AVTEC LTD

Power Unit Plant

The Power Unit Plant (PUP) of AVTEC Ltd (formerly Hindustan Motors Ltd), which
initially the passenger car division, was established in 1984. The production started in 1987.
The division comprised of state of art manufacturing complex, manufacturing fuel-efficient
engines and transmission, basically for passenger car application. The division is spread
over area of 153 hectare. The total investment in the division including the machinery
amounted to around Rs 1840 million. The assimilation of technology was from ISUZU. The
organization is specially oriented towards environment protection. The in-house machine
components included cylinder block, main drive, gear assembly, cylinder head,
transmission, idler and counter gear, crank shaft, sleeves etc.

During their journey towards excellence, AVTEC Ltd. Pithampur got ISO 9001
accreditation in 1994 to be renewed in 1997 and 2000. In addition these they were certified
as ISO 14001 company for their environmental management system implementation. The
journey for the excellence continues with the effort in embracing Total Productive
Maintenance (TPM) as a religion in addition to maintaining QS9000 standards.

HM Transfers the Component Business to AVTEC.

And Inducts ACTIS As Financial Partner.
New Delhi - 28th June 2005
Transaction Consummation: Today, Hindustan Motors transferred its Component
Business to AVTEC, and immediately thereafter sold a part of its stake in AVTEC to Actis
and the promoter group of Hindustan Motors Ltd. additionally; Actis and the promoter
group have invested app. Rs.30 cr. into AVTEC. At the valuation agreed to be paid by Actis
and the Promoter Group for acquiring AVTEC shares through the secondary and primary
purchase as above, the enterprise valuation of AVTEC works out at Rs.423 cr. Post this,
Hindustan Motors, Actis and promoter group hold approximately 49%, 30% and 21%
ownership respectively in AVTEC.

Transaction Background: In February 2005, the Board of Directors of Hindustan Motors

Ltd. (a GP-CK Birla group company) (“Hindustan Motors”) had approved to hive off the
Component Business of the Company into its subsidiary AVTEC Limited (“AVTEC”) and
invited Funds managed by Actis Capital LLP (“Actis”) as financial partners.

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The Component Business: The Component Business of Hindustan Motors comprises

(a) The Power Unit Plant (PUP) located at Indore that manufactures engines, transmissions
and their components for automobiles, and

(b) The Power Products Division (PPD) located at Hosur, Tamil Nadu that manufactures
automatic transmission and their components for off-highway heavy-duty vehicles like
dumpers, loaders and dozers as well as on-highway vehicles.

The Component Business has recorded Sales of approximately Rs.445 cr. for the financial
year ending 31 March 2005.

The Components Business supplies its products to reputed global OEMs like GM, Ford,
Caterpillar and BEML, Mitsubishi cars and Mahindra & Mahindra in India. It also has a
range of collaborations with various global players. Assisted by its strong R&D and
engineering skills, the Components Business has bagged critical components orders from
various OEMs.

Kotak Investment Banking acted as financial advisor to Hindustan Motors for the
transaction; and Khaitan & Co. acted as the legal advisors to Hindustan Motors.

Introduction to HM

Hindustan Motors Limited (HML), India's pioneering automobile manufacturing company

and Flagship Company of the C.K. Birla Group was established just before Indian
independence, in 1942 by Mr. B.M. Birla of the industrious Birla family. Commencing
operations in a small assembly plant in Port Okha near Gujarat, the manufacturing facilities
later moved to Uttarpara, West Bengal in 1948, where it began the production of - the
Ambassador. (HML) is one of the most prominent companies today, making striding
contributions to the Indian economy.

Over the years the HML has diversified its activities. Equipped itself with state-of-the-art
facilities for the manufacture of heavy engineering equipment, HML's activities involve the
production of passenger cars, trucks, Multi utility vehicles, manufacture of Power Shift
Transmission Products.

Besides passenger cars (Ambassador, Contessa), Multi Utility Vehicles (Trekker, Porter, and
Pushpak) and the RTV, Hindustan Motors also manufactures passenger cars in the mid size

2
premium segment (Mitsubishi Lancer) and has brought in Sports Utility Vehicle (Mitsubishi
Pajero) into the Indian market in collaboration with Mitsubishi Motors, Japan.

As pioneers in the Indian Automotive industry for over five decades HML operations are
spread across Madhya Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal and Karnataka. HML functions
with a commitment to core values such as quality, safety, and environmental care
coordinated with customer-oriented total solutions. The mission of HML is to offer
appropriate automobiles that assure Travel Comfort to every Indian.

The Plants

• Uttarpara (Kolkata): The Automobile division at Uttarpara near Kolkata is engaged

in the manufacture of passenger cars- Ambassadors and Contessa and Multi Utility
vehicles -the Trekker, Porter and Pushpak.

• Hosur (Bangalore): HML's Power Product Division located in Hosur produces

automatic transmissions for heavy-duty vehicles.

• Tiruvallur (Chennai): Exclusive plant dedicated to the manufacture of Lancer cars in

technical collaboration with Mitsubishi Motors Japan.

• Pithampur (Indore): The Power Unit Plant at Pithampur near Indore manufactures
fuel-efficient engines and transmissions based on technology from Isuzu Motors and
Mitsubishi Motors Japan.

This plant also houses the RTV division, manufacturing the "Ranger" brand of multi
utility vehicles, in technical collaboration with OKA Motor Company, Australia.

Milestones

HML was incorporated at Port Okha in Gujarat as a small assembly plant for
1942
passenger.
HML shifted its activities to Uttarpara in West Bengal and set up facilities for
1948
manufacture of cars and trucks.
HML further diversified its activities by setting up an Earthmoving Equipment
1971 Division at Tiruvallur near Chennai, Tamil Nadu, for the manufacture of Earthmoving
equipments such as dumpers, front-end loaders, crawler tractors and so on.
HML commenced a Power Products Division at Hosur, Karnataka for manufacture of
1985
heavy duty transmission required for Earth moving Equipments.

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 The Commercial Vehicle Division for the manufacture of Heavy Commercial Vehicles
at Vadodara, Gujarat was commenced. Due to increase in project cost and material cost
1986 arising out of adverse exchange fluctuation, the project was abandoned. The company
sold a part of the assets of this division to General Motors India Limited, for
manufacture of "Opel Astra" range of passenger cars in the premium segment.
HML commenced production of petrol engines and transmissions at Pithampur,
1987
Madhya Pradesh, in collaboration with Isuzu Motor Company, Japan.
HML modernized, upgraded and expanded its three existing divisions Earthmoving
1996
Equipment Division, Power Plant Division and the Uttarpara Plant.
1997 HML began the production of the Road Trusted Vehicle.
1998 Commenced the Mitsubishi Lancer Car project.
2001 The Earthmoving Equipment Division plant was sold off to Caterpillar, USA.
Launch of the Mitsubishi Pajero (in collaboration with Mitsubishi Motors, Japan), in
2002
India.
Components Business (PUP-Pithampur and PPD–Hosur) transferred to AVTEC – a
2005
company jointly held by HM, Actis and CK Birla Group.

Some other important events should be considered are:

May,1984 Entered in technical collaboration with Isuzu Motors, Japan.

Jun,1988 Completed phase-I and started assembly of Power Units.
Oct,1991 Completed phase-II and started component manufacturing.
Oct,1993 Developed 2 liter Diesel Engine.
Dec,1994 IRQS (Indian Register Quality Systems) awarded ISO 9001 to PUP.
Nov,1995 Entered in technical collaboration with Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, Japan.
Aug,1997 Implemented concept of “Manufacturing Systems Engineering” (MSE)
Oct,1998 Developed Multi Point Fuel Injection with fuel management system, USA.
Apr,1999 Initiated ISO 14001 activities.
Apr,1999 Cleared Euro-I & Euro-II emission norms for diesel and gasoline engines, resp.
Initiated “Total Productive Maintenance” (TPM) under guidance of Japan
Mar,2000
Institute of Maintenance, Japan.

4
Collaborations

Hindustan Motors Ltd. (HML) collaboration with overseas automobile manufacturers has
brought models in keeping with the present trend in the automobile arena. Besides vehicles,
HML has entered into collaboration with foreign companies for its manufacture of
automobile parts and transmissions as well.

• Chennai Car Plant (Tiruvallur, Tamilnadu)

Collaboration: Mitsubishi Motors Japan in the year 1998.

Products: The Lancer and Pajero range of cars.

• RTV Plant (Pithampur, Madhya Pradesh)

Collaboration: OKA Motor Company Australia in the year 1998

Products: Road Trusted Vehicles

• Past Collaborations:

Isuzu Motors Ltd. Japan from 1983–1993.

Vauxhall Motors U.K. from 1980–1990.

Ricardo Consulting Engineers Ltd, U.K. from 1989-1993.

In addition to the above HML owned an Earth Moving Equipment Division (EED) in
collaboration with the following companies:

Caterpillar U.S.A. for the manufacture of Dumpers and Excavators.

Terex for the manufacture of Dumpers, Loaders and Dozers.

Fermac U.K. for the manufacture of Backhoe Loaders.

5
AVTEC Ltd – Products

Engine Systems:

• Rocam ------- Ford Ikon

• Sigma -------- Ford Fiesta

• Izuzu --------- Petrol

• Izuzu --------- Diesel

Transmission Systems:

• Ford ---------- Cable Shift

• Ford ---------- Rod Shift

• Izuzu --------- Petrol

• Izuzu --------- Diesel

• Tavera ------- GMI

• Bolero ------- M&M

• Eicher

• Trekkar

TPM Policy

“Building profitable and productive work culture by enhancing effectiveness of people And
plant equipment and achieving zero losses through participation of all employees”

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Environment Policy

We, at Hindustan motors limited, Pithampur, are committed to conserve and continually
improve the environment through:

 Designing, manufacturing and delivering products as per national and international

environmental norms.

 Educating and motivating our employees and sub-contractors.

 Enhancing visual and natural values of our surrounding with extensive plantation.

 Complying with environment regulation and requirements.

 Reinforcing all processes to

o Reduce the wastage off oil, paint, steel and packing materials.

o Reduce and recycle the waste generated, wherever possible.

o Optimize usage of energy.

 Develop categorized and effective waste disposal system.

Quality Policy

Excellence at all levels of activities leading to continuous improvements of products,

processes, systems, cost-effectiveness and productivity for total customer satisfaction
through:

 Participative work culture.

 Adherence to product specification.

 Optimized use of state of art technology.

 Continuous training for all in technical and managerial skills.

 Active participation with vendors and dealers.

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 Fast response to customer needs.

PROJECT OBJECTIVE

To perform Potential Failure mode and effect analysis for Transaxle Case Sub-
Assembly on a new SPM Machine modified from earlier manual operation.

8
 INTRODUCTION

Potential Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)

An FMEA can be described as a systematic group of activities intended to:

a) recognize and evaluate the potential failure of a product/process and the effect of that
failure,

b) identify actions that could eliminate or reduce the chance of the potential failure
occurring, and

c) document the entire process.

It is complementary to the process of defining what a design or process must do to satisfy

the customer.

All FMEAs focus on the design, whether it is of the product, or process.

FMEA Implementation: Because of the general industry trend to continually improve

products and processes whenever possible, using the FMEA as a disciplined technique to
identify and help minimize potential concern is as important as ever.

One of the most important factors for the success implementation of an FMEA program is
timeliness. It is meant to be a “before-the-event” action, not an “after-the-fact” exercise. To
achieve the greatest value, the FMEA must be done before a product or process failure mode
has been incorporated into a product or process. Communication and coordination should
occur among all FMEA teams.

Figure 1 depicts the sequence in which an FMEA should be preformed. It is not simply a
case of filling out the form but rather of understanding the FMEA process in order to
eliminate risk and plan the appropriate controls to ensure customer satisfaction.

There are three basic cases for which FMEAs are generated, each with a different scope or
focus:

Case 1 New designs, new technology, or new process. The scope of the FMEA is the
complete design, technology, or process.

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 Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Sequence

Subsystem C O D
Potential Responsibility Action Results
Potential Potential S l c Current Control e R.
Cause(s)/ Recommended & Target
Failure Effect(s) of e a c t P. S O R.
Mechanism(s) Action(s) Completion Actions
Function Mode Failure v s
of Failure
u e N.
Date e c P.
s r Prevention Detection c Taken
Reqt’s v c N.

What are
the How bad What can be
effect(s)? is it? done?
What are the
Functions, Features Design Changes
or Requirements? Process Changes
Special Controls
How often Changes to
What Standards,
are the does it
happen? Procedures, or
What can go wrong? Cause(s)? Guides
No Function
Partial/Over/
Degraded
Function How can this be
Intermittent prevented and
Function detected? How good is
Unintended
Function this method at
detecting it?
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 Case 2 Modifications to existing design or process (assumes there is an FMEA for the
existing design or process). The scope of FMEA should focus on the
modification to design or process, possible interaction due to the modification,
and field history.

Case 3 Use of an existing design or process in a new environment, location, or

application (assumes there is an FMEA for existing design or process). The scope
of the FMEA is the impact of the new environment or location on the existing
design or process.

A review of the FMEA document against FMEA quality objectives is recommended

including a management review.

Follow-Up: The need for talking effective preventive/corrective actions, with appropriate
follow-up on those actions, cannot be overemphasized. Action should be communicated to
all affected activities. A thoroughly thought-out and well-developed FMEA will be of
limited value without positive and effective preventive/corrective actions.

The responsible engineer is in charge of ensuring that all recommended actions have been
implemented or adequately addressed. The FMEA is a living document and should always
reflect the latest level, as well as the latest relevant actions, including those occurring after
the start of production.

The responsible engineer has several means of assuring that recommended actions are
implemented. They include, but are not limited to the following:

a. Reviewing designs, processes, and drawings, to ensure that recommended actions

have been implemented,

b. Confirming the incorporation of changes to design/assembly/manufacturing

documentation, and,

c. Reviewing design/process FMEAs, special FMEA applications, and Control Plans.

The current report is dealing with the Process FMEA.

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 PROCESS FMEA

A process FMEA is an analytical technique used by a manufacturing/Assembly-responsible

Engineer as a means to ensure that, to the extent possible, potential failure mode and their
associated causes or mechanisms have been considered and addressed. In its most rigorous
form, an FMEA is a summery of the team thoughts (including an analysis of items that could
go wrong based on experience) as a process in developed.

The Process Potential FMEA:

• Identifies the process functions and requirements,

• Identifies the potential product and process related failure modes,

• Assesses the effects of the potential failure on the customer,

• Identifies the potential manufacturing or assembly process causes and identifies

process variables on which to focus controls for occurrence reduction or detection of
the failure conditions,

• Identifies process variables on which to focus process controls,

• Develops a ranked list of potential failure modes, thus establishing a priority system
for preventive/corrective action considerations, and,

• Documents the results of the manufacturing or assembly process.

Customer: for a Process FMEA ‘Customer’ should normally be the ‘End-User’.

However, the customer can also be a subsequent or downstream manufacturing or
assembly operation, or government regulations.

Team Effort: the process FMEA should be a catalyst to simulate the interchange of ideas
between the areas affected and thus promote a team approach.

The process FMEA is a living document and should be initiated:

• Before or at the feasibility stage,

• Prior to tooling for production, and

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 • Take into account all manufacturing operations, from individual components
to assemblies.

Early review and analysis of new or revised processes is promoted to anticipate, resolve, or
monitor potential process concerns during the manufacturing planning stages of a new
model or component program.

The process FMEA assumes the product as designed will meet the design intent. Potential
failure modes that can occur because of a design weakness may be included in a process
FMEA. Their effects and avoidance is covered by the Design FMEA.

The Process FMEA does not rely on product design changes to overcome weakness in the
processes. However, it does take into consideration a product’s design characteristics
relative to the planned manufacturing or assembly process to assure that, to the extent
possible, the resultant product meets customer needs and expectations.

Process FMEA Quality Objectives

a. Process improvements: The FMEA drives process improvements as the primary

objective, with an emphasis on error/mistake proofing solutions.

b. High risk failure modes: The FMEA addresses all high risk failure modes, as
identified by the FMEA team, with executable action plans. All other failure modes are
considered.

c. Control plans: The pre-launch and production control plans consider the failure
modes from the Process FMEA

d. Integration: The FMEA is integrated and consistent with the Process Flow Diagram
and the Process Control Plan. The Process FMEA considers the Design FMEA, if
available as part of its analysis.

e. Lessons learned: The FMEA considers all major “lessons learned” (such as high
warranty, campaigns, non-confirming product, customer complaints, etc.) as input to
failure mode identification.

f. Special or key characteristics: The FMEA identifies the appropriate key

characteristics candidates as input the key characteristics selection process, if applicable
due to company policy.

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 g. Timing: The FMEA is completed during the “window of opportunity” where it
could more efficiently impact the design of product or process.

h. Team: The right people participate as part of the FMEA team throughout the
analysis, and are adequately trained in FMEA methods. As appropriate, a facilitator
should be used.

i. Documentation: The FMEA document is completely filed out “by the book”,
including “Action taken” and new RPN values.

j. Time usage: Time spent by the FMEA team as early as possible is an effective and
efficient use of time, with a value-added result. This assumes Recommended Actions are
identified as required and actions are implemented.

Development of a Process FMEA

The FMEA begins by developing a list of what the process is expected to do and what it is
expected not to do, i.e., the process intent.

The process FMEA should begin with a flow chart of the general process. This flow chart
should identify the product/process characteristics associated with each operation. Copies of
the flow chart used in FMEA preparation should accompany the FMEA.

In order to facilitate documentation of the analysis of potential failures and their

consequences, a process FMEA form has been developed.

Process FMEA form

1) FMEA No.: Shows the FMEA document number, which may be used for tracking.

2) Item: Shows the name and number of the component or sub-system for which the
process is being analyzed.

3) Process Responsibility: Shows the OEM, department, and group.

4) Prepared By: Shows the name, and company of the engineer responsible for
preparing the FMEA.

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 Potential
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 1
FMEA Number _____________________
(Process FMEA) Page ____________ of _______________
Item ________________________________
2 Process Responsibility __________________
3 Prepared By ________________________
4
Model Year(s)/Program(s) _______________ Key Date _____________________________ FMEA Date (Orig.) _______(Rev.)______
5 6 7
Core Team _________________________________________________________________________________________________________
8

C O D Action Results
Process Potential Current Control Responsibili
Potential Potential S l c e R. Recommen
Function / Cause(s)/ ty & Target
Failure Effect(s) E a c t P. ded

R.P.N.
Requirem Mechanism(s) Completion Actions

Occ.
Sev.
Mode of Failure V s u e N. Action(s)
ents of Failure Date Taken
s r Prevention Detection c
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
15
5) Model Year(s)/Program(s): Shows the intended model year(s)/program(s) that
will use and/or be affected by the design/process being analyzed (if known).

6) Key Date: Shows the initial FMEA due date, which should not exceed the schedule
start of production date.

7) FMEA Date: Shows the date when the original FMEA was compiled and the latest
revision date.

8) Core Team: List the names of the responsible individuals and departments that have
the authority to identify and/or perform tasks.

9) Process Function/Requirements: Shows the simple description of the process or

operation being analyzed. In addition, it is recommended to record the associated
process/operation number for the step being analyzed. Indicate as concisely as possible
the purpose of the process or operation being analyzed, including information about
the design (metrics/measurable) of the system, subsystem, or component.

10) Potential Failure Mode: Potential failure mode is defined as the manner in which
the process could potentially fail to meet the process requirements and/or design intent
as described in the process function/requirements column. It is a description of the
nonconformance at the specific operation. It can be a cause associated with a potential
failure mode in a subsequent (downstream) operation or an effect associated with a
potential failure in a previous (upstream) operation. However, in preparing the FMEA,
assume that the incoming part(s)/material(s) are correct. Exception can be made by the
FMEA team where historical data indicate deficiencies in incoming part quality.

List each potential failure mode for the particular operation. Assume that the failure
could occur but may not necessarily occur. The process engineer/team should be able
to pose and answer the following questions:

1) How can the process/part fail to meet requirement?

2) Regardless of engineering specification, what would a customer consider

objectionable?

Start by Comparing similar processes and reviewing customer claims relating to

similar components. In addition, knowledge of the design intent is necessary.

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 Note: - potential failure modes should be described “physical” or technical terms, not
as a symptom noticeable by the customer.

11) Potential Effect(s) of Failure: Potential failure is defined as the effects of the
failure mode on the customer(s).

Describe the effects of the failure in terms of what the customer might notice or
experience, remembering that the customer may be an internal customer as well as the
ultimate end user. State clearly if the failure mode could impact safety or cause
noncompliance to regulations.

For the end user, the effects should always be stated in terms of product or system
performance.

If the customer is the next operation or subsequent operation(s)/location(s), the effects

should be stated in terms of process/operation performance.

12) Severity (S): Severity is the rank associated with the most serious effect for a given
failure mode. Severity is a relative ranking within the scope of the individual FMEA.
A reduction in severity ranking index can be effected through a design change to
system, subsystem or component, or a redesign of the process.

The team should agree on an evaluation criteria and ranking system. Severity should
be estimated by using given table as a guideline:

Note: - It is not recommended to modify criteria for ranking values of 9 and 10. Failure
modes with a rank of severity 1 should not be analyzed further.
Ranking

Criteria: Severity of effect

Effect This ranking results when a potential failure mode results in a final
customer and/or a manufacturing/assembly plant defect. The final

17
 customer should always be considered first. If both occur use the
higher of the two severities.

Customer Effect Manufacturing/ Assembly Effect

Very high severity ranking when it
Hazardous affects safe vehicle operation Or may endanger operator
without and/or involves non-compliance (machine or assembly) without 10
warning with government regulation without warning.
warning.
Very high severity ranking when it
Hazardous affects safe vehicle operation Or may endanger operator
with and/or involves non-compliance (machine or assembly) with 9
warning with government regulation with warning.
warning.
Or 100% of the product may have
Vehicle/item inoperable (loss of to be scrapped, or vehicle/item
Very High 8
primary function). repaired in repair department with a
repair time > 1 hr.
Or product may have to be sorted
Vehicle/item operable but at a and a portion (< 100%) scrapped,
High reduced level of performance. or vehicle/item repaired in repair 7
Customer very dissatisfied. department with a repair time in
b/w ½ hr and 1 hr.
Or a portion (< 100%) of the
Vehicle/item operable but comfort/ product may have to be scrapped
Moderate convenience item(s) inoperable. with no sorting, or vehicle/item 6
Customer dissatisfied. repaired in repair department with a
repair time < ½ hr.
Or 100% of product may have to be
Vehicle/item operable but comfort/
reworked, or vehicle/item repaired
Low convenience item(s) operable at a 5
off-line but does not go to repair
reduced level of performance.
department.
Fit and finish/squeak and rattle item Or the product may have to be
Very Low do not conform. Defect noticed by sorted, with no scrap, and a portion 4
most customers (> 75%). (< 100%) reworked.
Or a portion (< 100%) of the
Fit and finish/squeak and rattle item
product may have to be reworked,
Minor do not conform. Defect noticed by 3
with no scrap, on-line but out-of-
50% customers.
station.
Fit and finish/squeak and rattle item Or a portion (< 100%) of the
Very do not conform. Defect noticed by product may have to be reworked,
2
Minor discriminating customers (> with no scrap, on-line but in-
25%). station.
Or slight inconvenience to
None No discernible effect. 1
operation or operator, or no effect.

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13) Classification: This column may be used to classify any special product or process
characteristics (e.g., critical, key, major, significant) for components, systems, or
subsystems that may require additional process controls.

This column may also be used to highlight high priority failure modes for engineering
assessment.

14) Potential Cause(s)/Mechanism(s) of Failure: Potential cause of failure is

defined as how the failure could occur, described in terms of something that can be
corrected or can be controlled.

List to the extent possible every failure cause assignable to each potential failure mode.
If a cause is exclusive to the failure mode, i.e., if correcting the cause has direct impact
on the failure mode, then this portion of FMEA thought process is completed.

Only specific errors or malfunctions (e.g., operator fails to install seal) should be
listed; ambiguous phrases (e.g., operator error, machine malfunction) should not be
used.

15) Occurrence (O): Occurrence is the likelihood that a specific cause/mechanism of

failure will occur. The likelihood if occurrence ranking number has a relative meaning
rather than an absolute value. Preventing or controlling the causes/mechanisms of
failure through a design or process change is the only way a reduction in the
occurrence rating can be affected.

Estimate the likelihood of occurrence of potential failure cause/mechanism on a 1 to

10 scale.

The team should agree on an evaluation criteria and ranking system that is consistent.
Occurrence should be estimated using given table as a guideline:

Probability Likely Failure Rates Ranking

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 ≥ 100 per 1000 pieces 10
Very high: Persistent Failure
50 per 1000 pieces 9
20 per 1000 pieces 8
High: Frequent Failure
10 per 1000 pieces 7
5 per 1000 pieces 6
Moderate: Occasional Failure 2 per 1000 pieces 5
1 per 1000 pieces 4
0.5 per 1000 pieces 3
Low: Relatively Few Failure
0.1 per 1000 pieces 2
Remote: Failure is Unlikely ≤ 0.01 per 1000 pieces 1
Note: - The ranking value of 1 is reserved for “Remote: failure is Unlikely”.

16) Current Process Controls: Current process controls are description of the controls
that either prevent to the extent possible the failure mode or cause of failure from
occurring, or detect the failure mode or cause of failure should it occur. These controls
can be process controls such as error/mistake proofing, statistical process control
(SPEC), or can be post-process evaluation. The evaluation may occur at the subject
operation or at subsequent operations.

There are two types of Process Controls to consider:

Prevention: Prevent the cause/mechanism of failure or failure mode from occurring,

or reduce their rate of occurrence,

Detection: Detect the cause/mechanism of failure or the failure mode, and lead to
corrective action(s).

17) Detection (D): Detection is the rank associated with the best detection control listed
in the process control column. Detection is a relative ranking, within the scope of the
individual FMEA. In order to achieve a lower ranking, generally the planned process
control has to be improved.

Do not automatically presume that the detection ranking is low because the occurrence
is low (e.g., when control charts are used). The team should agree on an evaluation
criteria and ranking system that is consistent. Detection should be estimated using
given table as a guideline:

Detection Criteria Inspection Suggested Range of Detection Method Rank-

Types ing

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 A B C
Almost Absolute certainty
x Cannot detect or is not checked. 10
Impossible
of non detection.
Very Control will Control is achieved with indirect or
x 9
Remote probably not detect. random checks only.
Controls have poor Control is achieved with visual
Remote x 8
chance of detection. inspection only.
Controls have poor Control is achieved with double visual
Very Low x 7
chance of detection. inspection only.
Control is achieved with charting
Controls may
Low x x methods, such as SPC (Statistical 6
detect.
Process Control).
Control is based on variable gauging
Controls may after parts have left the station, or Go/No
Moderate x 5
detect. Go gauging performed on 100% of the
parts after part have left the station.
Controls have a Error detection is subsequent operations,
Moderately
good chance to x x or gauging performed on setup and first- 4
High
detect. piece check (for set-up cause only).
Error detection in-station, or in
Controls have a
subsequent operations by multi layers of
High good chance to x x 3
acceptance: supply, select, install, verify.
detect.
Cannot accept discrepant part.
Error detection in-station (automatic
Controls almost
Very High x x gauging with automatic stop feature). 2
certain to detect
Cannot pass discrepant part.
Discrepant parts cannot be made because
Controls certain to
Certain x item has been error-proofed by 1
detect
process/product design.
Inspection Types:
A. Error-proofed
B. Gauging
C. Manual Inspection
Note: - The ranking value of 1 is reserved for “Certain to Detect”.

18) Risk Priority Number (RPN): The risk priority number is the product of severity
(S), occurrence (O), and detection (D) rankings.

(S) x (O) x (D) = RPN

Within the scope of the individual FMEA, this value (between 1 and 1000) can be used
to rank order the concerns in the process.

21
19) Recommended Action(s): Engineering assessment for preventive/corrective action
should be first directed at high severity, high RPN, and other items designated by the
team. The intent of any recommended action is to reduce rankings in the following
order: severity, occurrence, and detection.

Action such as, but not limited to, the following should be considered:

 To reduce the probability of occurrence, process and/or design

revisions are required.

 Only design and/or process revision can bring about a reduction in

the severity ranking.

 The preferred method to accomplish a reduction in the detection

ranking is the use of error/mistake proofing methods.

If the engineering assessment leads to no recommended actions for a specific failure

mode/cause/control combination, indicate this by entering “None” in this column.

20) Responsibility and Target Completion Date: Shows the individual responsible
for the recommended action, and the target completion date.

21) Action(s) Taken: After the action has been implemented, enter a brief description of
the actual action and effective date.

22) Action Results: After the preventive/corrective action has been identified, estimate
and record the resulting severity, occurrence, and detection rankings. Calculate and
record the resulting RPN. If no actions are taken, leave the related ranking columns
blank.

All revised ratings should be reviewed and if further action is considered necessary,
repeat the analysis. The focus should always be on continuous improvement.

22
Follow-Up Actions

The process-responsible engineer is responsible for ensuring that all actions recommended
have been implemented and adequately addressed. The FMEA is a living document and
should always reflect the latest design level as well as the latest relevant actions, including
those occurring after the start of production.

The process-responsible engineer has several means of ensuring that concerns are identified
and that recommended actions are implemented. They include, but not limited to the
following:

o Ensuring that process/product requirements are achieved,

o Reviewing engineering drawings, process/product specifications, and process

flow,

o Confirming the incorporation of changes in assembly/manufacturing

documentation, and,

o Reviewing Control Plans and operation instructions.

23
 PROCESS REQUIREMENT

To perform sub-assembly of Belleville washers, outer cone for differential bearing, bush for
5th fork shift shaft, and Welch plug Ø18 for Arm Trans control in transmission case.

Components Required:

Sr. No. Part Description Quantity

1 Transaxle Case 01
2 Bushing (5th Fork Shift Shaft) 01
3 Welch plug Ø18 01
4 Belleville Washers 02
5 Cup Differential Bearing 01

Manual Operation

In case of earlier manual operation the Process Flow Chart is given as:

Opn Process S/C

Equipment S/C Product
No. Description Process
Case Transaxle Sub
Assembly
1) Pressing depth of
Install bush into the bush 0.5mm
t/m case (5th fork max.
* 1. Manual,
shift shaft) and 2) Depth of Welch
Welch plug Ø18 2. Fixture, plug Ø18.0 is Sequence
3. Hand 1.00±0.25mm &
800
Tool, orientation
Install Belleville
4. Steel of parts
washers, & outer
Hammer. 1) Crimping
cup into t/m case *
180o across.
& crimp to retain
parts.
move the clutch
housing and t/m
810 *
case to the next
station
And so accordingly the Process Potential FMEA analysis is given as below:

Note: - for the sake of simplification the last few columns viz. ‘Recommended Action(s)’,
‘Responsibility and Target Completion Date’ and ‘Action Results’ are removed; also the
columns contain no information.

24
 Available Process FMEA

Part Name: Rod shift Transaxle Assembly Process responsibility: -- PFMEA No.: -- Rev. No.: --
Part No.: -- Key Date: 08 Oct. 2002 Page: 01 of 30
Core Team: VM, MA, MM, VU, RD. FMEA Date: 06 Sep. 2004 Prepared by: --
25
 Potential
Process Potential S C O Current Process Controls D R
Opn. Potential Cause(s) /
Function/requir Effect(s) of E la C E P
No. Failure mode Mechanism(s) Prev. Det.
ements failure V ss C T N
of failure Control Control
Install Belleville Wrong
Insufficient
washers & outer sequence for Operator skill Operator Functional 5
790 preload on 6 3 3
cup on axis of assembling insufficient trained testing 4
transmission
ram washers,
Orientation of
Operator skill Operator Functional 5
Belleville Wrong preload 6 3 3
insufficient trained testing 4
washers
Install case in
fixture, bush (5th
fork shift shaft),
Shifting is not
Welch plug Ø18
smooth, Operator fails to Functional 6
800 on axis of ram & Bush missing 7 3 3
dissatisfaction to install part testing 3
press all parts.
customer
Press cup &
crimp to retain
parts.
Operator
Leak in trained &
transmission, Operator fails to check is 4
Plug missing 7 2 Leak test 3
dissatisfaction to install plug introduced for 2
customer existence of
part
Plug
Operator does Gauge 7
insufficiently 7 2 5
not install fully check 0
installed
Assembly
Washers & cone
part come out
Missed will fall out & Operator fails to 2
4 3 from sub Visual 2
crimping there will be no install part 4
sequent
preload
operation
Tool control
Crimping 5
-do- 4 Tool is not sharp 2 calibration Visual 7
insufficient 6
record

NEW SPM MACHINE

Special Purpose Pressing Machine

Transmission Case Sub-Assembly, Belleville Cup, Bush,
Component:
Welch plug.
System, Bush pressing, Plug pressing, Belleville and cup
Function:
crimping.
W.O.No.: 9022-26
Mfd. By: S.P.M. India Ltd, Banglore-70
Error List:

The new SPM machine contains various sensors and “POKA YOKE” system, which
indicates the operators in case of any error/mistake done in the process. Various
problems/errors likely to be held in process on the machine and their corresponding
indication given by the machine are listed below:

26
 Indi.
No. Particular Sensor
00 Normal
01 Emergency Stop
02 Hydraulic system pressure low
03 Pneumatic air pressure low
04 Hydraulic oil level low
05 Component de-clamp not ok
06 Top mandrill pressing cycle reverse not ok
07 Bottom DU bush pressing cycle reverse not ok
08 Belleville cup pressing cycle reverse not ok
09 Safety door open not ok
10 Top mandrill component presence not ok
11 Bottom DU bush presence not ok
12 Belleville cup presence not ok
13 Belleville cup orientation not ok
14 Model selection not ok
15 Safety door close not ok
16 Component clamp not ok
17 Top mandrill pressing cycle fwd. not ok
18 Bottom DU bush pressing cycle fwd. not ok
19 Belleville cup pressing cycle fwd. not ok
20 Trans axle pressing cycle LS both on
21 Bush (5th fork shaft) pressing cycle LS both on
22 Seal pressing cycle LS both on
23 Bush pressing cycle LS both on
24 Belleville cup pressing cycle LS both on
25 Safety door RS both on
26 Belleville cup orientation reverse not ok
Check Sheet:

Machine is inspected according to the following schedule:

Sr.
Check Item Std. Value Duration
No.
1 Pneumatic cylinder stroke Smooth movement (W)
2 Safety Guard Correct place (D)
3 Machine table surface Clean (D)
4 Pressing tool No damage (W)
5 Pneumatic pressure 5-6 bar (D)

MODIFIED PROCESS

Process Flow Diagram:

27
 1 Place outer cone, Belleville washers on axis of ram (Bottom side).
1 Ensure orientation and sequence of parts as per drawing.
2 Install case in fixture.
3 Install bush, plug Ø18 on axis of ram (Top side).
4 Press cycle start button for pressing of all components.
2 Ensure depth of Welch plug and bush as per specification.
3 Ensure proper crimping at around 180o across.
5 Move the case to sealant application station.
Work Content. Post Check. Pre Check

Operation Details

Part No. :- --
Part description :- iB5 Transaxle Assembly - Rod shift
Operation No. :- 790-810
Operation Description :- Case sub assembly
Machine No. :- 07
Machine Description :- S.P.M. Press

Process Parameter:
Parameter Specification Method Check Tool of Control
Pressing Pressure 40 bar Pressure Visual Daily Check Sheet
Required Gauge

Quality Characteristics:
Parameter Specification Method Check Tool of Control
Crimping 180o Apart Visual 100% M/c Control
Depth of Plug 1.0 ± 0.25 Depth Gauge 1/10 LOG Box
Depth of Bush 0.5mm Max. Visual 1/10 LOG Box
Sequence and As per Visual 100% Poka Yoke in
Orientation of Parts Drawings Machine
And the Process flow Chart for the modified process is give as:

28
Process Flow Chart

Part Name: iB5 Rod Transaxle Assembly PFC No.: --

Part No.: -- Date of generation: 06/07/04
Operation: Assembly and Functional Present Revision level: 12 on 25/04/06
testing

Opn Equip S/C

Process Description S/C Product
No. ment Process
Case Transaxle Sub
Assembly
Install Belleville
790 washer & outer cup on *
axis of ram
Install Case in fixture, 1. Pressing Depth Sequence
bush (5th fork shift SPM of the bush 0.5mm &
*
shaft), Welch plug Ø18 Press. max. (5th fork shift orientation
800 on axis of ram shaft) of parts
Press all parts. 2. Depth of Welch
Press cup & crimp to * plug Ø18.0 is 1.00
retain parts. ± 0.25mm
move the clutch
810 housing and t/m case to *
the next station

Process FMEA on SPM Machine

1) Insufficient Crimping: In case if crimping around the Belleville washers and cone
cup is not sufficient then there will be chances that washers and cone will fall out
from the required place and there will be no or insufficient preload on the
differential. It is a revised point from earlier Process FMEA because after
modification also there is possibility of occurrence of this event.

29
 In this case the transmission will be operable but at a reduced level of performance
and hence according to the severity index table (given at Page No. -18) the severity
assignable to this condition will be “S=7”.

The cause of this failure is due to reduced sharpness of tool or tool is worn out. And
after a discussion and considering past experience of engineer, it is found that their
occurrence is very rear or null. So the occurrence ranking given to the failure will be
“O=1”.

It can be prevented by tool control Calibration record. And can be detected by

Double Visual observation/inspection, and so its detection ranking according to the
table (give at Page No. -21) will be “D=7”.

So corresponding RPN value will be “RPN = 7 x 1 x 7 = 49”.

And hence there is no recommended action.

2) Damage to the Housing: During mounting the case on the machine fixture there
is chances of that the case got damage in order to formation of dents and scratches.
This will leads to the leakage in the transmission case or improper sealing of to parts.

In this case there are chances that the complete oil of the transmission case will be
drawn off and in that case there will be the loss of primary function and the
transmission will be inoperable. So the severity ranking given to the case will be
accordingly “S=8”.

The main cause of this failure is rubbing or hitting of the t/m case on the fixture, and
its primary cause is unskilled operator. As in the plant operators are highly skilled to
wards their work, the occurrence of this failure is given as “O=2”.

Moreover, it can be only prevented by giving complete guidance and proper

knowledge to the operator. The detection of this failure is only possible by visual
inspection and leak test i.e. in the subsequent operation the detection ranking will be
“D=4”.

So, “RPN = 8 x 2 x 4 = 64”.

3) Insufficient Installation of Bush: In any case due to insufficient stroke of the

ram it is possible that bush for 5th fork shift shaft is not sufficiently installed. In that

30
 case the shifting of gears will not be smooth and it will leads to the dissatisfaction of
the customer.

In this case the transmission will be operable but the convenience of the customer in
shifting the gears will suffer. So accordingly the severity assignable in this case will
be “S=5”.

As the machine is properly calibrated always, and with addition to the past
experience of the engineers the occurrence will be “O=2”. This failure can be
detected by performance test or we can say in subsequent operation, hence the
detection ranking will be “D=4”.

So, “RPN =5 x 2 x 4 = 40”.

4) Plug Insufficiently Installed: Due to the same reason as into the earlier case it is
possible that the plug is not installed properly, this failure will leads to the leakage in
transmission. But as this portion is on the upper side of housing the oil removal in
bulk is not possible.

The t/m will be operable but its convenience of operation will suffer and so
accordingly severity assigned is “S=6”.

As the machine is properly calibrated always, and with addition to the past
experience of the engineers the occurrence will be “O=2”. This failure can be
detected by Gauging only, after the part have left the station and hence accordingly
the detection ranking will be “D=5”.

So, “RPN =6 x 2 x 5 = 60”.

5) Damage of Plug: Due to the possibility of insufficient stroke and as well as due to
application of excessive pressure it is possible that he plug got damaged. This will
again leads to leakage in the t/m case and convenience in operation will be lost. And
so due to similar effect it will also gives “S=6”.

By the proper calibration and track record its occurrence ceases to “O=1”. And
similarly the failure may be checked or detected by leak test or we can say the
control may detect the failure, hence its detection ranking will be “D=6”.

So, “RPN =6 x 1 x 6 = 36”.

31
The Process Failure Mode and Effect Analysis in its most rigorous form is given in the
following pages along with the Control Plan of the Process.

Note: - As there is no requirement of ‘Recommended actions’ and so subsequent columns,

these columns are removed.

32
 PROCESS FMEA

Part Name: Rod shift Transaxle Assembly Process responsibility: -- PFMEA No.: -- Rev. No.: --
Part No.: -- Key Date: 08 Oct. 2002 Page: --
Core Team: VM, MA, MM, VU, RD. FMEA Date: 06 Sep. 2004 Prepared by: --
32
 Current Process Controls
Process S C Potential Cause(s) / O D R
Opn. Potential Failure Potential Effect(s) of
Function/requireme E la Mechanism(s) of C E P
No. mode failure
nts V ss failure C Prev. Control Det. Control T N

Install Belleville
790 washers & outer cup
on axis of ram

Install case in
fixture, bush (5th fork
shift shaft), Welch Washers & cone will
Crimping Tool is worn out or Tool control
800 plug Ø18 on axis of fall out & there will be 7 1 Visual 7 49
insufficient Tool is not sharp calibration record
ram & press all parts. no preload
Press cup & crimp to
retain parts.
Damage to housing
Rubbing or striking
(dents or scratches Leak in transaxle case Visual & Leak
8 of component on 2 Operator trained 4 64
formation) while or improper sealing test
fixture
mounting on fixture
Shifting is not smooth,
Insufficient Insufficient stroke of Performance
dissatisfaction to 5 2 4 40
installation of bush ram test
customer
Leak in t/m &
Plug insufficiently
dissatisfaction to 6 -do- 2 Gauge Check 5 60
installed
customer
Insufficient stroke or
Leak test may
Damage of plug -do- 6 excessive pressure 1 6 36
detect
applied

Control Plan
Part Name: iB5 Rod Transaxle Assembly Drawing No.: -- Control Plan No.: --
Part No.: -- Engineering level: -- Date of generation: 06/05/04 Rev.: 12 on 25/04/06

Part / Process Name/ Machine/ Characteristics C Method

33
 Device/ Product/ Process/ Evaluation/
Proce la Control
Operation Description Jigs/ Product Process Specification Measurement Size Frequency Who Reaction Plan
ss No. ss Method
Fixtures Tolerance Technique
Install Belleville washers
790 Manual
& outer cup on axis of ram
Install case in fixture, bush
(5th fork shift shaft),
Welch plug Ø18 on axis of SPM Bush Butting of Bush should properly Machine
800 Visual 100% 100% Operator Reset process parameter
ram & press all parts. Press Assembly. Bush butt against face. Control
Press cup crimp to retain
parts.
Pressure
Pressure Daily
required for TBE 1 1/day operator Reset pressure
indicator check sheet
pressing
Fixture & tool Should be free from Daily Rework or replace tool
Visual 1 1/day operator
condition dents & damages check sheet or fixture
Calibration of As per calibration Calibration Calibration Standards Recalibrate / replace
1 Year
pressure gauge procedure record records. room with new
Assembly
of Welch Depth of Flush pin Reset process
Depth 1 ±0.25mm 1 10 Log Book Operator
plug pressing gauge parameter.
Ø18.00mm
Damage free 1 Correct/repair fixture
Damage free Visual Every day None Operator
tool check Review audit freq.
Pressure
Pressure Daily
required for TBE 1 1/day operator Reset pressure
indicator check sheet
pressing
Calibration of As per calibration Calibration Calibration Standards Recalibrate / replace
1 Year
pressure gauge procedure record records. room with new
Crimping
Ref.visual
Orientation Sequence of As per operation Reorient parts as per
Visual 100% 100% aid for operator
of parts. operation standards operation standards
crimping
Damage free 1 Correct/repair fixture
Damage free Visual Every day None Operator
tool/fixture check review audit freq.
33
 CONCLUSION

The Potential FMEA is a most important managerial tool used to reduce the chances of
potential failure in a process. The Process FMEA is performed in order to improve
consistency, quality, efficiency and performance of a particular process. FMEA is used to
decrease; (a) Customer complaints, (b) Severity through design changes, and (c) Occurrence
of failure. In this project the Process FMEA and its component viz. Potential failure mode,
their Effect on subsequent operation or on end-user, Severity, Causes, Process control,
Occurrence, RPN number and various other aspects are studied.

Although responsibility for the preparation of the FMEA is usually assigned to an

individual; FMEA input should be a team effort. A team of knowledgeable individuals
should be assembled (e.g., engineers with expertise in their respective fields). During the
initial development of the Process FMEA, the responsible engineer is expected to directly
and actively involve representative from all affected areas.

Up-front time spent properly completing an FMEA when process changes can be most
easily and inexpensively implemented, will minimize late change crises. An FMEA can
reduce or eliminate the chance of implementing a preventive/corrective change that would
create an even larger concern.

After analyzing given process, its requirements and its modification from earlier manual
operation to current machine operation. Studying the modified flow process chart and flow
process diagram, and by going through the previously performed Process FMEA and 12th
revised Control Plan, the required Process FMEA has been prepared and addressed in its
most common form.

34