Why idealist Realism can´t win the War on Terrorism

Dipl. Pol. Cornelia Beyer

The United States Strategy in the war on terrorism is heavily influenced by realist
thinking. This realist thinking about terrorism is an explanation for intervention.
Both realist thought and deed are misguided and problematic in countering
terrorism as they do not respect the structural features of the phenomenon they are
supposed to address. Second, Counterterrorist strategies of the United States do
not regard nor address root causes of terrorism adequately but apply power
politics in responding to the phenomenon. This theoretically must and empirically
has the effect not to diminish but to increase terrorism.

Terrorism – Structure and Causes

Hartmut Behr analyzed forms of organization of transnational politics at

the example of international terrorism (especially Al Qaeda). We speak of
international terrorism, when perpepetrator and victims are of at least two
different nationalities. The term transnational terrorism refers to international
terrorism, but describes the organizational structures. Transnational terrorism thus
is characterized by:

- the transborder coordination of attacks and their planning,

- the erection of an internationally networked infrastructure,
- international fundraising and financing,
- international trade in weapons and materials,
- recruitment and training of terrorists on a global scale1.

The group around Bin Laden is seen as the prototype of this new
international and transnational terrorism. It even here serves for the description of
the new transnationalism. Generally this transnationalism is marked by the
overcoming of territorial forms of statehood and deterritorialization2.
Al Qaeda is a privte enterprise that operates a worldwide network for
support, action and funding on a highly modern niveau. For this, management and

1
Behr 2002, 110.
2
Schneckener 2002, 19.

1
marketing methods known from economics are applied3. The centre of the group
is organized around bin Laden and was formerly located in Afghanistan and
Sudan interchangeably. Currently Pakistan is suspected to be the haven for the
center. From the center, multiple interconnections exist with the subgroups of the
organization and other afiliated or sypathetic groups all over the world. Al Qaeda
for example has connections to Jemaah Islamiyah in Idonesia and many other
international terrorist organizations in the United States, Europe, Russia, Asia and
the Middle East4. Linkages are formed spontaneously and are managed according
to functional considerations. Schneckener5 and Renate Mayntz also compare the
organizational structures of international terrrorism with networks. According to
Schneckener the networks are highly flexible. Regional bureaus as hubs can be
easily transferred from one country to another. Due to their structure and
flexibility the networks are also resistent vis a vis systemic schocks, given that not
one of the central hubs is attacked.6 According to Mayntz we can observe similar
structures in terrorism as we find them in transnational enterprises7. The role of
states is described by Schneckener as being in decline. States are less important
for international terrorism than they have been in the 1970s and 1980s8.
The causes of the new terrorism are to be searched within a larger context.
A global context is made clear just by the selection of targets. Quantitatively,
American economic installations are the main targets of international terrorism.
International terrorism is particularly directed (mainly, but not solely) against the
United States. Thus it can be argued, the role of the sole superpower in the world
might contribute to international terrorism. The role of the US, especially in the
Middle East, shall be discussed here as one of the main reasons for international
terrorism.

„American global primacy is one of the causes of this war“ (Betts 2002,
20).

International terrorism can be understood as a reaction to the global

3
Behr 2002, 112.
4
Behr 2002, 112.
5
Schneckener 2002.
6
Schneckener 2002, 26.
7
Mayntz 2004.
8
Schneckener 2002, 35.

2
hegemony of the United States. The United States have acted as a hegemon
particularly in the Middle East in that they intervened there repeatedly by political
or military means, inspired or supported political coups and supported regimes
that would otherwise not have survived (for example 1953 in Iran, 1979 in
Afghanistan, 1983 in Lebanon, 1992 in Iraq, 1998 in Iraq, 2001 in Afghanistan
and again 2003 in Iraq9). Richman and others10 state, that the main interest behind
these interventions has been the resource of oil to be found in the region. Frequent
interventions of the US abroad lead to terrorism. According to the Pentagon´s
Defense Science Board there is a strong causal connection between the
involvement of the United States internationally on the one hand and the increase
of terrorist attacks against the US as a result. President Clinton had acknowledged
this fact11. Ivan Eland could show causality of interventions in foreign countries
for terrorism in 65 cases between 1915 and 199812. And finally Osama bin Laden
himself has stated: „The answer to that question [why we attack] is very simple.
Because you attacked us and continue to attack us“13.
Apart from these there are also further political reasons for the conflict
between the United States and the Arab world that are not new. They include for
example the support for Israel that is accused of occupation of Palestinean
territory14. So for example Ivo Daalder of the Brookings Institution states that the
unresolved conflict between Israel and Palestine, wherein the former is clearly
supported by the United States, is one reason for Anti-Americanism in the
reagion. This Anti-Americanism is a source for support and recruitment of
terrorism in the Arab world. For this, a highly onesided support for Israel is
fueling terrorism15. At least in parts of the Islamic world it is understood this way.
Iran’s spiritual leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini said that “his country would not
join the U.S. coalition against terrorism, stating that the United States was ´not
sincere enough` to lead such a campaign in view of its continued support for
Israel“16. The United States provide military and economic support to great extent

9
Richman 1991, Chomsky 1983.
10
Jhaveri 2004.
11
Eland 1998.
12
Ibd.
13
Anonymous 2004, 131, see also Osama bin Ladens fatwa 1998.
14
Bobrow 2002, 186.: „The major sources of terrorist attack were seen as Middle Eastern and
North African. ... The motives were arguably to achieve political gains in this world (e.g., a
Palestinian state and the isolation and eventual elimination of Israel.“
15
Daalder 2001, 407.
16
U.S. Department of State 2001.

3
to Israel. Since 1976 Israel has been the largest recipient of US foreign aid. Within
the past half century Israel overall has received more than 80 billions of dollars, so
the Congressional Research Service. „To groups like Al Quaeda, the United States
is the enemy because American military power dominates their world, … and
backs Israelis against Muslims“17. Up to present Israel remains the largest
beneficiary of US military and economic means. This accounts for 3 billion dollar
per year of which nearly 2 billion dollar are for military means (18 billion within
the past decade). In sum, 17 percept of the foreign aid of the United States goes to
Israel.

„American involvement in the Middle East is clearly the main impulse of

the hatred that has been directed at America. ... [caused] by the direct injection
of American power into the region“18.

The conflict not only is caused by American presence and projection of

power in the region, but is also fueled by support for autoritarian regimes in the
Middle East. These regimes might have desastrous effects on the economic,
political as well as social sphere and the US in turn is seen responsible for their
actions. It is argued, that it is not the Western community of values or economic
or ecological catastrophies and not even globalization that cause terrorism. It is
the undemocratic, corrupt and repressive regimes in the most of the regional states
that squander the resources of the region and are responsible for poverty and
political oppression of millions that are the cause of terrorism19. It is further
argued, that these regimes have been the traditional targets of terrorism, but now
the US has become the far enemy.
The underlying structure of the conflict regarding terrorism thus can be
explained in terms of the political and military involvement of the United States in
the region and the injection of US interests in regional politics. Yet it could also
be argued, that the dominant power globally of the United States alone could be a
cause for international terrorism. According to the theory of Neorealism it could
be assumed that smaller powers try to balance the only remaining superpower.
The US within the military sphere are unequalled – as well against their allies as

17
Betts 2002, 29.
18
Brzezinski 2002.
19
Bahadir 2001, 35f.

4
their rivals. Already at the end of the 1990s the expenses for the defense budget of
the United States neared 300 billion dollar, compared to 45 billion in Japan or 40
billion in France, even less in Great Britain. The United States thus do spend more
on their defenses than the next 15 to 20 militarily most powerful nations together.
This position of power in itself is a cause for concern for many nations and leads
to a strong Anti-American sentiment in the whole world. Terrorism can therefore
be also understood as an expression of this sentiment, as a kind of balancing
below the state by sub-state actors. Yet, Neorealism generally does not regard
non-state transnational actors as capable of balancing.
Regarding the economic causes of international terrorism the scientific
community is divided. For some they are causal for violence, others argue that
terrorists mostly stem from well off families and poverty thus cannot be a cause.
Kitschelt come to the conclusion that deprivation – for example by the exclusion
from the beneficial effects of globalization – can lead to extremism and
potentially to violence: „For such suffering to motivate mobilization, political
ideologues must articulate interests and a broad cultural interpretation that
explains to potential activists how deprivations have come about and how to
overcome them“20. The Middle East and the African continent are predistined for
this development, as they have shown very bad economic performances since the
1980ies: „There is thus no question that the intensity of socio-economic
deprivation felt throughout much of the Middle East has become great“21.
Particularly relative deprivation and structural unequalities respectively can be
described as structural violence according to Galtung. Structural violence can lead
to frustration and this is an important cause for material violence22. This is
especially to be feared in those societies within which more and more young
people are without any prospects for a fulfilled and meaningful life, where
unemployment is the norm. These societies are particularly threatened to be
susceptible to radical ideologies.
Historian Walter LaFeber defines terrorism as a violent action from within
a social order against the very same order in order to attack it and to overthrow the
existing elites. International terrorism thus is directed against a unipolar
hierarchical global society that is perceived as „unrighteous, seditious and

20
Kitschelt 2004, 159.
21
Kitschelt 2004, 163.
22
Beyer 2006.

5
arrogant“23. LaFeber analyses the problem of terrorism as a result of unification as
well as fragmentation of the world, as opposition against an encompassing yet
uneven globalization. Globalization is understood to be mainly a result of US
foreign policies and these are regarded as partly imperialst. But the important
argument is, that terrorism is caused by globalization itself. It is not caused by the
exesses of globalization, though, but by ist limitations: „It [globalization] could
produce wealth but it could not necessarily distribute it more equitably or with the
necessary intelligence“24. Globalization here is understood as a two sided process,
which only partly brings wealth and integration, but on the other hand leads to
relative deprivation and unwanted presence of the US as well as fragmentation
caused by local or national opposition to these results: „and because the benefits
of globalization were either doubtful or badly distributed, one result was a
terrorism that exploited both the globalization and fragmentation“25.
Finally, an international expert group that researched causes of terrorism
for five month in the year 2005 came to the conclusion that never one factor alone
can be causal for terrorism. It was also stated, that poverty as such is not a cause
of terrorism. Yet, modernization and structural unequalities pose a risk factor for
terrorism: „We believe … that poverty is not a cause of terrorism but that rapid
modernization and structural inequalities, both national and international, and the
culture of resentment and alienation they often breed, are risk factors for
terrorism“26.

The strategy of the United States in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)

The National Secrurity Strategy of the United States from 2002 refers to the
probem of international terrorism. It starts with highlightening the principles of
freedom and equality that are relevant to all societies have to be defended on a
global scale. In the second paragraph then the reference to terrorism is made. The
following sentence here became widely known: „we will not hesitate to act alone,
if necessary, to exercise our right of selfdefense by acting preemptively against
such terrorists“27. With this the willingness to unilateral action was uttered which

23
Cox 2002, 270.
24
LaFeber 2002, 11.
25
LaFeber 2002, 12.
26
International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security 2005.
27
The White House 2002, 6.

6
led to international dissent from the United States. Beyond, interventions in haven
states were mentioned in the strategy:

„direct and continuous action using all the elements of national and
international power. Our immediate focus will be those terrorist organizations of
global reach and any terrorist or state sponsor of terrorism which attempts to
gain or use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their precursors“28.

Thus the decision was made for a military approach against terrorism, in
order to respond to attacks and to prevent them. The preemptive option is made
explicit here. The third of the following chapters deals with rogue states and does
mention Iraq in this context. Iraq and similar states threaten the United States and
for this reason a proactive strategy was necessary: „We must deter and defend
against the threat before it is unleashed. We must ensure that key capabilities –
detection, active and passive defenses, and counterforce capabilities – are
integrated into our defense transformation”29 As a further element in the strategy
what follows is the support for free markets. It is hoped that these lead to an
increase in global wealth. As terrorism is understood as the embitterment of few,
this could be understood as part of a strategy against it. Yet the connection
between development and terrorism is only made indirectly: „Economic growth ...
reinforces the habits of liberty“30.
Finally, there is also reference to development as such. A world, it is argued,
wherein half of the people live on less than two dollars a day is neither just nor
stable. Development thus has been one of the highest priorities of the United
States. Classical development aid is abandoned, as this has so far not lead to
success but just malpractice and misuse. For this reason all measures must be
coupled with political changes. Resources would only be made available to those
nations that show political reforms.
In the year 2003 the administration of the US presented the „National
Strategy For Countering Terrorism“ – a strategy that was designed to specifically
address terrorism. It was again highlightened that one would not hesitate to act
unilaterally and preemptively: „If necessary ... we will not hesitate to act alone, to

28
Ibd..
29
The White House 2002, 14.
30
Ibd., 17.

7
exercise our right to self-defense, including acting preemptively against terrorists
to prevent them from doing harm to our people and our country”31. It is
remarkable that the role of states has been underlined as well: „Terrorists must
have a physical base from which to operate“32. States are understood as haven
states in this context: „states around the world still offer havens“33. Very
intensively the behaviour against supporting and haven states is described. The
approach differs according to their willingness to cooperate: „we will reinvigorate
old partnerships … we will support them … convince them … we will act
decisively to counter the threat they pose“34. Countering is supposed to happen by
further aggression („we must continue to take aggressive action“35) and
„extending our defenses“36. Beyond the negation of safe haven the direct fight
against terrorism, the fight against root causes as well as the defense of the
homeland are elements of a 4D-strategy (defeat terrorist organizations; deny
further sponsorship, support and sanctuary; diminish the underlying conditions;
defend the United States). The first refers to military and police employment
agains terrorist organizations. Also the conrol of the finances as well as intelligene
operations count here. The second refers implicitly to military interventions in
states that harbour terrorism. States that are not cooperative shall be held
accountable. Regarding the fight against underlying causes it was described that
the administration intends to act in a development policy scheme as well as wage
a war of ideas. But in the same paragraph it is made clear that one is not willing to
fulfill this part of the strategy alone (contrary to the military pillar). Other states
are also concerned with terrorism and thus have to take part in aid and the war of
ideas. Regarding these two elements, no further elaboration is given apart from
the statement that development aid is ongoing anyway (please remember that the
US like many other states is far beneath the internationally agreed aim of 0,7 %
development aid of the general social product). Regarding the war of ideas it is
said, that the aim is to defeat the ideology of terrorism and delegitimize terrorism
so it will not be able to recruit anymore.
In the year 2006 another National Security Strategy was published which

31
The White House 2003, 2.
32
The White House 2003.
33
Ebd.
34
Ebd., 12.
35
Ebd., 5.
36
Ebd., 12.

8
did not very much differ from the one of 2002. The preemptive option was
highlightened again even without mentioning unilateralism. Yet a strategy can be
constructed from this publication that might continue the GWOT with the known
means against Iran37 and possibly Syria: „We make no distinction between
terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them“38. Under
“further steps” it is written: „In the short run, the fight [against terrorism] involves
using military force and other instruments of national power to kill or capture the
terrorists, deny them safe haven or control of any nation“39. Particularly for the
Middle East the following shall be achieved: Prevention of further attacks,
prevention of the possesssion of WMD for rogue states and terrorists, prevention
of safe haven for terrorists in rogue states and control from the former of the
latter. In this context, eplicitly Syria and Iran are mentioned that have to be “held
accountable” by the world. Finally, the paper adresses the root causes of terrorism.
Poverty, US foreign policy and the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians are
dismissed as causes. Instead, one refers to autoritarian regimes and the following
political alienation, the lack of participatory rights, unjustified allegations, as well
as subcultures that are characterized by conspiracy theories and desinformation
and an ideology that justifies murder. As solution to all these factors, democracy
is presented.
As well, the Strategy for Countering Terrorism was revised in 2006. Herein,
first the successes in the GWOT were described as well as the phenomenon of
terrorism itself. What follows is a presentation of a concrete strategy against
terrorism. The longrange strategy it is to further the spread of democracy and
support democratic changes. Democracy is seen as the „antidote to the ideology of
terrorism“40. As well, the formerly named causes for terrorism are repeated with
the argument, that democracy is capable of dimishing all of them. Political
alienation is replaced by participation, frustration and allegations are replaced by
the rule of law and peaceful conflict resolution, the culture of conspiracy theories
does find ist remedy in the freedom of speach and the free exchange of ideas.
Finally, an ideology that furthers violence is replaced by the respect for
human dignity. So, democracy is the antithesis of and the solution to terrorism.

37
Matin 2006.
38
The White House 2002.
39
The White House 2006b, 9.
40
The White House 2006a, 9.

9
Short term, though, one will further refer to military means. One will attack
terrorist organizations in all their dimensions and diminish their capability to
attack.

Why Realism is losing the war

What do statistics on terrorism tell us regarding the effectiveness of US

counterterrorism? By employing the presented strategies, terrorism could be
prevented from attacking the homeland of the United States again. This might be
seen as a success of these strategies. Yet international terrorism overall has not
been on the decline for the past 5 years and is not going to recede soon. As
structures and causes of the phenomenon are neglected, the following effect
remains ignored: The more the US is fighting terrorism the way it does, the more
it will create new terrorists to follow. For the past 5 years this can be proven
empirically: The data on international terrorism published by the State
Department of the United States in 2004 have to be corrected (and this was openly
admitted by Rumsfeld). The international attacks had tripled in the year 2004
compared to 2003, from 175 attacks to 65541. New numbers so far have not been
published, but members of the State Department and the National
Counterterrorism Centre are said to have referred to these numbers as “dramatic
uptick“. The National Counterterrorism Centre, which was installed by President
Bush, has counted 3,192 attacks with 28.433 victims. Finally, the data from the
RAND Corporation have to be cited. According to this base, there have been 104
international terrorist attacks in 2000, 298 in the year 2002 and 302 in 2005.
These data are showing a decrease in the late 1990ies and a strong increase after
2001. I conclude that we can firmly assume that terrorism is on the rise and not
decreasing.
So, why is the US and idealist Realist and why can´t idealist Realism win?
A dominantly military approach within the US policies in the Global War
on Terror can be discerned given the dominant interpretation of terrorism as an
external phenomenon located in haven states. This interpretation is dominant in
the current US administration. It can be linked to the state centric worldview that

41
S. B. Glasser, ´U.S. Figures Show Sharp Global Rise in Terrorism`, online:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/04/26/AR2005042601623.html,
30.03.06.

10
is embraced by Realism. Realism generally highlights states as the relevant actors
in world politics and neglects other actors. So the necessity in dealing with
terrorism arises (if one accepts this framework of thinking) to trace transnational
terrorism back to the state. This is achieved by the construction of haven states.
Construction here means that the overemphasis on the state as the culprit with
regards to transnational terrorism only makes sense through the lense of Realism.
It cannot be justified beyond that paradigm. Not appyling Realism would mean to
fight terrorism as a transnational network, by multinational cooperation and police
coordination. As the first part tried to show, this would be a much more efficient
approach towards ´international` terrorism than the current policies of
intervention.
This was the first argument for the inefficiency of Realism. Yet in the
strategies there is also a reference to democratization. Here idealism comes in.
Promoting the spread of democracy was a genuine interest of idealists such as
Wilson. But the means currently employed contradict idealism. Violence and
intervention are not quite idealist instruments for pursuing the high aims of
democratization. It has to be mentioned, that the debate on how to term the
foreign policy of the US – as realist or idealist – is ongoing.
We just mentioned another issue the lack of which has to do with Realism:
multilateralism. Multilateral cooperation – even global governance – are
necessary for an effective fight against terrorism. Transnational problems that can
be understood as externalities of globalization just brought about the claim for and
the construction of global governance. Global governance can be understood as
the institutionalization of multilateral cooperation for the sake of addressing
policy problems. Even more than preventing war, global governance nowadays is
in existence to deal with the externalities of globalization and the global system.
Examples of these externalities are climate change and human rights but also
international terrorism. So, it would only be logical to think of global governance
first in order to attack international terrorism. This once again would make sense
with regards to addressing the transnational – even global – network structure of
terrorism. Policing and financial control for example only do make sense if
applied globally, which is why the Financial Action Task Force is a global
governance tool. Purely national police actions against transnational terrorism can
be helpless at best. So, multilateral cooperation within the framework of global

11
governance is essential for effectively fighting terrorism. Yet what is happening is
at least partly opposed to this. The United States proceeds unilaterally and even
violates the United Nations and alienates its allies. On the other hand, the US
demands other states to cooperate in intelligence sharing, aviation security and
financial control for example, but does not cooperate in turn to full extent42.
Third, the US does pay attention to lower politics, like policing and
financial control43 against terrorism, but its focus is on the high politics of power
and military employment. Yet it can be firmly assumed, that just these might be
effective in fighting a transnational network as well they will even inspire more
violence as they fuel the underlying tensions. The military pillar is particularly
dominant in the Strategy of the United States against terrorism. This is congruent
with Realisms claims on defence and the neglect of lower policies. The focus on
the military can empirically proven by looking at the United States budgets for
2006:

Budget of the United States Administration 200644

Defense budget45 419,3 billion

Military sorties 85 billion46
Department of Homeland Security 34,2 billion
Foreign aid 18,5 billion
FBI 5,7 billion
47
Department of Justice 3,1 billion
Control of terrorist funding 100 million
Border security48 23 million

Military interventions have the biggest share of the budget. This means,
the US focusses on the military fight against terrorism and haven states in
particular and does, relatively speaking, neglect other elements, such as the fight

42
Results of research on US-ASEAN counterterrorism cooperation by interviews with security
policy experts in Singapore.
43
Jackson 2005.
44
The White House 2006.
45
Budget of the U.S. Department of Defense.
46
Bilmes and Stiglitz 2006.
47
Budget for homeland security.
48
For policies of the Department of Homeland Security.

12
against the formation of networks or the fight against root causes of terrorism. As
discussed, networks cannot be fought by punctual interventions. Networks simply
evade military attacks and reform their structures. Further, the networks develop
more and more into a loose community. Increasingly Al Qaeda in particular is
spoken of as an ideology more than an organization. This implies that direct
connections between the central leaders and new members are less and less
important. Individual perpetrators and groups dispose of information, knowledge
and material necessary to conduct an attack. The information that is critical can be
obtained by simply using the internet. The attacks in London are an example for
this new kind of unorganized terrorism. The United States Administration is
aware of this effect, as can be seen in their strategy papers. Yet, a change in their
policies to attack the so called haven states is not to be expected.
Apart from the structural argument the strategy against terrorism cannot be
successful as the causes of international terrorism are not observed and addressed.
Relative deprivation, aggressive foreign policy and psychosocial effects of
globalization are not regarded causes of terrorism (or only marginally so) and thus
are not addressed. Just herein lies a problem: „One critical issue is how terrorism
is produced in particular places through social, political, economic, ecological,
and psychological tensions. This type of understanding emphasizes changing
conditions, not attacking people and places“49. And:

„without understanding how to utilize … root causes-based conceptual

capability and tools, combating terrorism campaigns are likely to be ineffectual
and terrorist insurgencies will become, due to lack of effective resolution,
increasingly protracted and lethal in their warfare.50“

For addressing the root causes that were shown in the first part, alternative
approaches and means that can be subsumed under so called soft power are
essential. An international experts meeting on terrorism and counterterrorism
found, that a number of policies that are currently neglected might be beneficial in
countering terrorism. These encompass the respect for human rights, economic aid
and support for democratization without military interventions51. These might be

49
Ettlinger and Bosco 2004, 254.
50
Sinai 2004, 63.
51
International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security 2005a.

13
more effective than military interventions.
Finally, the United States acts the way it does because it embraces a Realist
understanding of the conflict itself. Terrorism is not understood as a crime (as for
example the European Union understands it), but war. This refers to a general
understanding of the setting as one of anarchy. In anarchy there can be no crime
that could be legally punished and thus dealt with within a structured framework.
Within anarchy any aggression is war and the defense against it can only be the
same.

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