DEBATE

the concept of the state in

political philosophy
brian barry (author) and marcel wissenburg (editor)*
Department of Public Administration and Political Science, Institute for Management
Research, Radboud University Nijmegen, PO Box 9108, 6500 HK Nijmegen, the
Netherlands
E-mail: m.wissenburg@fm.ru.nl

*Corresponding editor.

doi:10.1057/eps.2010.56

Abstract
In a lecture given in 1991, while working on the never finished third volume
of his series on theories of justice, Brian Barry gave a rare glimpse into the
ideas with which he was wrestling – twenty years ahead of present-day
political theorists. What is the role of the state, how are we to conceptualize
it, in a world if globalization, and against the background of a legitimate
appeal for international distributive justice?

Keywords international justice; social justice; sovereignty; state

EDITOR’S NOTE at his talk into an article. Moreover, the

notes he used were already part of the

T
he structure of this text deviates
markedly from that of an ordinary
scientific article. It is not the orderly
organized and carefully revised article in
which contributions to conferences usual-
ly find their last resting place. Instead, it
consists of the transcription of a lecture
given by Brian Barry (1936–2009) and a
summary of the ensuing debate during
the founding conference of the Dutch
Graduate School for Political Science
in Wassenaar, the Netherlands, 9–10
January 1991. The rationale behind this
choice of form is simple and unscientific.
Brian Barry himself lacked the time and
interest to rearrange the notes he used
92 european political science: 10 2011
book manuscript he was working on at
the time – the never completed third
volume of his treatise on social justice.
Brian felt that turning the lecture into an
article would add little to, and only
distract from his work on, the book – but
he did not mind publication in the form I
proposed: authorized lecture notes dis-
playing one of the best political philoso-
phers of our days struggling to perfect
and further develop his ideas though
debate with his critics. The text was
offered for publication in the journal of
the Dutch Political Science Association in
the autumn of 1991, but its editors neither
appreciated the format, nor were they

(92 – 102) & 2011 European Consortium for Political Research. 1680-4333/11 www.palgrave-journals.com/eps/
impressed by the novelty of what Barry had
to offer. It was rediscovered in 2009 in the
process of converting files, created with
now defunct word processing software, to a
more current format. I have added nothing
to the original text, except a couple of
references to Brian Barry’s own (later) work.
Although little of what Barry had to say
is really surprising, from the point of view
of 2009, the text does offer a rare glimpse
into the ideas with which Theories of
Justice: Volume III might have begun,
and for the biographer it shows the very
first signs of his growing impatience with
academic political philosophy.
The 1991 lecture was prepared while
he was working on the final draft of his
second volume in the Theories of Justice
series – or so he thought at the time.
However, Brian Barry always refused
to publish any text he was not deeply
satisfied with; hence, Justice as Impar-
tiality did not appear until 1995. Volume
III – which, as Barry announced in 1991,
would discuss international justice – was
never finished. Moreover, he soon changed
his plans and intended to devote Volume III
to the institutions of justice (cf. Dowding,
2009). Instead, after a period during
which Barry wrote about environmental
and intergenerational justice, he aban-
doned purely ‘academic’ political theory
completely in favour of more involved
writing like Culture and Equality (2002)
and Why Social Justice Matters (2005).
As Keith Dowding (2009) noted, Barry
left behind the manuscript of a book on
international social justice, all but finished
in 1980: Rich Countries and Poor Coun-
tries. Had it been published then, the
book would have set him on a collision
course with Charles Beitz (1979) and
Thomas Pogge (1989), the first major
thinkers to apply John Rawls’ theory of
social justice on a global scale (the oracle
himself remained silent on global justice
until 1997; cf. Rawls, 1999). While Barry
certainly agreed with the cosmopolitans
on the existence of global distributive
brian barry and marcel wissenburg
‘y American academics
in general attach far too
much importance to the
state and far too easily
assume that only a world
state can be an
alternative for the
classical nation-state’.
injustice and of moral obligations towards
the world’s poor, the 1991 lecture illustrates
that, and why he had little faith in global
redistributive institutions or powers.
Justice requires a commitment, a sense
of belonging, to a cooperative venture,
and it requires strong institutions to
effectively implement redistribution,
neither of which a global society or world
state can offer in any foreseeable future.
A position like this might be taken as
support for Rawls’ later rejection of global
justice; for Rawls (1999), the reciprocity,
broadness, intensity and duration of the
ties that make a people a people justify
limiting social justice to within the bor-
ders of its state, and justify the rejection
of global redistribution. Yet the most
important message in Barry’s 1991 lec-
ture is that Rawls and – as we can sense
in Barry’s reply to a comment by Stanley
Hoffmann – American academics in gen-
eral attaches far too much importance to
the state and far too easily assumes that
only a world state can be an alternative
for the classical nation-state. Barry calls
for a far more flexible understanding of
structures of social cooperation, reflecting
a political reality in which state authority
‘leaks away’ to sub- and supranational
institutions, and in which peoples, socie-
ties and cooperative ventures are not
necessarily identical (cf. also Wissenburg,
2007). In this respect, Barry was at least a
decade ahead of, and may still inspire,
current academic debates on the right to
partial or total secession, on the justification
european political science: 10 2011 93
 of borders per se, and about the (at least
contractual) justification of governance
and institutions of governance.
BRIAN BARRY’S LECTURE
Undoubtedly, John Rawls’ A Theory of
Justice (1971) has been responsible for
an upsurge in the production of political
philosophical literature. Yet little of what
has been written since – including my
own work – concerns the concept of the
state. Modern political philosophy takes
the state and its boundaries as a given, in
sharp contrast to classic contract theor-
ists like Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau.
Rawls himself is a good example: his
theory is built on the assumption of a
certain kind of society, characterized as
a group of people living in a state, with a
common sense of justice, and rules to
which they agree and generally adhere.
A society is, furthermore, supposed to
know no immigration or emigration, to be
economically self-sufficient, and to have
no external obligations of any kind. In
short, Rawls’ view of society is not ade-
quate for this century; an organization
like the UN does not fit into his theory.
Within this framework, Rawls develops a
social-democratic theory of the rights of
citizens. His explicit aim is the reconcilia-
tion of liberty and equality by means of his
two principles. Liberty in these principles is
represented by civil liberties and the free-
dom to follow one’s preferences; equality
is the basic principle of distribution. How-
ever, the theory has a hidden third leg –
efficiency. Rawls turns the Pareto-principle
of rationality or efficiency into a principle
of justice. He allows deviations from
equality in those cases where an unequal
distribution would make someone better
off than she was before, without making
anyone else worse off. From these possi-
ble Pareto-optimal distributions, Rawls
then selects the most equal distribution,
the one that makes the worst-off in society
best off – the so-called maximin-rule.
94 european political science: 10 2011 the concept of the state in political philosophy
Now Rawls is important for two reasons.
Firstly, he is politically important. Ever
since the publication of his book, it seems
clear to us that if a moderately redistribu-
tive welfare state – like ours – can be
defended, then Rawls’ theory would be
best suited. Secondly, he is intellectually
important as he has set the agenda for
political philosophy, leaving open numer-
ous lines for criticism and revision.
Let me illustrate four possible types of
move towards Rawls. Firstly, Rawls’ argu-
ments can be criticized, especially his
Original Position and the derivation of his
principles from this version of the state of
nature. There are other conceivable ori-
ginal positions, and I think mine is one of
the more interesting (cf. Barry, 1989).
Secondly, there are internal problems
of consistency in his theory. His principle
of distributive justice – the ‘difference
principle’ – for instance combines two
political theories in one: Pareto’s, which
is welfare-based, and his own, which is
resource-based. The effect of applying
this principle might be that someone gets
paid more (resources) as an incentive to
work harder in the interest of society, but
in fact works less hard, and therefore
has more welfare. The difference principle
is intuitively appealing, but cannot be
taken seriously as it stands now.
Thirdly, the underlying ideas of the
theory can be modified. The difference
principle – again – forbids the use of
merit-arguments in distribution. But can
this be reconciled with Rawls’ ideas about
rights and opportunities, which imply
that what people get should reflect what
they choose to do? In other words, can
desert or merit be included in his theory?
Finally, the implications of Rawls’ theory
can be explored. Rawls has, for example,
little to say about the intra-state and
inter-class exchanges needed to finance
the social security of a welfare state.
I now switch to autobiography for a
short personal statement. I feel com-
mitted to both the political and the
intellectual programme of Rawls: I think
the Western European arrangements of
societies are better than any existing
alternative, and I think that changes in
these arrangements must be defended
from within the existing framework.
The most fruitful approach to political
theory is contractual, that is, justification of
theories by agreement under ideal con-
ditions. Charles Beitz’ Political Equality
(1990) is an excellent example of this
approach, as is my own three-volume
treatise on social justice1 – though I fear it
will turn out in the same way as my Political
Argument (Barry, 1968), which seems to
have been the last contribution to linguistic
philosophy. My book on social justice may
be seen as the end of the line, while the
philosophical debate is moving into new
territory. I do not think that I am saying the
last word on the subject, but perhaps our
energy can be spent in better ways.
Now why do I say this? Because build-
ing theories of this kind is more costly
than beneficial. The advantages are real;
there is now a well-worked out tradition
for analysing states – but the problem is
that the conceptual net catches too little
reality. Compare Rawls’ assumptions
about the state: the facts are that there
are many political decisions taken outside
the state’s borders – for example in the
E.C. – that there is a massive capital flow
between states (GATT etc.), and an un-
deniable interdependence of economies.
Rawls’ assumptions about the state’s
sovereignty thus have to be revised.
On the other hand, what comes out of
the state nowadays is less; the Scottish
educational system, for instance, was and
perhaps still is the best in Britain. It allowed
Scots to fill jobs all over the British Empire,
an opportunity they would not have had if
Scotland had been independent. But being
part of the UK now no longer offers them
any advantages in this respect. The ideo-
logical high tide of the state has also
passed. Following the religious decline
since the sixteenth century, service to the
brian barry and marcel wissenburg
‘The most fruitful
approach to political
theory is contractual,
i.e., justification of
theories by agreement
under ideal conditions’.
state became a second religion, but na-
tionalism as it used to be has passed away.
The modern forms of nationalism are not
focused on purifying and regenerating
man; rather, they are born out of fear of
bad treatment. Like socialism, once a
regeneration theory, nationalism now is a
theory combining efficiency and equity. If
ideology means the belief in a finite
struggle for an aim that will change people,
then ideology is indeed dead.
Political philosophy has not yet come to
terms with the ‘leakage’ of the state up
and downwards. Yet the foundations of
Rawls’ theory, the idea of a contract etc.,
do not have to be changed, nor are the
underlying ideas of the Rawlsian theory –
Western social democracy – too ‘institu-
tionally bound’. Ideas like eliminating
morally arbitrary features in society –
compensating brute bad luck – and reflec-
ting the voluntary choices of people in the
outcome of their actions – the problem of
desert, discussed earlier – can and must
be saved. However, this does not mean
that it is clear what exactly a voluntary
choice or bad luck is.
Other features of Rawls’ theory, how-
ever, must be rebuilt if we drop his defini-
tion of social justice as the subject
of ‘the basic structure of society’. The
idea of equal opportunity on the national
labour market must be rethought for
non-national labour markets such as
the European Community, where equal
opportunity now already is a serious pro-
blem. The same goes for equal opportu-
nity as far as educational opportunity is
concerned. We have to design Rawlsian
distributive arrangements next to that of
european political science: 10 2011 95
 the state, working on a lot of different levels
and each affecting the overall pattern of
distribution. No one knows as yet how to
deal with this; the debate on international
justice is still far too little developed. And,
finally, questions of non-state political
institutions and political accountability
have to be taken more seriously.
There is a lot of capital locked up in our
state framework, but it will take time to
include the actual changes in institutional
frameworks in political theory. I expect
that if the discomfort about the mismatch
between theoretical assumptions and
reality induces such a change in political
theory, then it will happen in Western and
Central Europe rather than in the United
States, as there is in fact less pressure in
the US to think about the diminishing
sovereignty of the state. The US political
philosophers will continue to write about
and along the lines of the Constitution and
decisions taken by the Supreme Court,
whereas their European colleagues will
be driven to rethink the foundations of the
state.
DEBATE
Question by Stanley Hoffmann, Harvard
University: I have two points to make:
(1) I do not see the decline in nationalism
you refer to, and (2) there is controversy
about a lot of Rawls’ conceptions, such as
his view on liberalism, and his idea of
the state as a contract among indivi-
duals. Most notably, there is a US reaction
to Rawls by the so-called communi-
tarians (Taylor, Walzer, and my colleague
Sandel) – a confused and, in my opinion,
bad, movement of left, right, and catholic
writers, who have in common that they
always take tradition and authority as their
point of departure. They want to conceive
of the state in a different way, and argue
that Rawls’ conception of a contract is not
consistent or realistic. Sandel’s critique of
Rawls, for instance, is based on Rawls’ not
taking seriously religious beliefs (which in
96 european political science: 10 2011 the concept of the state in political philosophy
our times sometimes seem to take over
the role of national beliefs) – and I think
this is a serious challenge to Rawls.
Brian Barry: Concerning (2), I think the
communitarians are a very small, confu-
sed and not a serious or interesting move-
ment. The question – as far as Sandel is
concerned – is even whether Rawls used
the assumptions that Sandel ascribes to
him, such as disembodied people in a
contract situation. My alternative to Rawls
is, by the way, an original position with
real people, who imagine changes in their
relative power positions and not in their
beliefs.
There are some elements of truth in
the, otherwise very confused, premises of
the communitarians, but I think these can
be incorporated in a contractual frame-
work. Contractual theorists do not deny
that states can be concerned with cultural
matters, as the communitarians seem
to suppose. The communitarian critique
of Rawls’ and Dworkin’s enthusiasm
for neutrality is misplaced. The stress
on neutrality is a peculiarity of modern
liberals; it is not inherent to liberalism.
Their objections to neutrality are sound,
but they do not stab into the heart of the
contractual framework. Another objection
to the communitarian desire to ‘kill the
contract’ is that the costs will be too
high; it implies, for instance, that educa-
tional systems should be killed as well –
whereas there are, I am sure, things
every person needs to know.
With regard to your first remark, I
won’t deny that national identification is
still important, and that more blood will
be spilled on it than on other issues.
Yet there is a decline in nationalism in
Western Europe (even in Britain); and
nationalism is now more an ideology of
collective selfishness and less one of
universalistic, regenerative sentiments
than it was before World War II.
Question by Ido de Haan, University of
Amsterdam: Rawls presupposes a ‘we’, a
community. What happens when you
bring in other people, when you skip the
idea of a community? Doesn’t this mean
that there can no longer be a neutral
position – and that consequently Rawls’
framework cannot be used as the basis of
our thought about modern society?
Brian Barry: You are correct in saying
that Rawls’ theory itself is state-based,
and that he presupposes the boundaries
of states but never talks about what these
boundaries should be. Rawls’ reply would
be that it took him over 500 pages to
develop his theory, working with these
assumptions, let others do the rest if they
like to.
I think the real question is: what is left,
if we abstract from Rawls’ state-based
theory? You are implicitly saying that his
theory stands or falls with that assump-
tion, and I do not agree. The framework
is much more robust than that; it is not
necessarily bound to the idea of a pre-
existing society with only one level of
authority. The weakness of liberalism is
that it must always come to terms with
the question why people want to be
associated with one state or community
rather than another. The answer to such
questions about the boundaries of politi-
cal authorities cannot only be based on
technical demands or on calling national-
ism for instance romanticism, irrational-
ism, or a thing of the Right. Distributive
justice, for example, asks for something
that binds people together; there is a
relation between the degree of identifica-
tion and the degree of willingness to give,
the degree of redistribution. Contract
theories can deal with such questions.
They must be more intricate than they
are at the moment, but the idea is not
basically wrong. Basically, you can put
everyone in the contract situation and let
them talk about the political structure.
Question by Grahame Lock, University of
Nijmegen, chair: We haven’t talked about
non-universal political institutions, only
brian barry and marcel wissenburg
‘The weakness of
liberalism is that it must
always come to terms
with the question why
people want to be
associated with one state
or community rather
than another’.
about states and world-wide arran-
gements. In non-universal structures
there are boundaries and non-members,
strangers.
Brian Barry: In Rawls’ theory, one is
allowed to do more for one’s family than
for others. On a world scale, we would still
have such differential political authorities,
lower-level institutions with boundaries.
Critics of the idea of impartiality in con-
tract situations, like Sandel and Bernard
Williams, have not understood this idea
too well. Basically, it only means that I
cannot make claims on my behalf without
accepting that others can do the same
on their behalf – a more or less Kantian
premise. There is no more to it, no other
implications than to beware of writing off
the perspectives of others, building in a
veto, and accepting that whatever we
decide must make sense to everybody.
And what makes sense now, in our
days, is differential political authority –
so contract theories can very well deal
with that problem.
Question by Stanley Hoffmann: My pro-
blem is: who are ‘we’, for whom do we
accept, for example, Rawls’ difference
principle? Lots of people do not want to
grant rights to others, simply because
these others are ‘not-we’. Secondly, even
if people in a world-wide original position
decided in favour of the difference princi-
ple, will or must they also decide on the
shape of political institutions, the educa-
tional system, immigration policy, etc.?
european political science: 10 2011 97
 Brian Barry: The contract theory is not a
panacea; hard problems will come up
in any theory. It is just a useful way of
posing problems. But Rawls’ theory is not
all contract theory. What you want is
different authorities deciding on different
issues at different levels. But distributive
justice is only possible in states: there is a
correlation between ethnic homogeneity,
identity, even smallness of the state, and
the willingness to redistribute. The great-
er the state, the more capital there is to
be redistributed – but at the same time,
the greater the danger of capital flight and
labour mobilization, and the less willing-
ness to redistribute. Redistribution will
become more difficult as states become
more permeable.
Grahame Lock: The idea of putting
everyone in a contract is yours; but
Hoffmann says that people do not want
to be part of such a contract where a
distribution of political borders could re-
sult in an unfavourable outcome. This is
a conflict between real life and theory:
if people have still got a strong enough
national(ist) feeling, then they won’t
accept a Barryan theory of justice.
Stanley Hoffmann: I want to distinguish
between the applicability of social justice
to existing states, and the problem on a
world scale – an option Rawls, in a recent
article, rejects.
Brian Barry: You are right. As I see it,
Rawls is turning communitarian; appar-
ently, he has bought the Sandelian stuff,
which I regret. In his book international
relations are just a by-product of the
theory, and it is true that his theory
cannot be applied on an international
scale. But the contractarian framework
is not exclusively Rawls’.
Rawls himself now stresses the ‘wes-
tern post-enlightenment view of the in-
dividual’, and defends his principles by
saying that they are implied by the
institutions you and I accept. This is an
unsound argument; you cannot say ‘you
must believe this because it is implied by
98 european political science: 10 2011 the concept of the state in political philosophy
‘y distributive justice is
only possible in states:
there is a correlation
between ethnic
homogeneity, identity,
even smallness of the
state, and the willingness
to redistribute’.
your practices’. Rawls is definitely going
conservative. He is defenceless against,
for instance, political theories based on
the Koran. If someone believes in the
political implications of the Koran, and
believes it is a sufficient basis for politics,
then a liberal must argue that the Koran is
not true enough to make it a basis of
society. Rawls’ idea of neutrality cannot
defend liberalism; we will have to revive
the seventeenth century arguments
against intolerance and in favour of liber-
alism (cf. Barry, 1990).
Brian Barry, summarizing: I think it
is of immediate importance to get an
informal theory about the institutions
that already exists outside of the state,
for example Belgium’s solution to their
cultural problem by differentiation of
functions. In general, notions of dis-
connecting tasks from the nation to per-
sons – for example, cultural groups – are
not yet incorporated in political theory.
We are not ahead of reality, we are not
even in it.
Elly van Laar, Free University Amsterdam:
You define the state as a territory with a
certain population, and you place the
contract in this state, to link preferences
of individuals to output, to their desert.
But how can the state be neutral, as it
influences this conversion?
Brian Barry: I do not endorse neu-
trality; it is only appropriate in certain
contexts, for instance in the European
Community towards religion. Deriving
liberal conclusions from neutrality, thus
generalizing neutrality, is wrong; neutral-
ity is the form liberal conclusions take in
certain contexts. The society should not
be regarded as treating preferences neu-
trally; nobody believes that it is legitimate
to spend one’s share in medical care
on Scotch. Some things can be distributed
through the market, with some people
ending up better than others. Religious
freedom on the other hand cannot. A
confession is not just a preference for a
religion, it is important to people, and too
important for the state not to be neutral
towards religions.
The state indeed has its own interests,
and that has to be part of a more
self-conscious analysis of institutions.
But the tendency has indeed been to look
upon the state as a neutral body, pro-
claiming the general will. The new theo-
retical discussion on this subject has not
yet taken place.
Grahame Lock: For non-political theor-
ists, for political scientists, the state’s or
government’s interest is overwhelmingly
obvious. Isn’t it strange that political
theorists, except for the now defeated
Marxist opposition, have neglected this
point?
Brian Barry: This idealism regarding the
state is strange, but it goes back a long
way. If I were to predict the growth area
in political theory, then I think this, at
least issues involving political institutions,
will be in the focus, at the expense of
issues of distributive justice. Look at
Rawls: since 1975, he stopped discussing
distributive justice itself, and changed to
defending basic liberties and so on and so
forth.
Godfried van Benthem van den Bergh,
Institute for Social Studies, The Hague:
Do you agree with my conclusion that the
Rawlsian frame can only be adapted to a
world scale only if the world is divided in
brian barry and marcel wissenburg
states or on a world scale – but not to
anything in between?
Brian Barry: I have to stress again that
Rawls’ theory is not the only possible
version of contractarianism. If contract
theories are to have implications, then
the issue is whether people will accept its
results. The task of political philosophy
is to make it acceptable, to give good
reasons for thinking that what the
contract generates is just. It is another
question if we want to be just; if the price
is too high, then we probably will not.
On an international level, social justice
contracts will give less acceptable results
than on the scale of a well-defined com-
munity. But, on the other hand, can you
convince the world’s poor to accept the
status quo? There is grave injustice in
their missing the basic needs for life. This
problem does not need a very sophisti-
cated theory of justice. Sophisticated
theories are for rich communities, for
problems of answering not so basic needs
of not so needy people.
COMMENTS
Herman van Gunsteren, University of
Leiden: There is a puzzle central to my
remarks, namely that the state is a self-
evident point of reference in much poli-
tical analysis, but the outcome of that
analysis is not all that clear – and still
political theory fares well. Furthermore, I
wonder if this period, in which the state
was a kind of unshakeable certainty, is
now over – and if we can do without that
certainty.
The concept of the state as a central
point of reference is obviously important
as well as widespread – in the UN, in
sociology (which presupposes national
societies), and in Rawls. But given the
fact that we do not know much about
the state – where it comes from, how it
european political science: 10 2011 99
 functions, what we can demand of it – we point of reference? The nineteenth cen-
have not got far in analysing the state. tury was special: in those days the state
The results of those analyses are un- was purified. Until then public power was
convincing and confusing. Let me give not concentrated in the state – compare,
some examples from four areas: for instance, the Dutch East-Indies Com-
pany, VOC. During the nineteenth century
(1) What the Germans call Allgemeine
political functions were taken away from
Staatslehre now reads like old-fash-
the judiciary. In our times, this process
ioned schoolbooks – and has not
is reversed: the judge again has, as in
produced any convincing results.
medieval times, a political function in
(2) The philosophical concept of the
deciding on the primacy of political autho-
state, linking up with Kant and
rities and their respective rules, while
Hegel; there is not much coming
referring to generally accepted principles
out of this approach, its foundations
of justice.
are under serious fire – so my con-
Second, and related to this matter, is
clusions are the same.
the question how the international setting
(3) Studies on the constitution, distribu-
gets into the state’s legislation and its
tion, and functioning of power within
practical day-to-day work.
the state, by Marxists like Miliband,
Next, there is the question of citizen-
dealing with the accumulation-legit-
ship. Barry asks what a group is, if you let
imization-crisis theory of the state,
go of the Rawlsian premises. My question
with questions like why people are
is: if there is citizenship, or membership,
obedient, and what is the genesis of
but no state – then what means of access
the state – well, all that work has
to, or exclusion from, citizenship do you
not thrown any light on the centrality
have?
of the concept of the state, on
Fourth, a question brought up by Brian
the question why it is so central. In
Barry: to what extent is the Rawlsian
addition, this approach is seriously
theory state-based? Barry denies that the
underdetermined by empirical re-
Rawlsian concept of the state is a neces-
search; and there is no give-and-
sary condition for contractarianism, but I
take of arguments possible.
wonder. Even if you get everyone in a
(4) The ordinary language analysis of
contract, you will still need a technology
the concept of the state has not
of justice – and the only technology we
brought much. It does not allow for
know of is the state (or do you know any
conflict, which is a central concept in
realistic alternative?). So in practice we
politics but not in language analysis.
do need the state.
A modern form of linguistics, analys-
Fifth, to return to the beginning: why
ing the language games of the state
is political theory doing so well without
as rhetoric – as done, for example,
addressing the problem of the state – and
by Willem Witteveen in his disser-
would it do better if it did? Whatever our
tation – has its own problems. It
answer may be, given the importance of
uncovers practises of making fictions
the concept of the state, I think we will
true, for example, the accountability
have to address it.
of ministers – but then what is the
use of keeping up fictions if we all
Reply by Brian Barry: I cannot discuss all
know they are fictions?
the points you made. One thing though. If
Considering all this, I think the following we started reasoning from universal con-
research questions must be answered. In tractarianism and reached communal
the first place: is the state still a central conclusions – well, then we are already
100 european political science: 10 2011 the concept of the state in political philosophy
a long way from the closed, competent
state. Unless everything that happened to
the state since 1945 is a mistake, we do
need a political theory of what is already
in existence. And I do not think that
things are as simple as the communitar-
ians suggest. Walzer, for example, has an
absolutely crazy idea about the basic
beliefs of Americans – as if they were
social-democrats. Another fiction is the
overstressing of differences between be-
lief systems ‘just across the border’,
between societies. There may be some
difference, but I do not believe it can be
that much.
Herman van Gunsteren: I was not
thinking so much about belief systems,
but rather about passports, permits, etc.
Brian Barry: Let us start with what
already exists outside of the state.
Herman van Gunsteren: I don’t think
you really want to choose your terrain
between state and world.
Brian Barry: O.K., but in the meantime
the contractarian framework must be
applied to reasonably sized entities;
that’s what we need first of all.
Stanley Hoffmann: One remark and
one comment. First the remark: I think
Barry is unfair to Walzer. It is much
more complicated than that. Walzer is an
optimist, he believes in cultural consen-
sus – I, by the way, don’t – but he also
believes that across the borders the
consensus is the same. Sometimes, when
I am mad, I throw the Nazis at him,
but his only answer is that that was an
exception.
Then my comment: I think political
philosophy is about nothing but the
state: the Marxists, endlessly scratching
their heads about the state’s autonomy;
or Rawlsians reflecting on the relation
between the state and individuals. And
how could political philosophy not be
concerned with the state? We are not
out of the logic of the state, we, at least
the Europeans, are building a bigger
brian barry and marcel wissenburg
state. Courts are now applying general
principles to support a new state; they are
still operating as national judges.
Herman van Gunsteren: I cannot agree.
These principles which judges apply are
used to decide about, and weigh up,
authorities.
Brian Barry: I agree with Herman. It is a
derogation of Hobbes’ national sover-
eignty, creating a ‘raison du juge’.
Grahame Lock: The new problems of
political philosophy, emerging through
new variants of the state, are more acute
in Europe than in the USA. Now for young
people it is wise to follow the agenda. Do
you think the focus of discussion will
move back to Europe, which would be
good news for the young scholars here
present?
Brian Barry: I think there are reasons
to suppose that Europe will break
away anyway. A lot of the American
political philosophy is too culturally spe-
cific. The idea of identifying liberalism with
neutrality for instance is basically Amer-
ican – as I stated in my article (Barry,
1990).
Suzanne Berger, Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology: Is Rawls really such
an American generalizer?
Brian Barry: He generalizes the
American state and society; he has
hangovers on typical American ideas
like subsidizing the arts. And anyway,
the idea of neutrality underlies a lot
of American political theory, including
Rawls’ – and these concerns never had
the same salience in Europe. Europe for
instance has never had religious neutral-
ity, there was and still is always some
preferred religion. Another objection to
American political philosophy is that so
much of it is ‘What’s up at the Sup-
reme Court?’. Therefore I think that, if
we get our heads together across the
European borders, we can break away,
starting with premises more fitting our
own traditions.
european political science: 10 2011 101
 Acknowledgements these proceedings. Thanks are due to
I am grateful to Brian Barry’s Estate Marjolien Kavelaars, Masja Nas and
and to the contributors to this debate Grahame Lock for comparing their notes
for granting their permission to publish with mine and Brian’s.

Note

1 Volume I had already appeared in 1989, Brian was still revising Volume II but expected it to be ready by
July 1991, and he had just started work on what he thought would be the final Volume III.

References
Barry, B. (1968) Political Argument, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Barry, B. (1989) Theories of Justice, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Barry, B. (1990) ‘How not to defend liberal institutions’, British Journal of Political Science 20(1): 1–14.
Barry, B. (1995) Justice as Impartiality, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Barry, B. (2002) Culture and Equality, Oxford: Polity.
Barry, B. (2005) Why Social Justice Matters, Oxford: Polity.
Beitz, C. (1979) Political Theory and International Relations, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Beitz, C. (1990) Political Equality, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Dowding, K. (2009) ‘Obituary: Brian Barry (1936–2009)’, Political Studies 57(2): 459–463.
Pogge, T. (1989) Realizing Rawls, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice, Harvard: Harvard University Press.
Rawls, J. (1999) The Law of Peoples, Harvard: Harvard University Press.
Wissenburg, M. (2007) Political Pluralism and the State, Abingdon: Routledge.

About the Authors

Brian Barry (1936–2009) (Author) was the most prominent British and European political
theorist of the last three or four decades. He worked at numerous academic institutions, the
last two being London School of Economics and Columbia University, and published seven
autographs (ending with Why Social Justice Matters in 2005), five (co-)edited volumes and
over 70 articles and book chapters. He was a Fellow of the British Academy, Fellow of the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and was awarded the Johann Skytte Prize in
Political Science from the University of Uppsala in 2001.
Marcel Wissenburg (Editor) is Professor of Political Theory at the Radboud University Nijmegen,
the Netherlands, and Visiting Professor at Keele University, UK. His research interests
include liberalism, theories of justice and environmental political theory. He is the author of,
among others, Green Liberalism (1998) and Political Pluralism and the State (2008).

102 european political science: 10 2011 the concept of the state in political philosophy
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