Sumulong v.
Guerrero 154 SCRA 461 (1987) F: On writs of execution" or "orders of demolition" issued against
December 5, 1977, the National Housing Authority filed a
complaint for the expropriation of 25 hectares of land in
Antipolo, Rizal pursuant to PD 1224 authorizing the
expropriation of private lands for socialized housing. Among
those lands sought to be expropriated are the petitioners''
lands. They brought this suit in the SC challenging the
constitutionality of PD 1224. HELD: Petitioners contend that
socialized housing for the purpose of condemnation
proceedings is not public use since it will benefit only a
handful of people. The "public use" requirement is an
evolving concept influences by changing conditions. Urban
renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low-cost
housing is recognized as a public purpose, not only because
of the expanded concept of public use but also because of
specific provisions in the Constitution. Shortage in housing is
a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly
affects public health, safety, the environment and, in sum,
the general welfare. Petitioners claim that there are vast
areas of lands in Rizal hundreds of hectares of which are
owned by a few landowners only. Why should the NHA pick
their small lots? Expropriation is not confined to landed
estates. The test to be applied for a valid expropriation of
private lands was the area of the land and not the number of
people who stood to be benefitted. The State acting through
the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the
property. The property owner may not interpose objections
merely because in their judgment some other property would
have been more suitable. The provisions on just
compensation found in PD 1224, 1259, and 1313 are the
same provisions which were declared unconstitutional in
EPZA v. Dulay (1987) for being encroachments on judicial
prerogatives.
G.R. No. L-31814 January 31, 1973
RAYMUNDO Z. FAMILARA, petitioner,
vs.
J.M. TUASON & CO., INC., GREGORIO ARANETA, INC.,
CITY ENGINEER PANTALEON TABORA OF QUEZON
CITY, ALL THE JUDGES PRESIDING OVER THE
VARIOUS BRANCHES OF THE COURTS OF FIRST
INSTANCE AND CITY COURTS OF QUEZON CITY, and
THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, respondents.
An original action by the barrio captain of Barrio Tatalon, in
his own behalf and in representation of 1,500 "bona-fide"
occupants of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City, to enjoin the
respondent Corporations, J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and
Gregorio Araneta, Inc., "from bulldozing and fencing any
portion" of the Tatalon Estate "and/or from selling" any of the
lots therein, "and/or from filing ejectment cases" against the
"bona-fide" occupants of the estate, the respondent City
Engineer Quezon City from issuing "building and fencing
permits" to purchasers of lots within the Tatalon Estate, and
respondent City Sheriff of the same city from "implementing
Actually, there should no longer be any doubt, on this matter.
that occupants of the estate. The petitioner also seeks for In a series of cases previously passed upon by this Court,
the issuance of an order to compel the presiding judges of involving the same private respondents and property, and
the Courts of First Instance and Courts of Quezon City to occasioned by the congressional approval of the same
dismiss the cases of accion publiciana or for ejectment filed Republic Act No. 2616, it was definitively ruled that until the
by said Corporation again the aforesaid occupants. This proceedings for condemnation have been fully instituted and
action is predicated on the averment that on November 10, possession of the property is taken over by the condemnor,
1960, the Land Tenure Administration was directed by the the enforcement of final decrees of eviction may not be
Executive Secretary to initiate proceedings for the lawfully suspended. 5 Thus:
expropriation of the Tatalon Estate.
... the mere filing of the condemnation proceedings for the
Reliance is thus placed by petitioner upon the provisions of benefit of tenants can not, by itself alone, lawfully suspend
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 2616. There is no averment the condemnee's dominical rights, whether of possession,
however in the petition that any expropriation proceedings enjoyment or disposition. And this is especially the case
has in fact been actually instituted before the courts. In view where final and executory judgments of ejectment have been
of recent developments, since the submission of this case, obtained against the occupants of the property. (Tuason and
the parties were required on November 24, 1972, to Co. Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration, L-18128, Dec. 26,
comment whether or not in their view, the case has been 1961).
rendered moot. In the comment of respondent Gregorio
Araneta, Inc. said party stated that, while a "preliminary
As heretofore adverted to nothing has been presented in the
conference" has been held between the People's Homesite
case at bar, to show that an action for expropriation of the
& Housing Corporation and the respondent, on the unsold
lots allegedly occupied by the 1,500 persons named in
lots within the Tatalon Estate, which may still be acquired by
Annex "A" of the petition has actually been instituted and is
the government for distribution to the bona-fide occupants
being pursued by the government, nor is there proof that the
thereof pursuant to Republic Act No. 2616, said party
supposed appropriated amount of P10,000,000.00, for the
"cannot determine the outcome of the announced desire of
purchase of the Tatalon Estate by the government, has been
the Government to acquire said property pursuant to said
duly certified as available for that purpose. Under such
law."
circumstances no valid ground has really been established
to restrict respondents' exercise of their dominical rights over
In the absence of any proceeding for expropriation instituted their property.
before the courts, petitioner has clearly no cause of action. It
is true that Republic Act No. 2616, insofar as it expropriated
In view of the conclusion thus arrived at, We find it
singularly a particular private property, had survived the
unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised by the
challenge of being discriminatory, and was declared free
respondents.
from constitutional infirmity. 1 Nevertheless, this Court has
also ruled that Section 4 2 thereof, which places a restraint
upon the exercise and enjoyment by the owner of certain WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed, without
rights over its property, is justifiable only if the government costs.
takes possession of the land and is in a position to make a
coetaneous payment of just compensation to its owner. 3
Manotok v. NHA 150 SCRA 89 (1987) F: Petitioners are the
There could not be any other way by which the validity of the
owners of two large estates known as the Tambunting
provision may be sustained. Definitely, to hold that the mere
Estate and Sunog-Apog in Tondo, Manila, both of which
declaration of an intention to expropriate, without instituting
were declared expropriated in two decrees issued by
the corresponding proceeding therefor before the courts,
President Marcos, PD 1669 and PD 1670. The petitioners
with assurance of just compensation, would already preclude
contend that the decrees violate their constitutional right to
the exercise by the owner of his rights of ownership over the
due process and equal protection since by their mere
land, or bar the enforcement of any final ejectment order that
passage their properties were automatically expropriated
the owner may have obtained against any intruder into the
and they were immediately deprived of the ownership and
land, is to sanction an act which is indeed confiscatory and
possession thereof without being given the chance to
therefore offensive to the Constitution. For it must be
oppose such expropriation. The government on the other
realized that in a condemnation case, it is from the
hand contends that the power of eminent domain is inherent
condemnor's taking possession of the property that the
in the State and when the legislature or the President
owner is deprived of the benefits of ownership, 4 such as
through his law-making powers exercises this power, the
possession, management and disposition thereof. Before
public use and public necessity of the expropriation and the
that time, the proprietary right of the owner over his property
fixing of the just compensation become political in nature
must be recognized.
and the courts must respect the decision. HELD: The
challenged decrees are unfair in the procedures adopted
and the powers given to the NHA. The Tambunting
subdivision is summarily proclaimed a blighted area and
directly expropriated by decree without the slightest
semblance of a hearing or any proceeding whatsoever. The
expropriation is instant and automatic to take effect
immediately upon the signing of the decree. No deposit
before the taking is required. There is not provision for any
interest to be paid upon unpaid installments. Not only are the
owners given absolutely no opportunity to contest the
expropriation, or question the amount of payments fixed by
the decree, but the decision of the NHA are expressly
declared beyond judicial review. PD 1669 and 1670 are
declared unconstitutional. Teehankee, CJ, concurring: The
judgment at bar now learly overturns the majority ruling in
JM Tuason v. LTA that the power of Congress to designate
the particular property to be taken adn how much may be
condemned thereof must be duly recognized, leaving only as
a judicial question whether in the exercise of such
competence, the party adversely affected is the victim of
partiality and prejudice. The SC now rules that such singling
out of properties does not foreclose judicial scrutiny as to
whether such expropriation by legislative act transgresses
the due process and equal protection and just compensation
guarantees of the Constitution.
Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes 123 SCRA 220 F: The
Philippine Tourism Authority sought the expropriation of 282
Ha of land in Barangay Malubog and Babag in Cebu City.
upon deposit of an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of
the property, the CFI authorized the PTA to take immediate
possession of the property. The charter of the PTA
authorizes it to acquire through condemnation proceedings
lands for tourist zone development of a sports complex. The
petitioners who are occupants of the lands, filed a petition for
certiorari in the SC. They contended that (1) the taking was
not for public use; (2) the land was covered by the land
reform program; and (3) expropriation would impair the
obligation of contracts. HELD: The concept of public use is
not limited to traditional purposes for the construction of
roads, bridges, and the like. The idea that "public use"
means "use by the public" has been discarded. As long as
the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of
eminent domain comes into play. It is accurate to state then
that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for
the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.
The petititioners have not shown that the area being
developed is land reform area and that the affected persons
have been given emancipation patents and certificates of
land transfer. The contract clause has never been regarded
as a barrier to the exercise of the police power and likewise
eminent domain.
De Knecht v. Bautista 100 SCRA 660 (1980) F: The plan to
extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard to be ultimately linked to
the Cavite Coastal Road Project, originally called for the
expropriation of properties along Cuneta Avenue in Pasay
City. Later on, however, the Ministry of Public Highways
decided to make the proposed extension pass through
Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. Because of the protests
of residents of the latter, the Commission on Human
Settlements recommended the reversion to the original plan,
but the Ministry argued the new route withh save the
government P2 million. The government filed expropriation
proceedings against the owners of Fernando Rein and Del
Pan streets, among whom was petitioner. HELD: The choice
of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets is arbitrayr and should
not receive judicial aprpoval. The Human Settlements
Commission concluded that the cost factor is so minimal that
it can be disregarded in making a choice between the two
lines. The factor of functionality strongly militates against the
choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets, while the
factor of social and economic impact bears grievously on the
residents of Cuneta Avenue. While the issue would seem to
boil down to a choice between people, on one hand, and
progress and development, on the other, it is to be
remembered that progress and development are carried out
for the benefit of the people
Republic v. De Knecht, 182 SCRA 142 (1990) F: De
Knecht was one of the owners of several properties along
the Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets which the Government
sought to expropriate to give way to the extension of EDSA
and the construction of drainage facilities. De Knecht filed a
case to restrain the Government from proceeding with the
expropriation. Her prayer was denied by the lower court but
upon certiorari, the SC reversed the lower court decision and
granted the relief asked for by De Knecht ruling that the
expropriation was arbitrary. The case was remanded to the
lower court. No further action was taken despite the SC
decision until two years later, in 1983, when the Government
moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the
Legislature has since enacted BP 340 expropriating the
same properties for the same purpose. The lower court
denied tthe motion. Appeal. RULING: While it is true that
said final judgment of this Curt on the subject becomes the
law of the case between the parties, it is equally true that the
right of petitioner to take private properties for public use
upon payment of just compensation is so provided in the
Constitution and the laws. Such expropriation proceeding
may be undertaken by the petitioner not only by voluntary
negotiation with the land owners but also by taking
appropriate court action or by legislation. When BP 340 was
passed, it appears that it was based on supervening events
that occured after the 1980 decision of the SC on the De
Knecht case was rendered. The social impact factor which
persuaded the Court to consider this extension to be
arbitrary had disappeared. Moreover, the said decision is no
obstacle to the legislative arm of the Government in
thereafter making its own independent assessment of the
circumstances then pravailing as to the propriety of
undertaking the expropriation of properties in question and
thereafter by enacting the corresponding legislation as it did
in this case. The Court agrees in the wisdom and necessity
of enacting BP 340. Thus the anterior decision of the Court
must yield to the subsequent legislative fiat
NAPOCOR v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991) F: For the
construction of its 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines,
Napocor''s lines have to pass the lands belonging to
respondents. Unsuccessful with its negotiations for the
acquisition of the right of way easements, Napocor was
constrained to file eminent domain proceedings. ISSUE:
W/N petitoner should be made to pay simple easement fee
or full compensation for the land traversed by its transmissin
lines. RULING: In RP v. PLDT, the SC ruled that "Normally,
the power of eminent domain results in the taking or
appropriation of the title to, and possession of, the
expropriated property, but no cogent reason appears why
said power may not be availed of to impose only a burrden
upon the owner of the condemned property, without loss of
title or possession. It is unquestionable that real property
may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of
right of way." In this case, the easement is definitely a taking
under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature
and effect of the installation of the transmission lines, the
limitations imposed by the NPC against the use of the land
(that no plant higher than 3 meters is allowed below the
lines) for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of
ts ordinary use. For these reasons, the owner of the property
expropriated is entitled to a just compensation which should
neither be more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the
assessment, than the money equivalent of said property.
Just equiivalent has always been understood to be the just
and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the
thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the
expropriation. The price or value of the land and its character
at the time of taking by the Govt. are the criteria for
determining just cmpensation.
Due process
G.R. No. L-65848 May 24, 1985
HERNANDO C. LAYNO, SR., petitioner
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, and THE HONORABLE
TANODBAYAN, respondents.
The validity of the mandatory provision of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, 1 suspending from office any public
officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under such statute, is assailed in this certiorari
and prohibition proceeding on the ground that it is violative of
the constitutional presumption of innocence. 2 Petitioner
Hernando Layno Sr.. is the duly elected Municipal Mayor of
Lianga, Surigao del Sur. He was accused in an information
filed by respondent Tanodbayan "of grave abuse of authority
and evident bad faith in the exercise of his official and/or
administrative duties" for "knowing fully well that he has no
authority," he suspended and prohibited Vice-Mayor
Bernardita Resus and three Sangguniang Bayan members 3
from participating and exercising their official functions" as
such thus causing them injury "consisting of the salaries due
to said officials not [being] received by them." 4
The information against petitioner was filed by respondent
Tanodbayan with respondent Sandiganbayan on May 17,
1983. 5 He was charged with violating paragraph (e), Section
3 of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended. 6 Petitioner was
then arraigned on October 3, 1983, and he pleaded not
guilty. 7 There was earlier submitted as far back as August,
1983 with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Suspend Accused
Pendente Lite. 8 Notwithstanding petitioner's opposition to
such motion, respondent Sandiganbayan suspended him on
October 26, 1983. 9 Accordingly, on October 3, 4 and 5,
1983, respondent Sandiganbayan conducted hearings and
received evidence of the prosecution. 10 It was further
alleged that respondent Sandiganbayan (Second Division)
set the case for further hearings on January 11, 12, and 13,
1984. 11
In the resolution issued by this Court on January 5, 1984,
respondents were required to file an answer within ten days
from notice. That was done. There was on the whole
admission that the facts were as alleged. Respondents
denied, however, that the law is as set forth in the petition.
More specifically, it was asserted that the order of the
Sandiganbayan "suspending petitioner pendente lite does
not violate the latter's constitutional right to be presumed
innocent." 12 Such a presumption "is a guaranty that no
person shall be convicted of a crime except upon his guilt
[being] established by proof beyond reasonable doubt." 13
Accordingly, such suspension "does not impair petitioner's
foregoing constitutional right since the same is not a penalty
or a criminal punishment, because it was not imposed by the
court in a judgment of conviction or as a result of judicial
proceeding." 14 Further: "The suspension is merely a
precautionary or preventive measure issued even before the
case is tried on its merits, purposely to ensure the fair and
just trial of the case." 15
The plea for restraining order was not granted by this Court.
Thereafter the memoranda by both parties were submitted.
Before a decision could be rendered on the merits, there
was an urgent motion to lift the order of suspension filed on
February 13, 1985 stressing the need for a resolution of
such question. This Court, after dealing on such motion as
wen as on the merits of the case, is of the view that this
petition need not be resolved by a ruling on the validity of the
provision on mandatory suspension. It suffices at this stage
that this Court rules that there is an unconstitutional
application of the assailed provision of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
1. A succinct statement of the doctrine on unconstitutional could in effect, be removed without a finding of a cause duly
application was set forth in Pintacasi v. Court of Agrarian established after due hearing, in violation of the
Relations 16 in these words: "A law may be valid and yet Constitution." 21 Clearly then, the policy of the law mandated
susceptible to the charge of its being unconstitutionally by the Constitution frowns at a suspension of indefinite
applied." 17 This is one such case. duration. In this particular case, the mere fact that petitioner
is facing a charge under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act does not justify a different rule of law. To do so would be
2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga,
to negate the safeguard of the equal protection guarantee.
Surigao del Sur. His term of office does not expire until 1986.
Were it not for this information and the suspension decreed
by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and 4. Hence the conclusion reached by the Court as to the
Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in unconstitutional application of the mandatory suspension as
the full discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor. applied to petitioner in accordance with the circumstances of
He was elected precisely to do so. As of October 26, 1983, this case.
he has been unable to. It is a basic assumption of the
electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the
WHEREFORE, this certiorari petition is granted and the
people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their
preventive suspension imposed on petitioner Hernando C.
choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could,
Layno, Sr. is set aside, thus enabling him to assume once
of course, be proceeded against administratively or, as in
again the functions of municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao
this instance, criminally. In either case, his culpability must
del Sur, without prejudice to the continuance of the trial of
be established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is
the pending case against him in the Sandiganbayan. This
entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. A
decision is immediately executory. No costs.
preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance,
however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due
process question. For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. No. L-63915. April 24, 1985
Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered
by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted FACTS:
likewise on the people of Lianga. They were deprived of the Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent
services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the
that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
continuance of this preventive suspension had outrun the instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive
bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial orders, letters of implementation and administrative orders.
of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an Respondents, through the Solicitor General would have this
unconstitutional application that the order of suspension case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have
should be lifted. no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition.
The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing
that the petitioner are personally and directly affected or
3. Nor is it solely the denial of procedural due process that is
prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential
apparent. There is likewise an equal protection question. If
issuances in question.
the case against petitioner Layno were administrative in
Respondent further contend that publication in the Official
character the Local Government Code would be applicable.
Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity
It is therein clearly provided that while preventive suspension
of the law where the law themselves provides for their own
is allowable for the causes therein enumerated, there is this
effectivity dates.
emphatic limitation on the duration thereof: "In all cases,
preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days
ISSUES:
after the start of said suspension." 18 It may be recalled that
Whether the presidential decrees in question which contain
the principle against indefinite suspension applies equally to
special provisions as to the date they are to take effect,
national government officials. So it was held in the leafing
publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for
case of Garcia v. Hon. Executive Secretary. 19 According to
their effectivity?
the opinion of Justice Barrera: "To adopt the theory of
respondents that an officer appointed by the President,
RULING:
facing administrative charges, can be preventively
Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those
suspended indefinitely, would be to countenance a situation
cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its
where the preventive suspension can, in effect, be the
effectivity date, for then the date of publication is material for
penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due hearing,
determining its date of effectivity, which is the 15th day
contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution and the
following its publication, but not when the law itself provides
Civil Service law." 20 Further: "In the guise of a preventive
for the date when it goes into effect.
suspension, his term of office could be shortened and he
Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in
the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the
date of its effectivity.
The publication of all presidential issuances of a public
nature or of general applicability is mandated by law.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose
burdens on the people, such as tax revenue measures, fall
within this category. Other presidential issuances which
apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published
on the assumption that they have been circularized to all
concern.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of
general application, which have not been published, shall
have no force and effect.
G.R. No. L-35701 September 19, 1973
ARTURO H. TROCIO, petitioner-appellant, vs. JORGE
LABAYO, Undersecretary of Finance; SIXTO B. TADEO,
Assistant Provincial Treasurer of Misamis Oriental; and
ABELARDO SUBIDO, Commissioner of Civil Service,
respondents-appellees.
The novel question in this case certified to us by the Court of
Appeals is whether or not a party is denied his constitutional right
to procedural due process if in the notice of the hearing the suit
filed by him, it was not specified that the purpose thereof was for a
pre-trial. There is no instrinsic difficulty posed by such a query.
The answer would appear to be rather obvious. Such a purely
formal objection is hardly impressed with any element indicative
of that absence of fairness which is indispensable for an attack on a
due process ground to succeed. The failure of the lower court then
to use language more explicit in character does not lend itself to
such a reproach. The order of dismissal for failure of petitioner
Arturo H. Trocio, now appellant, to prosecute, is affirmed. law libr
There is no dispute as to what transpired. On August 11, 1964,
petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
against respondents' 1 to set aside decision of respondent Abelardo
Subido dismissing him from the position of Municipal Treasurer of
Mambajao, Camiguin, which is being enforced by the other
respondents on the ground of its nullity. It was his contention that
the charges against him for neglect of duty, grave misconduct and
oppression in office were not duly proved, there being a denial of a
motion for postponement on his part, thus infecting the
proceedings with grave infirmity. There was, on August 15, 1964,
a written opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, and on August 27, 1964, an answer to such petition
wherein it was stressed that petitioner had been granted by the
investigating officer six postponements of the hearing of the case
to afford him a chance to engage the services of counsel. Then
came on September 10, 1964, a notice to the parties that the case
had been set for hearing on October 14 of that year, a copy thereof
being served on petitioner's counsel. Upon that case being called 2. There is an additional reinforcement to the correctness of the
on that date, there was a motion on the part of petitioner's counsel challenged order of dismissal, when the nature of a pre-trial is
to set the case for pre-trial. The provincial fiscal who represented taken into consideration. 7 As set forth in an opinion penned by
the respondents informed the Court that he was ready for the pre- Justice Castro, speaking for the Court, in Permanent Concrete
trial but, if no amicable agreement was reached, the trial proper Products, Inc. v. Teodoro: 8 " "One of the objectives of pre-trial
should be conducted, as his witnesses had come all the way from procedure is to take trial of cases out of the realm of surprise and
Manila and expenses in the amount of about P400.00 had been maneuvering." Pre-trial is primarily intended to make certain that
incurred by the government. Counsel for petitioner was adamant, all issues necessary to the disposition of a cause are properly
however, insisting that the notice of hearing as such was null and raised. Thus, to obviate the element of surprise, parties are
void. When the Court inquired as to where the petitioner was, expected to disclose at a pre-trial conference all issues of law and
counsel answered that he was in Cebu City, upon his own advice, fact which they intend to raise at the trial, except such as may
on the assumption that a hearing on the merits could not be held. involve privilege or impeaching matter." 9 The lower court
From the standpoint of the court, this step taken by petitioner therefore acted in accordance with law and sound reason when it
smacked of a dilatory tactic, as evidenced by its being raised only noted that the facts being undisputed and the legal issue likewise
on that morning, notwithstanding the fact that notice was sent as being clear, pre-trial, under the circumstances, would not be a
far back as September 10, 1964 and that at any rate, petitioner not necessity even on the assumption that the belated insistence of its
being present, a pre-trial could not anyway be held. Moreover, the observance by petitioner was motivated in entire good faith. law li
notification as worded did not preclude a pre-trial, which
incidentally was not at all necessary as the question posed was
The suspicion entertained by the lower court as to its being
legal. Hence the order of dismissal, based on what for the lower
resorted to as a dilatory tactic by petitioner was not without basis.
court, under the circumstances, was a lack of interest to prosecute
He had more than a month, from September 9 to October 14, 1966,
the case.c law library
to seek clarification of the nature of the scheduled hearing. What
was even more revealing as to his lack of good faith was his
The matter was elevated to the Court of Appeals on the ground that absence on the day of hearing. What was the lower court to make
there was a denial of procedural due process as the notice of the of such tell-tale conduct? Did it not indicate lack of interest to
hearing without the specification that it should be for pre-trial prosecute? There was nothing then, that did smack of arbitrariness
deprived the accused of a procedural right and infected the in its ruling as it did. There was no affront to the sense of justice
proceedings with unfairness. As the question raised was purely and of fair play which is essential for an assault on any actuation of
legal, the case, as noted at the outset, was elevated to us. law librar governmental agency predicated on a denial of due process
succeed. Instead of this futile insistence on a pre-trial, which would
serve no useful purpose, petitioner could have impressed on the
There is no legal justification then, as already made clear, for us to
court the legal support for his stand that the order of dismissal by
give our seal of approval to the contention vigorously pressed by
respondent Commissioner of Civil Service was devoid of legality.
petitioner that there was a denial of procedural due process. In
He did nothing of the kind. Under the undeniable facts of record,
reaching such a conclusion, we were aided considerably by the
the lower court certainly could have decreed the dismissal without
thorough brief submitted by the then Solicitor General, now
any legitimate fear that its order suffers from the constitutional
Associate Justice, Antonio P. Barredo and the then Assistant
infirmity of failure to accord respect to the due process safeguard.
Solicitor General, now judge, Pacifico de Castro, the persuasive
quality of which was enhanced not only by the plausibility of the
assertions made with support from authoritative doctrines, but also WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court of October 14, 1964
by the failure of petitioner to file a reply brief. law library dismissing the petition is affirmed. With costs against petitioner.
1. No merit attaches to the contention of petitioner that the notice
as to the hearing scheduled for October 14 should specify that it
was for a pre-trial. A hearing as known to the law is not confined
to a trial but embraces the several stages of litigation. It does not
preclude pre-trial. Outside of the American cases cited 2 by
respondents, mention can be made of authorities in this jurisdiction
that speak to the same effect. A hearing "does not necessarily mean
presentation of evidence." 3 It could cover the determination of
whether an accused is entitled to bail 4 or the submission for the
court's determination of a motion to dismiss, 5 or any motion for
that matter. 6 It does not admit of doubt then, considering
furthermore what did transpire, that such a purely technical
objection on the part of petitioner raised at the last moment should
not be taken too seriously. Much less does it lay any basis for an
asserted denial of procedural due
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