admission is made. While it may be refuted, if
the admission is a notarial document, it may
only be refuted by evidence that is clear,
convincing, and more than merely
preponderant. In this case, since A had indeed
voluntarily executed the separation letter and
affidavit of separation from employment, A
must have presented clear, convincing evidence
against the same, and not just a subsequent
notarial document refuting it. Since he failed to
do so, the two documents must be given more
weight.
(3) Estate of Jesus S. Yujuico v Republic, G.R.
No. 168661, October 26, 2007
BAR Q: OSG filed a case for reversion against X
and Y, alleging that the and registered in the
name of Y which was later on sold to X, was still
a portion of Manila Bay as evidenced by Namria
Hydrographic Map as surveyed by Engineer H.
The allegations were based on the statement of
M, who contacted their legal department, and
V, who issued the report stating that the land in
issue is part of Manila Bay. X and Y filed a
motion to dismiss which was granted by the
RTC. On appeal, Republic alleged that the trial
court erred in its decision that they have
evidence to that such parcel of land acquired by
X used to be foreshore and is part of Manila
Bay. In the CA, the parties were allowed to
present evidence. New officials of Bureau of
lands made 2 ocular inspections; surveyed the
land and later came up with a report that the
land purchased by X is solid and is not part of
Manila Bay. Do the findings of the new officials
of the bureau of lands eliminate the probability
of the evidence issued by the retired officers?
ANSWER: YES. Section 13 of Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court provides: Before a witness can be
impeached by evidence that he has made at
other times, statements inconsistent with his
present testimony, the statements must be
related to him, with the circumstances of the
times and places and the persons present, and
he must be asked whether he made such
statements and if so, allowed to explain them. If
the statements be in writing, they must be
shown to the witness before any question is put
to him concerning them. In the case at bar, the
statements given by the previous and present
officers of the Bureau of lands are
contradictory, however, the Republic was not
able to present M and V as their witness since
both already retired. Assuming arguendo that
M and V were available to testify, the
projections made on the cadastral map will not
prevail to the results of the two ocular
inspections made by the new officers of the
Bureau of Lands.
B. Compromises
a) §1(f), Rule 116
b) §§1-2, Rule 118
c) §27, Rule 130
(1) VARADERO v INSULAR LUMBER, 46 PHIL.
176 )1924)
BAR Q: X had a lighter which was to be repaired
by Y, pursuant to no express agreement, but
with the implicit understanding that the price
would be as low as, or lower than, could be,
secured from any other company. When repairs
were completed and Y gave X the bill, the latter
refused to pay because it was of the opinion
that the price was grossly exorbitant. X offered
a compromise, but they disagreed. In the
course of the negotiations before the court, the
X expressed a willingness to pay Y. Ultimately,
they never settled on an agreed figure. The RTC
adopted X’s proposal. Is the offer of
compromise excluded?
ANSWER: NO. The general rule is an offer of
compromise in a civil case is not an admission of
liability. It is not admissible in evidence against
the offeror. To determine the admissibility or
non-admissibility of an offer to compromise,
the circumstances of the case and the intent of
the party making the offer should be
considered. Thus, if a party denies the existence
of a debt but offers to pay the same for the
purpose of buying peace and avoiding litigation,
the offer of settlement is inadmissible. If in the
course thereof, the party making the offer
admits the existence of an indebtedness
combined with a proposal to settle the claim
amicably, then, the admission is admissible to
prove such indebtedness. In this case the Court
applied the exception to the general rule there
was neither an expressed nor implied denial of
liability, but during the course of the abortive
negotiations therein, the defendant expressed a
willingness to pay the plaintiff. Finding that
there was no denial of liability, and considering
that the only question discussed was the
amount to be paid, the Court did not apply the
rule of exclusion of compromise negotiations.
(2) PEOPLE v LAMBID, 412 SCRA 417 (2003)
BAR Q: X was criminally charged for rape. Upon
his arraignment, X pleaded not guilty. A review
of the transcript of stenographic notes taken
 during X’s direct and cross examinations shows
that he never disowned the acts imputed
against him. X merely claimed that he was
drunk and he asked for forgiveness from the
victim, if he had really raped her. Is X’s plea for
forgiveness considered an admission of guilt?
ANSWER: Yes. Jurisprudence provides that a
plea for forgiveness may be considered as
analogous to an attempt to compromise and an
offer of compromise by the accused may be
received in evidence as an implied admission of
guilt. Thus, by asking for forgiveness, X has
admitted his guilt.
(3) PEOPLE v GODOY, 250 SCRA 676 (1995)
BAR Q: Godoy was accused of the crimes of
rape and kidnapping with serious illegal
detention. The private complainant Mia
allegedly said that her teacher Godoy by means
of force, threat and intimidation, by using a
knife and by means of deceit, have carnal
knowledge with her and kidnapped or detained
her. Godoy`s main defense was the sweetheart
theory and the same was corroborated by the
testimonies of the defense witnesses. Godoy`s
mother, absence his knowledge and presence,
offered a compromise. Is the compromise
admissible in evidence against the accused?
ANSWER: NO. In criminal cases, an offer of
compromise is generally admissible as evidence
against the party making it. However, it has
been held that where the accused was not
present at the time the offer for monetary
consideration was made, such offer of
compromise would not save the day for the
prosecution. In another case, this Court ruled
that no implied admission can be drawn from
the efforts to arrive at a settlement outside the
court, where the accused did not take part in
any of the negotiations and the effort to settle
the case was in accordance with the established
tribal customs.
C. Res Inter Alios Acta (§§28 and 34, Rule 130)
(1) PEOPLE v GAUDIA, 423 SCRA 520 (2004)
BAR Q: G was accused of raping R, a minor. A,
R’s mother was presented the primary witness.
A found R in the mango trees, naked and with
fresh and dried blood on her body. One
neighbor saw G pass by their house and took R.
G interposed an alibi claiming that he was with
T to register at the Comelec and gathered tuba.
He also claimed that the child he was carrying
was D and not A. RTC found G guilty. Did the
RTC erred in convicting G?
ANSWER: NO. G was convicted with simple
rape. Under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised
Rules of Court, conviction may be based on
circumstantial evidence provided three
requisites concur: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. The ruling case law is that for
circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to
support a conviction, all circumstances must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the
same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that
he is innocent and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt. In this case, the
circumstances are listed by the SC. The
circumstances prove the culpability of G with
moral certainty. The circumstances have been
indubitably proven, both by the testimonial and
documentary evidence presented by the
prosecution, and by the inability of the
appellant to discredit their veracity.
a) Admissions by a co-partner or agent
i. §29, Rule 130 ii. §23, Rule 138
(1) ACENAS v SISON, 8 SCRA 711 (1963)
BAR Q: Mrs. S executed a promissory note,
promising to pay Mrs. A. Mrs. S was able to pay
up to several months only. Upon her failure to
pay the balance of the note, she was sued and
Mr. S, was joined as a defendant. When this
case was called for hearing, counsel for Spouses
S moved for the postponement of the hearing
in view of the absence of his clients and that he
needs time within which to confer with them
for the purpose of amicably settling this case.
When the court indicated to Spouses S' counsel
that there seems to be no defense on the part
of Spouses S in this case, and that it would be
for the best interest of the latter if the case is
terminated by way of judgment on the
pleadings or confession of judgment, counsel
for Spouses S offered no objection and asked
that confession of judgment by Spouses S may
be entered in this case provided that the
corresponding writ of execution thereof should
not be issued until June 30, 1960, to which
counsel for Spouses A agreed. Was the laywer
authorized to confess judgment for Mr. S?’
ANSWER: NO. Section 21 of Rule 127 expressly
requires that attorneys have special authority
not only to receive anything in discharge of a
client's claim but the full amount in cash but
also to compromise their client's litigation. In
this case, it was error for the trial court to
accept the confession made by counsel without
ascertaining his authority to do so, at least with
respect to Mr. S. With respect to Mrs. S,
however, the judgment will be maintained,
there being no claim in this appeal that the
confession of judgment made in her behalf was
unauthorized. In fact, her liability is admitted
here.
b) Admission by conspirators (§30, Rule 130)
(1) PEOPLE v CABRERA, 57 SCRA 715 (1974)
BAR Q: X and Y are convicted of Robbery-Hold-
up with Homicide. X did not appeal. Only Y
appealed. X was arrested by the police. She
executed an extra-judicial confession. In the
said extra-judicial confession she pointed to
appellant Y as the mastermind of the robbery.
She merely hired the jeep upon instruction of
appellant but the robbery and the killing of the
deceased were done by appellant and his two
unidentified companions. The only evidence
that would support the judgment of conviction
of appellant Y was the extrajudicial confession
of his co-accused X. Is the rule on admission by
conspirator can be availed of?
ANSWER: NO. Admission by conspirator.— The
act or declaration of a conspirator relating to
the conspiracy and during its existence, may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator
after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration. In the case at bar,
there is no question that X's inculpatory
statements were made by her during the
investigation conducted by the Valenzuela
police on January 20, 1972, two days after the
date of the incident in question. For this reason
alone, that is, that said statement was not made
during the existence of the alleged conspiracy
between her and appellant, but after said
supposed conspiracy had already ceased and
when she was already in the hands of the
authorities, Section 27 of Rule 130 cannot be
availed of.
(2) ALVIZO v SANDIGANBAYAN, 406 SCRA 311
(2003)
BAR Q: During the trial, accused M (Region VII
Accountant) who signed all the fake LAAs and
SACDCs, and co-accused contractors/ suppliers
G and E who delivered the materials and
“prosecuted” the ghost projects, changed their
previous pleas of “not guilty” to “guilty” to the
crimes charged against them. According to A, et
al., the admission or confession of a party may
be presented as evidence only against himself
pursuant to Sec. 33 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court and under Sec. 26 of the same Rule; that,
therefore, admission of the pleas of guilty of M,
G and E against petitioners violated the hearsay
and res inter alios acta rules. Did the
Sandiganbayan violated the rule of res inter
alios acta?
ANSWER: NO. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court provides that the act or declaration of
a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence, may be given in evidence
against the coconspirator after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. In this case, G, M and E were
charged together with A, et al., for having acted
in conspiracy with one another to commit the
offenses. The pleas of guilty of some of the
accused are admissions of the truth of the
accusations that they committed acts of
falsifications done during the existence of the
conspiracy. However, it is submitted that said
pleas are nonetheless admissible against A, et
al., as co-conspirators because the pleas were
made in open court. In other words, they are
judicial confessions. The rule embodied in Sec.
30 that the declaration of a conspirator made
after the termination of the conspiracy is
inadmissible against his co-conspirator applies
only to an extra-judicial confession, and not to a
plea of guilty, which is a judicial confession.
(3) PREAGIDO, ET AL. v SANDIGANBAYAN, 476
SCRA 143 (2005)
BAR Q: A case of estafa through falsification of
public and commercial documents was filed
against AB. It was averred that ABC as public
officials who by reason of the duties of their
office, are accountable officers, and conspiring
and conniving among themselves, as well as
with their private party co-accused, after having
falsified or caused to have falsified Letters of
Advice of Allotment (LAA) which are all public
documents. Sandiganbayan convicted ABC on
the basis of conspiracy. AB averred, among
others, that assuming that there were
admissions from the other co-accused, the
alleged conspiracy must first be proven by
evidence other than the declaration of a co-
conspirator citing Section 27 of Rule 130, Rules
of Court. Is the contention correct?
ANSWER: NO. Section 27, Rule 130 provides
that “Admission by conspirator- The act or
declaration of a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence, may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator
after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration.” Such provision
applies only to extrajudicial acts or declarations
but not to testimony given on the witness stand
at the trial where the defendant has the
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.
c) Admission by privies (§31, Rule 130)
(1) CITY OF MANILA v DEL ROSARIO, 5 PHIL.
227 (1905)
BAR Q: The City of Manila sought to recover
possession of two lots. It appears that A
acquired the land from B and then sold it to his
brother C, the defendant in this case. However,
the City of Manila wanted to recover possession
of the lots and presented as one of its
witnesses, D, who testified that the land in
question was formerly included in the Gran
Divisoria, and that all the land included in it
belonged to the city. This particular testimony is
at variance with the testimonies of two other
witnesses E and F who testified that the land
belonged to the Central Government (not the
city). D’s testimony was based on what he had
learned from the oldest residents of that
section of the city and was introduced by the
City of Manila apparently for the purpose of
proving that the city was generally considered
the owner of the land drawing from this fact the
presumption of actual ownership. Was the
testimony of D admissible as proof of common
reputation, making it an exception against
hearsay?

ANSWER: NO. D's testimony was merely

hearsay. It consisted of what he had learned
from some of the oldest residents in that
section of the city. His testimony was
introduced by the plaintiff apparently for the
purpose of proving that the city was generally
considered the owner of the land, drawing from
this fact the presumption of actual ownership
under the Code of Civil Procedure. Such
testimony, however, does not constitute the
"common reputation" referred to in the section
mentioned. "Common reputation," as used in
that section, is equivalent to universal
reputation. The testimony of this witness is not
sufficient to establish the presumption referred
to.