Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
By
T.K. Ahn
Department of Political Science
Florida State University
January 1, 2004
Game Theory and Transitions
Abstract:
Several authors have used game theory to analyze the strategic interaction of the
competing groups of democratic transition as an analytical tool to clarify the strategies
and beliefs of the actors. Most prominently, Przeworski’s game theoretic analysis of
political liberalization in authoritarian regimes that models the strategic interaction of
civil society and liberalizers has provided much of the theoretical groundwork. This
paper demonstrates that by treating and solving his original game as one with incomplete
information we may gain a better understanding of the role of uncertainty in the process
of democratic transition. This examination highlights the subsequent game theoretic
improvements to Przeworski’s model and some of the critiques of the theories employed
by his model. Employing equilibrium refinements to earlier models, we posit and solve a
model of the game incorporating uncertainty. The game is then used as a model of
negotiated transition in Eastern Europe.
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Game Theory and Transitions
I. Introduction:
liberalization that found wide acceptance among scholars in the post-1989 political world
(1991). On the heels of the fundamental political reforms taking place in the former
Soviet Union and during the on-going democratization process of Latin America,
the strategic interaction between members of the former regime and members of civil
society. His use of game theoretic analysis is appropriate and fertile for evaluating the
behavior despite being a suboptimal equilibrium (17). Rather than ascribing this
particularly ‘losers’, in the political arena of democracy, continue to play the game as the
This research attempts to show that by treating and solving the game as one with
the process of democratic transition. In doing so, this will open the possibility of
constructing more interesting models to address not only the impact of uncertainty on this
political phenomenon but also to gain some insight into the process of democratic
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Game Theory and Transitions
game by including civil society’s uncertainty about the type of elite that they face.
use of formal modeling in attempting to further understand and analyze the interaction of
competing players. It does, however, fail to incorporate components that can provide a
Przeworski focuses on the liberalizers as the pivotal actor such that his analysis of
how transitions occur centers on the changing preferences and subsequent strategy
decisions made by the varying types of liberalizers. He first posits that in one situation,
liberalizers are actually proto-democratizers who mislead hardliners in order to reach the
increased expected payoff that is a result of reforming with an organized civil society
(60). In a second scenario, he argues that liberalizers are not proto-democratizers but
realize that repression is more costly than acquiescence, resulting in transition as the
default response to an organized civil society. He suggests that the second of these
simply overestimate their post-electoral chances (65). Although he introduces the notion
of changing beliefs, he does not attempt to formalize this within his model.
Early in the chapter, he mentions that during the unfolding of this game, events
can take place that can affect the outcome (57). He cites the examples of the popular
mobilization of civil society that might signal to liberalizers that they are willing to
participate or that a split occurs in the regime, signaling an “opening” that civil society
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Game Theory and Transitions
can exploit. In terms of formal analysis, his model does not incorporate these various
signals that can be included in the structure and subsequent play of the game. In our
calculus of strategic decision making for civil society while retaining the internal
consistency of the model. This concatenation provides us with a more accurate model of
the interaction between the competing sets of players. Secondly, signaling, whether a
can shape the equilibrium possibilities by changing the credibility of threats, implicating
withdrawal divorces the process of strategic interaction among competing groups from
the catalysts of transition, international pressures, and the economics of reform (see
Ekiert 1991). The context of this strategic interaction can affect the authoritarian
withdrawal process such that impending economic failure (the former Soviet Union), an
overt military presence (South and Latin America), intra-national disintegration (Africa
and the former Yugoslavian states) impact the choices and strategies available to both
regime liberalizers and civil society (if one exists). Despite this, as a model of the
such that elite actors can frame democracy as the best alternative for all players (1990).ii
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Game Theory and Transitions
model of democratic change as pacts and concessions (the bargaining process) are
designed to gather the strength of mobilized actors or politically disarm them. While
process oriented arguments support this approach, many transitions are not negotiated
(i.e. top-down) transitions (see Bova 1991). Huntington posits that for democratization to
occur, economics makes transition possible but elites’ actions to thwart or encourage
transition make it legitimate (1991). Like both Przeworski and di Palma, Huntington is
democratization. Although, he suggest that opportunities for transition are not entirely
economic as internal crises, such as a shift in the general political stance of elites (by a
change in guard or of heart), can reach sufficient salience to bolster a split in the regime,
conceptualization of the transition process, the contest between elites and civil society
varies between a zero-sum game between hard-liners and civil society and a positive-sum
the inclusion of civil society in this transitional process as an interactive actor is not new
(O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Huntington 1991; Sutter 1995; McAdam et al 1996).
More specifically, for Huntington, while civil society cannot initiate a democratization
process (although it can certainly serve as a catalyst), regime initiated transitions (elite-
driven) are more likely to be successful and peaceful (1991). Relatedly, and as mentioned
before, the unitary actor approach for regimes and civil society can prove to be
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Game Theory and Transitions
problematic. However, the impact of civil society in the strategic interaction of transition
(in contrast to the strictly reactive role it has been argued to play) confronts the
assumption of a unitary actor. Even Przeworski has trouble allowing civil society to
remain monolithic. His secondary games consisting of varying player types demonstrates
how different types have different responses to demands and others’ strategies.
society emerges from a loose connection of disassociated groups and serves as one of the
limited viable sources of opposition (the military being another significant source). The
degree that a regime, or its constituent members, adheres to the emergence of civil
‘type’. Although an intuitive division, does this provide a clear, empirical referent for
scholars to identify? Again, as Gates and Humes attempt to incorporate into their revised
model (1997), beliefs of both the liberalizers and civil society do change in this game.
Although some have argued that elite commitment levels may not be relevant (Young
1992), it may be theoretically more accurate to consider the less committed Liberalizers
Democratizers. Liberalizers within the regime can be divided into factions, hardliners and
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Game Theory and Transitions
procedurally. Rather than identify its constituent parts, we can define civil society along
the dimension of its ‘common enemy’ and its role as a non-governmental player (or
buffer to the state). What then do the constituent members of civil society commonly
share? Democratization does not differentiate along the strength of civil society but rather
the commitment levels. Pivotal to civil society’s role is its capacity to bind diverse
elements of a nascent if not wholly non-existent civil society during the period of
transition. However, for civil society to be a unitary actor, the definition of a common
goal is merely probabilistic. The actors subsumed under the very broad title civil society
are likely to have a wide dispersion of beliefs about reform, such that some may believe
that centralized socialism is the appropriate form of governmental structure but is poorly
Although several studies have cited the existence of a proto-civil society prior to
1989 in Eastern Europe (see Bernhard 1993, di Palma 1991, Evans and Whitefield 1995
to name just a few), that it would be capable as a unitary actor may be a tenuous
assumption. For this model of the interaction between civil society and varying regime
types, civil society need not necessarily be well-defined or developed but requires some
coherency (capability for unified action). For this game, we will assume that the set of
strategies posited at the beginning of the game are the exhaustive set of strategies
available for each actor. Again, civil society is not seeking to replace the state, only to
create the opportunity for a political opening. It is possible that for many nations, an early
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Game Theory and Transitions
rallying point for civil society was provided by international agreements on new norms of
respect for human rights, the ‘third basket’ of the 1975 Helsinki Agreement. Dissidents in
Latin America, the Soviet satellites, and China all used this as an impetus for
organization and ultimately opposition. For the countries of Central and Eastern Europe,
these organizational networks coupled with the euphoria of potential regime change
given the demise of the Soviet Union, may have provided enough initial cohesiveness
among these groups to promote a unified response. For many of them, encouragement in
the form of international diffusion of the potential impact of civil society (the
demonstration effect) and the simultaneity of transitions served as a necessary but not
Przeworski eventually address the heterogeneity inherent in the two main actors
(the regime and civil society) and Gates and Humes also add this to their re-examination
of his model, adhering to the theoretical importance of these factional divides within the
two groups (O’Donnell 1979, O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, although they use the term
activity signals to hardliners and liberalizers alike about the possibility of reversal. This
on whether the regime draws its legitimacy from force or provision (i.e. fear or
There remains the challenge that the ‘rules of transition’ may differ from normal
science; such that the process, players, actions (or strategies), and ‘rules’ of transition lay
at the margins of theories explaining what causes transition and what consolidates the
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Game Theory and Transitions
resulting regime. For game theorists, this liminal stage between more continuous political
modes of existence challenges their assumption of rule and, ultimately, game constancy.
deficiencies in the form of players’ possession of incomplete information (as our model
does). Incomplete information impacts the outcome of the game as both civil society and
elite devise strategies that account for their uncertainties about the game.
Similar to many scholars at the time, Przeworski also makes the implicit argument
literature, the normative assumption of eventual political and economic order rarely
questioned such that transition away from authoritarianism is not necessarily transition
toward democracy. Bunce was one of the few scholars who, during the initial periods of
transition of the former Soviet Union, continually argued that political liberalization is
not necessarily democratization and that the notion of transition as a single path or a
deterministic trajectory is misleading (1990). Liberalizers within the regime may not
necessarily assume that what is wrong with their system requires a new one. Therefore,
should we simply assume that what was wrong with authoritarianism can and will be
different (a good example being Gorbachev’s intentions in the mid-1980’s versus the
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Game Theory and Transitions
Sutter introduces the notion of pacting into the transition game, concerning the process of
dealing with out-going elites and their potential to renege and re-intervene in the
transition process (1995). His later work posits a unitary regime and opposition actors
with complete, symmetrical information (2000). Rather than confront the unilateral action
mutually agreed upon changes. While he seeks to define the conditions necessary to bring
about founding elections, the utilities derive from the “gains from transition” (2000, 70).
He mentions but ignores the ‘liberalization effect’ of the opposition that gains power
during the process of transition, especially if the regime cracks. Although the regime
consists of hardliners and reformers and the opposition consists of moderates and
radicals, he posits that they interact as unitary actors (regime and opposition) pivoting
primarily on the actions of only the moderates and reformers. Although others have done
the same (Gates and Humes 1997, see below), some authors suggest that the interplay of
these factions is important, ultimately modeling this as a four player game (see Colomer
1995). As do many transitionologists, he isolates the game from international forces and
occur at points of relative power parity between incumbent regimes and civil society
(1999). His interest is to explain variation between peaceful and conflictual regime
However other examples demonstrate that the impact of international factors can
provide insights into the beliefs and ultimately actions of players as Zielinski incorporates
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Game Theory and Transitions
the threat of a Soviet invasion into Poland into the game of transition (1995). In later
civil society (or maybe more appropriately, simply unintentional mis-signaling by elites)
attempted transitions from authoritarian rule (1999). He makes the explicit assumption
that hard-liners are the military (1999, 214). What differentiated the mid-1950’s from the
1980’s push for reform in both Poland and Hungary was the explicit decision of Soviet
non-intervention in the latter time period. Without this threat of external power (in the
form of military-backed repression), regime elites were left to their internal battles of
transition.
uncertainty while still adhering to the underlying theoretical principles. They are
transitions to democracy. They introduce the notion of Nature as the formal introduction
model in two ways. First, it allows for the existence of varying player types for
Liberalizers and secondly allows for players to know payoffs but suffer from uncertainty
about the ‘move’ Nature has made. This gives Gates and Humes the advantage of
incorporating actual payoffs that equal Przeworski’s varying outcomes of his different
They divide their analysis into three parts. In the first part they insert values into
Przeworski’s ordered preferences and look at the outcomes, changing payoffs to see
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Game Theory and Transitions
differing equilibrium. In the second part, they posit liberalizers that can be more or less
committed to reform and civil society does not know which it is facing (introducing
Nature). This also introduces the missing notion of signaling (liberalizer player types). In
the third part, they introduce three types of liberalizers: more committed, less committed,
and those affected by r, incorporating the entire argument into a larger game of
incomplete information in which Civil Society does not know the Liberalizer type.
Similar to Przeworski, they discuss the prospect of repeated games and the notion of
reputation. These games are repeated in that any chance for Liberalizers to side with
hardliners is an expression (a signal) about their beliefs of the game building a reputation
for regime unity. Although the game above could be played repeatedly to take advantage
continued negotiations with divisions within the regime are most likely not to occur
frequently.
outcomes such that a higher payoff signifies an outcome is more preferred by an actor.
Civil society’s preference is fixed, i.e., we only posit a single type of Civil Society:
uncertainty regarding the Liberalizer's type, i.e., liberalizer's preference ordering. Gates
and Humes posit three types. All of the three types most prefer BDIC and least prefer
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Game Theory and Transitions
Given the three types of Liberalizers, there are four possible ways of constructing
a game of incomplete information. Three of them involve two types of Liberalizers and
one involves all three types of liberalizers. Gates and Humes present two of them: a game
with more and less committed liberalizers (1997, 126: Figure 18), and another with all
they unfortunately do not apply the solution concepts for such incomplete information
game correctly. Specifically, they treat the incomplete information game as if it were a
concatenated complete information games. For example in their model with more and
less committed Liberalizers, they present the equilibrium in following manner. “If Nature
The equilibria are mere restatement of the subgame perfect equilibria stated above
for the complete information games. It simply asserts that depending on the liberalizers’
types different outcomes are possible. A correct statement of the perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of the game must take a form of, {less committed liberalizer’s strategy, more
strategy for a player assigns an action to each of its information sets. A belief is a
Bayesian equilibrium requires two conditions. First, strategies should be rational given
beliefs, i.e., the sequential rationality. Second, beliefs should be calculated, on the
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Game Theory and Transitions
equilibrium path, from the Nature’s move probabilities and the equilibrium strategies via
Bayes rule.
The perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the incomplete information game with two
types, posited by Gates and Humes, is rather straightforward. Regardless of the value of
r, Liberalizers of either type chooses to reform in its final decision node. Therefore the
Civil Society has the dominant strategy of organizing once its information set is reached
no matter what its belief in the information set. For the less committed Liberalizer, then,
the expected utility of staying is 4 and that of opening is 3. On the other hand, for the
more committed Liberalizer, the expected utility of staying is 3 and that of opening is 4.
The only perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game, thus, is a separating equilibrium that
Liberalizer’s strategy; Civil Society’s strategy: Civil Society’s belief that the Liberalizer
The restated perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game is unaffected by the initial
distribution of the two types. That is, how small or large the proportion of the less
committed Liberalizer is, the equilibrium strategies of the players are the same; and the
belief of the Civil Society in its information set is always 1. This is because the more
committed type of Liberalizer is the only type that opens the regime. Now we turn to
Gates and Humes equilibrium statement which is reproduced below exactly as it appears
in their book.
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Game Theory and Transitions
As one can see, their statement is in fact two subgame perfect equilibria put
incomplete information game, primarily due to the fact that the Civil Society has a
dominant strategy in its information set and as such the best responses of the two types of
This, however, is not the case with three types (1997, 128: Figure 19). While
Gates and Humes use x, y, and z to refer to the types of liberalizers, we use them to
denote the proportions of the types of liberalizers (or the initial, prior probabilities of the
types of liberalizers). It is rather critical since in this game, unlike the game above, the
initial probability matters. We first state the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game as
The perfect Bayesian equilibria are stated in the following manner: {less committed
strategy; civil society’s strategy: civil society’s belief (the posterior probability
assessment the liberalizer is a certain type where by µls, µm, and µlt denote the posterior
probability assessment of the Civil Society that the liberalizer is less, more, and least
follows. In the Liberalizers’ final information set, all of the three types of Liberalizers
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Game Theory and Transitions
have the dominant strategy of reforming. Then, regardless of its belief, the Civil Society
prefers to organize. In the initial information set of the Liberalizers, then, only the more
The equilibria are a bit more complicated when the probability of a successful
repression is greater than or equal to ½. In both the zones II and III, that is, regardless of
the initial probability distribution among the three types of Liberalizers, there always
Zone I, except that on the off-the-equilibrium path, the least committed Liberalizers
However, in Zone III in which r is greater than or equal to ½ and z, the initial
probability that the Liberalizer is the least committed type is greater than or equal to
1
2(1+ r ) , there is a pooling equilibrium. In the pooling equilibrium, all three types of
Liberalizers open and the Civil Society enters. Let us check the sequential rationality of
the strategies in this equilibrium. Given that the Civil Society enters, it is easy to
understand why all types of Liberalizers open. Therefore, the key question is whether the
If the Civil Society enters, the payoff is 4. On the other hand, if the Civil Society
organizes, there is a probability z that the Liberalizer is the least committed type and,
thus, will repress. Otherwise, i.e., when the Liberalizer is either more committed or less
committed type, the Liberalizer will reform, returning a payoff of 5 for the Civil Society.
Put them all together, we have the expected payoff for the Civil Society when it organizes
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Game Theory and Transitions
z≥ 1
2(1+ r ) .
Notice that Zone III is the only area of the parameter combinations of (r,z)
whereby pooling equilibrium exists. If the pooling equilibrium is played and the realized
type of the Liberalizer happens not to be the least committed, then we have cases in
which the Civil Society enters the regime even though the Liberalizer would reform if the
Civil Society organized. This is the most unique feature of the incomplete information
game compare to the complete information games of democratic transition. That is,
because the Civil Society does not exactly know the type of the Liberalizer when the
latter opens the regime while the joint probability that an opening Liberalizer is the least
committed type combined with the probability that repression goes successful is high
enough, the Civil Society does not take the risk of organizing for fear of bringing about
the NDIC.
While this is a good story for the Liberalizers, uncertainty does not always benefit
the Liberalizers. Note that even when the pooling equilibrium exists, there always exists
the separating equilibrium in which only the more committed Liberalizer opens the
regime. In the separating equilibrium, the least committed Liberalizer stays for fear of
repression is greater than a half. Compare this with the case of complete information
game in which the Liberalizer is of the least committed type. In that case, the least
committed Liberalizer opens the regime and the Civil Society, knowing that the
Liberalizer would repress if it organizes, enters the regime. But in the separating
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Game Theory and Transitions
equilibrium of Zone III, the least committed Liberalizer stays because it fears the Civil
Society would organize not knowing the exact type of the Liberalizer.
In the pooling equilibrium, the more and the less committed Liberalizers obtain
their most preferred outcome free-riding on the threat posed by the least committed
Liberalizers. In the separating equilibrium of zone III, and if it happens that the least
committed Liberalizer is the type that Nature chooses, the players end up in an outcome
SDIC which is strictly Pareto-inferior to BDIC that could have been realized had the
analysis of the game with the three types of Liberalizers. In addition, they do not provide
a clear equilibrium statement. We will briefly discuss the moment where their analysis
begins to fail. They state in an earlier phase of their analysis that “[I]f Nature chooses x,
liberalizers will choose to stay with the hardliners” (1997, 129). This is correct for
separating equilibrium, but not for the pooling equilibrium. The problem is that instead of
searching for mutually consistent strategy-belief pairs, using the concepts of sequential
rationality and Bayesian update, they wrongly assumes that the less committed
Liberalizers have the dominant strategy of staying. We will not further discuss the details
of the errors in their analysis; instead, we hope the readers can compare the equilibrium
Let us briefly discuss the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the other two possible
games with incomplete information: one with more and the least committed Liberalizers
and the other with the less and the least committed Liberalizers. They could be
considered as special cases in which the prior probability for a type of Liberalizers is
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Game Theory and Transitions
zero. For the game with the more and the least committed Liberalizers, let us set y+z=1.
If r is less than or equal to ½, both the types reform rather than repress in the final
decision nodes. The Civil Society, knowing this, organizes whenever its information set
is reached. Then, in the initial information sets for the Liberalizers, the more committed
type opens and the least committed type stays. Therefore the perfect Bayesian
Liberalizers’ strategy; Civil Society’s strategy: Civil Society’s belief that the liberalizer is
The case with the less and the least committed Liberalizers is interesting in that
there exists a pooling equilibrium in which both the types stay with the hardliners. When
r is smaller than or equal to ½, the equilibrium is {(stay, reform), (stay, reform); organize:
0 ≤ µlt ≤1}. In this equilibrium, the Civil Society’s information set is not reached and,
thus, the belief cannot be calculated using the Bayes rule. Instead, it is sufficient to
specify the range of belief that supports the sequential rationality of the Civil Society’s
equilibrium strategy. In fact, in this case, the Civil Society has a dominant strategy of
organizing regardless of its posterior. Therefore the supporting range of belief is [0,1].
What if r is greater than or equal to ½ and, thus, the least committed Liberalizer
represses when the Civil Society organizes. Given that the Civil Society organizes, it is
sequentially rational for both the types of Liberalizers to stay. What is necessary again is
to find the range of belief that supports the sequential rationality of the Civil Society. If
the Civil Society enters, its payoff is 4. If it organizes, its expected payoff is (1-
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Game Theory and Transitions
organize if z is smaller than of equal to ½(1+r). Notice again that the belief cannot be
calculated using the Bayes rule because the information set is off-the-equilibrium path.
The equilibrium can be stated as follows: {(stay, reform), (stay, repress); organize: 0 ≤ µlt
≤½(1+r)}.
Another pooling equilibrium is the one in which both types open and the Civil
Society enters. The condition for this pooling equilibrium is the same as that with the
of two types. The reason is that the best responses of the two types of the Liberalizers to
the Civil Society’s strategy are the same. If the Civil Society organizes, both types of the
Liberalizers stay; if the Civil Society enters, both types of the Liberalizers open.
democratic transition. Of the Central and East European states that have recently
significant intra-elite contestation over reform and respective civil societies that were
sufficiently organized to provide coherent responses. This may not simply be fortuitous
political organization in Central and Eastern Europe, which have had profound effects on
their post-1989 political trajectories. These varying modes of communist rule affected not
only the post-transition trajectories but also the nature of the transitions, shaping the
arena for conflict or cooperation, the players, and the distribution of resources.iii
communism, provided “… a greater propensity to permit modest levels of civil rights and
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Game Theory and Transitions
elite contestation at least episodically, while relying more on co-optation than repression
as ways to instill citizens’ compliance” (24); such that, oppositional forces (many times
with nationalist undertones) were minimally tolerated rather than eliminated from the
public sphere. For our purposes here and in contrast to other countries with dissimilar
with the negotiated transition modeled here in which opposition groups were able to
negotiations with) regime incumbents (30). It seems that both Hungary and Poland may
have been institutionally advantaged in the pre-transition period for a negotiated regime
change between elites and oppositional civil society. These authors characterize both
although they put Poland in the mixed category in Table 1.2 (39), they ascribe National-
For this model, more committed and even less committed liberalizers may signal
civil society in such a way as to establish their player type and demonstrate that z is low.
Given the value of r, least committed liberalizers know that there is a pooling equilibrium
that distorts the signal of the liberalizer type to civil society, affecting civil society’s
beliefs about the value of z. The other liberalizer types know this as well and must clearly
demonstrate their player types (changing civil society’s beliefs about µls, µm, and µlt).
At the beginning of the 1980s, elites in both Hungary and Poland, in fact, all
Central and Eastern European countries were faced with the dire consequences of
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Game Theory and Transitions
defeated in a national referendum. Not only did this present an ideological crisis for the
incumbent regime but also left Poland without means to manage the urgent and escalating
the Catholic Church and the peasantry, Solidarity organized and continued debilitating
strikes across Poland (Lewis 1998). Action, or the failure to act, by Polish elites had
At the national level, Hungary was facing the macro-economic reality of Kádár’s
failing New Economic Mechanism (NEM). Initiated in 1968, it had failed to re-energize
Hungary, once the most industrially advanced among the Soviet satellites. A by-product
of the NEM’s continuing failure was, during the decade leading up to 1989, a vibrant
second economy, commonly referred to as the ‘goulash economy’ (Gati 1990). This black
market of relatively unrestricted trade, exchange, and barter was important economically
and politically as it laid the groundwork for a nascent civil society by creating
organizational networks among individuals and groups along which not only economic
exchange but also information and influence could flow (see Gray 1990). However, while
this alternative market-based form of exchange alleviated some pressure for Hungarians
from their macro-economic woes, at the end of the 1980‘s, Hungary (along with Poland)
continued to suffer economically from the enormous debt generated from their ‘within
socialism’ economic experiments and foreign loans. Despite these economic failures, it is
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Game Theory and Transitions
significant that both Hungary and Poland were able to interpret the signals from the
Soviet leadership to experiment not only with economic policy within the socialist state
To this point, despite the Soviet leadership’s steadfast Communist politics, its
opportunity for incumbent elites. While incumbent elite hard-liners may have been
reforms, in effect, co-opting power rather than negotiating a power transfer; a national
economic approach may have provided reform-minded national elites the impetus and
opportunity for signaling their implicit disapproval of the ideological, political, and
economic status quo. Further, incumbent, reform-minded elites might have known that, in
initiating negotiations with civil society, they provided de facto legitimization of these
relations in both Poland and Hungary through the process of sharing of political and
sponsored communism in Poland and Hungary had begun to emerge among groups of
national elites. Although direct proclamations might have been dangerous, symbolic
actions could signal this ideological drift. In both Poland and Hungary, national elites
credibility of communism (Batt 1998). One clear example was the re-classification of
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Game Theory and Transitions
acknowledgement of the real character of the uprising was clear evidence of growing
groups of national elites who refused to continue to accept Soviet revised national
histories.
officials into power. Then-President Kádár was purged along with a majority of his
supporters, while many of newly-selected elites were responsible for having previously
set up the semi-oppositional group (Hungary’s first opposition party) the Hungarian
Democratic Forum (MDF) and proto-opposition groups (Forum of Free Democrats and
the Federation of Young Democrats) (Jasiewicz 1998; Linz and Stepan 1996). Further
evidence of waning elite commitment to the Soviet backed regime continued to emerge.
order to describe in more detail their successful pacted transition from authoritarian rule.
By September 1989, elites’ ideological shifts away from Soviet-style communism was
evidenced as Hungary begun to dismantle the formidable ‘iron curtain’ of barbed wire
that ran along the border with Austria and flagrantly, yet officially, allow East Germans
Similarly for Poland, the regime’s distance to the Soviet Union was historically
significant in that, among the Central and Eastern European nations, it had remained the
least subsumed under Soviet domination with provisions not only for the Catholic Church
but also for an independent peasantry, who had largely retained their private holdings
(Lewis 1998). In the context of the model presented here, we are looking for implicit or
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Game Theory and Transitions
explicit signals that either hard- or soft-liner elites may have made in order to
communicate to civil society not only the probability of the use of repressive force in the
event of misconstrued marginal political liberalization but also their commitment levels.
Distinctive to both Hungary and Poland, the confluence of economic and political events
in the 1980’s provided reform-minded elites with a modicum of political autonomy and
environments converged to create a fissure among both Polish and Hungarian elites to
either proceed with ideologically rigid, ‘within system’ responses to these crises or
Far from a public, meso-level sphere of freely associating groups, in the former
Soviet Union (FSU) groups and members of such types of organizations were subject to a
variety of disincentives. Can using the term civil society to delineate non-
definition of civil society as “…the realm of organized intermediary groups that are
voluntary, self-generating, independent of the state and the family, and bound by a legal
order or set of shared rules” (1997, xxx); it is possible to ascribe this term to the loosely
bound set of, although frequently illegal, groups that sought to oppose the regime.
necessary evidence for the existence of a civil society, [but] it alone is not sufficient
proof” (1997, 240). This is generous given his earlier proclamation that civil society
occurs only after, not before, the transition begins (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986).
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Game Theory and Transitions
Others, however, have argued that the primary organizing principle behind civil
society is one seeking freedom of association and communication ((Linz and Stepan
1996: Table 1.1, 14). Even Schmitter places social groups and potential groups concerned
with interest articulation and providing pressure on legislative assemblies (via what he
calls the ‘pressure regime’) near the end of both the state-civil society and power resource
continuums, such that these groups represent intense, non-state pressure apparatus
(Schmitter 1997, see Figure 1, 245). Civil society in pre-transitional nations can simply
and individuals to pressure the regime. Other scholars argue that for Central and Eastern
European countries, the notion of civil society was an ‘us vs. them’ construction, such as
the ‘us vs. the regime’ (Smolar 1997, 263; see also Linz and Stepan 1996, 270; Taras
1992).
Although, rather than a strict interpretation of ‘us vs. them’, it may have been the
initial alliances between the regime and oppositional groups that fostered the rise of civil
society (Linz and Stepan 1996, 304). As in Russia proper, groups in Central and Eastern
Europe responded to the 1975 Helsinki agreement as an impetus for organization around
types (Poland and Hungary) were tolerant of low level dissident activity (Kitshelt et al
1999, 25) and these initial groups further served as precedents to pressure regimes in not
only tolerating their presence but also tolerating the gradual increase of new groups.
This illegal, yet implicitly tolerated market established networks of individuals and
groups that were neither monitored nor regulated. Although its primary function was one
26
Game Theory and Transitions
of satisfying economic needs, it became conduits for information and influence between
these same individuals and groups. For Hungarians, because of the only loosely inter-
regime (Kitschelt et al 1999), a formally defined and recognizable civil society was
mostly a collection of dispersed and less organized dissident groups (Fehér 1992).
organizations that remained for the most part uncongealed until 1987 (Linz and Stepan
1996, chapter 17). After which, the regime’s willingness to engage opposition groups
provided a degree of legitimacy for these non-political groups. Their impact was
significant in the process of transition as the nascent civil society did succeed in acting, if
not in a monolithic, at least a unified manner by negotiating free elections and a delay of
the presidential election in order for Hungarians to assess the outcome of the
Poland’s pre-transition civil society drew its markedly stronger coherence from
another source. Backed in part by the Catholic church, anti-regime movements were
moral movements against the imposed communist doctrine and ideology. Polish
dissidents such as Jacek Kuroń and Adam Michnik emphasized civil society’s ethical
opposition to continued Soviet-sponsored communist rule (Linz and Stepan 1996, chapter
16; Taras 1992). Further, pre-transition Polish civil society, driven by more than strictly
intellectuals, and students. Distinctive to Poland, this unity among disparate groups (one
hesitates to call it solidarity) has been acknowledged as its civil society’s uniquely
powerful “horizontal relationship with itself” (Linz and Stepan 1996, 262).
27
Game Theory and Transitions
In both the 1970’s and 1980’s, the regime’s hesitancy toward the purging of all
opposition and dissident groups was a source of constant irritation between the Soviet
and Polish political elites. Poland’s hegemonic member of a proto-civil society was the
labor organization, Solidarity; and although not alone in opposition,vi as the herald for
political liberalization in that geo-political region during the 1980’s, it benefited from the
Similar to the transitions of Chile and Brazil, Poland’s transition benefited from
the organizational and associational strength of its core members about the existing
networks of labor unions as the prototype of their civil society. With increasing frequency
and intensity through the 1980’s, Poland was being subjected to coordinated, strikes of
workers, the intelligentsia, and students (backed by the illegal Solidarity) aimed at
voicing increasingly political popular demands. Linz and Stepan have argued that
May 1988, Poland’s transition could clearly be delineated into the actors that this model
For our concerns here, after establishing the existence of a split among within-
regime elites and a civil society in both Hungary and Poland, we must address the latter’s
perceptions and beliefs about r (that is the probability of a successful repression) and z
(the probability that the liberalizer type is the least committed to reform). Again, if r and
z are high enough, the all types of elites play open (distinct from the separating
equilibrium and opening move of most committed elites: zone I and III in Figure 2) and
28
Game Theory and Transitions
will be met with civil society playing ‘enter’ (rather than ‘organize’), ending the
opportunity for transition. As civil society wants Transition rather than Broader
Dictatorship, the biggest (and more tractable) concern for civil society is probably r
(although still considered in conjunction with z) and Zone I provides the certainty of a
separating equilibrium and the dominant strategy for all liberalizer types to play ‘reform’
For both Hungary and Poland, incumbent elite behavior in the late 1980’s was
increasingly reform oriented (see above). However, civil society’s beliefs about z were
repression? Central to this was the possibility of Soviet military intervention and one
fraught with uncertainty. For members of the Polish and Hungarian civil societies, there
existed competing notions about the possible intervention by the Soviet military on behalf
of the incumbent regime. Recent history provided each country with precedents about the
use of Soviet military force to eliminate popular protests and calls for reform.vii However,
this use of force was lowered given the new political paradigm of Gorbachev’s
perestroika and glasnost, an international ‘peering into the region’, and a seemingly
activists for reform remained skeptical of the use of Soviet military intervention as they
were concerned that hard-liners within the Kremlin would oust Gorbachev and return the
Soviet Union to a more totalitarian regime (Linz and Stepan 1996, 241). Similarly, yet
on behalf of the ancien regimes, albeit formidable, for the Soviets, was too costly given
29
Game Theory and Transitions
Elites in both countries seemed to be signaling their intentions such that the use of
repression was increasingly improbable, despite the value of r, which itself had lessened
due to the late 1980’s proliferation of Gorbachev’s “within-system” change and refusal to
institutional reform with members of civil society. This is significant to the strategic
interaction. Combined with both Poland and Hungary’s civil societies’ beliefs about the
types of elites they were facing, the diminishing possibility of Soviet military
intervention (r) encouraged civil society to negotiate with an opening regime. Again, civil
society’s choice of strategy pivots on their cautious assumptions about r and z. If the joint
probability is high enough, civil society does not organize, but Enters when liberalizers
open the regime. This Zone III is subject to the joint probability of both r and z, resulting
liberalizers with a risk-averse ‘Enter’. Despite the possibility that the liberalizer player
type is either less or more committed, civil society, based on its beliefs about r and z,
For Poland, the leader of Solidarity (re-legalized in April 1989), Lech Walesa was
invited to the Round Table talks with the Communist Party, which not only resulted in a
power sharing arrangement for first parliamentary election but also eventually propelled
him to the Presidency. This process began in Poland and demonstrated to Hungary that it
was a possibility (Linz and Stepan 1996). The Hungarian regime’s straddling of the
divide between political systems was resolved when members of the regime agreed to
meet with members of dissident organization at the regime-initiated Round Table talks.ix
30
Game Theory and Transitions
V. Conclusion:
The importance of civil society in this model is not its potential role in the
eventual consolidated democracies but that it offers a pivotal and, albeit it fleeting,
primary role. Smolar (1997, 268) states simply that “[t]he existence of a civil society of
resistance was dependent upon the existence of a hostile state…[and a]s soon as this state
disappeared, the civil society that opposed it also disintegrated”. Following the transition
period, civil society, as a collection of interest associations that pressured the regime
evolved quickly into institutionalized participants (parties and interest groups). In some
cases, the regime’s willingness to negotiate weakened the centripetal forces of civil
society immediately following the transition period. In this period, the fragmentation of
civil society into competing groups, whether interest groups, parties, or non-
give way to a more narrowly defined political society (see Cohn and Arato 1992), as
without a common enemy there remains no raison d’etre for a unified civil society.
The role of uncertainty (on the part of a civil society about the intentions and
preferences of the liberalizer that opens the regime) in the transition game is evident. Not
only did both the government and the opposition overestimated the government’s
strength leading the former to engage civil society and the latter to underestimate the
rapidity and totality of the collapse (Linz and Stepan 1996; see Przeworski 1991, 87), but
the beliefs about the possibility of intervention by the Soviet military (r) also encumbered
the process of engagement. Yet both Przeworski’s model and our model with uncertainty
presented here do not attempt to explain all anti-authoritarian transitions as in some cases,
the basic assumptions are not met. Again, using game theory to analyze the strategic
31
Game Theory and Transitions
interaction of the competing groups of transition is an analytical tool that helps to clarify
the strategies and beliefs of the actors from which to construct explanations and
eventually predictions. Although Przeworski’s model is not the only attempt in trying to
account for this complex and dynamic process, it does capture one important interaction
between substantively significant groups and their decisions that occur during the
transition process. Future prospects for this particular game include creating competing
groups within the larger unitary actors or introducing 3-person triadic competition (e.g.
regime, civil society and outside player games). As our theoretical knowledge increases
about the process of transitions, game theory may be called upon to examine structural
32
Game Theory and Transitions
Stay Open
Enter organize
BDIC Liberalizers
Repress reform
Nature
r 1–r
x z
y
33
Game Theory and Transitions
1/3
1/4 1/4
Zone II
0
0 1/2 1
Probability of successful
repression
34
Game Theory and Transitions
5 4 3 2 1
1 z ∈ [0,1]
r≤ stay, reform open, stay, reform organize µm = 1
2 reform
1 z ∈ [0,1]
stay, reform open, stay, organize µm = 1
r≥ reform repress
2
1 1
r≥ z ∈[ ,1] open, open, open, Enter µls = x, µ m = y, µlt = z
2 2(1 + r ) reform reform repress
35
Game Theory and Transitions
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Game Theory and Transitions
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Game Theory and Transitions
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Game Theory and Transitions
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Game Theory and Transitions
i
In assessing the game theoretic parts of the book, we will be drawing primarily from
chapter 2, “Transitions to Democracy” (Democracy and the Market, 1991).
ii
Although, di Palma’s argument relies heavily on the negotiated transition between the
new elites and incumbent elites, rather than incorporating the participation of civil
society.
iii
Their ideal types include: Patrimonial communism relies on the charismatic, personal
relations of the leaders in the state and within the party. This is supported by extensive
patronage and clientelist networks. National-Accommodative Communism is more
formally developed formal-rational bureaucratic form of governance structures that
partially separates party rule and technical state administration. Bureaucratic-
Authoritarian Communism is in essence a formalized authoritarian, if not quasi-
totalitarian, state (Kitschelt et al 1999, chapter 1).
iv
Most explicit was Gorbachev’s encouragement for experimenting with “within system”
solutions, his ‘profound restructuring’ or perestroika.
v
As the old regime was looking to preserve power with strong elected presidencies and
majoritarian forms of representation, many forfeited strict adherence to this for the
promise of early elections (Geddes 1996, 21-22).
vi
Other dissident groups included KOR (1976), the Movement for the Defense of Human
and Civil Rights (1977), and the Flying Universities which retained the teaching of Polish
history and applied somewhat challenging Marxist critiques to ‘really existing Polish
socialism’ (Taras 1992, 88).
vii
For Hungary it was the popular uprising of October 1956. For Poland it was December
1981.
viii
Although, Soviet action with both Polish and Hungarian history has been rife
contradictions between things said and actions taken.
ix
The saying at the time was that transitions in Central and Eastern Europe took 10 years
in Poland, 10 months in Hungary, 10 weeks in East Germany, 10 days in Czechoslovakia,
and 10 hours in Romania.
x
SDIC is Status Quo Dictatorship, BDIC is Broadened Dictatorship, NDIC is Narrower
Dictatorship, and r is the probability Liberalizers attach to successful repression.
40