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Strategy as Vector and To examine the consequences of a period of extraordi-
the Inertia of nary success for the long-term adaptive capability of a
firm's strategy-making process, this comparative longitu-
Coevolutionary Lock-in dinal study of Andy Grove's tenure as Intel Corporation's
chief executive officer (CEO)documents how he moved
Robert A. Burgelman Intel's strategy-making process from an internal-ecology
StanfordUniversity model to the classical rational-actor model during
1987-1998. His creation of a highly successful strategy
vector pursued through an extremely focused induced-
strategy process led to coevolutionary lock-in with the
personal computer market segment, in which Intel's strat-
egy making became increasingly tied to its existing prod-
uct market. Intracompany analysis of four new business
development cases highlights the inertial consequences
of coevolutionary lock-in. The paper examines implica-
tions of coevolutionary lock-in in terms of its effect on
balancing induced and autonomous strategy processes
and exploitation and exploration in organizational
learning.?
There is a vast literatureascribingthe success of a company
to the vision, strategy, and leadershipapproachof its chief
executive officer (CEO).Some of these accounts put the
CEOat center stage (e.g., Welch, 2001); others put him or
her more modestly in the background(e.g., Collins,2001).
Organizationaland strategic management researchers, how-
ever, have long highlightedthe difficultiesleaders encounter
in aligningorganizationalaction in the pursuitof strategic
intent (e.g., Mintzberg,Ahlstrand,and Lampel, 1998). Recent
work in organizationalecology (e.g., Barnettand Hansen,
1996), the behavioraltheory of the firm (e.g., Levinthaland
March,1993), and neo-institutionaltheory (e.g., Zuckerman,
2000) continues to illuminatethe external and internallimita-
tions facing top management. Yet we still understandlittle
about why some firms have periods of extraordinarysuccess,
what the role of the CEOis in heraldingand leadingthe orga-
nizationthroughsuch periods, and what the consequences
are of such periods for strategy makingthereafter.While
organizationalresearchers are mostly concerned with ordi-
narystates and expect regression toward the mean to wash
out fluctuationsover time, periods of extraordinarysuccess
?2002 by Johnson GraduateSchool, have potentiallyimportantconsequences for the strategy-
CornellUniversity.
0001-8392/02/4702-0325/$3.00. makingprocess as a long-termadaptiveorganizationalcapa-
bility,that is, spanning multiplegenerations of CEOs.
The researchfor this paperwas critically Longitudinalfield-based research on strategy makingat Intel
dependenton my case writingand teach- CorporationduringAndy Grove'stenure as CEOoffered the
ing collaborationwith AndrewS. Grove, opportunityto study a periodof extraordinarycorporatesuc-
Intel'sformerCEOand currentchairman,
since 1988. The generous collaborationof cess and its consequences for the company's strategy-mak-
IntelCorporation and its managersin this ing process. Intelseemed a particularlyinteresting research
researchis much appreciated.James G.
Marchand EzraW. Zuckermanoffered site because it is one of the most importantfirms of the digi-
many useful comments on an earlier tal age (Gilder,1989; Isaacson, 1997), and its evolution high-
draft.I am especiallyindebtedto Jim
Marchfor drawingattentionto coevolu- lights the fundamentaltechnologicaland economic forces
tionarylock-inas a phenomenonof orga- that characterizedigitalindustries(e.g., Arthur,1987). The
nizationaladaptation.The ideas of this research could be used to compare Grove'sstrategy-making
paperwere significantlysharpenedas the
resultof challengingcomments and approachto that of his predecessor (GordonMoore)and suc-
queries of the ASO reviewersand of cessor (CraigBarrett)and thus could examine his efficacy as
ChristineOliver,its editor.Thanksalso to
the managingeditor,LindaJohanson,for CEOwithin the context of Intelas an evolving system over
helpfuleditorialsuggestions. time.
325/Administrative Science Quarterly, 47 (2002): 325-357
Andy Grovesucceeded GordonMoore as CEOin 1987 at the
time that Intelwas recoveringfrom defeat in its original
semiconductormemory business and refocusingon its
microprocessorbusiness (Burgelman,1994). He held the
position untilearly 1998. Between 1987 and 1998, Intel
became the clear winner with its microprocessorsin the per-
sonal computer (PC)marketsegment. Intel'srevenues grew
from $1.9 billionto $25.1 billion-an increase of 29.4 percent
per annum-and net income grew from $248 millionto $6.9
billion-an increase of 39.5 percent per annum. In 1998,
however, Intel'sgrowth in the core business slowed down
significantly.Also, it had become clear that new business
development was relativelyunsuccessful duringGrove's
tenure as CEO.In 1997, CraigBarrett,then Intel'schief oper-
ating officer (COO),observed that Intel'score microprocessor
business had begun to resemble a creosote bush, a desert
plantthat poisons the groundaroundit, preventingother
plants from growing nearby.The creosote bush metaphor
raised potentiallyinterestingquestions about the strategic
consequences of Intel'sabilityto dominate in the PC market
segment. It drew attentionto the phenomenon of coevolu-
tionarylock-in:a positive feedback process that increasingly
ties the previoussuccess of a company's strategy to that of
its existing product-marketenvironment,thereby makingit
difficultto change strategic direction.Despite the attention
given to winner-take-allcompetition in digitalindustries(e.g.,
Arthur,1987) and the role of inertiain organizationaland
industryevolution (e.g., Hannanand Freeman, 1977, 1984),
researchers have paid littleattentionto how coevolutionary
lock-incomes about and may become a significantsource of
strategic inertia.This study addresses this gap. It seeks to
shed lighton the role of the CEOin creatinga strategy-
makingprocess that leads to coevolutionarylock-inand what
its implicationsare for organizationaladaptation.
Grovedescribed his approachas "vectoring"Intel'sstrategy-
makingprocess. Vector-a quantityhavingdirectionand mag-
nitude, denoted by a line drawnfrom its originalto its final
position (OxfordEnglishDictionary)-seems an apt metaphor
to describe his efforts to align strategy and action. By creat-
ing a strategy vector, Grovewas able to drive Intelin the
intended directionwith a total force equal to all the forces at
its disposition.The paper examines the long-termadaptive
implicationsof Grove'sstrategic leadershipapproach,which
seemed to approximatethe classical rational-actormodel
(Allisonand Zelikow,1999; Bendorand Hammond,1992),
and contrasts it with that of his predecessor.
COEVOLUTIONARY LOCK-ININ FIRMEVOLUTION
Informedby evolutionaryorganizationtheory (e.g., Aldrich,
1999; Baum and McKelvey,1999), earlierresearch on Intel
before Grovebecame CEOsuggested that effective strategy
makingmay be as much about creatingan environmentin
which middle management makes strategic decisions as it is
about strategy makingin the classical sense and that the role
of top management might be to recognize transitionsrather
than to initiatethem (Burgelman,1994). These findingswere
consistent with an internalecology model of strategy making,
which was conceptualizedin terms of inducedand
326/ASQ, June 2002
Coevolutionary Lock-in
Table1
Informants Providing Data Concerning Epoch II(1988-1998)
Informal
Name and most relevant job during Epoch II Interview Interaction
1. GordonMoore,chairman X X
2. AndyGrove,CEO X X
3. CraigBarrett,COO X X
4. GerryParker,executive VP,Technologyand Mfg. Group X X
5. PaulOtellini,executive VP,IntelArchitectureBusiness Group X X
6. FrankGill,executive VP,IntelProductsGroup,gen. mgr.Networking X X
7. Les Vadasz,senior VP,CorporateBusiness DevelopmentGroup X X
8. AlbertYu,senior VP,MicroprocessorProductsGroup X X
9. RonWhittier,senior VP,IntelArchitectureLabs,ContentGroup X X
10. AndyBryant,senior VP and CFO X X
11. Sean Maloney,senior VP,Sales and MarketingGroup X
12. Dennis Carter,VP,CorporateMarketingGroup X X
13. Ron Smith,VP,gen. mgr.Chipsets X X
14. PatrickGelsinger,VP,gen. mgr.ProShare X X
15. MikeAymar,VP,Desktop ProductsGroup,Hood River X X
16. MarkChristensen,VP,gen. mgr.Networking(late 1990s) X X
17. John Miner,VP,EnterpriseServerGroup X
18. Hans Geyer,VP,gen. mgr.FlashProductsDivision X
19. Patty Murray,VP,HumanResources X
20. HaroldHughes, VP and CFOmid-1990s X X
21. John Davies, VP,ConsumerMarketingDesktop Prod.Grp.,Hood River X
22. AvramMiller,VP,CorporateDevelopmentGroup,Hood River X
23. Jim Johnson, gen. mgr.PC EnhancementOrganization(late 1980s) X X
24. ClaudeLeglise, MarketingDirectori860 (late 1980s) X X
25. Steve McGeady,gen. mgr. Home Media Lab(mid-1990s) X X
26. Scott Darling,gen. mgr.Busin.Com. Prod.Grp.,ProShare(late 1990s) X X
27. SandraMorris,managerIntelProd.Grp.(mid-1990s) X X
28. TomYan,mgr.development OEMProd.and Syst. Div.,Hood River X
29. DickPashley,gen. mgr.FlashMemoryDivision(early1990s) X X
30. WarrenEvans, Business Process Network,Planning X X
31. Renee James, technicalassistant to AndyGrove(mid-1990s) X X
32. KatherineYetts, technicalassistant to CraigBarrett(mid-1990s) X X
33. MichaelBruck,programmanagerContentGroup X X
34. VinDham,programmanagerPentiumprocessor (early1990s) X X
35. RichardWirt,directorSoftware, IAL X X
36. Les Kohn,technicalmanager,i860 processor (late 1980s) X
37. Bruce McCormick,manager,Flash(mid-1980s) X
38. SallyFundakowski,manager,CMG(early1990s) X
39. Tom Macdonald,marketingdirectorfor 386 and 486 processors X
40. Jim Yasso, mgr.in Desktop Prd.Grp.and Microp.Prd.Grp.(mid-1990s) X
41. Don Whiteside, gen. mgr., DigitalImagingand Video Division X
43. LoriWigle, strat. mkting.dir.DigitalImagingand Video Division X
43. TomWillis,managerin CorporateBusiness DevelopmentGroup X
44. Dave Williams,directorHome MediaLab X
45. Dave Cobbley,directorHome Media Lab X
46. Rob Siegel, programmanagerHood River X X
47. Ganesh Moorthy,mgr.,Applianceand Comp. Div.(Deskt. Prod.Grp.) X
48. KrishBandura,engineer, Hood River X
49. Roy Coppinger,productmgr.OEMProd.and Syst. Div.,Hood River X
50. EricMentzer,marketingmanager,Chipsets X* X
51. AndyWilhelm,technicalmanager,Chipsets X*
52. Andy Beran,finance manager,Chipsets X*
53. Tom Bruegel,finance manager,Networking(mid-1990s) X*
54. Dan Sweeney, marketingprogrammgr.,Networking(mid-1990s) X*
55. Steve Cassell, engineeringmgr.,Networking(early1990s) X*
56. KirbyDyess, marketingmgr., PC Enhancemt.Org. (late 1980s) X* X
57. Susan Studd, humanres. mgr., PC Enhancemt.Org. (late 1980s) X* X
58. GerryGreve, marketingdirectorProShare(mid-1990s) X*
60. LauraFinney,finance managerProShare(mid-1990s) X*
61. TaymoorArshi,engineeringmanager,ProShare(mid-1990s) X*
62. MarkOlson, productmarketingmanagerMicroproc.Prod.Grp. X
63. John Sutherland,manager,Systems ManagementDivision X
* These interviewswere tape recordedby Intelconsultants,an transcriptsof the raw recordedinterviewdata were
made availableto this author.
Continued
Table2 (Continued)
Resolving conflict around "IntelInside" between Corporate Marketingand Intel Products Group
DirectobservationduringSLRP1993: Andy Grove: "This is a lame state- Grove decides: "Dennis [Carter]and
At the end of SLRPthe objectives as ment. And yet it is the inflection Frank[Gill]must rephrasethis. It must
stated in 1992 were revisitedin light point-[similar] to what happened be words that will affect hundredsof
of the discussion during the 1993 with the transitionfrom memories to people that work for them and are
SLRP.The thirdobjectivein 1992 was microprocessors. This involves a fightingover it. The new words [must
"Manage the Intel and Intel Inside dialectic. It is a move from a single make sure] we get creditfor what we
brandsfor significantreturnand long- space to a dual one. This dualityis all do for our lend-user] customers:
term advantage."Grovefelt that this over the place. It is a continuationof ease-of-use, richness, upgradability;
objectivehadto be restated in lightof the change from OEM to a distribu- and who our customers could be."
the intense conflicts that had broken tion channel."
into the open between CM (Dennis
Carter)and IPG(FrankGill)duringthe
SLRP1993 discussions.
Supporting Intel's motherboard business in the face of organizational resistance (mid-1990s)
HaroldHughes (formerCFO):"Andy Andy Grove:"Ihave been rabidabout Grovesupportedthe development of
was always brilliantat identifying fourthings in my careerat Intel:moth- the motherboardbusiness in spite of
threatsto our business. Forexample, erboards, Intel Inside, chipsets, and strong oppositionof the microproces-
on the motherboardsbusiness, Andy videoconferencing." sor division,whose OEM customers
and I clashed. I said that we were complained vigorously about Intel's
never going to make any money on verticalintegrationstrategy,and in the
motherboards. But they did push face of reservationson the partof the
adoptionof our microprocessors.Our CFO.
motherboardbusiness allowedthe lit-
tle [OEMs]to stay competitive."
Supporting the chipset business to drive industry adoption of Intel technology (mid-1990s)
Several executives pointed out that After the chipset business became Grovethen began to view the chipset
Andy Grove initiallydid not support very successful, AndyGrovechanged business as an importanttool for sup-
the development of the chipset busi- his mindabout chipsets as a strategic portingthe corporate strategy. Andy
ness based on the new Peripheral business for Intel. Bryant(CFO)said, "At a time when
Component Interconnect (PCI) bus motherboardpricing was extremely
technology but, rather, wanted to competitive,the motherboarddivision
introducethe new technology as an decided not to use Intel'schipsets be-
enabling technology into the PC cause they were morecostlythanthird-
industry with a consortium-based party alternatives-even though they
effort. providedsuperior performance..
Groveruledthatthe long-terminterests
of the company required moving
advancedtechnologyinto the market-
place and that we should forgo short-
termreturnsforthe long-termbenefits."
Driving Intel to meet the threat of the growth of the low-end of the PC market segment (1997)
Direct observation during SLRP in Andy Groveduringhis SLRPkickoff: Grove articulated a new mandate,
September 1997: Grove was very "We say we have a top-to-bottom requiringthe assignment of a large
concerned about recent develop- strategy. But we don't act top-to-bot- number of engineers to the task of
ments in the PC marketsegment. He tom, because Intel has low-end pho- developing a microprocessorspecifi-
felt that Intel'stop managementwas bia..... But the low end is not going callyfor the low-end marketsegment
failing to see the strategic implica- away. . . . The data about desktop
tions of the rapidgrowth in demand sales at the retail,reseller,and direct Inaboutsix monthsthe team developed
for below-$1,000 PCs. level all show a downward trend in a new productcalledthe Celeronproces-
price:$500 in about a year! I have not sor, which made it possiblefor Intelto
seen that before, And the volumes at regain marketsegment share against
the low end are up. So, the good AMDinthe low end by early1999.
news about segment zero is that we
have it on our road map. The bad In early 1999, Paul Otelliniobserved,
news is that we don't have an engi- "We've made a lot of progress on the
neered product." low end. One year ago in the sub-
$1,000 market our share was about
38 percent. We then lost some
ground, but we have regained share,
so we're at about 38 percent again."
Continued
We learned that we had to get around the companies that had sub-
jugated us in DRAM. We learned that high market share was critical
for success and that to get market share we had to be willing to
invest in manufacturing capacity. Such investments involve big bets
because they have to be made in advance of actual demand. We
learned that commodity businesses are unattractive, so we didn't
want to license out our intellectual property anymore.
Table3
Company Level of Analysis: Views on Intel's Narrow Business Strategy
during Epoch II
GordonMoore (1989):
"Overtime ... Intelhas narrowedand narrowedits technologicalinterests.
Andy[Grovelhas been instrumentalin this.... We can do variationson
present businesses very well. But doing something new is more difficult."
GerryParker(1989):
"We could now manufactureeverythingin one and one-halfplants.That's
obscene. Youneed a broadproductbase-EPROM [electricallyprogramma-
ble read-onlymemory]is a natural...."
Les Vadasz(1988):
"Thesystem [strategiclong-rangeplanning]is now [inthe late 1980s] more
top-down.A high-levelgroupsets the corporatestrategy,and business
units operate withinthat focus. Business units must focus on a few things
and do them right ... Some managerscomplainthat their 'sandbox'is too
well defined."
A senior executive (1995):
"Intelmay be too focused too soon. We have narrowedour range of experi-
mentationtoo fast from 360 degrees to 180 and then to 90. The code
words are:Youdon't have a business plan;your strategy is vague."
"We must narrowdown from a 360 degree scan to 20, but even so we still
have 20 things to do. Andy[Grove],however, wants a 'laser shot.'"
FrankGill(1997):
"In1994-95, Andy[Grove]would tell me 'Frank,I make a billiondollarsin
profitper quarterand you make a billiondollarsin revenue per year.This is
all distraction,so focus on Job 1.'"
Anothersenior executive (1998):
"... a lot... is drivenfrom Job 1, because every six months we have a
SLRP[strategiclong-rangeplanningmeeting].Andy[Grove]stands up and
says ... here is a problem.And everyone says ... we can go do wonderful
things to solve that problem."
CraigBarrett(1999):
"[Duringthe second epoch] we became much more verticalizedbehind IA
and relatedbusinesses. Now we are more broad.... This requiresless top
down managementand more P&Land line management."
A thirdsenior executive (1999):
"Barrettis very differentfrom Grove.First,he's encouragingnew ideas....
Andy wouldn't have let that happen. Craig made it happen .... Second is
behavior.Ifyou have a good idea, overwhelm it with resources:What do
you need? Do what it takes. Come backwith a prize.... That'sa different
style."
A fourthsenior executive (1999):
"ButI am more concernedabout Andy[Grovelbecause of his singularfocus.
Andysays that PCs are becoming a commodity.So, we must focus on
servers and not let Sun [Microsystems]capturethis. It is like going backto
the old days."
"Barrettat some pointwill be expected to set the corporatestrategy;and if
he doesn't, Andy [Grove]will."
Intel also made a distinction between "Job 1" and "Job 2."
Job 1 encompassed everything that had to do with making
the Intel architecture more successful. Job 2 involved the
development of new businesses around the core business.
CEO-driven strategic planning. Grove said that he had used
changes in the company's strategic long-range planning
process (SLRP) to redefine the content of the new corporate
strategy and get the organization to execute it:
In 1987, we blew up the SLRP process. Formerly it had been a very
bottom-up process, but there was no strategic framework. Each of
the different groups was supposed to come up with the strategy for
Table4
Company-environment-interface Level of Analysis: Highlights of Coevolution of Intel's Narrow Business Strategy
PC market segment
Table5
Company Level of Analysis: Coevolutionary Lock-inand Sources of Strategic Inertiaduring Epoch II
Views from below Intel's strategic intent Strategic action
If strategic, apply logic of core business strategy
Intel's strategy for videoconferencing (ProShare)
PatrickGelsinger(GMProShare): Grove'sintentwas to make video- Groveassigned PatrickGelsinger,in
"ProSharewas viewed as a horizon- conferencingan integralcapabilityof charge at the time of the next-gener-
tal capability-that was Andy's the PC.Tothis end, he favoreda ation microprocessordevelopment,
[Grove]wish." frontalassault on the entire PC mar- to ProShare.Grove:"MovingPat off
ket segment, ratherthan targeting of P6, a producton which the future
"We could have acted on the vertical verticalsegments first. of our companytrulydepends, to run
marketssix months sooner if Andy this new initiativewas a very contro-
had not had such a strong opinion." versialstep. But in manyway this is
the test of it."
AnotherProShareexecutive: "There
wasn't a debate about it, there wasn't Grovecontinuedto be deeply
even a discussion.... Andy had involvedin the strategicdecision
alreadytrainedthe organization, makinguntil1996, when he asked
meaning Intel,that periodicallyhe FrankGillto scale down the effort,
gets all these flashes of an idea." which involvedsome 700 people at
the time.
FrankGill(seniorexecutive): "Itwas
not being out of the loop so much as Grovein 1999: "Weassumed that
not being sure.... [I thought] just because it could be done techni-
maybe the throwingof massive callythere would be high demand. I
resource at it would work. I didn't was an enthusiasticuser and sup-
know for sure and Andyand Pat porter,but I've stopped using it....
were quite confident." If we were to do it over again,our
approachwould be not so much like
the Normandyinvasion,but more of
a vertical focus.... We brought a
style and conceptualapproachto an
area where it did not work."
Intel's strategy for bringing the PC into the living room (Hood River)
Rob Siegel (projectmanager)and his Andy Grove:"'ThePC is it,' Grove Siegel and his team continuedtheir
team identifiedthe target applica- declares. 'Thatsums up Intel'sbusi- efforts throughthe fallof 1996. But
tions and uses for the Hood River ness planand rallyingcry.''Some they raninto fundingproblemswhen
product.The design called for the thinkthe informationsuperhighway the idea of a "networkcomputer"
use of Intel's233 MHzPentiumII will come throughtheirTV,'Grove (NC)gained some trackingunderthe
processor,the highest performance proclaimed... .'[But]the information impulseof Oracle'sLarryEllison,and
CPUat the time. tool of the futureis on yourdesk, the Desktop ProductGroup(DPG)
not in your livingroom"'(Burstein reallocatedresources to meet the
By August 1996, Siegel: "... we and Kline, 1995: 24). perceivedthreatto the core busi-
had accomplisheda lot. We had ness. Siegel was able to get funding
Microsoftdoing what we wanted reinstated,but the marketfor Hood
them to do, and we had established Riverdid not develop as planned.
an impressivecustomer list. Inaddi-
tion, the ProductLineBusiness Plan Inearly 1997, MikeAymar(GMof
presentationwent well. We received DPG)haltedthe venture.
the highest rating,and AndyGrove
came up with the phrase, 'Hijackthe we expected the
Aymar:"Originally
TV,'which became our rallyingcry." venture to ... generate demand for
another1 millionPCs per year. But
marketprojectionswere for various
vendorsworldwideto ship only in
the tens of thousandsof units in '97
and '98 .... This is insufficient."
Continued
344/ASQ, June 2002
Coevolutionary Lock-in
Table 5 (Continued)
EricMentzer(marketingmgr.):"They
said, we don't believe you guys are
going to be successful, so we don't
want you going into those
accounts.... The processor division
was out tellingthe field sales force
and the customers, don't use this;
use the low-riskthing."
Table6
Intra-companyLevel of Analysis: Comparative Process Model Analysis of Four New Business Development
Cases during Epoch II
Leadership activities by
management level and
subprocess* ProShare Hood River Chipsets
Corporatemanagement level:
Definition:Monitoring Fromthe start Fromthe start Flyunderradar
Impetus:Authorizing Fromthe start Erratic Pay as you go
Strategiccontext: Rationalizing Premature Didn'tget to Lagging(linkto
Pentium)
Structuralcontext: Structuring Suspended Stronginfluence Stronginfluence
Selecting (linksto structuraland
strategic contexts) Suspended Stronginfluence Strong influence
Middlemanagement level:
Definition:Coaching Limited Limited Strong
Impetus:Strategicbuilding Didn'tget to Didn'tget to Not necessary
Organizationalchampioning(links
impetus and strategiccontext) Not necessary Didn'tget to Strong
Strategiccontext: Delineating Premature Didn'tget to Strong
Structuralcontext: Negotiating Not necessary Ineffective Strong
Venturemanagement level:
Definition:Technicaland need linking Limitedeffectiveness Ineffective Effective
Productchampioning(linksdefinition
and impetus) Not necessary Ineffective Effective
Impetus:Strategicforcing Limitedeffectiveness Ineffective Effective
Strategiccontext:e.g., bootlegging Littleroom Not possible AnticipatePentium
Structuralcontext: Questioning Littleroom Ineffective Workaround
Leadership activities by
management level and Networking
subprocess* Until 1997 Changes after 1997
Corporatemanagementlevel:
Definition:Monitoring Littleinterest Strong
Impetus:Authorizing Pay as you go Strong
Strategiccontext: Rationalizing Lagging Linkto core
Structuralcontext:Structuring Stronginfluence Adjusted
Selecting (linksto structuraland
strategiccontexts) Stronginfluence Adjusted
Middlemanagementlevel:
Definition:Coaching Strong
Impetus:Strategicbuilding Limited Strong
Organizational championing(links
impetus and strategiccontext) Give up Strong
Strategiccontext: Delineating Limited Strong
Structuralcontext: Negotiating Defensive Strong
Venturemanagementlevel:
Definition:Technicaland need linking Effective
Productchampioning(linksdefinition
and impetus) Effective
Impetus:Strategicforcing Effective
Strategiccontext:e.g., bootlegging Limited
Structuralcontext:Questioning Workaround
*Source: Burgelman(1983).
from the CEO for this project, the selective effects of the
structural context were very strong (table 6). This was evi-
dent when funding was temporarily cut off without warning
in December 1996 to harness resources in the face of the
perceived threat of the "network computer" (NC) to Intel's
core business. Ineffective technical and need-linking activities
made it difficult to collaborate with the consumer electronics
OEMs, who had a very different view of the market and the
347/ASQ, June 2002
technology required.Siegel triedto pursue product-cham-
pioningactivities, but, as a relativenewcomer, he could not
exert influence in the networkof resource-controllingrelation-
ships of Intel'smatrix.Strategicforcingnever got started, as
no consumer electronics OEMs or PC OEMswere willingto
adopt the Hood Riverproductconcept (table6). As a result,
MichaelAymar,the middle-levelexecutive, had no foundation
to buildon and could not continue to ask top management
for support. He stopped fundingHood Riverin 1997 (table5).
Emerging New
Product-market
Environments
Strategic InertiaII
Autonomous st ic
Strategic ----. . ---
Action
4 Narrow Current
I"""^
Strategic Inertia Business Product-
Environment
Induced Tight
Strategic - Structural
Action Context