The Intentional Character of Propositions and the Demise of Possibility

In this paper, I will argue that Plantinga’s use of certain concepts in his Two

Concepts of Modality is confused and leads him down a path that ultimately undermines

his project of modality. I begin with an examination of his defined use of the term

‘proposition’ and how this confusion leads to further mistakes. From this confused

notion, his further attempts to elucidate ‘possibility’ and ‘necessity’ take him farther

down the path of puzzlement. Then taking these concepts into possible worlds to explain

the properties of propositions is a mistake. I will appeal to Kripke’s idea of possible

worlds as a better alternative than Plantinga’s (as well as Lewis’). In conclusion, I will

look at a few alternatives to understanding the concept of ‘possibility’.

Propositions are the metaphysician’s friend. In the realm of analytic philosophy,

propositions share a sacred space somewhere between universals and axioms of logic.

Propositions are the building material or a major portion of what one uses in the

construction of metaphysical structures. A definition of “proposition” could be defined,

“…in modern logic as “what is asserted” when a sentence (an indicative, or declarative,

sentence) is used to say something true or false,…”1 As stated by Alvin Plantinga,

propositions are, “The things that are both true or false and capable of being believed or

disbelieved.”2 What “the things” are is open for debate, but as I understand Plantinga’s

position, propositions are either true or false; likewise, propositions can be believed or

disbelieved. David Lewis addresses the trouble with, “the things” propositions are, in the

following: “The conception we associate with the word ‘proposition’ may be something
1
Colwyn Williamson, “Proposition” in The Oxford Guide to Philosophy, edited by Ted Honderich,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 763.
2
Alvin Plantinga, “Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal Reductionism,” Philosophical
Perspectives, Vol. 1, Metaphysics (1987), 189-231, 190.

© Jeffrey W Roop 2010. All Rights Reserved. 1

of a jumble of conflicting desiderata.” [emphasis in the original]3 Per Lewis,

propositions are wanted and desired if one is going to pursue metaphysics. At best,

propositions seem to be some sort of statement that one uses in some sort of way as to be

either true or false. While metaphysicians argue over the meaning and properties of

propositions, Plantinga has put them to use in explaining the properties of possibility and

necessity in relation to propositions. It is in this additional understanding of propositions

as logical entities and therefore tense-less and unchanging that poses some potential

confusion for the concept of possibility. Likewise, I believe Plantinga is unfair in his

treatment of Lewis’ understanding of universals.

From the beginning of his article he makes some assumptions without laying

down any groundwork. He drops the terms ‘phenomena,’ ‘realism’ and ‘existentialism’

in ways that are not entirely lucid. He speaks of, “Necessary and contingent propositions,

objects with accidental and essential properties, possible worlds, individual essences—

these are the phenomena of modality.”[emphasis in the original]4 While I understand

that he is dealing with modal logic in particular why bring in phenomena? He clarifies

this in the footnote that this notion of phenomena is Platonic rather than Kantian in

nature.5 So without having to retrace the history of Western philosophy what does he

mean here? Since he is not taking the Kantian view I would understand this as something

not related to experience or perception of humans in the world. The Platonic view, as I

understand it, would allow for understanding of ‘the Forms’ in a way that does not

require any human perception. In one way, this could be akin to a posteriori and a priori

views of concepts. So with these concepts in a timeless and eternal state, much like the

3
David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, (New York: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1986), 54.
4
Plantinga, 1987, 189.
5
Ibid., 230.

© Jeffrey W Roop 2010. All Rights Reserved. 2

‘Forms’, this is Plantinga’s starting place for elucidating modality. He seems to pursue

the logic of these notions as they are in some sort of Platonic heaven. Whether or not

humans can know such concepts without any context one would need to expound in some

sort of epistemology. Therefore, I wonder if Plantinga is concerned with logic or

epistemology in this article from the start.

Likewise, he uses the term ‘realism’ in relation to both modality and existence.

As far as modal realism is concerned this view, “…has nothing to do with whether certain

sentences or propositions have truth values.”6 Nor does it have anything to do with the

possibility of theories being false. In contrast to this misunderstood view of modality, is

his view of existential realism. In his understanding, the existential realist holds “…that

there really are such things as universals…”7 It is in respect to both notions that

Plantinga will later criticize Lewis. Again, this does not clarify whether his usage is

taking a strict logical approach to realism and existence. While he disagrees with Lewis’

view on universals, it is not clear if he disagrees on logical or epistemic grounds. I would

think Plantinga would want to pursue the logic since he is placing ‘the phenomena of

modality’ in a Platonic realm. Be that as it may, without wandering off too far into the

metaphysical lands, let us turn to Plantinga’s understanding of the term ‘proposition.’

As Plantinga uses and explains the term, propositions reside in a logical space that

has no tensed statements. The formal language of such a space has neither a past tense

nor a future tense. I would like to call this logical space a priori land. In this logical

space, one must abide by the rules of propositional logic, which also has no sense of past

or present regarding logical statements. While Plantinga wants to examine concepts in

6
Ibid., 189.
7
Ibid.

© Jeffrey W Roop 2010. All Rights Reserved. 3

such a space, I believe he runs into problems from the beginning. I take these problems

to arise when he affirms that propositions have intentional character as he states in the

following:

It is the intentional character of propositions that is most fundamental and

important. Propositions are claims, or assertions; they attribute or
predicate properties to or of objects; they represent reality or some part of
it as having a certain character. A proposition is a sort of thing according
to which things are or stand a certain way.8

It is this affirmation and understanding of propositions that sends him down a path of

confusion as well as his unreasonable criticisms of Lewis regarding universals and

Lewis’ use of sets that leads to the demise of his paper.

If propositions are tenseless in use, how can these things also have any sort of

intentional character? When I think of intentions, I tend not to think of things but rather

of persons. People have an intentional character not propositions. One source states:

Intentionality is the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand

for, things, properties and states of affairs. The puzzles of intentionality lie
at the interface between the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of
language. The word itself, which is of medieval Scholastic origin, was
rehabilitated by Franz Brentano towards the end of the nineteenth century.
‘Intentionality’ is a philosopher's word. It derives from the Latin
word intentio, which in turn derives from the verb intendere, which means
being directed towards some goal or thing.9

Intentionality is like a mental directedness with a goal or thing in mind. If this is a

reliable definition, then how can a proposition have intentional character? A proposition

can be the object of one’s directedness of mind, but how does the proposition acquire

such a characteristic? I think a person gives such characteristics to propositions, not the

other way around. I believe this is a misstep on Plantinga’s part regarding propositions.

8
Ibid., 190.
9
Pierre Jacob, “Intentionality” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/

© Jeffrey W Roop 2010. All Rights Reserved. 4

Although Plantinga would surely say that God as a person can give that characteristic to

propositions, then a distinction would need to be made between God as person and God

as personal. Even when Scripture speaks of the “mind of Christ” or the purposes of God,

does this speak of the same kind of intentionality of human minds? I do not think the

classical theist would affirm that kind of similarity. God is beyond our complete

understanding; God is a very different reality. Maybe at this point Plantinga should

remain silent. However, Plantinga might retort, “What of the human nature of Jesus

Christ?”, could that intention of mind bring some redemption to propositions? Even here,

an epistemic issue arises and not a logical one. Depending on how one understands the

relation of the two natures in Christ, how this would bear on the rest of humanity would

depend on which aspect of the two natures grasped the fullness of these eternal

propositions.

As Plantinga understands these things, that is, propositions, as true or false,

believable or not, the issue also arises, as to whether or not it makes sense to talk about

statements without a context; especially statements that can be held, or better yet

believed, as true or false. At the end of the day, the issue the intentional character of

propositions has to deal with the problem of translation. In the various forms of logic, an

issue of translation always arises; the process of converting a statement from an ordinary

language into a formal language of logic is not perfect; the process leaves out much that

is meaningful. Even if one can overcome the translation issue, a certain disjunction

remains between (pure) logical propositions and propositions of language. Wittgenstein

speaks of a similar separation between logical propositions and the experience of

language. In the Tractatus, 6.1222 states the following:

© Jeffrey W Roop 2010. All Rights Reserved. 5

 This throws light on the question why logical propositions can no more be
empirically established than they can be empirically refuted. Not only
must a proposition of logic be incapable of being contradicted by any
possible experience, but it must also be incapable of being established by
any such.10

In this he speaks of the zero-method in logic, that like math, logic will equal out. Now if

Plantinga holds to a form of logical space similar to Wittgenstein, this would cause a

tremendous amount of problems for Plantinga’s overall metaphysical goal regarding

necessity and possibility at least in how it relates to the world. Likewise, this would be

problematic for his use of phenomena mentioned earlier.

Along with this misunderstood view of intentional character is how we give

something the characteristic of intentionality. What sense does it make, for me to say,

“My laptop computer has intentional character because my mind is directed toward it?”

How about this statement: “My cat, Sally, has intentional character because I am paying

attention to her.” The first statement seems rather silly. I can ascribe certain propositions

to my laptop but does that now mean that I have given the intentional character to my

laptop? Now if we consider the attribution of intentional character in the other direction,

this leads to further nonsense; the computer is not directed toward anything nor does it

have mental capacity. (I do not think we are yet at the place for portable artificial

intelligence.) The second statement could be more troublesome since Sally does have

some sort of activity going on in that smaller brain of hers. She does have a way of

getting my attention when she needs food or water by way of meowing or hopping on my

lap. Would one count this as intentional character? I tend to think not. Even, if it was a

lower level of intentionality, it certainly would not be related to ascribing intentional

character to propositions in the same way as a human would understand propositions.

10
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 2003).

© Jeffrey W Roop 2010. All Rights Reserved. 6

Likewise, any sort of intentionality she seems to have, limited as it is and even if you

wanted to call it that, would not be a result of me attributing it to her, it would be a

mental attitude she would already have. It almost seems as if Plantinga wants to grant

God magical (logical) powers to imbue logical propositions with intentional character

because God is thinking them or directs his mind toward them. Plantinga confuses the

notion of intentionality and by that confusion, intentional character as well.11 A statement

used in a particular way to attribute truth or falsity to something cannot have an

intentional character. It, by relation to a person with intentional character, can receive the

attention of that person, who then judges for truth or falsity. Applying intentional

character to something supposedly used in a logical space is a mistake.

A logical realm like a priori land has no context since it is, strictly speaking, a

space without time; eternal and unchanging. This entire enterprise takes logic as an

exercise that can occur on its own apart from any human thought (excepting the mind of

God).12 Ultimately Plantinga pushes the point, in a footnote no less, that these

propositions are intentional because of God as he states in footnote three: “According to

the classical theist, every proposition is in fact (and, indeed, necessarily) believed or

disbelieved—by God, who is a necessary being and essentially omniscient.” 13 Bringing

God into the picture happens to make matters worse. How is this God, necessary and

omniscient as He is, in this logical sense, in any way either related to a Christian

11
It would be interesting to hear how Plantinga would explain the intentionality of God in the phrase, “His
eye is on the sparrow.” Would it deal with propositions about the sparrow and God’s relation to it? Or
would it deal with God’s concern in knowing the intimate details of our life? It seems one of these
approaches is more appealing.
12
I know, I know, some people, classical Christian theologians in fact, take such an enterprise as an attempt
to “think the thoughts of God.” If one can understand the realm of propositions better, one can better
understand God. The question is, does God really care about propositions or the people wrangling with the
propositions? This may very well be the fundamental question that would require another paper (or book)
to deal with the response.
13
Plantinga, 1987, 226.

© Jeffrey W Roop 2010. All Rights Reserved. 7

conception of God or meaningful in such a way as to inspire worship? 14 This totally cuts

itself off from any context that would have a significant meaning for human life. If

classical theism holds forth such a view, then I will bid farewell and search for a better

option. Logic should help us to clarify concepts in the midst of human life, even in

religious life. Again, Wittgenstein states in 4.112 of the Tractatus:

The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts.

Philosophy is not a theory but an activity.
A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations.
The result of philosophy is not a number of “philosophical
propositions”, but to make propositions clear.
Philosophy should make clear and delimit sharply the thoughts
which otherwise are, as it were, opaque and blurred.

While I am sure that Plantinga is engaged in philosophy as an activity, whether or not he

is bringing clarity and elucidation is debatable.

So far, Plantinga’s clarification regarding propositions has yet to obtain. Maybe

he has not worked out all the possibilities. This seems likely since he further qualifies

what propositions are throughout the paper. 15 On one hand, the continual qualification of

the term is not without purpose. He is apparently trying to strengthen his case against

Lewis. Since he is qualifying a confused concept though, he is making the issue even

more muddled. On the other hand, this muddled and continually qualifying approach

seems to lead the notion of proposition to a death by a thousand qualifications. As it

stands, Plantinga has not drawn the line regarding propositions, as continual

qualifications will make any idea fuzzy. I would tend to think that such concepts would

14
Again, one could say that one derives the propositions regarding God from the Bible. This abstraction
process leaves out meaningful and crucial language regarding God and God’s relation to humanity. Again,
more papers, more books.
15
See pages 190, 191, 192, 194, 196, 198 in Plantinga, 1987, to see the full variety of the qualifications
placed on the notion of a proposition.

© Jeffrey W Roop 2010. All Rights Reserved. 8

have no place in the logical space that Plantinga so desires. A priori land has no place for

fuzzy, unkempt concepts; only professional, clean cut concepts need apply.

In spite of such a separation from the human context, Plantinga still insists on

continuing this contextless and tenseless enterprise by turning to the concepts of

possibility and necessity as properties. Plantinga considers necessity as a property of a

proposition.16 If one strictly uses these propositions in a logical realm, what connection

would a property have in relation to a proposition? I guess one could think of properties

as abstract entities that are bound to or inhere in an abstract object. Can one describe a

property of a proposition in such a tenseless and contextless way that it could have any

meaning in our world? I tend to think not. This raises an even greater assumption made

by Plantinga that leads further down the rabbit hole. This assumption ignores the fact

that language use among humanity has tenses and this seems to be the main way of

speaking about possibility in the actual world.

Plantinga wants to hold onto ‘broadly logical’ 17 understandings of possibility and

necessity. The entirety of modal logic rests on the notion that ‘things could have been

otherwise.’ Yet this statement is dripping with rich waters of tensed language so how

does one translate this into a tenseless statement? It seems one would be forced to stick

with the present tense in all situations but this would all but eliminate talk about

possibility. Possibility as a propositional property puts forth no position or meaning in

purely logical terms. This tenseless possibility seems to turn ordinary language use on its

head. When we speak of “what could have been” we tend to reflect on the past and

different decisions that one could have made, with some mixed variations between

16
Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1974), 9.
17
Ibid., 2.

© Jeffrey W Roop 2010. All Rights Reserved. 9

fondness and bitterness. Likewise, when we speak of “what could be” we tend to look

forward to the possible futures that we can shape by the choices made in the present.

With a tenseless conception of possibility, Plantinga carves out a large section of the very

concept strictly for use in a priori land. Nevertheless, his concern is with the logical

understanding of the concept. However, “Reason is a whore….”18

Now given that Plantinga has removed a large portion of the understanding of

possibility for his own purposes, he further complicates matters by taking this conception

and applying it to possible worlds. Possible worlds are the little darlings or maybe the

big darlings of metaphysicians depending on who is speaking regarding possible worlds.

Plantinga takes the big approach in allowing for an entire world as a possibility. To

quote Plantinga at length, consider the following:

…for every (possible) temporally invariant proposition or state of affairs

there is a possible world in which it is true or obtains. Further, there is one
possible world which includes every actual state of affairs; this is the
actual world, which I shall call ‘alpha’. Alpha alone is actual, although of
course all the worlds exist, and indeed actually exist. Still further, this
vast assemblage of worlds is complete and world invariant: each of the
worlds exists necessarily, and there could not have been a world distinct
fro each of the worlds that does in fact exist. (At any rate so I say; the
existentialist would disagree.) We can now make the traditional assertion
connecting truth in worlds with modality de dicto: a proposition is
necessarily true if and only if true in every possible world.19

So on Plantinga’s view, all the true propositions and states of affairs, if true in all possible

worlds, those propositions and states are necessarily true.

Lewis takes a different approach to possible worlds by considering both the small

possible world, limited to a particular entity and the large possible world, which

18
To paraphrase the Protestant Reformer, Martin Luther.
19
Plantinga, 1987, 193.

© Jeffrey W Roop 2010. All Rights Reserved. 10

encompasses an entire world much like Plantinga’s notion as well as everything in

between. Lewis elaborates on his notion of possible worlds in the following:

I advocate a thesis of plurality of worlds, or modal realism, which holds

that our world is but one world among many….Our world consists of us
and all our surroundings, however remote in time and space; just as it is
one big thing having lesser things as parts, so likewise do other worlds
have lesser otherworldly things as parts….There are ever so many ways
that a part could be; and so many and so varied are the other worlds that
absolutely every way that a part of the world could possibly be is a way
that some part of some world is.20

Lewis’ view allows for the plurality of both parts and entire worlds engaging a wide

spectrum of multiplicity regarding possibilities. The donkey alone as a singular part of a

world unto itself to the donkey in the entire world as a part in the whole world of

aggregated parts.

While these two giants of modal logic think of possible worlds as their

playgrounds, I feel that their playgrounds are conceptual sandboxes filled with the broken

glass of overextended ontologies. Let me explain. Both Plantinga and Lewis account for

their possible world talk in terms of “any number of” 21 and “countless many”22 worlds of

possibility respectively. For Plantinga any number of possible worlds exist but only one

is actual. For Lewis, the countless many worlds of possibility are all actual. Both hold to

the logical possibility but each one views the actuality of the world(s) in different ways.

While many would consider Lewis’ view as completely incredulous, what benefits from

Plantinga’s view would be more believable? The only benefit I can gather from

Plantinga’s view is that he does not endorse a countless number of worlds as actual.

However, he still has any number of worlds existing, (logically speaking?) but only one is

20
Lewis, 2.
21
Plantinga, 1974, 48.
22
Lewis, 2.

© Jeffrey W Roop 2010. All Rights Reserved. 11

actual. How and in what way is Plantinga speaking of existence? It does not seem to be

the sort of case that is related to my knowledge, i.e., that I know the computer in front of

me “exists”. Nor does it seem like the “existence” of concepts that are used in the daily

life of a scientist, e.g., she believes the moon exists. This ‘existence’ of Plantinga’s seems

like an entirely different conception similar to the surgical work he did with the concept

of ‘possibility.’ This is the existence limited to the realm of the logical, the favorite place

of metaphysicians, in a priori land. While in logic speak the logician refers to existential

quantifiers. This quantifier, ∃ , is the little symbol telling them, “there is an x such

that…” That is, all of that said about such and such an object finds expression in this

symbol. Even when taking the symbolic existential into account, something is lost when

you speak of existence and distill it to a symbol.23 Then again, some like doing this with

language and concepts, but for the sake of deeply meaningful language, like poetry and

literature, admit what is being done and do not call what is left out meaningless. While I

do not discount what is done in the field of logic, it bears a closer resemblance to

mathematics than to ordinary language. The attempts by analytic philosophers of

language to find a formal semantic language have greatly limited the majority of ordinary

language in the process of devising a logical game.

So is there still a way to consider modal logic without concocting an entire

ontology of possible worlds? I think that Kripke’s approach in Naming and Necessity is a

better alternative. First, he does not consider possible worlds as entire worlds. He views

these worlds more in terms of stipulated situations, probabilities expanded to a larger

23
Maybe this is why I gave up on most analytic philosophy of language long ago. Language is rich in truth
and meaning, like a big pot of chicken noodle soup, but boiling it down in an attempt to make it more
formal either reduces it to a burnt and ruined mess or leaves out so much of what makes language palatable
it is not fit for even the vilest prisoner.

© Jeffrey W Roop 2010. All Rights Reserved. 12

level but not worldwide. He talks of the probabilities of dice used by school boys as the

intuition behind this idea. He further states,

’Possible worlds’ are little more than the miniworlds of school probability
blown large. It is true that there are problems in the general notion not
involved in the miniature version. The miniature worlds are tightly
controlled, both as to the objects involved (two dice), the relevant
properties (number on face shown), and (thus) the relevant idea of
possibility. ‘Possible worlds’ are total ‘ways the world could have been’,
or states or histories of the entire world….Certainly the philosopher of
‘possible worlds’ must take care that his technical apparatus not push him
to ask questions whose meaningfulness is not supported by our original
intuitions of possibility that gave the apparatus its point. Further, in
practice we cannot describe a complete course of events and have no need
to do so.24

These are important points that both Plantinga and Lewis sweep aside for the purposes of

their own agendas, agendas that leave both with questions lacking anything meaningful to

give. Second, his approach is not so much concerned with propositions than with the

function of proper names, and how these play out in the variety of stipulated possible

situations. He responds to criticisms regarding the ability to substitute proper names with

propositions in the following:

How this relates to the question what ‘propositions’ are expressed by these
sentences, whether these ‘propositions’ are objects of knowledge and
belief, and in general, how to treat names in epistemic contexts, are vexing
questions. I have no ‘official doctrine’ concerning them, and in fact I am
unsure that the apparatus of ‘propositions’ does not break down in this
area.

So with Kripke’s view, taking propositions into the realm of possible worlds is a shaky

approach to the very idea of possible worlds. Third, since his focus is more on language

and naming, possibility takes on a different meaning. He brings up this different notion

of possibility as it relates to the ideas a priori and necessity both of which are concepts he

finds vague. The first deals more with epistemology, knowing something apart from
24
Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), 18.

© Jeffrey W Roop 2010. All Rights Reserved. 13

experience, which is a notion that is problematic and dependant on the knower. This is

the difference between ‘can be known a priori’ and ‘must be known a priori.’ Necessity

however, can be a matter of logical or physical necessity. In this way, Kripke considers

matters of metaphysical necessity and contingency.25 It is the difference between

something necessarily or possibly named this or that as opposed to something necessarily

or possibly is this or that.

In light of Plantinga’s view of existence and actuality, I believe his use of the

concept ‘the world’ is also confused. In the light of Kripke’s view of possible worlds,

this seems to be the case. Plantinga, by expanding the idea of possible worlds too

largely, has brought in a host of problems. One basis for this confusion is in his

assumptions about what exists and what is actual. Ordinary usage of either word would

seem to indicate a comment regarding reality. Consider the following statements. “Polar

bears exist in the harsh climate of the Arctic Circle.” “I saw an actual polar bear at the

zoo.” Both are statements about a creature in which we connect the words and concepts

with the reality of the creature. Now if one speaks of the possibility of polar bears no

longer existing, is this a statement of possibility that requires a distinction between

existence and actuality? If anything, it is a statement regarding a future possibility of

extinction. Actuality and existence of polar bears are two sides of the same coin; a coin

that does not require a metaphysical Federal Reserve.

Plantinga is quite critical of Lewis’ use of sets to define propositions and

properties. He even states that one problem with such a view is that sets have no

characteristic of intentionality. Therefore, per Plantinga’s view, propositions have an

intentional character but sets do not have this characteristic. As we saw earlier, this
25
Ibid., 34 – 37.

© Jeffrey W Roop 2010. All Rights Reserved. 14

notion of intentionality as used by Plantinga is problematic. At the present if we step

back and look at both concepts, if both are viewed at a different level, (maybe with a

human perspective), both could be said to be the result of intentional character. Those

who use the concepts give both propositions and sets the attention of their respective

intentional character. Plantinga uses propositions to delineate what has possible and

necessary properties. Lewis uses sets to clarify what is a necessary property. Plantinga

might further push the point that one cannot believe in sets as one can with propositions.

Nevertheless, sets do serve an intentional function in that the sets are characteristic of

what Lewis considers a property. In all fairness to Lewis let me offer a few passages

regarding his views on propositions and properties.

I identify propositions with certain properties – namely, with those that are
instantiated only by entire possible worlds. Then if properties generally
are the sets of their instances, a proposition is a set of possible worlds….A
proposition holds at just those worlds that are members of it.26

In other words, propositions have properties instantiated by sets of possible worlds.

Lewis continues to clarify what he means by properties in the following:

Propositions, being sets of worlds, also fall in with the properties taken as
sets. A proposition is a partly actual at just those worlds where it is true,
for it has just those worlds as its members. So we might call at least the
true propositions ‘actual’; or we might just call propositions ‘actual’,
distinguishing however between those that are and are not actually true.27

So for Lewis, sets comprise both properties and propositions. In relation to the ‘actual’

consider the next passage, “…I would like to say that sets of actual things are actual.

Sometimes we hear it said that sets are one and all unlocated; but I don’t know of any

reason to believe this, and a more plausible view is that a set is where its members are.”28

26
Lewis, 53.
27
Ibid., 95.
28
Ibid., 94-95.

© Jeffrey W Roop 2010. All Rights Reserved. 15

When it comes to actuality Lewis has a very broad view namely, “There is no need to

decide, once and for all and inflexibly, what is to be called actual.”29 At least he is

keeping his options open.

Now, in considering Plantinga’s conceptual confusion regarding existence, actual,

possible and the world, does this confusion carry over to his understanding of necessity?

Since he has a different understanding of the conception of possibility, a conception

greatly restricted by his use, does this lead to a problem with his conception of necessity

that by implication would be limited in both ordinary use and understanding. If problems

do arise because the notion of necessity was undermined by a conceptually muddled view

of possibility then Plantinga’s conception of God might be in trouble as the necessary

being.

This entire logical exercise on Plantinga’s part seems to support a theological

purpose that is not intent on proving God’s existence, but that accepting belief in God is

rational. Even with this discussion of possibility and necessity, it seems, as those other

alternatives are available, to talk about possibility and by Plantinga’s implication,

possibility for God.

The first alternative is to analyze the language in the context one finds it, that of

life and practice. This area is rich with language that people use in describing and

explaining not only their relation to God but also their conception of God as well. In this

context, the notion of “the possibility of God’s existence” would likely evince looks of

puzzlement from the believing community. Although Plantinga is writing this for an

audience that may or may not be theistic in nature, he surely is writing from such a

community. While he occasionally drops theological ideas into his writing in an effort to
29
Ibid., 95.

© Jeffrey W Roop 2010. All Rights Reserved. 16

be clever, in essence, he neglects a rich heritage of religious language to support ideas of

possibility and necessity for vaguely philosophical apologetic purposes.

Another area to explore regarding possibility in relation to God is that of soft

rationalism.30 This is an approach to exploring different worldviews critically taking into

account personal and historical narrative. This is not a strictly logical exercise but

involves critical thinking in the midst of a person’s life. If someone is exploring the

possibility of God, even a Christian understanding of God, a wide variety of factors can

come into play during this exploration. Among these factors are changes in religious

practice among friends; biographies of the saints; Scripture; arguments for God’s

existence; the coherence of Christian thought and so on.31 While these factors are not

causal in nature, they can play a part in an individual’s journey from doubt to faith. By

allowing a (logical) space for conversion or change in a person’s life, this opens up an

entirely different conversation regarding the possibility of God and possibility in one’s

life. The positive possibility is not a brute fact that one metaphysically asserts, rather it is

a possibility born out of a personal struggle to seek the option of God. What may trouble

Plantinga with such an approach is the possibility of a person leaving one’s faith. Then

again, this may reflect the reality of religious life better than the elaborate metaphysical

system that Plantinga has set up.

30
William J. Abraham, “Soft Rationalism” in Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, Edited by
Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach and David Basinger, 98–108, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2001), 99-101.
31
Ibid., 101-104.

© Jeffrey W Roop 2010. All Rights Reserved. 17