Jerusalem Issue Briefs-What Happened to the U.S. Deadline on Iran?

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Iran's new proposal to the West did not provide any opening for
International Law serious negotiations on the nuclear issue, but rather vague Our Fellows' Books
Israeli Security formulations for the agenda of any future talks. Back in July, when
the G-8 announced that the opening of the UN General Assembly
Jerusalem "would be an occasion for taking stock of the situation in Iran,"
most international observers understood that there was a hard
ME Diplomacy September deadline that Iran had to meet to begin serious nuclear
U.S. Middle East Policy negotiations. Unfortunately, at this stage, there is little evidence
that the Obama administration is about to adopt effective action in
EU Middle East Policy a timely manner in light of Iran's policy of rejectionism, setting
aside diplomatic engagement and moving to a policy of severe
Radical Islam\Iran
sanctions.
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Glyn Davies, the U.S. ambassador to the International Atomic La Shoah
Audio Archive Energy Agency (IAEA), recently acknowledged that the Iranian - Freddy Eytan-
stockpile of low-enriched uranium has already reached a sufficient
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level so that it was possible to talk about Tehran having "a
dangerous and destabilizing possible breakout capacity." Tehran Show Publications
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North Korea for its nuclear breakout, either by the Bush or Obama By Author
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The common assumption in Washington policy circles today is that
Jerusalem Center even if Iran reaches the nuclear finish-line, the U.S. can fall back
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Projects and On-Line on the same Cold War deterrence that was used against the Soviet All
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Publications nuclear arsenal. However, Iran is a true revolutionary power whose
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aspirations extend into the oil-producing states. It is involved in
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both the Afghan and Iraqi insurgencies, while its support for
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terrorism reaches into Lebanon, Gaza, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and
Books by JCPA Fellows Sudan. With Iran threatening the flow of oil tankers through the
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Strait of Hormuz as well, through which roughly 40 percent of the
Israel's Early Diplomatic world's oil flows, the nuclearization of Iran has global - and not just Print page
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In 2003-2005, Tehran engaged with the EU-3 for two years,
exploiting the talks to race ahead with construction of key uranium
enrichment facilities, while fending off punitive measures by the UN
Security Council for three entire years. Iran today is far more
advanced than it was then and the time for diplomatic
experimentation is extremely limited.

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Jerusalem Issue Briefs-What Happened to the U.S. Deadline on Iran?

In the first part of September 2009, it became clear that Iran was defying
the U.S. and its Western allies by again refusing to open serious
negotiations over its nuclear program, thereby ignoring the deadline it had
been given to respond favorably to President Barack Obama's repeated
overtures to engage diplomatically. After all, President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad declared on September 7 that, from his point of view, "the
nuclear issue is finished." To be clear, he added: "we will never negotiate
on the Iranian nation's rights." Days later, Iran's new five-page proposal to
the P-5 plus 1 (the U.S., Russia, China, the UK, France and Germany)
did not provide any opening for serious nuclear negotiations either, but
rather vague formulations for the agenda of any future talks.

Indeed, the Iranian document began by asserting that the world was
moving beyond "the difficult era characterized by domination of empires,
predominance of military powers," in essence envisioning a period in
which the U.S. was no longer a dominant power. It made reference to the
need for "complete disarmament," but said nothing about Iran's own
nuclear program. In his Friday sermon on September 11, Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei further backed the uncompromising Iranian
nuclear stance that Ahmadinejad had voiced and which appeared in the
Iranian document. It is to be remembered that Iran is presently in violation
of at least five UN Security Council Resolutions that insist it suspend its
continuing enrichment of uranium.

The U.S. Sets a September Deadline for Serious Nuclear Talks

Back in July, when the G-8 announced that the opening of the UN
General Assembly "would be an occasion for taking stock of the situation
in Iran," most international observers understood that there was a hard
September deadline that Iran had to meet to begin serious nuclear
negotiations. President Obama stated at a July 10 press conference after
the G-8 meeting: "We've offered Iran a path towards assuming its rightful
place in the world. But with that right comes responsibilities. We hope Iran
will make the choice to fulfill them, and we will take stock of Iran's
progress when we see each other this September at the G20 meeting."

Unfortunately, at this stage, there is little evidence that the Obama

administration is about to adopt effective action in a timely manner in light
of Iran's policy of rejectionism, setting aside diplomatic engagement and
moving to a policy of severe sanctions. Engagement was the centerpiece
of its Middle East policy and has been hard to abandon. For example,
while rejecting the newest Iranian proposals on September 10, State
Department Spokesman Philip J. Crowley reminded reporters that
engagement was still official U.S. policy, stating: "We remain willing to
engage Iran."

Moreover, within twenty-four hours he announced the Obama

administration's willingness to join the P-5 plus 1 in order to meet with
Iranian leaders directly and open negotiations, despite the repeated
statements coming out of Tehran. The hard-line Iranian
newspaper Javan noted the dramatic U.S. shift on September 14: "One
day after the hasty response to Iran's updated package of proposals,
America made a U-turn and announced that because these proposals
could become a basis for direct talks with Iran, it accepts the talks over
this package." Indicating Iranian understanding of the new U.S. policy, the
article was entitled: "The Inevitable Acceptance of Nuclear Iran."

The first meeting between the two sides reportedly will take place in early
October when Javier Solana, the EU foreign policy chief, meets with
Saeed Jalili, the chief Iranian nuclear negotiator. They will be joined by
representatives from the P-5 plus 1, but, according to Solana's office, the
meeting will not yet be a "formal negotiation," which presumably will come

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Jerusalem Issue Briefs-What Happened to the U.S. Deadline on Iran?

at a later stage. The September deadline appeared to have vanished and

the Iranians have gained valuable time. 

A Display of Western Weakness

The consequences of letting the September deadline pass without

demonstrating a decisive response is clearly not understood in Western
capitals. Iran will carefully calibrate its next moves on the basis of how it
believes the U.S. and its allies will act in the weeks ahead. Up until now,
President Obama's efforts to reach out to the Iranian leadership with
carefully-crafted public messages and private letters have elicited the
opposite response of what he intended. During March he stated in his
address marking Nowruz, the Iranian New Year, that the U.S. wanted the
Islamic Republic "to take its rightful place in the community of nations."
While Ahmadinejad welcomed the administration's call for dialogue with
Iran, nonetheless he bluntly warned: "We say to you today that you are in
a position of weakness. Your hands are empty, and you no longer
promote your interests from a position of strength." What might have been
seen in Washington as a magnanimous gesture was perceived in Tehran
as a sign of reduced Western resolve. 

Iran's Nuclear "Breakout" Scenario

There are two very important Iranian considerations that are likely to be
affected by what the West does now. Just recently, Glyn Davies, the U.S.
ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
acknowledged that the Iranian stockpile of low-enriched uranium has
already reached a sufficient level so that it was possible to talk about
Tehran having "a dangerous and destabilizing possible breakout capacity."
What he probably meant was that the Iranians could soon take their low-
enriched uranium and put it through a further stage of enrichment to
produce weapons-grade fuel. He announced that Iran already has enough
low-enriched uranium for at least one atomic bomb. Under the breakout
scenario, Iran would refuse any more IAEA inspections, shut down the
IAEA cameras that provide a partial picture of what transpires in the
Natanz enrichment plant, and manufacture high-enriched fuel.        

International precedents in this area are not encouraging. North Korea's

nuclear weapons program was initially based on plutonium and not
uranium (now North Korea is moving into uranium enrichment as well), but
nevertheless there is an analogy that can be made regarding its breakout
from IAEA restrictions. It is to be remembered that North Korea's
Yongbyon nuclear reactor was under IAEA monitoring, which sought to
verify that its spent fuel rods would not be reprocessed to produce
weapons-grade plutonium. In 2002, Pyongyang removed the IAEA seals
from its stock of spent fuel rods and subsequently expelled international
inspectors, while announcing its withdrawal from the 1968 Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty.

Since that time North Korea conducted two nuclear tests and got away
with them: first in October 2006 and then in May 2009. Reportedly, Iranian
representatives were present at both. Tehran undoubtedly observed that
no serious action was taken against North Korea for its nuclear breakout,
either by the Bush or Obama administrations. Should Iran escape from
the September deadline that the West itself instituted, then its readiness
to follow the North Korean example will substantially increase.

Can the West Deter Iran?

The second area which will be affected by how Iran is handled at present
will be deterrence. The common assumption in Washington policy circles
today is that even if Iran reaches the nuclear finish-line, the U.S. can fall

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Jerusalem Issue Briefs-What Happened to the U.S. Deadline on Iran?

back on the same Cold War deterrence that was used against the Soviet
nuclear arsenal. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's offer in July of a
"defense umbrella" against Iran to worried Arab states foreshadows the
coming approach of the administration to a nuclear Iran. But will Iran
respond to Western deterrence the way Washington hopes? Indeed, over
the last year, Western leaders have repeatedly declared that a nuclear-
armed Iran was "unacceptable." But should they subsequently acquiesce
to Iran's final sprint to a nuclear capability, what credibility will U.S.
deterrence have with the leadership in Tehran after it successfully defied
the West's repeated warnings?

Unwarranted Complacency

There is an unwarranted complacency growing in the West about Iran.

Some believe that if the world survived the advent of Pakistani and North
Korean nuclear weapons, and the sky did not fall, then an Iranian bomb
will be no more threatening. The cases are, of course, very different:
Pakistan's bid for nuclear power was based largely on its preoccupation
with India, while North Korea has been focused on regime survival and its
interests on the Korean Peninsula (not with conquering Japan). In
contrast, Iran is a true revolutionary power whose aspirations extend into
Iraq, to Bahrain, and the other oil-producing states. It is involved in both
the Afghan and Iraqi insurgencies, supplying weapons and training, while
its support for terrorism reaches into Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, and Sudan. Now Iran is heavily involved in South America
and East Africa, with growing security and economic ties. With Iran
threatening the flow of oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz as well,
through which roughly 40 percent of the world's oil flows, the
nuclearization of Iran has global - and not just Middle Eastern -
implications.       

In dealing with the new Ahmadinejad government, the proposals currently

being considered in the U.S. Congress for a gasoline quarantine on Iran
could be an important good start. The West must demonstrate political
will, but time is now short. It must be remembered that the decision to
engage Iran diplomatically has never been cost-free. In 2003-2005,
Tehran engaged with the EU-3 (UK, Germany and France) for two years,
exploiting the talks to race ahead with construction of key uranium
enrichment facilities, while fending off punitive measures by the UN
Security Council for three entire years. Iran today is far more advanced
than it was then and the time for diplomatic experimentation is extremely
limited. The scale of the next crisis with Iran will largely be affected by
how the Obama administration responds to the challenge it faces when it
meets the Iranians next month.

*     *     *

Dore Gold, President of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, was
Israel's ambassador to the United Nations in 1997-1999. He is the author
of the newly-released book The Rise of Nuclear Iran: How Tehran Defies
the West (Regnery, 2009).

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