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• The phenomenon that could have undermined our bullish call has undermined it.
Stagflation is not just a journalistic debating point, but its effects are reflected in
equity valuations. As much as we might protest that the environment is very
different from 1974 and 1978, relative equity valuations are at those historic levels.
Regulars • With oil at $140 per barrel, global oil consumption accounts for nearly 7% of
world GDP, a similar proportion to the peak reached in the early 1980s.
Recommended Portfolio 6
• Returning to that era, the equity market consequences of the tripling in oil prices
Global Index Targets 7 and subsequent global recession, while not good, were heavily mitigated by the
Recommended Weightings 8 extremely low valuations that stocks traded on during that period.
On-going Stylistic Themes 9
• We believe the same can be said for the current period.
Databank
• While our in-house forecasts indicate a fall in crude prices is likely which should
Market Performance 10
prompt a rally in the market, even without a large drop in prices, some stability,
Sector Performance 10 coupled with the extreme valuations on offer, should be enough to allow equities to
Style Performance 10 recover.
Research Library 13
Lehman Brothers does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the firm may have a conflict of
interest that could affect the objectivity of this report.
Customers of Lehman Brothers in the United States can receive independent, third-party research on the company or companies covered in this report, at no cost to them,
where such research is available. Customers can access this independent research at www.lehmanlive.com or can call 1-800-2LEHMAN to request a copy of this research.
Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision.
This research report2008
27 June has been prepared in whole or in part by research analysts that are not registered/qualified as research analysts with FINRA. 1
PLEASE SEE ANALYST(S) CERTIFICATION(S) AND IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES INCLUDING FOREIGN AFFILIATE DISCLOSURES BEGINNING ON PAGE 15
Lehman Brothers | Global Strategy Weekly
MARKET SELECTOR
4
Stagflation fears are behind
equities’ de-rating.... 2
-2
-4
70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08
1
Trailing Earnings Yield less 10 year Global Treasury Yield (equity market cap weighted)
Source: MSCI, Datastream, Lehman Brothers
Oil is, of course, the main issue. Crude price movements have been responsible for large
equity de-ratings in the past, and the same factor would appear to be happening now.
... and oil prices are behind With oil demand inelastic to price, at least in the short term, and the importance of oil as
those stagflation fears both an input into the production process and as a consumer good, we believe it is the
one commodity with the capacity to derail the global economy unilaterally, and within it,
corporate profitability.
%
7
6
If crude were to stay at $140,
oil consumption would once 5
again account for almost 7 %
4
of world GDP
3
0
1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006
1
2008 plot takes current spot rate of $140 as basis for calculation
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2008, IMF, Datastream
27 June 2008 2
Lehman Brothers | Global Strategy Weekly
Certainly, with crude at $140 per barrel, the world will once again spend nearly 7% of
aggregate GDP on oil: a return to the peak levels of expenditure seen in the early 1980s.
This was responsible for subsequent severe recessions in most developed economies, but
it is also true to say that the extreme levels of “value” on offer during the period were
followed by strong stock market performance. This environment of extreme valuation
coupled with extreme economic conditions meant that market dynamics were key.
70 5
78 79 80 81 82 83 84
If we examine the 1980s’ analogue, given that the overall effect of higher crude prices
(as a percentage of global GDP) is on a par with the current environment, then it is clear
to us that the rise in crude between 1978 and 1980 was accompanied by higher stock
markets, but once growth slowed, stocks fell by 17% (peak to trough), between April
1981 and March 1982, subsequently recovering as growth resumed.
Figure 4: Global Equity Prices and Industrial Output Growth, Jan 78 to Dec 84
70 -6
78 79 80 81 82 83 84
Interest rates did not determine the turning point for stocks in 1982; bond yields had
already been falling for a year.
27 June 2008 3
Lehman Brothers | Global Strategy Weekly
Figure 5: Global Equity Prices and Short Rate Movements, Jan 78 – Dec 84
But, despite the similarities in terms of valuation and the link to crude, underlying
inflation is much lower now and labour markets more flexible. As we have demonstrated
before, US unit labour cost growth has been quick to adjust to the weakening demand for
labour.
% year-on-year
12
10
-2
71 76 81 86 91 96 01 06
Source: BLS
Core inflation has not demonstrated, so far, the feared second-round effects of higher
food and energy prices. In prior cycles, both unit labour costs and core inflation were
faster to respond to the higher oil prices.
27 June 2008 4
Lehman Brothers | Global Strategy Weekly
y/y%
18
16
14
12 OECD Europe
10
8 US
6
4
2
0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Source: OECD
So, while it is easy to see why the market is so fearful of higher crude prices – as history
has shown us – this time round, it is hard to argue that things are as bad as they were in
either the mid 1970s or early 1980s. Yet relative valuations are as extreme.
We believe the best catalyst for stocks right now is a drop in crude. Our in-house
forecast suggests prices will decline to $110 by the year-end and average $93 next year.
If this comes to pass, then the currently attractive valuations on offer will translate into a
significant rally, in our view. The more challenging question is whether the current
value, alone, is enough. As the analysis above suggests, in the past, value has been
enough.
27 June 2008 5
Lehman Brothers | Global Strategy Weekly
Portfolio perf. (US$ terms, %) YTD Last Week 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997
LB Strategy Recommend Portfolio -8.32 -1.91 6.90 12.92 11.10 11.87 33.69 -23.80 -13.80 -2.80 40.80 35.7 20.1
FTSE-World Index -8.85 -1.92 11.74 18.82 8.87 13.66 30.97 -20.60 -17.50 -12.20 24.20 22.8 13.6
1
Analyst rating refers to Lehman Brothers research dept rating: "1 - OW" = Overweight; "2 - EW" = Equal Weight; "3 - UW" = Underweight, "NR" = Not Rated, "RS" = Rating Suspended.
2
Sector rating refers to Lehman Brothers research dept sub sector rating: "1" = Positive; "2" = Neutral; "3" = Negative.
3
Return history presented as price return in US$ Terms from before 2006. Returns from 2007 to present are on a Total Return basis.
4
Relative performance shown as total return performance less performance of FTSE World total return index.
Please turn to the back cover for an explanation of Lehman Brothers' rating system.
27 June 2008 6
Lehman Brothers | Global Strategy Weekly
27 June 2008 7
Lehman Brothers | Global Strategy Weekly
RECOMMENDED WEIGHTINGS
Benchmark
Recommended
Weighting Recommendation • The subprime crisis and resulting credit crunch have
injected a high level of volatility into the markets,
Equities 60 72 Overweight compounding ‘late-cycle’ effects. Over a 12-month
Bonds 35 24 Underweight
horizon, we expect equity markets to recover and to
Cash 5 4 Underweight
outperform bonds, supported by the combined effects of
what we perceive to be attractive valuations and
aggressive policy actions from central banks
Source: Lehman Brothers research and FTSE World.
Benchmark
Recommended
Weighting Recommendation • We have moved to an underweight stance on
Continental European stocks and increased our
North America 47 52 Overweight exposure to the US.
Europe Ex-UK 21 12 Underweight
UK 9 7 Underweight
• We think the hawkish stance of the ECB is likely to
Japan 9 14 Overweight result in underperformance of Continental Europe.
Asia Ex-Japan 9 12 Overweight
Latin America / Other EMG 4 1 Underweight • Labour costs in Continental Europe are increasing faster
than in the US, while earnings revisions and valuations
are moving in favour of the US.
• We recommend overweighting Asian and Japanese
stocks. These markets should enjoy better earnings
growth and benefit from Fed easing, in our view.
Benchmark: FTSE W World Index.
Source: Lehman Brothers research and FTSE World.
27 June 2008 8
Lehman Brothers | Global Strategy Weekly
Chart shows the relative performance of highest/lowest quartile stocks Please click here for the latest daily update and more history on our website
screened size on an equal-weighted basis. Source: Lehman Brothers, FTSE
World, Worldscope, Exshare For a full discussion of this investment theme, please refer to "Style Selector”,
16 August 2007
Composite Value
Chart shows the relative performance of highest/lowest quartile stocks Please click here for the latest daily update and more history on our website
screened on 12-month forward P/E, Dividend Yield, and Price to Book Value
on an equal weighted basis. Portfolios have been rebalanced quarterly. The For a full discussion of this investment theme, please refer to "A Tactical Case
benchmark universe is the 500 largest stocks in the FTSE World index. for Deep Value”, Global Strategy, 14 April 2007.
Source: Lehman Brothers, FTSE World, IBES, Exshare
* Themes referred to here are those that have been featured in recent Global Weekly Strategy reports, and where the advice is not captured in either the asset,
regional or sector recommendations shown on the prior page.
27 June 2008 9
Lehman Brothers | Global Strategy Weekly
GLOBAL PERFORMANCE
1
Performance is calculated on a local currency total return basis. Please click here for the latest daily update and more history on our website.
Benchmark: FTSE W World Index.
Source: FTSE World, Lehman Brothers research
1
Performance is calculated on a local currency total return basis. Please click here for the latest daily update and more history on our website
Benchmark: FTSE W World Index
Source: FTSE World, Lehman Brothers research
27 June 2008 10
Lehman Brothers | Global Strategy Weekly
12 month Forward PE
27 June 2008 11
Lehman Brothers | Global Strategy Weekly
27 June 2008 12
Lehman Brothers | Global Strategy Weekly
RESEARCH LIBRARY
27 June 2008 13
Lehman Brothers | Global Strategy Weekly
27 June 2008 14
Lehman Brothers | Global Strategy Weekly
Analyst Certification:
I, Ian Scott, hereby certify (1) that the views expressed in this research report accurately reflect my personal views about any
or all of the subject securities or issuers referred to in this report and (2) no part of my compensation was, is or will be directly
or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views contained in this report.
Important Disclosures:
The analysts responsible for preparing this report have received compensation based upon various factors including the
Firm's total revenues, a portion of which is generated by investment banking activities.
With the exception of analysts who publish for either LBI or a branch of LBI, research analysts may not be associated persons
of the member and therefore may not be subject to Rule 2711 restrictions on communications with a subject company, public
appearances and trading securities held by a research analyst account.
Our coverage analysts use a relative rating system in which they rate stocks as 1-Overweight, 2- Equal weight or 3-
Underweight (see definitions below) relative to other companies covered by the analyst or a team of analysts that are deemed
to be in the same industry sector (“the sector coverage universe”).
In addition to the stock rating, we provide sector views which rate the outlook for the sector coverage universe as 1-Positive,
2-Neutral or 3-Negative (see definitions below). A rating system using terms such as buy, hold and sell is not the equivalent
of our rating system. Investors should carefully read the entire research report including the definitions of all ratings and not
infer its contents from ratings alone.
Stock Rating
1-Overweight - The stock is expected to outperform the unweighted expected total return of the sector coverage universe
over a 12-month investment horizon.
2-Equal weight - The stock is expected to perform in line with the unweighted expected total return of the sector coverage
universe over a 12-month investment horizon.
3-Underweight - The stock is expected to underperform the unweighted expected total return of the sector coverage universe
over a 12-month investment horizon.
RS-Rating Suspended - The rating and target price have been suspended temporarily to comply with applicable regulations
and/or firm policies in certain circumstances including when Lehman Brothers is acting in an advisory capacity on a merger or
strategic transaction involving the company.
Sector View
Distribution of Ratings:
27 June 2008 15
GLOBAL EQUITY RESEARCH
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27 June 2008 16