THIRD DIVISION unlawfully and feloniously shot [sic] the victim, Rey Perfecto C.
de Luna,
G.R. No. 210710, July 27, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LUISITO
GABORNE Y CINCO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision  of the Court of Appeals
1
(CA) dated 29 July 2013 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01183, affirming the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33, Calbiga, Samar
which found appellant Luisito Gaborne y Cinco guilty of the crime of Murder
with the use of Unlicensed Firearm, as defined in Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) as amended by Sec. 6 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659,
and Frustrated Murder as defined in Article 248 in relation to Article 50 of
the RPC, respectively.
Together with two others, appellant was charged with Murder with the use
of Unlicensed Firearm and Frustrated Murder in the following Informations:
Criminal Case No. CC-2007-1650
That on or about the 2nd day of February 2007, at about 11:00 o'clock in
the evening more or less, at Brgy. Mugdo, Hinabangan, Samar, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above -named
accused, conspiring, confederating, mutually helping one another, with
deliberate intent to kill, and with treachery and evident premeditation,
which qualify the offense into murder, did there, willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, shot (sic) Sixto Elizan y Herrera, with the use of an unlicensed
firearm a caliber [.]45 pistol, a special aggravating circumstance pursuant
to RA 8294, which accused have provided themselves for the purpose,
thereby hitting and inflicting upon the said Sixto Elizan y Herrera fatal gun
shot wounds on the different parts of his body, which gun shot wounds
caused his instantaneous death.3chanrobleslaw
Criminal Case No. CC-2007-1650
That on or about the 2nd day of February 2007, at around 11:00 o'clock in
the evening more or less, at Brgy. Mugdo, Municipality of Hinabangan,
Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above named accused, conspiring, confederating, mutually
helping one another, with deliberate intent to kill, and with treachery,
which qualifies the offense to murder, did, then and there, willfully,
with the use of a caliber [.]45 pistol, an unlicensed firearm, a special
aggravating circumstance pursuant to Rep. Act No. 8294, with which the
accused have provided themselves for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon
the victim the following wounds, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Gun shot wound (R) back penetrating (R) chest, lacerating diaphragm, (R)
lobe of the liver, thru and thru and greater omentum with massive
hemoperitoneum
Gun shot wound (R) para spinal area at L2 penetrating abdomen
perforating ileum thru and thru
thus, accused have performed all the acts of execution which should have
produced the crime of murder as a consequence but which nevertheless did
not produce it by reason of some cause independent of the will of the
accused, that is, the timely medical treatment/intervention rendered to the
victim at Saint Paul's Hospital, Tacloban City.4
On arraignment, appellant entered a plea of NOT GUILTY5 for both charges.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
The Facts
The antecedent facts culled from the Appellee's Brief6 and the records of
the case are summarized as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryOn 2 February 2007 at around 10:30 in the
evening, Rey Perfecto%De Luna (De Luna) and Sixto Elizan7 (Elizan)
entered a videoke bar8 at Barangay Mugdo, Hinabangan, Samar.9 Noli
Abayan (Abayan), appellant and Joselito Bardelas (Bardelas) followed five
minutes thereafter.10chanrobleslaw
While Elizan and De Luna were drinking, singing and merely having fun,
four successive gunshots11 were fired through the window. Because of this,
Elizan and De Luna were hit from behind.12 Later on, De Luna13 and
Marialinisa Pasana14 (Pasana) saw appellant, who was then wearing a black
t-shirt and a black cap, holding a gun aimed at their location. Pasana also
saw accused-appellant and Bardelas escape after the
incident.15chanrobleslaw
Elizan and De Luna were brought to St. Paul's Hospital at Tacloban
City.16 Unfortunately, Elizan was pronounced dead upon arrival. De Luna,
on the other hand, survived.17chanrobleslaw
Appellant steadfastly denied the accusations. According to him, he and his
companions ordered for bottles of beer. However, when they tried to order
for more bottles, the waitress refused to give them their order unless they
pay for their previous orders first.18 While Abayan was explaining to the
father of the owner of the videoke bar, appellant and Bardelas went out to
urinate,19 however, the waitress locked the front door.20 While standing
outside, he heard the waitress utter the words, "If you will not pay, I [will]
have you killed, all of you, right this moment.21 He also consistently
contend that it was a man wearing black shirt and camouflage pants who
fired shots to the videoke bar22, not him.
The following day, appellant and Bardelas were arrested and underwent
paraffin test.23chanrobleslaw
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On 12 March 2010, the RTC rendered a joint judgment finding accused-
appellant guilty of the two (2) charges of Murder with the use of Unlicensed
Firearm and Frustrated Murder. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [c]ourt finds the co-
accused LUISITO GABORNE y CINCO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT as principal in the crimes of:
 
A. Murder with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm under Art. 248 of the
Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No. CC-2007-1640 and
considering the presence of one (1) aggravating circumstance
without any mitigating circumstance to offset it, hereby sentences
him to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA; to pay the
Heirs of Sixto Elisan y Herrera Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity for
his death; Php50,000.00 in moral damages and Php25,000.00 in
exemplary damages and to pay the costs of this suit.
B. Frustrated Murder penalized under Art. 248 in relation to Art. 50 of
the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No. CC-2007-1650 and
considering the presence of one (1) aggravating circumstance
without any mitigating circumstance to offset it hereby sentences
him to suffer imprisonment of an indeterminate penalty ranging
from ELEVEN (11) YEARS of Prision Mayor as minimum to
EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS of Reclusion Temporal as maximum, to pay
Perfecto de Luna Php264,866.58 as civil liability without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of this suit.
The accused who underwent preventive imprisonment since February 3,
2007 shall be credited with the full time during which he was deprived of
his liberty if he agreed voluntarily and in writing to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners otherwise he will be
entitled to only four-fifths (4/5) thereof.
Because the prosecution absolutely failed to prove guilt of accused NOLI
ABAYAN y LARGABO and co-accused JOSELITO BARDELAS y
BACNOTAN from the instant criminal charges, they are ACQUITTED in
these cases. No civil liability is assessed against them.
Because the said accused are detained, the Provincial Warden of Samar are
hereby ordered to release the said accused from detention unless they are
held for some-other cause or ground.24
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA found no merit in appellant's arguments. It pointed out that
appellant is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest as it was
raised for the first time on appeal.25cralawred Thus, the appellate court was
fully convinced that there is no ground to deviate from the findings of the
RTC. The dispositive portion of the decision reads
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The Joint Judgment
dated March 12, 2010 rendered by Branch 33, Regional Trial Court of
Calbiga, Samar, 8th Judicial Region in Criminal Case Nos. [CC-] 2007-1640
and [CC-]2007-1650 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as to
the award of damages, to wit:
1. The award of civil indemnity in Criminal Case No.
[CC-]2007-1640 is affirmed;
2. The award of moral damages in the amount of
Php50,000.00 in Criminal Case No. [CC-]2007-1640 is
affirmed;
3. The award of exemplary damages in the amount of
Php25,000.00 in Criminal Case No. [CC-]2007-1640 is
affirmed;
4. In Criminal Case No. [CC-]2007-1650, accused-appellant
is ordered to pay moral damages to the private offended
party, Rey Perfecto De Luna, in the amount of
Php40,000.00;
5. In Criminal Case No. [CC-]2007-1650, accused appellant
is likewise ordered to pay exemplary damages to the
private offended party, Rey Perfecto De Luna, in the
amount of Php20,000.00; and cralawlawlibrary
 6. Accussed-appellant is further ordered to additionally pay
the private offended parties in the two criminal cases,
Rey Perfecto De Luna and the heir/s of Sixto Elizan,
interest on all damages at the legal rate of six percent
(6%) from the date of finality of this judgment until the
amounts awarded shall have been fully paid.26
Appellant appealed the decision of the CA. The Notice of Appeal was given
due course and the records were ordered elevated to this Court for review.
In a Resolution27 dated 19 February 2014, this Court required the parties to
submit their respective supplemental briefs. Both parties manifested that
they are adopfing all the arguments contained in their respective briefs in
lieu of filing supplemental briefs.28chanrobleslaw
Our Ruling
We find that the degree of proof required in criminal cases has been met in
the case at bar. Appellant's defenses of denial and alibi are bereft of merit.
Assailing the legality of arrest should
be made before entering a plea
Before anything else, we resolve the procedural issue raised by the
appellant.29chanrobleslaw
Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the
court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made
before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.30 In
People v. Velasco,31 this Court held that the accused is estopped from
assailing the legality of his arrest for his failure to move for the quashal of
the Information before arraignment. In this case, appellant only questioned
the legality of his arrest for the first time on appeal.32chanrobleslaw
Furthermore, even granting that indeed there has been an irregularity in
the arrest of the appellant, it is deemed cured by his voluntary submission
to the jurisdiction of the trial court over his person.33 Thus, appellant is
deemed to have waived his constitutional protection against illegal
arrest34 when he actively participated in the arraignment35 and trial of this
case.36chanrobleslaw
Elements of Murder and Frustrated
Murder were established
This Court finds that the circumstance of treachery should be appreciated,
qualifying the crime to Murder. According to the Revised Penal Code:
ARTICLE 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions
of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be
punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength,
with the aid of armed men, or employing means to
weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or
afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion,
shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault
upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by
means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other
means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the
preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a
volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other
public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting
the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his
person or corpse.
Thus, the elements of murder are: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that
the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of
the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (4)
that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.37chanrobleslaw
Furthermore, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make.38chanrobleslaw
The requisites of treachery are:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) The employment of means method, or manner of execution which
will ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or
retaliating acts on the part of the victim, no opportunity being
given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and
(2) Deliberate or conscious adoption of such means, method, or Pasana's testimony:
manner of execution.39
   
In this case, the hapless victims were merely drinking and singing in-front
of the videoke machine when shot by the appellant. The firing was so Q: Can you recall who among the five (5) went out?
sudden and swift that they had no opportunity to defend themselves or to
retaliate. Furthermore, appellant's acts of using a gun and even going out A: Yes, Ma'am.
of the videoke bar evidently show that he consciously adopted means to
ensure the execution of the crime.    

Q: Of the two (2) among the five (5) who went out, are these two (2)
In addition, the lower courts appropriately found appellant liable for the
people or persons here in court right now?
crime of Frustrated Murder.
A: Yes, Ma'am.
A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution
which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless,    
do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.40chanrobleslaw Q: And who are these two (2) persons you are referring to, can you
point it out to the Honorable Court if they are here in [c]ourt right
Dr. Angel Cordero M.D. categorically said that De Luna could have died now?
because of the wounds if the surgery was not conducted timely.41 Hence,
A: That person, Ma'am.
appellant performed all the acts of execution which could have produced
the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it    
by reason of a cause independent of his will, which is, in this case, the
timely and able medical attendance rendered to De Luna. Interpreter: Witness, Your Honor, is pointing to a person who earlier
identified himself as Luisito Gaborne.
The defense of denial cannot be given
more weight over a witness'positive    
identification
xxxx
Appellant denies the accusations on the ground that he has no motive to    
kill Elizan and injure De Luna. This alibi is bereft of merit. Intent is not
synonymous with motive. Motive alone is not a proof and is hardly ever an Q: Point specifically, who among those persons?
essential element of a crime.42 As a general rule, proof of motive for the
commission of the offense charged does not show guilt and absence of A: That person, Ma'am.
proof of such motive does not establish the innocence of accused for the
crime charged such as murder.43 In Kummer v. Peopled44 this Court held    
that motive is irrelevant when the accused has been positively identified by
Interpreter: Witness, Your Honor, is pointing to a person who identified
an eyewitness.
himself earlier as Luisito Gaborne.46
Evidently, accused-appellant's intent to kill was established beyond    
reasonable doubt. This can be seen from his act of shooting Elizan and De
Luna from behind with a firearm while they were innocently singing and De Luna's Testimony:
drinking. Intent to kill was also manifest considering the number of gun
shot wounds sustained by the victims.45chanrobleslaw    

Q: How about the appearance of the guy whom you said holding a
In the instant case, Pasana and De Luna positively identified accused-
gun, can you recall?
appellant as the person who fired shots during the
incident:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A: I can recall him if he is inside the court, ma'am.
   
Q: Can you point it out to the court, the other guy whom you saw at
the videoke bar?
A: Yes, ma'am, if I can go with him in a short distance, I can point
him.
Q: Can you point him?
A: (The witness stood up and approach (sic) the accused' bench and
pointed to a person and when asked his name answered to (sic):
Luisito Gaborne)
   
Q: You said that there was also another guy by the window? (the court
butt-in [sic])
   
THE COURT:
   
Q: Excuse me, this man who answered Luisito Gaborne was the one
holding the fire arm?
A: Yes, your Honor.47
This Court gives the highest respect to the RTC's evaluation of the
testimony of the witnesses, considering its unique position in directly
observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its vantage point,
the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of
witnesses.48chanrobleslaw
It is doctrinally entrenched in our jurisprudence49 that the defense of denial
is inherently weak because it can easily be fabricated. Such defense
becomes unworthy of merit if it is established only by the accused
themselves and not by credible persons. Thus, this Court agrees with the
lower courts in giving the positive identification of the eyewitnesses more
weight than appellant's defense of denial.
Paraffin Tests are not conclusive
The positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses bears more
weight than the negative paraffin test result conducted the day after the
incident.
Paraffin tests, in general-, have been rendered inconclusive by this Court.
Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test was extremely
unreliable for use. It can only establish the presence or absence of nitrates
or nitrites on the hand; however, the test alone cannot determine whether
the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm; The
presence of nitrates should be taken only as an indication of a possibility or
even of a probability but not of infallibility that a person has fired a gun,
since nitrates are also admittedly found in substances other than
gunpowder.50chanrobleslaw
In this case, prosecution witness, Pasana51 and the victim himself, De
Luna,52 testified in the trial court that it was indeed the appellant who was
holding the gun during the incident. It should also be considered that
appellant was arrested the day after the incident.53 Thus, it is possible for
appellant to fire a gun and yet bear no traces of nitrate or gunpowder as
when the hands are bathed in perspiration or washed
afterwards.54chanrobleslaw
Corpus delicti of the crime can be
established by testimony
With regard to the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of the use
of an unlicensed firearm, we agree with the trial court and the appellate
court that the same must be appreciated in the instant case. In People v.
Lualhati, this Court ruled that in crimes involving unlicensed firearm, the
prosecution has the burden of proving the elements thereof, which are: (1)
the existence of the subject firearm and (2) the fact that the accused who
owned or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding license or
permit to possess the same.55chanrobleslaw
Appellant's contention that the corpus delicti was not established for the
reason that the firearm used was not presented as evidence is not
persuasive. In People v. Orehuela,56 this Court held that the existence of
the firearm can be established by testimony, even without the presentation
of the said firearm. In the present case, the testimonies of Pasana and De
Luna indubitably demonstrated the existence of the firearms. Furthermore,
the certification57 from the Philippine National Police that appellant is not a
firearm license holder of any caliber proves that he is not licensed to
possess the same. Thus, the prosecution was able to prove the existence of
the firearm and that the appellant is not licensed to possess the same
notwithstanding the fact that the firearm used was not presented as
evidence.
Illegal Possession of Firearm as an
aggravating circumstance
in the crimes of Murder and
Frustrated Murder
The CA appropriately appreciated the use of an unlicensed firearm as an
aggravating circumstance in the crimes of Murder and Frustrated Murder.
Under R.A. No. 1059, use of loose firearm in the commission of a crime,
like murder, shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.58chanrobleslaw
In view of the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 8294 and R.A. No.
10591, to Presidential Decree No. 1866, separate prosecutions for
homicide and illegal possession are no longer in order. Instead, illegal
possession of firearm is merely to be taken as an aggravating circumstance
in the crime of murder.59 It is clear from the foregoing that where murder
results from the use of an unlicensed firearm, the crime is not qualified
illegal possession but, murder. In such a case, the use of the unlicensed
firearm is not considered as a separate crime but shall be appreciated as a
mere aggravating circumstance. Thus, where murder was committed, the
penalty for illegal possession of firearms is no longer imposable since it
becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance.60 The intent of
Congress is to treat the offense of illegal possession of firearm and the
commission of homicide or murder with the use of unlicensed firearm as a
single offense.61chanrobleslaw
In the case at hand, since it was proven that accused-appellant was not a
licensed firearm holder,62 and that he was positively identified by the
witnesses as the one who fired shots against the victims, the use of an
unlicensed firearm in the commission of the crimes of Murder and
Frustrated Murder should be considered as an aggravating circumstance
thereof.
The presence of such aggravating circumstance would have merited
the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of Murder. However, in
view of R.A. No. 9346, we are mandated to impose on appellant the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Damages and civil liability
This Court resolves to modify the damages awarded by the appellate court
in line with the recent jurisprudence.63 Appellant shall pay the Heirs of
Sixto Elizan y Herrera P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as
moral damages, and PI00,000.00 as exemplary damages for the crime of
Murder with the use of Unlicensed Firearm.
Appellant shall also be liable to pay P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages for
the crime of Frustrated Murder. In addition, interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all monetary awards from
date of finality of this Judgment until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the 29 July 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01183 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant
LUISITO GABORNE Y CINCO is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Murder with the use of Unlicensed Firearm and shall suffer a
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility for parole and shall pay
the Heirs of Sixto Elizan y Herrera P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P1
00,000.00 as moral damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
and of the crime of Frustrated Murder and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty ranging from eleven (11) years of Prision Mayor as
minimum, to eighteen (18) years of Reclusion Temporal as maximum and
shall pay P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages,
and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages.
All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until
fully paid.
In the service of his sentence, appellant, who is a detention prisoner, shall
be credited with the entire period of his preventive imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Reyes, and Perlas-
Bernabe,*JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 165483             September 12, 2006
RUJJERIC Z. PALAGANAS,1 petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For what is a man, what has he got?
If not himself, then he has naught.
To say the things he truly feels;
And not the words of one who kneels.
The record shows I took the blows -
And did it my way!
The song evokes the bitterest passions. This is not the first time the song "My
Way"2 has triggered violent behavior resulting in people coming to blows. In the case
at bar, the few lines of the song depicted what came to pass when the victims and the
aggressors tried to outdo each other in their rendition of the song.
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari3 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
petitioner Rujjeric Z. Palaganas prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22689 dated 30 September 2004,4 affirming with
modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, in Criminal Cases No. U-9608, U-9609, and U-9610 and U-9634, dated
28 October 1998,5 finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and two (2) counts of
Frustrated Homicide under Article 249 in relation to Articles 6 and 50 of the same
Code.
On 21 April 1998, petitioner and his older brother, Ferdinand Z. Palaganas
(Ferdinand), were charged under four (4) separate Informations6 for two (2) counts of
Frustrated Murder, one (1) count of Murder, and one (1) count for Violation of
COMELEC Resolution No. 29587 relative to Article 22, Section 261, of the Omnibus
Election Code,8 allegedly committed as follows:
accused having thus performed all the acts of execution which would have
produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but which nevertheless,
did not produce it by reason of the causes independent of the will of the
accused and that is due to the medical assistance rendered to said Michael
"Boying" Ferrer which prevented his death, to his damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY to Art. 248 in relation with Arts. 6 and 50, all of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-9610
That on or about January 16, 1998, in the evening at Poblacion, Manaoag,
Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused armed with an unlicensed firearm, with intent to kill,
treachery and evident premeditation, conspiring together, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot MELTON FERRER alias "TONY
FERRER", inflicting upon him mortal gunshot wounds in the head and right
thigh which caused the instantaneous death of said Melton "Tony" Ferrer,
to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.

CONTRARY to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.

CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-9608
7659.

That on or about January 16, 1998, in the evening at Poblacion, Manaoag,

CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-9634
Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused armed with an unlicensed firearm, with intent to kill,
treachery and evident premeditation, conspiring together, did then and there That on or about January 16, 1998 which is within the election period at
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot SERVILLANO FERRER, JR. y Poblacion, Manaoag, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this
Juanatas, inflicting upon him "gunshot wound penetrating perforating Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully,
abdomen, urinary bladder, rectum bullet sacral region," the accused having unlawfully and feloniously bear and carry one (1) caliber .38 without first
thus performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the securing the necessary permit/license to do the same.
crime of Murder as a consequence, but which nevertheless, did not produce
it by reason of the causes independent of the will of the accused and that is
CONTRARY to COMELEC RES. 2958 in relation with SEC. 261 of the
due to the timely medical assistance rendered to said Servillano J. Ferrer,
OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE, as amended.9 (Underscoring supplied.)
Jr. which prevented his death, to his damage and prejudice.

When arraigned on separate dates,10 petitioner and Ferdinand entered separate pleas

CONTRARY to Art. 248 in relation with Arts. 6 and 50, all of the Revised
of "Not Guilty." Upon motion of Ferdinand,11 the four cases were consolidated and
Penal Code, as amended.
were assigned to Branch 46 of the RTC in Urdaneta, Pangasinan.12

CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-9609

The factual antecedents as viewed by the prosecution, are summarized in the
Comment dated 18 April 2005 of the Office of the Solicitor General,13 to wit:
That on or about January 16, 1998, in the evening at Poblacion, Manaoag,
Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
On January 16, 1998, around 8:00 in the evening, brothers Servillano,
named accused armed with an unlicensed firearm, with intent to kill,
[Melton] and Michael, all surnamed Ferrer were having a drinking spree in
treachery and evident premeditation, conspiring together, did then and there
their house because [Melton], who was already living in San Fernando, La
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot MICHAEL FERRER alias "Boying
Union, visited his three brothers and mother at their house in Sitio Baloking,
Ferrer", inflicting upon him gunshot wound on the right shoulder, the
 Poblacion, Manaoag, Pangasinan. At 9:45 in the evening, the three brothers
decided to proceed to Tidbits Videoke bar located at the corner of Malvar
and Rizal Streets, Poblacion, Manaoag to continue their drinking spree and
to sing. Inside the karaoke bar, they were having a good time, singing and
drinking beer.
Thereafter, at 10:30 in the evening, Jaime Palaganas arrived together with
Ferdinand Palaganas and Virgilio Bautista. At that time, only the Ferrer
brothers were the customers in the bar. The two groups occupied separate
tables. Later, when Jaime Palaganas was singing, [Melton] Ferrer sang
along with him as he was familiar with the song [My Way]. Jaime however,
resented this and went near the table of the Ferrer brothers and said in
Pangasinan dialect "As if you are tough guys." Jaime further said "You are
already insulting me in that way." Then, Jaime struck Servillano Ferrer with
the microphone, hitting the back of his head. A rumble ensued between the
Ferrer brothers on the one hand, and the Palaganases, on the other hand.
Virgilio Bautista did not join the fray as he left the place. During the rumble,
Ferdinand went out of the bar. He was however pursued by Michael. When
Servillano saw Michael, he also went out and told the latter not to follow
Ferdinand. Servillano and Michael then went back inside the bar and
continued their fight with Jaime.
Meantime, Edith Palaganas, sister of Jaime and the owner of the bar,
arrived and pacified them. Servillano noticed that his wristwatch was
missing. Unable to locate the watch inside the bar, the Ferrer brothers went
outside. They saw Ferdinand about eight (8) meters away standing at Rizal
Street. Ferdinand was pointing at them and said to his companion, later
identified as petitioner [Rujjeric] Palaganas, "Oraratan paltog mo lara",
meaning "They are the ones, shoot them." Petitioner then shot them hitting
Servillano first at the left side of the abdomen, causing him to fall on the
ground, and followed by [Melton] who also fell to the ground. When
Servillano noticed that [Melton] was no longer moving, he told Michael
"Bato, bato." Michael picked up some stones and threw them at petitioner
and Ferdinand. The latter then left the place. Afterwards, the police officers
came and the Ferrer brothers were brought to the Manaoag Hospital and
later to Villaflor Hospital in Dagupan. Servillano later discovered that
[Melton] was fatally hit in the head while Michael was hit in the right
shoulder.
On the other hand, the defense, in its Appellant's Brief dated 3 December
1999,14 asserted the following set of facts:
On January 16, 1998, at around 11:00 in the evening, after a drinking
session at their house, the brothers Melton (Tony), Servillano (Junior) and
Michael (Boying), all surnamed Ferrer, occupied a table inside the Tidbits
Café and Videoke Bar and started drinking and singing. About thirty minutes
later, Jaime Palaganas along with his nephew Ferdinand (Apo) and friend
Virgilio Bautista arrived at the bar and occupied a table near that of the
Ferrers'.
After the Ferrers' turn in singing, the microphone was handed over to Jaime
Palaganas, who then started to sing. On his third song [My Way], Jaime was
joined in his singing by Tony Ferrer, who sang loudly and in an obviously
mocking manner. This infuriated Jaime, who then accosted Tony, saying,
"You are already insulting us." The statement resulted in a free for all fight
between the Ferrers', on one hand, and the Palaganases on the other.
Jaime was mauled and Ferdinand, was hit on the face and was chased
outside of the bar by Junior and Boying Ferrer.
Ferdinand then ran towards the house of the appellant Rujjeric Palaganas,
his brother, and sought the help of the latter. Rujjeric, stirred from his sleep
by his brother's shouts, went out of his house and, noticing that the van of
his uncle was in front of the Tidbits Videoke Bar, proceeded to that place.
Before reaching the bar, however, he was suddenly stoned by the Ferrer
brothers and was hit on different parts of his body, so he turned around and
struggled to run towards his house. He then met his brother, Ferdinand,
going towards the bar, so he tugged him and urged him to run towards the
opposite direction as the Ferrer brothers continued pelting them with large
stones. Rujjeric then noticed that Ferdinand was carrying a gun, and, on
instinct, grabbed the gun from the latter, faced the Ferrer brothers and fired
one shot in the air to force the brothers to retreat. Much to his surprise,
however, the Ferrer brothers continued throwing stones and when (sic) the
appellant was again hit several times. Unable to bear the pain, he closed his
eyes and pulled the trigger.
On 28 October 1998, the trial court rendered its Decision finding petitioner guilty only
of the crime of Homicide and two (2) counts of Frustrated Homicide.15 He was,
however, acquitted of the charge of Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2958 in
relation to Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code.16 On the other hand, Ferdinand
was acquitted of all the charges against him.17
In holding that petitioner is liable for the crimes of Homicide and Frustrated Homicide
but not for Murder and Frustrated Murder, the trial court explained that there was no
conspiracy between petitioner and Ferdinand in killing Melton and wounding Servillano
and Michael.18 According to the trial court, the mere fact that Ferdinand "pointed" to
where the Ferrer brothers were and uttered to petitioner "Araratan, paltog mo lara!"
(They are the ones, shoot them!), does not in itself connote common design or unity of
purpose to kill. It also took note of the fact that petitioner was never a participant in the
rumble inside the Tidbits Cafe Videoke Bar (videoke bar) on the night of 16 January
1998. He was merely called by Ferdinand to rescue their uncle, Jaime, who was being
assaulted by the Ferrer brothers. It further stated that the shooting was instantaneous
and without any prior plan or agreement with Ferdinand to execute the same. It found
that petitioner is solely liable for killing Melton and for wounding Servillano and
Michael, and that Ferdinand is not criminally responsible for the act of petitioner.
Further, it declared that there was no treachery that will qualify the crimes as murder
and frustrated murder since the Ferrer brothers were given the chance to defend
themselves during the shooting incident by stoning the petitioner and Ferdinand.19 It
reasoned that the sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on
the part of the victims, was absent. In addition, it ratiocinated that there was no
evident premeditation as there was no sufficient period of time that lapsed from the
point where Ferdinand called the petitioner for help up to the point of the shooting of
the Ferrer brothers.20 Petitioner was sleeping at his house at the time he heard
Ferdinand calling him for help. Immediately, petitioner, still clad in pajama and
sleeveless shirt, went out of his room to meet Ferdinand. Thereafter, both petitioner
and Ferdinand went to the videoke bar where they met the Ferrer brothers and,
shortly afterwards, the shooting ensued. In other words, according to the trial court,
the sequence of the events are so fast that it is improbable for the petitioner to have
ample time and opportunity to then plan and organize the shooting.
Corollarily, it also stated that petitioner cannot successfully invoke self-defense since
there was no actual or imminent danger to his life at the time he and Ferdinand saw
the Ferrer brothers outside the videoke bar.21 It noted that when petitioner and
Ferdinand saw the Ferrer brothers outside the videoke bar, the latter were not carrying
any weapon. Petitioner then was free to run or take cover when the Ferrer brothers
started pelting them with stones. Petitioner, however, opted to shoot the Ferrer
brothers. It also stated that the use by petitioner of a gun was not a reasonable means
to prevent the attack of the Ferrer brothers since the latter were only equipped with
stones, and that the gun was deadlier compared to stones. Moreover, it also found
that petitioner used an unlicensed firearm in shooting the Ferrer brothers.22
As regards the Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2958, in relation to Section 261
of the Omnibus Election Code, the trial court acquitted the petitioner of the offense as
his use and possession of a gun was not for the purpose of disrupting election
activities.23 In conclusion, the trial court held:
WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Under CRIM. CASE NO. U-9610, [Rujjeric] PALAGANAS is hereby
CONVICTED beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE (Not
Murder) with the use of an unlicensed firearm. The penalty imposable is in
its maximum period which is 20 years. The Court sentences [Rujjeric]
Palaganas to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Temporal in its maximum
period or 20 years of imprisonment; and to pay the heirs of [MELTON]
Ferrer the sum of P7,791.50 as actual medical expenses of [MELTON]
Ferrer; P500,000.00 as moral damages representing unearned income of
[MELTON]; P50,000.00 for the death of [MELTON]; P50,000.00 for
exemplary damages and P100,000.00 for burial and funeral expenses.
Ferdinand Palaganas is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to
prove conspiracy and likewise, for failure to prove the guilt of Ferdinand
Palaganas beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Under CRIM. CASE NO. U-9608, [Rujjeric] PALAGANAS is hereby
CONVICTED beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of FRUSTRATED
HOMICIDE (Not Frustrated Murder), with the use of an unlicensed firearm,
the Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of Prision Mayor in its
maximum period or 12 years of imprisonment and to pay Servillano Ferrer
the sum of P163,569.90 for his medical expenses and P50,000.00 for
exemplary damages;
Ferdinand Palaganas is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove
conspiracy and likewise, for failure to prove the guilt of Ferdinand
Palaganas beyond reasonable doubt.
3. Under CRIM. CASE NO. U-9609, [Rujjeric] PALAGANAS is hereby
CONVICTED beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of FRUSTRATED
HOMICIDE (Not Frustrated Murder), with the use of an unlicensed firearm,
the Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of Prision Mayor in its
maximum period or 12 years of imprisonment; and to pay Michael Ferrer the
sum of P2,259.35 for his medical expenses and P50,000.00 for exemplary
damages;
Ferdinand Palaganas is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove
conspiracy and likewise, for failure to prove the guilt of Ferdinand
Palaganas beyond reasonable doubt.
Ordering accused [Rujjeric] Palaganas to pay Mrs. Elena Ferrer, the mother
of the Ferrer brothers, the amount of P100,000.00 as attorney's fees in
CRIM. CASES NOS. U-9608, U-9609, U-9610.
4. Under CRIM. CASE NO. U-9634, for failure of the prosecution to prove
the guilt of [Rujjeric] Palaganas beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2958 in relation with Section 261 of
the Omnibus Election Code, the Court ACQUITS [RUJJERIC]
PALAGANAS.24
Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed the foregoing Decision of the RTC dated 28
October 1998, before the Court of Appeals. In its Decision dated 30 September 2004,
the Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the assailed RTC Decision. In
modifying the Decision of the trial court, the appellate court held that the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender under Article 13, No. 7, of the Revised Penal
Code should be appreciated in favor of petitioner since the latter, accompanied by his
counsel, voluntarily appeared before the trial court, even prior to its issuance of a
warrant of arrest against him.25 It also stated that the Indeterminate Sentence Law
should be applied in imposing the penalty upon the petitioner.26 The dispositive portion
of the Court of Appeals' Decision reads:
 WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to "Exhibit O" should have been given due weight since it shows that there was slug
the MODIFICATION that the penalty to be imposed for the crimes which the embedded on the sawali wall near the sign "Tidbits Café and Videoke Bar"; that the
appellant committed are as follows: height from which the slug was taken was about seven feet from the ground; that if it
was true that petitioner and Ferdinand were waiting for the Ferrer brothers outside the
videoke bar in order to shoot them, then the trajectory of the bullets would have been
(1) For Homicide (under Criminal Case No. U-9610), the appellant is
either straight or downward and not upward considering that the petitioner and the
ordered to suffer imprisonment of ten (10) years of prision mayor as
Ferrer brothers were about the same height (5'6"-5'8"); that the slug found on the wall
minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
was, in fact, the "warning shot" fired by the petitioner; and, that if this exhibit was
temporal as maximum. Appellant is also ordered to pay the heirs of Melton
properly appreciated by the trial court, petitioner would be acquitted of all the
Ferrer civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the
charges.29
amount of P50,000.00 without need of proof and actual damages in the
amount of P43,556.00.
Moreover, petitioner contended that the warning shot proved that that the Ferrer
brothers were the unlawful aggressors since there would have been no occasion for
(2) For Frustrated Homicide (under Criminal Case No. U-9609), the
the petitioner to fire a warning shot if the Ferrer brothers did not stone him; that the
appellant is hereby ordered to suffer imprisonment of four (4) years and two
testimony of Michael in the trial court proved that it was the Ferrer brothers who
(2) months of prision correcional as minimum to ten (10) years of prision
provoked petitioner to shoot them; and that the Ferrer brothers pelted them with
mayor as maximum. Appellant is also ordered to pay Michael Ferrer actual
stones even after the "warning shot."30
damages in the amount of P2,259.35 and moral damages in the amount
of P30,000.00.
Petitioner's contention must fail.
(3) For Frustrated Homicide (under Criminal Case No. U-9608), the
appellant is hereby penalized with imprisonment of four (4) years and two Article 11, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code provides for the elements and/or
(2) months of prision correcional as minimum to ten (10) years of prision requisites in order that a plea of self-defense may be validly considered in absolving a
mayor as maximum. Appellant is also ordered to pay Servillano Ferrer person from criminal liability, viz:
actual damages in the amount of P163,569.90 and moral damages in the
amount of P30,000.00.27
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. – The following do not incur any criminal
liability:
On 16 November 2004, petitioner lodged the instant Petition for Review before this
Court on the basis of the following arguments:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the
following circumstances concur;
I.
First. Unlawful aggression;
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT.
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
it;
II.
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING himself. x x x.
ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON THE GROUND OF LAWFUL SELF-
DEFENSE.28
As an element of self-defense, unlawful aggression refers to an assault or attack, or a
threat thereof in an imminent and immediate manner, which places the defendant's life
Anent the first issue, petitioner argued that all the elements of a valid self-defense are in actual peril.31 It is an act positively strong showing the wrongful intent of the
present in the instant case and, thus, his acquittal on all the charges is proper; that aggressor and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude.32 It is also described
when he fired his gun on that fateful night, he was then a victim of an unlawful as a sudden and unprovoked attack of immediate and imminent kind to the life, safety
aggression perpetrated by the Ferrer brothers; that he, in fact, sustained an injury in or rights of the person attacked.33
his left leg and left shoulder caused by the stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers; that
the appellate court failed to consider a material evidence described as "Exhibit O"; that
There is an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he puts in actual or
imminent peril the life, limb, or right of the person invoking self-defense. There must
be actual physical force or actual use of weapon.34 In order to constitute unlawful
aggression, the person attacked must be confronted by a real threat on his life and
limb; and the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and actual, not merely
imaginary.35
In the case at bar, it is clear that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the
Ferrer brothers that justified the act of petitioner in shooting them. There were no
actual or imminent danger to the lives of petitioner and Ferdinand when they
proceeded and arrived at the videoke bar and saw thereat the Ferrer brothers. It
appears that the Ferrer brothers then were merely standing outside the videoke bar
and were not carrying any weapon when the petitioner arrived with his brother
Ferdinand and started firing his gun.36
Assuming, arguendo, that the Ferrer brothers had provoked the petitioner to shoot
them by pelting the latter with stones, the shooting of the Ferrer brothers is still
unjustified. When the Ferrer brothers started throwing stones, petitioner was not in a
state of actual or imminent danger considering the wide distance (4-5 meters) of the
latter from the location of the former.37 Petitioner was not cornered nor trapped in a
specific area such that he had no way out, nor was his back against the wall. He was
still capable of avoiding the stones by running away or by taking cover. He could have
also called or proceeded to the proper authorities for help. Indeed, petitioner had
several options in avoiding dangers to his life other than confronting the Ferrer
brothers with a gun.
The fact that petitioner sustained injuries in his left leg and left shoulder, allegedly
caused by the stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers, does not signify that he was a
victim of unlawful aggression or that he acted in self-defense.38 There is no evidence
to show that his wounds were so serious and severe. The superficiality of the injuries
sustained by the petitioner is no indication that his life and limb were in actual peril.39
Petitioner's assertion that, despite the fact that he fired a warning shot, the Ferrer
brothers continued to pelt him with stones,40 will not matter exonerate him from
criminal liability. Firing a warning shot was not the last and only option he had in order
to avoid the stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers. As stated earlier, he could have run
away, or taken cover, or proceeded to the proper authorities for help. Petitioner,
however, opted to shoot the Ferrer brothers.
It is significant to note that the shooting resulted in the death of Melton, and wounding
of Servillano and Michael. With regard to Melton, a bullet hit his right thigh, and
another bullet hit his head which caused his instant death.41 As regards Servillano, a
bullet penetrated two of his vital organs, namely, the large intestine and urinary
bladder.42 He underwent two (2) surgeries in order to survive and fully
recover.43 Michael, on the other hand, sustained a gunshot wound on the right
shoulder.44 It must also be noted that the Ferrer brothers were shot near the videoke
bar, which contradict petitioner's claim he was chased by the Ferrer brothers. Given
the foregoing circumstances, it is difficult to believe that the Ferrer brothers were the
unlawful aggressors. As correctly observed by the prosecution, if the petitioner shot
the Ferrer brothers just to defend himself, it defies reason why he had to shoot the
victims at the vital portions of their body, which even led to the death of Melton who
was shot at his head.45 It is an oft-repeated rule that the nature and number of wounds
inflicted by the accused are constantly and unremittingly considered
important indicia to disprove a plea of self-defense.46
Let it not be forgotten that unlawful aggression is a primordial element in self-
defense.47 It is an essential and indispensable requisite, for without unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim, there can be, in a jural sense, no complete or
incomplete self-defense.48 Without unlawful aggression, self-defense will not have a
leg to stand on and this justifying circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated,
even if the other elements are present.49 To our mind, unlawful aggression, as an
element of self-defense, is wanting in the instant case.
The second element of self-defense requires that the means employed by the person
defending himself must be reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression of the victim. The reasonableness of the means employed may take into
account the weapons, the physical condition of the parties and other circumstances
showing that there is a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the
defense.50 In the case at bar, the petitioner's act of shooting the Ferrer brothers was
not a reasonable and necessary means of repelling the aggression allegedly initiated
by the Ferrer brothers. As aptly stated by the trial court, petitioner's gun was far
deadlier compared to the stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers.51
Moreover, we stated earlier that when the Ferrer brothers allegedly threw stones at
the petitioner, the latter had other less harmful options than to shoot the Ferrer
brothers. Such act failed to pass the test of reasonableness of the means employed in
preventing or repelling an unlawful aggression.
With regard to the second issue, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in
not acquitting him on the ground of lawful self-defense.
Petitioner's argument is bereft of merit.
In resolving criminal cases where the accused invokes self-defense to escape criminal
liability, this Court consistently held that where an accused admits killing the victim but
invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he acted in self-defense.52 As the burden of evidence is
shifted on the accused to prove all the elements of self-defense, he must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.53
As we have already found, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the Ferrer
brothers which justified the act of petitioner in shooting them. We also ruled that even
if the Ferrer brothers provoked the petitioner to shoot them, the latter's use of a gun
was not a reasonable means of repelling the act of the Ferrer brothers in throwing
stones. It must also be emphasized at this point that both the trial court and the
appellate court found that petitioner failed to established by clear and convincing
evidence his plea of self-defense. In this regard, it is settled that when the trial court's
findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally
conclusive and binding upon this Court.54 In the present case, we find no compelling
reason to deviate from their findings. Verily, petitioner failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he is entitled to an acquittal on the ground of lawful self-
defense.
On another point, while we agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
petitioner is guilty of the crime of Homicide for the death of Melton in Criminal Case
No. U-9610, and Frustrated Homicide for the serious injuries sustained by Servillano
in Criminal Case No. U-9608, we do not, however, concur in their ruling that petitioner
is guilty of the crime of Frustrated Homicide as regards to Michael in Criminal Case
No. U-9609. We hold that petitioner therein is guilty only of the crime of Attempted
Homicide.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code states and defines the stages of a felony in the
following manner:
ART. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. –
Consummated felonies, as well as those which are frustrated and
attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for the for its
execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the
offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony
as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason or
causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a
felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance (italics supplied).
Based on the foregoing provision, the distinctions between frustrated and attempted
felony are summarized as follows:
1.) In frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony as a consequence; whereas in attempted
felony, the offender merely commences the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution.
2.) In frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime
is some cause independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand,
in attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment of the crime is a cause
or accident other than the offender's own spontaneous desistance.
In addition to these distinctions, we have ruled in several cases that when the accused
intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault,
and his victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely
medical assistance, the crime committed is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide
depending on whether or not any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code are present.55 However, if the wound/s sustained by the
victim in such a case were not fatal or mortal, then the crime committed is only
attempted murder or attempted homicide.56 If there was no intent to kill on the part of
the accused and the wound/s sustained by the victim were not fatal, the crime
committed may be serious, less serious or slight physical injury.57
Based on the medical certificate of Michael, as well as the testimony of the physician
who diagnosed and treated Michael, the latter was admitted and treated at the
Dagupan Doctors-Villaflor Memorial Hospital for a single gunshot wound in his right
shoulder caused by the shooting of petitioner.58 It was also stated in his medical
certificate that he was discharged on the same day he was admitted and that the
treatment duration for such wound would be for six to eight days only.59 Given these
set of undisputed facts, it is clear that the gunshot wound sustained by Michael in his
right shoulder was not fatal or mortal since the treatment period for his wound was
short and he was discharged from the hospital on the same day he was admitted
therein. Therefore, petitioner is liable only for the crime of attempted homicide as
regards Michael in Criminal Case No. U-9609.
With regard to the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of use of an
unlicensed firearm, we agree with the trial court and the appellate court that the same
must be applied against petitioner in the instant case since the same was alleged in
the informations filed against him before the RTC and proven during the trial.
However, such must be considered as a special aggravating circumstance, and not a
generic aggravating circumstance.
Generic aggravating circumstances are those that generally apply to all crimes such
as those mentioned in Article 14, paragraphs No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19 and
20, of the Revised Penal Code. It has the effect of increasing the penalty for the crime
to its maximum period, but it cannot increase the same to the next higher degree. It
must always be alleged and charged in the information, and must be proven during
the trial in order to be appreciated.60 Moreover, it can be offset by an ordinary
mitigating circumstance.
On the other hand, special aggravating circumstances are those which arise under
special conditions to increase the penalty for the offense to its maximum period, but
the same cannot increase the penalty to the next higher degree. Examples are quasi-
recidivism under Article 160 and complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code. It does not change the character of the offense charged.61 It must always be
alleged and charged in the information, and must be proven during the trial in order to
be appreciated.62 Moreover, it cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.
It is clear from the foregoing that the meaning and effect of generic and special
aggravating circumstances are exactly the same except that in case of generic
aggravating, the same CAN be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance whereas
in the case of special aggravating circumstance, it CANNOT be offset by an ordinary
mitigating circumstance.
Aside from the aggravating circumstances abovementioned, there is also an
aggravating circumstance provided for under Presidential Decree No. 1866,63 as
amended by Republic Act No. 8294,64 which is a special law. Its pertinent provision
states:
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm,
such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.
In interpreting the same provision, the trial court reasoned that such provision is "silent
as to whether it is generic or qualifying."65 Thus, it ruled that "when the law is silent,
the same must be interpreted in favor of the accused."66 Since a generic aggravating
circumstance is more favorable to petitioner compared to a qualifying aggravating
circumstance, as the latter changes the nature of the crime and increase the penalty
thereof by degrees, the trial court proceeded to declare that the use of an unlicensed
firearm by the petitioner is to be considered only as a generic aggravating
circumstance.67 This interpretation is erroneous since we already held in several cases
that with the passage of Republic Act. No. 8294 on 6 June 1997, the use of an
unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is now considered as a SPECIAL
aggravating circumstance and not a generic aggravating circumstance.68 Republic Act
No. 8294 applies to the instant case since it took effect before the commission of the
crimes in 21 April 1998. Therefore, the use of an unlicensed firearm by the petitioner
in the instant case should be designated and appreciated as a SPECIAL aggravating
circumstance and not merely a generic aggravating circumstance.
As was previously established, a special aggravating circumstance cannot be offset by
an ordinary mitigating circumstance. Voluntary surrender of petitioner in this case is
merely an ordinary mitigating circumstance. Thus, it cannot offset the special
aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm. In accordance with Article 64,
paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposable on petitioner should
be in its maximum period.69
As regards the civil liability of petitioner, we deem it necessary to modify the award of
damages given by both courts.
In Criminal Case No. U-9610 for Homicide, we agree with both courts that the proper
amount of civil indemnity is P50,000.00, and that the proper amount for moral
damages is P50,000.00 pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.70 However, based on the
receipts for hospital, medicine, funeral and burial expenses on record, and upon
computation of the same, the proper amount of actual damages should
be P42,374.18, instead of P43,556.00. Actual damages for loss of earning capacity
cannot be awarded in this case since there was no documentary evidence to
substantiate the same.71 Although there may be exceptions to this rule,72 none is
availing in the present case. Nevertheless, since loss was actually established in this
case, temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 may be awarded to the heirs
of Melton Ferrer. Under Article 2224 of the New Civil Code, temperate or moderate
damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss was
suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty. Moreover, exemplary
damages should be awarded in this case since the presence of special aggravating
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm was already established.73 Based on
prevailing jurisprudence, the award of exemplary damages for homicide
is P25,000.00.74
In Criminal Cases No. U-9608 and U-9609, we agree with both courts as to the award
of actual damages and its corresponding amount since the same is supported by
documentary proof therein. The award of moral damages is also consistent with
prevailing jurisprudence. However, exemplary damages should be awarded in this
case since the presence of special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed
firearm was already established. Based on prevailing jurisprudence, the award of
exemplary damages for both the attempted and frustrated homicide shall
be P25,000.00 for each.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30
September 2004 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. U-9609, the petitioner is found guilty of the crime of
attempted homicide. The penalty imposable on the petitioner is prision
correccional under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code.75 There being a special
aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence of Law, the penalty now becomes four (4) years and two (2)
months of arresto mayor as minimum period to six (6) years of prision correccional as
maximum period. As regards the civil liability of petitioner, the latter is hereby ordered
to pay Michael Ferrer exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in addition to
the actual damages and moral damages awarded by the Court of Appeals.
(2) In Criminal Case No. U-9608, the penalty imposable on the petitioner for the
frustrated homicide is prision mayor under Article 50 of the Revised Penal
Code.76 There being a special aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed
firearm and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty now becomes six
(6) years of prision correccional as minimum period to twelve (12) years of prision
mayor as maximum period. As regards the civil liability of petitioner, the latter is
hereby ordered to pay Servillano Ferrer exemplary damages in the amount
of P25,000.00 in addition to the actual damages and moral damages awarded by the
Court of Appeals.
(3) In Criminal Case No. U-9610, the penalty imposable on petitioner for the homicide
is reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.77 There being a
special aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty now is twelve (12) years of prision mayor as
minimum period to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum period. As
regards the civil liability of petitioner, the latter is hereby ordered to pay Melton Ferrer
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in addition to the actual damages
and moral damages awarded by the Court of Appeals. The actual damages likewise
awarded by the Court of Appeals is hereby reduced to P42,374.18.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J., Chairperson, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr.,

J.J., concur.

G.R. No. 135784               December 15, 2000

RICARDO FORTUNA Y GRAGASIN, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Perhaps no other profession in the country has gone through incessant maligning by
the public in general than its own police force. Much has been heard about the
notoriety of this profession for excessive use and illegal discharge of power. The
present case is yet another excuse for such vilification.
On 21 July 1992 at about 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, while Diosdada Montecillo and
her brother Mario Montecillo were standing at the corner of Mabini and Harrison
Streets waiting for a ride home, a mobile patrol car of the Western Police District with
three (3) policemen on board stopped in front of them. The policeman seated on the
right at the front seat alighted and without a word frisked Mario. He took Mario’s belt,
pointed to a supposedly blunt object in its buckle and uttered the word
"evidence."1 Then he motioned to Mario to board the car. The terrified Mario obeyed
and seated himself at the back together with another policeman. Diosdada
instinctively followed suit and sat beside Mario.
They cruised towards Roxas Boulevard. The driver then asked Mario why he was
carrying a "deadly weapon," to which Mario answered, "for self-defense since he was
a polio victim."2 The driver and another policeman who were both seated in front grilled
Mario. They frightened him by telling him that for carrying a deadly weapon outside his
residence he would be brought to the Bicutan police station where he would be
interrogated by the police, mauled by other prisoners and heckled by the press. As
they approached Ospital ng Maynila, the mobile car pulled over and the two (2)
policemen in front told the Montecillos that the bailbond for carrying a "deadly weapon"
was ₱12,000.00. At this point, the driver asked how much money they had. Without
answering, Mario gave his ₱1,000.00 to Diosdada who placed the money inside her
wallet.
Diosdada was then made to alight from the car. She was followed by the driver and
was told to go behind the vehicle. There, the driver forced her to take out her wallet
and rummaged through its contents. He counted her money. She had ₱5,000.00 in
her wallet. The driver took ₱1,500.00 and left her ₱3,500.00. He instructed her to tell
his companions that all she had was ₱3,500.00. While going back to the car the driver
demanded from her any piece of jewelry that could be pawned. Ruefully, she removed
her wristwatch and offered it to him. The driver declined saying, "Never mind,"3 and
proceeded to board the car. Diosdada, still fearing for the safety of her brother,
followed and sat beside him in the car.
Once in the car, Diosdada was directed by the policeman at the front passenger seat
to place all her money on the console box near the gearshift. The car then proceeded
to Harrison Plaza where the Montecillos were told to disembark. From there, their
dreadful experience over, they went home to Imus, Cavite.
The following day Diosdada recounted her harrowing story to her employer Manuel
Felix who readily accompanied her and her brother Mario to the office of General
Diokno where they lodged their complaint. Gen. Diokno directed one of his men, a
certain Lt. Ronas, to assist the complainants in looking for the erring policemen. They
boarded the police patrol car and scoured the Mabini area for the culprits. They did
not find them.
When they returned to the police station, a line-up of policemen was immediately
assembled. Diosdada readily recognized one of them as the policeman who was
seated beside them in the back of the car. She trembled at the sight of him. She then
rushed to Lt. Ronas and told him that she saw the policeman who sat beside them in
the car. He was identified by Lt. Ronas as PO2 Ricardo Fortuna. A few minutes later,
Gen. Diokno summoned the complainants. As they approached the General, they at
once saw PO2 Eduardo Garcia whom they recognized as the policeman who frisked
Mario. The following day, they met the last of their tormentors, the driver of the mobile
car who played heavily on their nerves - PO3 Ramon Pablo.
The three (3) policemen were accordingly charged with robbery. After trial, they were
found guilty of having conspired in committing the crime with intimidation of persons.
They were each sentenced to a prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day to ten (10)
years of prision mayor, to restitute in favor of private complainants Diosdada
Montecillo and Mario Montecillo the sum of ₱5,000.00, and to indemnify them in the
amount of ₱20,000.00 for moral damages and ₱15,000.00 for attorney’s fees.4
The accused separately appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 31 March 1997 the
appellate court affirmed the lower court's verdict.5 Accused-appellant Ricardo Fortuna
moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied. Hence, this petition by Fortuna
alone under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. He contends that the appellate court erred
in holding that private complainants gave the money to the accused under duress, the
same being negated by the prosecution’s evidence, and in affirming the decision of
the court below. He argued that the evidence presented by the prosecution did not
support the theory of conspiracy as against him.6
The issues raised by accused-appellant, as correctly observed by the Solicitor
General, are purely factual. We have consistently stressed that in a petition for review
on certiorari this Court does not sit as an arbiter of facts. As such, it is not our
function to re-examine every appreciation of facts made by the trial and appellate
courts unless the evidence on record does not support their findings or the judgment
is based on a misappreciation of facts.7 The ascertainment of what actually happened
in a controverted situation is the function of the lower courts. If we are to re-examine
every factual finding made by them, we would not only be prolonging the judicial
process but would also be imposing upon the heavily clogged dockets of this Court.
We do not see any infirmity in the present case justifying a departure from this well-
settled rule. On the contrary, we are convinced that the trial and appellate courts did
not err in holding that accused-appellant Fortuna conspired with the accused Pablo
and Garcia in intimidating private complainants to give them their money.
We are convinced that there was indeed sufficient intimidation applied on the offended
parties as the acts performed by the three (3) accused, coupled with the
circumstances under which they were executed, engendered fear in the minds of their
victims and hindered the free exercise of their will. The three (3) accused succeeded
in coercing them to choose between two (2) alternatives, to wit: to part with their
money or suffer the burden and humiliation of being taken to the police station.
To our mind, the success of the accused in taking their victims' money was premised
on threats of prosecution and arrest. This intense infusion of fear was intimidation,
plain and simple.
Accused-appellant further argues that assuming arguendo that the element of
intimidation did exist, the lower court erred in holding that he conspired with his
companions in perpetrating the offense charged.
This indeed is easy to assert, for conspiracy is something which exists only in the
minds of the conspirators, which can easily be denied. However, conspiracy may be
detected and deduced from the circumstances of the case which when pieced
together will indubitably indicate that they form part of a common design to commit a
felony; and, to establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be actual proof
evincing that all of the conspirators took a direct part in every act, it being sufficient
that they acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.8
periods the range of which is four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two
(2) months.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed that of the trial
court finding accused-appellant Ricardo Fortuna guilty of robbery and ordering him to
pay complaining witnesses Diosdada Montecillo and Mario Montecillo ₱5,000.00
representing the money taken from them, ₱20,000.00 for moral damages and
₱15,000.00 for attorney's fees, is AFFIRMED with the modification that accused-
appellant Ricardo Fortuna is SENTENCED to the indeterminate prison term of two (2)
years four (4) months and twenty (20) days of the medium period of arresto
mayor maximum to prision correccional medium, as minimum, to eight (8) years two
(2) months and ten (10) days of the maximum period of prision correccional maximum
to prision mayor medium, as maximum.
Costs against accused-appellant Ricardo Fortuna.

In the present case, accused-appellant would want to impress upon this Court that his SO ORDERED.
silence inside the car during Mario’s interrogation confirmed his claim that he did not
participate in the offense.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

We do not agree. As a police officer, it is his primary duty to avert by all means the
commission of an offense. As such, he should not have kept his silence but, instead,
should have protected the Montecillos from his mulcting colleagues. This accused-
appellant failed to do. His silence then could only be viewed as a form of moral
support which he zealously lent to his co-conspirators.1âwphi1

In one case, we ruled that in conspiracy all those who in one way or another helped
and cooperated in the consummation of a felony were co-conspirators.9 Hence, all of
the three (3) accused in the present case should be held guilty of robbery with
intimidation against persons.

We however observe that the courts below failed to appreciate the aggravating
circumstance of "abuse of public position."10 The mere fact that the three (3) accused
were all police officers at the time of the robbery placed them in a position to
perpetrate the offense. If they were not police officers they could not have terrified the
Montecillos into boarding the mobile patrol car and forced them to hand over their G.R. No. 137036            March 14, 2001
money. Precisely it was on account of their authority that the Montecillos believed that
Mario had in fact committed a crime and would be brought to the police station for PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
investigation unless they gave them what they demanded. vs.
HERNANDO DE MESA and TWO (2) JOHN DOES, accused.
Accordingly, the penalty imposed should be modified. Under Art. 294, par. (5), of The HERNANDO DE MESA, accused-appellant.
Revised Penal Code, the penalty for simple robbery is prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. In view of the aggravating PUNO, J.:
circumstance of abuse of public position, the penalty should be imposed in its In the evening of October 15, 1996, Patricio Motas, Barangay Chairman of Barangay
maximum period11 while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in Sta. Cruz Putol, San Pablo City, was shot dead while playing a card game with some
degree, which is arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional medium in any of its townmates at a neighborhood store. One of those implicated in the killing was
Hernando de Mesa, the appellant in this case.
Accused-appellant, together with two unidentified persons, were charged before the
Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch 32 with the crime of murder under the
following information:1
"The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses HERNANDO DE
MESA and two (2) John Does of the crime of MURDER under Art. 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, committed as follows:
'That on or about October 15, 1996, in the City of San Pablo,
Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused above-named, with treachery and
evident premeditation, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shoot one PATRICIO MOTAS with a long firearm with
which accused Hernando de Mesa was then conveniently
provided, thereby inflicting multiple wounds upon the said victim
which caused his immediate death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.'
City of San Pablo, February 26, 1997.
(SGD)ALBERTO B. DORIA
Assistant City Prosecutor"
The trial court issued a warrant of arrest against accused-appellant on March 3,
1997.2 The return of the warrant, however, showed that accused-appellant could not
be located at his given address and it was reported that he was hiding somewhere in
Quezon province to evade his arrest.3 An alias warrant of arrest was issued by the trial
court on August 29, 1997.4 On February 14, 1998, elements of the PNP 49th
Provincial Mobile Group apprehended accused-appellant in Calapan, Oriental
Mindoro. He was transferred and detained at San Pablo City Jail on March 1, 1998.5
Accused-appellant was arraigned on March 23, 1998 where he pleaded not
guilty.6 Trial ensued.
Jose Umali, a resident of Barangay Sta. Cruz Putol, San Pablo City, testified that he
has known accused-appellant since birth as they live in the same barangay. On
October 15, 1996, around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, he was playing "tong-its", a card
game, with Bernie Padua and Florante Alvero at the store owned by Ruby Padua in
Barangay Sta. Cruz Putol, San Pablo City while their other neighbors, Ading, Nido,
Pungay and Barangay Chairman Patricio Motas, looked on. While they were playing,
Umali felt the need to relieve his bowels. He excused himself from the game and went
to the back of the house around 35 meters from the store. Barangay Chairman Motas
took over his place. While he was relieving himself, Umali heard a loud burst of gunfire
coming from Padua's store. Moments later, he saw accused-appellant followed by two
men pass by. They were four meters away from him and they were walking fast. He
saw that accused-appellant carried a long firearm. Then he heard one of accused-
appellant's companions ask him, "Ano sa palagay mo pare?" Accused-appellant
replied, "Sigurado akong patay iyong putang inang si Chairman." The three headed
toward the direction of Barangay San Vicente. After they were gone, Umali went to the
side of the road near Padua's store. He heard from the people that Motas had been
shot and was brought to the hospital. Umali went home. The following day, he learned
that the victim had died. When asked by the court how he recognized accused-
appellant, he replied that he knew him by his movement. He also said that there was
light coming from the house around 25 meters away.7
Rommel Maghirang, also a resident of Barangay Sta. Cruz Putol, San Pablo City,
corroborated the testimony of Umali. He testified that on October 15, 1996, around
8:00 o'clock in the evening, he was driving his car in Barangay Sta. Cruz Putol, San
Pablo City within the vicinity of Ruby Padua's store. As he was making a u-turn about
15 meters from the store, he saw accused-appellant and two men walking near the
house of a certain Pablo Itat which was about 8 to 10 meters from Padua's store. He
noticed that accused-appellant was carrying a long firearm known as "de sabog". He
recognized accused-appellant because the headlight of his car was focused on them
without any obstruction. He even noticed accused-appellant tilt his head to the left as
if avoiding the light. On October 16, 1996, he heard from his neighbors that Barangay
Chairman Motas had been killed at the store of Ruby Padua. Maghirang stated that he
has known accused-appellant since childhood as they were classmates in grade
school and they lived in the same barangay. He said that he did not know the
companions of accused-appellant.8
Edna Motas, wife of the victim, testified that her husband, Patricio Motas, died on
October 15, 1996 after being gunned down by assassins. He was Barangay Chairman
at the time. She tearfully recounted that on that fateful night, she was roused from her
sleep when she heard a neighbor shouting, "May tama si Chairman!" She stood up
and went out to the street. She saw the people boarding her husband on a jeepney to
bring him to the hospital. She followed them to San Pablo City District Hospital. A
hospital staff who earlier asked her if she was the wife of the victim told her to go
inside the room where he laid. As she stepped into the room, she saw her husband
lying dead. She noticed that he had gunshot wounds at the back. She later learned of
the identity of the assailant from Romy Aliazas, a witness in this case who also died
after being shot. She said that Aliazas identified the suspect as Hernando de Mesa.
Edna has known accused-appellant for 17 years. She further testified that accused-
appellant had an axe to grind with her husband because of the confrontations they
had in the past. On one occasion, accused-appellant was drunk and was creating
trouble. To quiet him down, Barangay Chairman Motas boxed him. Accused-appellant
filed a case against Barangay Chairman Motas but lost. On another occasion,
accused-appellant was caught stealing fruits from a lanzones tree under the care of
Barangay Chairman Motas. The latter confronted him and they had a heated
exchange of words. Accused-appellant threatened Barangay Chairman Motas, "May
araw ka rin Chairman. Papatayin kita." Edna also testified on the expenses incurred
for the funeral and burial of her husband, as follows: P17,000.00 for funeral
services,9 P10,000.00 for food, P500.00 for the church, and P4,500.00 for the
memorial lot.10
Dr. Azucena Ilagan-Bandoy, Assistant City Health Officer, San Pablo City, testified
that she conducted an autopsy on the body of Patricio Motas on October 16, 1996.
She prepared a necropsy report11 stating her findings in the autopsy. She found eight
gunshot wounds on the body of the victim. She also recovered deformed fragment
pellets from his body. She turned over the recovered fragments to the PNP
Investigation Section, San Pablo City. The necropsy report stated that the cause of
death was shock and hemmorhage due to gunshot wounds involving the left kidney,
liver and descending colon of the large intestine. The autopsy also revealed that the
assailant was at the back of the victim when he was shot.12
Pinky Almazan, Stenographic Reporter at the Office of the City Prosecutor, stated that
she is the secretary of Prosecutor Alberto Doria who was assigned to conduct the
preliminary investigation of accused-appellant in connection with the killing of
Barangay Chairman Motas. She testified that accused-appellant did not appear during
the preliminary investigation scheduled on February 26, 1997 despite service of
notice.13
Ruben Chumacera, former head of the Investigation Section of PNP San Pablo City,
testified that on November 12, 1996, he conducted an investigation regarding the
death of Patricio Motas. Prior to that date, the police officers on duty relayed to the
police headquarters that a wounded man was brought to the hospital. He instructed
Police Officers Armando Demejes and Norberto Enrique to go to the hospital to
conduct an investigation. Following his order, they proceeded to the hospital and then
to the scene of the crime. They reported that the victim, Patricio Motas, Barangay
Chairman of Barangay Sta. Cruz Putol, San Pablo City, was dead on arrival. The
report was entered into the police blotter. Considering that the assailants have not
been identified, Chumacera referred the incident to the Intelligence Section for follow-
up. On November 10, 1996, members of the Intelligence Section took the statement of
Romy Aliazas who pointed to Hernando De Mesa as the perpetrator of the crime. After
perusal and examination of the statement of Romy Aliazas, Chumacera, together with
SPO1 Gil Edrinal went to the scene of the crime and summoned the witnesses. There
Romy Aliazas narrated and demonstrated all that he saw during the incident.
Chumacera drew a sketch based on the narration of Romy Aliazas.14
For the defense, Chona De Mesa, wife of the accused, recounted their activities
during the whole day of October 15, 1996. She said that in the morning, while she
cooked breakfast, her husband prepared the materials that they would use for
gathering fruits which they would later sell in the market. After breakfast, she and her
husband walked to Barangay San Vicente. They passed by her parents' house before
proceeding to the jackfruit farm owned by a certain Ma Mundo. After some
negotiations with the owner of the farm, accused-appellant started picking jackfruit.
Chona returned to her parents' house to get a bicycle. They placed the harvested
fruits on the bicycle and brought them to her parents' house. After lunch, the spouses
walked to Barangay Sta. Ana and gathered more crops. In the afternoon, after
depositing the fruits at her parents' house, the spouses walked back to their home in
Barangay Sta. Cruz Putol. They reached their home at dusk. She prepared supper
while her husband lied on the sofa in the living room to rest. He told her he was very
tired. They had dinner at 7:00 o'clock in the evening. After eating, her husband went
back to the sofa and watched television but he fell asleep while watching. Chona
continued with her chores. Chona testified that accused-appellant fell asleep before
8:00 o'clock in the evening. He allegedly slept on the sofa from 7:00 o'clock until 10:00
o'clock and he transferred to the bedroom at 10:00 o'clock that evening.15
Accused-appellant also testified for his defense. He stated that he was engaged in the
business of buying fruits from farm-owners and selling them at the public market. In
the morning of October 15, 1996, before breakfast, he prepared the sacks that he
would use for gathering fruits. After breakfast, he and his wife started walking to
Barangay San Vicente, San Pablo City. They reached their destination at 9:00 o'clock
in the morning. They went to the plantation owned by a certain Ma Mundo where he
picked some jackfruit. As he gathered the fruits, his wife went to the house of his in-
laws to get his bicycle. After paying the farm-owner, they loaded the gathered fruits on
his bicycle and brought them to the house of his in-laws. After having lunch at his in-
laws' house, they rested for a while and then proceeded to Barangay Sta. Ana to
gather more fruits for selling. They returned to his in-laws' house at 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon. They covered the fruits with sacks and stored them there. Accused-
appellant and his wife walked back to Barangay Sta. Cruz Putol and reached their
house around 6:00 o'clock in the evening. Accused-appellant rested for half an hour
before having dinner. After eating, he watched the news on the television but fell
asleep due to exhaustion. It was already morning when he woke up. Accused-
appellant said that he was not aware of any unusual incident that could have disturbed
his sleep that night. The next day, October 16, he learned from his neighbors that their
barangay chairman had been killed. He did not know who was responsible for the
killing. He said that he and his wife attended the wake of their barangay chairman.16
Accused-appellant further testified that it was in November 1996 that he first learned
that he was a suspect in the killing of Barangay Chairman Motas. Before that time,
several unidentified armed persons wearing black clothes and bonnet surrounded
their house. One night, he heard the dogs barking and he noticed some noise coming
from outside the house. He peeped through the wall and he saw several persons
garbed in black walking around their house. When his wife opened the window, one of
them poked a gun at her. The incident happened twice. Accused-appellant reported
the matter to their barangay councilman. Fearing for their safety, his wife convinced
him to leave their abode and move to another place. Heeding his wife's advice,
accused-appellant went to Oriental Mindoro where he worked as calamansi picker and
copra maker. Accused-appellant said that he did not bring his children because they
were still young. He also did not execute an affidavit concerning this case because he
was afraid of the unidentified persons who were harassing them.17
On rebuttal, Edna Motas testified that accused-appellant never attended the wake of
her husband.18
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
 "WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the
accused HERNANDO DE MESA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 2659 with the aggravating
circumstances of commission of the crime in contempt of or assault to public
authorities and at nighttime. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the costs.
Accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim Barangay
Chairman Patricio Motas the sums of P50,000.00 as death indemnity;
P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P32,000.00 for funeral and
other incidental expenses; unearned income of P250,000.00 and
P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED."
Accused-appellant now comes to this Court seeking the reversal of the decision of the
trial court. He raises the following arguments:
"1. The trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused of the crime
charged despite the manifest lack of evidence to warrant conviction.
2. The trial court gravely erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance
of treachery."19
We affirm the judgment of conviction. We find that although the prosecution did not
adduce direct evidence to prove the guilt of accused-appellant, it nevertheless
presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to support his conviction.
Direct evidence of the killing is not indispensable for convicting an accused when
circumstantial evidence can sufficiently establish his guilt.20 There can be a judgment
of conviction when the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain of events
that leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator of the crime.21 Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:
"(1) There is more than one circumstance;
(2) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(3) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt."22
In the case at bar, the facts proved by the prosecution all point to accused-appellant
as the perpetrator of the killing of Barangay Chairman Motas.
First, Barangay Chairman Motas was killed by gunshot around 8:00 o'clock in the
evening of October 15, 1996 at a neighborhood store in Barangay Sta. Cruz Putol,
San Pablo City. A few minutes after the shooting, two witnesses, Umali and
Maghirang, saw accused-appellant within the vicinity of the crime scene carrying a
long firearm. He and his companions were walking fast. Umali heard accused-
appellant's companion ask him, "Ano sa palagay mo pare?" to which he replied,
"Sigurado akong patay iyong putang inang si Chairman."
The testimonies of Umali and Maghirang are entitled to full faith and credit. Their
testimonies were clear and straightforward. The defense has not shown any dubious
or improper motive on their part to testify falsely against accused-appellant.
Furthermore, they clearly identified accused-appellant as the person they saw carrying
a long firearm within the vicinity of the crime scene on the night that the victim was
shot. Records show that their view was unobstructed and there was sufficient light in
the places where they saw accused-appellant. Umali testified that there was light
coming from the house around 25 meters from where he was, while Maghirang
testified that the headlight of his vehicle was focused on accused-appellant and his
companions. Moreover, Umali and Maghirang have known accused-appellant since
childhood, thus, it was easy for them to recognize him even at night. The delay on the
part of Umali to give his statement to the police does not impair his credibility. The
prosecution explained that Umali did not immediately volunteer to testify because of
fear, considering that accused-appellant had a notorious reputation in their barangay.
It was only after accused-appellant's commitment to prison that he gained the courage
to testify against him. It has been held that the non-disclosure by the witness to the
police officers of the identity of the accused immediately after the occurrence of the
crime is not entirely against human experience. In fact, the natural reticence of most
people to get involved in criminal prosecutions against their neighbors is of judicial
notice.23
Second, accused-appellant left his residence in Barangay Sta. Cruz Putol, San Pablo
City after the killing of Barangay Chairman Motas. Records show that he did not
appear during the preliminary investigation scheduled on February 26, 1997 despite
service of notice. Neither did he file a counter-affidavit. Furthermore, when the police
went to his residence in March 1997 to serve the warrant of arrest, they found that
accused-appellant was no longer there. They gathered information that he was hiding
somewhere in Quezon Province to evade his arrest. He was later apprehended by the
police in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. Such sudden disappearance of accused-
appellant from his residence is suspect. The Court has repeatedly held that the flight
of the accused from the scene of the crime is an indication of a guilty conscience for
as the maxim goes, "the wicked fleeth, even when no man pursueth, whereas the
righteous is as brave as a lion."24
We are not convinced with the explanation offered by the defense for accused-
appellant's sudden flight. Accused-appellant said that he was compelled to leave their
residence because several armed men wearing black garments and bonnet would go
around their house at night, posing a threat to their safety. This fact, however, has not
been proved by evidence other than the naked allegation of accused-appellant and his
wife. Accused-appellant allegedly reported the incident to the barangay councilman,
but the defense did not present said councilman to testify in court to support the
accused-appellant's allegation. Moreover, we note that it was only accused-appellant
who fled to Oriental Mindoro, while his wife and children remained in their residence.
This fact casts doubt on the veracity of accused-appellant's story as it is unnatural for
a father to abandon his wife and children alone in their house knowing that there are
suspicious-looking persons hounding their dwelling at night. A father faced with such
peril would not be concerned only with his own safety but more so for his family.
Third, the prosecution has shown that accused-appellant had motive to kill the victim.
Evidence shows that accused-appellant and the victim had some violent fights in the
past, resulting in accused-appellant threatening to kill Barangay Chairman Motas.
Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the
perpetrator. Coupled with enough circumstantial evidence or facts from which it may
be reasonably inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive may be sufficient
to support a conviction.25
All the foregoing circumstances, taken as a whole, lead to the conclusion that it was
indeed accused-appellant who killed Barangay Chairman Motas.
Having established the guilt of accused-appellant, we now go to the nature of the
crime committed and the corresponding penalty to be imposed. Accused-appellant
was charged with the crime of murder. The information alleged that the killing was
attended by treachery and evident premeditation. The trial court, in convicting
accused-appellant for murder, appreciated the aggravating circumstances of
treachery, nighttime and commission of the crime in contempt of or with assault to
public authorities.
After a thorough evaluation of the evidence presented in this case, we find that the
prosecution failed to prove the presence of treachery. There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing means, methods or
forms of attack which tend directly and especially to insure the execution of the crime
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.26 For treachery to exist, two essential elements must concur: (1) the
employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate, and (2) the said means of execution was deliberately or
consciously adopted. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it
impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.27 Treachery cannot be
presumed but must be proven positively.28 The circumstantial evidence on record does
not prove that there was any conscious and deliberate effort on the part of the
accused-appellant to adopt any particular means, method or form of attack to ensure
the commission of the crime without affording the victim any means to defend himself.
Absent any particulars as to the manner in which the aggression commenced or how
the act which resulted in the death of the victim unfolded, treachery cannot be
appreciated. The mere fact that the wounds were found at the back of the victim does
not by itself prove that there was treachery. An attack from behind is not necessarily
treacherous unless it appears that the method of attack was adopted by the accused
deliberately with a special view to the accomplishment of the act without any risk to
the assailant from the defense that the party assaulted may make. Hence, treachery
cannot be considered an aggravating circumstance in the case at bar, there being no
eyewitnesses to the killing or evidence on the manner of its execution.29
We also find that the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of
nighttime. By and of itself, nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance. The fact that
the offense was committed at night will not suffice to sustain such aggravating
circumstance. For nocturnity to properly attend the commission of a crime, it must be
shown that it facilitated the commission and that it was purposely sought by the
offender.30 These facts were not proved in the case at bar.
The trial court also erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance that the
commission of the crime was in contempt of or with assault to public authorities. The
requisites of this circumstance are: (1) the public authority is engaged in the discharge
of his duties and (2) he is not the person against whom the crime is committed.31 None
of these circumstances are present in this case. In the first place, the crime was
committed against the barangay chairman himself. At the time that he was killed, he
was not engaged in the discharge of his duties as he was in fact playing a card game
with his neighbors.
Absent any qualifying aggravating circumstance, the crime committed by accused-
appellant is only homicide, for which the imposable penalty under the Revised Penal
Code is reclusion temporal. Applying the indeterminate sentence law and considering
that there is neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance present in this case, the
penalty that may be imposed on accused-appellant is prision mayor in its medium
period as minimum to reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo
City is MODIFIED. The Court finds accused-appellant GUILTY of the crime of
HOMICIDE and sentences him to imprisonment of ten (10) years of prision mayor as
minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as
maximum. All the other aspects of the judgment is AFFIRMED.
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 144086-87 : February 6, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDRALIN TABOGA, Accused-
Appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Francisca Tubon, a widowed septuagenarian, was robbed, stabbed and burned beyond
recognition when her house built of strong materials was set on fire.
For the commission of the above felonies, Edralin Taboga was charged in Criminal Case No.
1818-K with Robbery with Homicide in an Information1 which reads as follows:
st
That on or about the 1  day of April 1998, in the municipality of Magsingal, province of Ilocos
Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with intent to gain, and with violence against person[s], did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously enter the house of one FRANCISCA TUBON, and once inside, did then and
there, with treachery and abuse of superior strength, assault, attack and stab FRANCISCA
TUBON, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which necessarily caused the death of
said FRANCISCA TUBON, and then, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal and carry away three (3) finger rings, one (1) necklace with pendant, and one (1)
vial of perfume, and four (4) gantas of rice belonging to FRANCISCA TUBON.
Contrary to law and aggravated by the circumstances that the crime was committed in
disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of her age and sex, that the crime
was committed in the dwelling of the offended party and that the crime was committed after an
unlawful entry.
Accused-appellant Taboga was likewise indicted for Arson in Criminal Case No. 1819-K in an
Information2 which avers:
st
That on or about the 1  day of April 1999, in the municipality of Magsingal, province of Ilocos
Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously set fire to the house of FRANCISCA
TUBON after having robbed and stabbed her inside the said house and by reason or on
occasion of the arson the death of FRANCISCA TUBON resulted.
Contrary to law and aggravated by the circumstance that the crime was committed in the
dwelling of the offended party and that the crime was committed after an unlawful entry.
Barangay Captain William Pagao heard Marites shouts for help. He and other barangay
officials and residents helped in dousing out the fire using a water pump. When they entered
the burned house, they discovered the charred remains of Francisca Tubon. They examined the
body and found stab wounds on the chest of the deceased.
Later that morning, Pagao reported the incident to the police authorities of Magsingal, Ilocos
Sur. SPO1 Tiburcio Panod went to the scene of the crime to investigate and gather physical
evidence. He saw the charred remains of Francisca Tubon inside what used to be her bedroom.
He also found stab wounds on her chest. Meanwhile, Hilaria Migo, a niece of the deceased,
took pictures of the charred remains.
A sack of about four (4) gantas of rice was found some thirty to forty meters away from the
burned house. Also found were two crumpled five peso bills, twenty peso and fifty peso bills,
and a five dollar bill underneath a big stone along the barangay road. The investigators
likewise found a necklace with pendant, three rings, a certificate of ownership of large cattle
and a vial of perfume near the scene.
The deceaseds former farm workers were rounded up, namely, Mario Ceria, Edwin Ceria,
Tante Dumadag and Edralin Taboga. Brgy. Capt. Pagao noticed fresh blood stains on the short
pants of Taboga. He confronted Taboga, and the latter readily admitted that he killed Francisca
Tubon and set the flue-cured tobacco stored inside her house on fire, causing the whole house,
including the dead body of the old woman, to be burned.
Taboga was brought to the police station for further investigation. During the investigation,
SPO1 Panod asked Taboga, Apay, sica ti akinaramid wenno saan? (Why, were you the one
who did it or not?) Taboga answered, Wen, Sir, ngem tulungannac cadi. (Yes, sir, but please
help me.) SPO1 Panod prepared a written extra-judicial confession for Taboga. During the
inquest, however, Taboga refused to sign the confession upon the advice of his lawyer.
The following day, April 2, 1998, Mr. Mario Contaoi, a radio announcer of DZNS, went to the
Magsingal Municipal Police Station to interview the suspect, Edralin Taboga. Again, Taboga
admitted killing the deceased and setting her and her house on fire.

In the meantime, the Forensic Biologist of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), who
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant entered separate pleas of Not Guilty to the crimes
examined the bloodstains on Tabogas shorts and on the kitchen knife, found that the said
charged.3 The cases were thereafter tried jointly.
specimens contained human blood Type O,4 the blood type of the deceased.

It appears that at 2:00 in the early morning of April 1, 1998, at Magsingal, Ilocos Sur,
On the other hand, the Municipal Health Officer of Magsingal, Ilocos Sur who performed an
Barangay Councilman Cirilo Urayani woke up to the sound of loud explosions. He thought
autopsy on the victims charred remains, found several stab wounds on the chest.5 According to
people were lighting firecrackers in the neighboring barangay to celebrate their fiesta. He went
him, the victim may have been stabbed to death before she and her house were burned.
out of the house to fetch water, and he saw the house of Francisca Tubon on fire.

The daughter of the deceased, Dr. Marcelina T. Salvador, testified that the family spent the
Marites Ceria, a niece of Francisca Tubon, was also awakened by the explosions. She rushed to
total amount of P115,960.00 for the wake and interment of her mother, and that the house,
her aunts house and, seeing it on fire, shouted for help. She called out the name of her aunt but
including the pieces of furniture, fixtures and valuables therein, was easily worth
there was no response.
P1,000,000.00.
Accused-appellant Edralin Taboga raised the defense of denial and alibi. He alleged that he
was in the house of the parents of his live-in partner, Liza Almazan, at Brgy. Maratudo,
Magsingal, Ilocos Sur, seventy meters away from the house of the deceased. He knew the
deceased as he used to gather tobacco leaves for her. On the night prior to the commission of
the crimes, he had supper at home at 7:00, after which he washed the dishes and went to sleep
at 8:00. At around 1:00 to 2:00 the next morning, he was awakened by shouts for help. He got
out and helped put out the fire at the house of the deceased. At 3:00 a.m., he returned home and
went back to sleep. At 6:00 a.m., he was fetched from the house and brought to the scene of the
fire. The police asked him about the blood stains on his short pants, but he did not know
anything about it.
Accused-appellant further claimed that he was maltreated by the policemen and forced to admit
the crime. Regarding his admission to radio announcer Mario Contaoi, he narrated that the
interview was held inside the investigation room of the police station where policemen were
present. Thus, he had to admit the crimes because he was afraid of the policemen. Moreover,
relatives of the deceased beat him up by kicking him, hitting him with a chair, slapping him
and punching him on the head and face.
Accused-appellants live-in partner corroborated his testimony. She stated that she got up to
relieve herself at about 1:00 at dawn of April 1, 1998 when she heard shouts of a fire. She
woke up accused-appellant and, together, they went to help put out the fire. After an hour, they
returned home and went back to sleep.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, Branch 24, rendered judgment
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes and accordingly sentencing him as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 1818-K, the Court finds the accused Edralin Taboga GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide with all the
aggravating circumstances alleged in the information, and hereby sentences him to suffer the
supreme penalty of DEATH by lethal injection, to indemnify the heirs of Francisca Tubon in
the following amounts:
(a) P50,000.00 as death indemnity;
(b) P115,960.00 as reimbursement for actual expenses; and
(c) P50,000.00 as moral damages
and to pay the costs
(2) In Criminal Case No. 1819-K, the Court finds the accused, Edralin Taboga, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Destructive Arson and hereby sentences him to suffer reclusion
perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, to indemnify the heirs of
Francisca Tubon in the amount of P1,000,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
He shall be credited in full with the period of his preventive imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.6cräläwvirtualibräry
The case is now before us on automatic review pursuant to Section 22 of Republic Act No.
7659, amending Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code. In his brief, accused-appellant alleges
that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSION MADE BY THE ACCUSED TO A RADIO REPORTER FOR THE LATTER
WAS ACTING AS AN AGENT FOR THE PROSECUTION AND HENCE THE
PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION SHOULD HAVE
BEEN OBSERVED.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE FOR THE
ROBBERY OR THEFT WAS NOT PROVEN WITHOUT THE SAID EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSION AND HENCE ONLY THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE EXISTS.
The first assigned error is untenable.
There is nothing in the record to show that the radio announcer colluded with the police
authorities to elicit inculpatory evidence against accused-appellant. Neither is there anything
on record which even remotely suggests that the radio announcer was instructed by the police
to extract information from him on the details of the crimes. Indeed, the reporter even asked
permission from the officer-in-charge to interview accused-appellant. Nor was the information
obtained under duress. In fact, accused-appellant was very much aware of what was going on.
He was informed at the outset by the radio announcer that he was a reporter who will be
interviewing him to get his side of the incident:
Q Will you please tell the court what [did] you tell the accused before you conducted the
interview if any?
A It is inside the tape of our conversation, sir.
Q We see a small tape recorder in your possession Mr. Witness, where was that place[d]?
A In front of the suspect, sir. A I dont recognize [them], sir.

Court Q How about [the] barangay officials of Barangay Maratudo?

Q And he was aware of that? A I only see (sic) the barangay captain of Maratudo at the house of the victim, sir.

A Of course, Your Honor. Q When you interviewed the suspect, he do (sic) not know that the interview will be
aired?
xxx
A I told him I am a reporter, sir.
Q Was he aware he was being interviewed?
Q But you did not tell him that the interview will be aired?
A Yes, sir, I introduced myself as a reporter from the DZNS, sir.
A I tell (sic) him that the interview will be aired, sir.8cräläwvirtualibräry
Q What else did you ask after asking his name and personal circumstances?
The records also show that accused-appellant not only confessed to the radio reporter but to
several others, among them his live-in partner,9 Barangay Captain William Pagao, 10 and SPO1
A Regarding the crime which was allegedly committed, sir.
Tiburcio Panod.11cräläwvirtualibräry

Q Did he answer your question?

The defense maintained that the confessions were obtained through compulsion. Accused-
appellant claimed that the policemen maltreated him by hitting him four (4) times on the head
A Yes, sir. with a chair and forced him to admit the crimes.12 However, accused-appellant failed to present
convincing evidence to substantiate his claim, other than his bare self-serving assertion.
Apropos is our ruling in People v. Pia,13 where we said that: where the defendants did not
Q In your observation, Mr. Witness, as a radio reporter were the answers given to your present evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on their persons; where they failed to
questions voluntary? complain to the officers who administered the oaths; where they did not institute any criminal
or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where there
A Voluntary, sir.[7cräläwvirtualibräry appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies and where they did not have themselves
examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim, all these should be considered as
factors indicating the voluntariness of the confession.14cräläwvirtualibräry
During cross-examination, defense counsel failed to extract an admission from the reporter that
accused-appellant was under compulsion from the police to face him:
Furthermore, accused-appellants confession is replete with details on the manner in which the
crimes were committed, thereby ruling out the probability that it was involuntarily made. The
Q Before you conducted the interview, you do know what transpired between the suspect and voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language such that if, upon its face the
the policeman? confession exhibits no sign of suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity,
it being replete with details which could be supplied only by the accused reflecting spontaneity
A I do not know, sir. and coherence which, psychologically, cannot be associated with a mind to which violence and
torture have been applied, it may be considered voluntary.15 In the early case of U.S. v. De
los Santos,16 we stated:
Q You did not observe Mr. Witness whether the suspect during your interview was under
pressure or intimidated?
If a confession be free and voluntary the deliberate act of the accused with a full
comprehension of its significance, there is no impediment to its admission as evidence, and it
A When I went there I saw the suspect watching the TV together with the policeman, sir. becomes evidence of a high order; since it is supported by the presumption a very strong
presumption that no person of normal mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to
Q You did not see relatives of the victim?
be a perpetrator of a crime, especially if it be a serious crime, unless prompted by truth and facts must establish such a certainty of guilt of the accused as to convince the judgment beyond
conscience. reasonable doubt that the accused is the one who committed the offense. The peculiarity of
circumstantial evidence is that the guilt of the accused cannot be deduced from scrutinizing just
one particular piece of evidence. It is far more like puzzle which when put together reveals a
Under Rule 133, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, an extrajudicial confession made by an
convincing picture pointing towards the conclusion the accused is the author of the
accused shall not be a sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence
crime.24cräläwvirtualibräry
of corpus delicti. As defined, it means the body of the crime and, in its primary sense, means a
crime has actually been committed.17 Applied to a particular offense, it is the actual
commission by someone of the particular crime charged.18 In the case at bar, the confession In the case at bar, the following circumstances cited by the trial court lead to the inevitable
made by accused-appellant was corroborated by several items found by the authorities, to wit: conclusion that accused-appellant perpetrated the crimes, to wit:
the knife which was used to kill the victim and the charred body of the victim.
1. As the victims farm worker, the accused must have acquired knowledge of the set-up of the
The court a quo did not err in admitting in evidence accused-appellants taped confession. Such victims house, including its openings, as well as the places where the victim used to keep her
confession did not form part of custodial investigation. It was not given to police officers but to valuables;
a media man in an apparent attempt to elicit sympathy. The record even discloses that accused-
appellant admitted to the Barangay Captain that he clubbed and stabbed the victim even before
2. When confronted by Brgy. Captain William Pagao with respect to the fresh blood stains on
the police started investigating him at the police station.19 Besides, if he had indeed been forced
his short pants, the accused immediately became restless and his face turned pale;
into confessing, he could have easily asked help from the newsman. In People v. Endino, et
al.,20 we held:
3. Upon scientific examination of the blood stains found on the knife and short pants of the
accused, it was found that the same consisted of human blood belonging to Type O which was
We do not suggest that videotaped confessions given before media men by an accused
the blood type of the deceased Francisca Tubon;
with the knowledge of and in the presence of police officers are impermissible. Indeed, the
line between proper and invalid police techniques and conduct is a difficult one to draw,
particularly in cases such as this where it is essential to make sharp judgments in determining 4. When the Barangay Captain asked him if he had something to do with the killing of the
whether a confession was given under coercive physical or psychological atmosphere. victim and the burning of the house, the accused broke down and admitted his guilt;

Even assuming for the nonce that the extra-judicial confession was indeed inadmissible, this 5. When he was interviewed by the radio announcer, Dr. Mario Contaoi, the accused reiterated
will not absolve accused-appellant from criminal liability because there exists independent his earlier confession given to Brgy. Captain William Pagao and SPO1 Tiburcio Panod; and
evidence to establish his authorship of the victims death. While there was no prosecution
witness who positively identified accused-appellant as the assailant of the victim,  his
6. He could only present his live-in partner, Liza Almazan, and no other, to corroborate his
culpability was nonetheless proven through circumstantial evidence.
denial and alibi.25cräläwvirtualibräry

Hence, accused-appellants second assigned error that his guilt was not proven beyond
Moreover, it appears that accused-appellant had a criminal record for theft. 26 The foregoing
reasonable doubt must likewise fall.
circumstances when viewed in their entirety are as convincing as direct evidence and, as such,
negate the innocence of the accused-appellant. 27cräläwvirtualibräry
Direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a court may
draw its conclusions and findings of guilt.21 The rules on evidence22 and case law sustain the
In stark contrast to the foregoing factual and evidentiary circumstances arrayed against him, all
conviction of the accused through circumstantial evidence when the following requisites
accused-appellant could muster in his defense of alibi. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the
concur: (1) there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences
accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time the crime was
are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a
committed but that it was likewise impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of
conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.23cräläwvirtualibräry
the alleged crime.28 In the instant case, accused-appellant failed to prove and demonstrate the
physical impossibility of his being at the scene of the crime at the approximate time of its
With regard to the yardsticks to be used in assaying the probative value thereof commission. No less than accused-appellant himself admitted that the house where he was
staying was only seventy meters away from the house of the victim. 29 As an element of a
credible alibi, physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the accused
Wharton suggests four basic guidelines in the appreciation of circumstantial evidence, (1) it
was when the crime transpired and the place it was committed, as well as the facility of
should be acted upon with caution; (2) all the essential facts must be consistent with the
access  between the two places.30cräläwvirtualibräry
hypothesis of guilt; (3) the facts must exclude every other theory but that of guilt; and (4) the
Basic is the rule that alibi is easy to concoct, and accused-appellant failed to prove that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the approximate time of its
commission. While, indeed, accused-appellants common-law wife Liza Almazan corroborated
his alibi, the trial court aptly pointed out that witnesses who are either wives or mothers of the
accused, in almost all instances, would freely perjure themselves for the sake of their loved
ones.31 Consequently, accused-appellants defense of alibi can not prosper.32cräläwvirtualibräry
The doctrinal rule is that findings of fact made by the trial court, which had the opportunity to
directly observe the witnesses and to determine the probative value of the other testimonies are
entitled to great weight and respect because the trial court is in a better position to assess the
same, an opportunity not equally open to an appellate court.33 Verily
Truth does not always stalk boldly forth naked, but modest withal, in a printed abstract in a
court of last resort. She oft hides in nooks and crannies visible only to the minds eye of the
judge who tries the case x x x x. The brazen face of the liar, the glibness of the schooled
witness in reciting a lesson, or the overeagerness of the swift witness, as well as the honest face
of the truthful one, are alone seen by him.34cräläwvirtualibräry
What remains to be determined is whether the elements of the felonies have been established.
The Court will not dwell further on the crime of Arson because, as admitted no less by counsel
for accused-appellant, the penalty of reclusion perpetua  has become final and executory for
failure of the defense to appeal the same.35cräläwvirtualibräry
On the other hand, the Information indicting accused-appellant for the special complex crime
of Robbery with Homicide alleged that the felony was committed with disregard to the respect
due the offended party on account of her age and sex, further aggravated by dwelling and
unlawful entry. The elements of the complex crime of Robbery with Homicide are: (1) the
taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (2) the
property thus taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain
or animus lucrandi; and (4) on occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of
homicide, which is used in a generic sense, was committed.36cräläwvirtualibräry
In the appreciation of evidence in criminal cases, it is the basic tenet that the prosecution has
the burden of proof in establishing the guilt of the accused for all the offenses
charged ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat.37 He who asserts, not he who denies,
must prove.38 The conviction of accused-appellant must rest not on the weakness of his defense
but on the strength of the prosecutions evidence.
In proving the case of Robbery with Homicide, it is necessary that the robbery itself be
established conclusively as any other essential element of the crime.39 This is not so in the
instant case. Apart from the sack of rice, necklace with pendant, three rings, vial of perfume
and cash which were recovered within the vicinity of the burned house, no one saw accused-
appellant actually asporting these items, much less has it been satisfactorily shown that
robbery was the main purpose of the culprit in perpetrating the crimes. In fact, the sack
containing the four gantas of rice was found some forty to fifty meters away from the
house,40 while the rest of the items were found hidden under some rocks nearby.41 Yet accused-
appellant was convicted of the complex crime because according to the lower court, [w]ith the
recovery of the various items in or about the vicinity of the burned house, including cash
money, the [c]ourt is convinced that robbery was the main purpose of the culprit and that the
killing was merely incidental thereto.42 This is a glaring error because it practically convicts the
accused-appellant of the crime charged on the basis of an assumption. Where a complex crime
is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the component offenses, the
accused can be convicted only of the offense proved.43 Absent any evidence that the accused
indeed robbed the victim, the special complex crime of robbery with homicide cannot
stand.44cräläwvirtualibräry
In any event, the aggravating circumstances alleged attended the killing. The immutable fact
remains that the crime of homicide was committed in the victims dwelling and without regard
to her age and sex.
The circumstance of dwelling aggravates the felony when the crime was committed in the
residence of the offended party and the latter was not given provocation. 45 It is considered an
aggravating circumstance primarily because of the sanctity of privacy that the law accords to
the human abode.46 As one commentator puts it, ones dwelling is a sanctuary worthy of
respect; thus one who slanders another in the latters house is more severely punished than one
who offends him elsewhere.47 According to Cuello Calon, the commission of the crime in
anothers dwelling shows worse perversity and produces graver alarm.48cräläwvirtualibräry
Anent the circumstance of age, there must be a showing that the
malefactor deliberately  intended to offend or insult the age of the victim.49 Neither could
disregard of respect due to sex be appreciated if the offender did not manifest any intention to
offend or disregard the sex of the victim.50 In other words, killing a woman is not attended by
the aggravating circumstance if the offender did not manifest any specific insult or disrespect
towards the offended partys sex.51 In the case at bar, there is absolutely no showing that
accused-appellant deliberately intended to offend or insult the victim. However, even if
disrespect or disregard of age or sex were not appreciated, the four circumstances enumerated
in Article 14, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, can be
considered singly or together.52 Article 64, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code is clear on
this point:
ART. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods. In cases in which
the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or
composed of three different penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the
provisions of Article 76 and 77, the courts shall observe for the application of the penalty the
following rules according to whether there are no mitigating or aggravating circumstances:
xxx
3. When only an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they shall
impose the maximum period.
xxx.
The penalty imposable on accused-appellant for homicide, under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code, is reclusion temporal in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, accused-appellant should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of ten years and one
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.

The civil damages awarded by the trial court are in accordance with controlling statutory
provisions and case law on the matter. Following prevailing jurisprudence and in line with
controlling policy, the Court finds the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of
the victims proper, without any need of proof other than the death of the
victim.53cräläwvirtualibräry

The award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 to the victims heirs is likewise
proper taking into consideration the pain and anguish of the victims family brought about by
her death.54cräläwvirtualibräry EN BANC

The award of P115,960.00 as actual damages for the funeral and burial expenses incurred by
the heirs of Francisca Tubon, being amply supported by documentary evidence,55 is likewise
sustained.
The attendance of an aggravating circumstance, however, warrants the additional imposition of
exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the Civil Code,56 which the Court fixes at
P50,000.00.57cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, Branch 24, in Criminal Case Nos. 1818-K, is MODIFIED. Accused-
appellant Edralin Taboga is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide
and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, in addition to the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P115,960.00 as actual damages, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Pardo,
Buena, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, and Carpio, JJ., on official leave.
G.R. No. L-11991            October 31, 1960
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ORFIRIO
TAÑO, ET AL., defendants.
PORFIRIO TAÑO and DIONISIO CANTONG, Defendants-Appellants.
Humberto C. Garganera for appellant.
Asst. Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor Pacifio P. de Castro
for appellee.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from a judgement of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Hon.
Hilarion Y. Jarencio, presiding, finding Porfirio Taño, Guellermo Camina and
Roman Caldito guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery in
band with Rape, and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify jointly and severally the offended
parties in the amount of P210.00, and also finding Dionisio Cantong and
Maximo Calico guilty of the crime of simple robbery in band and sentencing
them also for said offense. Parfirio Taño and Dionisio Cantong appealed
from the judgement, but while the case was pending in this Court, the
latter withdrew his appeal. The present appeal, therefore, refers to that of
Porfirio Taño.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It is not disputed by the appellant, as found in the decision appealed from,

that on July 25, 1955, at 8:00 in the evening, some persons called at the
house of the spouses Leodegario Domingo and Herminigilda Domingo in
barrio Talacuan, municipality of Loo, province of Iloilo, informing the
inmates of the house that there was a letter for Leodegario. As soon as
Leodegario reached the ground, carrying a lamp and the fell down and the offended party stated in her affidavit that three accused, including
light was put out. Then Taño pointed a rifle at Leodegario, while Camina appellant Taño, had taken turns in committing the crime of rape on her.
tied his hands at the back. After giving a blow on the face of Leodegario, The imputation of rape is not, therefore, the product of fabrication,
Taño ordered his companions to take Leodegario to the river bank 40 because no appreciable time had elapsed between the commission of the
meters away. Then Taño Camina and Caldito went up the house, each rape and the execution of the
carrying with him a firearms. They searched the house, and upon seeing a affidavit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
trunk forced it open and took away some pieces of men's and women's
apparel and an envelope containing
Last, the trial judge who heard the offended party testify believed her
P210.00.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
testimony and found that rape was actually committed. We find nothing to
indicate that the court's finding in this respect are not correct. We are,
The evidence shows that after the money had been taken away Taño therefore, forced to the conclusion that the claim of appellant Taño that the
dragged Herminigilda, pushing her down the floor. Taño then placed rape imputed to him was not sufficiently proved, is without
himself on top of Herminigilda, while his companions held legs apart. He merit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
gave a blow at her left high and tore her "panty" away and then had
intercourse with her. After his Camina also had access to her, while his
We also agree with the trial court that four aggravating circumstances
companions held her down. Caldito also did this. After raping her, they
namely, commission by a band, taking advantage of nighttime and
went down the house and, thereafter, all of them ran
dwelling, and use of superior strength attended the commission of the
away.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
offense. There being no mitigating circumstance in appellant's favor, the
penalty should be imposed in it maximum
Counsel for appellant Taño argues that there is no sufficient evidence to degree.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
sustain the finding that appellant had access to the offended party, for the
reason that the physician who examined her made no examination of her
The judgement of conviction appealed from should, therefore, be as it
private parts. That no such examination was made is true; the physician
hereby affirmed. With costs against
who examined Herminigilda found a contusion on the face of her left thigh
appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
(Exhibit "M"), but made no mentioned of having examined her private
parts or having found evidence involving intercourse forced on
her.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
Gutierrez David, and Paredes, JJ., concur.
We have, however, carefully examined the evidence in this respect and we
found that Herminigilda testified that when Taño placed himself on top of
her, she scratched his face, but Camina came and took hold of, and then
stretch her legs apart to aid Taño; hit her on the lap and tore away her
"panty"; that her "panty" had a coloration at the lower part caused by the
semen of Taño while on top of her (t.s.n. pp. 16-18). Her testimony is
corroborated by the finding of a contusion on her left thight and of a
coloration of her "panty" which was produced to the court. Besides, the
offended party expressly declared that Taño was able to have carnal
knowledge of her (Id, pp. 18-19). It is well-known fact that women,
especially Filipinos, would not admit that they have been abused unless
that abuse had actually happened. This is due to their natural instinct to
protect their honor. We can not believe that the offended party would have
positively stated that intercourse took place it did actually take
place.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Another circumstance which supports the claim that rape was committed is
the fact that following the day of the commission of the crime of rape, the
G.R. No. 77284 July 19, 1990

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BONIFACIO BALANSI alias "BAN-OS", defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Balgos & Perez for defendant-appellant.

SARMIENTO, J.:

The accused-appellant stands charged with the murder of Elpidio Dalsen on January
30, 1982 at Balinciagao, Pasil, Kalinga-Apayao. The Information alleged that he,
armed with a Garand rifle, went inside the house of the victim, then allegedly fast
asleep, where he shot him twice and killed him. Treachery was held to be present,
and so were evident premeditation and employment of means to weaken the defense
of the victim. 1

The accused-appellant was then the Barangay Captain of Balinciagao Norte, Pasil,
Kalinga-Apayao, and a member of the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF), while
the victim was the Provincial Development Officer of Kalinga-Apayao. 2 The incident
took place during a wedding celebration at Balinciagao Sur, Pasil, at or about 5:30 or
6:00 o'clock in the afternoon. The prosecution presented eight witnesses. The defense
placed two on the stand.

The trial court found the accused guilty as charged and sentenced him to die and to
pay a total of P590,000.00 in actual (P540,000.00 for loss of the victim's earning
capacity) and moral damages, plus costs. 3
It appears that the victim, a nephew of the appellant, was then sleeping at the house After the prosecution rested, the defense presented its evidence. It presented two
of his parents located opposite the house where the wedding celebration was being witnesses, the accused himself and Masadao Jose, who lived in Samangana,
held. At or about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Beatrice Canao, a Balinciagao resident, Balinciagao.
saw the accused, her uncle, standing at the door of the house of the victim's parents,
also her relatives, armed with a gun. She inquired what he was doing there and he
The accused claimed that he was also at the wedding celebration on that fateful
allegedly replied that he was waiting for the victim. She then entered the premises to
afternoon when he too heard two gunshots break in the air. As a member of the
locate an old newspaper with which to wrap food, a rice cake, when she saw the
CHDF, he allegedly took it upon himself to investigate the matter. He said that he went
victim asleep. When she left, she saw the accused at the doorway. After disposing of
to the direction where the shots came from and was on his way to the entrance of the
her rice cake (which she gave to a certain Fr. Medina), she heard two gunshots, fired
house when Yulo Asbok allegedly prevented him from doing so, who grabbed the
at an interval of two or three seconds, emanating apparently from the house, to which
firearm he was carrying. He did not allegedly know at that time that the victim had
she shortly rushed. She allegedly met the accused at the steps leading to the second
been shot and allegedly learned of it only on the following day. He admitted having ran
floor, brandishing his rifle. 4
away but allegedly because he had been implicated. Four days later, he voluntarily
turned himself in to the police. Masadao Jose corroborated his statement. 11
She allegedly shouted "putok, putok!" 5 She then reported the matter to the police.
In returning a verdict of guilty, the trial judge observed: "While there is no eye witness
Yulo Asbok a fellow CHDF member of the accused and likewise a Balinciagao who testified to having seen the accused Bonifacio Balansi shoot the victim, yet all the
resident, also heard two gunshots ring that afternoon. He said that he was three circumstances pointed to him as the perpetrator of the crime." 12
meters from the house where the gunshot sounds seemed to have originated. He
allegedly proceeded there but was met by the accused at the steps. They allegedly
The circumstantial evidence referred to came primarily from the lips of Yulo Asbok and
grappled for possession of the rifle, which, he alleged, was still warm and reeked of
Beatrice Candao as well as the accused himself, who admitted having been at the
gunpowder. He was able to wrest possession, after which, the accused allegedly ran
scene of the crime. Obviously, the judge did not lend credence to the accused's
away and fled to Pogon, also in Balinciagao. He later learned that the victim had been
defense.
shot and that he died at Lubuagan Hospital. 6

The accused-appellant now contends that the judge erred, first, in appreciating
Rosalina Dalsen, the victim's wife was enjoying the wedding celebration when she
circumstantial evidence, second, in appreciating treachery, and third, in rejecting his
heard two gunshots. She made inquiries subsequently and was informed that the
defense of alibi.
victim was her husband. She claimed that she saw the accused standing at the
entrance of her parents- in-law's house prior thereto. 7
We affirm, with modification, the decision appealed from.
Dr. Nicolas Balais, a dentist by profession, was also at that celebration when he heard
the shots. He then went to the victim's parent's house where they, the shots, rang out While there was no eyewitness account, the web of circumstantial evidence points to
from. He did not allegedly have in mind that somebody had actually been fired upon no other conclusion than that the accused was guilty of shooting the victim, Elpidio
but thought that may be there had been a burglary. He ascended the steps of the Dalsen to death in the afternoon of January 30, 1982. These circumstances are as
house where the accused earlier met Beatrice Candao and Yulo Asbok, and entered follows: (1) He was seen standing by the entrance of the house where the victim had
the second floor. He saw the victim lying in his room, whom he initially believed to be sojourned, armed with a long rifle, minutes before gunshots were heard. Three
merely sleeping, but who was, in fact, dead. 8 witnesses saw him: Beatrice Canao, Yulo Asbok, and Rosalina Dalsen. (2) Moments
later, two shots rang out, one after the other. Four witnesses heard them: Canao,
Asbok, Dalsen and Nicolas Balais. (3) Thereafter, Canao saw him descending from
The prosecution also presented Simeon Valera, principal of Pasil Central School, and
the steps of the house. Asbok also saw him there, whom he wrestled for the
Artemio Dalsen the victim's brother, who sought to establish a motive for the killing of
possession of the rifle. (4) He fled and hid for four days.
the victim, a motive they imputed to the accused. Valera testified that revenge was
supposedly a tradition among Kalingas (of which both the accused and victim were
members), which, however, could be prevented by the dusa, meaning, apparently, Under Rule 133, Section 5, of the Rules of Court:
intervention and mediation by community elders. 9 Meanwhile, Dalsen claimed that the
accused had nursed along- standing grudge against the victim, whom he accused of
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. —
delaying on alleged award for the construction of a bridge in Balinciagao in 1979. 10
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if.

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

 (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 13
As we glean from the evidence, there is no one, other than the accused-appellant,
who could have perpetrated the offense.
commit the offense; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his
determination; and (3) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and
execution. 18 The prior determination of the accused to do away with the victim has not
been sufficiently demonstrated by the prosecution.
That the accused also employed means to weaken the victim's defenses is likewise
missing in this case. As we said, there was no actual eyewitness to the killing and
hence, we can not say for sure, based on the evidence before us, that the appellant
did employ means to weaken the defense of the victim.

The accused-appellant, as we said, disagrees. He insists that he was there, precisely,

We, however, affirm the trial court insofar as it appreciated dwelling. Although the
to investigate the matter, and armed himself for the purpose, but was stopped by Yulo
victim was not shot in his house (his parents owned it) it has been held that the
Asbok. His protests notwithstanding, we too must reject this defense. Two reasons
dwelling place need not be owned by the victim.19 In that case, it was held:
persuade us. First, he has not ascribed any motive to Yulo Asbok as to why he, Asbok
should testify falsely against him. Second, he admits having fled immediately
thereafter. If he were truly innocent, he would not have done so. We have held time La circunstancia agravante de morada, aunque no fuese la casa
and again that flight is a silent admission of guilt. 14 As aptly put "The righteous is propia de los occisos, debe estimarse porque — segun el
brave as a lion, but the wicked man fleeth." 15 Tribunal Supremo de España — " no solo por el respeto que el
domicilio ajeno merece, como especie de complements de la
personalidad, y por el que es debido al hogar de la familia, sino
If he were moreover truly innocent, and that it was Yulo Asbok who had something to
por el no menor de que es digna la residencia privada de
do with the killing and who had meanwhile tried to stop him from conducting an
cualquier ciudadano, y por el mayor grado de malicia que revela
inquiry, it would have been he, the accused, to be the first to make a report to the
quien busca a su victima alli en donde se encuentra con la
authorities so that Asbok could be brought to the bar of justice. If the latter did try to
confianza y abandono propios del lugar elegido para el descanso
prevent him from performing his duties, as he claimed, 16 he should have gone to
y las intimidades de la vida: razon por la cual habla el Codigo
lengths to implicate Asbok because that too was his duty.
penal en el art. 10, no de domicillo en sentido legal, sino de
morada en su acepcion real, que no es otra que la del paraje en
We also reject his claims of inconsistency on the part of the prosecution's witnesses, donde una persona hace estancia de asiento. ... a titulo de
notably Asbok who stated that he was the first to be in the victim's house after the nuesped, o por otro cualquiera.i•t•c-aüsl (S. de 25 de Junio de
shooting (aside from the accused), in the face of Canao's testimony that she also had 1886, 2 Viada., 5 ed., 329.) 20
been there. The Court is not convinced that an inconsistency exists. For obviously,
Asbok had been mistaken. Canao had earlier been there.
In the Basa case, the victims were killed while sleeping as guests in the house of
another. Dwelling there was held to be aggravating.
The Court sees no need to make an inquiry on the admissibility of testimonies
attributing motive to the accused-appellant. We are sufficiently persuaded that even
According to earlier cases, including U.S. v. Bredejo, 21 our ruling was that the dwelling
without any successful showing of a motive, the circumstantial evidence on hand
place must be owned by the offended party. In another decision, People v.
nevertheless suffices to warrant a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Celespara, 22 dwelling was not appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in the
absence of proof that the victim owned the dwelling place where he was killed.
The Court, however, is not convinced that the accused-appellant had committed In People v. Guhiting, 23 morada was not likewise considered for the same reasons.
murder arising from treachery, evident premeditation, and means employed to weaken
the defense of the victim. As to treachery, jurisprudence is ample that the manner of
However, more recent cases have since followed the lead of Basa, notably People v.
attack must be shown. While there are testimonies to the effect that the victim was
Galapia 24 and People v. Sto. Tomas. 25
"fast asleep", we can not safely presume that he was still in that condition when the
accused sprung his attack. And since nobody saw the actual shooting, we can not
justifiably say that the victim was still actually still asleep at that time. 17 "Dwelling" is considered an aggravating circumstance because primarily of the
sanctity of privacy the law accords to human abode. According to one commentator,
one's dwelling place is a "sanctuary worthy of respect" 26 and that one who slanders
Neither is evident premeditation a qualifying circumstance. In appreciating evident
another in the latter's house is more guilty than if he who offends him elsewhere.
premeditation, it is necessary to show: (1) the time when the offender determined to
However, one does not lose his right of privacy where he is offended in the house of
another because as his invited guest, he, the stranger, is sheltered by the same roof
and protected by the same intimacy of life it affords. It may not be his house, but it is,
even for a brief moment, "home" to him. He is entitled to respect even for that short
moment.

It is with more reason in this case. The late Elpidio Dalsen died in the house of his
very parents. who raised him until he could be on his own.

Under the circumstances, we affirm the lower court, but only insofar as it held the
accused-appellant responsible for taking the life of Elpidio Dalsen. We hold him liable
for simple homicide aggravated by dwelling. Under the Revised Penal Code, he must
suffer reclusion temporal in its maximum period, there being no mitigating
circumstances and one aggravating circumstance. 27

G.R. No. 130492        January 31, 2001

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The accused-appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to seventeen
(17) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal. The grant of PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
damages is affirmed. vs.
SALVADOR ARROJADO, accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
MENDOZA, J.:
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
This is appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Roxas City,
finding accused-appellant Salvador Arrojado guilty of murder and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of 30 years of reclusion perpetua and to pay the amounts of
P60,000.00 as civil indemnity, P80,000.00 as moral damages, and the costs to the
heirs of the victim Mary Ann Arrojado.2

The Information against accused-appellant alleged:

That on or about the 1st day of June, 1996, in the City of Roxas,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with a knife, with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously attack, assault, and stab one Mary Ann Arrojado, on the different
parts of the body, to wit:

1. Stab wound, gaping, 1.5 cm. Length with a depth of 5 cm.

Located at the supra sternal area;

2. Stab wound, gaping, measuring 3 cm. in length, 10 cm. depth,

directed downward 5 cm. above the left nipple area the level of
midclavicular line;
 3. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 2.5 cm. in length,
5.5 cm. depth, located 4 cm. above the left nipple area,
midclavicular line;
4. Stab wound, elongated, gaping measuring 3 cm. in length,
18.53 cm. in depth, directed medially downward, located 3 cm.
above the left nipple, midclavicular line;
5. Stab wound, elongated, gaping measuring 3 cm. in length, 10.5
cm. depth, located 3 cm. medial to the left nipple;
6. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 3.5 cm. in length,
12 cm. in depth, directed laterally downward, located, 12 cm. in
depth, directed laterally downward, located 2 cm. medial to the
left nipple;
7. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 3.5 cm. in length,
12 cm. in depth, directed laterally, located 2 cm. medial to the left
nipple;
8. Stab wound, elongated, gaping measuring 3 cm. in length, 5.5
cm. in depth directed downward, located at the xiphoid area;
9. Stab wound, elongated gaping, measuring 3 cm. in length, 4
cm. in depth, directed medially, located 4 cm. below the left
nipple;
10. Stab wound penetration, measuring 4 x 4 cm. in length with
[e]visceration of the small intestine;
Thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal wounds which were the direct
and immediate cause of her death.
That by reason of the death Mary Ann Arrojado, her heirs incurred actual
and moral damages which may be awarded under the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The information was read and explained to accused-appellant in his native dialect,
after which he pleaded not guilty.5 Trial on the merits then ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution shows the following:
Accused-appellant Salvador Arrojado and the victim Mary Ann Arrojado are first
cousins, their fathers being brothers. The victim's father, Alberto Arrojado, who was
living in Canada, suffered a stroke for which reason he decided to come home to
Roxas City and spend the remainder of his days there. The victim accompanied her
father to the Philippines. They eventually settled in a house in Barangay Tanque,
Roxas City, where they lived on the financial support of the victim's sister Asuncion,
who continued to live in Canada, and her brother Buenaventura, who continued to live
in Canada, and her brother Buenaventura, who lived in Manila.
Starting February 15, 1996, accused-appellant lived with the victim and her father. He
helped care for the victim's father, for which he was paid a P1,000.00 monthly salary.6
In the early morning of June 1, 1996, accused-appellant went to the house cousin,
Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo, and reported that the victim had committed suicide. In
response, Erlinda, together with her husband Romulo Magdaluyo and her father
Teodorico Arrojado, went with accused-appellant to the house in Barangay Tanwue
where they found the victim dead. The victim, who was bloodied, was lying on her left
side facing the bedroom door with her hands clasped together. On her bed was a
rosary and a cruifix. Near her was a knife (Exh. C).7 Erlinda recognized it to be the
knife kept in the kitchen. Erlinda also noticed that the electric fan was turned on full
blast, while all the windows were closed except the window on the east side which
was slightly open. As he went to the other room, where the victim's father stayed,
accused-appellant told Erlinda that he was afraid he might be suspected as the one
responsible for the victim's death.8
The matter was reported to the police which noticed that the victim's room "was very
neat as if nothing happened." The police saw no signs of forcible entry.9 They made a
sketch of the victim's position in relation to the whole house (Exh. D)10 and took
pictures of her (Exhs. E-E-3).11
Dr. Ma. Lourdes Roldan, of the Roxas City Health Office, conducted the postmortem
examination of the victim at 1:30 p.m. of June 1, 1996. Her findings revealed that the
victim sustained the following stab wounds:
1. Stab wound, gaping, 1.5 cm. Length with a depth of 5 cm. Located at the
supra sternal area;
2. Stab wound, gaping, measuring 3 cm. in length, 10 cm. depth, directed
downward 5 cm. above the left nipple area the level of midclavicular line;
3. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 2.5 cm. in length, 5.5 cm.
depth, located 4 cm. above the left nipple area, midclavicular line;
4. Stab wound, elongated, gaping measuring 3 cm. in length, 18.53 cm. in
depth, directed medially downward, located 3 cm. above the left nipple,
midclavicular line;
 5. Stab wound, elongated, gaping measuring 3 cm. in length, 10.5 cm.
depth, located 3 cm. medial to the left nipple;
6. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 3.5 cm. in length, 12 cm. in
depth, directed laterally downward, located, 12 cm. in depth, directed
laterally downward, located 2 cm. medial to the left nipple;
7. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 3.5 cm. in length, 12 cm. in
depth, directed laterally, located 2 cm. medial to the left nipple;
8. Stab wound, elongated, gaping measuring 3 cm. in length, 5.5 cm. in
depth directed downward, located at the xiphoid area;
9. Stab wound, elongated gaping, measuring 3 cm. in length, 4 cm. in
depth, directed medially, located 4 cm. below the left nipple;
10. Stab wound penetration, measuring 4 x 4 cm. in length with
[e]visceration of the small intestine;12
Dr. Roldan testified that the victim died at around midnight of May 31, 1996 from
wound nos. 2, 4, 6, 7, and 10, which she deemed fatal.13 Thus, in the victim's death
certificate (Exb. B),14 she listed "HEMORRHAGIC SHOCK as the victim's immediate
cause of death and "multiple stab wounds" as the antecedent cause.
Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo testified that the relationship between the victim and
accused-appellant had been strained as the victim constantly picked on accused-
appellant even for the slighest mistake. Erlinda remembered the scolding that the
victim gave accused-appellant on May 27, 1996 over the loss of keys. Accused-
appellant was badly hurt by the victim's tonguelashing, according to Erlinda, and
complained to the victim, "You're too much." Erlinda said she offered to take the victim
in her house, but the latter refused, saying that her place was with her father. The
victim entrusted, however, her jewelry and bank book with signed withdrawal slips to
Erlinda. Three days later, on May 30, 1996, Erlinda returned the same and told the
victim that she should no be afraid of accused-appellant because he was taking care
of both her (the victim) and her father. Erlinda said she again met the victim on May
31, 1996 when she reminded the latter of their agreement to go out the following day,
June 1, 1996. On that day, however, the victim was found dead.15
Another relative of accused-appellant and the victim, Thelma Arrojado, corroborated
Erlinda's testimony. The father of Thelma's husband, Roque Arrojado, is a brother of
the victim's father and that of accused-appellant. Thelma said that she and her
husband lived at one time with the victim, and she knew the latter to be a snob
("suplada") and overly strict. Because they did not get along with the victim, Thelma
and her husband eventually left. She testified that accused-appellant was angry at the
victim and in fact passed by her store thrice (on May 27, 29, and 31, 1996),
complaining to her of the victim's maltreatment of him.16
Accused-appellant testified in his behalf. He told the court that on June 1, 1996, at
around 6:00 a.m., Alberto Arrojado asked him for food, so accused-appellant went to
the kitchen to find out if the victim had already prepared breakfast. When accused-
appellant found that the victim was not in the kitchen, he proceeded to the victim's
room. From the doorway, he saw the victim lying on her bed, bloodied. He thought
that the victim had committed suicide because the victim had told him that she felt tied
down taking care of her father. She in fact once remarked that "It would be better that
my father and I commit suicide." Accused-appellant said that the victim scolded him
only once and that was for buying rotten cabbage.17 He said that the victim was the
one who was constantly being scolded by her father who often found fault with her.
When presented with the knife found on the victim's bed (Exh. C), accused-appellant
admitted he was familiar with the knife as he saw the victim using it in
kitchen.1âwphi1.nêt
On April 21, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds and declares
accused Salvador Arrojado GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
heinous crime of murder, defined and penalized by Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Section 6 of Republic Act 7659, and, there
being no aggravating circumstance, hereby sentences him to imprisonment
of thirty (30) years of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnity the heirs of the
deceased Mary Ann Arrojado in the amount of P60,000.00, pay them moral
damages of P80,000.00, and pay the costs of this action.
In the service of his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, the
accused, who is a detention prisoner and not otherwise disqualified, shall be
credited with the full time of his confinement under preventive imprisonment,
provided he voluntarily agrees in writing to abide by the same disciplinary
rules imposed on convicted prisoners, pursuant to Art. 29 of the Revised
Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.18
The trial court held that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict
accused-appellant for the victim's death. In its decision, the trial court said:
The accused was the only person in the world who had the strong motive to
eliminate from earthly existence the deceased, who had no known enemies,
as he could no longer endure the verbal abuse to which he was frequently
subjected, even on trivial matters, by the deceased whom he must have
perceived as his evil tormetor. Being older [but] every now and then
scolded, insulted, and humiliated, he must have felt that the deceased had
no respect for him as a person and elder cousin. Suicide being physically
impossible and there being no shared of evidence showing that an intruder
could have surreptitiously entered the house as all doors and windows were
 securely closed, the killing could have been done only by someone who was
already inside the house. Certainly it could not have been the deceased's
old and invalid father who could not stand on his own, much less walk from
his room to the kitchen, get the fatal weapon, the kitchen knife, from where
it was placed therein, walk to his daughter's room, and then stab her. As
there were only the three of them inside the house, that leaves no one else,
by the process of elimination, who could have perpetrated the dastardly act
but the accused who had the only motive to do it and who was inside the
house at the time of the commission of the crime. Reinforcing this
conclusion is the admission of the accused that when he peeped into the
room of the deceased and allegedly saw for the first time the lifeless body of
the victim, he was already sure, even without going near or touching her
body and asking aloud what happened to her, that she was already dead
because he stabbed her not only once, but ten (10) times, inflicting five (5)
mortal wounds. And he had the gall to attribute his cousin's untimely death
to suivide because he could not concoct any other reason to save himself.19
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellants assigns the following errors as allegedly
having been committed by the trial court:
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT MARY ANN
ARROJADO WAS STABBED TEN TIMES AT HER HOME.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT MARY ANN
ARROJADO COULD NOT HAVE COMMITTED SUICIDE.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE HOUSE
OF MARY ANN RROJADO WAS TOTALLY CLOSED AND LOCKED
AGAINST INTRUDERS.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED-
APPELLANT WAS ABUSED AND OPPRESSED BY MARY ANN
ARROJADO THAT LED ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO KILL MARY ANN
ARROJADO.20
First. Accused-appellant claims that most of the victim's wounds were inflicted after
she had already committed suicide to make it appear that she was murdered. He says
that he saw only one wound in the victim's stomach,21 while Erlinda Arrojado
Magdaluyo said she saw only two wounds, one on the victim's neck and the other in
her abdomen. These are wound nos. 1 and 10 in the postmortem examination.22 Of
these two, the stomach wound was fatal, according to Dr. Roldan.23 accused-appellant
says that the other wounds may have been inflicted on the victim between the time the
body was brought out of the house in the morning and the time Dr. Roldan examined
the same at around 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon og June 1, 1996 at the De Jesus
funeral parlor.24
Accused-appellant's contention has no merit. That accused-appellant only saw one
wound while Erlinda Magdaluyo saw two one wound while Erlinda Magdaluyo saw two
wounds on the victim does not necessarily mean that the other wounds were inflicted
upon the victim afterwards. The two might have simply missed seeing the other
wounds. In accused-appellant's case, it may be because he did not go inside the room
but only viewed the body from a distance.25 On the other hand, while Erlinda Arrojado
Magdaluyo went near the victim's chest because the latter was dressed.26 But Dr.
Roldan, who conducted a postmortem examination, testified that the victim actually
sustained ten wounds. Between the cursory examination of the victim by accused-
appellant and Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo and Dr. Roldan's exhaustive examination,
there is no doubt that the latter's findings are entitled to credence.
Accused-appellant also argues that the varying depths of wound nos. 2, 4, 5, 8 and 9
(10 cm., 10.5 cm., 5.5 cm., and 4 cm.) despite the fact that they had the same surface
length of 3 cm. could only mean that after the victim was found dead, she was again
stabbed with a knife or knives other than the one (Exh. C) found beside her.27
The contention is without merit. The variance in depth does not necessarily mean that
more than one weapon was used. As has been stated:
[I]t is not possible to determine the depth of penetration of a stab
wound with any degree of accuracy, inasmuch as effusion of
blood into the tissues, changes in the position of the viscera, or
numerous other circumstances may alter the conditions existing
at the time when the wound was inflicted. Consequently, the
depth of the track at autopsy may be different from the actual
penetration of the instrument at the time of the
stabbing. Moreover, it is not always possible to correlate the
depth of the wound with the blade of the stabbing instrument. For
example, a short blade of two inches can penetrate four inches
into a soft area like the thigh or through the anterior abdominal
wall because the force of the thrust may dent the tissues
appreciably and thus deepen the wound. Conversely, a long
blade may not be thrust into its full length, and the wound may be
shorter than the blade. For these reasons attempts to correlate
the depth of the track and the length of the weapon should be
made with caution.28
Dr. Roldan in fact testified that the kitchen knife, marked as Exh. C, could have
caused all the wounds sustained by the victim.29 She also testified that the stab
wounds could have all been inflicted in the span of one minute.30 Having examined no
less than 100 victims of violence,31 Dr. Roldan's conclusions should be given
credence.
Moreover, with the exception of wound no. 10, all the wounds were described by Dr.
Roldan as "gaping." As stated in Forensic Medicine:
 … An ante-mortem wound gapes; there is eversion of the edges; a large
amount of blood is present, this is coagulated and infiltrating the wound; and
there is swelling and signs of inflammation and repair. In a post-mortem
wound there is no gaping. The bleeding is slight, if any, and it does not
infiltrate the wound.32
This belies accused-appellant's theory that the victim committed suicide and that it
was only after she was found dead that she was again stabbed to make it appear that
she had been killed.
Nor were the bloodsstains which PO2 Orly Baril33 and Erlinda Arrojado
Magdaluyo34 found on the victim's hands necessarily evidence of the victim's suicide.
The bloodstains could have come from the wounds sustained by her rather than from
her attempt to kill herself.
Accused-appellant also insists the victim committed suicide because she was feeling
respondent over her remaining single, her lack of regular employment which made her
dependent on the support of her siblings, and the responsibility of taking care of her
father who had become an invalid. He cites Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo's testimony
that the victim entrusted her jewelry and bankbook to her four days before she died.35
Erlinda, however, testified that the victim did this because she had a premonition that
accused-appellant might harm her, and not became of any intimation that she (the
victim) would kill herself.36
Contrary to the claim of accused-appellant that the victim was a depressed person
with a low sense of self-worth, Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo described the victim as "a
jolly person" who had many friends who go to her house. Moreover, according to
Erlindam, the victim, while not earning a fixed income, was not without means of
livelihood. The victim was good at cooking and took orders from neighbors. Erlinda
also disclosed that on the very day the victim was found dead, she and the victim had
plans to go out for relaxation.37 This negates any theory that the victim committed
suicide.
Second. Somewhat inconsistently with his claim that the victim was a suicide,
accused-appellant disputes the trial court's conclusion that only one of those residing
in the house could have killed the victim because the police found not sign of a break-
in. Accused-appellant says that in the morning of June 1, 1996, he found that the
kitchen door leading outside was open.38
Accused-appellant's contention must fail. Accused-appellant admitted that it did not
occur to him that an intruder was in the house in the evening of May 31, 1996
because "No person could get inside because the windows were closed and besides
the doors were closed."39
Significantly, Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo testified that accused-appellant also said
that no person could get inside the house because the doors and the windows were
closed.40 Accused-appellant never told Erlinda that the kitchen door was open that
morning. Indeed, Erlinda testified that "it is not possible that somebody would enter
the house as the doors were securely locked… with additional barrel bolts, and the
windows have grills."41
Third. Accused-appellant contends that Thelma Arrojado's testimony does not
deserve consideration because, by her own admission,42 the victim's sister Asuncion
asked her to testify on accused-appellant's complaints against the victim's treatment of
him. He also claims that it was inconsistent for Erlinda to testify, on the one hand, that
the victim was "loving friendly, and reasonable" and, on the other to say that she was
strict and domineering. Accused-appellant cites the testimony of the victim's brother,
Buenaventura Arrojado, that before her death the victim denied having any quarrel
with accused-appellant.43
To be sure, the evaluation of the trial court of the credibility of witnesses will not be
disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that it overlooked certain facts or
circumstances of substance that, if considered, could have affected the outcome of
case. This is because the trial court is in a better position to decide the question of
credibility having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment during the
trial.44 In this case, accused-appellant's contention that the testimonies of Thelma
Arrojado and Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo are incredible is without merit. Thelma
Arrojado's admission that the victim's sister Asuncion had asked her to testify does not
impair her credibility. Thelma was can did enough to say that at first she was hesitant
to testify because accused-appellant is also her relative. But she denied having been
coached on what to say, stating that she only testified as to "what Salvador Arrojado
said to me" which is that he could not bear the victim's maltreatment.45
As for Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo, she said that she suspected accused-appellant
but she did not want to say anything until she had proof.46 She testified also that so far
as she knew, only accused-appellant harbored a grudge against the victim, and that
accused-appellant himdelf told her so.47 With regard to Erlinda's seemingly
inconsistent description of the victim, suffice it to say that the victim's treatment of
accused-appellant does not necessarily reflect her attitude and behavior toward other
people.
Anent the testimony of the victim's brother, Buenaventura Arrojado, that the victim
denied having any quarrel with accused-appellant when he called her up two weeks
before her death,48 it is possible that the victim did not want to bother her brother who
was after all too far (since he lived in Manila) to be of much help. It is only to be
expected that Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo and Thelma Arrojdo, who lived near
accused-appellant and the victim, have a much more accurate assessment of the real
relationship between accused-appellant and the victim. Buenaventura Arrojado
testified that it was Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo who told him of the alleged quarrel
between the victim and accused-appellant.49
In sum, the following circumstances point to accused-appellant as the perpetrator of
the crime:
1. Accused-appellant, the victim, and the latter’s father were the only ones
living in the house in which the crime was committed in the evening of May
31, 1996.50
2. No one from the outside can gain entry since all doors of the house were
locked and the windows had grills.51
3. Accused-appellant had access to the victim’s bedroom because the
bedroom doors were left unlocked so that the victim could check on her
father’s condition during the night. Accused-appellant sleeps in the same
bedroom as the victim’s father.52
4. The murder weapon was a kitchen knife readily accessible to the
occupants of the house.53 As the Solicitor General observed, common
sense dictates that if an outsider entered the house with the intent to kill the
victim, he would have brought his own weapon to ensure the execution of
his purpose.54
5. None of the victim’s belongings was missing or disturbed, indicating that
the motive for the crime was not gain but revenge.55
6. Judging from the number and severity of the wounds (10 stab wounds,
half of which were fatal),56 the killer felt deep-seated resentment and anger
toward the victim. Accused-appellant had admitted those feelings to Erlinda
Arrojado Magdaluyo and Thelma Arrojado.57
7. Aside from accused-appellant, no one was known to harbor a grudge
against the victim.58
8. As the Solicitor General also pointed out, accused-appellant’s behavior in
the morning of June 1, 1996 was inconsistent with someone who had just
found his cousin and employer, a person he claims to get along with,
dead.59 By his testimony, he did not even go inside the room to check on her
condition on the lame excuse that he was afraid. He also did not inform his
neighbors about the incident for the equally flimsy reason that he did not
know them nor did he go to the police.60
Under Rule 133, §4 of the Rules on Evidence, cricumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inference are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. As the foregoing discussion
shows, these requisites have been established in this case.
Fourt. With respect to the circumstances attending the commission of the crime, the
trial court correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery against
accused-appellant. To appreciate treachery, two conditions must be present: (1) the
employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked np opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate and (2) the means of execution is deliberately or
consciously adopted.61 Both requisites have been established in this case.
Anent the first requisite, Dr. Roldan testified that based on her findings, the victim was
not in a position to fight the assailant and that she might have been stabbed while she
was asleep.62 As regards the second requisite, the number and nature of the wounds
sustained by the victim lead to no other conclusion thatn that accused-appellant
employed means in killong the victim which tended directly and specially to ensure its
execution without risk to himself arising from the defense so many wounds, a total 10,
half of which were fatal, if he had not deliberately adopted such manner of
attack.63 Abuse of superior strength also attended the killing since accused-appellant,
a man and armed with a knife, attacked the victim, an unarmed and dfenseless
woman.64 However, since abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery, there is
no need to appreciate it separately as an independent aggravating circumstance.65
The trial court correctly held that there was no proof of evident premeditation since the
requisites thereor, to wit, (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the
crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to his determination;
and (c) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him
to reflect upon the consequence of his act,66 have not been established in this case.
Nor can the generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling be appreciated against
accused-appellant since the latter and the victim lived in the same house.67
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence, however, is present in this
case. For this aggravating circumstance to exist, it is essential to show that the
confidence between the parties must be immediate and personal such as would give
the accused some advantage or make it easier for him to commit the criminal act. The
condifence must be a means of facilitating the commission of the crim, the culprit
taking advantage of the offended party's belied that the former would not abuse said
confidence.68 In this case, while the victim may have intimated her fear for her safety
for which reason she entrusted her jewelry and bank book to Erlinda Arrojado
Magdaluyo, her fears were subsequently allayed as shown by the fact that she took
back her personal effects from Erlinda.69 Thinking that accused-appellant would not do
her any harm, because he was after all her first cousin, the victim allowed accused-
appellant to sleep in the same room with her father and left the bedroom doors
unlocked.70
The murder in this case took place after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659 on December
31, 1993 which increased the penalty for murder from reclusion temporal maximum to
death to reclusion perpetua to death. In view of the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of confidence and in accordance with Art. 63(1) of the Revised
Penal Code, the trial court should have imposed the penalty of death on accused-
appellant. However, on December 1, 2000, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
took effect, requiring that every complaint or information state not only the qualifying
but also the aggravating circumstances.71 This provision may be given retroactive
effect in the light of the well settled rule that "statutes regulating the procedure of the
court will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time
of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that
extent."72 The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence not having been
alleged in the information, the same therefore could not be appreciated to raise
accused-appellant's sentence to death.1âwphi1.nêt

In accordance with the ruling in People v. Lucas73 that the penalty of reclusion

perpetua remains indivisible notwithstanding the fixing of its duration from twenty (20)
years and one (1) day to forty (40) years,74 the trial court erred in imposing on
accused-appellant the penalty of 30 years of reclusion perpetua. In the with the ruling
in Lucas, accused-appellant should suffer the entire extent of forty (40) years
of reclusion perpetua.75

Consistent with current case law,76 the civil indemnity for the crime of murder should
be reduced from P60,000.00 to P50,000.00, while the award of moral damages in the
amount of P80,000.00 should be reduced to P50,000.00.
G.R. No. 149368             April 14, 2004
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Roxas City, is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Salvador Arrojado is PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in its entire duration and to its vs.
full extent. Furthermore, he is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Mary Ann Arrojado FRANCISCO DACILLO alias DODOY AND JOSELITO PACOT y IBARRA (case
the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and the further sum of P50,000.00 as provisionally dismissed), accused,
moral damages and the costs. FRANCISCO DACILLO alias DODOY, appellant.

SO ORDERED. DECISION

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena.JJ: concur. CORONA, J.:

Before us on automatic review is the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City, Branch 31, in Criminal Case No. 45,283-2000 convicting appellant Francisco
Dacillo y Timtim alias Dodoy of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of death.

Appellant Dacillo together with Joselito Pacot y Ibarra were indicted for murder in an
information that read:

The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the crime of

Murder, under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
7659, committed as follows:

That on or about February 6, 2000, in the City of Davao,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-mentioned accused, conspiring, confederating together
 and helping one another, with treachery and evident
premeditation, and with intent to kill, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attacked, assaulted and stabbed one Rosemarie B.
Tallada with a bladed weapon, thereby inflicting upon the latter
mortal wounds which caused her death.
That the commission of the foregoing offense was attended by the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The case against appellant’s co-accused, Joselito Pacot, was provisionally dismissed
for lack of sufficient evidence to identify him with certainty.
Appellant was arraigned on February 21, 2001 and, assisted by counsel, pleaded not
guilty. Pre-trial was conducted on March 1, 2001 and trial ensued thereafter.
To establish appellant’s guilt, the prosecution presented the following witnesses:
Charlita Tallada, the victim’s mother; Patricia Turlao, the victim’s aunt; appellant
Dacillo’s neighbors, Jovelyn Dagmil, Augusto Cesar Arara, Roche Abregon, Resna
Abregon, Allan Castanares, Jupiter Campaner; police officers SPO2 Rodolfo Taburda
and SPO1 Avelino Alcobus, and medico-legal officer Dr. Danilo P. Ledesma.
The facts, as established by the prosecution witnesses’ collective testimonies, follow.
The victim, seventeen-year-old Rosemarie B. Tallada, was last seen alive at
dusk on February 6, 2000, on the bridge near appellant’s house at Purok
No. 3, New Society Village, Ilang, Davao City.
Around 7:45 p.m. that evening, witness Jovelyn Dagmil, who was living with
her aunt in the house adjacent to appellant’s, was looking for her cousin
when she saw the victim Rosemarie on the bridge. Because it was drizzling,
she invited Rosemarie inside their house but the latter declined and told her
she was waiting for someone.3
After a while, Jovelyn heard a man inside appellant’s house calling "Psst, psst . . ."
Thinking the call was meant for her, she turned but instead saw Rosemarie walking
towards and entering appellant’s house.4
Not long after Rosemarie went inside the house, a struggle was heard therein.
Witnesses Roche and Resna Abregon, who were in the adjacent house singing with a
karaoke machine, suddenly felt the floor shaking as if a scuffle was going on at the
other side of the wall. The houses were built on stilts above the seashore, adjoining
one another with mere wooden partitions in between. Roche Abregon peeped through
a hole on the wall and saw appellant and another man grappling with a woman who
was gagged with a handkerchief.5 When Roche saw appellant choking the woman,
she informed her aunt about the commotion in appellant’s house but the aunt brushed
it aside as a simple family quarrel.6 For a while they heard the sound of a woman
being beaten up. Then everything became quiet. Later that evening, they saw
appellant leaving his house.7
The following day, February 7, 2000, at around 8:00 a.m., appellant was seen entering
his house carrying lumber and screen.8 He was observed going in and out of his
house several times, each time carefully locking the gate as he left.9 At around 9:00
a.m., appellant was seen with ready-mixed cement in a plastic pail and, when asked
what he was going to do with the cement, replied that it was for the sink he was
constructing.10
Later, appellant entrusted a bag of woman’s personal belongings to barangay
tanod Allan Castañares and told the latter that it belonged to his woman companion.
He allegedly could not bring it home because his wife might see them.11
By February 11, 2000, neighbors started smelling the rotten odor of Rosemarie’s
already decomposing body.12
At 5:00 p.m. the same day, witnesses Roche, Resna, and Rachel were gathering
seashells under appellant’s house when they saw droplets of blood and pus dripping
from appellant’s comfort room. They immediately reported it to their aunt who in turn
instructed her husband to get a stick and poke the sacks covering the comfort room.
However, the husband instead climbed up the house and was greeted by the stink
emanating from the corner where he saw a tomb-like structure. They immediately
reported the matter to barangay officials who called the police.13
At about 10:00 p.m., policemen arrived at appellant’s house, accompanied by his wife,
and forcibly opened the lock. They proceeded to where the tomb was located.
When cracked open, the tomb revealed the decomposing body of a woman.14
The corpse was brought to the Rivera Funeral Parlor where it was identified by the
victim’s mother Charlita Tallada and aunt Patricia Turlao as that of Rosemarie,
through the keloid scar on her forearm.
Dr. Danilo Ledesma conducted an autopsy on Rosemarie’s remains. His necropsy
report revealed that Rosemarie died from a stab wound in the abdomen. The report
further disclosed that she suffered contusions in the anterior chest wall and her right
hand; an incised wound on her left middle finger; a stab wound on the left side of the
face and fractures on the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th ribs on her side.15
Dr. Ledesma testified that the wounds suffered by Rosemarie indicated that she put
up a struggle and the wounds were inflicted before her death.16
In his defense, appellant admitted complicity in the crime but minimized his Costs de oficio.
participation. Appellant alleged that he only held down Rosemarie’s legs to prevent
her from struggling and, after the latter was killed by another man he identified as
SO ORDERED.18
Joselito Pacot, he encased the corpse in cement.

Thus, this automatic review.

He claimed that Pacot, a co-worker at Davao Union Cement Corporation (DUCC), was
looking for a house where he and his girlfriend Rosemarie could spend the night. He
offered his brother’s house which was under his care. In the evening of February 6, In his brief, appellant raises the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
2000, he and Joselito Pacot brought Rosemarie to the house at Purok No. 3, New
Society Village, Ilang, Davao City.
I

After accompanying the couple there, he went home to take supper. Later that
evening, he returned to the house with the bottle of Sprite Pacot had ordered. When
he arrived, Pacot and Rosemarie were already grappling with each other and Pacot
was strangling the girl. He told Pacot to stop but instead of heeding him, the latter
ordered him to close the door. Pacot told appellant that he was going to be implicated
just the same so he closed the door as ordered and helped Pacot "(hold) the feet of
the woman" as "her feet kept hitting the walls."17
The two men stopped only when Rosemarie was already motionless. Pacot wanted to
dump the body into the sea but appellant told him it was low tide. Appellant then
suggested that they entomb the body in cement for which Pacot gave appellant ₱500.
Pacot left the house at dawn the following day, February 7, 2000. At past 10:00 a.m.,
appellant brought the concrete mixture and cast the dead body in cement. After
finishing the job in the afternoon of that day, appellant reported for work at DUCC.
When the body was discovered in the evening of February 11, 2000, appellant
immediately left for Cebu City, arriving there the next day, February 12, 2000. He
stayed in Cebu City until his arrest the following year.
On May 31, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty of murder
and imposed upon him the supreme penalty of death:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Francisco Dacillo GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER for the death of
Rosemarie Tallada, as defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. Considering the aggravating circumstance of
recidivism with no mitigating circumstance to offset the same, he is hereby
sentenced to the extreme penalty of DEATH,
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE APPELLANT
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING THE HEIRS OF
THE OFFENDED PARTY THE AMOUNT OF PHP50,000.00, WHICH
APPEARS AS PAYMENT FOR ACTUAL DAMAGES.19
Appellant admitted that he had a hand in the killing of Rosemarie but attempted to
downgrade his participation in the crime by claiming he only held Rosemarie’s legs as
Pacot was strangulating her. The rule is that any admission made by a party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof to hold him liable
therefor. Such admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made
through palpable mistake or no such admission was in fact made. There was never
any such disclaimer by appellant.
Moreover, despite appellant’s self-serving, exculpatory statement limiting his
involvement in the crime, all circumstances pointed to his guilt. His declaration faltered
in the face of the testimonies of eyewitnesses positively identifying him as one of the
two men who were with Rosemarie when she was killed. Witness Roche Abregon
pointed to appellant as the one who strangled Rosemarie. He was established to be
inside the house at the time the witnesses heard a woman being battered. Thus,
assuming for the sake of argument that Pacot was the mastermind, appellant’s
admission that he participated in its commission by holding Rosemarie’s legs made
him a principal by direct participation.
Two or more persons taking part in the commission of a crime are considered
principals by direct participation if the following requisites are present:

He is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the offended party in the

1. they participated in the criminal resolution and
amount of ₱50,000.00, plus the sum of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and
the sum of ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
2. they carried out their plan and personally took part in its execution by
acts which directly tended to the same end.20
His immediate confinement to the national penitentiary is hereby ordered.
Both requisites were met in this case. Two or more persons are said to have The killing of Rosemarie was thus correctly qualified to murder by the abuse of
participated in the criminal resolution when they were in conspiracy at the time of the superior strength, a circumstance specifically pleaded in the information and proved
commission of the crime. To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof beyond reasonable doubt.
of the previous agreement and decision to commit the crime, it being sufficient that the
malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.21
The Court, however, finds that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty on
the ground that appellant admitted during re-cross examination that he had a prior
The prosecution was able to prove appellant’s participation in the criminal resolve by conviction for the death of his former live-in partner. The fact that appellant was a
his own admission that, right after he was told by Pacot to close the door, he held recidivist was appreciated by the trial court as a generic aggravating circumstance
down Rosemarie’s legs. He was pinpointed as the one who throttled the victim. He which increased the imposable penalty from reclusion perpetua to death.
admitted that they only stopped when they were sure that Rosemarie was already
dead. The two men planned how to dispose of the victim’s body; it was in fact
In order to appreciate recidivism as an aggravating circumstance, it is necessary to
appellant’s idea to pour concrete on the body, prevailing over Pacot’s suggestion to
allege it in the information and to attach certified true copies of the sentences
just dump the body into the sea. It was appellant himself who encased the body in
previously meted out to the accused.26 This is in accord with Rule 110, Section 8 of
cement and made sure that there were no leaks from which foul odor could emanate.
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:
He was a conspirator in the killing and, whether or not he himself did the strangling or
the stabbing, he was also liable for the acts of the other accused.
SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall
state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or
It is well-settled that a person may be convicted for the criminal act of another where,
omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and
between them, there is conspiracy or unity of purpose and intention in the commission
aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense,
of the crime charged.22 Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of prior
reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute
agreement on the commission of the crime as the same can be inferred from the
punishing it. (Emphasis supplied)
conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime showing
that they acted in unison with each other pursuant to a common purpose or design.23
The aggravating circumstance of recidivism was not alleged in the information and
therefore cannot be appreciated against appellant. Hence the imposable penalty
We are convinced beyond doubt of the joint and concerted effort between appellant
should be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
and the man he identified as Pacot in the killing of Rosemarie.

Regarding the award of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim, appellant
Appellant likewise contends that the trial court erred in ruling that the presence of the
claims that said amount was awarded by the trial court as payment for actual
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength qualified the killing to murder.
damages. This claim is misleading. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the
He contends that the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was not
amount was granted by the trial court by way of indemnity ex delicto to compensate
specifically alleged in the information. Nothing can be farther from the truth. A cursory
for the death of the victim which prevailing jurisprudence fixes at ₱50,000.27 The
reading of the information reveals that appellant was sufficiently informed of the
award of such indemnity requires no proof other than the death of the victim and the
charges against him, including the use of superior strength in killing the hapless and
accused’s responsibility therefor.28
defenseless female victim.

The award of ₱50,000 as moral damages is proper, supported as it was by the

The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength necessitates a showing of
testimony of Charlita Tallada, the victim’s mother, that Rosemarie’s death caused her
the relative disparity in the physical characteristics of the aggressor and the victim
immeasurable pain.29
such as age, gender, physical size and strength. We agree with the trial court that the
killing of Rosemarie was committed with abuse of superior strength. As found by the
court a quo, two grown-up men against a young fragile woman whose ability to defend In addition, the Court awards ₱25,000 in temperate damages, said amount being
herself had been effectively restrained revealed a shocking inequality of physical awarded in homicide or murder cases when no evidence of burial and funeral
strength. The victim was much weaker in constitution and could not have possibly expenses is presented in the trial court.30
defended herself from her stronger assailants.24 Such disparity was manifest in the
contusions in the chest and hands, wounds on the fingers, a stab wound on the left
With regard to the award of exemplary damages, the Civil Code of the Philippines
side of the face and multiple fractures in the ribs of the victim.25 The abuse of superior
provides:
strength was obvious in the way Rosemarie was mercilessly beaten to a pulp.
 ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of Costs de oficio.
example of correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
SO ORDERED.

ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil

Davide, Jr., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga
aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from
JJ., concur.
fines and shall be paid to the offended party.

In People vs. Catubig,31 we explained that:

The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not
having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic
sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the
public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim
as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by,
respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by
an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or EN BANC
a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the
attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in
its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State G.R. Nos. 137520-22 : May 9, 2002
concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily,
intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ALFREDO BAROY and FELICISIMO
sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended NACIONAL, appellants.
party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld
when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an
aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of DECISION
consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender.
In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, PANGANIBAN, J.:
whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award
of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the
Civil Code. Where no aggravating circumstance is alleged in the information and proven during the trial,
the crime of rape through the use of a deadly weapon may be penalized only with reclusion
perpetua, not death.
Thus, the award of exemplary damages is warranted under Art. 2230 of the Civil Code
in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
Imposition of exemplary damages is also justified under Art. 2229 of the Civil Code in The Case
order to set an example for the public good.32 For this purpose, we believe that the
amount of ₱25,000 may be appropriately awarded. Before us for automatic review is the January 20, 1999 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court
of Paraaque City (Branch 259) in Criminal Case Nos. 98-355/7, finding Alfredo Baroy and
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment in Criminal Case No. 45,283-2000 of the Felicisimo Nacional guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of qualified rape and
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 31, is sentencing them to death for each offense. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Francisco Dacillo y reads as follows:
Timtim alias Dodoy is declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder as defined
and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. There being neither WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court finds accused Alfredo Baroy and
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, appellant is hereby sentenced to reclusion Felicisimo Nacional GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt [of] the crime of rape (three counts) in
perpetua and is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Rosemarie Tallada the sum Crim. Case Nos. 98-355/7 as defined and penalized under Republic Act. 8353 Art. 266-A and
of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000 as moral damages, ₱25,000 as temperate Art. 266 B through the use of force[,] threat or intimidation with a deadly weapon upon the
damages and ₱25,000 as exemplary damages. person of Emeliza Bueno with the aggravating circumstances of nightime and confederation
and there being no mitigating circumstances, both accused are hereby sentenced [for] each
count of rape (three counts) the penalty of DEATH by lethal injection and to suffer the
accessory penalties provided by law specifically Art. 40 of the RPC. For the civil liability each
accused is hereby further condemned to indemnify the private complainant the amount
of P50,000.00 in each of the three counts of rape in line with existing
jurisprudence; P50,000.00 each for three counts for moral damages and P50,000.00 each for
exemplary damages for each count.2cräläwvirtualibräry
With the assistance of their counsel de oficio,3 appellants pleaded not guilty during their
arraignment on April 16, 1998.4 In three (3) separate identically worded Informations,5 they
were accused of sexually assaulting Emeliza Bueno allegedly as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of March[,] 1998 in the Municipality of Paranaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court[,] the above-named accused
ALFREDO GORRE BAROY, conspiring and confederating with accused FELICISIMO
HAMTIG NACIONAL, by means of force and intimidation, with the use of a chisel, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one Emeliza Bueno,
against her will and consent.6
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecutions version of the factual antecedents of the case are presented by the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) as follows:
Sometime on March 2, 1998 at around 2:30 in the morning, Emeliza Bueno, a guest relations
officer of Ringo Japanese Karaoke Bar in Pasay Road, Makati, left the place of her work and
proceeded to her home in Camella, Paraaque. While on board a tricycle along U.N. St., Better
Living Subd., two armed men who later on were identified as appellants Alfredo Baroy and
Felicisimo Nacional blocked the path being traversed by the tricycle. Then, they asked money
from the driver and pulled Emeliza out from the tricycle.
The tricycle driver however was able to escape but appellants succeeded in taking Emeliza to a
vacant lot. There, Emeliza begged for mercy but her pleas fell on deaf ears. She struggled to
get loose but appellants overpowered her. Baroy took off her pants and underwear and pointing
a chisel towards the victim succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her while Nacional
served as a lookout.
After Baroy finished raping Emeliza, Nacional took turn in raping her. Afterwards, Nacional
left leaving behind Baroy who raped Emeliza x x x for the second time.
The tricycle driver Alfredo Vinuya who was able to escape proceeded to the guardhouse of
Better Living Subd. at 1618 Levitown and informed the guards of the incident. Vinuya was
able to convince the security guards to accompany him to the place of the incident to look for
the victim. When they searched the place, one of the security guards noticed that someone went
out of the bushes and there, they saw the victim Emeliza and appellant Baroy. The guards
apprehended Baroy while Vinuya boarded the victim to his tricycle. Baroy was taken to the
Barangay Hall and thereafter to the police station where the police learned from him the place
where Felicisimo Nacional could be arrested.7 (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
On the other hand, appellants give the following account:
On the part of accused Felicisimo Nacional, it appeared that he was working as a stay-in driver
of a certain Mr. Vicente Saldana with residence at Betterliving Subdivision. On the early
morning of March 1, 1998, he delivered some garments at Taytay, Rizal and went back after
lunch. At around 1:30 p.m., he drove for Mr. Saldana, who went to several factories and they
returned home at around 10:00 o clock in the evening. At around 11:00 p.m., he again drove
for Mr. Saldana, who went to his friend in Merville. On the same night, he had a drinking spree
with Alfredo Baroy at a Videoke Bar. He left earlier, since he had work the next day. He rode
in a tricycle to his employers house, however, when he arrived the door was already closed. He
went to the guard house in order to sleep there. He was awaken(ed) when someone kicked the
folding bed in which he was sleeping and he was arrested by the police. He was being accused
of committing rape. He denied the charge and stated that the only time he saw the victim was
in the courtroom.
On the part of accused Alfredo Baroy, it appeared that he was working for a certain Atty.
Galicia as caretaker of his chickens. He met the accused Nacional, when the latter went to their
barracks and asked him if he wants to work as a delivery boy. On March 1, 1998 at around
10:00 p.m., they had a drinking spree (in) a store at Singapore Street. Nacional invited him to a
nearby farm in order for a drink, however it was already closed, so they went back to his
barracks. While they were walking at around 11:00 p.m. they passed by a videoke and they had
a drinking and singing session. They rode a tricycle and disembarked at U.N. Avenue where he
slept in a nearby store which was already closed. Nacional left and blocked a passing tricycle.
Nacional asked him to guard the driver and the former pulled down the woman passenger
afterwhich he took her to a vacant lot. While Nacional was pulling the woman towards the
vacant lot, Baroy returned to the store. He heard the woman crying and asking for help, so he
went to the place and saw the woman lying down with her pants pulled down. Nacional had
already left. He helped the woman to put on her pants and asked her what happened, but she
could not speak. He accompanied the woman in waiting for a tricycle in order to take her
home. The first tricycle which passed by did not stopped [sic]. The second one stopped and
turned out to be the tricycle earlier blocked by Nacional. The said tricycle was loaded with
barangay tanods, who thinking that he will escape, started to beat him and apprehended him.8
Ruling of the Trial Court
The RTC gave full credence to the positive and unequivocal testimony of complainant that
appellants had taken turns in raping her. Corroborating her testimony was the tricycle driver,
who said that appellants had forcibly taken her from his vehicle after holding him up. The RTC
found the denial by appellants, who had given conflicting statements regarding their
participation in the crime, totally bereft of merit, self-serving and not deserving of any
credibility.9cräläwvirtualibräry
Hence, this automatic review.10
The Issues
In their Brief, appellants submit the following assignment of errors for our consideration:
I
The court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of rape.
II
The court a quo gravely erred in considering the existence of nightime and
confederation as aggravating circumstances.
III
The court a quo gravely erred in not appreciating the privilege mitigating circumstance
of minority in favor of accused-appellant Alfredo Baroy.[11
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious; the penalty should be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Main Issue:
Sufficiency of the Prosecutions Evidence
Appellants assert that the evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to establish
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They point to some alleged flaws and inconsistencies in
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly with respect to the exact location of
the scene of the crime and the recovery of the chisel used in its commission. According to
them, highly doubtful is the claim of the victim that she was raped on a vacant lot about 10
arms length away from the place where the tricycle was blocked, because neither the victim
nor any of the accused was supposedly found in that place when the tricycle driver and the
security guards returned there.
Likewise, appellants harp on the supposed contradictory statements of the prosecution
witnesses with regard to where the chisel was actually recovered. They argue that these
inconsistencies and contradictions render the prosecution evidence unreliable and insufficient
to warrant a conviction.
We are not persuaded. We have carefully scrutinized the records of the case. Contrary to the
assertion of appellants, the prosecution was able to establish clearly their acts of rape as well as
their participation in its commission. The alleged inconsistencies on matters relating to where
exactly the rapes were committed and where the chisel was recovered are minor details that do
not form part of the elements of the crime charged. By no means can we disturb the findings
and conclusions of the trial court on the basis of these contentions which do not in any way
contradict or, at the very least, cast serious doubt on the rape charge.
Whether the rapes were committed within the vicinity where the tricycle was stopped or at a
considerable distance therefrom is of no moment in proving the existence of the crime.
Likewise, regardless of whether the chisel was recovered from the crime scene or from
Appellant Baroy does not obscure, much less contravene, the unequivocal and undeniable fact
that appellants had carnal knowledge of the victim against her will by means of force and
intimidation.
Inconsistencies in minor details and collateral matters do not affect the weight, the substance or
the veracity of a witness testimony as a whole12 with respect to material and important
facts.13 Such inconsistencies even serve to strengthen rather than destroy ones
credibility.14cräläwvirtualibräry
Verily, to be crucial to or determinative of the culpability of the accused, the discrepancies
should touch on significant facts.15 As long as there is consistency in the positive identification
of the accused and in the narration of the principal occurrence, the credibility of a witness is
not impaired.16 And the testimony of the rape victim deserves full faith and credit, provided it
is plain, straightforward, to the point, and unflawed by any material or significant
inconsistency.17cräläwvirtualibräry
To be sure, the victim narrated the libidinous transgressions committed against her by
appellants, her sordid experience of violence and sexual abuse in their hands, as follows:
Q Upon going home to Camella, do you recall of any incident that happened? in the morning
of March 2?
A Yes, sir. Noong papauwi na po ako, hinarang po yong tricycle na sinasakyan ko.
Q Where?
A At UN Avenue.
Q Do you recall who blocked the tricycle you were riding in at that time?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please look around the courtroom and point to this Honorable Court the persons who Q Do you know who pulled you down?
blocked the tricycle you were riding in?
A Nacional, Sir.
A The two of them, sir.
Q After he pulled you [down], what did he do?
(WITNESS POINTED TO TWO MALE PERSONS INSIDE THE COURTROOM WHO
WHEN ASKED THEIR NAMES ANSWERED AS ALFREDO BAROY AND FELICISIMO
A The tricycle driver was able to run and I was left behind and they brought me to the vacant
NACIONAL)
lot.

Q You said they blocked the tricycle you were riding in, how did they block it?
Q How did they bring you to the vacant lot?

A Pinara nila ang tricycle na sinasakyan ko.

A Hinila po nila ako, hawak-hawak po ang magkabila kong braso.

Q After that, what happened?

Q While they were pulling you, were you saying anything to them?

A Hinold-up po nila yong tricycle driver. Hiningi po yong pera tapos tinatanong po nila kung
A Yes, sir.
ano yong pasahero. Nang makita po nilang babae, sabi nila ibaba daw po dahil papatayin nila
ang driver at ibababa nila ang sakay na babae.
Q What?
Q Were they bringing anything with them at that time?
A Nagmamakaawa po ako sa kanila.
A The small one had a chisel and Nacional had a stone.
Q What exactly did you tell them?
ATTY. MACASAET:
A Sabi ko po huwag po nila akong galawin dahil binigay ko na po lahat ng pera ko, lahat ng
gamit ko pero hindi po nila ako pinakinggan.
Your Honor, since the evidence custodian is not around, may we reserve the identification and
marking of the chisel. What did they tell you when they blocked the tricycle driver?
Q When you were at the vacant lot, what happened next?
A Hinohold-up po nila ang tricycle driver, hinihingi nila ang pera.
A Nagmamakaawa po ako sa kanila pero hindi nila ako pinakinggan tapos ni-rape na po nila
ako.
Q Did the tricycle driver give the money?

Q Paano nila isinagawa ang pangre-rape sa iyo?

A Yes, sir.

A Hinubaran po ako ng damit.

Q After that, what happened next?

Q Who undressed you?

A Tapos po nang makita nila na ang pasahero ng tricycle driver ay babae, pinababa po nila ako.

A Baroy, the small one?

Q Paano ka nila pinababa?

Q What was done to you after you were undressed?

A They pulled me down.
A Ginahasa na po ako.
Q While you were being raped by them, did you struggle?
A Opo pero lalaki po sila at malakas kaya wala po akong nagawa.
Q While you were being raped by Baroy, where was the other one?
A Nakabantay po sa paligid, nagmamasid po na baka po may dumating.
Q You said they had with them chisel and stone, while you were being raped, were they still
bringing those items?
A Yes, sir.
Q Sino ang mga may hawak non?
A Baroy was holding the chisel and Nacional was holding the stone.
Q What happened next after Baroy raped you?
A Nacional followed, he also raped me.
Q How did he rape you?
A Pinuwersa po nila ako.
Q How did they force you?
A They held my hands and then the two of them raped me.
Q While you were being raped, were you telling them something?
A Nagmamakaawa po ako sa kanila pero wala po silang naririnig, nagbibingi-bingihan po sila.
Q What happened next, after you were raped by Nacional?
A Umalis po si Nacional, naiwan po yong maliit, hinihila-hila po ako dahil dadalhin daw po
ako sa manukan at doon ako yayariin.
Q When you heard the word yayariin, what do you understand by that, yayariin ka sa
manukan?
A I will be killed.[18cräläwvirtualibräry
As can be gleaned from the foregoing testimony, the victim rendered a clear, coherent and
consistent account of the rape incidents and positively identified appellants as the perpetrators.
Indeed, she could not have been motivated by any persuasion other than to prosecute the real
culprits who had violated her. As a rule, a rape victim will not come out in the open if her
motive is not to seek redress and obtain justice.19 Neither would she allow herself to suffer the
social scourge and the psychological stigma of rape if her testimony as to the identities of the
perpetrators are false or fabricated. It is an accepted doctrine that in the absence of improper
motive on the part of the victim of rape to falsely testify against the accused, her testimony
deserves utmost credence.20cräläwvirtualibräry
On the other hand, appellants present divergent accounts that only reflect the feigned and
perfidious nature of their testimonies. Appellant Nacional denies having had any knowledge of
the circumstances leading to the rape incidents; Appellant Baroy, however, readily admits their
participation therein, pointing to his co-appellant as the one who had raped the victim as
follows:
Q S[o] bale kayong dalawa ni Nacional, naglalakad doon sa United Nations Avenue?
A Opo.
Q Pagkatapos hinarang ninyo iyong tricycle, na ang hawak mo ay paet?
A Opo.
Q Ang hawak naman ni Nacional ay bato?
A Opo.
Q Tapos hiningi ninyo iyong pera?
A Opo.
xxx
Q So hinarang nyo nga iyong tricycle at pinalalabas nyo iyong pera ng tricycle driver di ba?
A Opo.
Q At dahil walang maibigay na pera iyong driver, inundayan nyo ng saksak iyong driver, di A Hindi po nandun lang po ako sa tindahan.
ba?
Q At ang sinasabi mo si Nacional ang may kagagawan ng lahat? Hindi ba kasama ka roon,
A Hindi po. Sinilip ni Nacional iyong laman ng sidecar. Pinabantayan naman niya sa akin dalawang beses mo pa nang pinilit iyong babae na gamitin?
iyong driver.
A Hindi po.
Q At nakita niya iyong babae?
Q Nakailang beses si Nacional gamitin iyong babae, na puwersahin iyong babae?
A Opo.
A Isang beses lang po.
Q At pinilit nyong pinababa iyong babae?
Q Paano mo nalaman na isang beses lang daw?
A Opo. Tapos iyong babae, humawak siya doon sa sidecar. Tapos hinila niya.
A Kasi iyon po ang sinabi nya sa akin.[21cräläwvirtualibräry
Q Ayaw sumama ng babae, pero pinipilit nyo naman siyang pababain. Kundi pupukpokin ng
bato, ganun ba?
The denials resorted to by appellants are not supported by clear and convincing
evidence.22 Moreover, their discordant and irreconcilable testimonies only indicate a tendency
A Hindi ho. Hinila lang niya. to prevaricate and a desperate attempt to distort an otherwise unequivocal factual scenario
established by the prosecution. Bare denials by the accused, unsubstantiated by convincing
evidence, are not enough to engender reasonable doubt in the light of sufficiently telling proof
Q Pero kitang-kita mo sa mukha ng babae na takot na takot?
of guilt presented by the prosecution.23 When the latters evidence convincingly connects the
crime and the culprit, the probative value of denial becomes quite
A Opo. negligible.24cräläwvirtualibräry

Q At walang nagawa iyong babae kundi sumama na dahil sa takot, ganun ba?
A Opo.
Q At dinala na ninyo sa may bakanteng lote, kayong dalawa?
It is well-settled that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative
self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law.25 Between the positive assertions of the
prosecution witnesses and the negative averments of the accused, the former indisputably
deserve more credence and are entitled to greater evidentiary weight.26Thus, the categorical
statements of the prosecution witnesses must perforce prevail over the bare denials of
appellants.27cräläwvirtualibräry

A Si Nacional po ang nagdala. Indeed, the Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing upon the
credibility of the witnesses or the veracity of their testimonies unless a material fact or
circumstance has been overlooked which, if considered, would affect the outcome of the case.28
Q Hindi bat ikaw ang nagdala sa kanya roon?

Second and Third Issues:

A Hindi po, dinala po siya ni Nacional.

Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances

Q Hindi bat ikaw ang gumamit doon sa babae dahil nakatutuk iyong paet sa kanya?

The trial court found appellants guilty of three (3) counts of qualified rape -- with the use of a
A Hindi po. Wala pong nakatutok sa kanya. deadly weapon as the qualifying circumstance -- the prescribed penalty for which is reclusion
perpetua to death. In imposing the maximum penalty of death, it considered the aggravating
Q Hindi ba ginamit mo rin iyong babae ng dalawang ulit? circumstances of nighttime and confederation. Now appellants question the appreciation of
these circumstances and argue that the imposition of the death penalty was erroneous and While Appellant Baroy38 stated in his testimony that they had drunk about eight (8) bottles of
unjustified. We agree. beer, Appellant Nacional39 admitted to having downed seven (7). Moreover, the tricycle driver
affirmed this fact in his testimony when he said that appellants eyes were flaring when they
blocked the path of the tricycle.40 Indeed, under normal circumstances, a glass of beer is not so
It is worthy to note that confederation is not enumerated as an aggravating circumstance under
intoxicating as to diminish a mans rational capacity.41 But in this case, the quantity consumed
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Like conspiracy which must be alleged in and not
by appellants could certainly have affected their capacity to realize or contemplate the
merely inferred from the information, confederation is but a mode of incurring criminal
wrongfulness of their actions.
liability and may not be considered criminal in itself unless specifically provided by
law.29 Neither may confederation be treated as an aggravating circumstance in the absence of
any law defining or classifying it as such.30 Thus, the trial court erred in appreciating it for the Article 15, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, explicitly provides as follows:
purpose of imposing the maximum penalty.
The intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance
On the other hand, nighttime is considered an aggravating circumstance only when it is when the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual
deliberately sought to prevent the accused from being recognized or to ensure their escape. or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony; but when the intoxication is habitual or
There must be proof that this was intentionally sought to ensure the commission of the crime, intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
and that appellants took advantage of it. In the instant case, there is paucity of evidence that
nighttime was purposely and deliberately sought by appellants.31cräläwvirtualibräry
Intoxication, according to this article, is mitigating if not habitual or subsequent to the plan to
commit the felony; having been accidental and prior to any criminal resolve, it was more out of
The records reveal that they did not utilize the circumstance of nighttime to conceal their impulse or delusion born of alcohol that the offender committed the crime.42cräläwvirtualibräry
identities, as there was sufficient illumination at the scene of the crime that enabled both the
tricycle driver and the victim to recognize them easily.32 Moreover, the fact that they
Drunkenness or intoxication is mitigating if accidental, not habitual or intentional; that is, not
committed the crime at nighttime did not at all facilitate it or ensure their escape, considering
subsequent to the plan to commit the crime.43 To be mitigating, the state of intoxication of the
that they were immediately apprehended soon after. Clearly then, they did not specifically or
accused must be proved or established by sufficient evidence.44 But if intoxication is proved,
purposely seek the cover of darkness, which was merely incidental, in the advancement of their
then in the absence of truth to the contrary, it is presumed to be unintentional or not
criminal pursuit.
habitual.45 In People v. Vega,46 the Court ruled that intoxication was present when the rape was
committed, because the evidence had not established that the drunkenness of the accused was
Nocturnity is not aggravating when, other than the time, there is nothing on record or even in intentional or habitual.
the testimonies of the witnesses from which it may be inferred that the accused particularly
took advantage of the darkness of the night to facilitate their criminal design. 33 Certainly, the
Hence, this mitigating circumstance should be appreciated where the accused committed the
mere fact that the offense was committed at night will not suffice to sustain a finding of
felony in a state of intoxication, and there was no sufficient proof that it was habitual or
nocturnity.34cräläwvirtualibräry
subsequent to the plan to commit the felony.47 Furthermore, a finding of this circumstance has
the effect of decreasing the penalty, as long as it meets these twin requirements.48 This finding
Where rape is alleged and proven to have been committed with a deadly weapon and by two buttresses our opinion that reclusion perpetua, not death, is the proper penalty.
persons, it is held to be qualified rape (due to the use of such weapon) with the aggravating
circumstance of superior strength (there being two rapists acting in concert).35 However, like
In regard to the minority claimed by Appellant Baroy, an examination of the records of the
nighttime and confederation, the use of superior strength was not alleged in the Information.
case shows that when the presiding judge inquired about his age, he admitted to having been
Under the present Rules,36 aggravating circumstances must be alleged; otherwise, they cannot
coached by his mother to lie about it. He testified thus:
be appreciated. Being favorable to the accused, this new procedure may be given retroactive
effect.37cräläwvirtualibräry
Q Sa iyong mukha, ang tingin ng husgado ay 20 anyos ka nang mahigit. Ano ba talaga ang
totoo sa kapanganakan mo?
Furthermore, the trial court likewise overlooked the mitigating circumstance of intoxication. A
perusal of the records of the case, as well as the testimonies of the witnesses of both the
prosecution and the defense, shows that appellants were indeed intoxicated when they A Kasi sabi po sa akin ng nanay ko, pag daw may nagtanong sasabihin ko ang birthday ko ay
committed the crime. Amidst the maze of absurdly disjunctive statements they made, the only January 19.
semblance of consistency was in their consumption of several bottles of beer prior to the
incident.
Q Anong taon iyon?
A Hindi ko po alam.

Q Di ba ang sabi mo ngayong umaga 17 years old ka?

A Opo.

Q Pero doon sa Piskalya sinabi mong 18 years old ka.

A Opo.

Q Bakit ganun ang sinabi mo doon sa pulis, na 18 years old ka na?

A Kasi ho noong nakakulong na ako, dinalaw ako ng nanay ko. Tapos sabi sa akin ng nanay
ko pag tinanong daw kung ilang taon na ako ay sasabihin kong 17 years old ako.[49 (Italics
ours)

Having been obviously fabricated, minority cannot be appreciated as a mitigating

circumstance.

Finally, we take note of the observation of the trial court regarding the deviousness and the
criminal propensity of Appellant Baroy, as well as its recommendation as to the appropriate
penalty to be imposed. We quote from its ruling:

x x x. One final word on accused Baroy, this Court has observed hundred, nay even thousands
of persons suspected or accused of having committed crimes but never has anyone made an
imprint of deviousness as said accused and if for any reason he is able to escape the claws of
death for his pernicious acts, then the court recommends that he be not given a day of freedom
more than what is necessary to make him pay for his crime.50cräläwvirtualibräry

WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED; the appealed Decision is

hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the penalty of death is reduced
to reclusion perpetua  for each count of rape. The civil awards are also AFFIRMED, consistent
with prevailing jurisprudence.51 No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.

De Leon, Jr., abroad on official business.