JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

( ARTICLE VIII)

HACIENDA LUISITA INC. VS PARC ET.AL

FACTS:

The SC en banc voted 11-0 dismissing the petition filed by HLI Affirm with
modifications the resolutions of the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC for brevity)
revoking Hacienda Luisita Inc.  (HLI for brevity) Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the
subject land in HL under compulsory coverage of the CARP of the government.

Thereafter, the SC voting 6-5 averred that there are operative facts that occurred in the
premises.  The SC thereat declared that the revocation of the SDP shall, by application of the
operative fact principle, give the 5296 qualified Farmworkers Beneficiaries (FWBs for brevity)
to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or choose actual land distribution.
Considering the premises, DAR immediately scheduled a meeting regarding the effects of their
choice and therefrom proceeded to secret voting of their choice.

The parties, thereafter, filed their respective Motion for Reconsideration regarding the
SC’s decision.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not operative fact doctrine is applicable in the said case.

2. Whether or not Sec. 31 of R.A. 6657 unconstitutional.

RULING:

1.  Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable to the instant case. The court ruled that the doctrine is
not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional law but also to decisions made by the president or
the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws, especially if the said decisions
produced acts and consequences that must be respected. That the implementation of PARC
resolution approving SDP of HLI manifested such right and benefits favorable to the FWBs;

2.  The SC said that the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of R.A. 6657 is not the lis mota of the case
and it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and did not rule on the constitutionality of the
law;

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MALAGA VS PENACHOS JR.

FACTS:

Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards
Committee (PBAC) published an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory
Building at ISCOF. The PBAC advertised therein the deadlines for the submission of the pre-
qualification documents. Petitioner Malaga et al. (contractors) submitted theirs accordingly but
because the deadline was moved up without their knowledge (as such change was merely posted
in the ISCOF bulletin board), they were disqualified to bid for being late. Malaga et al. filed a
complaint. A TRO was hence issued, however it was lifted on the ground that the Court was
prohibited to issue such under PD 1818. Hence, this petition. Malaga et al. contends that PD
1818 is not applicable in this case because, among others, the prohibition in PD 1818 presumes a
valid and legal govt project, not one tainted with anomalies like the instant project.

ISSUE:

Does the court have jurisdiction to issue a restraining order against PBAC notwithstanding
the prohibition in PD 1818?

RULING:

Yes. It has been held that the prohibition pertained to the issuance of injunctions/restraining
orders by courts against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of
discretion in technical cases. However, on issues definitely outside of this dimension and
involving questions of law, courts could not be prevented by such PD from exercising their
power to restrain xxx. In the case at bar, what is involved is noncompliance with the procedural
rules on bidding which require strict observance for securing competitive bidding to prevent
collusion in the award of these contracts to the detriment of the public. PD 1818 was not
intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed by administrative agencies such
as the anomalies above-described. Restraining order upheld.

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PACU VS SECRETARY OF EDUCATION

Bona fide suit — cases and controversies where one actually sustains [or is in danger of
sustaining] injury … mere apprehension [of an injury] is not enough.

FACTS:

Petitioner Philippine Assoc of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assails the constitutionality of
Act No. 2706 as amended and RA 139. Act No. 2706 provides that before a private school may
be opened to the public, it must first obtain a permit from the Sec. of Education, which they aver
restrains the right of a citizen to own and operate a school. Said Act also confers on the Sec. of
Education the duty to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all private schools xxx. PACU
contends this confers unlimited power constituting unlawful delegation of legislative power. On
the other hand, RA 139 confers upon the Board of Textbooks power to review all textbooks to be
used in private schools and prohibit the use of those deemed, in sum, unsuitable. PACU avers
this is censorship in “its baldest form.

ISSUE:

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May PACU validly assail the constitutionality of foregoing statutes?

RULING:

No. The action is premature. There is no justiciable controversy as petitioners have suffered no
wrong and therefore no actual and positive relief may be had in striking down the assailed
statutes.202 Petitioner private schools are operating under the permits issued to them pursuant to
the assailed Act, and there is no threat, as they do not assert, that the Sec. of Education will
revoke their permits. Mere apprehension that the Secretary might, under the law, withdraw the
permit does not constitute a justiciable controversy. Petitioners also do not show how the
“general standard of efficiency” set by the Secretary has injured any of them or interfered with
their operation. It has not been shown that the Board of Textbooks has prohibited certain texts to
which petitioners are averse and are thereby in danger of losing substantial privileges or rights.

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MARIANO JR.VS COMELEC

FACTS:

RA 7854 is “An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati in Into a Highly Urbanized City
xxx”. Sec 51 thereof (which provides that the incumbent officials of the Municipality shall
continue as the officials of the City of Makati) carries the proviso “that the new city will acquire
a new corporate existence”. Petitioners contend this disregards the limit of 3 terms of office of
elective local officials set in the Constitution. They argue that the “new corporate existence” will
restart the term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati disregarding the terms
previously served by them. They particularly point to incumbent Mayor Binay who has already
served for 2 consecutive terms.

ISSUE:

May the petitioners validly challenge the constitutionality of said Sec 51?

RULING:

No. The petitioners have far from complied with the requirements203 before this Court may
have the jurisdiction to pass upon questions of constitutionality. The petition is premised on the
occurrence of many contingent events, i.e. Mayor Binay will run again this coming elections,
that he would be re-elected, and that he would seek re-election for the same post in the 1998
elections. Petitioners, thus, merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen into an actual
controversy. Also, Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the
proper parties to raise this issue.

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MACASIANO VS NHA

FACTS:

Petitioner Macasiano seeks to declare as unconstitutional Secs 28 and 44 of RA 7279 (Urban

Devt and Housing Act of 1992). Assailed Sections provide as a general rule that eviction or
demolition shall be discouraged, and that a moratorium of 3 years shall be provided on the
eviction of all program beneficiaries. Macasiano predicates his locus standi on his being a
consultant of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and his being a taxpayer.
As to the first, he alleges that said Secs “contain the seeds of a ripening controversy that serve as
a drawback” to his “tasks and duties regarding demolition of illegal structures”.

ISSUE:

May Macasiano validly challenge the constitutionality of the foregoing provisions of law?

RULING:

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 No. The first two fundamental requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the
constitutionality of a law are absent. There is no actual controversy. Macasiano does not claim
that he has been actually prevented from performing his duties as a consultant and exercising his
rights as a property owner because of the assertion by other parties of any benefit under the
challenged sections of the said Act. He is likewise not a proper party. As a DPWH consultant, he
is not vested with any authority to demolish obstructions and encroachments on properties of the
public domain, much less on private lands. Nor does the petitioner claim he is an owner of an
urban property whose enjoyment and use would be affected by the challenged provisions. “As
far as a taxpayer’s suit is concerned, this Court is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it
should be entertained

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J. JOYA VS PCGG

FACTS:

Petitioners are Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists who claim to be deeply concerned
with the preservation and protection of the country's artistic wealth. This petition concerns old
Masters Paintings and antique silverware alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late
Pres. Marcos and his cronies. These were seized from Malacañang and the Metropolitan
Museum of Manila, and were consigned for sale at public auction by the Govt through
respondent PCGG. Believing the items to be historical relics of cultural significance, petitioners
filed the instant petition for prohibition and mandamus to enjoin the PCGG to proceed with an
auction sale with prayer for preliminary injunction. The application for preliminary injunction
was denied and the auction proceeded as scheduled.

ISSUE:

Does the instant petition comply with the legal requisites for this Court to exercise its power
of judicial review over this case?

RULING:

No. The petitioners have no legal standing205 to file this petition. The confiscation of the
subject items by the Aquino administration should not be understood to mean that its ownership
has automatically passed on to the govt without complying with constitutional or statutory
requirements. Any dispute on the statutory defects in the acquisition and their subsequent
disposition must be raised only by the proper parties—the true owners thereof—whose authority
to recover emanates from their proprietary rights. Having failed to show that they are the legal
owners of the artworks or that these have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any
legal right to question their alleged unauthorized disposition.206 Furthermore, for a court to
exercise its power of adjudication there must be an actual case or controversy207 — one which
must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not
cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has
become stale, such as the case at bar since the purpose of the petition is to enjoin respondent
public officials from holding the auction sale which have long passed.

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LEGASPI VS CSC

FACTS:

Petitioner Legaspi, a Filipino citizen, requested for information on the civil service
eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Dept of Cebu City.
Respondent Civil Service Commission denied his access. He now invokes his fundamental right
to information on matters of public concern and prays for the issuance of the writ of Mandamus
to compel the Commission to disclose said information. The Solicitor General challenges
Legaspi’s personality to institute this petition on the ground that he does not possess any actual
interest in the information sought to be disclosed.

ISSUE:

Does Legaspi have the personality, the actual interest required in filing this suit?

RULING:

Yes. It is clear that Legaspi anchors his case upon the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern, which,by its very nature is a public right. When a Mandamus
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right (to procure the enforcement of a public duty),
the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen,
and therefore, part of the general “public” (who are the real party in interest) which possesses the
right

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BANKERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES VS COMELEC

FACTS:

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 The petitioners, Bankers Association of the Philippines and Perry L. Pe, assail the
constitutionality and legality of the respondent Commission on Elections' (Comelec's) Resolution
No. 9688 dated May 7, 2013, entitled "In the Matter of Implementing a Money Ban to Deter and
Prevent Vote-Buying in Connection with the May 13, 2013 National and Local
Elections" (Money Ban Resolution). The petitioners included a prayer for the issuance of a
status quo ante/temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin its
implementation. The Comelec's Resolution No. 9688-A, issued on May 9, 2013, amended the
Money Ban Resolution by:

1. Exempting withdrawals that are routine, regular and made in the ordinary course of
business of the withdrawing client on the basis of the prevailing "Know-Your-Client/Customer"
policy of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), which requires banks "not only to establish the
identity of their clients but also to have background knowledge of their normal business
transactions," and

2. Presuming that the possession or transportation of cash in excess of P500,000.00 from

May 8 to 13, 2013 was for the purpose of vote-buying and electoral fraud when the same was
without tenable justification or whenever attended by genuine reason engendering belief that the
money would be used for vote-buying.

The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9688-A on the same day that the petitioners filed the
present petition

ISSUE:

W/N petitioners have the right to file said petition

RULING:

We resolve to dismiss the petition for being moot and academic. By its express terms, the
Money Ban Resolution was effective only for a specific and limited time during the May 13,
2013 elections, i.e., from May 8 to 13, 2013. The Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order on May
10, 2013; thus, the Money Ban Resolution was not in force during the most critical period of the
elections from May 10, 2013 to actual election day. With the May 13, 2013 elections over, the
Money Ban Resolution no longer finds any application so that the issues raised have become
moot and academic.

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. The Court, as a rule,
will decline to exercise jurisdiction over a case and proceed to dismiss it when the issues posed
have been mooted by supervening events. Mootness intervenes when a ruling from the Court no
longer has any practical value and, from this perspective, effectively ceases to be a justiciable

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controversy. "Without a justiciable controversy, the petition would become a plea for declaratory
relief, over which the Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction."

While the Court has recognized exceptions in applying the "moot and academic" principle,
these exceptions relate only to situations where: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
(2) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; (3) the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

KILOSBAYAN VSS GUINGONA

FACTS:

Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), with the approval of the President, entered
into a Contract of Lease with Phil. Gaming Management Corp. (PGMC) which was organized
through the initiative of the Berjaya Group Berhad, a foreign company. This was executed
despite vigorous opposition from petitioner Kilosbayan on account of its alleged immorality and
illegality. Kilosbayan, an organization of “civic-spirited citizens,” filed the instant petition as
taxpayers and concerned citizens. Respondents challenge the petitioners’ legal standing to file
this petition.

ISSUE:

Must the action fail for the alleged lack of a legal standing?

RULING:

No. We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public, and the
issues it raised are of paramount public interest. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably
affect the social, economic, and moral wellbeing of the people even in the remotest barangays of
the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery
system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. In the exercise of its sound
discretion, in keeping with its duty to determine whether or not the other branches of govt have
exercised grave abuse of discretion given them, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural
barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of. The Court voted 7-6 on this issue.

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TATAD VS GARCIA. JR

FACTS:

The Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) sought to construct LRT

III along EDSA in accordance with the Build-Operate- Transfer (BOT) Law. The project was
awarded to EDSA LRT Corp. Ltd. under its “Revised and Restated Agreement to Build, Lease
and Transfer an LRT System for EDSA” with the DOTC. Sen. Tatad et al., as taxpayers and
members of the Senate, now seek to prohibit respondents from further implementing said
Agreement on account of several alleged inconsistencies with the Constitution and the BOT
Law. Respondents aver that Tatad et al. are not the real parties-in-interest and they do not have
legal standing to sue.

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ISSUE:

Does Tatad et al. have legal standing to sue?

RULING:

Yes. The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer’s suit are to allow taxpayers to question contracts
entered into by the national govt or govt-owned or controlled corps. allegedly in contravention of
the law (Kilosbayan, Inc v. Guingona) and to disallow the same when only municipal contracts
are involved (Bugnay Const. and Devt Corp. v. Laron) For as long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on
locus standi is not reversed, we are constrained to follow it and uphold the legal standing of
petitioners as taxpayers to institute present action.

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OPOSA VS FACTORAN

FACTS:

A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their
generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio
Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant,
his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising
new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They
alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are
entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that
the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests
constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in
trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly
pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:

Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

RULING:

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 Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to
come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and
for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding
generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of
nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future
generations.

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently,
the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

KILOSBAYAN VS MORATO

FACTS:

As a result of the Court’s ruling in the first Kilosbayan case, PCSO forged a new and
allegedly legal agreement with Phil. Gaming

Management Corp. (PGMC): the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA). Petitioners file this
suit seeking to invalidate the ELA for the reason that it is substantially the same as the Contract
of Lease nullified in the first case. Respondents again challenge the petitioners’ locus standi.
Petitioners contend the previous ruling sustaining their standing is now the “law of the case” and
therefore the question of their standing can no longer be reopened.

ISSUE:

May the petitioners’ locus standi be challenged anew notwithstanding the previous ruling
sustaining it?

RULING:

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 Yes. The Doctrine of “law of the case” is not applicable in this case. While this case is a
sequel to the first Kilosbayan case, it is not its continuation. The doctrine applies only when a
case is before a court a second time after a ruling by an appellate court, i.e. where both the
parties and the case are the same in the first and in the subsequent. In the case at bar, the parties
are the same but the cases are not. The ELA in this present case is essentially different from the
1993 Contract of Lease in the first case. Moreover, there is no constitutional question actually
involved here and therefore, “standing” is, strictly speaking, not the issue since that is a concept
in constitutional law. On the contrary, what is raised here actually involves questions of contract
law, more specifically whether petitioners have a legal right which has been violated. The issue,
thus, is not “standing” but whether the petitioners are the “real parties-in- interest”, those who
have “present substantial interest”. But petitioners do not have such present substantial interest in
the ELA as would entitle them to bring this suit. We deny them of their right to intervene, but
they may still raise their issues in an appropriate case before the Commission on Audit or the
Ombudsman

ATTY. OLIVER LOZANO VS SPEAKER PROPERO NOGRALES

FACTS:

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 The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned
citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled “A
Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering
Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members
of Congress,” convening the Congress into a Constituent Assembly to amend the 1987
Constitution. In essence, both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would
warrant a definitive interpretation by this Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for
the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution. The petitioners contend that the House
Resolution contradicts the procedures set forth by the 1987 Constitution regarding the
amendment or revision of the same as the separate voting of the members of each House (the
Senate and the House of Representatives) is deleted and substituted with a vote of three-fourths
of all the Members of Congress (i.e., ¾ of the “members of Congress” without distinction as to
which institution of Congress they belong to).

ISSUE:

Whether the court has the power to review the case of the validity of House Resolution No.
1109.

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court cannot indulge petitioners’ supplications. While some may interpret
petitioners’ moves as vigilance in preserving the rule of law, a careful perusal of their petitions
would reveal that they cannot hurdle the bar of justiciability set by the Court before it will
assume jurisdiction over cases involving constitutional disputes.

The Court’s power of review may be awesome, but it is limited to actual cases and controversies
dealing with parties having adversely legal claims, to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. The “case-or-controversy” requirement bans this court from deciding “abstract,
hypothetical or contingent questions,” lest the court give opinions in the nature of advice
concerning legislative or executive action

An aspect of the “case-or-controversy” requirement is the requisite of “ripeness.” In the

United States, courts are centrally concerned with whether a case involves uncertain contingent
future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. Another approach
is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial
decision; and second, the hardship to the parties entailed by withholding court consideration. In
our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff.

Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. An alternative road to review similarly taken
would be to determine whether an action has already been accomplished or performed by a
branch of government before the courts may step in.

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 In the present case, the fitness of petitioners’ case for the exercise of judicial review is
grossly lacking. In the first place, petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or
hardship from the act complained of. In the second place, House Resolution No. 1109 only
resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of
proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired
and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. More importantly, no proposal has yet been
made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. In
short, House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an uncertain contingent
future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The House has not
yet performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this Court.

As in the case of Tan v. Macapagal, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on
by it, there is no room for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has made concrete
what it intends to submit for ratification may the appropriate case be instituted. Until then, the
courts are devoid of jurisdiction

A party will be allowed to litigate only when he can demonstrate that (1) he has personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely
to be redressed by the remedy being sought. In the cases at bar, petitioners have not shown the
elemental injury in fact that would endow them with the standing to sue. Locus standi requires a
personal stake in the outcome of a controversy for significant reasons. It assures adverseness and
sharpens the presentation of issues for the illumination of the Court in resolving difficult
constitutional questions. The lack of petitioners’ personal stake in this case is no more evident
than in Lozano’s three-page petition that is devoid of any legal or jurisprudential basis.

Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the claim of petitioners that they are instituting
the cases at bar as taxpayers and concerned citizens. A taxpayer’s suit requires that the act
complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. It
is undisputed that there has been no allocation or disbursement of public funds in this case as of
yet.

The possible consequence of House Resolution No. 1109 is yet unrealized and does not
infuse petitioners with locus standi

The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a constitutional requirement
derived from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which mandates courts of justice to
settle only “actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.”
Moreover, while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of locus standi,
evolving from the stringent requirements of “personal injury” to the broader “transcendental
importance” doctrine, such liberality is not to be abused. It is not an open invitation for the
ignorant and the ignoble to file petitions that prove nothing but their cerebral deficit.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed.

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LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES VS COMELEC

FACTS:

During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities
into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which
took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by
increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20
million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator
Aquilino Pimentel, “the mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a
larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal
independence.

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 After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted
Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in
RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress.
However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29
as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again
failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16
municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood
bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million
income requirement in RA 9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The
Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was
passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates
from March to July 2007 without the President’s signature.

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the
voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a
city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for
violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal
protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into
cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more
cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of
the Local Government Code.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

RULING:

We grant the petitions.The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the
Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a
prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the
cityhood bills became law more than five years later.

Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the
creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the
Cityhood Laws.

Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they
prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.

Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by
RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no
resort to any statutory construction.

Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the
coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local
Government Code.

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 Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are
not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.

Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause.

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VENANCIO INONOG VS JUDGE FRANCISCO IBAY

FACTS:

According to complainant, at around 1:00 a.m. of March 18, 2005, he parked the vehicle that
he drives for his boss in a vacant parking space at the basement of the Makati City Hall because
the slot where he usually parked was already occupied. At the time, the parking slots at the
basement of the Makati City Hall were indicated only by numbers and not by names of officials
to whom they were assigned. Thereafter, complainant notified his... superior that he will not be
reporting for work for the rest of that day, March 18, 2005, because he was not feeling well.
Thus, he left the vehicle in the said basement parking area and went home to Tanay, Rizal.

Later that morning, complainant received a call from his brother, also an employee of the
City Government of Makati, informing him that he should appear before the sala of respondent
judge at 10:30 a.m. to explain/show cause why he should not be cited for contempt of court for...
parking his vehicle at the space reserved for respondent judge. He was informed that the
respondent judge blamed the usurpation of the said parking space for the delay in the
promulgation of the decision in Criminal Case Nos. 02-1320, 02-3046, 02-3168-69, and 03-392-
393... scheduled at 8:00 a.m. of March 18, 2005 because the latter had a hard time looking for
another parking space. Complainant was also informed that if he failed to appear at the hearing, a
warrant for his arrest will be issued.

Aggrieved by the said orders of respondent judge, complainant filed the instant
administrative complaint. Respondent judge explained that on March 18, 2005, he proceeded to
the court at around 7:00 a.m. to finalize the decision in Criminal Case Nos. 02-1320, 02-3046,
02-3168-69 and 03-392-393, all entitled People v. Glenn Fernandez, et al.,... which were to be
promulgated on the first hour of the same day. Upon reaching his parking slot, he found
complainant's vehicle parked there. As a result, he had a hard time looking for his own parking
space. Hence, the promulgation of the decision was delayed.

Respondent judge added that he ordered the complainant to appear before him for the
hearing at 10:30 a.m. of March 18, 2005, but, complainant refused, thus, he declared him in
contempt of court. The OCA made the following evaluation and recommendation: In the instant
case, there was no defiance of authority on the part of the complainant when he parked his
vehicle at the spot reserved for the respondent judge. The incident is too flimsy to be a basis of a
contempt proceedings. At most, the act resulted to a minor inconvenience... on the part of the
respondent but it was unlikely that it delayed the administration of justice. Besides, it was not
shown that complainant parked his vehicle at the spot intentionally to show disrespect to Judge
Ibay. Respondent Judge Ibay acted precipitously in citing... complainant in contempt of court in
a manner which obviously smacks of retaliation rather than upholding of the court's honor.

Records failed to show that complainant was properly notified of Judge Ibay's order
directing the former to appear and explain why he should not be cited in contempt of court. The
hearing was set at 10:30 A.M. or only about two and a half hours after respondent judge found

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that... his parking space was occupied. The lack of notice accounts for the complainant's failure
to appear at the hearing. Verily, complainant was not given a reasonable opportunity to be heard
and submit evidence in support of his defense.

ISSUE:

W/N that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.

RULING:

The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA but deems it proper to impose a penalty
different from the OCA's recommendation.
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court prescribes the rules and procedure for indirect contempt.
Sections 3 and 4 of the said rule read as follows:

SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.--After a charge in writing has
been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as
may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a... person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court,

including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by
the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or... induces
another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership
or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be
entitled thereto;

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not
constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

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(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue
of an order or process of a court held by him. xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced.--Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu
proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal
charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for... contempt.
xxx xxx xxx

The phrase "improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice" is so broad and general that it encompasses wide spectrum of acts that
could constitute indirect contempt. However, the act of complainant in parking his... car in a slot
allegedly reserved for respondent judge does not fall under this category. There was no showing
that he acted with malice and/or bad faith or that he was improperly motivated to delay the
proceedings of the court by making use of the parking slot supposedly... reserved for respondent
judge. We cannot also say that the said act of complainant constitutes disrespect to the dignity of
the court. In sum, the incident is too flimsy and inconsequential to be the basis of an indirect
contempt proceeding.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial
proceedings as well as to uphold the administration of justice. The courts must exercise the
power of contempt for purposes that are impersonal because that power is intended as a...
safeguard not for the judges but for the functions they exercise. Thus, judges have, time and
again, been enjoined to exercise their contempt power judiciously, sparingly, with utmost
restraint and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the...
dignity of the court, not for retaliation or vindication. Respondent judge's act of unceremoniously
citing complainant in contempt is a clear evidence of his unjustified use of the authority vested
upon him by law.

BIRAGO VS PHILS. TRUTH COMMISSION

FACTS:

For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases both of which essentially
assail the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled
"Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010." The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a
special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his
capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of
the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the
constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds
therefor.

The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and
Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of
Representatives.

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 To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special
body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the
previous administration. Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010,
signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth
Commission). Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one.

To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under
Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-
judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in... disputes
between contending parties. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative
penalties or sanctions.

ISSUE:

Is the Highest Tribunal, which is expected to be the protector of the Constitution, itself
guilty of violating fundamental tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers?

RULING:

Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body
to which they belong as members. This certainly... justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for
Congress as an institution and present the complaints on the usurpation of their power and rights
as members of the legislature before the Court.

Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to
question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their... prerogatives
as legislators.With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he has no standing to
question the creation of the PTC and the budget for its operations. As correctly pointed out by
the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and
direct injury attributable to the implementation of Executive Order No. 1.

Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers,
and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of...
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest."

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL VS PRES. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

FACTS:

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 Atty. Romulo Macalintal filed a motion for reconsideration regarding the previous ruling of
the SC that found the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal by the SC as constitutional.
In his motion, Macalintal contended that the creation of the PET by the SC did not fall within the
ambit of the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. He also contended
that the PET exercises quasi-judicial power, and thus, its members violate Section 12, Art. VIII
of the 1987 Constitution,

ISSUE:

Whether or not the PET is constitutional.

HELD:

Yes, the Court held that PET is constitutional. A look at the deliberations of the framers
reveals that the exclusive authority granted to the SC in judging cases relating to the elections of
President and Vice-President does not impinge on the supposed separation of power between the
judiciary and the executive departments, even if the said provision can be found in Art. VII.

The Court held that election issues are adversarial and judicial proceedings, and are
essentially justiciable questions. Similarly, the Court held that in creating PET, it merely
constitutionalized what was statutory. The last paragraph of Section 4, Art. VII bestows upon the
SC the power to hear questions relating to the election of the President and Vice-President.
Following the doctrine of necessary implication, the creation of PET should be seen as the means
necessary to carry said constitutional mandate into effect.

Motion for reconsideration denied.

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