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But this I say, brethren, the time is short: it remaineth, that both
they that have wives be as though they had none; And they that
weep, as though they wept not; and they that rejoice, as though they
rejoiced not; and they that buy, as though they possessed not; And
they that use this world, as not abusing it: for the fashion of this
world passeth away.
1 Corinthians 7:29–31
140
JACOB TAUBES: “APOCALYPSE FROM BELOW” 141
several statements that he made towards the end of his life.1 Laying his
cards out on the table in a lecture given in 1985, he remarked: “Carl
Schmitt spoke to me as an apocalypticist [Apocalyptiker] of counter-revo-
lution. As an apocalypticist I knew and know myself related to him. The
themes [pertaining to the relationship between theology and politics] are
common to us, even if we draw contrary conclusions.”2 In the same talk
he added, “Carl Schmitt thinks apocalyptically, but top-down, from the
powers that be [von den Gewalten]; I think from below [von unten her].
But what is common to both of us is the experience of time and history as
a respite, as reprieve [als Frist, als Galgenfrist]. That too is originally a
Christian experience of history.”3 Slyly moving between differentiation
and identification, this last comment illustrates how Taubes, like Schmitt,
is a theorist of borders—though one concerned with complicating rather
than upholding them.4
Yet how is one to understand the expression “apocalypse from
below”? A part of the answer is to be found in Jan Assmann’s observa-
tion that political theology can investigate the relationship of theology
to hierarchy and order imposed from above; or it can consider the role
of religion in constituting the identity of a community.5 According to
this schema, something like Schmitt’s preoccupation with the doctrine
of the katechon—described in The Nomos of the Earth as “the restrainer
[who] holds back the end of the world”—would fall into the first
category.6 Exemplifying the alternate interpretation of political theology
would be Taubes’ reading of Romans 9–11, which stresses Paul’s identifi-
cation with Moses as the founder of a new nation and the representative of
a new law.7 From this perspective, “apocalypse from below” would be
consistent with Assmann’s call to address the “horizontal” axis of polit-
ical theology along with its “vertical” one.
However, Assmann’s remark, though perspicacious, brings into relief
only one aspect of Taubes’ conception of apocalypse, albeit a crucial one.
Taking his philosophical relationship to Schmitt, Benjamin, and others as
points of reference, the following pages argue that Taubes transforms the
theological concept of apocalypse into a critical category, and that he does
so by thinking through the political and ethical implications of the claim
that there is an end to time. According to Taubes, this claim represents a
breakthrough in human thought by emancipating consciousness from its
subservience to the endless repetition of natural cycles. However, while
apocalypse takes humanity out of the realm of necessity and nature and
places it within the sphere of freedom and history, the apocalyptic quest
for total liberation courts potential cataclysm. Consequently, Taubes
argues that apocalypse must guard against its own destructive impulses
without relinquishing its antagonism towards profane authority. Therein
consists the reason for his concern with the passive aspect of the apoca-
lyptic comportment; therein too consists the reason for his account of
Gnosticism as a turning inward of apocalypse. Nonetheless, as his inter-
pretation of Paul shows, Taubes regards apocalyptic thought as a gesture
of protest against the law whose nihilism precludes any accommodation
to the prevailing political establishment. Thus, far from uncritically
embracing apocalypse as a gesture of revolt, Taubes’ writings represent a
sustained effort to distinguish the oppositional elements contained in this
concept from its potentially regressive tendencies.
6. Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, trans. G. L. Ulmen (New York: Telos Press,
2003), pp. 59–60. Jürgen Ebach has elsewhere argued that there is a certain affinity
between the katechon and apocalypse. See “Zeit als Frist: Zur Lektüre der Apocalypse-
Abschnitte in der Abendländische Eschatologie,” in Abendländische Eschatologie: Ad
Jacob Taubes, ed. Richard Faber, Eveline Goodman-Thau, and Thomas Macho
(Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2001), pp. 85–86 (hereafter cited as Ad Jacob
Taubes).
7. See for example Taubes, Political Theology of Paul, pp. 39–40. For Assmann’s
own remarks on the relevance of Taubes’ exegesis of Romans to the “horizontal” axis of
political theology, see Herrschaft und Heil, p. 286n42.
JACOB TAUBES: “APOCALYPSE FROM BELOW” 143
which “the same Whence and Whither coincide,” thereby forming “the
center of the mythic world.”12 In contrast to this condition, history puts an
end to humanity’s subservience to nature, and not simply because it intro-
duces change where there was formerly repetition. More to the point,
Taubes links history to freedom, which “first raises humanity out of the
circle of nature into the empire of history.”13 History and freedom are
intertwined because change results from the efforts of human beings to
transform their world—in other words, history is the domain of freedom
on account of the inherent negativity of human activity, which alters the
world instead of accepting it as is.14
Yet the revolutionary aspect of apocalypse for Taubes not only has to
do with the way that it breaks the hold of myth over humanity; by positing
an end to time, it also confers significance to the act of decision. Taubes
suggests as much in Abendländische Eschatologie when he writes: “In the
order of eternity Being is sublated by time [als Zeit aufgehoben]. Endless
infinity characterizes indifferent happening [das gleich-gültige
Geschehen] that does not call for decision. History separates itself from
this indifferent happening by placing one into the decision for truth
[dadurch, daß sie in die Entscheidung um die Wahrheit stellt].”15 There
are therefore two ways in which the apocalyptic structure of history
makes the act of decision unavoidable. First, it confers upon decisions a
12. Ibid., p. 11. In a move that also recalls Benjamin, Taubes argues in later essays that
modernity has witnessed the resurgence of mythic repetition, and he takes Nietzsche’s
notion of “the eternal return of the same” as well as Freud’s notion of “the return of the
repressed” as evidence of the archaic tendencies within modernity. See Taubes, “Religion
and the Future of Psychoanalysis,” Psychoanalysis 4, no. 4/5 (1957): 136–42; Taubes,
“Religion und die Zukunft der Psychoanalyse,” in Vom Kult zur Kultur, pp. 371–78; and
Taubes, “Zur Konjunktur des Polytheismus,” in Vom Kult zur Kultur, pp. 340–51. See also
Taubes’ remarks on Nietzsche in Political Theology of Paul, pp. 76–88. One should hasten
to add that Taubes’ relationship to both Nietzsche and Freud is far from mere dogmatic
rejection. In fact, Taubes sees in Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity “a deeply humane
impulse against the entanglement of guilt and atonement, on which the entire Pauline dialec-
tic—but even already that of the Old Testament—is based. This continually self-perpetuat-
ing cycle of guilt, sacrifice, and atonement needs to be broken in order finally to yield to an
innocence of becoming (this is Nietzsche’s expression).” Ibid., pp. 87–88. In addition, while
he views the return of the repressed as a modern manifestation of mythic thinking, Taubes
also argues that psychoanalysis is indebted to Christianity with regard to its emphasis on
guilt, and that Freud ultimately identifies himself with Paul. Ibid., pp. 88–95. For a discus-
sion of Taubes and Nietzsche, see Andreas Urs Sommer, “Eschatologie oder Ewige
Widerkehr? Friedrich Nietzsche und Jacob Taubes,” in Ad Jacob Taubes, pp. 341–54.
13. Taubes, Abendländische Eschatologie, p. 5.
14. Ibid., pp. 14–15.
15. Ibid., p. 4.
JACOB TAUBES: “APOCALYPSE FROM BELOW” 145
gravity that the realm of nature can afford to do without, owing to the
repetitive character of mythic temporality. For naturalized consciousness,
decision lacks all sense of urgency; for historical consciousness, however,
the inevitability of the end prohibits a casual approach to decision. As
Taubes noted of apocalypse in a 1987 interview, “Whether one knows it
or not is entirely irrelevant, whether one takes it for fancy or sees it as
dangerous is all uninteresting in view of the intellectual breakthrough and
experience of time as respite [daß Zeit Frist heißt]. This has consequences
for the economy, actually for all life. There is no eternal return, time does
not enable nonchalance [Lässigkeit]; rather, it is distress [Bedrängnis].”16
Thus, the apocalypticist recognizes that all time is borrowed time. More-
over, if history constitutes a process that culminates in the revelation of
truth, then it is impossible to disregard how one stands vis-à-vis this pro-
cess; the end not only prohibits indifference towards decision, it also
prohibits indifference towards the meaning of history itself. This points
towards the implicitly paradoxical character of history for Taubes: it does
not allow the luxury to deliberate whether or not to opt for the truth—the
imperative to decide is forced upon us as historical subjects.
Taubes’ claim that historical existence entails urgency or duress
points towards another parallel between his thinking and Benjamin’s.17
The appropriate point of reference here is the latter’s well-known remark
that “‘the state of emergency’ in which we live is not the exception but the
rule,” a comment that resembles Taubes’ observation in Abendländische
Eschatologie that apocalypse possesses “knowledge [ein Wissen] of what
is crisis-like in time [ein Wissen um das Krisenhafte der Zeit]” because
“apocalyptic chronology assumes that time is not a mere sequence
16. “Jacob Taubes,” in Denken, das an der Zeit ist, ed. Florian Rötzer (Frankfurt a. M.:
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1987), p. 317.
17. One might also take note of certain affinities between Taubes’ preoccupation with
apocalypse and Heidegger’s preoccupation with finitude—though Taubes himself situated
his concerns beyond individual Dasein. As he remarked apropos of Heidegger: “He
indeed understands time in view of existential and individual experience, whereas I
believe that it is also about collective experiences.” Nonetheless, Taubes also makes it
clear in the same interview that he regards Heidegger’s work as something of a break-
through in philosophical thought: “Already I regard the very title of Heidegger’s Being
and Time, beyond its content, as a dramatic reversal of the classical philosophical tradi-
tion. In itself the layman or even the average philosopher associates Being with something
that is eternal, with something stable and eminent, yet there’s nothing more fleeting than
time.” “Jacob Taubes,” p. 317. For Taubes’ attempt to relate Heidegger to Gnosticism, see
“Vom Adverb ‘nichts’ zum Substantiv ‘das Nichts’” in Vom Kult zur Kultur, pp. 160–72.
146 JOSHUA ROBERT GOLD
18. Taubes, Abendländische Eschatologie, p. 33. See also Walter Benjamin, “On the
Concept of History,” in Selected Writings, Volume 4: 1938-1940, ed. Howard Eiland and
Michael W. Jennings, trans. Harry Zohn (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard UP,
2003), p. 392.
19. Benjamin, “On the Concept of History,” p. 395.
20. Ibid., p. 392.
21. Ibid.
22. This is not to say that Marx is absent from Taubes’ concerns. See Taubes, Abendlän-
dische Eschatologie, pp. 163–91, as well as the essay “Kultur und Ideologie,” in Vom Kult
zur Kultur, pp. 283–304.
23. Schmitt makes this comment in the context of a discussion of the conservatism of
Donoso Cortés. See Taubes, Political Theology of Paul, p. 63.
JACOB TAUBES: “APOCALYPSE FROM BELOW” 147
behavior recedes. The fate of world history is determined from the outset,
and it is senseless to want to guard against it.” This orientation also char-
acterizes apocalyptic writings, the style of which “predominantly applies
the passive. In the apocalypses no one ‘acts,’ rather everything ‘hap-
pens.’”28 In short, regardless of how eagerly he awaits the passing away of
this world, the apocalypticist must eschew the temptation to force the
course of events.29 One example of the passive comportment that the
apocalypticist must assume in order to avoid the self-immolating flames
of eschatological intensity is the act of interpretation, which Taubes dis-
cusses in Abendländische Eschatologie. “All apocalypse tells of the
triumph of eternity,” he writes in the introduction. “This telling is an inter-
cepting of the clues of eternity. What is complete is first glimpsed in the
first sign, and what is glimpsed is put into words in order to gesture ahead
of time towards that which is not yet fulfilled.”30 This is a noteworthy pas-
sage, for while it refers to the “triumph of eternity,” Taubes also suggests
here that the end of time is only accessible to the apocalypticist through
the mediating process of reading. “Clues” (Winke) and “sign” (Zeichen)
reveal the need for hermeneutic skill in addition to revolutionary fervor,
and the expression “to put into words” (ins Wort zu stellen) indicates that
the ability to communicate interpretations is equally indispensable. Taken
together, this vocabulary shows how the apocalypticist must give himself
over to a twofold process of reading and speaking. Not only does this
gradual movement counteract the demonic side of apocalypse; more cru-
cially, Taubes’ claim that the apocalypticist gestures towards a turning
point “ahead of time” (voraus) ascribes a distinctly proleptic character to
his orientation. This condition of indefinite postponement stems back the
violence of apocalypse by interposing itself between the desire to termi-
nate time and the apocalyptic event itself. In short, this second,
hermeneutic moment must accompany the revolutionary impulse of apoc-
alypse in order to balance the blindness of enthusiasm with the lucidity of
reflection. As Taubes remarks in the conclusion of Abendländische
Eschatologie, this “deficient” (dürftig) time between “the No-Longer of
what is past and the Not-Yet of what is coming” requires “holding one’s
self open for the first signs [Zeichen] of the coming day” and “interpreting
[deuten] the clues [Winke] of what is coming.”31 Drawing upon the inter-
pretive act in this way, the language of apocalypse provides its own form
of demystification.32
Taubes’ later works exhibit a similar concern with stemming the
demonic powers of apocalypse, though they focus on the phenomenon of
Gnosticism rather than the act of interpretation. The editors of the
anthology Vom Kult zur Kultur have pointed to Gnosticism as “the red
thread” running through Taubes’ thinking insofar as the Gnostic emphasis
upon the absolute separation between the divine and the profane is consis-
tent with the motif of distinction that is discernible in his works.33 This
observation is true, but one hastens to add that the significance of this
Gnostic theme for Taubes’ thinking also concerns the way that it implies a
radical devaluation of the world that recalls Nietzsche’s notion of “active
nihilism.” Such a gesture admittedly characterizes the concept of apoca-
41. This is not to equate Gnosticism with quietism or acquiescence; on the contrary,
Gnosis preserves an anarchistic impulse at the same time that it directs messianic intensity
inward. Addressing a similar theme in his essay on Surrealism, Taubes describes how the
Gnostic, in detaching himself from the law and traditions of this world, arrives at “a new
idea of freedom, which in terms of its mundane consequences leads to ethical [sittlichen]
anarchism and libertinage. Pneumatic man is a homo novus, for whom the law and wisdom
of the world are not binding.” Taubes, “Noten zum Surrealismus,” p. 139. Thus, proceed-
ing from the assumption that the law confirms the worthlessness of the profane, the Gnos-
tic does not conclude by withdrawing from the world but by challenging the conventions
that govern moral life.
42. Taubes, Abendländsiche Eschatologie, p. 9.
43. Terpstra and de Wit do a noteworthy job of foregrounding this aspect of Taubes’
works. Designating his position as that of “negative political theology” (negative poli-
tische Theologie), they note how his work aims to elaborate “a theological delegitimation
of political power as a whole” (eine theologische Deligitimierung sämtlicher politischer
Macht). Further on in their article they argue that “a positive (or ‘right’) political theol-
ogy” (eine positive (oder ‘rechte’) politische Theologie) provides “a spiritual justification
of profane power” (eine geistliche Rechtfertigung einer weltlichen Macht), while “a nega-
tive (revolutionary, critical, or ‘left’) political theology” (eine negative (revolutionäre,
kritische oder ‘linke’) politische Theologie) provides “a spiritual justification of the under-
mining of profane power” (eine geistliche Rechtfertigung der Unterminierung weltlicher
Macht). Terpstra and de Wit, “No spiritual investment,” pp. 77, 86 (my translation).
44. Taubes, Abendländische Eschatologie, p. 9.
JACOB TAUBES: “APOCALYPSE FROM BELOW” 153
45. It is worth pointing out here that the hostility of apocalypse towards law illustrates
the way in which Taubes understands the difference between theology and philosophy on
the one side and jurisprudence on the other. For the jurist, unlike the theologian or the phi-
losopher, seeks “to legitimate the world as it is”—a task that is “part and parcel of the
whole education, the whole idea of the office of the jurist.” Schmitt is no exception to this
tendency: as “a clerk” he “understands his task to be not to establish the law but to inter-
pret it” in order to insure “that the party, that the chaos not rise to the top, that the state
remain. No matter what the price.” See Taubes, Political Theology of Paul, p. 103.
46. Taubes, Abendländische Eschatologie, p. 64.
47. Ibid.
48. For a discussion of the influences upon the reading of Paul in Abendländische
Eschatologie and the relationship of this reading to Taubes’ other works, see Christoph
Schulte, “PAULUS,” in Ad Jacob Taubes, pp. 93–104; and Martin Treml, “Die Figur des
Paulus in Jacob Taubes’ Religionsphilosophie,” in Torah-Nomos-Ius: Abendländischer
Antinomismus und der Traum vom herrschaftsfreien Raum, ed. Gesine Palmer, Christiane
Nasse, Renate Haffke, and Dorothee C. v. Tippelskirch (Berlin: Verlag Vorwerk 8, 1999),
pp. 164–84.
154 JOSHUA ROBERT GOLD
rather the one who was nailed to the cross by nomos who is the imper-
ator!” exclaims Taubes, describing Paul’s revolt against the imperial
order. “This is incredible, and compared to this all the little revolution-
aries are nothing. This transvaluation turns Jewish-Roman-Hellenistic
upper-class theology on its head, the whole mishmash of Hellenism.”54
Another conception of universalism arises under the sign of this murdered
God, “one that signifies the election of Israel,” to be sure, but a “transfig-
ured” Israel that has rendered more capacious the concept of the chosen
people.55 Instead of modeling itself along the lines of empire and nomos,
this inclusive “pas Israel” is open to all who obey but one commandment:
“Love your neighbor as yourself.”56
As Taubes notes, Paul claims that the triumph of Israel over empire
will come through the eschaton rather than by force of arms. This obser-
vation is consistent with Taubes’ observation in Abendländische
Eschatologie that apocalypse considers the end of history to be “not in an
indeterminate future, but entirely proximate.”57 Paul shows himself to be
no different in this regard when he assures his brethren that “Salvation is
nearer to us now than when we became believers.” As a consequence of
this conviction he never calls for open rebellion, and Taubes summarizes
Paul’s advise as “Demonstrate obedience to state authority, pay taxes,
don’t do anything bad, don’t get involved with conflicts,” since “under
this time pressure, if tomorrow the palaver, the entire swindle were going
to be over—in that case there’s no point in any revolution!”58 The crucial
point here is that Taubes interprets this apparent acquiescence to
authority as an indication of Paul’s radical nihilism: far from ascribing
endurance to the law, this call to obedience is indicative of Paul’s under-
standing of Creation, which Taubes describes as “decay . . . without
hope,” a realm that “groans [and] sighs under the burden of decay and
futility.”59 From this perspective, the law is in decline, for like all profane
phenomena, terrestrial power is destined for oblivion, regardless of how
splendid its appearance.
The law is in decline: this is the secret knowledge promised by apoca-
lyptic thought that worldly authority would prefer to pass over in silence.
For Taubes, the fragility of the law could only come to light through the
passage from nature to history, which reveals the world in its ephemer-
ality. Yet he did not restrict himself entirely to analyzing the political
implications of transience; rather, there are moments when his writings
appear to open themselves up to another, uncanny condition that is best
illustrated by the following passage from Abendländische Eschatologie:
“Paul determines the time between the death of Jesus and the parousia of
Christ as the kairos, which is characterized by the crossing over of the still
natural and the already supernatural states of the world [das Ineinander
des noch natürlichen und des schon übernatürlichen Weltzustandes]. With
the death and resurrection of Jesus the change [Wende] has been met: the
fashion [Wesen] of this world passes away. But the fashion of this world is
the law.”60 Touching upon this moment of transition when one state is
fading away and another is coming into existence, these words ask us to
consider whether there is not a mode of temporality that is unique to the
political. To understand what constitutes such a temporality is among the
most formidable tasks that Taubes has left to posterity.
59. Ibid., 72, 73. Note that Taubes puts forth this description in discussing the influ-
ence of the Pauline understanding of nature on Benjamin’s “Theologico-Political Frag-
ment.” See Taubes, Political Theology of Paul, pp. 70–76.
60. Taubes, Abendländische Eschatologie, p. 67. In a similar vein, Agamben discusses
the uncanny quality of messianic time as an intermediary mode of temporality, “the time
that remains between time and its end.” Agamben, The Time That Remains, p. 62.