Rel 12/30/2010

Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance
s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e Reporter of Decisions,
A l a b a m a A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ( ( 3 3 4 ) 2 2 9 ¬
0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e
t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r .

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011

1060855

Redtop M a r k e t , I n c . , and R i v e r Road A u t o R e p a i r , by and

t h r o u g h i t s owner, R i c k e y B o l t o n

v.

S t a t e o f Alabama ex r e l . A r t h u r G r e e n , D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y f o r
t h e Bessemer D i v i s i o n o f t h e T e n t h J u d i c i a l C i r c u i t o f
Alabama

Appeal from J e f f e r s o n C i r c u i t Court

(CV-03-905)

PER CURIAM.

Redtop Market, I n c . , a n d R i v e r Road A u t o R e p a i r , by and

through i t s owner, Rickey Bolton (hereinafter collectively

referred t o as "Redtop"), appeal from the t r i a l court's order

1060855

g r a n t i n g t h e S t a t e o f A l a b a m a on t h e r e l a t i o n of Arthur Green,

district attorney f o r the Bessemer Division of the Tenth

Judicial Circuit of Alabama, r e l i e f under Rule 60(b)(6), A l a .

R. C i v . P. We vacate the order, dismiss the action, and

dismiss the appeal.

Facts and P r o c e d u r a l History

On July 1, 2003, Redtop filed a complaint seeking a

judgment d e c l a r i n g t h a t c e r t a i n gaming machines Redtop w i s h e d

to operate i n i t s place of business were "bona fide coin-

operated amusement machines" under § 13A-12-76, A l a . Code

1975. According to the complaint, Green had refused to

a p p r o v e t h e g a m i n g m a c h i n e s f o r u s e as amusement m a c h i n e s and

had taken the position that the operation of the machines

w o u l d v i o l a t e §§ 13A-12-20 t h r o u g h 13A-12-76, A l a . Code 1975.

The complaint alleged that "the machines i n question are

primarily games o f s k i l l and n o t chance and t h e r e f o r e , should

be allowed t o be operated."

After conducting a hearing, the t r i a l court on February

3, 2004, entered an order holding that the gaming machines

were bona fide coin-operated amusement m a c h i n e s u n d e r § 13A-

12-76, A l a . Code 1975. The trial court's order stated that

2
1060855

"any and a l l law e n f o r c e m e n t agencies, i n c l u d i n g the Jefferson

County Sheriff's Department and a l l local municipal law

enforcement authorities, [shall] abstain from seizing or

charging criminally any individuals o p e r a t i n g or p o s s e s s i n g

[the gaming m a c h i n e s ] in Jefferson County."

On F e b r u a r y 27, 2004, the S t a t e f i l e d a motion for a new

trial or a r e h e a r i n g . After conducting a h e a r i n g , the trial

court denied the motion f o r a new trial on July 1, 2005. On

August 11, 2005, the State f i l e d a notice of appeal to this

Court. I n S t a t e v. R e d t o p M a r k e t , I n c . , 937 So. 2d 1013 (Ala.

2006), t h i s Court h e l d that the S t a t e ' s motion f o r a new trial

h a d b e e n d e n i e d b y o p e r a t i o n o f l a w on May 27, 2004; thus, the

State's a p p e a l was untimely. Therefore, this Court dismissed

the appeal.

On January 18, 2007, the S t a t e f i l e d a motion under Rule

60(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., seeking relief from the trial

court's February 3, 2004, order. The Rule 60(b)(6) motion

alleged that this Court i n Barber v. Jefferson County Racing

Ass'n, 960 So. 2d 599 ( A l a . 2006), examined gaming machines

that were essentially identical to the gaming machines at

issue i n the p r e s e n t case and held that such gaming machines

3
1060855

are illegal gambling devices. The S t a t e a s k e d t h e t r i a l court

to find that t h e gaming machines at issue i n the present case

are illegal gambling devices and to lift i t s injunction

preventing law-enforcement agencies from s e i z i n g the machines

or from c r i m i n a l l y charging individuals f o u n d t o be operating

or p o s s e s s i n g the machines i n Jefferson County. On January

26, 2007, the trial court granted the State's motion and

lifted the injunction.

On F e b r u a r y 2 3 , 2 0 0 7 , R e d t o p filed a motion to set aside

the January 26, 2007, order or to stay that order pending

appeal. The trial court denied that motion on F e b r u a r y 26,

2007. On March 7, 2007, Redtop filed a notice of appeal to

this Court.

Discussion

After the appeal i n this case was taken, this Court

released i t s opinion i n Tyson v. Macon C o u n t y Greyhound Park,

Inc., 43 So. 3d 587 ( A l a . 2010), which held that t h e Macon

Circuit Court lacked subject-matter j u r i s d i c t i o n to i n t e r f e r e

in the enforcement of c r i m i n a l l a w s t h r o u g h t h e i s s u a n c e o f an

injunction in a civil action. That holding i s dispositive in

the present case.

4
1060855

In Tyson, Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc., d/b/a

VictoryLand ("VictoryLand"), filed an action in the Macon

Circuit Court against J o h n M. Tyson, Jr., individually and i n

his official capacity as special prosecutor and task-force

commander of the Governor's Task Force on Illegal Gambling,

seeking injunctive and declaratory relief stemming from

Tyson's arrival at the premises of V i c t o r y L a n d f o r the purpose

of seizing machines that, Tyson said, were illegal gambling

devices. In i t s complaint, VictoryLand asserted that i t s

activities were l a w f u l and that i t would suffer irreparable

i n j u r y i f the machines were s e i z e d . The circuit court entered

a written order barring Tyson from taking further action

pending a hearing t o be h e l d a f e w d a y s l a t e r . Tyson filed an

emergency motion in this Court to stay or to vacate the

circuit court's order.

This Court held that "[t]he general rule i s that a court

may not interfere with the enforcement of criminal laws

through a civil a c t i o n ; i n s t e a d , the p a r t y aggrieved by such

enforcement shall make his case in the prosecution of the

criminal a c t i o n . " T y s o n , 43 S o . 3 d a t 5 8 9 . We also noted that

"[t]his C o u r t has recognized an e x c e p t i o n to the general rule

5
1060855

whereby the e q u i t a b l e powers of the court can be invoked to

avoid i r r e p a r a b l e i n j u r y when t h e p l a i n t i f f contends that the

statute at i s s u e i s v o i d , " 43 So. 3d at 589, but we held that

"[t]he complaint in this a c t i o n does not present a situation

in which the plaintiff acknowledges that his conduct is

p r o h i b i t e d by a s t a t u t e and then challenges the enforceability

of the s t a t u t e . " 43 So. 3d a t 590. Therefore, b a s e d on those

propositions, we held that the circuit court lacked subject-

matter jurisdiction, and we vacated the order before us,

dismissed the a c t i o n , and dismissed the appeal.

As d i d the plaintiffs i n Tyson, Redtop sought a judgment

declaring the operation of the gaming machines to be legal,

and, like the trial court i n Tyson, the trial court in this

case, in its February 3, 2004, order, enjoined a l l law-

enforcement agencies "from s e i z i n g or c h a r g i n g criminally any

individuals operating or p o s s e s s i n g [the gaming machines] in

Jefferson County." Such a d e c l a r a t i o n would impermissibly

interfere with the enforcement of criminal laws through a

civil action. A l s o , no exception to the general rule applies

in the present case because Redtop does not challenge the

enforceability of any statute. Instead, Redtop alleges that

6
1060855

the gaming machines are legal because, i t says, the machines

meet the definition of a "bona fide coin-operated amusement

m a c h i n e s " u n d e r § 13A-12-76, A l a . Code 1975. Therefore, like

the c i r c u i t court i n Tyson, the c i r c u i t court i n the present

case lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action, and

all orders entered by the trial court in this case are void.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we vacate the order before us,

dismiss the action, and dismiss the appeal.

ORDER V A C A T E D ; A C T I O N D I S M I S S E D ; A P P E A L DISMISSED.

Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, and Shaw, JJ.,

concur.

Murdock, J . , concurs specially.

Cobb, C . J . , concurs i n the result.

7
1060855

MURDOCK, J u s t i c e (concurring specially).

In Tyson v. Macon C o u n t y G r e y h o u n d P a r k , Inc., 43 S o . 3 d

587 ( A l a . 2010), this Court held that a circuit court

exercising its civil jurisdiction d i d n o t have subject-matter

jurisdiction over an action seeking to restrain the

enforcement of this State's criminal laws. Among other

things, this Court supported i t s holding with the following

observations:

"The general rule i s that a court may n o t

interfere with t h e enforcement o f c r i m i n a l laws
through a c i v i l a c t i o n ; instead, the party aggrieved
by such enforcement shall make h i s c a s e i n t h e
prosecution of the criminal action:

"'It i s a p l a i n p r o p o s i t i o n of law that

e q u i t y w i l l not e x e r t i t s powers merely t o
enjoin criminal or quasi criminal
p r o s e c u t i o n s , "though the consequences t o
the complainant of allowing the
prosecutions t o p r o c e e d may b e e v e r so
grievous and irreparable." Brown v.
B i r m i n g h a m , 140 A l a . [ 5 9 0 , ] 6 0 0 , 37 S o u t h .
[ 1 7 3 , ] 174 [ ( 1 9 0 4 ) ] . " H i s r e m e d y a t l a w i s
plain, a d e q u a t e , a n d c o m p l e t e b y way o f
establishing and h a v i n g h i s innocence
adjudged i n the c r i m i n a l court." I d . '

" B o a r d o f Comm'rs o f M o b i l e v . O r r , 181 A l a . 3 0 8 ,

3 1 8 , 61 S o . 9 2 0 , 923 ( 1 9 1 3 ) . S e e a l s o 2 2 A A m . J u r . 2 d
D e c l a r a t o r y J u d g m e n t s § 57 ( 2 0 0 3 ) ('A d e c l a r a t o r y
j u d g m e n t w i l l g e n e r a l l y n o t be g r a n t e d w h e r e i t s
only effect would be to decide matters which
p r o p e r l y s h o u l d be d e c i d e d i n a c r i m i n a l a c t i o n . ' ) . "

8
1060855

Tyson, 43 So. 3d a t 589.

The present case well demonstrates the wisdom of the

above-quoted general principles and the harmony of those

principles with the d o c t r i n e of the s e p a r a t i o n of powers as

provided in § 43 of the Alabama Constitution. I f we limit

"matters which properly should be decided in a criminal

action" to c r i m i n a l actions, a mistake i n favor of a c r i m i n a l

actor serves only to immunize from further law-enforcement

efforts the s p e c i f i c past acts alleged i n the indictment or

information. On t h e o t h e r hand, i f such a m i s t a k e i s made i n

a civil case like the present one, the result could be

injunctive or other relief that could t i e t h e hands of law

enforcement i n the future so a s , i n e f f e c t , t o immunize from

further law-enforcement efforts a l lfuture acts of the same

nature by the p r e v a i l i n g party and p o s s i b l y o t h e r similarly

situated actors in the county in which the decision is

rendered. In p r a c t i c a l effect, the r e s u l t w o u l d be a change

by civil judicial decree f o r that county of what has been

prescribed by the legislature as the uniform statutory

criminal law f o r the e n t i r e s t a t e . The judiciary would, in

one f e l l s w o o p , be a b l e to i n t e r f e r e with both the legislative

9
1060855

and executive branches, contrary to § 43 of the Alabama

Constitution.

Alabama's constitution prescribes to the legislative

branch of our State government the task of promulgating

criminal laws for the sake of the public's safety, health,

and welfare. It prescribes to the executive branch of State

government the task of enforcing criminal laws to the same

end. It i s e s s e n t i a l to the integrity of the delegation of

t h e s e r e s p e c t i v e t a s k s t o t h e s e p a r t i c u l a r b r a n c h e s and to the

realization of these purposes i n a uniform manner throughout

the various counties to adhere to the notion that an order

from the judicial branch of the nature at issue in this case

is subject to future, collateral attack as beyond the

jurisdiction of the civil court that entered it. Maintaining

this integrity and meeting these purposes dictate that the

potential prospective, b i n d i n g e f f e c t of the order of a s i n g l e

court not be dependent upon the immediate stance t a k e n by, or

the skill or d i l i g e n c e o f , a l o c a l official in relation to the

trying of a single civil action, the preserving of error in

that a c t i o n , or the pursuing of a t i m e l y and e f f e c t i v e appeal

from any adverse judgment.

10
1060855

Related to the foregoing, I note that our opinion in

Tyson stated that this Court has r e c o g n i z e d an e x c e p t i o n to

the g e n e r a l r u l e whereby t h e e q u i t a b l e powers of t h e c o u r t can

be invoked to avoid irreparable injury when the plaintiff

concedes that h i s or her conduct falls within a criminal

statute but contends that the statute itself i s void. 43

So. 3d a t 589. Because t h i s exception i s again referenced i n

the opinion i n this case, I find i t appropriate t o make note

here of questions regarding the correctness of this exception

that have a r i s e n f o r me since T y s o n was decided.

Most fundamentally, i t appears t o me that the above-

described principles and purposes could be defeated as

effectively by a civil action that adjudicates a criminal

statute or ordinance t o be void as by a civil action that

successfully s e e k s on some o t h e r ground t o prevent particular

conduct from being prosecuted under that criminal statute or

ordinance i n the future. 1

I question whether any exception

1
See g e n e r a l l y C i t y C o u n c i l o f Montgomery v. West, 4 0 So.
215, 215 ( A l a . 1906) (not r e p o r t e d i n Alabama Reports)
(holding that a court exercising civil jurisdiction i s
" w i t h o u t power t o e n j o i n t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f t h r e a t e n e d c r i m e s ,
or t o r e s t r a i n t h r e a t e n e d p r o s e c u t i o n s f o r t h e commission of
a l l e g e d c r i m e s , " e v e n when " t h e o r d i n a n c e o r s t a t u t e f o r t h e
a l l e g e d v i o l a t i o n of which the prosecution i s threatened, i s
a b s o l u t e l y v o i d " a n d a v e r m e n t i s made t h a t t h e r e " w o u l d b e

11
1060855

that allows such a result c o u l d be correct since i t is those

principles and purposes that inform the general rule.

Although there are indeed numerous cases that articulate

an exception to the general rule for c i v i l actions seeking an

adjudication t h a t an enactment i s v o i d (which I understand to

be a reference to facial voidness), i t may be observed that

such cases, particularly early ones, usually involved the

validity of local ordinances, rather than State criminal

statutes. See, e.g., Board of Comm'rs o f M o b i l e v. Orr, 181

Ala. 308, 318 , 61 So. 920 , 923 (1 913) (noting the "plain

proposition of law that equity will not exert its powers

merely to e n j o i n c r i m i n a l or q u a s i c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n s , " but

subsequently observing that the Court had recognized "the

power ... of the equity courts to interfere by injunction

where q u a s i criminal prosecutions under m u n i c i p a l ordinances

will destroy or i m p a i r p r o p e r t y rights" and citing a s e r i e s of

repeated and numerous prosecutions" that would "inflict

i r r e p a r a b l e i n j u r y " b u t m a k i n g no r e f e r e n c e t o a n y exception
t o t h i s g e n e r a l r u l e ) . S i m i l a r l y , i f an o r d i n a n c e p u r p o r t s t o
d e c l a r e l e g a l c e r t a i n a c t i v i t y that would otherwise run a f o u l
o f a S t a t e c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e , I q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r t h e r e i s any
difference in adjudicating in a c i v i l action for prospective
effect the validity of that ordinance and a similar
a d j u d i c a t i o n of the l e g a l i t y of the a c t i v i t y at i s s u e i n the
a b s e n c e o f an o r d i n a n c e t h a t p u r p o r t s t o l e g a l i z e i t .

12
1060855

cases involving alleged violations of municipal ordinances

(emphasis added)); Franklin Soc. Club v. Town of Phil

Campbell, 204 A l a . 2 5 9 , 85 S o . 527 (1920); Walker v. C i t y o f

Birmingham, 2 1 6 A l a . 2 0 6 , 112 So. 823 (1927 ) . Such cases

arguably do n o t i m p l i c a t e the above-described concerns as t o

the separation and independence of the legislative and

executive branches of State government, nor t h e need f o r

statewide uniformity i n the application of State criminal

statutes, i n t h e same m a n n e r a s do c a s e s s e e k i n g t o a d j u d i c a t e

the v i a b i l i t y o f a c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e e n a c t e d by t h e l e g i s l a t i v e

branch of State government f o r enforcement throughout the

State.

Assuming that an e x c e p t i o n of the nature expressed i n

Tyson i s available, however, I also have come to question

whether we as a C o u r t failed i n Tyson to observe adequately

that the r i s k of irreparable i n j u r y t h a t must be shown must be

to property and e n t e r p r i s e s other than those that are the

subject of the enforcement action itself. 2

By e x t e n s i o n , i t

2
C o m p a r e , e . g . , B e s s e m e r v . B e s s e m e r W a t e r W o r k s , 152 A l a .
3 9 1 , 44 S o . 663 ( 1 9 0 7 ) ( i n v o l v i n g l o c a l o r d i n a n c e s i m p o s i n g
restrictions on b u s i n e s s e s a n d p r o p e r t y t h a t i n a l l o t h e r
r e s p e c t s were " p e r f e c t l y l e g i t i m a t e and h i g h l y u s e f u l " ) ; Brown
v . B i r m i n g h a m , 140 A l a . 5 9 0 , 37 S o . 173 ( 1 9 0 4 ) ; O l d D o m i n i o n
T e l . C o . v . P o w e r s , 140 A l a . 2 2 0 , 37 S o . 195 ( 1 9 0 4 ) ; B r y a n v .

13
1060855

may be q u e s t i o n e d whether i n a circumstance where there i sa

C i t y o f B i r m i n g h a m , 154 A l a . 4 4 7 , 4 5 0 , 45 S o . 9 2 2 , 923 ( 1 9 0 8 )
(addressing on i t s m e r i t s the t r i a l court's denial of
e q u i t a b l e r e l i e f i n a case where t h e " t h r e a t e n e d enforcement
of t h e ordinance would n o t o n l y g r e a t l y d i m i n i s h t h e v a l u e o f
the p r o p e r t y , but w i l l p r a c t i c a l l y destroy i t s value, by
forbidding the use t o which i t i s b e t t e r or e x c l u s i v e l y
adaptable," i n this case a cemetery); Town o f C u b a v .
M i s s i s s i p p i O i l C o . , 150 A l a . 2 5 9 , 43 S o . 7 0 6 ( 1 9 0 7 ) ; P o r t o f
Mobile v . L. & N.R.R., 84 A l a . 1 1 5 , 4 S o . 1 0 6 (1 88 8 ) ;
M o n t g o m e r y v . L. & N.R.R., 84 A l a . 1 2 7 , 4 S o . 626 ( 1 8 8 8 ) , w i t h
Ex p a r t e S t a t e e x r e l . M a r t i n , 200 A l a . 1 5 , 1 6 , 75 S o . 3 2 7 ,
328 ( 1 9 1 7 ) ("The p r o p e r t y r i g h t s o u g h t t o b e a s s e r t e d ... d o e s
n o t ... b r i n g [ t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s ] c a u s e w i t h i n t h e e x c e p t i o n ...
r e c o g n i z e d i n t h e c a s e s n o t e d i n B o a r d o f Com'rs o f M o b i l e v .
O r r , 181 A l a . 3 0 8 , 61 S o . 920 [ ( 1 9 1 3 ) ] . The f a c t , i f s o , t h a t
complainant has brought into the state o r has i n h i s
possession a beverage t h a t , though i n f a c t not p r o h i b i t e d ,
w i l l s u b j e c t or has s u b j e c t e d him t o a r r e s t and h i s beverage
to s e i z u r e , c a n n o t a v a i l t o i n v e s t t h e c o u r t o f e q u i t y w i t h
j u r i s d i c t i o n i n t h e p r e m i s e s . The i s s u e , w h e t h e r t h e b e v e r a g e
i s w i t h i n t h e p r o h i b i t o r y l a w s , c a n be f u l l y d e t e r m i n e d by t h e
c o u r t i n which t h e p r o s e c u t i o n and t h e proceedings on s e i z u r e
a r e h e a r d . " ) ; C a u d l e v . C o t t o n , 234 A l a . 1 2 6 , 1 2 7 , 173 S o .
847, 848 (1937) (dissolving an i n j u n c t i o n a g a i n s t law
enforcement's seizure of gambling devices and n o t i n g that
" [ p ] e r h a p s t h e c a s e o f E x p a r t e S t a t e , 200 A l a . 1 5 , 75 S o . 327
[ ( 1 9 1 7 ) ] , f u r n i s h e s an i l l u s t r a t i o n more n e a r l y i n p o i n t t o
t h e i n s t a n t c a s e " t h a n o t h e r s ) ; K e n n e d y v . S h a m b l i n , 234 A l a .
2 3 0 , 2 3 1 , 174 S o . 7 7 3 , 774 ( 1 9 3 7 ) ( a f f i r m i n g t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s
d e n i a l o f e q u i t a b l e r e l i e f where " t h e o n l y p r o p e r t y rights
involved a r e such as t h e c o m p l a i n a n t has i n s a i d slot
m a c h i n e s , i n w h i c h he h a s i n v e s t e d h i s money a n d t h e p r o f i t s
which s a i d machines a r e t a k i n g " ) . See a l s o D i c k e y v . S i g n a l
P e a k E n t e r s . , 340 A r k . 2 7 6 , 280 , 9 S.W.3d 5 1 7 , 51 9 ( 2 0 0 0 )
(holding that a threatened prosecution did not f a l l within the
exception to the general preventing a chancery court from
restraining prosecutorial efforts because the threatened
prosecution "was a i m e d exclusively at i l l e g a l gambling
operations, not lawful business operations"); B i l l y / D o t , Inc.
v . F i e l d s , 322 A r k . 2 7 2 , 908 S.W.2d 3 3 5 ( 1 9 9 5 ) .

14
1060855

commingling of both allegedly illegal enterprises with legal

enterprises the complainant has not voluntarily undertaken a

risk for which a court exercising c i v i l j u r i s d i c t i o n may not

provide relief.

While I therefore question whether this Court's

articulation of an exception i n T y s o n was correct, i t is not

necessary to answer this "question" in order to decide the

case before us. I agree with the main opinion that the

exception articulated i n Tyson i s not applicable here, and I

therefore concur in that opinion.

15