Professional Ethics

There is a temptation to think that professional ethics are just about some vague code of
practice about being nice to other people.

I think this topic requires more serious consideration. For that reason I shall rehearse
some of the arguments and questions as I see them about art and ethics or morality.

In preparing this note I have drawn heavily upon

Gaut, B ‘Art and Ethics’ in Gaut & Lopes Routledge Companion to Aesthestics
2nd ed (2005) Abingdon, Routledge and
Eldridge, R (2003) An Introduction to the Philosophy of Art, Cambridge,
Cambridge Univ Press

Issues

History

Art mimicking reality undermines rationality, stimulates emotion and just creates a poor
reproduction (simulacrum) of true knowledge. Art should not be allowed to undermine
public order or government stability

To my mind these arguments of Plato in The Republic are nonsense. They are based
on an exaggerated worship of reason, an unbalanced fear of or wish to suppress
valuable emotion and his determination to justify greater political power for philosophers
than artists in ancient Greece. However, bits of the arguments underpin concerns about
artworks being violent, sexually explicit, racist, sexist etc.

Many reactionary types such as Gardner (1978) criticise contemporary art for being
nihilistic, absurd and “avant garde” and want a “return” to some mythical age of moral art
celebrating human fulfilment (Roger Scruton and Prince Charles with their beliefs
glorifying privilege and imperial tastes in fictionalising nature, beauty and harmony come
to mind).

Does exposure to ethically suspect artwork (violent etc) morally corrupt its audience?
This raises questions about causation and would need scientific evidence through
psychological and sociological testing. This remains an inconclusive area.

Does the ethical badness of some artworks justify their censorship/suppression?

This is in many ways a question of political philosophy

Do we have moral obligations towards artworks to preserve them/not interfere with them?
Are there parallels between moral and aesthetic judgments – are they objective or
relative? are they governed by principles? do they depend on personal responses?
These are mostly 18th century concerns of the likes of Hume and Kant.

The major question is

Are the ethical flaws or merits of artworks also aesthetic flaws or merits?

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Riefenstahl’s film Triumph of the Will enthused about the 1934 Nuremberg Rally but is
regarded by some as a good artwork. Likewise Griffith’s 1915 film Birth of a Nation with
its KKK racism

Is it aesthetically flawed because of its Nazi/racist sympathy?

Is it bad art because of its message?
Is its immoral stance irrelevant as to whether it’s a good work of art?
Is it good because its immorality is disturbing and challenging?

Do controversial works (see Serrano etc below) contribute to moral understanding?

Although dealing with values (not being purely formal works) how are artworks different
from theoretical moral arguments?
Are they polemics that do no deserve public support because they undermine “public
morality”?
Do they offer genuine insight or are they “above morality because they are art”?
What does art have to do with morality?

• Aestheticism (autonomism) says ethical flaws or merits are never aesthetic flaws
or merits - ethics is irrelevant to aesthetic assessment

• Moralism (ethicism) says artworks are always aesthetically bad if they are
ethically bad

• Contextualism says that artworks are sometimes aesthetically good despite their
ethical flaws and sometimes aesthetically bad because of them

The term “ethically flawed” does not refer to a propensity to affect audiences (that is the
causation issue – propaganda, advertising, inducing behaviours).
It refers to intrinsic properties that manifest ethically reprehensible attitudes eg a Nazi film.

Aestheticism (autonomism)

An extreme aestheticism is to say that it’s senseless to morally evaluate artworks

because they should only be assessed aesthetically.

With distain for almost everyone as inferior, it was notoriously put

“There is no such thing as a moral or an immoral book. Books are well written or
badly written. That is all…the only excuse for making a useless thing is that one
admires it intensely. All art is quite useless”
(Oscar Wilde The Picture of Dorian Gray (1982) ed Ackroyd, Harmondsworth,
Penguin

I think that reflects a facetious reactionary political predisposition upheld by the

privileged to pretend art can be separated from politics. It is a way to defend the status
quo and conceal injustice by trying to divert attention away from life to something other
worldly.

A more moderate aestheticism is to say that artworks can be morally evaluated but
those flaws or merits do not detract or enhance their aesthetic merits or flaws. This view
argues that ethics and aesthetics are different. In effect the manner of expression (how

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things are done) is what matters aesthetically, not the fact that immoral views are
proposed (what is said eg racist views) according to Beardsley (1981). He denies any
message to art, only self-contained lack of moral dimension

Clive Bell (1987) at the beginning of the 20th century appealed to an aesthetic attitude to
assess artworks without sensitivity to morality, detached and disengaged from practical
concerns (derived from Kant’s 18th century notion of disinterest) out of pure
contemplation. Bell thought that by restricting yourself to forms, lines and colours only
aesthetic emotions would be generated. This ignores what may well be aesthetically
important to a work such as its subject, ideas or attitudes. If one considers Picasso’s
Guernica, such an exaggerated formalism (especially that promoted by Greenberg in the
50s-60s) can be seen for its inadequacy.

Again, I feel that it is a misguided viewpoint. I doubt it is even entirely possible.

Feminism, post-colonialism, anti-consumerism etc have thankfully moved us on.
“Aesthetic” qualities are often laden with ethical evaluations about insight, sensitivity,
passion etc. In any event, it is obvious that ethical intentions are often a major
component to an artwork. To say they have nothing to do with aesthetic value is clearly
nonsense.

Another argument is that there should be no worrying about the moral consequences of
art because there should be censorship of nothing.

I do not accept that snuff art should be tolerated.

A different argument

Moralism (ethicism)

Leo Tolstoy (1930) at the beginning of the 19th century was an extreme moralist who felt
that art’s cultural value should be assessed by its moral virtue (exemplified by the
Christian gospel).

I cannot agree that religious, political or moral correctness is the sole determinant of an
artwork’s worth. There are so many other possible qualities – complexity, simplicity,
profundity, wit, ambiguity, clarity, unity, disparateness, beauty, challenge, intensity,
subtlety, expression, coolness etc etc
Just because something is done out of good intentions does not to my mind force a
conclusion that it is a good artwork.

There is an alleged moderate moralist argument (Gaut 1997) that although a moral flaw
is an aesthetic flaw, removing or replacing it would not necessarily make it better. This
is the “pro tanto argument” which supports telling a lie out of kindness where telling the
truth would cause hurt ie all in all it’s the better course. The argument goes that ethical
flaws are only sometimes aesthetically relevant.

I think applying the white lie argument to aesthetics but saying you are a moralist is
misconceived. To my mind the pro-tanto argument is contextualist not moralist. To be a
moralist but not have any principle as to what is aesthetically relevant is unconvincing to
me.

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Another moralist argument is that artworks can teach us things and what they can teach
includes moral truths (Eaton 2001). Then it argues that it must be shown that the
teaching element has aesthetic merit (ie what art teaches is essentially about how it
teaches – Beardsmore 1971) and is profound, insightful, wise etc.

Again, I don’t think artworks have to teach us things. Even if they do, those things need
not be about morality.

An old moralist argument Hume advanced was that we are not capable of immoral
sentiments when responding to artworks.
That is obviously incorrect.
The modern argument is that if the response should be condemning, then the artwork is
aesthetically flawed if it does not provoke that response (eg comedies that do not make
us laugh). Similarly if they provoke responses that are not justified (eg comedies that
should not make us laugh) (Gaut 1997). In short, how we react is an aesthetic issue
and a flaw if not what it should be. The argument is that if it’s wrong to be amused
therefore it’s flawed humour. This condemns for example satire because it’s cruel and
invites ridicule.

To my mind there are serious problems with this reasoning. This confuses being wrong
to respond in certain ways with whether the response is unjustified. It may be wrong for
a white person to laugh at a vicious in-joke by a black person about another black
person, but that does not mean it’s not funny (Jacobson 1997). Satire is not inherently
aesthetically flawed (eg where ridicule and criticism of hypocrisy is well deserved. I
cannot agree with Gaut’s reasoning - that moralists can claim to be “moderate” by saying
that a work can be morally flawed but have other redeeming qualities and - that
moralism is the leading position in this debate about art and ethics. To my mind, that is
contextualism parading as moralism.

Contextualism

There is an argument that ethical flaws in a work are sometimes aesthetic defects,
sometimes neutral and sometimes aesthetic merits depending on the context.

In my view, transgressive or subversive qualities which challenge or subvert established

moral values may well be aesthetically good even though ultimately the moral argument
is not convincing.

There is nothing unethical about a work asking us to question moral attitudes. That may
well be an aesthetic quality.

The contextualist position is that even though the work endorses a different moral
position as well as questioning it, if after reflection we still disagree that does not make
the endorsement an aesthetic flaw. It need not be seen as an aesthetic merit either. It
depends on the context.

I agree with that. The fact someone has a different view (which we think is wrong) does
not to my mind mean that the work or the argument is necessarily aesthetically flawed or
good. For me it depends on whether the endorsement has a moral and not simply a
purely selfish basis. In issues such as sex and death, raising questions and advancing

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arguments about consensual acts and the freedoms of minorities are one thing,
gratuitous celebration of enjoying murdering or raping is an aesthetic as well as a moral
flaw.

It is said that another contextualist argument is that if an ethical flaw is so bound up in a

work, its inseparability prevents there being any aesthetic flaw.

Personally I disagree with this argument that there can be no aesthetic flaw. That strikes
me as practically an aestheticism argument that aesthetics is separate from ethics. An
ethical flaw may be utterly interwoven into the work but it may be a minor aesthetic flaw
or an important one such as a Nazi or racist film. To my mind it depends on the
historical and other contexts, extent and so on.

The moralist position is that the work would be better if the flaw were removed or
replaced. The “pro tanto moralist” leaving the work as it is (mild or brief ethical flaws
perhaps being irrelevent to aesthetics or only minor aesthetic flaws), is within the
territory of contextualism as far as I see it. It is a viewpoint I sympathise with.

There is another argument where the boundaries of contextualism and moralism seem
to blur. This is in the area of “aesthetic cognitivism” – works are aesthetically good
because of their teaching us something.

Contextualists say that even though one might experience sympathy with an advocated
immoral position, the seductive experience deepens understanding of why the position
is immoral (Kieran 2003).
I agree that being shown how easy it is to be seduced is an aesthetic merit.

Moralists argue that because an immoral position is advocated, it’s an aesthetic flaw
even though they accept that being shown how easy it is to be taken in is an aesthetic
merit.

In my opinion this shows moralism to have a grim Puritanism. I prefer a more pluralist
attitude which does not find aesthetic flaws in learning how one can be persuaded about
and therefore understand different moral positions. You do not need to be told what you
should think. You can be left to think for yourself why your initial sympathy is misplaced
and later work out for yourself that a position is immoral.

Andres Serrano’s Piss Christ

This photograph shows a small plastic crucifix and body of Jesus Christ submerged in a
glass of the artist’s urine (and perhaps some of his blood). When it was exhibited in
1989 it caused a major issue. It was accused of being blasphemous. Senators Al
D’Amato and Jesse Helms denounced it on the floor of the US Senate. They expressed
outrage that a federal tax financed institution – National Endowment for the Arts – had
supported the piece. Catholic nun and art critic Sister Wendy Beckett approved of it. It
was regarded as a test case for the clash between freedom of speech/expression and
hurt felt by a section of the community.

Chris Ofili’s Holy Virgin Mary

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In 1999 Brooklyn Museum of Art came under fire when it exhibited this picture. The
museum is funded by NYC. The painting included sexually explicit collaged cut-outs and
used elephant dung covered in resin to represent a breast of the Virgin Mary. The
Catholic Church and NYC’s catholic mayor Rudolph Giuliani expressed outrage. He
denounced it as morally offensive. He threatened to cut off the museum’s funding and
terminate its lease if it failed to terminate the exhibition which included the painting. The
museum declined to do so. NYC filed a state lawsuit to get the lease revoked and the
museum reacted by filing a federal suit claiming violations of the First Amendment. The
judge granted an injunction against NYC withholding funds and it was ordered to resume
funding the museum and stop the proceedings on the lease.

Schneider, Vargas and Shvarts

Gregor Schneider found that doing a sculpture of a dead woman caused controversy.
Later he pretended to be dead as part of one of his exhibitions. On another occasion he
sought an already dying volunteer to lay in an art gallery for viewers to anticipate the
person’s death and capture the “beauty in death”.

Guillermo Habacuc Vargas removed a starving dog from the streets and showed it unfed
at an exhibition to highlight that audiences who saw it but walked on were no different to
people in the street. He was criticised for allowing suffering to the dog.

Aliza Shvarts collected donated sperm, artificially inseminated herself and used
medicines that may/not have caused miscarriages every month for 9 months. She
wrapping the blood in Vaseline and plastic, putting it in a cube and videoing the events.
She challenged the use of language – who was to say it was not just menstruation, who
is to say there was ever any fertilisation, miscarriage or abortion. Her work addressed
feminism and the politics of abortion.

Beardsley, M (1981) Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism 2nd ed,

Indianapolis, Hackett
Beardsmore, R (1971) Art and Morality, London, Macmillan
Bell, C (1987) Art ed Bullen, J, Oxford, Oxford Univ Press
Eaton, M (2001) Merit, Aesthetic and Ethical, Oxford, Oxford Univ Press
Gardner, J (1978) On Moral Fiction, New York, Harper Collins
Gaut, B (1997) ‘The Ethical Criticism of Art’ in Levinson, J, Aesthetics and Ethics,
Cambridge, Cambridge Univ Press
Jacobson, D (1997) ‘In Praise of Immoral Art’ in Philosophical Topics 25
Kieran, M (2003) ‘Forbidden Knowledge: The Challenge of Immoralism’ in Bermudez, J
Art and Morality, London, Routledge
Tolstoy, L (1930) What is Art trans Maude, Oxford, Oxford Univ Press