5th COA

05-20-00098-CV
Demand Jury Trial
Gallagher
v
Collin County, AG and State of Texas

Brief

I. Introduction
In summary this filing is a Constitutional Challenge to the Texas Controlled Substances Act as well as
Rule 11 the Bill of Review Law and the Vexatious Litigant Law as well as a Writ of InnocenceCite
Collin County Bill of Review Case # 416-00070-2020
In Re: Gallagher, WR-90,174-01 (Tx. Crim. App.)
The Laws of the State of Texas do not allow the State to Sanction and or Declare someone a Vexatious
Litigant because of their Religious Beliefs, or because of their Pursuit to have Religious Rights
Recognized in the Courts. But that is what has happened here. “Because this dispute presents us with a
constitutional issue, we review the trial court's decision de novo. See, e.g., Perry v. Del Rio, 67 S.W.3d
85, 91 (Tex. 2001). Thus, we owe no deference to the trial court's decision and may proceed to resolve
the issues presented as a matter of law. Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex.1998).”
-Strayhorn v. Ethical Society of Austin 110 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. App. 2003)

We review constitutional challenges to a statute de novo. VanDyke v. State, 538 S.W.3d 561, 570 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2017); see also Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10, 2 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (facial challenges
to statutes reviewed de novo). When, as here, a litigant claims that a statute is facially unconstitutional,
we consider the statute as it is written, rather than any particular application of it. Peraza v. State, 467
S.W.3d 508, 514–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). A claim of facial unconstitutionality asserts that the
statute is unconstitutional in all possible circumstances. Salinas v. State, 464 S.W.3d 363, 367 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2015). -Leland Kremplewski v. State, 01-19-00033-CR (Tex. App.)

Because he relies on the standard discussed in Kramer v. Price,[5] which deals with the interplay of
the vagueness doctrine and the First Amendment guarantees, and on Article I, Section 8 of the Texas
Constitution,[6] we construe Appellant's vagueness argument as including a complaint that the statute
offends the First Amendment protection of free speech. The State argues that the First Amendment is
not implicated in this case because harassment is not protected speech contemplated by the First
Amendment. The problem with the State's argument is that it is the challenged statute itself that defines
harassment. Unless the harassment statute is sufficiently clear to withstand constitutional scrutiny, no
unlawful harassment exists that would be excluded from First Amendment protection -Karenev v.
State, 258 S.W.3d 210 (Tex. App. 2008)

Christian relies on Omura v. State,730 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, pet. ref'd). The effect
of the trial court's failure, argues Christian, is: (1) a void original judgment granting probation; (2)
insufficient evidence to support the original judgment granting probation; (3) a void judgment revoking
probation; and (4) an application of the Act violative of article five, sections one and seven of the Texas
Constitution. Additionally, Christian argues that the provisions of the Act that allow the court to adopt,
by inaction, the magistrate's actions render the Act facially unconstitutional. See TEX.GOV'

Generally, an appeal from an order revoking probation is limited to the propriety of the revocation
order and does not include review of the original conviction. See Whetstone v. State, 786 S.W.2d 361,
363 (Tex. Crim.App.1990). However, the original conviction may be collaterally attacked if
fundamental error occurred in the original conviction that rendered the proceeding absolutely void.
See Trcka, 744 S.W.2d at 680. Christian has the burden of showing that the underlying conviction is
void. See Cunningham v. State,815 S.W.2d 313, 315 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, no pet.). The State
argues that even if the trial court failed to timely review the magistrate's actions, this error would
render the judgment voidable, not void. See Armstrong v. State, 805 S.W.2d 791, 793 n. 3
(Tex.Crim.App.1991). We agree. -Christian v. State, 865 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. App. 1993)

"To properly raise a constitutional challenge to a statute, the party attacking the statute must show
three things: "`(1) [T]he statute or the particular part or parts of the statute which the party would
challenge must be stated or pointed out with fair precision; (2) the provision of the Constitution which
 it is claimed has been violated must be clearly designated; and (3) it must be shown wherein the
statute, or *141 some designated part of it, violates such constitutional provision."." -DeKalb County
v. Post Properties, 245 Ga. 214, 218, 263 S.E.2d 905 (1980) (quoting Richmond Concrete Products
Co. v. Ward, 212 Ga. 773, 774, 95 S.E.2d 677 (1956)). Accord Cooper v. State,277 Ga. 282, 284, 587
S.E.2d 605 (2003); Wallin v. State, 248 Ga. 29, 30, 279 S.E.2d 687 (1981).

"Constitutional challenges to statutes present questions of law, which we review for correctness." Provo
City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14, ¶ 5, 86 P.3d 735. "When addressing such a challenge, this court
presumes that the statute is valid, and we resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality."
State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, ¶ 6, 980 P.2d 191.
see also Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1238
(2010) (“[A] ‘facial challenge’ is nothing more nor less than a claim that Congress (or a state
legislature) has violated the Constitution.”). State v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Alaska, 204 P.3d 364,
372 (Alaska 2009). State v. Planned Parenthood (Planned Parenthood 2007), 171 P.3d 577, 581 (Alaska
2007). See State, Dept. of Revenue v. Andrade, 23 P.3d 58, 71 (Alaska 2001). See Estate of Kim ex rel.
Alexander v. Coxe, 295 P.3d 380, 386-88 (Alaska 2013). See Planned Parenthood 2016, 375 P.3d at
1135-36.

GOVERNMENT CODE
TITLE 4. EXECUTIVE BRANCH
SUBTITLE A. EXECUTIVE OFFICERS
CHAPTER 402. ATTORNEY GENERAL
SUBCHAPTER A. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 402.010. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE STATUTES.
(a) In an action in which a party to the litigation files a petition, motion, or other pleading challenging
the constitutionality of a statute of this state, the party shall file the form required by Subsection (a-1).
 The court shall, if the attorney general is not a party to or counsel involved in the litigation, serve
notice of the constitutional challenge and a copy of the petition, motion, or other pleading that raises
the challenge on the attorney general either by certified or registered mail or electronically to an e-
mail address designated by the attorney general for the purposes of this section.
(a-1) The Office of Court Administration of the Texas Judicial System shall adopt the form that a party
challenging the constitutionality of a statute of this state must file with the court in which the action is
pending indicating which pleading should be served on the attorney general in accordance with this
section.
(b) A court may not enter a final judgment holding a statute of this state unconstitutional before the
45th day after the date notice required by Subsection (a) is served on the attorney general.
(c) A party's failure to file as required by Subsection (a) or a court's failure to serve notice as required
by Subsection (a) does not deprive the court of jurisdiction or forfeit an otherwise timely filed claim or
defense based on the challenge to the constitutionality of a statute of this state.
(d) This section or the state's intervention in litigation in response to notice under this section does not
constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity.

Arrett v. Bower, 237 Ariz. 74, 79 ¶ 15, 345 P.3d 129, 134 (App. 2015) (permitting the secretary of state
to intervene to defend the constitutionality of a statute); Grammatico v. Indus. Comm'n, 208 Ariz. 10,
12 ¶ 5 n.3, 90 P.3d 211, 213 n.3 (App. 2004) (providing the attorney general an opportunity to address
constitutional challenge to a statute), aff’d 211 Ariz. 67, 117 P.3d 786 (2005). Compare, e.g., Kepple v.
Fairman Drilling Co., 615 A.2d 1298, 1303 n.3 (Pa. 1992) (noting that notice to attorney general is not
required when contending statute is unconstitutional as applied), with Lazo v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of
Bernalillo Cnty., 690 P.2d 1029, 1031–32 (N.M. 1984) (taking the opposite view). See Fielden, 280 Ga.
at 444-445, 629 S.E.2d 252; Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-112, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 33 L.
Ed. 2d 222 (1972) (school anti-noise ordinance not unconstitutionally vague, as ordinance, as a whole,
clearly prohibits noisy or diversionary activity that disrupts normal school activity)

This is in regards to Criminal Case# 0058313010 in the Collin County County Criminal Court
and Civil Case# 417-01458-2017 in the Collin County District Civil Court.
First, in 0058313010 I was arrested in my Home, with no Warrant in violation of my 4th
Amendment Rights, and in Violation of my 1st Amendment Religious Rights, as well as against
my Texas Constitutional Rights of Religion and Search. And a Motion to Dismiss was filed to
this effect, but even though the Case was dismissed the Judge refused to Acknowledge the
Motion to Dismiss and its contents. But this is what the Motion to Dismiss was about.
Then the Case was dismissed, and instead of Redisposing the Case, the Judge left it on my
Record as if I had finished Probation, which I did not, I was not even in the State for Probation.
Then I sued because I was fired from a Job for a Felony they had put on my Record, and
instead of “Guilty” or “Not Guilty” or “Dismissed” it said “Released from Jail” and it affecting my
ability to rent and work for 7 years. I did get the County to delete that Case (not a Judge, some
other City Employee, her name was Deborah Ramirez or something, I can find it if I
need to) so that case is no longer on my Record. The Lawsuit also involved Religious Violations
in the County Jail, such as the Pastor there telling me I had to be Christian and Couldn’t be
Hindu and kicking me out of Church on Sunday for knowing too much about where everything is
in the Bible and not being Christian.

Then I asked the Judge in Case# 0058313010 to redispose the Case, but he refused.
I filed a Civil Case, Case# 417-01458-2017 and they filed a hearing for when I was in Colorado,
and did not read anything I filed in response to the Defendants, and gave me Sanctions
because the County Requested Sanctions and I was not at the Hearing. Not based on
Evidence, not based on anything other than the Fact that I was not there. So they gave me
Sanctions, and Dismissed the Case, and that was my first Court Case ever.
I am Pro Se, I am not an Attorney, and they forced me to learn about the Courts and the Federal
Courts, and since Austin Texas removed a Case on Mine to Federal Court in 2015, I have
learned a lot more. But when I was doing this County Case I was not familiar with Federal filing
deadlines, and Notices, and everything.

Request part 1:
So I request that the Court Correct the Lower Courts Legal Errors, in
a Writ of Mandamus or Writ of Error:
1. I request the Low Court be ordered to Redispose my Criminal Case to reflect the Dismissal

2. I request that the Sanctions be lifted, after a hearing to determine that they are Void

3. I request that my Civil Case be reopened and actually tried, not brushed under a rug

TEXAS CODE
ARTICLE 1, BILL OF RIGHTS
Sec. 6. FREEDOM OF WORSHIP.
All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of
their own consciences. No man shall be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or
to maintain any ministry against his consent. No human authority ought, in any case whatever, to
control or interfere with the rights of conscience in matters of religion, and no preference shall ever be
 given by law to any religious society or mode of worship. But it shall be the duty of the Legislature to
pass such laws as may be necessary to protect equally every religious denomination in the peaceable
enjoyment of its own mode of public worship.
Sec. 19. DEPRIVATION OF LIFE, LIBERTY, PROPERTY, ETC. BY DUE COURSE OF LAW.
No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in
any manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land.
Sec. 27. RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY; PETITION FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES.
The citizens shall have the right, in a peaceable manner, to assemble together for their common good;
and apply to those invested with the powers of government for redress of grievances or other purposes,
by petition, address or remonstrance.
Sec. 29. BILL OF RIGHTS EXCEPTED FROM POWERS OF GOVERNMENT AND INVIOLATE.
To guard against transgressions of the high powers herein delegated, we declare
that everything in this "Bill of Rights" is excepted out of the general powers of government, and
shall forever remain inviolate, and all laws contrary thereto, or to the following provisions, shall
be void

"It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating particular exceptions to
the grant of power, it would disparage those rights which were not placed in that enumeration;
and it might follow by implication, that those rights which were not singled out, were intended to
be assigned into the hands of the General Government, and were consequently insecure. This
is one of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard against the admission of a bill of rights
into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against."
-James Madison, when Introducing the Bill of Rights

The 9th Amendment

"The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people."

There is a place where Human Understanding and Reality separate. Not that Reality needs to be
supplememted from that point, it is still real, Humans just don't understand it. And now adays people
are so connected and surrounded by new things, and inventions, and google, etc, it is hard to accept that
Reality is itself beyond our comprehension in many ways.

Just for examples of Human Understanding falling short. First, if you were writing a Book about
America as a Historian, you could write about Americans in the 1900s and 2000s believe in Ghosts.
Not because they read about them, but because they have experiences.

That brings us to the Human Brain, Ghosts must be Psychological, right? Well we don't understand
Brains either, because we can only Xray for Molecules that are Radio-active Isotopes which are not
representative of their Parent/Source Molecule, ex: Iodo-Melatonin is not Melatonin in the Body or
Brain, it is a new substance. And Brain scans measure responses of the Brain and Activity, not the
Driving force. We still don't understand the mind beyond the Frontal Lobe and Synapses, Memory is
only just beginning to be understood.

The Big Bang Theory, it is constantly in opposition to Jahovah with Adam and Eve, but even Big Bang
apologists have to admit that we are likely not the only Universe, and that it is not impossible that our
Universe was not just a Big Bang but the end of another Universe, populated, collapsing on itself to
produce a centerpoint from which we all are moving away from. If I say there is a force connecting you
and I, to the Earth, to the Sun, the Moon and all the Planets, it sounds New Age. But if I say "Gravity"
it's like, "Yeah, that thing that connects everything together".

"ib. §. 27. that 'los obrages los aniquilan por la inhumanidad con que se les trata.' that in other
situations also he meets death with more deliberation, and endures tortures with a firmness unknown
almost to religious enthusiasm with us"
- Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Virginia, speaking about Native Americans

II. Jurisdiction
As a general proposition, before a court may address the merits of any case, the court must have
jurisdiction over the party or the property subject to the suit, jurisdiction over the subject matter,
jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, and capacity to act as a court. See Austin Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Sierra Club, 495 S.W.2d 878, 881 (Tex.1973). Subject matter jurisdiction requires that the party
bringing the suit have standing, that there be a live controversy between the parties, and that the case
be justiciable. See Texas Ass'n of Business v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443-46
(Tex.1993). If the district court lacks jurisdiction, in any of these senses, then its decision would not
bind the parties. See Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 495 S.W.2d at 881 (noting that collateral attacks on a
judgment are allowed when the district court lacked jurisdiction). And, a decision that does not bind
the parties is, by definition, an advisory opinion prohibited by Texas law. See Texas Ass'n of Business,
852 S.W.2d at 444 (citing Article II, Section 1, of the Texas Constitution as prohibiting advisory
opinions). See Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398-99 (Tex.1979) (noting that doctrine of
inherent power is derived, in part, from the separation of powers dictated by Article II, Section 1 of the
Texas Constitution) See generallyJIM R. CARRIGAN, INHERENT POWERS OF THE COURTS 2
(1973) (defining inherent powers as those "reasonably required to enable a court to perform efficiently
its judicial functions, to protect its dignity, independence and integrity, and to make its lawful actions
effective"). The Court's inherent powers, such as the power to regulate the practice of law, are
not jurisdictional powers.-The State Bar of Texas v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. 1994)

Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of law. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife
v. Miranda,133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex.2004); Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n v. IT-Davy, 74
S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex.2002); Dallas County v. Wadley, 168 S.W.3d 373, 376 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, pet.
denied). Accordingly, an appellate court reviews a challenge to the trial court's subject matter
jurisdiction de novo. Thompson v. City of Dallas,167 S.W.3d 571, 574 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet.
filed) (quoting Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228); Benefit Realty Corp. v. City of Carrollton, 141 S.W.3d
*809 346, 348 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied). In performing this review, an appellate court does
not look to the merits of the case, but considers only the pleadings and evidence relevant to the
jurisdictional inquiry. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227; County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555
(Tex.2002). -Willms v. Americas Tire Co., Inc., 190 S.W.3d 796 (Tex. App. 2006)

(A) Texas Jurisdiction

Ordinarily, to assert a challenge that a taxing statute is unlawful, the taxpayer is required to pay the
tax under protest and seek a refund. See TEX. TAX CODE § 112.051(a) (“If a person who is required
to pay a tax or fee imposed by this title or collected by the comptroller under any law, including a local
tax collected by the comptroller, contends that the tax or fee is unlawful or that the public official
charged with the duty of collecting the tax or fee may not legally demand or collect the tax or fee, the
person shall pay the amount claimed by the state, and if the person intends to bring suit under this
subchapter, the person must submit with the payment a protest.”). However, the Administrative
Procedure Act authorizes the filing of a declaratory judgment action to challenge “the validity or
applicability of a rule,” when “it is alleged that the rule or its threatened application interferes with or
impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, a legal right or privilege of the plaintiff.” TEX.
GOV’T CODE § 2001.038(a). A party can also challenge the constitutionality of a statute or rule
under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act. See Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation, 469
S.W.3d 69, 76 (Tex. 2015). -Glenn Hegar, Comptroller of Public Accountsv.Texas BLC, Inc., 01-18-
00554-CV (Tex. App)

Water & Power Resources Board, Department of Forests and Waters v. Green Springs Company,
Inc.,394 Pa. 1, 6, 145 A.2d 178, 181 (1958) ("[T]he fact that [a] statute has remained on the statute
books unassailed for many years does not in itself justify a court in reaching an interpretation favorable
to its validity for `old age cannot give it life.'"); Page v. Carr, 232 Pa. 371, 377, 81 A. 430, 432 (1911)
("If a statute is plainly in conflict with the organic law, mere lapse of time cannot cure the defect.") In
short, "this [C]ourt must perform its duty, in spite of the delay." Wilson,328 Pa. at 242, 195 A. at 100.

Cite Austin Transcript where State gives Bob Davis the ability to represent them
Coherent Evidence of Residency

Alternatively, the officers ask us to recognize an implied private right of action for damages for the
violation of their constitutional rights. The officers claimed that their rights under the Texas
Constitution were violated by the City and its officers because they were retaliated against for
exercising their free speech rights under Article 1, section 8 of the Texas Constitution and for
exercising their right to assemble under Article 1, section 27 of the Texas Constitution.[4] They ask us
to find a state analog to the federal Bivens-type cause of action. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971).[5]

In Bivens, the United States Supreme Court recognized an implied private cause of action against a
federal agent acting under color of authority who violates an individual's Fourth Amendment rights
under the United States Constitution. 403 U.S. at 389, 91 S.Ct. at 2001. This remedy has also been
*147 applied to the Fifth Amendment's equal protection component, Davis v. Passman,442 U.S. 228,
248, 99 S. Ct. 2264, 2278, 60 L. Ed. 2d 846 (1979), and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 24-25, 100 S. Ct. 1468, 1474-75, 64 L.
Ed. 2d 15 (1980). The United States Supreme Court has come to refer generically to causes of action
for damages for the violation of constitutional rights as Bivens-type causes of action. See Bush v.
Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 377, 103 S. Ct. 2404, 2411, 76 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1983) (referring to Bivens, Davis,
Carlson, and other cases seeking damages for violation of constitutional right as "Bivens-type actions
based directly on the Constitution."). The Court in Bush held a Bivens-type action would not lie where
a federal statutory scheme provided a remedy for the violation of a particular constitutional right, in
that case, the First Amendment right to free speech. Id. at 390, 103 S. Ct. at 2417.

The Bivens implied cause of action against federal officers complements the statutory § 1983 cause of
action which lies against state or other non-federal government officials. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). The
deterrent effect provided by Bivens-type actions works similarly to that provided by § 1983. See
Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19-22, 100 S. Ct. at 1472-73; Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590-91, 98 S.
Ct. 1991, 1995, 56 L. Ed. 2d 554 (1978). Section 1983 provides that one who under the color of any
state law deprives another of rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution shall be liable in an
action at law or equity. Id.[6] Our analysis focuses on two questions. First, we must determine whether
there is an implied private right of action for damages against governmental entities for violations of
the Texas Constitution. Second, we must decide whether we may look to the Constitution to define the
element of duty for a Texas common law cause of action.

Because Texas has no provision comparable to § 1983, the first question must be answered by
determining whether a private right of action for damages can be implied under the Texas Constitution.
We hold there is no implied private right of action for damages arising under the free speech and free
assembly sections of the Texas Constitution.

Initially, the officers argue that other jurisdictions have recognized state causes of action based on
Bivens. Several states faced with the issue before us have found an implied cause of action while others
have rejected such an action. There is little uniformity in how other jurisdictions have addressed the
issue. Several jurisdictions have followed the approach used by the United States Supreme Court in the
Bivens line of cases, and have based their decisions on the presence or absence of alternative remedial
schemes. See, e.g., Dick Fischer Dev. No. 2, Inc. v. Dep't of Admin.,838 P.2d 263 (Alaska 1992)
(expressing reluctance to extend Bivens to the realm of state constitutional violations except in cases of
flagrant constitutional violations where little or no alternative remedies are available); Gay Law
Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 595 P.2d 592 (1979)
(finding an implied cause of action appropriate because of absence of other remedies); Kelley Property
Dev. v. Town of Lebanon,226 Conn. 314, 627 A.2d 909 (1993) (holding that because of statutory
remedial scheme, court would not imply a cause of action arising directly under the state constitution);
Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines & Risk Management Servs., Inc.,408 So. 2d 711
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982),

Other jurisdictions have based their determination on the ground of sovereign immunity. See, e.g.,
Figueroa v. Hawaii,61 Haw. 369, 604 P.2d 1198 (1979) (noting that Tort Liability Act does not make
state liable in money damages for violation of state constitution); Smith v. Dept. of Public Health,428
Mich. 540, 410 N.W.2d 749 (1987) (holding that where it is alleged that state has violated rights
conferred by constitution, governmental immunity is not available in state court action, but declining to
infer a right to sue the state for damages on the basis of a violation of the Michigan constitution), aff'd,
491 U.S. 58, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 105 L. Ed. 2D 45 (1989); City of Mound Bayou v. Roy Collins Const. Co.,
457 So. 2d 337 (Miss.1984) (holding that state liability only accrues as expressly authorized by law);
Rockhouse, 503 A.2d at 1385 (noting the sovereign immunity scheme cuts against the creation of a
state cause of action); Livingood v. Meece, 477 N.W.2d 183 (N.D.1991) (holding that state sovereign
immunity bars state constitutional claims).

Similarly, other courts have based their determination on either the text of the state constitutions or the
relationship between those constitutions and other bodies of state laws. See, e.g., HFH, Ltd. v. Superior
Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 542 P.2d 237 (1975) (noting that the remedy for improper
legislative acts is undoing the wrongful act and not in money damages), cert. denied,425 U.S. 904, 96
S. Ct. 1495, 47 L. Ed. 2D 754 (1976); Widgeon, 479 A.2d at 921 (holding that where an individual is
deprived of liberty or property interests in violation of article of the state Declaration of Rights, he may
enforce those rights by a common law action for damages); Anderson v. Dep't of Revenue, 313 Or. 1,
828 P.2d 1001 (1992) (noting that taxpayer claims against state for damages based only on state
constitutional violations do not state cognizable claims for relief).
As we consider the reasoning underpinning these decisions, we recognize them as persuasive authority,
but we also recognize that we are not controlled by any one approach used by other states interpreting
specific provisions of their constitutions. Because our Bill of Rights is "based on a myriad of
sources,"[7] ultimately we must interpret our particular Texas Constitution. To interpret our
Constitution, we give effect to its plain language. Dawkins v. Meyer,825 S.W.2d 444, 448 (Tex.1992).
We presume the language of the Constitution was carefully selected, and we interpret words as they are
generally understood. Leander Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Cedar Park Water Supply Corp.,479 S.W.2d 908
(Tex.1972). Thus, we turn our attention to our Constitution.

As we begin, we note that we have been presented no authority, and our research has revealed no
authority, that would indicate that at the time the Constitution was written, it was intended to provide
an implied private right of action for damages for the violation of constitutional rights. See Jones v.
Ross, 141 Tex. 415, 173 S.W.2d 1022, 1024 (1943) (constitutional provisions must be construed in light
of conditions existing at the time of adoption). Accordingly, we find no historical basis to create the
remedy sought.

Additionally, the text of the Texas Bill of Rights cuts against an implied private right of action for the
damages sought because it explicitly announces the consequences of unconstitutional laws. The
guarantees found in the Bill of Rights are excepted from the general powers of government; the State
has no power to commit acts contrary to the guarantees found in the Bill of Rights. Tex. Const. art. 1, §
29. Section 29 has been interpreted as follows: any provision of the Bill of Rights is self-executing to
the extent *149 that anything done in violation of it is void. Hemphill v. Watson,60 Tex. 679, 681
(1884). When a law conflicts with rights guaranteed by Article 1, the Constitution declares that such
acts are void because the Bill of Rights is a limit on State power. Id. The framers of the Texas
Constitution articulated what they intended to be the means of remedying a constitutional violation.
The framers intended that a law contrary to a constitutional provision is void. There is a difference
between voiding a law and seeking damages as a remedy for an act. A law that is declared void has no
legal effect. See Cain v. Fry, 86 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1935, no writ). Such a
declaration is different from seeking compensation for damages, or compensation in money for a loss
or injury. Thus, suits for equitable remedies for violation of constitutional rights are not prohibited.
Section 29 does not support the officers' claim that a private right of action for damages is implied
under the Texas Constitution.

The officers rely on Article 1, section 17 as evidence that this Court has approved actions for damages
arising under the Constitution before. Their reliance on that section is misplaced. Section 17 provides
that no person's property shall be taken, damaged or destroyed or applied to public use without
adequate compensation. Tex. Const. art. 1, § 17. The converse of the provision is that if property is
taken, the owner is entitled to adequate payment. Section 17 provides a textual entitlement to
compensation in its limited context. The officers focus on language from Steele v. City of Houston,603
S.W.2d 786, 791 (Tex.1980), where we stated: "The Constitution itself is the authorization for
compensation for the destruction of property and is a waiver of governmental immunity for the taking,
damaging or destruction of property for public use." However, this language cannot be interpreted
beyond its context. The text of section 17 waives immunity only when one seeks adequate compensation
for property lost to the State. We are not persuaded that a right to damages for injuries to
constitutional interests can be implied solely from a limited explicit entitlement for compensation for
the loss of property.

The court of appeals below rejected the City's reliance on Bagg v. Univ. of Texas Medical Branch,726
S.W.2d 582 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.), a case in which the court of
appeals affirmed the dismissal of a constitutional tort for damages. The court of appeals below
distinguished Bagg, stating that Baggturned on the issue of immunity and not on a holding that there is
no state constitutional tort. 873 S.W.2d at 440. However, the plaintiff in Baggpursued causes of action
for violations of both his federal and state constitutional rights. With respect to his claims under the
state constitution, the Bagg court did recognize that although Texas has a strong bill of rights, "no
Texas statute or case ... provides a citizen the kind of redress afforded by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or by
Bivens.... There is no state `constitutional tort.'" Bagg, 726 S.W.2d at 584 n. 1. Therefore, because the
state claims were rejected, the immunity discussion was necessary only to dispose of the federal causes
of action.

The court of appeals was also persuaded by Jones v. Memorial Hospital Sys.,746 S.W.2d 891 (Tex.App.
—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ). In Jones, the court of appeals held that Article 1, section 8 of the
Texas Constitution provides an independent legal basis for a cause of action. However, Jones is not
inconsistent with our holding today to the extent Jones is understood as approving suits for injunctive
relief. Jones is not to be read as implying from the Constitution a cause of action for damages for the
violation of free speech rights.

The officers fail to satisfy their burden to relate to this Court any textual basis for their argument that
the Constitution affords more than equitable relief for a violation of its provisions. Our review of the
language of the Constitution leads us to conclude that there is no basis from the text of the Constitution
to assume a party is given more than equitable protection. Accordingly we hold that there is no implied
private right of action for damages under the Texas Constitution when an individual alleges the
violation of speech and assembly rights.

Alternatively, we also ask whether we may look to the Constitution to define the element of duty for a
Texas common law cause of action. We answer this in the negative as well. Other jurisdictions split on
whether a common law cause of action is implied to remedy the violation of constitutional rights. At
common law, the violation of a right such as those protected by the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution was viewed as a trespass, giving rise to an action for damages for trespass. For
example, the United States Supreme Court in Bivens referred to the principle that the essence of liberty
consists in the right of individuals to claim protection of the laws when injured, 403 U.S. at 397, 91
S.Ct. at 2005 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803)), and thus held that
a cause of action existed to remedy a violation of the Fourth Amendment by the federal government.
Yet, even given the imperative from Marbury v. Madison, the same Court refused to imply a cause of
action for the violation of an employee's First Amendment rights in Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 389,
103 S. Ct. 2404, 2417, 76 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1983). There, the Court recognized that Congress had crafted
a remedy for the misconduct alleged, and deferred to Congress to decide whether to create a cause of
action. Congressional action, in effect, precluded a finding of a common law remedy.

States have turned to the common law to allow an action for trespass when individual rights analogous
to those protected by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution were violated. See
Widgeon, 479 A.2d at 927 (following Bivens). North Carolina recognized that the common law can
provide a remedy for the violation of free speech, but also noted that the trial judge must craft the
appropriate remedy, and that remedy may include injunctive relief, such as reinstatement, and backpay.
Corum, 413 S.E.2d at 290-91. Ohio, on the other hand, did not establish a common law cause of action
for the violation of free speech because the legislature was viewed to be the more appropriate body to
provide those remedies. Provens, 594 N.E.2d at 962. Our State does not recognize a common law cause
of action for damages to enforce constitutional rights.
Historically Texas common law has not provided a cause of action for damages for the violation of
constitutional rights. The only Texas case we can find that can be read to allow an award of damages
for the violation of constitutionally protected rights is Gold v. Campbell,54 Tex. Civ. App. 269, 117 S.W.
463 (El Paso 1909, no writ). There, the court of appeals recognized that a victim of false imprisonment
could pursue a tort cause of action against an officer. However, the cause of action alleged in Gold was
the traditional common law tort of false imprisonment, not a tort for the violation of constitutional
rights. Gold did not create a new cause of action; rather, it recognized that an officer who acts outside
the scope of his authority is amenable to suit under a traditional common law cause of action. We
disapprove of any interpretation of Gold that concludes it authorized a constitutional tort cause of
action.
-City of Beaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d 143 (Tex.1995)

(B) Federal Question Jurisdiction

Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973) (A Texas statute making it a crime to procure or to attempt to
procure an abortion except on medical advice to save the life of the mother infringes upon a woman’s
right of privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U. S. ___, No. 15–274, slip op. (2016) (A Texas law, which requires that (1)
physicians performing or inducing an abortion have admitting privileges at a local hospital and (2)
abortion facilities meet the minimum standards for ambulatory surgical centers under Texas law,
imposes a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion, imposing an undue burden on a liberty
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause); In Re State of Texas, 15-0139
(Tex. 2016) (Judge Willet on gay marriage); Tucker v. Texas, 326 U. S. 517 (1946) (The Texas Penal
Code makes it an offense for any “peddler or hawker of goods or merchandise” willfully to refuse to
leave premises after having been notified to do so by the owner or possessor thereof. A state,
consistently with the freedom of religion and the press guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, cannot impose criminal punishment upon a person engaged in religious activities and
distributing religious literature in a village owned by the United States under a congressional program
designed to provide housing for workers engaged in national defense activities, where the village is
freely accessible and open to the public); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 (1945) (A Texas statute
required union organizers, before soliciting members, to obtain an organizer’s card from the Secretary
of State. As applied in this case, the statute violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it
imposes a prior restraint on free speech and free assembly. The First Amendment’s safeguards apply to
business and economic activity, and restrictions of these activities can be justified only by clear and
present danger to the public welfare); Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas School Dist., 361 U. S. 376
(1960) (Texas statutes discriminated against the United States in violation of Article VI, clause 2, by
levying a tax on federally owned land and improvements used and occupied by a private concern that
was more burdensome than the tax imposed on similarly situated lessees of property owned by Texas
and its subdivisions); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476 (1965) (A statute providing for the suppression
of the Communist Party and authorizing the issuance of search warrants for subversive books and other
materials is constitutionally defective because it does not require a description with particularity of the
things to be seized); Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U. S. 123 (1880) (A Texas statute, insofar as it levied an
occupational tax only upon the sale of outofstate beer and wine, violated Congress’s power to regulate
foreign and interstate commerce); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460 (1882) (A
Texas tax collected on private telegraph messages sent out of the state imposed an invalid burden on
foreign and interstate commerce, and, insofar as it was imposed on official messages sent by federal
officers, it constituted an unconstitutional burden on a federal instrumentality); Houston & Texas
Central R. R. v. Mayes, 201 U. S. 321 (1906) (A Texas statute exacting of an interstate railroad an
absolute requirement that it furnish a certain number of cars on a given day to transport merchandise to
another state imposed an invalid, unreasonable burden on interstate commerce); Smith v. Texas, 233 U.
S. 630 (1914) (Texas act of 1914 stipulating that only those who have previously served two years as
freight train conductors or brakemen shall be eligible to serve as railroad train conductors was arbitrary
and effected a denial of the equal protection of the laws); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U. S. 389
(1924) (An insurance policy originally issued to insurer in Tennessee and converted by him in Texas
from term insurance to 20 year payment life was deemed to be a mere continuation of the original
policy, and upon suit on the policy in Texas, a Texas law imposing a penalty and allowing an attorney’s
fee could not constitutionally be applied against the insurer for the reason that Texas could not regulate
contracts consummated outside its limits in conformity with the laws of the place where the contract
was made without violating Full Faith and Credit Clause); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307 (1925)
(A Washington law that prohibited motor vehicle common carriers for hire from using its highways
without obtaining a certificate of convenience could not validly be exacted of an interstate motor
carrier; the law was not a regulation designed to promote public safety but a prohibition of competition
and, accordingly, burdened interstate commerce) Bush Co. v. Maloy, 267 U. S. 317 (1925) (voiding like
application of a similar Maryland law) Allen v. Galveston Truck Line Corp., 289 U. S. 708 (1933)
(voiding like application of a Texas law); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536 (1927) (Texas White
Primary Law that barred Negroes from participation in Democratic party primary elections denied them
the equal protection of the laws); Graysburg Oil Co. v. Texas, 278 U. S. 582 (1929) (voiding
application of Texas gasoline tax statute to gasoline sold to the United States); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick,
281 U. S. 397 (1930) (A Texas law that forbade insurance stipulations limiting the time for suit on a
claim to less than two years could not be applied, consistently with due process, to permit recovery
contrary to the terms of a fire insurance policy executed in Mexico by a Mexican insurer and covered in
part by reinsurance effected in Mexico and New York by New York insurers licensed to do business in
Texas who defended against a Texas claimant to whom the policy was assigned while he was a resident
of Mexico and where he resided when the loss was sustained); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73 (1932)
(Texas White Primary Law that empowered the state executive committee of a political party to
prescribe the qualifications of members of the party and thereby to exclude Negroes from voting in
primaries conducted by the party amounted to state action in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 (1950) )Texas constitutional and statutory
provisions restricting admission to the University of Texas Law School to white students violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because Negro students denied admission are
afforded educational facilities inferior to those available at the University); United States v. Texas, 339
U. S. 707 (1950) (Notwithstanding provisions in Texas laws under which Texas extended its boundary
to a line in the Gulf of Mexico 24 marine miles beyond the three-mile limit and asserted ownership of
the bed within that area and to the outer edge of the continental shelf, the United States is entitled to a
decree sustaining its paramount rights to dominion of natural resources in the area, beyond the low-
water mark on the coast of Texas and outside inland waters. Any claim that Texas may have asserted
over the marginal belt when it existed as an independent Republic was relinquished upon its admission
into the Union on an equal footing with the other states); Carr v. City of Altus, 385 U. S. 35 (1966) (A
district court decision holding unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause a Texas statute forbidding
anyone to withdraw water from any underground sources in state without authorization of legislature is
affirmed); Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395 (1971) (A Texas statute (and ordinance of City of Houston) that
provide for imprisonment of persons unable to pay a fine for period calculated at $5 a day violate the
Equal Protection Clause); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972) (Texas’ filing fee system, which
imposes on candidates the costs of the primary election operation and affords no alternative opportunity
for candidates unable to pay the fees to obtain access to the ballot, violates the Equal Protection
Clause); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U. S. 535 (1973) (A Texas law denying right of enforced paternal support
to illegitimate children while granting it to legitimate children violates the Equal Protection Clause);
White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973) (The establishment of multimember legislative districts in
certain Texas urban areas in the context of pervasive electoral discrimination against blacks and
Mexican-Americans denied equal protection of laws); Texas v. Pruett, 414 U. S. 802 (1973) (A federal
court decision that a Texas statutory system that denies good time credit to convicted felons in jail
pending appeal but allows good time credit to incarcerated nonappealing felons unconstitutionally
burdens the right of appeal is summarily affirmed); Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U. S. 308
(1980) (A Texas public nuisance statute authorizing state judges, on the basis of a showing that a
theater exhibited obscene films in the past, to enjoin its future exhibition of films not yet found to be
obscene is an invalid prior restraint in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Bernal v.
Fainter, 467 U. S. 216 (1984) (A Texas requirement that a notary public be a United States citizen
furthers no compelling state interest and denies equal protection of the laws to resident aliens); Texas
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U. S. 1 (1989) (A Texas sales tax exemption for publications published or
distributed by a religious faith and consisting of teachings of that faith or writings sacred to that faith
violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558 (2003)
(A Texas statute making it a crime for two people of the same sex to engage in sodomy violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The right to liberty protected by the Due Process Clause
includes the right of two adults, “with full and mutual consent from each other, [to] engag[e] in sexual
practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.”)

28 U.S. Code§ 1337.Commerce and antitrust regulations; amount in controversy, costs

(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising
under any Act of Congress regulating commerce
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (affirming that Congress may regulate personal Marijuana use as
Interstate Trade); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 US ___(2014) (ACA held to be in Violation of
Religious Right to believe Fetuses have Souls); Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 US ___(2015) (A case using the
Cocaine Tax Law/Harrison Tax Act where the CSA is not definitive, showing the CSA is a generational
member of a family of Laws, and not some alien lifeform immune to Fundamental Law); Linder v.
United States, 268 US 5 (1925) (Harrison Narcotics case Stating "direct control of Medical practice in
the States is beyond the power of the Federal Government"); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114
(1889) (Attainder case, and first case to mandate State Licensed Medical Doctors, and State Medical
Boards).

"Congress may regulate it in its entirety. That a particular instance of carjacking may have a de
minimis effect on interstate commerce is of no consequence" -Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S. Ct. 1624
(citing Maryland v. Wirtz,392 U.S. 183, 197 n. 27, 88 S. Ct. 2017, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1020 (1968)). See also
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1995); United States v.
Morrison,529 U.S. 598, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 146 L. Ed. 2d 658 (2000); and Jones v. United States, 529
U.S. 848, 120 S. Ct. 1904, 146 L. Ed. 2d 902 (2000); United States v. Rivera-Figueroa,149 F.3d 1, 3-4
(1st Cir.1998); United States v. Cobb,144 F.3d 319, 321 (4th Cir.1998); United States v. Romero, 122
F.3d 1334, 1339 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. McHenry, 97 F.3d 125, 126-27 (6th Cir.1996);
United States v. Coleman, 78 F.3d 154, 157-60 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Hutchinson, 75 F.3d
626, 627 (11th Cir.1996); United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 576-83 (3d Cir.1995); United States v.
Robinson,62 F.3d 234, 236 (8th Cir.1995); United States v. Oliver,60 F.3d 547, 549-50 (9th Cir. 1995).

(C) Ultra Vires & Anti-Trust Law

Constitutional Challenges to Government actions are not new, otherwise there would be no purpose in
having a Constitution. Ultra Vires is Latin, meaning "beyond the powers." .
"No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the Sovereignty from which its authority is
derived" -Hilton v. Guyot, 159 US 113 (1895); Marbury v. Madison, 5 US 137 (1803)

"In looking at the facts pled in a light most favorable to plaintiff, we find that defendant state *74
agency's employees were clearly engaged in ultra vires activity and were not, therefore, involved "in
the exercise or discharge of a governmental function". Thus, the granting of summary judgment was in
error." -McCann v. Michigan, 247 N.W.2d 521 (Mich. 1976)

"The trial judge discharged the accused on the ground that the ordinance was ultra vires" -City of
Shreveport v.Taylor, 151 So. 638 (La. 1933)

A great example of Ultra Vires acts are those where Governments create Monopolies, or Trusts. Though
Ultra Vires relates to Rule 5.1 historically, but is now primarily cited in Private Corporate Contract
Law, Ultra Vires and Rule 5.1 directly connect when the Government engages in an Ultra Vires contract
forming a Monopoly. Tunica Web Advertising v. Tunica Casino Operators, 496 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2007)
(Section 1 of the Sherman Act)

A Monopoly is not a Monopoly if they happen naturally, with no Government Contract.

"In commenting upon the statute, 21 Jac. I. c. 3, at the commencement of chapter 85 of the third
institute, entitled "Against Monopolists, Propounders, and Projectors," Lord Coke, in language often
quoted, said:
"It appeareth by the preamble of this act (as a judgment in Parliament) that all grants of monopolies
are against the ancient and fundamental laws of this kingdome. And therefore it is necessary to define
what a monopoly is… A monopoly is an institution, or allowance by the King by his grant, commission,
or otherwise to any person or persons, bodies politique, or corporate, of or for the sole buying, selling,
making, working, or using of anything, whereby any person or persons, bodies politique, or corporate,
are sought to be restrained of any freedome or liberty that they had before or hindred in their lawfull
trade." -United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895)

Trust Defined:
"1. Engaged in Conspiracy
2. That restrained trade;
3. In a particular market" -Spectator's Comm. Network, Inc. v. Colonial Country Club, et al., 253
F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2001)

"Disadvantaged competitors by directly denying… relationships the competitor needs in the

competitive struggle" -NW Wholesale Stationers v. Pac. Stationary, 472 US 284 (1985)

"...it is not surprising that profit margins declined somewhat after 1994 when Noramco joined
Mallinckrodt in the market, transforming it from a monopoly to a duopoly — but this does not mean the
minimal competition between two market participants was adequate…" -Noramco DE Inc v. DEA,
No. 02-1211 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Referring to a Cocaine Trust formed by the DEA); John Doe inc,v.
DEA, 484 F.3d 561 (DC Cir 2007); Norman Bridge Drug Company v. DEA, et al., 529 F.2d 822 (5th
Cir 1976).

"Competition is a rough, often inelegant process by which winners and losers -- whether products,
firms, or technologies -- are chosen by decisions made in the marketplace. In that process, economic
actors are constantly challenged to improve on price, cost, and technology -- or exit. The end result is
economic efficiency and increased technological innovation." -MEMORANDUM OF THE
ANTITRUST DIVISION OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AS
AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF THE APPLICATION OF JOHNSON MATTHEY, INC.
Docket #99-27 (Discussing the Normaco case)

Title 5 Chpt 110 – Grievance system, no 30 days and can not be barred from filing court cases because
the Government doesn’t like your religion
Whether the UPL Committee's records requested by Nolo Press are confidential is a judicial issue.
Nolo Press argues that this Court's 1986 Order contravenes the Public Information Act,[58] various
state constitutional provisions, and the common law. Recently in Commission for Lawyer Discipline v.
Benton,[59] we considered a constitutional challenge to Rule 3.06(d) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules
of Professional Conduct, a rule promulgated by this Court. The district court rejected the challenge,
but the court of appeals sustained it, holding the rule unconstitutional. Nolo Press's challenge to this
Court's 1986 Order is no less justiciable than the challenge in Benton to this Court's rule, and the
appropriate initial forum for this challenge is the district court.-In Re Nolo Press/Folk Law, Inc., 991
S.W.2d 768 (Tex. 1999)

Sanctions can’t be an outcome when you don’t appear, etc

Vexatious Litigant motion has to prove case will not be won cite case law and transcript Vexatious
Litigant case law
Collin County paying for the case to be transferred to Collin County from Austin

(D) Collin County

Defendant' s main argument in support of his claim that there is a fair and just reason to allow him to
withdraw his guilty plea ls that he did not knowingly or voluntarily enter a guilty plea. Defendant
bases this argument on the fact that prior counsel did not explain to him that his plea in federal court
could be used against him in a parallel case in state court 1n Collin County Texas." For a plea to be
knowing and voluntary, ‘the defendant must be advised of a'nd understand the consequences of the
[guilty] plea. United States v. Gaitan,954 F.2d 1005, 1011 (5th Cir. _1992)(quoting United States v.
Pearson,910 F.2d 221223 (5th Cir. 1990 )) -Johnson, Dietrick Lewis Sr., WR-83,532-01 (Tex. App.
2015)

“Law enforcement did not initiate this investigation, nor did law enforcement aid in this investigation.
This investigation originated and was subsequently conducted by the CCDAO and, later, by the Office
of the Attorney General (OAG) acting in conjunction with the CCDAO. The investigation lasted over
two years before Judge Wooten was initially indicted on October 14, 2010. Another nine months went
by before the final indictment against Judge Wooten was filed on July 14, 2011.” -Wooten v. Collin
County, 4:18-cv-00380-ALM (NDTX 2018)

“1. Plaintiff, Suzanne H. Wooten, was wrongfully arrested, charged, and convicted of multiple
contrived counts of Bribery, Conspiracy to Commit Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity, Money
Laundering, and Tampering with a Governmental Record, based on false and legally untenable
allegations.
2. Defendants John Roach, Sr., Christopher Milner, Collin County, Texas, Gregory
Abbott, and Harry White conspired to wrongfully obtain an indictment and prosecute Plaintiff by
inventing and perverting law, misleading judges and juries, and taking apart Plaintiff’s life and
career one piece at a time.
3. Beyond the fact Plaintiff did not engage in the conduct alleged by Defendants,
Defendants knew full well the law did not proscribe any of the alleged conduct. In an attempt to
ensure that Plaintiff was convicted despite her innocence, and knowing she committed no
criminal act, Defendants intentionally misrepresented the law and facts and secured a wrongful
conviction of Plaintiff.
...
5. Ultimately, the criminal case against Plaintiff fell apart when her alleged co-conspirators were held
by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to be actually innocent and that there was no evidence of any
wrongdoing. On May 24, 2017, after spending five and a half years under community supervision,
Plaintiff was exonerated by Writ of Actual Innocence. Unfortunately, the damage had already been
done. As noted in the Order granting the Writ of Actual Innocence, Plaintiff’s civil rights have been
violated. Plaintiff now sues to recover for the harm done to her by the corrupt government agents who
targeted her unjustly.
…
The CCDAO used at least five grand juries to investigate this criminal case against Judge Wooten.
More specifically, the grand juries of the Fall of 2008, Spring of 2009, Fall of 2009, Spring of 2010,
and Fall of 2010. Four of the five grand juries were used to subpoena bank records, phone records,
credit card documents, personal records, emails, and various campaign-related vendor information.
Three of the five grand juries was used to subpoena witnesses.
…
Prior to Defendant Milner being employed at the CCDAO, grand jury investigations were initiated by
law enforcement organizations. There were no independent investigations initiated and conducted by
the CCDAO. However, when Defendant Milner started his employment with the CCDAO, the Special
Crimes Unit was formed, and grand jury cases began to be initiated from within the Special Crimes
Unit.
…
Defendant Milner explained to Judge Rusch that he wanted to leave the CCDAO with a bang. Judge
Rusch had mentioned to Judge Wooten that Defendant Milner was looking to prosecute Dallas District
Attorney Craig Watkins on a constable investigation. Further, Judge Rusch told Judge Wooten not to
worry about Judge Sandoval, but to worry about the “army” coming after her.
…
Defendant Milner told Schulte that Judge Wooten had one week to resign, or she was going to be
facing indictment and would lose her house, law license, her family, her reputation, and that he would
put her in prison for a long time. When Schulte inquired about the basis for Judge Wooten resigning,
Defendant Milner replied that “she knows what she did” and that the “Judge” (Defendant Roach
insisted that he be called Judge Roach) would look favorably upon her if she resigned.
…
On August 28, 2010, the FBI investigation into the CCDAO ended after Defendant White told FBI
investigators that the CCDAO had a legitimate investigation against Judge Wooten and that the OAG
expected to receive a grand jury indictment in the near future.
…
The constitutional injuries complained-of herein were proximately caused by a herein. pattern and
practice of misconduct which occurred with the knowledge and consent of those of Defendants who
acted in a supervisory capacity, such that these Defendants personally knew about, facilitated,
approved, and condoned this pattern and practice of misconduct, or else affirmatively turned a blind
eye thereto without taking any steps to stop it. In this way, these Defendants are personally responsible
for the complained-of injuries because they knowingly, willfully, or at least recklessly caused the
alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s civil rights by their actions or by their deliberately indifferent failure
to act.
…
Statements the Individual Defendants made regarding Plaintiff’s alleged culpability were made with
the knowledge that said statements were false. The Individual Defendants withheld the facts of their
manipulation from Plaintiff.” -Wooten v. Collin County, 4:18-cv-00380-ALM (NDTX 2018)
III. Bill of Review

Cite Bill of Review Case # 416-00070-2020

In Re: Gallagher, WR-90,174-01 (Tx. Crim. App.)

I petition for a Bill of Review in the 417/16th Court. A Case in which Illegal Sanctions were granted to
the Defendant providing a Windfall in the Case, and in which all my Motions were denied, including
motions requesting transfer to Federal Court under Federal Question Jurisdiction. And now the
defendant is asking that I be held in Contempt of a court which decided a case in which it had no
jurisdiction. The court also has a conflict of interest, both in deciding a case which involved the county
that it represents and for myself because my father does business with the republican party of Collin
county and is named publicly as an affiliate of them.
See Prestige Land Iran v. Hilti, 3:15-CV-3734-L (N.D. Tex. Jun. 14, 2018)

I ask that the court set aside judgment so that we may decide the matters in the original case in a court
of appropriate jurisdiction. The defendant only filed sanctions as a strategy to scare me into dismissing
the case and then the court moved forward in a case it had no jurisdiction in sanctions that are
unfounded which is clear when you read the reason for the sanctions as they are listed as

1. filing a case against public officials which is my right

Gallagher v. Collin County, 417-01548-2017 (417th District 2017)
Gallagher v. Collin County, et al, 05-20-00098-CV (Tx. App. 2020)

2. filing a case involving the religious use of marijuana which is my right, as the criminal case that was
dismissed involves the same
State of Texas v. Gallagher, Collin County Criminal Court, 0058313010 (2010-2015)
Gallagher v. Collin County, 417-01548-2017 (417th District 2017)
Gallagher v. Collin County, et al, 05-20-00098-CV (Tx. App. 2020)

3. the sanctions request goes on to erroneously claim that the religious violations in the jail are related
to marijuana use which they are not I was denied access to my religious text which was mailed to me
by family and I was told by a preacher in the jail that I could not attend church service because I was
not Christian none of which involve the use of religious marijuana in jail and none of that is
sanctionable but sanctions were granted simply because I am homeless and indigent and could not
appear
Gallagher v. Collin County, 417-01548-2017 (417th District 2017)
Gallagher v. Collin County, et al, 05-20-00098-CV (Tx. App. 2020)

In the original case I filed against the county I outlined that the country had illegally entered our
property and had arrested me both actions in violation of my 4th amendment constitutional rights
against search and seizure and the criminal charges were later dismissed, and I have since retrieved
the police report proving that the arrest was completely illegal. Further the complaint listed a number
of religious rights violations under the 1st amendment during the time I was kept in Collin county jail
for 40 days before the case was dismissed

A bill of review is an equitable proceeding brought by a party seeking to set aside a prior judgment that
is no longer subject to challenge by a motion for new trial or appeal. Caldwell v. Barnes, 975 S.W.2d
535, 537 (Tex.1998). To set aside a judgment by bill of review, the petitioner must ordinarily plead and
prove (1) a meritorious defense to the cause of action alleged to support the judgment, (2) that he was
prevented from making by the fraud, accident or wrongful act of his opponent, (3) unmixed with any
fault or negligence of his own. Id. If the petitioner was not served, constitutional due process relieves
him of showing a meritorious defense, he is not required to show that the other party's fraud, accident
or wrongful act prevented him from presenting such a defense, and his own want of fault or negligence
is established. Id. The grounds upon which a bill of review can be obtained are narrow because the
procedure conflicts with the fundamental policy that judgments must become final at some point.
Transworld Fin. Serv. Corp. v. Briscoe, 722 S.W.2d 407, 407 (Tex.1987) (citing Alexander v. Hagedorn,
148 Tex. 565, 226 S.W.2d 996, 998 (1950)).

Although it is an equitable proceeding, the fact that an injustice has occurred is not sufficient to justify
relief by bill of review. Wembley Inv. Co. v. Herrera, 11 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex.1999) (per curiam).
Before filing a bill of review, a person must exercise due diligence to avail himself of all adequate legal
remedies against a former judgment. Caldwell, 975 S.W.2d at 537. If legal remedies were available but
ignored, relief by equitable bill of review is unavailable. Wembley, 11 S.W.3d at 927. This applies even
if the failure results from the negligence or mistake of a party's attorney. Gracey v. West,422 S.W.2d
913, 916 (Tex.1968); Thompson v. Henderson,45 S.W.3d 283, 288 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied).
-Nguyen v. Intertex, Inc., 93 S.W.3d 288 (Tex. App. 2002)

“"It is . . . axiomatic that the inferior federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They are
'empowered to hear only those cases within the judicial power of the United States as defined by
Article III of the Constitution,' and which have been entrusted to them by a jurisdictional grant
authorized by Congress." Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409 (11th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994)). "Congress has provided for removal
of cases from state court to federal court when the plaintiff's complaint alleges a claim arising under
federal law." Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 472 (1998) “Where, as here, only
state-law claims are asserted in a complaint, a claim "aris[es] under" federal law if it "necessarily
raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain
without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities."
Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005); Gunn v.
Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013) "The test ordinarily applied for determining whether a claim
arises under federal law is whether a federal question appears on the face of the plaintiff's well-
pleaded complaint." -Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 651 F.3d 1241, 1251 (11th Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 101 (2012)” -Morgan v.PNC Bank, 14-00181-KD-B (S.D. Ala. May. 14, 2014)

“"A bill of review is an independent equitable action brought by a party to a former action seeking to
set aside a judgment, which is no longer appealable or subject to motion for new trial." Baker v.
Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex.1979). According to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, "[o]n
expiration of the time within which the trial court has plenary power, a judgment cannot be set aside by
the trial court except by a bill of review for sufficient cause, filed within the time allowed by law."
Tex.R.Civ.P. 329b(f) (emphasis added). The rules themselves do not define "sufficient cause" but the
Texas Supreme Court, in a series of well-known cases, has set out the requirements that must be met
in order to obtain relief by bill of review. As the following review of these cases will show, the
requirements for obtaining a bill of review differ depending on the particular fact situation.”
-McDaniel v. Hale, 893 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. App. 1995)

“The trial court found that Hagedorn "had a complete and absolute defense" to the Alexanders' suit in
that he did not own the mule and was not responsible for it being on the highway when the Alexanders'
car was forced off the road; that the court would not have entered judgment for the Alexanders on
December 8, 1947, if he "had not understood from the testimony given and the statements made to
the Court at that time that defendant William Hagedorn admitted that the mule which was on the
highway and which was alleged to have caused the accident *998 * * * was his mule and was a mule
for the custody of which he was responsible"; that when Hagedorn came to the courtroom on
September 1, 1947, he came to inform the court that he did not own, and was not responsible for, the
mule at the time of the accident; and that the mule belonged to, and was under the control of,
Hagedorn's son, Robert, at the time of the accident, which fact was known to the Alexanders when
they filed suit "and at all time thereafter."” -Alexander v. Hagedorn, 226 S.W.2d 996 (Tex. 1950)

“The trial court here found that Hanks was not negligent in failing to file an answer because of his
having misplaced the citation, and that the default judgment was not caused by his negligence. It will
be here assumed that, viewing the matter under bill of review standards, there is no evidence to support
these findings, and that Hanks was negligent as a matter of law. This negligence, however, was in
failing to file an answer in time, not in his failure to timely file a motion for new trial.
Under the law, Hanks had two rights or remedies: (1) to file an answer to prevent a default judgment,
and (2) to file a motion for new trial within ten days after the judgment was taken. Rule 329b (1),
Tex.Rules Civ.Proc. Since there was a reliance on the erroneous official information given by the clerk,
it was unnecessary for Hanks to show, as was required under other circumstances in Hagedorn, that he
was prevented from filing his motion for new trial because of some accident, fraud, or wrongful act of
the opposing party.” -Hanks v. Rosser 378 S.W.2d 31 (1964)

In this Case I was unable to appear because I am Homeless and Indigent, Collin County does not
have public Transportation, and I was unable to appear. During this time Uber and Lyft did not even
exist yet, or were not something I had ever used in my life at least, as I did not begin to use them until
2018 so did not know that I could get to Collin County Court, and was indigent anyway so could not
appear. When the Court reviews the Original case they will see that not only did I request the Case be
removed to Federal Court for Federal Question Jurisdiction, but that I am Indigent and Homeless.
In this Case the County refused to Acknowledge that they have no Jurisdiction in a Case regarding
themselves, and in which I was requesting 1st Amendment and Title 42 Section 1983 Relief, this Case
was full of Federal Question Jurisdiction.

State of Texas v. Gallagher, Collin County Criminal Court, 0058313010 (2010-2015)

Gallagher v. Collin County, 417-01548-2017 (417th District 2017)
Texas Criminal Appeals Case #

“… with respect to the bribery charges at the heart of this case, this case is most unusual because the
State’s evidence is not merely insufficient - if affirmatively negates an essential element of the bribery
charges and proves appellant not guilty.” Id. at page 1, Dissenting Opinion (Tex.App. -Dallas 2014)”
-Stacy Cary v. State, 05-12- 01421-CR, 2014 WL 4261233 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2015)

Appeals reversed the convictions of David Cary and rendered acquittals on all counts, finding
that there "was insufficient evidence to support his convictions" on all counts (emphasis added).
See David Cary v. State, 460 S.W.3d 731 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2015)

In David Cary’s case, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the 5th District Dallas Court of Appeals
opinion and affirmed the acquittal on all counts.
See David Cary v. State, PD-0445-15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)

In Stacy Cary’s case, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the opinion of the 5th District Dallas
Court of Appeals and rendered acquittals on all counts as well.
See Stacy Cary v. State, PD-1341-14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)

“As described more fully above, all of the Defendants, while acting individually, herein. jointly and in
conspiracy, as well as under color of law and within the scope of their employment, deprived Plaintiff
of her constitutional rights. Indeed, a judicial finding has been made that the arrest and prosecution of
Plaintiff violated her right to due process. Exhibit A, Order, attached hereto and incorporated herein by
reference … Defendants’ misconduct directly resulted in the unjust arrest and criminal prosecution of
Plaintiff, in violation of her rights under the United States Constitution … The misconduct described in
this Count was undertaken by employees and agents of the Collin County, including but not limited to
Defendants, pursuant to the policy and practices of Collin County to pursue wrongful arrests and
convictions through profoundly flawed investigations and false allegations. In this way, Collin County
violated Plaintiff’s rights by maintaining policies and practices that were the moving force driving the
foregoing constitutional violations. These widespread practices, so well settled as to constitute de facto
policy of Collin County, were able to exist and thrive because the policymaker(s) with authority over
the same exhibited deliberate indifference to the problem, thereby effectively ratifying it. The
widespread practices described in the preceding paragraphs were allowed to flourish because Collin
County failed to implement sufficient training and/or any legitimate mechanism for oversight or
punishment. As a result of the Defendants’ unconstitutional conduct, Plaintiff sustained, and continues
to sustain, injuries including emotional pain and suffering… Defendants John Roach, Sr., Christopher
Defendant Milner, Gregory Abbott, and herein. Defendant White (hereinafter the “Individual
Defendants”) reached an agreement amongst themselves to wrongfully arrest and prosecute Plaintiff
for false and legally untenable claims of Bribery, Conspiracy to Commit Engaging in Organized
Criminal Activity, Money Laundering, and Tampering with a Governmental Record, and to thereby
deprive Plaintiff of her constitutional rights, all as described in the various paragraphs of this
Complaint.” -Wooten v. Collin County, 4:18-cv-00380-ALM (NDTX 2018)

“That hostility surfaced at the Commission’s formal, public hearings, as shown by the record. On May
30, 2014, the seven-member Commission convened publicly to consider Phillips’ case. At several
points during its meeting, commissioners endorsed the view that religious beliefs cannot legitimately be
carried into the public sphere or commercial domain, implying that religious beliefs and persons are
less than fully welcome in Colorado’s business community. One commissioner suggested that Phillips
can believe “what he wants to believe,” but cannot act on his religious beliefs “if he decides to do
business in the state.” Tr. 23. A few moments later, the commissioner restated the same position: “[I]f a
businessman wants to do business in the state and he’s got an issue with the—the law’s impacting his
personal belief system, he needs to look at being able to compromise.” Id., at 30. Standing alone, these
statements are susceptible of different interpretations. On the one hand, they might mean simply that a
business cannot refuse to provide services based on sexual orientation, regardless of the proprietor’s
personal views. On the other hand, they might be seen as inappropriate and dismissive comments
showing lack of due consideration for Phillips’ free exercise rights and the dilemma he faced. In view
of the comments that followed, the latter seems the more likely.” -Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 584 U.S. ___ (2018)

“Other statements by members of the city council were in a similar vein. For example, Councilman
Martinez, after noting his belief that Santeria was outlawed in Cuba, questioned: "[I]f we could not
practice this [religion] in our homeland [Cuba], why bring it to this country?" Councilman Cardoso
said that Santeria devotees at the Church "are in violation of everything this country stands for."
Councilman Mejides indicated that he was "totally against the sacrificing of animals" and
distinguished kosher slaughter because it had a "real purpose." The "Bible says we are allowed to
sacrifice an animal for consumption," he continued, "but for any other purposes, I don't believe that
the Bible allows that." The president of the city council, Councilman Echevarria, asked: "What can we
do to prevent the Church from opening?".” -Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520 (1993)

Bill of Review Case Law

Writ of Error Case Law New Evidence
Clear Error cite Clear Error case law throughout

IV. Conflict of Interest

This Case filed in the Texas Courts, and involving the Texas Attorney General is more of a
Personal case than it seems to be on its Face.

My Father is Robert Scott Gallagher, who is associated with PrintingYourNameOnIt

(PYNOI) and Executive Press, as Co-Owner of these Companies (PYNOI being merged into
Executive Press) as well as a Former Member of the YMCA Board after our years in Indian
Guides and Tae Kwon Do with the Valazquezes, and also in a friendly relationship with the
recent Former Mayor and other Parents of kids from my School. I went to School with Chelsea
Loughmiller, and she used to come over to our house, this is the Daughter of the Former Mayor.
My Dad is also friends with other Kid’s Parents from my Childhood, such as a Lawyer named
Mr. Futia who was the Father of Alex Futia, who I did not know well but was in Classes with in
Elementary School. I did not really speak to my Father from about 6th Grade to the age of about
18, except for Occasionally. And only slightly more Frequently since then, I do meet with him
when I am in the Area now.

My Stepmom, Wendy Gallagher, was even given the role of Operating the McKinney Visitors
Center, which is Basically the Collin County Visitor Center, and my Parents have been to Ken
Paxton Campaign events, as he was previously the DA in our Town.

So as the Plaintiff, I am much more Closely tied to the Texas Attorney General than your
average Plaintiff, and anyone associated with me or the Attorney General, or Collin County, and
who would Benefit from this Case, should recuse themselves.
And it may be best for these Cases to be tried in more Neutral Counties, who are not directly
effected by the Relationships in this Case.

Cynthia Wheless Recusal because of Human Rights complaint cite # Gallagher v. Collin County, 417-
01548-2017 (417th District 2017) and City CJC Misconduct Case # Wooten v. Collin County, 4:18-
cv-00380-ALM (NDTX 2018) Christine Nowak Federal Case # cite lines from the Nowak R&R with
Dates that it was written and ordered by the Judge later Greg Abbott then appoints Nowak’s husband
within 1 month of Nowak R&R to replace Cynthia Wheless husband, Suzanne Wooten same Judge
Andrea Thompson Wooten v. Collin County, 4:18-cv-00380-ALM (NDTX 2018) who said this case
would be an appeals case and that is why the record needed to be clear, point out Greg Abbott Wheless
connection in
“At the time of the CCDAO’s and the OAG’s investigation and prosecution of Judge Wooten, Gregory
Abbott was the Attorney General of Texas… Defendant Abbott, the OAG, allowed his office and
staff, including Defendant White, to assist the CCDAO in the investigation into Judge Wooten…
Further, Defendant White informed the FBI that CCDAO thought that once Greg Willis was elected
Collin County District Attorney, the “Wooten investigation would be discontinued if not transferred to
the AG’s office”. It will become clear that the CCDAO wanted to maintain control over the malicious
investigation and prosecution of Judge Wooten under the guise of the OAG leading the charge… D.J.
stated that the two cases against Judge Greg Willis and Judge Wooten were completely different from
all the other cases heard by the grand jury. The presentation of evidence for the two cases was strange.
The prosecutors, Davis and Defendant Milner, often set the stage for a witness by telling the grand jury
what the witnesses would testify about. The prosecutors often made comments to both D.J. individually
and to the grand jury as a whole, which led D.J. to believe both cases may have had underlying
personal issues … D.J. and other grand jury members started articulating to Davis and Defendant
Milner their concerns as to the DA’s Office having conflicts of interest with these cases. D.J. told the
prosecutors that the investigation seemed more like a political witch-hunt. D.J. asked Davis if his boss
(CCDA John Roach) knew what the prosecutors were doing. Davis responded that of course Roach
knew, that was why they were presenting the cases, and that Roach did not like this person (Judge Greg
Willis). After that comment, Davis tried to backtrack and told D.J. to forget that D.J. heard that
comment … On June 24, 2010, the Collin County grand jury (CCGJ) voted eight to three in favor of a
90-day extension to their six-month term. The CCGJ wanted to hear additional findings in the Judge
Wooten investigation. Collin County District Judge Ray Wheless was presiding over the grand jury at
that time. Judge Wheless denied the grand jury the 90-day extension because he felt the Attorney
General (OAG) prosecutor was working on behalf of the CCDAO and not the OAG.
” -Wooten v. Collin County, 4:18-cv-00380-ALM (NDTX 2018).

Ashley Wysocki in the Dallas Court In Re: Gallagher, 05-20-00128-CV (Tx. App. 2020) married to
O’Neil Wysocki Law Firm who helped to elect Andrea Thompson and in the Name change case In Re:
Gallagher, 05-20-00128-CV (Tx. App. 2020) the Representative who appeared, on no legal grounds,
stated as their Primary argument that they did not want to “Start over with the Vexatious litigant
process”, a case taken by Andrea Thompson later that month, see Gallagher v. Collin County, et al,
05-20-00098-CV (Tx. App. 2020); Gallagher v. Collin County, 417-01548-2017 (417th District
2017); Wooten v. Collin County, 4:18-cv-00380-ALM (NDTX 2018), which was added as a late
tactic when Bob Davis realized his Motion for Contempt including an indefinite jail sentence and $500
per day fee would not be upheld after Cynthia Wheless recused herself, see Gallagher v. Collin
County, 417-01548-2017 (417th District 2017) Phi Delta Phi. This is why Andrea Thompson says it is
an issue for appeal, she does not want to rock the boat because they do not want to ”Start over” see
Gallagher v. Collin County, et al, 05-20-00098-CV (Tx. App. 2020)
”A pattern of abuse of power and malicious prosecution for political gain plagues the CCDAO. In the
time surrounding the gross misuse of the law against Judge Wooten, there has accumulated multiple
examples of similar abusive conduct, including the following:
• Collin County District Judge Greg Willis was investigated by Defendant Milner and Assistant
Attorney General David Glickler while Greg Willis was a candidate for the Collin County District
Attorney position that would be vacated by Roach. Judge Greg Willis’ case was not indicted by the
grand jury convened by Defendant Milner.
• Denton County Sheriff Weldon Lucas was indicted by Defendant Milner a day after the election. The
indictment against Sheriff Lucas was thrown out by a judge just over one week later.
• Dallas County Sheriff Jim Bowles was indicted by Defendant Milner for allegedly funneling more
than $100,000 in political contributions into his personal accounts. The indictment was thrown out by
a judge. The provision of the Texas Election Code used by Defendant Milner does not even specify
criminal penalties for the alleged violations.
• Dallas County Jail Commissary Vendor Jack Madera was indicted by Defendant Milner only to have
the indictment dropped.
• J.V. 3 is a defense attorney who was indicted by Defendant Milner for tampering with a government
record. The indictment was later thrown out. Upon information and belief Defendant Milner
specifically target J.V. because of a personal vendetta.
• D.W. 4 is a defense attorney who was indicted by Defendant Milner for tampering with a government
record. The indictment was later thrown out.” -Wooten v. Collin County, 4:18-cv-00380-ALM
(NDTX 2018)

Filing Ethics Complaint notarize at Wells Fargo Financial reports and missing information

What they fail to realize is that when this is properly adjudicated (which is what they are requesting be
delayed by the court when they request that proper decisions be withheld because they do not want to
start over) is that they will have to stop. They are in violation of Rights Title 5 Chpt 110 – Grievance
system, no 30 days they do not need to start over they need to stop.

Cite transcript in Collin County where Bob Davis says he knows this is about religion

cite appearance of misconduct throughout

V. History
Texas Criminal Appeals Case #
State of Texas v. Gallagher, Collin County Criminal Court, 0058313010 (2010-2015)
Residence
609 Riviera

Mckinney FOIA for 2010

Guilty Plea

Kerrie Walker ineffective assistance of counsel and corruption

Fingerprint Background from In Re: Gallagher, 05-20-00128-CV (Tx. App. 2020)

Defendant' s main argument in support of his claim that there is a fair and just reason to allow him to
withdraw his guilty plea ls that he did not knowingly or voluntarily enter a guilty plea. Defendant
bases this argument on the fact that prior counsel did not explain to him that his plea in federal court
could be used against him in a parallel case in state court 1n Collin County Texas." For a plea to be
knowing and voluntary, ‘the defendant must be advised of a'nd understand the consequences of the
[guilty] plea. United States v. Gaitan,954 F.2d 1005, 1011 (5th Cir. _1992)(quoting United States v.
Pearson,910 F.2d 221223 (5th Cir. 1990 )) -Johnson, Dietrick Lewis Sr., WR-83,532-01 (Tex. App.
2015)
“The CCDAO had ulterior malicious political motivations for prosecuting Judge Wooten. The CCDAO
wanted Judge Wooten off the bench because the CCDAO disagreed with Judge Wooten’s rulings in
criminal cases. This motivation is evident from a myriad of evidence including, a CCDAO internal
email and the redaction of incriminating statements before dissemination of that email as a response to
a public information request, the pressuring of witnesses, destruction of evidence, and the clear misuse
and abuse of the grand jury process. Additionally, it was widely known in the legal community that the
CCDAO had a Special Crimes Division headed by Defendant Milner who used heavy-handed tactics
and strategies to investigate, intimidate and often indict those who were his enemies. As detailed below,
numerous lawyers, elected officials and courthouse staffers were target by CCDAO during the two
terms former District Attorney Roach ran the CCDAO and employed Defendant Milner. The OAG
knowingly aided the CCDAO in accomplishing their goals by way of prosecuting Judge Wooten when it
was clear a crime had not occurred… As a result of this baseless investigation, prosecution, and
conviction, Judge Wooten was forced out of her position as judge of the 380 th Judicial District Court,
exactly as the CCDAO and OAG planned.” -Wooten v. Collin County, 4:18-cv-00380-ALM (NDTX
2018)

Grievance system and Attorney General Opinion about FOIA and Discovery
Wooten v. Collin County, 4:18-cv-00380-ALM (NDTX 2018) Bob Davis lying about requesting
Marijuana in jail and then disputing the existence of the felony on my record which effected my ability
to rent apartments or get jobs for 7 years and was dismissed in examining trial with me never even
being made aware of it and never being convicted or tried for it cite 2 Collin County transcripts from
Jan 23rd and Austin Transcript and EDTX R&R Nowack
Police Report # for Aggravated Perjury cite cases where people have been convicted of it
Gallagher v. Collin County, 417-01548-2017 (417th District 2017)
Cynthia Wheless Sanction calling things rumors and bad faith with no evidence of bad faith whatsoever
and Contempt motion not upheld by Andrea Thompson

“Although the trial court was acting within its discretion in proceeding to trial in the absence of
Kenneth and Clarke and in granting Lisa all of the relief sought in her counter-petition, the mere
failure of Kenneth and Clarke to appear for trial should not expose them to sanctions. A defendant
who fails to appear for trial may be subject to a judgment following trial in his absence, but the worst-
case scenario for such a defendant should be an adverse judgment for all relief sought in the plaintiff's
pleadings. See Sharpe v. Kilcoyne, 962 S.W.2d 697, 698-702 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet.)
(affirming sanctions against defendant that were limited to a post-answer default judgment as to
liability and damages after defendant moved from Texas to Canada, refused to accept correspondence
from court and counsel regarding the lawsuit, and failed to appear at two deposition settings, a
sanctions hearing, and a trial setting).” -In the Interest of K.A.R. 14-03-00970-CV (Tx Crt Apps
Houston)

“Gilbert Maxwell appeals that order, complaining in four issues that the trial court abused its
discretion in assessing sanctions pursuant to its "inherent power over attorneys appearing before it"
and because the new order is not supported by the evidence. We affirm.” -Gilbertv.Tx. Mut. Insu. Co.
03-05-00787-CV (Tex. App. Dec. 19, 2008)

“...violation of a vague and uncertain court order cannot be punished by contempt.” -Ex Parte Price
741 S.W.2d 366 (1987)
Filed in 2017 and 2020 merge case Austin, Collin County, Bill of Review

United States v. Morgan,230 F.3d 1067, 1071 (8th Cir.2000) (recognizing that a claim that a statute is
facially unconstitutional is a jurisdictional claim not waived by a guilty plea); United States v. Bell, 70
F.3d 495, 496-97 (7th Cir.1995) (challenge to constitutionality of statute of conviction is, in certain
circumstances, jurisdictional claim not waived by guilty plea)."); Bell, 70 F.3d at 496-97 (addressing
defendant's challenge to the constitutionality of the underlying statute after recognizing the principle
that such a challenge "is a jurisdictional claim which is not waived by the guilty plea"); United States v.
Montilla, 870 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir.1989) (stating that although the dividing line between
constitutional claims that are waived by a guilty plea and those that survive the plea is not "crystal-
clear," "[c]laims that `the applicable statute is unconstitutional or that the indictment fails to state an
offense' are jurisdictional claims not waived by the guilty plea" (quoting Broncheau, 597 F.2d at 1262
n. 1)), amended by907 F.2d 115 (9th Cir.1990); States v. Barboa,777 F.2d 1420, 1423 n. 3 (10th
Cir.1985) ("A plea of guilty ... does not bar a claim that the defendant may not constitutionally be
convicted in the first instance.... If [the defendant] ple[aded] guilty to something which was not a
crime, he is not now precluded from raising this jurisdictional defect, which goes `to the very power of
the State to bring the defendant into court to answer the charge brought against him.'" (quoting
Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30, 94 S. Ct. 2098)); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 978 n. 8 (5th
Cir.1975) (recognizing "that after entering ... a plea of guilty, a defendant may only appeal
jurisdictional defects in the proceeding below, such as ... the unconstitutionality of the statute
underlying the indictment"); Mercado v. Rockefeller,502 F.2d 666, 672 (2d Cir.1974) ("[I]t is clear that
[a] guilty plea waives only nonjurisdictional defects and does not waive the right to contest the
constitutionality of the statute that is the basis for a conviction." (second alteration in original)
(quotations and citation omitted))

VI. Writ of Innocence

VII. Judge Cynthia Wheless

Gilbert Maxwell appeals that order, complaining in four issues that the trial court abused its discretion
in assessing sanctions pursuant to its "inherent power over attorneys appearing before it" and because
the new order is not supported by the evidence. We affirm. -Gilbert v. Tx. Mut. Insu. Co. No. 03-05-
00787-CV (Tex. App. Dec. 19, 2008)

CJC NO. 20-0485 CJC NO. 20-0053

I filed the Civil Action in the Collin county District Court in 2017, and then could not appear, and was
Sanctioned on the Grounds that I requested $2,000,000 and used News Paper Articles as part of my
Prima Facie Evidence, and because my Religion involves Marijuana use (the Flesh of the Lord God
Shiva). The Collin County Lawyer Bob Davis Continuously states that I requested to use Marijuana in
jail, but I requested that I be allowed to take my Religious Text (the Rig Veda) to Trustee Jobs the same
as the Christians. He has stated this in more than one Court and it is a Blatant lie.

But that is not the issue at hand. That Case, the Civil Case in which Sanctions were Granted and I was
ordered to no longer file Claims for Religious Violations in Jail by Collin County, was by Judge
Cynthia Wheless. Her Husband is the Founder of the Drug Court in Collin County, and as being such
has a bias and is unable to see Marijuana as a Religious Sacrament (Sacred Food), rather than a "Drug"
which we are not using it as. She may be able to put the Fact that ruling for me in her Case could
destroy her Husbands Legacy out of her mind and rule fairly in my Case, but she did not disclose this
information, and accepted a Contempt Hearing Motion recently still with no mention of this, and I am
just learning all of this about the Whelesses and the Nowaks in September.

“The court agrees with the reasoning in Bollinger. Any amount above the rate at which Defendant’s
counsel charged for legal services in this matter would result in a windfall for Defendant.” PRESTIGE
LAND IRAN CO. v. HILTI, INC, 3:15-cv-03734 (NDTX 2018)

“The testimony drives the court to find as a fact, that unlawful and illegal sanctions were imposed.
Such sanctions were being carried out.” Humble Oil Refining Co. v. Eighth Regional W.L.B. 56 F.
Supp. 950 (N.D. Tex. 1944)

When she made her error I filed in the Federal Court, not understanding appeals processes at the time. I
also did not realize that Cynthia Wheless was the Judge, as I was unable to appear, and upon searching
the last name Wheless in Collin County found Ray Wheless, and filed the Federal Action against him,
and Collin County, and Ken Paxton. The Judge that took the Case was Christine Nowak. On September
10th, 2019, just about 2 months from this instant filing you are reading, she dismissed the Case against
Ken Paxton and Ray Wheless.

That same Month, Ray Wheless Retired as Collin County Judge, and appointed Christine Nowak's
Husband, Tom Nowak, to replace him in the 366th Court. So the Federal Magistrate who decided that
the District Court Judge's ruling was not Erroneous, without mentioning that her Husband was
replacing him (I mistakenly thought it was Ray Whelesses order) dismissed the Case and within the
same exact month, her Husband replaced the Defendant on the Bench. Who appoints Judges at this
time? Greg Abbott.

”42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution, to vindicate her right to be free from wrongful arrest and prosecution, and
files this, her Original Complaint, complaining of and about John Roach, Sr., Christopher Milner,
Collin County, Texas, Gregory Abbott, and Harry White (hereinafter collectively referred to as
“Defendants”)” -Wooten v. Collin County, 4:18-cv-00380-ALM (NDTX 2018)

So at this point this is a case that was decided by the Wife (Chrinstine Nowak) of the Judge (Tom
Nowak) who replaced her Husband (Ray Wheless) who founded the Collin County Drug Court, under
the supervision of a corrupt Governor. And all of this happened within a 1 month period, and with the
Vexatious Litigant Motion a 4 month period, as if the Dismissal was a payment for the Husband to be
placed on the Bench. These People have no business deciding any of my Cases at this point, and should
probably be disbarred. This is completely and absolutely unethical.

TITLE 5. OPEN GOVERNMENT; ETHICS

SUBTITLE B. ETHICS
CHAPTER 572. PERSONAL FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE, STANDARDS OF CONDUCT, AND
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
SUBCHAPTER A. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 572.001. POLICY; LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
(a) It is the policy of this state that a state
officer or state employee may not have a direct or indirect interest, including financial and other
interests, or engage in a business transaction or professional activity, or incur any obligation of
any nature that is in substantial conflict with the proper discharge of the officer's or employee's
duties in the public interest.
(b) To implement this policy and to strengthen the faith and confidence of the people of this
state in state government, this chapter provides standards of conduct and disclosure

In her first two issues, Lugo contends Judge Khoury erred in denying her motion to recuse because the
evidence established as a matter of law that the trial judge was biased. Lugo argues that the trial
judge's bias, and Judge Khoury's failure to recuse him, violated her constitutional right to due process.
We review an order denying a motion to recuse for an abuse of discretion. See Sommers v.
Concepcion,20 S.W.3d 27, 41 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). We examine the
totality of the circumstances and will not reverse an assigned judge's ruling if it is within the zone of
reasonable disagreement. See In re C.J.O.,325 S.W.3d 261, 267 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2010, pet. denied).
The movant bears the burden of proving that recusal is warranted, and this burden is met only through
ing of bias or partiality to such an extent that the movant was deprived of a fair trial. Id. Judicial
rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a motion to recuse based on bias or partiality.
See Liteky v *254 U.S., 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 127 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1994). Furthermore,
opinions formed by the judge based on facts introduced or events occurring in the course of
proceedings do not constitute a valid basis for a recusal motion unless "they display a deep-seated
favoritism or antagonism that would make a fair judgment impossible." Id. A judge's ordinary efforts at
courtroom administration, even if stern or short-tempered, are immune. Id. at 556, 114 S. Ct. 1147.

For a judge to be disqualified based on an interest in the proceedings, that interest must generally be
either a direct pecuniary interest or a property interest in the subject matter of the litigation. See Bank
of Texas, N.A., Trustee v. Mexia,135 S.W.3d 356, 361 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied). The subject
matter of the litigation in this case was the care and custody of the minor, H.M.S. The trial judge had
neither a pecuniary nor a property interest in that matter. A party cannot cause a judge to have an
"interest in the proceedings" merely by threatening to call him as a witness. To allow a trial judge to be
disqualified because he sought affirmative relief against being called as a witness would allow a party
an easy means of forcing a recusal. See Sommers, 20 S.W.3d at 42.

Collin County asserts, however, that Judge Khoury had the authority to award sanctions in its favor
under the court's inherent power to discipline an attorney's behavior. See In re Bennett, 960 S.W.2d 35,
40 (Tex.1997). This inherent power to sanction exists to enable courts to perform their judicial
functions effectively and to protect their dignity, independence, and integrity. See Eichelberger v.
Eichelberger,582 S.W.2d 395, 399 (Tex.1979). The power may be exercised to the extent *257
necessary to deter, alleviate, and counteract bad faith abuse of the judicial process, such as any
significant interference with the traditional core functions of the court. See Lawrence v. Kohl, 853
S.W.2d 697, 700 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ). Lugo does not assert the trial court
erred in awarding sanctions to Collin County because there was no evidence that her conduct or the
conduct of her counsel interfered with the core functions of the court.

Lugo additionally argues that she was not given proper notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard
on the sanctions issue. As a general rule, a party made the subject of a sanctions motion must receive
written notice of the allegations and a reasonable opportunity to respond. See Low v. Henry, 221
S.W.3d 609, 618 (Tex.2007). A party may waive proper notice, however, by failing to object in the trial
court. See id. In this case, Sampley provided notice to Lugo that he was seeking sanctions in his
response to the motion to recuse. Later, at the hearing on the motion to recuse, Collin County orally
moved for sanctions and requested attorney's fees. Both Sampley and Collin County put on evidence of
the amount of attorney's fees they were seeking, and Judge Khoury announced in open court that he
was granting the sanctions requested. Although counsel representing Lugo was present at the
proceedings, he raised no objection to the request, the evidence, or the award on the ground of lack of
notice. We conclude, therefore, that this argument has been waived. TEX. R.APP. P. 33.1(a)(1). 5g -In
Re Hms, 349 S.W.3d 250 (Tex. App. 2011)

We must decide if Judge Specia was authorized to act as he did considering the Family Code provision
that fixes "continuing, exclusive jurisdiction" in the court that renders the "final order" in a suit
affecting the parent-child relationship. See TEX. FAM.. CODE ANN. § 155.001(a)(Vernon 1996). The
divorce decree signed by Judge Gabriel qualifies as a "final order." See, e.g. Ex parte Sustrik, 721
S.W.2d 592, 593 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).

A person seeking mandamus relief generally must establish that the trial judge committed a clear
abuse of discretion that cannot be adequately remedied by appeal. See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d
833, 839-40 (Tex.1992). Alternatively, the supreme court has held that void orders can be challenged
by mandamus, regardless of whether an adequate appellate remedy is available. See Dikeman v.
Snell,490 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex.1973). An order is void only if the court rendering it had no jurisdiction
of the parties, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the judgment, or no capacity
to act as a court. See Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex.1990). When a court's action is
merely contrary to a statute or rule, the action is erroneous or voidable, rather than void. See id.;
accord Glunz v. Hernandez, 908 S.W.2d 253, 255 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1995, writ denied).

Judges may exchange districts, or hold courts for each other when they may deem it expedient...." TEX.
CONST. art. V, § 11. Further, the Government Code expressly grants the district courts in Bexar
County concurrent jurisdiction. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 24.139(c) (Vernon 1988). *441It also
sets forth liberal provisions for exchanging benches and transferring cases. The rules of civil
procedure implement these constitutional and statutory provisions. SeeTEX.R. CIV. P. 330(e)-(h)
(setting forth rules for transferring cases and exchanging benches). These provisions also form the
basis of the Bexar County local rules that provide for a centralized, rotating docket system for non-jury
civil matters. See Local Rules 3.1-3.10. -In Re Garza, 981 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. App. 1998)

Vexatious Litigant Designation and Rule 11

(A) Rule 11

The vagueness of the phrase "up to task" was addressed, on facts similar to those presently before the
Court, in First Bank of Marietta v. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company,307 F.3d 501 (6th
Cir.2002). In First Bank of Marietta, the district court ruled that Rule 11 was unavailable to sanction
certain conduct that had been raised because the movant who filed the motion for sanctions failed to
comply with Rule 11's safe harbor filing requirements. Id. at 510. Nevertheless, the district court
included that conduct, along with other conduct that would not have been subject to Rule 11, in a
single order for sanctions based on the court's inherent powers in Chambers. Id. at 509-11;. The Sixth
Circuit first pointed out that the failure to comply with Rule 11 was not fatal because the conduct under
Rule 11 was "intertwined" with conduct which was not subject to Rule and that, pursuant to Chambers,
the district court was correct in considering the entirety of the conduct under inherent powers. Id. at
513. The Sixth Circuit also pointed to language in Chambers which implies that, if conduct is
"intertwined," it is not necessary for the court to first apply the Rules or statutes before relying upon its
inherent powers because such a rule "`would serve only to foster extensive and needless satellite
litigation, which is contrary to the aim of the Rules themselves.'" Id. at 516 (quoting Chambers, 501
U.S. at 50-51, 111 S. Ct. 2123). The Sixth Circuit continued: "Where; as here, the offending party's
conduct extends through the proceedings, Rule 11 remedies would not address the injury that the
district court sought to remedy that included withholding evidence, the consequences of the
withholding, violating discovery orders and extending the proceedings." Id. at 517. Thus, the Sixth
Circuit concluded that since the district court had the authority to rely upon its inherent powers due to
the "Intertwined" and pervasive nature of the sanctionable conduct, any failures of Rule 11 were
irrelevant. Id. at 518. -In Re Cochener, 360 B.R. 542 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007)

(B) Vexatious Litigant Designation

Appellant Reidie Jackson, a prison inmate appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, sued appellees,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice employees David Ellis and Andrew Gratz, individually.
Jackson's pleadings alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights and asserted claims under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), and 1986. On the defendants' motion, the trial court found Jackson to be a
vexatious litigant, ordered him to deposit security of $150, and entered a pre-filing order. When
Jackson did not post security within the period required, the court dismissed his suit. This appeal
followed. We find Ellis and Gratz failed to prove Jackson is a vexatious litigant, and will reverse the
judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings. -Jackson v. Ellis, No. 07-13-
00184-CV (Tex. App. Jun. 4, 2015)

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 11.101(a).

The purpose of the statute is to make it possible for courts to control their
dockets rather than permitting courts to be burdened with repeated filings of
frivolous and malicious litigation by litigants without hope of success while, at the
same time, providing protections for litigants’ constitutional rights to open courts
when they have genuine claims that can survive the scrutiny of the administrative
judge and the posting of security to protect defendants. In re Potts, 357 S.W.3d 766, 768 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, orig. proceeding). In that regard, section 11.102 of the Texas Civil Practice
and Remedies Code, entitled “Permission by Local Administrative Judge,” provides:

(a) A local administrative judge may grant permission to a person

found to be a vexatious litigant under Section 11.101 to file a
litigation only if it appears to the judge that the litigation:
(1) has merit; and
(2) has not been filed for the purposes of harassment or delay.
a show
(b) The local administrative judge may condition permission on the
furnishing of security for the benefit of the defendant as provided in
Subchapter B [Sections 11.051-.057].
(c) A decision of a local administrative judge denying a litigant
permission to file a litigation under Subsection (a), or conditioning
permission to file a litigation on the furnishing of security under
Subsection (b), is not grounds for appeal, except that the litigant
apply for a writ of mandamus with the court of appeals not later than
the 30th day after the date of the decision. The denial of a writ of
 mandamus by the court of appeals is not grounds for appeal to the
supreme court or court of criminal appeals.-in Re Patricia Potts and A.M.W.(A Child), 14-13-
00562-CV (Tex. App. 2013)

Appellant, Ralph O. Douglas, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his case for failure to post
bond as a vexatious litigant.   Douglas also appeals the court's designation of him as a vexatious
litigant which order merged into the final judgment.   See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 11.054
(Vernon 2002). We determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting appellee,
American Title Company's (“ATC”), motion to declare Douglas a vexatious litigant and, thus, whether
the trial court erred in dismissing Douglas's suit for failure to post a vexatious-litigant bond.   We
reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause. -DOUGLAS v. AMERICAN TITLE
COMPANY 01-04-00669-CV Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist. 2006)

On appeal, Appellant challenges both the order that found him to be a vexatious litigant and the order
that dismissed his claims. Appellant’s brief contains the following seven issues:
1. Chapter 11 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code is unconstitutional
as applied to Appellant, as it violates his rights to access to the courts,
due process, and equal protection under the Texas and United States
Constitutions. The motion to declare Appellant a vexatious litigant filed on behalf of Teeters and
Owens by the attorney general is the only pleading filed by any of the defendants prior to the entry of
final judgment.
2. The trial’s court order that required Appellant to pay $7,500 in security
was an arbitrary condition that prevented him access to the courts.
3. The trial court erred when it dismissed Appellant’s claims as frivolous.
4. There was a reasonable probability that Appellant’s retaliation claim
would have been successful on the merits.
5. There was a reasonable probability that Appellant’s due process claim
would have been successful on the merits.
6. There was a reasonable probability that Appellant’s malicious
prosecution claim would have been successful on the merits.
7. Sovereign immunity was not a bar to Appellant’s claims. -Allen Glenn Thomas v. Texas
Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division, 11-12-00121-CV (Tex. App. 2014)

Compare Boyd v. Bulala,672 F. Supp. 915, 922 (W.D. Va.1987) ($1,000,000 damage cap violated right
of jury trial under seventh amendment to the U.S. Constitution) (prior opinion in same case held that
$750,000 cap violated right of jury trial under Virginia Constitution as well, 647 F.Supp. At 789). The
reasoning from the Smith opinion is entirely consistent with our "open courts" analysis in LeCroy v.
Hanlon,713 S.W.2d 335 (Tex.1986). LeCroy

While state constitutions cannot subtract from rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution,
state constitutions can and often do provide additional rights for their citizens. The federal constitution
sets the floor for individual rights; state constitutions establish the ceiling. Recently, state courts have
not hesitated to look to their own constitutions to protect individual rights. This court has been in the
mainstream of that movement. Like the citizens of other states, Texans have adopted state constitutions
to restrict governmental power and guarantee individual rights. The powers restricted and the
individual rights guaranteed in the present constitution reflect Texas' values, customs, and traditions.
Our constitution has independent vitality, and this court has the power and duty to protect the
additional state guaranteed rights of all Texans. By enforcing our constitution, we provide Texans with
their full individual rights and strengthen federalism. LeCroy, 713 S.W.2d at 338-39 (citations and
footnote omitted).

Article I, Section 19 of the Texas Constitution provides:

No citizen of this state shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any
manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land.

TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19. Article I, Section 19 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution impose similar restrictions on the legislature. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19; Lively v. Missouri
K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas, 102 Tex. 545, 120 S.W. 852 (1909); Mellinger v. City of Houston, 3 S.W. 249
(Tex.1887); Massachusetts Indem. & Life v. Tex. State Bd. of Ins.,685 S.W.2d 104 (Tex.App.- Austin
1985, no writ). The standard of review for constitutional challenges on substantive due process
grounds for both the state and federal due process clauses is as follows:

If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are
neither arbitrary nor *696discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502, 537, 54 S. Ct. 505, 516, 78 L. Ed. 940 (1933).

The other due process guarantee in the Texas Constitution is the open courts provision, which provides
as follows:

All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.

TEX. CONST., art. I, § 13. Similar guarantees are found in the constitutions of thirty-seven other
states. 1 G. Braden, The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis 51
(1977). Article I, Section 13 provides two separate and distinct guarantees: (1) all courts shall be
open, and (2) every person shall have remedy for injury by due course of law. The former category
guarantees a right of "access," while the latter category guarantees a right of "redress." No opinion of
this court has discussed the independent guarantee of redress; rather, the focus of our analysis has
been upon those legislative enactments which impose impossible or unreasonable conditions on a
litigant's right of access to the courts. It is of course obvious that an entire abrogation of access results
in an entire denial of redress. Thus, to that extent, the right of access and redress are inextricably
intertwined. However, this case presents a slightly different question because section 11.02 of Article
4590i leaves the right of access wholly intact; only the right of redress is partially restricted.

Thus, this case presents two important questions of first impression. Does a legislative enactment
which partially restricts the right of redress trigger the protections of Article I, Section 13? If so, what
is the appropriate standard of review to be applied? I have found no case which interprets the open
courts provision as independently protecting a litigant's right of redress. I am mindful, however, of the
text of our Constitutional provision: "every person ... shall have remedy by due course of law." TEX.
CONST. art. 1, § 13. I agree with the majority that the protections of Article I, Section 13 do extend to
legislative enactments which allow free access but restrict redress. I further agree that the appropriate
standard of review is whether the legislative purpose for the statute outweighs the partial diminution of
a litigant's constitutionally-guaranteed right of redress. I vigorously disagree, however, with the
majority's implication that the appropriate standard of review includes the existence of a reasonable
substitute (individual quid pro quo) as a constitutional prerequisite to statutory validity. -Lucas v.
United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988)
VIII. Greg Abbott and Ken Paxton: Conflict of Interest

IX. Bob Davis: Aggravated Perjury & Fraud on the Court

(A) Fraud on the Court

In Miller v. Miller, 956 P.2d 887, 905 (Okla.1998), the Oklahoma Supreme Court found that the former
wife's misrepresentations during the divorce decree were intrinsic fraud, as perjury is the prototypical
example of intrinsic fraud. -Parker v. Parker, 916 So. 2d 926 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

Where fraud on the court deprives the defendant of due process, that is, due notice and opportunity to
defend, and hence of jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, the court, upon sufficient findings, will
set aside the decree. McLean v. McLean, 233 N.C. 139, 63 S.E.2d 138. -Carpenter v. Carpenter, 93
S.E.2d 617 (N.C. 1956)

Some examples of fraud on the court include: • Fraud in service of court summons (such as
withholding a court summons from a party) • Corruption or influence of a court member or oflicial •
Judicial fraud • Intentionally failing to inform the parties of necessary appointments or requirements,
in efforts to obstruct the judicial process • “Unconscionable” schemes to deceive or make
misrepresentations through court system Fraud on the court only involves court officials or officers of
the court, such as judges or court- appointed attorneys. The fraud must be directed at the judicial
machinery” itself. Fraud on the court is one of the most serious violations that can occur in a court of
law. If fraud on the court occurs, the effect is that the entire case is voided or cancelled. Any ruling or
judgment that the court has issued will be void. The case will usually need to be retried with different
court officials, often in an entirely different venue. For official(s) who acted in fraud upon the court,
they may very well be required to step down from their position & may even be subjected to criminal
consequences like a fine or jail time. It could result in other serious consequences, such as an
attorney(s) being disbarred, or a judge being removed from service. If a court official is found to be
biased or prejudiced even before fraud occurs, they are required to excuse themselves from the case, &
different official must be appointed. In some jurisdictions. a trial tainted by fraud on the court will be
vacated or set aside for a certain time period (such as two years), to be “reopened” at a later date.
Fraud on the court can be devastating, especially for a party that may be waiting to receive relief from
the court.

Fraud on the court should embrace only that species of fraud which does or attempts to. subvert the
integrity of the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court ) (citation omitted); Kerwit
Med. Prods., Inc. v. N. & H. Instruments, Inc., 616 F.2d 833, 837 (11th Cir. ‘s-i 1980). Fraud on the
court must involve an unconscionable plan or scheme which is designed to improperly influence the
court in its decision Davenport RecyclingAssocs. r. CLR.. 220 F.3d 1255, 1262 (11th Cir. 2000)
(alleged fraud on tax court). â€wlt has been found only in those instances where the fraud vitiates the
court’s ability to reach an impartial disposition of the case before it, there was fraud: there was fraud
on the court; and there was a conspiracy t defraud. This fraud was intentional. The fraud was
perpetrated by officers of the court. Herring, 424 P.3d at 386. A judge is an officer of the court, as are
all members of the Bar. A federal judge is a federal judicial officer, paid by the federal government to
act impartially and lawftilly. Ajudge is not the court. People ; Zajk. 88 Ill.App.3d 477, 410 N.E.2d
626(1980). Chief Justice John Marshall acknowledged that a court may grant relief from judgment
where a new matter “clearly proves it to be against conscience to execute a judgment, and of which the
injured party could not have availed himself before judgment. Marhie Ins. (‘o. ofAlexandria v.
Hodgson, 11 U.s. (7 Cranch) 332, 336 (1813). lie further emphasized that an Article Ill court can grant
relief where “equity of the applicant [is] free from doubt,” and where ajudgment “would be against
conscience/or /1w peiwon 11110 has obtained i/to avail himself” Id. at 337 (emphasis supplied).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b) and 60(d) as well as independent actions in equity may all be
used to seek to vacate orders and judgments due to fraud upon the courts.One of the essential elements
of an independent action in equity is a showing of the absence of any adequate remedy at law. Bankers
Mortgage (‘a. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 79 (5th Cir. 1970). The Supreme Court has further noted
that an independent action in equity should be available only to prevent a grave miscarriage ofjustice.
United States v. Beggedj’, 524 U.S. 38,47(1998). The absence of any adequate remedy at law. In re
Macline Israel, Inc.. 48 F. App’x 859, 863 n.2 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Nat’l Stir. Co. ofN.Y. v. State
Bank of Humboldt, 120 F. 593. 599 (8th Cir. 1903)). “[A]n independent equitable action for relief from
judgment may only be employed to prevent manifest injustice.” Id. at 863. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v.
Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944), and United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38 (1998), this
Court’s leading recent discussions of fraud upon the court. -Darlene C. Amrhein v.Attorney Lennie
F. Bollinger, and Worminton & Bollinger Law Firm, 05-18-00567-CV (Tex. App.)

(B)Texas Penal Code § 37.03. Aggravated Perjury

Here is a fairly detailed list of the Records (Collin County Jail Grievance System) that I am talking
about, which Bob Davis continues to lie about. I wrote this out with Pen and Paper in the jail then
transferred it to an email when I won the case and was released, so I had it available. I would like him
to prove that I have ever once requested to use Marijuana during the time of my Incarceration:

Request # 37595, I asked to be allowed to attend Religious Services, and they said I could go to the
Christian ones (even though I am not Christian) and I was ok with that.

Request # 42101, I was told by the Christian Priest that I was not allowed to attend Bible study because
I was not Christian, and I spoke with the Programs director, Jamie Taylor, in person and she apologized
and said that I could go to the Christian services.

Request # 42121, I point out that the Supreme Court has said that a Jail may have to incur expenses to
accommodate Religion, as I was told I couldn't go to Christian services, and that they didn't have Hindu
Religious texts, etc.

Request # 43154, I respond to the Program Director's Apology, as it came after the original request was
sent

Request # 44481, I tell them how they can get other Hindus printed versions of the Rig Veda, so that
they never have to tell anyone "We don't have your text" ever again (advice I am sure they ignored)

Request # 44803, I make the Staff aware that I will be spreading my faith, and having my own
Religious services, and bringing my Holy Book with my everywhere, no different than the Christians.
Request # 46056, I am told I can no longer bring my Religious Text with me places, and am told I can
only bring books approved by the Programs Director

Request # 46146, I am kicked out of the Inmate Worker Program because of my Religion, even after
getting approval from the Program's director in person to bring my Religious text, and Christians were
never not allowed during this whole time.

There are various problems with the Positions put forward by the County, first of all they claim that the
Lawsuit surrounding this was regarding Religious Marijuana in Jail, when in Reality it is about
Violations in jail of not being allowed to bring Religious Texts to Trustee Jobs, and being told by one of
the Preachers that in order to attend the Christian Church Services I had to be Christian, simply because
I knew more about the Bible than the other inmates there who were Christian and he did not like it. So I
would like Bob Davis to provide to the Court the Evidence that Marijuana was ever Requested. The
Order of Sanctions is Erroneous in that is says that I can not file the same Claims in State or Federal
Court against the County, yet never actually states a set of Claims that I have made. So the Sanctions to
not actually fully exist, as they do not have a mooring in Reality.

Under Texas law, punishment of six months incarceration or less and a fine of $500 or less is
considered a petty offense, insufficient to trig- ger the right to trial by jury. Werblud, 536 S.W.2d
at 546. Punishment exceeding six months’ incarceration entitles the contem- nor to a jury, and the judge
must advise the contemnor of the right to jury. Griffin, 682 S.W.2d at 262.4. At what point in the
contempt proceeding the case is determined to be serious or petty is subject to conflicting authority. a.
The court in Ex parte York, 899 S.W.2d 47, 49 (Tex. App.—Waco 1995, no writ) held that “if
confinement may exceed six months,” then the contempt offense is serious and constitutional safe-
guards (i.e., the right to a jury) should be given. b. However, the court in In re Brown, 114 S.W.3d 7, 11
(Tex. App.— Amarillo 2003, no writ) (citing Werblud, 536 S.W.2d at 546), held that the actual
punishment imposed determines whether the character of the contempt is serious or petty.

“The power to punish for contempt should only be exercised with caution.” Ex parte Arnold, 503
S.W.2d 529, 534 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)

To be enforceable by coercive contempt the order must be clear and unambiguous. Ex parte Chambers,
898 S.W.2d 257, 260 (Tex. 1995)

To be held accountable for contempt of court, the order, whether written or oral, the judgment sought to
be enforced must be clear, specific, and unambiguous. Ex parte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d 43, 44 (Tex. 1967);
Ex parte Hodges, 625 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Tex. 1981); Ex parte Blasingame, 748S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex.
1988)

“Due process of law . . . in the prosecution of contempt, except of that committed in open court,
requires that the accused should be advised of the charges and have a reasonable opportunity to meet
them by way of defense or explanation . . .this includes the assistance of counsel, if requested, and the
right to call witnesses to give testimony . . .” Cooke, 45 Sup. Ct. at 395.

Ample time to prepare and respond to the allegation , In re Oliver, 68 Sup. Ct. 499, 507 (1948), Ex
parte Martin, 656 S.W.2d 443, 445 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)
The right to a jury trial if the potential punishment exceeds 6 months in jail, Muniz v. Hoffman, 422
U.S. 454, 95 S. Ct. 2178, 2190 (1975), Ex parte Werblud, 536 S.W.2d 542, 546
(Tex. 1976)

The court in Ex parte York, 899 S.W.2d 47, 49 (Tex. App.—Waco 1995, no writ) held that “if
confinement may exceed six months,” then the contempt offense is serious and constitutional
safeguards (i.e., the right to a jury) should be given.

The Court Ordered a fee of over $4,900 for the Attorney Costs in the Collin County Lawsuit, yet
Bob Davis states in the request for Sanctions that he is attempting to basically nip this in the
bud before it gets expensive. I would like him to prove that he has done over $4,900 worth of
Work for the County, as of the time of the Sanctions being granted in 2017, and is not simply
pulling that number out of his ass like everything else he says. Attorney’s fees range anywhere
from $100-$250 per Hour, and an Attorney generally spends 8-10 Hours or so on a Case that
has actually hearings and a Trails and everything, so there is no reason that his attorneys fees
should have ever been set at $4,900+ for a Case which he claims he nipped in the bud.

X. Constitutional Challenge to a Statute & Mandamus

Affidavit of Harm and Hardship
 Correspondence from DPS regarding Compassionate Use Program (CPU)

HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE

TITLE 6. FOOD, DRUGS, ALCOHOL, AND HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES
SUBTITLE C. SUBSTANCE ABUSE REGULATION AND CRIMES
CHAPTER 481. TEXAS CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT
Sec. 481.002. DEFINITIONS.
In this chapter:
(5)"Controlled substance" means a substance,including a drug, an adulterant, and a dilutant, listed in
Schedules I through V or Penalty Group 1, 1-A, 2, 2-A, 3, or 4. Theterm includes the aggregate weight
of any mixture, solution, or other substance containing a controlled substance. The term doesnot
include hemp, as defined by Section121.001, Agriculture Code,or the tetrahydrocannabinols in hemp.

(6)"Controlled substance analogue" means:(A)a substance with a chemical structure substantially

similar to the chemical structure of a controlled substance in Schedule I or II or Penalty Group 1, 1-A,
2, or 2-A; or(B)a substance specifically designed to produce an effect substantially similar to, or
greater than, the effect of a controlled substance in Schedule I or II or Penalty Group 1, 1-A, 2,or 2-A.

(17)"Drug paraphernalia" means equipment, a product,or material that is used or intended for use in
planting,propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing,compounding, converting,
producing, processing, preparing,testing, analyzing, packaging, repackaging, storing, containing,or
concealing a controlled substance in violation of this chapteror in injecting, ingesting, inhaling, or
otherwise introducing into the human body a controlled substance in violation of this chapter. The term
includes:(A)a kit used or intended for use in planting,propagating, cultivating, growing, or harvesting
a species of plant that is a controlled substance or from which a controlled substance may be derived;
(B)a material, compound, mixture, preparation,or kit used or intended for use in manufacturing,
compounding, converting, producing, processing, or preparing a controlled substance;(C)an
isomerization device used or intended foruse in increasing the potency of a species of plant that is a
controlled substance;(D)testing equipment used or intended for use in identifying or in analyzing the
strength, effectiveness, or purity of a controlled substance;(E)a scale or balance used or intended for
use in weighing or measuring a controlled substance;
(G)a separation gin or sifter used or intended for use in removing twigs and seeds from or in otherwise
cleaning or refining marihuana;
(L)an object used or intended for use iningesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing marihuana,
cocaine,hashish, or hashish oil into the human body, including:(i)a metal, wooden, acrylic, glass,
stone,plastic, or ceramic pipe with or without a screen, permanent screen, hashish head, or punctured
metal bowl;(ii)a water pipe;(iii)a carburetion tube or device;(iv)a smoking or carburetion mask;(v)a
chamber pipe;(vi)a carburetor pipe;(vii)an electric pipe;(viii)an air-driven pipe;(ix)a chillum;(x)a
bong; or(xi)an ice pipe or chiller.

(26)"Marihuana" means the plant Cannabis sativa L.,whether growing or not, the seeds of that plant,
and every compound,manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of that plant or its seeds.
The term does not include:(A)the resin extracted from a part of the plant or a compound, manufacture,
salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the resin;

(27)"Medical purpose" means the use of a controlled substance for relieving or curing a mental or
physical disease or infirmity.

(34)"Pharmacist" means a person licensed by the Texas State Board of Pharmacy to practice
pharmacy and who acts as an agent for a pharmacy.

(52) "Department" means the Department of Public Safety.

(53) "Chemical laboratory apparatus" means any item of equipment designed, made, or adapted to
manufacture a controlled substance or a controlled substance analogue, including:
(A) a condenser;
(B) a distilling apparatus;
(C) a vacuum drier;
(D) a three-neck or distilling flask;
(E) a tableting machine;
(F) an encapsulating machine;
(G) a filter, Buchner, or separatory funnel;
(H) an Erlenmeyer, two-neck, or single-neck flask;
(I) a round-bottom, Florence, thermometer, or filtering flask;
(J) a Soxhlet extractor;
(K) a transformer;
(L) a flask heater;
(M) a heating mantel; or
(N) an adaptor tube.

Sec. 481.062. EXEMPTIONS.

(a) The following persons may possess a controlled substance under this chapter without registering
with the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration:
(1) an agent or employee of a manufacturer, distributor, analyzer, or dispenser of the controlled
substance who is registered with the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration and acting in the usual
course of business or employment;
(2) a common or contract carrier, a warehouseman, or an employee of a carrier or warehouseman
whose possession of the controlled substance is in the usual course of business or employment;
(3) an ultimate user or a person in possession of the controlled substance under a lawful order of a
practitioner or in lawful possession of the controlled substance if it is listed in Schedule V;
(4) an officer or employee of this state, another state, a political subdivision of this state or another
state, or the United States who is lawfully engaged in the enforcement of a law relating to a controlled
substance or drug or to a customs law and authorized to possess the controlled substance in the
discharge of the person's official duties;
(5) if the substance is tetrahydrocannabinol or one of its derivatives:
(A) a Department of State Health Services official, a medical school researcher, or a research program
participant possessing the substance as authorized under Subchapter G; or
(B) a practitioner or an ultimate user possessing the substance as a participant in a federally
approved therapeutic research program that the commissioner has reviewed and found, in writing, to
contain a medically responsible research protocol; or
(6) a dispensing organization licensed under Chapter 487 that possesses low-THC cannabis.

Sec. 481.0621. EXCEPTIONS.

(a) This subchapter does not apply to an educational or research program of a school district or a
public or private institution of higher education. This subchapter does not apply to a manufacturer,
wholesaler, retailer, or other person who sells, transfers, or furnishes materials covered by this
subchapter to those educational or research programs.
(b) The department and the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board shall adopt a memorandum
of understanding that establishes the responsibilities of the board, the department, and the public or
private institutions of higher education in implementing and maintaining a program for reporting
information concerning controlled substances, controlled substance analogues, chemical precursors,
and chemical laboratory apparatus used in educational or research activities of institutions of higher
education.
(c) The department and the Texas Education Agency shall adopt a memorandum of understanding that
establishes the responsibilities of the agency, the department, and school districts in implementing and
maintaining a program for reporting information concerning controlled substances, controlled
substance analogues, chemical precursors, and chemical laboratory apparatus used in educational or
research activities of those schools and school districts.

Sec. 481.065. AUTHORIZATION FOR CERTAIN ACTIVITIES.

(a) The director may authorize the possession, distribution, planting, and cultivation of controlled
substances by a person engaged in research, training animals to detect controlled substances, or
designing or calibrating devices to detect controlled substances. A person who obtains an
authorization under this subsection does not commit an offense involving the possession or distribution
of controlled substances to the extent that the possession or distribution is authorized.
(b) A person may conduct research with or analyze substances listed in Schedule I in this state only if
the person is a practitioner registered under federal law to conduct research with or analyze those
substances and the person provides the director with evidence of federal registration.

Sec. 481.067. RECORDS.

(a) A person who is registered with the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration to manufacture,
distribute, analyze, or dispense a controlled substance shall keep records and maintain inventories in
compliance with record keeping and inventory requirements of federal law and with additional rules
the board or director adopts.
(b) The pharmacist-in-charge of a pharmacy shall maintain the records and inventories required by
this section.
(c) A record required by this section must be made at the time of the transaction that is the basis of the
record. A record or inventory required by this section must be kept or maintained for at least two years
after the date the record or inventory is made.

Sec. 481.071. MEDICAL PURPOSE REQUIRED BEFORE PRESCRIBING, DISPENSING,

DELIVERING, OR ADMINISTERING CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.
(a) A practitioner defined by Section 481.002(39)(A) may not prescribe, dispense, deliver, or
administer a controlled substance or cause a controlled substance to be administered under the
practitioner's direction and supervision except for a valid medical purpose and in the course of
medical practice.
(b) An anabolic steroid or human growth hormone listed in Schedule III may only be:
(1) dispensed, prescribed, delivered, or administered by a practitioner, as defined by Section
481.002(39)(A), for a valid medical purpose and in the course of professional practice; or
(2) dispensed or delivered by a pharmacist according to a prescription issued by a practitioner, as
defined by Section 481.002(39)(A) or (C), for a valid medical purpose and in the course of professional
practice.
(c) For the purposes of Subsection (b), bodybuilding, muscle enhancement, or increasing muscle bulk
or strength through the use of an anabolic steroid or human growth hormone listed in Schedule III by a
person who is in good health is not a valid medical purpose.

Sec. 481.111. EXEMPTIONS.

(a) The provisions of this chapter relating to the possession and distribution of peyote do not apply to
the use of peyote by a member of the Native American Church in bona fide religious ceremonies of the
church or to a person who supplies the substance to the church. An exemption granted to a member of
the Native American Church under this section does not apply to a member with less than 25 percent
Indian blood.
(b) The provisions of this chapter relating to the possession of denatured sodium pentobarbital do not
apply to possession by personnel of a humane society or an animal control agency for the purpose of
destroying injured, sick, homeless, or unwanted animals if the humane society or animal control
agency is registered with the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration. The provisions of this chapter
relating to the distribution of denatured sodium pentobarbital do not apply to a person registered as
required by Subchapter C, who is distributing the substance for that purpose to a humane society or
an animal control agency registered with the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration.
(c) A person does not violate Section 481.113, 481.116, 481.1161, 481.121, or 481.125 if the person
possesses or delivers tetrahydrocannabinols or their derivatives, or drug paraphernalia to be used to
introduce tetrahydrocannabinols or their derivatives into the human body, for use in a federally
approved therapeutic research program.
(d) The provisions of this chapter relating to the possession and distribution of anabolic steroids do
not apply to the use of anabolic steroids that are administered to livestock or poultry.
(e) Sections 481.120, 481.121, 481.122, and 481.125 do not apply to a person who engages in the
acquisition, possession, production, cultivation, delivery, or disposal of a raw material used in or by-
product created by the production or cultivation of low-THC cannabis if the person:
(1) for an offense involving possession only of marihuana or drug paraphernalia, is a patient for
whom low-THC cannabis is prescribed under Chapter 169, Occupations Code, or the patient's legal
guardian, and the person possesses low-THC cannabis obtained under a valid prescription from a
dispensing organization; or
(2) is a director, manager, or employee of a dispensing organization and the person, solely in
performing the person's regular duties at the organization, acquires, possesses, produces, cultivates,
dispenses, or disposes of:
(A) in reasonable quantities, any low-THC cannabis or raw materials used in or by-products created
by the production or cultivation of low-THC cannabis; or
(B) any drug paraphernalia used in the acquisition, possession, production, cultivation, delivery, or
disposal of low-THC cannabis.
(f) For purposes of Subsection (e):
(1) "Dispensing organization" has the meaning assigned by Section 487.001.
(2) "Low-THC cannabis" has the meaning assigned by Section 169.001, Occupations Code.

Sec. 481.121. OFFENSE: POSSESSION OF MARIHUANA.

(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, a person commits an offense if the person knowingly or
intentionally possesses a usable quantity of marihuana.
(b) An offense under Subsection (a) is:
(1) a Class B misdemeanor if the amount of marihuana possessed is two ounces or less;
(2) a Class A misdemeanor if the amount of marihuana possessed is four ounces or less but more than
two ounces;
(3) a state jail felony if the amount of marihuana possessed is five pounds or less but more than four
ounces;
(4) a felony of the third degree if the amount of marihuana possessed is 50 pounds or less but more
than 5 pounds;
(5) a felony of the second degree if the amount of marihuana possessed is 2,000 pounds or less but
more than 50 pounds; and
(6) punishable by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for life or for a term of
not more than 99 years or less than 5 years, and a fine not to exceed $50,000, if the amount of
marihuana possessed is more than 2,000 pounds.

HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE

TITLE 6. FOOD, DRUGS, ALCOHOL, AND HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES
SUBTITLE C. SUBSTANCE ABUSE REGULATION AND CRIMES
CHAPTER 487. TEXAS COMPASSIONATE-USE ACT
SUBCHAPTER A. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 487.053. LICENSING OF DISPENSING ORGANIZATIONS AND REGISTRATION OF

CERTAIN ASSOCIATED INDIVIDUALS.

(a) The department shall:

(1) issue or renew a license to operate as a dispensing organization to each applicant who satisfies the
requirements established under this chapter; and
(2) register directors, managers, and employees of each dispensing organization.
(b) Subject to Section 411.503, Government Code, the department shall enforce compliance of
licensees and registrants and shall adopt procedures for suspending or revoking a license or
registration issued under this chapter and for renewing a license or registration issued under this
chapter.

SUBCHAPTER C. LICENSE TO OPERATE AS DISPENSING ORGANIZATION

Sec. 487.101. LICENSE REQUIRED.

A license issued by the department under this chapter is required to operate a dispensing organization.

Sec. 487.102. ELIGIBILITY FOR LICENSE.

An applicant for a license to operate as a dispensing organization is eligible for the license if:
(1) as determined by the department, the applicant possesses:
(A) the technical and technological ability to cultivate and produce low-THC cannabis;
(B) the ability to secure:
(i) the resources and personnel necessary to operate as a dispensing organization; and
(ii) premises reasonably located to allow patients listed on the compassionate-use registry access to
the organization through existing infrastructure;
(C) the ability to maintain accountability for the raw materials, the finished product, and any by-
products used or produced in the cultivation or production of low-THC cannabis to prevent unlawful
access to or unlawful diversion or possession of those materials, products, or by-products; and
(D) the financial ability to maintain operations for not less than two years from the date of
application;
(2) each director, manager, or employee of the applicant is registered under Subchapter D; and
(3) the applicant satisfies any additional criteria determined by the director to be necessary to safely
implement this chapter.

Sec. 487.103. APPLICATION.

(a) A person may apply for an initial or renewal license to operate as a dispensing organization by
submitting a form prescribed by the department along with the application fee in an amount set by the
director.
(b) The application must include the name and address of the applicant, the name and address of each
of the applicant's directors, managers, and employees, and any other information considered necessary
by the department to determine the applicant's eligibility for the license.

Sec. 487.104. ISSUANCE, RENEWAL, OR DENIAL OF LICENSE.

(a) The department shall issue or renew a license to operate as a dispensing organization only if:
(1) the department determines the applicant meets the eligibility requirements described by Section
487.102; and
(2) issuance or renewal of the license is necessary to ensure reasonable statewide access to, and the
availability of, low-THC cannabis for patients registered in the compassionate-use registry and for
whom low-THC cannabis is prescribed under Chapter 169, Occupations Code.
(b) If the department denies the issuance or renewal of a license under Subsection (a), the applicant is
entitled to a hearing. Chapter 2001, Government Code, applies to a proceeding under this section.
(c) A license issued or renewed under this section expires as determined by the department in
accordance with Section 411.511, Government Code.

SUBCHAPTER E. DUTIES OF COUNTIES AND MUNICIPALITIES

Sec. 487.201. COUNTIES AND MUNICIPALITIES MAY NOT PROHIBIT LOW-THC

CANNABIS.

A municipality, county, or other political subdivision may not enact, adopt, or enforce a rule,
ordinance, order, resolution, or other regulation that prohibits the cultivation, production, dispensing,
or possession of low-THC cannabis, as authorized by this chapter.

"Mandamus is only available where no other adequate remedy at law is available." Vance v. Routt,571
S.W.2d 903, 907 (Tex. Cr.App.1978). It is also well settled that mandamus will not issue to compel a
particular result *594 in what is manifestly a discretionary decision, Garcia v. Dial, supra; see, e.g.,
Williams v. Placke,587 S.W.2d 166 (Tex.Cr. App.1979); and Ordunez v. Bean,579 S.W.2d 911
(Tex.Cr.App.1979), though mandamus may be appropriate to impel the consideration of a motion, the
issuance of a ruling, an entry of a judgment or other act, the doing of which is not discretionary. Id.
The affirmative duty upon an attorney to advise the court of any conflict, actual or potential, extant in
his representation of a defendant has been performed by Petitioner. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435
U.S. 475, 98 S. Ct. 1173, 55 L. Ed. 2D 426 (1978); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S. Ct. 457,
86 L. Ed. 680 (1942); Pete v. State,533 S.W.2d 808 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); see also State Bar of Texas
Rules and Code of Professional Responsibility (hereinafter C.P.R.) DR 5-105. And though it appears no
duty devolves on the trial court to sua sponte inquire, Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S. Ct. 1708,
64 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1980), the authorities agree that great deference should be accorded the
representations of an attorney that he feels a division of loyalty. -White v. Reiter, 640 S.W.2d 586
(Tex.Crim.App.1982)

TITLE 5. GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY

CHAPTER 110. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Sec. 110.001.
(1)DEFINITIONS.
(a) In this chapter:
"Free exercise of religion" means an act or refusal to act that is substantially motivated by sincere
religious belief. In determining whether an act or refusal to act is substantially motivated by sincere
religious belief under this chapter, it is not necessary to determine that the act or refusal to act is
motivated by a central part or central requirement of the person's sincere religious belief.
Attainder and Exemption

The Volstead Act Prohibited the use and Sale of Alcohol in the United States under the 18th
Amendment, and in it there was a Medical and Religious Exemption: "Liquor for nonbeverage
purposes and wine for sacramental purposes may be manufactured, purchased, sold, bartered,
transported, imported, exported, delivered furnished and possessed..." -41 Stat. 305 (Pub. Law 66-66)

"8th day of March, one thousand eight hundred and eighty-one. Every such person shall make and file
with the two members of the State Board of Health in the congressional district in which he resides, or
if he resides out of the State in the district nearest his residence, an affidavit of the number of years he
has continuously practiced in this State; and, if the number of years therein stated be ten or more, the
said Board, or said two members thereof, shall, unless they ascertain such affidavit to be false, give
him a certificate to that fact, and authorizing him to practice medicine in all its departments in this
State." -Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889)

"The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the
legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws. The constitutional inhibition
of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion
by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience
and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose
cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of
religion."
-Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)

“waive the requirement for registration of certain manufacturers, distributors, or dispensers if he finds
it consistent with the public health and safety.” 21 U. S. C. §822(d). The fact that the Act itself
contemplates that exempting certain people from its requirements would be “consistent with the public
health and safety” indicates that congressional findings with respect to Schedule I substances should
not carry the determinative weight, for RFRA purposes, that the Government would ascribe to them."
-Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006); Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (affirming that Congress may regulate personal Marijuana use as Interstate
Trade); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 US ___(2014) (ACA held to be in Violation of Religious Right to
believe Fetuses have Souls); Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 US ___(2015) (A case using the Cocaine Tax
Law/Harrison Tax Act where the CSA is not definitive, showing the CSA is a generational member of a
family of Laws, and not some alien lifeform immune to Fundamental Law); Linder v. United States,
268 US 5 (1925) (Harrison Narcotics case Stating "direct control of Medical practice in the States is
beyond the power of the Federal Government"); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889) (Attainder
case, and first case to mandate State Licensed Medical Doctors, and State Medical Boards).

XI.Request
Mandamus
State of Texas v. Gallagher, Collin County Criminal Court, 0058313010 (2010-2015)
Gallagher v. Collin County, 417-01548-2017 (417th District 2017)
Gallagher v. Collin County, et al, 05-20-00098-CV (Tx. App. 2020)
Bill of Review
State of Texas v. Gallagher, Collin County Criminal Court, 0058313010 (2010-2015)
Gallagher v. Collin County, 417-01548-2017 (417th District 2017)
Gallagher v. Collin County, et al, 05-20-00098-CV (Tx. App. 2020)
Title 5 Chpt 110 Relief, not “start over”, stop.
State of Texas v. Gallagher, Collin County Criminal Court, 0058313010 (2010-2015)
Gallagher v. Collin County, 417-01548-2017 (417th District 2017)
Gallagher v. Collin County, et al, 05-20-00098-CV (Tx. App. 2020)
Demand Jury Trial
Gallagher v. Collin County, 417-01548-2017 (417th District 2017)
Gallagher v. Collin County, et al, 05-20-00098-CV (Tx. App. 2020)
Records from Childhood Arrests and Probation so that any Conflicts may be revealed in these Cases as
well as Discovery for the Criminal Case in County and Redispose County Criminal Case to reflect
reality
State of Texas v. Gallagher, Collin County Criminal Court, 0058313010 (2010-2015)
Gallagher v. Collin County, 417-01548-2017 (417th District 2017)
Gallagher v. Collin County, et al, 05-20-00098-CV (Tx. App. 2020)
In Re: Gallagher, 05-20-00128-CV (Tx. App. 2020)
Rule 270 motion to merge all cases into and reopen Case from 2017 Cynthia Wheless recused
Gallagher v. Collin County, 417-01548-2017 (417th District 2017)
Gallagher v. Collin County, et al, 05-20-00098-CV (Tx. App. 2020)
Aggrevated Perjury Bob Davis
Gallagher v. Collin County, 417-01548-2017 (417th District 2017)
Gallagher v. Collin County, et al, 05-20-00098-CV (Tx. App. 2020)
Subpoena Andrew Hatch
Gallagher v. Collin County, 417-01548-2017 (417th District 2017)
Gallagher v. Collin County, et al, 05-20-00098-CV (Tx. App. 2020)

motion to retrieve copy of Police report for Agg Perjury from Collin County

S/_Ryan_Gallagher___
Rev. Ryan “Sasha” Gallagher
Mahatmajapa@gmail.com
1723 Candleglow
Castle Rock, Co 80109