Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUD
RaceTrac under ACE’s two excess liability insurance policies for allegations
the state courts of Mississippi (hereinafter “the Bunns lawsuit” and “the
injuries from exposure to benzene from gasoline vapors in the stores during
G21732850, which was effective from June 1, 2006 through June 1, 2007.
Both of the insurance policies provide coverage for “the ‘ultimate net
loss’ in excess of the ‘retained limit’ shown in the declarations’ that the
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denied coverage for that lawsuit based on the excess liability policies’
pollution exclusion. [Doc. 1, Exhibit F”]. ACE never received any notice
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relief and attorneys fees. [Doc. 1]. In its complaint, RaceTrac alleged that
the ACE excess liability insurance policies provide coverage for the Bunns
“ultimate net loss” and “loss adjustment expenses” in excess of each policy’s
[Doc. 1, ¶ 35].
ACE excess policies does not preclude coverage for the Bunns and Williams
ACE denied RaceTrac’s allegations that the claims asserted in the Bunns and
Williams lawsuits are covered under the excess liability insurance policies,
and denied that the policies’ pollution exclusion violates the public policy of
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because RaceTrac’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Specifically, the complaint fails to set forth plausible facts which, if
coverage under the ACE excess liability insurance policies. The pollution
proven true, would be sufficient to support its allegation that the pollution
Moreover, ACE submits that the pollution exclusion is valid and enforceable
and that as a matter of law it does not violate the public policy of the state of
Georgia.
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
upon which relief can be granted when it appeared “beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
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him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d
80 (1957). However, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127
S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), the United States Supreme Court
recently replaced the “no set of facts” standard with the “plausibility
standard,” which requires that factual allegations “raise the right to relief
above the speculative level.” Id. at 555; ADA v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d
1283, 1288-1289 (11th Cir. 2010). The “plausibility standard” does not
evidence” supporting the claim. Id. at 556, 127 S. Ct. at 1974; ADA v.
Cigna Corp., supra at 1289; Dege v. ationwide Ins. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist.
matters of which a court may take judicial notice. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor
Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322, 127 S. Ct. 2499, 168 L. Ed. 2d
179 (2007); Grossman v. ationsbank, A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir.
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claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. --- , 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). The United
complaint that are merely legal conclusions; and 2) where there are well-
Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d at 1290. A complaint must be dismissed under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) if the facts as pled do not “state a claim for relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. at 1974, 167
L.Ed.2d 929; Edwards v. Prime Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010);
Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009).
Under Georgia law, insurance policies are a matter of contract and are
intention of the parties, who are bound by its plain and unambiguous terms.
Boardman Petroleum v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 269 Ga. 326, 498 S.E.2d
492 (1998); Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. DeMoonie, 227 Ga. App. 812, 490
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S.E.2d 451 (1997); Progressive Preferred Ins. Co. v. Brown, 261 Ga. 837,
838, 413 S.E.2d 430 (1992); Richards v. Hanover Ins. Co., 250 Ga. 613,
Williams Seafood of Albany, Inc., 273 Ga. 710, 544 S.E.2d 156 (2001).
damages within the policy's coverage. See Util. Serv. Co. v. St. Paul
Travelers Ins. Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4634 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 22, 2007);
Erie Indem. Co. v. Acuity, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52590 (N.D. Ga. July 19,
2006); Safeco Ins. Co. v. Atlanta Metro Leasing, Inc., 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21468 (N.D. Ga. May 11, 1993). In this case, the complaint filed by
RaceTrac seeks coverage for damages that it may become liable to pay for
the bodily injuries in the Bunns and Williams lawsuits which are alleged to
45]. However, both of the ACE excess liability insurance policies contain
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in pertinent part:
2. Exclusions
* * *
f. Pollution
6U91c (07/02), pp. 2-3 [Doc. 1, Exhibits “A” and “B”]. However, that
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policies as it wishes, provided they are not contrary to law, and it may insure
against certain risks and exclude others. Reed v. Auto-Owners Inc. Co., 284
Ga. 286, 667 S.E.2d 90 (2008); Payne v. Twiggs County School District,
269 Ga. 361, 496 S.E.2d 690 (1998); Continental Cas. Co. v. HSI Fin.
Serv. Inc., 266 Ga. 260, 466 S.E.2d 4 (1996). Terms in an insurance policy
are given their ordinary and common meaning, unless otherwise defined in
the contract. Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 259 Ga. 333, 380
Mut. Ins. Co., supra; Giles v. ationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 199 Ga. App.
Ins. Co., supra (claim for injury from fumes fell within clear language of
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absolute pollution exclusion); Truitt Oil & Gas Co. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 231
Ga. App. 89, 498 S.E.2d 572 (1998) (absolute pollution exclusion not
App. 231, 378 S.E.2d 407 (1989) (no ambiguity as to scope of pollution
exclusion); Owners Ins. Co. v. Farmer, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1330 (N.D. Ga.
Fire Ins. Co., 856 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ga. 1993), aff’d, 21 F.3d 1126 (11th
pollution exclusions like the one at issue here routinely enforced such
Mut. Ins. Co., 451 Pa. Super. 136, 678 A.2d 802 (1996); Cook v. Evanson,
83 Wn. App. 149, 920 P.2d 1223 (1996); Crescent Oil Co. v. Federated
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Mut. Ins. Co., 20 Kan. App. 2d 428, 888 P.2d 869(1995); Apana v. TIG Ins.
Co., 504 F. Supp. 2d 998 (D. Haw. 2007); Maska U.S., Inc. v. Kansa Gen.
Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 1999); Stamford Wallpaper Co. v. TIG Ins.,
138 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 1998); Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hatch, 835 F.
Supp. 209 (D. Minn. 1992), aff’d, 5 F.3d 1175 (8th Cir. 1993); Alcolac, Inc.
v. California Union Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1546 (D. Md. 1989).
The mere fact that the ACE excess liability insurance policies do not
list the specific substances covered under the absolute pollution exclusion
does not mean that the exclusion is ambiguous. A contract is not rendered
ambiguous by the mere fact that the contract does not define a term, Da
F.3d 581 (11th Cir. 1997), or that the parties may not agree upon the proper
construction to be given it. Wile v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 410 F. Supp.
2d 1313 (N.D. Ga. 2005). As other courts have noted, the fact that a large
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30675 at [* 17] (N.D. Ga. Dec. 28, 2004). For these
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as a “hazardous air pollutant” in The Clean Air Act and a “toxic pollutant”
courts in other jurisdictions have ruled that benzene is a pollutant within the
orthbrook Indem. Ins. Co. v. Water Dist. Management Co., 892 F. Supp.
170 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (claims for bodily injury arising out of discharge of
exclusion); Gotham Ins. Co. v. GLX, Inc., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10891
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 1993) (claims of injury and damages arising from release
exclusion).
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construction, the court must enforce the contract as made by the parties.
Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Drury, 213 Ga. App. 321, 445 S.E.2d 272 (1994);
Burnette v. Georgia Life & Health Ins. Co., 190 Ga. App. 485, 379 S.E.2d
188 (1989). Under the plain language of the pollution exclusion, the ACE
excess liability insurance policies provide no coverage for the injuries and
this case would violate public policy – is not supported by Georgia law.
Competent parties are free to choose and insert whatever provisions they
Department of Transp. v. Brooks, 254 Ga. 303, 328 S.E.2d 705 (1985);
Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Dobbins, 205 Ga. App. 700, 423 S.E.2d
396 (1992); Donaldson v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 177 Ga. App. 748, 41 S.E.2d
279 (1986); Simmons v. Select Ins. Co., 183 Ga. App. 128, 358 S.E.2d 288
public policy unless the General Assembly has declared it to be so, or unless
law, or unless the contract is entered into for the purpose of effecting an
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Auto. Ins. Cos. v. Walker, 234 Ga. App. 101, 103, 505 S.E.2d 828 (1998);
Hartford Ins. Co. of Southeast v. Franklin, 206 Ga. App. 193, 195, 424
S.E.2d 803 (1992); Fournier v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 862 F. Supp. 357,
only where the case is free from doubt and where an injury to the public
interest clearly appears. Emory Univ. v. Porubiansky, 248 Ga. 391, 282
S.E.2d 903 (1981); Precision Planning, Inc. v. Richmark Cmtys., Inc., 298
Ga. App. 78, 679 S.E.2d 43 (2009); Baldwin v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
264 Ga. App. 229, 590 S.E.2d 206 (2003); Piedmont Arbors Condominium
Ass'n v. BPI Constr. Co., 197 Ga. App. 141, 397 S.E.2d 611 (1990); Harris
because it violates public policy only when the legislature has statutorily
Co. v. Smith, 218 Ga. App. 536, 462 S.E.2d 441(1995) (Emphasis added);
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Hartford Ins. Co. of Southeast v. Franklin, 206 Ga. App. 193, 424 S.E.2d
803 (1992); orth Georgia Petroleum Co. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 68 F.
carefully on its own merits, and apply the appropriate legal guideline to the
particular facts presented to the court. Collier v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 249 Ga. App. 865, 549 S.E.2d 810 (2001); ational Consultants, Inc.
v. Burt, 186 Ga. App. 27, 366 S.E.2d 344 (1988); Harris v. ational
Georgia law does not require liability insurance in every case, exclusions are
whether they are against public policy. Southern Guaranty Ins. Co. v.
Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 257 Ga. 355, 359 S.E.2d 665 (1987); Hoque
v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 281 Ga. App. 810, 637 S.E.2d 465
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pollution exclusions are against Georgia public policy came to the same
Supp. 2d 1321 (N.D. Ga. 1999). In that case, the insured argued that the
the clause merely ‘clarified’ the scope of existing coverage.” Id. at 1327.
violates public policy only if the legislature has statutorily mandated that an
inter alia, Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Drury, 213 Ga. App. 321, 445 S.E.2d
272 (1994), and Hartford Ins. Co. of Southeast v. Franklin, 206 Ga. App.
Hulstzman v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 188 Ga. App. 12, 372 S.E.2d 9
(1988), which held that “in those cases where restrictions or limitations have
been imposed by the courts on the right of an insurer to define and limit the
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risk or liability assumed under the terms of a policy, it has been on the basis
provided.” Id. at 1328. The orth Georgia Petroleum court then held:
Id.
exclusion for damages resulting from gasoline or one of its constituent parts
of benzene.” [Doc. 1, ¶¶ 49, 54].1 The policies upon which RaceTrac relies
for its allegations contradict these contentions. ACE insured RaceTrac for
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handler and purveyor of gasoline. The ACE excess policies on their face
“A” and “B”]. In the insuring sections of the policies, ACE insured
Exhibits “A” and “B”]. In other words, ACE insured RaceTrac for liability
for bodily injuries arising out of slip-and-falls on the premises, and other
store operator.
This alleged basis of RaceTrac’s claim for relief already has been
Coating Applicators, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 157 F.3d 843 (11th Cir.
1998). In that case, the Eleventh Circuit held that the absolute pollution
exclusion did not nullify the essential coverage provided by the policies
accidents and mishaps associated with the business of the insured. Id. at
846.
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plain terms of the ACE excess liability insurance policies, are not
“plausible” because they are clearly incorrect as shown by the policies which
that it is entitled to insurance coverage based upon the terms of the ACE
Court of Appeals decision in Barrett v. at'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 304 Ga.
App. 314, 696 S.E.2d 326 (2010). In Barrett, the court considered whether a
the complaint, the court in Barrett held that the policy’s absolute pollution
exclusion did not apply because (a) natural gas was not a pollutant within the
meaning of the policy, (b) it would violate public policy to permit the insurer
gas when the insured’s main product was natural gas, and (c) there was a
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question about whether the injuries arose from the natural gas discharge or
dispersal, rather than from the negligence of the insured's employees. Id.
Id. at 318-319. By way of contrast, the Bunns and Williams lawsuits allege
it involved a substance, natural gas, which was not a pollutant within the
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Id. at 319.
the meaning of the policy, the record did not show that the injuries arose out
In contrast, RaceTrac’s complaint alleges that the injuries to the Bunns and
falls within the ACE excess liability insurance policies’ absolute pollution
exclusion.
applying the criteria set by Georgia law that it “would violate the public
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AGL whose main product is natural gas, which policy contains an exclusion
The holding in Barrett was premised upon the misapplied rule that
insurer, at the expense of the insured, to avoid the risk for which the insurer
has been paid’ and for which the insured reasonably expects it is covered.”
Id., quoting Davis v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 271 Ga. 508,
510, 521 S.E.2d 815 (1999). However, the decision is Davis was based
Davis to hold that, “It is now clear that the public policy of this State will not
insurer, at the expense of the insured, to avoid the risk for which the insurer
has been paid by requiring the insured to reimburse the insurer whether or
not the insured was completely compensated for the covered loss.” Davis,
insurance coverage for injuries resulting from pollution. Thus, the ACE
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relief can be granted with respect to RaceTrac’s allegation that the ACE
excess policies is not against the public policy of Georgia, and no plausible
set of facts has been set forth by RaceTrac that prove otherwise.
III. COCLUSIO
upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff’s complaint against ACE does
not set forth facts stating a claim for relief that is plausible on its face
insurance policies preclude coverage for the claims asserted in the Bunns
and Williams lawsuits. The pollution exclusions are valid and enforceable,
and they do not violate the public policy of the state of Georgia.
requests that this Court (1) grant this motion to dismiss; (2) dismiss
plaintiff’s complaint; and (3) grant such other and further relief as is just and
appropriate.
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certifies that this pleading has been prepared using Times New Roman 14
point, one of the font and point selections approved by the Court in L.R.
5.1C.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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