Strategic Snapshots
Snapshot 3
Decisions and Destinies:
Asian Security in 2010
Rory Medcalf September 2010
I
n Washington, Beijing, Tokyo, New Delhi, Seoul and
Pyongyang, decisions and deeds this year have sharply
illustrated how political choice can shape Asia’s security
environment.
From a North Korean torpedo strike to an India-China hotline;
from a US-Taiwan arms deal to new levels of Chinese
maritime assertiveness; from coordinated displays of US
naval presence to the reshaping of diplomatic architecture
to accommodate America and Russia; from the tightening of
ties between Seoul and Washington even as they wavered
between the latter and Tokyo: contemporary events underline
that Asia’s strategic direction is not preordained simply by
shifts in economic weight and military potential. Whether the
region’s future will resemble a balance of power, concert of
powers, hegemony or some other arrangement will depend
also on the choices that governments make in responding
to structural forces, as argued in Power and Choice: Asian
Security Futures.1
Faced with strategic flux and the resulting sense of insecurity,
nations have some clear choices, including:
• to expand, consolidate or contract their military reach
and profile;
• to opt for unilateral assertiveness or to emphasise
dialogue and cooperation;
• to use defence diplomacy as a tool to reduce risk
of conflict, or to withhold it as a reward for political
concessions;
• to reinforce power-balancing capabilities, whether
national defence forces or alliances;
• to seek regional stability through attempts at
mutual threat reduction or through bids for military
superiority;
• to respond to transnational security threats unilaterally
or cooperatively;
• to shape, rather than simply follow, domestic public
opinion;
• to focus on regional or global imperatives;
• to invest seriously in inclusive diplomatic institutions;
• to tolerate or respond to provocative actions;
• and to decide whether interests, capabilities, or some
definition of values should take priority in determining
which countries to engage as security partners.
Some choices are not clear-cut. Actions that may appear
unsettlingly assertive in one capital might seem defensive in
another. Arms acquisitions can be destabilising or essential
to keep the peace, depending on complex and shifting
geopolitical circumstances. Dialogue, transparency and
cooperation can go hand-in-hand with the advancement
of national capabilities and interests. Competitive military
modernisation might persist in a relatively low-risk fashion
alongside economic and social enmeshment.
Still, there have been worrying signs of late: indications that
the threat and use of force, whether as a result of calculated
policy or of misperception, are going to remain a part of
Asia’s foreseeable future. Constructive steps have been over-
matched by a more risky kind.
All at sea
One notable feature is the maritime context of most of these
negative developments. It is no surprise that Asia’s key
security interactions should be in this domain, bearing in mind
the region’s geography and vast – and still-growing – reliance
on seaborne commerce, including energy imports. What is
alarming is the degree of risk some powers seem willing to
incur in this Indo-Pacific commons.2
Despite or because of its acute seaborne dependence, China
in particular appears to have taken a decision to pursue
assertive deployments and uncompromising diplomacy in
several maritime theatres. This April it ventured into the
Pacific with its most powerful eastward foray yet, in which its
helicopters buzzed Japanese patrol vessels at dangerously
short range. Beijing has declared the South China Sea a core
interest, suggesting a willingness to confront other countries
in these disputed waters. After objecting to US-South Korean
exercises in the Yellow Sea it has proceeded with its own
live-fire wargames there. And, amid all this, China has cited
long-anticipated US arms sales to Taiwan as its reason to
suspend precisely the kind of military-military dialogues
with the United States that both powers need to minimise
accidental confrontations at sea.
Broadly speaking, Beijing’s naval modernisation is the legitimate
response of a vast trading power to deep insecurity about its
supply vulnerabilities. It was inconceivable that China would
forever outsource the entirety of its sea-lane security to the
United States.  But that alone does not explain some of its key
capability choices, such as ballistic and cruise missiles.3 At this
time of unprecedented Chinese naval power, modernisation
and audacity, it is troubling that confidence-building and
dialogue mechanisms remain weak to non-existent, and that
Beijing appears to want it to remain so. This is as bad for
China’s interests as it is for everyone else’s.
If China’s maritime adventures are becoming perilous, those
of its spoilt little brother North Korea have turned lethal. The
sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan in March
appears to mark a new depth of risk-taking by the North. But
the dangers do not end with the loss of sailors’ lives and
the possibility that the North might attack again. For reasons
of credibility and deterrence, Seoul and Washington have
been confronted with the delicate task of preparing a range
of responses – including displays of force. Notable in this
regard has been their decision to proceed with major warfare
exercises (see Strategic Snapshot 1: Cheonan Choices).4
For its part, Beijing’s unwillingness to condemn the sinking,
its criticism of the US-South Korea exercises, and its rejection
of maritime confidence-building serve to worsen tensions in
Northeast Asian waters. This marks an even deeper problem.
It has been widely speculated that North Korea’s latest
phases of provocation – dating back to the 2009 nuclear
and missile tests – could relate to struggles for influence
within Pyongyang in preparation for a leadership transition.
If, however, an effective handover of power requires such
external risks, it is further evidence of the profound fragility
of the DPRK.
2 Decisions and Destinies: Asian Security in 2010
Concerns have resurfaced in the past year about the prospect
of DPRK state collapse, and the need for coordination among
countries with a key stake in Korean stability.5 In the current
climate of mistrust, however, the prospects for a constructive
contingency-related dialogue between the most crucial powers
– China and the United States – appear slim. Beijing’s current
calculation appears to be that such a dialogue would involve
unacceptable costs – perhaps because this might mean
admitting that Washington has a legitimate role in Korea’s future,
or because it might signal a lack of Chinese confidence in and
goodwill towards Pyongyang. Yet without such preparation, the
risks of China-US military confrontation during a future North
Korean regime crisis will be great. They have, of course, waged
bitter war over the existence of North Korea before.
Cross-currents
The news has not all been bad for peace and order. North
Korea’s action is driving solidarity among US allies and
partners not much accustomed to direct defence cooperation
with each other. Under its unsteady Democratic Party
of Japan-led government, Tokyo’s new official attitude to
a rising China has not yet crystallised, though will likely
revert to mistrust.6 It seems that the Cheonan incident is
bringing Japanese and South Korea closer together, now
that they have a more clear and present maritime danger than
zealous citizens claiming the contested Dokdo/Takeshima
island. Further away, Australia contributed expertise to the
multinational panel that identified the origin of the torpedo
attack. Aware of its crucial economic and strategic stake in
a prosperous, secure North Asia, Canberra has been trying
to add substantial defence ties with Seoul to its deepened
links with Tokyo.
Further south, China’s new tone of dominance in the South
China Sea is prompting firm reactions. In July the United
States has used the region’s most inclusive regional security
dialogue, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), to affirm its
own interest in peace and freedom of navigation in these
international waters. In August, in a demonstration both
material and intensely symbolic, a US destroyer visited
Vietnam7 and a high-level Vietnamese delegation visited a
US aircraft carrier offshore. Although Vietnam’s official media
sought to play down the power-balancing message, and
some ASEAN countries say they want to limit US involvement
in ‘resolving’ the South China Sea issue,8 it appears that
China’s assertiveness in Southeast Asian waters is reaching
the limits of what the rest of the region is prepared to accept.
Interestingly, the tone of some Chinese commentators has
already begun to moderate, with one even suggesting that
China consider referring the disputes to the International
Court of Justice.9
Meanwhile in the Indian Ocean, the picture is mixed. It is
not quite the race to great-power rivalry that some voices
have popularised, but it could very well become that. In
the Gulf of Aden, there has been some welcome progress
in coordination and communication between China’s and
some of the other naval taskforces patrolling against piracy,
including with China taking its turn as leader of an information-
sharing mechanism. New Delhi, initially rattled by the speed of
Beijing’s deployment to an ocean India had long considered
its own, has regained enough poise to propose limited
maritime security cooperation with China. The wider strategic
relationship between China and India will face major frictions
as the two powers rise, but this year’s announcement of a
leaders’ level hotline suggests a new recognition on both sides
that ignoring their differences is in the interests of neither.
Still, disputes over visas and territorial recognition threaten to
cripple the powers’ working-level defence diplomacy, and the
potential for confrontation between New Delhi and Beijing
will keep growing.
Gates to choose from
At the Shangri-La regional security dialogue in June, US
Defence Secretary Robert Gates reminded regional defence
ministers and experts of a key lesson from Asia’s post-1945
history:
… the success this region has enjoyed over the past
several decades – its unprecedented economic growth
and political development – was not a foregone
conclusion. Rather, it was enabled by clear choices about
the enduring principles that we all believe are essential to
peace, prosperity, and stability.10
He went on to describe choices about free commerce;
the rule of law in international order; open access to the
global commons; resolution of conflict without force; and
the elevation of common interest over national interest. His
message may have been aimed principally at North Korea, but
can apply more widely to the region.11
A central argument of Power and Choice is that the region’s
future is not pre-determined: shifting power balances alone do
not explain where the region is headed, including whether we
are headed for peace or war, for instability, balance, or the sort
of stability that comes through dominance by a single power.
Recent events underscore that some unsettling choices
are being made. The region appears headed for a period of
heightened risk. In particular, the United States and China
are not communicating properly with each other over the
day-to-day maintenance of East Asian security, including
at sea, at the very time when the risks of prolonged crisis
and confrontation on the Korean Peninsula have been
heightened.
Power and Choice highlights two kinds of choices that
will help determine which scenario – hegemony, balance
or concert – is most likely to come about in Asia, and also
how particular shocks might accelerate trends towards one
scenario or another.
Those two kinds of choices are: first, how to prepare for
shocks, how to change the conditions of the international
security environment to make it easier to manage shocks
when they are occur; and second, crisis decisions, the
immediate responses to shocks.  Of course the first kind
of shaping, preparatory decision helps to set the range of
practical options available for the second kind of reactive,
crisis decision.  In the event of a regime collapse or other
crisis in Korea, for example, there may not be a real option
for coordinated, de-conflicted action by the US and Chinese
militaries if the time of the shock has not been preceded by
a long period of improved communication and trust-building
between those militaries.  At the moment Washington is
willing but Beijing appears to be choosing to reject that kind
of confidence-building – in other words, raising the risks of
confrontation if a full-scale Korea crisis occurs.
One kind of preparatory, shaping choice that is beginning
to gain more attention is the formation and deepening of
multilateral diplomatic mechanisms – ‘architecture’ – which
might convene to prevent or manage crises. It now appears
almost certain that the United States and Russia will join the
East Asia Summit, ensuring that the region has a leaders’
meeting at which all key security actors are represented –
albeit in the presence of many smaller players. The United
States has signalled that it sees this summit as having a
central role in discussing critical strategic questions, like the
South China Sea. A smaller step is the establishment of an
inclusive forum for defence ministers in the region, the ASEAN
Defence Ministers Meeting Plus Eight, which will assemble
for the first time in Hanoi later this year. Unfortunately, there is
little evidence that this forum, like the ARF, will be invested any
time soon with responsibilities for active confidence-building,
discussion of core strategic problems or transparency over
offensive weapons procurements. At this stage, it is intended
to meet merely once in three years. So for the time being, the
region’s security future will continue to hinge on the choices
of the strong or the reckless.
Strategic Snapshots 3
Strategic Snapshots

Notes
1
Malcolm Cook, Raoul Heinrichs, Rory Medcalf and Andrew 9
Shen Dingli, China’s regional relations: Australian can help, The
Shearer, Power and Choice: Asian Security Futures, Lowy Interpreter http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2010/08/19/
Institute MacArthur Foundation Asia Security Project, 2010 Chinas-regional-relations-Australia-can-help.aspx
http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=1306 10
First Plenary Session, Dr Robert M. Gates, Shangri-La
2
The present analysis covers the same geographical footprint as Dialogue 2010 http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-
Power and Choice: Asia defined as an essentially Indo-Pacific la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2010/plenary-session-
region of large and middle powers, in particular the United speeches/first-plenary-session/robert-gates/
States, China, Japan, India, South Korea and Australia, also 11
Wider questions of the choices involved in US grand
taking into account Russia and potentially influential Southeast strategy and its relation to the maritime commons in Asia are
Asian states, notably Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore.  considered in Michael J. Green, America’s Grand Strategy
3
See, for instance, Annual Report to Congress: Military and in Asia: What Would Mahan Do? Strategic Snapshot 2,
Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of Lowy Institute MacArthur Foundation Asia Security Project,
China, 2010, Office of the Secretary of Defense, pp 29-33. September 2010. http://lowyinstitute.org/PublicationPop.
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf asp?pid=1374
4
Malcolm Cook and Andrew Shearer, Cheonan choices,
Strategic Snapshot 1, Lowy Institute MacArthur Foundation
Asia Security Project, August 2010 http://www.lowyinstitute.
org/Publication.asp?pid=1361 About The Author
5
A strategic shock explored in Power and Choice, pp 72-76.
6
Andy Forrest, Learning to live with rivalry, The Interpreter, 17 Rory Medcalf is the International Security Program Director at
August 2010 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2010/08/17/ the Lowy Institute, where his areas of interest include Asian
Japan-China-Learning-to-live-with-rivalry.aspx geopolitics, nuclear issues, Australian security, and Australia-
7
Appropriately, the USS John S McCain. India relations. His professional background spans intelligence
8
Manila says US not needed in South China Sea row, analysis, journalism and diplomacy.
Agence France-Presse, August 9, 2010 http://www.google.
com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hoOYtZyAGVIZe-
JcqZ42nTScZl5g

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The Lowy Institute’s MacArthur Asia Security Project explores evolving strategic relations among Asia’s major powers. Based
on a realistic understanding of the region’s competitive dynamics in a range of key domains, the Project aims to develop a
practical agenda for security cooperation across Asia and a suite of measures to ensure that competition does not lead to
miscalculation or conflict.

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