Rule of Law

Petitioner Organizations v. Executive Secretary

These are consolidated petitions to declare unconstitutional certain presidential decrees and executive orders of the
martial law era and under the incumbency of Pres. Estrada relating to the raising and use of coco-levy funds, particularly:
Section 2 of P.D. 755, (b)Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468, (c) E.O. 312, and (d) E.O. 313.

On June 19, 1971 Congress enacted R.A. 6260 that established a Coconut Investment Fund (CI Fund) for the
development of the coconut industry through capital financing. Coconut farmers were to capitalize and administer the
Fund through the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) whose objective was, among others, to advance the coconut
farmers interests.For this purpose, the law imposed a levy ofP0.55on the coconut farmers first domestic sale of every
100 kilograms of copra, or its equivalent, for which levy he was to get a receipt convertible into CIC shares of stock.

In 1975 President Marcos enacted P.D. 755 which approved the acquisition of a commercial bank for the benefit of the
coconut farmers to enable such bank to promptly and efficiently realize the industry's credit policy. Thus, the PCA
bought 72.2% of the shares of stock of First United Bank, headed by Pedro Cojuangco.Dueto changes in its corporate
identity and purpose, the banks articles of incorporation were amended in July 1975, resulting in a change in the banks
name from First United Bank United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB).

In November 2000 then President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order (E.O.) 312, establishing a Sagip Niyugan
Program which sought to provide immediate income supplement to coconut farmers and encourage the creation of a
sustainable local market demand for coconut oil and other coconut products.The Executive Order sought to establish
aP1-billion fund by disposing of assets acquired using coco-levy funds or assets of entities supported by those funds. A
committee was created to manage the fund under this program. A majority vote of its members could engage the
services of a reputable auditing firm to conduct periodic audits.

At about the same time, President Estrada issued E.O. 313, which created an irrevocable trust fund known as the
Coconut Trust Fund (the Trust Fund).This aimed to provide financial assistance to coconut farmers, to the coconut
industry, and to other agri-related programs. The shares of stock of SMC were to serve as the Trust Funds initial capital.
These shares were acquired with CII Funds and constituted approximately 27% of the outstanding capital stock of
SMC.E.O. 313 designated UCPB, through its Trust Department, as the Trust Funds trustee bank. The Trust Fund
Committee would administer, manage, and supervise the operations of the Trust Fund. The Committee would designate
an external auditor to do an annual audit or as often as needed but it may also request the Commission on Audit (COA)
to intervene.

To implement its mandate, E.O. 313 directed the Presidential Commission on Good Government, the Office of the
Solicitor General, and other government agencies to exclude the 27% CIIF SMC shares from Civil Case 0033, entitled
Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al.,which was then pending before the Sandiganbayan and to lift
the sequestration over those shares.

On January 26, 2001, however, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the suspension of E.O.s 312 and 313.
This notwithstanding, on March 1, 2001 petitioner organizations and individuals brought the present action in G.R.
147036-37 to declare E.O.s 312 and 313 as well as Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468 unconstitutional. On April 24, 2001
the other sets of petitioner organizations and individuals instituted G.R. 147811 to nullify Section 2 of P.D. 755 and
Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468 also for being unconstitutional.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the coco-levy funds are public funds?

Whether or not(a) Section 2 of P.D. 755, (b)Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468, (c) E.O. 312, and (d) E.O. 313 are
unconstitutional?

RULING:

1. coco levy as public funds

The Court was satisfied that the coco-levy funds were raised pursuant to law to support a proper governmental
purpose.They were raised with the use of the police and taxing powers of the State for the benefit of the coconut
industry and its farmers in general.The COA reviewed the use of the funds.The BIR treated them as public funds and the
very laws governing coconut levies recognize their public character.

The Court has also recently declared that the coco-levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be used for public
purpose.Taxes are enforced proportional contributions from persons and property, levied by the State by virtue of its
sovereignty for the support of the government and for all itspublic needs. Here, the coco-levy funds were imposed
pursuant to law, namely, R.A. 6260 and P.D. 276.The funds were collected and managed by the PCA,an independent
government corporation directly under the President.And, as the respondent public officials pointed out, thepertinent
laws used the termlevy, which meansto tax, in describing the exaction.

R.A. 6260 and P.D. 276 did not raise money to boost the governments general funds butto provide means for the
rehabilitation and stabilization of a threatened industry, the coconut industry, which is so affected with public interest as
to be within the police power of the State. The funds sought to support the coconut industry,one of the main economic
backbones of the country, and to secure economic benefits for the coconut farmers and farm workers.

Lastly, the coco-levy funds are evidently special funds. Its character as such fund was made clear by the fact that they
were deposited in the PNB (then a wholly owned government bank) and not in the Philippine Treasury.

2. constitutionality of the assailed p.d.s and e.o.s

The Court has already passed upon this question in Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) v. Republic
of the Philippines. It held as unconstitutional Section 2 of P.D. 755 for effectively authorizing the PCA to utilize portions
of theCCS Fundto pay the financial commitment of the farmers to acquire UCPB and to deposit portions of the CCS Fund
levies with UCPB interest free. And as there also provided, the CCS Fund, CID Fund and like levies that PCA is authorized
to collect shall be considered as non-special or fiduciary funds to be transferred to the general fund of the Government,
meaning they shall be deemed private funds.

In any event, such declaration is void. There is ownership when a thing pertaining to a person is completely subjected to
his will in everything that is not prohibited by law or the concurrence with the rights of another. An owner is free to
exercise all attributes of ownership: the right, among others, to possess, use and enjoy, abuse or consume, and dispose
or alienate the thing owned. The owner is free to waive all or some of these rights in favor of others.But in the case of
the coconut farmers, they could not, individually or collectively, waive what have not been and could not be legally
imparted to them.

Section 2 of P.D. 755, Article III,Section 5of P.D. 961, and Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468 completely ignore the fact that
coco-levy funds are public funds raised through taxation.And since taxes could be exacted only for a public purpose, they
cannot be declared private properties of individuals although such individuals fall within a distinct group of persons.
These assailed provisions,which removed the coco-levy funds from the general funds of the government and declared
them private properties of coconut farmers,do not appear to have a color of social justice for their purpose.The levy on
copra that farmers produce appears, in the first place, to be a business tax judging by its tax base.The concept of
farmers-businessmen is incompatible with the idea that coconut farmers are victims of social injustice and so should be
beneficiaries of the taxes raised from their earnings.

On another point, in stating that the coco-levy fund shall not be construed or interpreted, under any law or regulation,
as special and/or fiduciary funds, or as part of the general funds of the national government,P.D.s 961 and 1468 seek to
remove such fund from COA scrutiny.

This is also the fault of President Estradas E.O. 312 which deals with P1 billion to be generated out of the sale of coco-
fund acquired assets.E.O. 313 has a substantially identical provision governing the management and disposition of the
Coconut Trust Fund capitalized with the substantial SMC shares of stock that the coco-fund acquired.

But, since coco-levy funds are taxes, the provisions of P.D.s755,961 and 1468 as well as those of E.O.s 312 and 313 that
remove such funds and the assets acquired through them from the jurisdiction of the COA violate Article IX-D, Section
2(1) of the 1987 Constitution.Section 2(1) vests in the COA the power and authority to examine uses of government
money and property.The cited P.D.s and E.O.s also contravene Section 2 of P.D. 898 (Providing for the Restructuring of
the Commission on Audit), which has the force of a statute.And there is no legitimate reason why such funds should be
shielded from COA review and audit.The PCA, which implements the coco-levy laws and collects the coco-levy funds, is a
government-owned and controlled corporation subject to COA review and audit.

E.O. 313 suffers from an additional infirmity.Apparently, it intends to create a trust fund out of the coco-levy funds to
provide economic assistance to the coconut farmers and, ultimately, benefit the coconut industry.But on closer look,
E.O. 313 strays from the special purpose for which the law raises coco-levy funds in that it permits the use of coco-levy
funds for improving productivity in other food areas.

Clearly, E.O.313 above runs counter to the constitutional provision which directs thatall money collected on any tax
levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only.Assisting other
agriculturally-related programs is way off the coco-funds objective of promoting the general interests of the coconut
industry and its farmers.

A final point,the E.O.s also transgress P.D. 1445,Section 84(2),the first part by the previously mentioned sections of E.O.
313 and the second part by Section 4 of E.O. 312 and Sections 6 and 7 of E.O. 313.E.O. 313 vests the power to
administer, manage, and supervise the operations and disbursements of the Trust Fund it established (capitalized with
SMC shares bought out of coco-levy funds) in a Coconut Trust Fund Committee.

Section 4 ofE.O. 312 does essentially the same thing.It vests the management and disposition of the assistance fund
generated from the sale of coco-levy fund-acquired assets into a Committee of five members.

In effect, the provision transfers the power to allocate, use, and disburse coco-levy funds that P.D. 232 vested in the PCA
and transferred the same, without legislative authorization and in violation of P.D. 232, to the Committees mentioned
above.An executive order cannot repeal a presidential decree which has the same standing as a statute enacted by
Congress.
Adherence to International Law - Adherence to policy of peace, freedom, amity

Bayan Muna v. Romulo

Rome Statute - establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) with "the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the
most serious crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes) of international concern and shall be complementary to the
national criminal jurisdiction.

On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge d'Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its
terms, is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition,
only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval and concurrence process.
The Philippines is not among the 92.

On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter) between the USA
and the RP.

Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-03 dated May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-03, hereinafter), the RP, represented by then
DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the US proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to and
put in effect the Agreement with the US government. In esse, the Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and
defines as persons of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in
international tribunals. It is reflective of the increasing pace of the strategic security and defense partnership between
the two countries. As of May 2, 2003, similar bilateral agreements have been effected by and between the US and 33
other countries.

In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of the non-surrender agreement,
Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of October 28, 2003 that the exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a
legally binding agreement under international law; and that, under US law, the said agreement did not require the
advice and consent of the US Senate.

In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the
Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.

For their part, respondents question petitioners standing to maintain a suit and counter that the Agreement, being in
the nature of an executive agreement, does not require Senate concurrence for its efficacy. And for reasons detailed in
their comment, respondents assert the constitutionality of the Agreement.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Agreement, which has not been submitted to the Senate for concurrence, contravenes and
undermines the Rome Statute and other treaties.

RULING:

This petition is bereft of merit. Petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

Petitioner’s initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its threshold posture being that E/N BFO-028-03
cannot be a valid medium for concluding the Agreement.

Petitioner’s contention perhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized international doctrines, practices, and jargon
is untenable. One of these is the doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Article II of the Constitution,
wherein the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law and international jurisprudence as
part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations .An exchange of
notes falls into the category of inter-governmental agreements, which is an internationally accepted form of
international agreement. The United Nations Treaty Collections (Treaty Reference Guide) defines the term as follows:

An exchange of notes is a record of a routine agreement, that has many similarities with the private law contract. The
agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by
the representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to
record its assent. The signatories of the letters may be government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The
technique of exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to
avoid the process of legislative approval.

In another perspective, the terms exchange of notes and executive agreements have been used interchangeably,
exchange of notes being considered a form of executive agreement that becomes binding through executive action. On
the other hand, executive agreements concluded by the President sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and at
other times that of more formal documents denominated agreements or protocols. As former US High Commissioner to
the Philippines Francis B. Sayre observed in his work, The Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts:

The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements whether
denominated executive agreements or exchange of notes or otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready
ascertainment. It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/NBFO-028-03be it viewed as the Non-Surrender
Agreement itself, or as an integral instrument of acceptance thereof or as consent to be bound is a recognized mode of
concluding a legally binding international written contract among nations.

Senate Concurrence Not Required; treaties

Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty as an international agreement concluded
between states in written form and governed by international law,whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or
more related instruments and whatever its particular designation. International agreements may be in the form of (1)
treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive ratification; or (2) executive agreements that are similar to
treaties, except that they do not require legislative concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a narrower
range of subject matters than treaties.

Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding
effects on the contracting states concerned,as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers.
Neither,on the domestic sphere, can one be held valid if it violates the Constitution. Authorities are, however, agreed
that one is distinct from another for accepted reasons apart from the concurrence-requirement aspect. As has been
observed by US constitutional scholars, a treaty has greater dignity than an executive agreement, because its
constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority of the President, the Senate, and the
people;a ratified treaty, unlike an executive agreement, takes precedence over any prior statutory enactment.

The Agreement Not in Contravention of the Rome Statute

Contrary to petitioner’s pretense, the Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ from, the Rome
Statute. Far from going against each other, one complements the other. As a matter of fact, the principle of
complementarity underpins the creation of the ICC.As aptly pointed out by respondents and admitted by petitioners, the
jurisdiction of the ICC is to be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions of the signatory states. Art. 1 of the Rome
Statute pertinently provides:

Article 1

The Court

An International Crimininal Court(the Court) is hereby established.It x x xshall have the power to exercise its
jurisdictionover persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this Statute, andshall be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.The jurisdiction and functioning of the Court shall be governed by the
provisions of this Statute.

Significantly, the sixth preambular paragraph of the Rome Statute declares that it is the duty of every State to exercise
its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes. This provision indicates that primary jurisdiction
over the so-called international crimes rests, at the first instance, with the state where the crime was committed;
secondarily, with the ICC in appropriate situations contemplated under Art. 17, par. 1of the Rome Statute.

Of particular note is the application of the principle ofne bis in idemunder par. 3 of Art. 20, Rome Statute, which again
underscores the primacy of the jurisdiction of a state vis-a-vis that of the ICC.As far as relevant, the provision states that
no person who has been tried by another court for conduct [constituting crimes within its jurisdiction] shall be tried by
the [International Criminal] Court with respect to the same conduct.

The foregoing provisions of the Rome Statute, taken collectively, argue against the idea of jurisdictional conflict between
the Philippines, as party to the non-surrender agreement, and the ICC; or the idea of the Agreement substantially
impairing the value of the RPs undertaking under the Rome Statute. Ignoring for a while the fact that the RP signed the
Rome Statute ahead of the Agreement, it is abundantly clear to us that the Rome Statute expressly recognizes the
primary jurisdiction of states, like the RP, over serious crimes committed within their respective borders, the
complementary jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only when the signatory states are unwilling or unable to
prosecute.

Given the above consideration, petitioners suggestion that the RP, by entering into the Agreement, violated its duty
required by the imperatives of good faith and breached its commitment under the Vienna Convention to refrain from
performing any act tending to impair the value of a treaty, e.g., the Rome Statute has to be rejected outright. For
nothing in the provisions of the Agreement, in relation to the Rome Statute, tends to diminish the efficacy of the Statute,
let alone defeats the purpose of the ICC. Lest it be overlooked, the Rome Statute contains a proviso that enjoins the ICC
from seeking the surrender of an erring person, should the process require the requested state to perform an act that
would violate some international agreement it has entered into. We refer to Art. 98(2) of the Rome Statute, which
reads:

Article 98

Cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and consent to surrender

2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the requested State to act
inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is
required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the
sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.

Moreover, under international law, there is a considerable difference between a State-Party and a signatory to a treaty.
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a signatory state is only obliged to refrain from acts which would
defeat the object and purpose of a treaty; whereas a State-Party, on the other hand, is legally obliged to follow all the
provisions of a treaty in good faith.

In the instant case, it bears stressing that the Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome Statute and not a State-Party for
lack of ratification by the Senate. Thus, it is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose
of the Rome Statute. Any argument obliging the Philippines to follow any provision in the treaty would be premature.

As a result, petitioners argument that State-Parties with non-surrender agreements are prevented from meeting their
obligations under the Rome Statute, specifically Arts. 27, 86, 89 and 90, must fail. These articles are only legally binding
upon State-Parties, not signatories.

Furthermore, a careful reading of said Art. 90 would show that the Agreement is not incompatible with the Rome
Statute. Specifically, Art. 90(4) provides that if the requesting State is a State not Party to this Statute the requested
State, if it is not under an international obligation to extradite the person to the requesting State, shall give priority to
the request for surrender from the Court In applying the provision, certain undisputed facts should be pointed out:first,
the US is neither a State-Party nor a signatory to the Rome Statute; and second, there is an international agreement
between the US and the Philippines regarding extradition or surrender of persons, i.e., the Agreement. Clearly, even
assuming that the Philippines is a State-Party, the Rome Statute still recognizes the primacy of international agreements
entered into between States, even when one of the States is not a State-Party to the Rome Statute.

Agreement Not Immoral/Not at Variance with Principles of International Law

Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing immoral obligations and/or being at
variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of international law.The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact
that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, leaves criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities
that deeply shock the conscience of humanity; it precludes our country from delivering an American criminal to the ICC.

The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender agreement, as aptly described by the
Solicitor General, is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. The
agreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence of the country's judiciary to try offenses under its national
criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and judiciously.
Pharmaceutical and Healthcare v. Health Secretary

FACTS:

On 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O No. 51 otherwise known as the “Milk Code.” The said code states that
the law seeks to give effect to Article 11 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a
code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions
to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that
nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In 1990, the Philippines ratified the
International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take
appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents
and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. Petitioner assailed the RIRR for allegedly going beyond
the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending and expanding the coverage of said law. The defense of the DOH is
that the RIRR implements not only the Milk Code but also various international instruments regarding infant and young
child nutrition. Respondents' position that said international instruments are deemed part of the law of the land and
therefore the DOH may implement them through the RIRR.

ISSUE: Whether the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Milk Code (A.O 2006-0012) issued by DOH is
unconstitutional.

RULING:

YES. Under the Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation
or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law
through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere
constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law. Treaties become part of the
law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution, which provides that “No
treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
members of the Senate.” Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go through a process prescribed by the
Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts. In this case, it is said
that, ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treaties as they have not been concurred in by at least two-thirds of all
members of the Senate as required under Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

However, the ICMBS, which was adopted by the WHA in 1981, had been transformed into domestic law through local
legislation, the Milk Code. Consequently, it is the Milk Code that has the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction and
not the ICMBS per se. The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, but the Court noted that the Milk
Code did not adopt the provision in the ICMBS absolutely prohibiting advertising or other forms of promotion to the
general public of products within the scope of the ICMBS. Instead, the Milk Code expressly provides that advertising,
promotion, or other marketing materials may be allowed if such materials are duly authorized and approved by the
Inter-Agency Committee (IAC).

DOCTRINE:

Ultra Vires – “beyond the powers” performs acts, which do not provide in its express, implied or incidental powers

Transformation – international law can become part of a municipal law through constitutional machinery such as an act
of Parliament.

Incorporation – by constitutional declaration, international law have the force of domestic law.
Espina v. Zamora

In the year 2000, then President Estrada signed into law R.A. 8762, also known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of
2000 which lessens the restraint on the foreigners’ right to property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful business. It
expressly repealed R.A. 1180, which absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in the retail trade business.

R.A. 8762 also allows natural born Filipino citizens, who had lost their citizenship and now reside in the Philippines, to
engage in the retail trade business with the same rights as Filipino citizens.

Petitioners mainly argue that R.A. 8762 violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution for the State to develop a self
reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. They invoke the provisions of the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies under Article II of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional.

RULING:

No, R.A. 8762 is not unconstitutional.

Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the development of a self reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the
economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our economic
policies and ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development.

Further, the 1987 Constitution does not rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods, and services. While it does not
encourage their unlimited entry into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the
basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.

In this case, R.A. 8762 only allows aliens to engage in retail trade business subject to the categories enumerated in the
law. Only nationals from, or juridical entities formed or incorporated in countries which allow the entry of Filipino
retailers shall be allowed to engage in retail trade business and qualified foreign retailers shall not be allowed to engage
in certain retailing activities outside their accredited stores through the use of mobile or rolling stores or carts, the use of
sales representatives, door to door selling, restaurants and sarisari stores and such other similar retailing activities.

In sum, petitioners have not shown how the retail trade liberalization has prejudiced and can prejudice the local small
and medium enterprises since its implementation. The constitutionality of R.A. 8762 is upheld and this petition is
dismissed.
Supremacy of Civilian Authority

IBP v. Zamora

President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in the exercise of his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and
utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President
declared that the employed services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a
reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP then filed a petition seeking to
declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

Whether the declaration of Pres. Estrada is in violation of the supremacy of civilian authority over the military as
provided by in the Constitution

RULING:

The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause.  The calling of the Marines
in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement.  The participation of the Marines
in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the
deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render
logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is
supreme over civilian authority.  Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the
civilian character of the police force.  Neither does it amount to an “insidious incursion” of the military in the task of law
enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force.
The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military.
Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian
position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian
character of the PNP.
POLICIES - Independent foreign policy and a nuclear-free Philippines

Bayan v. Exec Sec

On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Bases Agreement which
formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by United States military personnel. To
further strengthen their defense and security relationship, the Philippines and the United States entered into a Mutual
Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991,
the Philippines and the United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases agreement. On September
16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in
effect, would have extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines. On July 18, 1997, the United States
panel, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine panel,
headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on "the complementing strategic
interests of the United States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region." Both sides discussed, among other things,
the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for brevity). Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos
approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by public respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States Ambassador
Thomas Hubbard on February 10, 1998.

On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. On
October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to
the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for concurrence
pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The Senate, in turn, referred the VFA to its Committee on
Foreign Relations. On May 3, 1999, the Committees submitted Proposed Senate Resolution No. 4438 recommending the
concurrence of the Senate to the VFA and the creation of a Legislative Oversight Committee to oversee its
implementation. Debates then ensued.

On May 27, 1999, Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 was approved by the Senate, by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of its
members. Senate Resolution No. 443 was then re-numbered as Senate Resolution No. 18.

On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an Exchange of Notes between respondent Secretary Siazon
and United States Ambassador Hubbard.

The VFA, which consists of a Preamble and nine (9) Articles (pls read na lang sa original case kasi medyo mahaba. 😊)

ISSUE:

W/N the VFA is governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution?

RULING:

Art. 7 Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

Art. XVIII Section 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the
United States of America concerning military bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the
Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a
majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by
the other contracting State.

Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities, should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section
21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes
required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate, as will be further discussed hereunder. It is a finely-imbedded
principle in statutory construction that a special provision or law prevails over a general one. Lex specialis derogat
generali. Thus, where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a general one which, in its most
comprehensive sense, would include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and
the general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language which are not within the
provision of the particular enactment.

To our mind, the fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Section 21, Article VII, and that the Senate
extended its concurrence under the same provision, is immaterial. For in either case, whether under Section 21, Article
VII or Section 25, Article XVIII, the fundamental law is crystalline that the concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to
comply with the strict constitutional requirements.

(Ang main argument lang dito is dapat concurred sya sa Senate with 2/3 vote of its members, ratified by the majority of
the people {kung required by the congress, pero kung hindi na, hindi na kailangan ng ratification ng people through
referendum}, and recognized as treaty by the other state {dito the mere fact na nasign ng ambassador ng US, ibig
sabihin nag aapply sya as treaty, saka based sa definition ng vienna convention on treatied, ang executive agreement is
also synonymous with a treaty} so hindi contradictory ang articles 7 and 18)
Lim v. Exec Sec

This petition for certiorari and prohibition prays that respondents be restrained from proceeding with the so-called
"Balikatan 02-1" and that after due notice and hearing, that judgment be rendered issuing a permanent writ of
injunction and/or prohibition against the deployment of US troops in Basilan and Mindanao for being illegal and in
violation of the Constitution.

1995: last Balikatan exercises was held. This was due to the paucity of any formal agreement between the two states.
The exercises were then conducted on a reduced scale.

1999: Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) was concluded by US and PH.

January 2002, armed forces of the US started arriving in Mindanao to take part in the so-called Balikatan exercises - the
largest combined training operations involving Filipino and American troops. In theory, they are a simulation of joint
military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the PH
and the US in 1951.

This was caused by the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by US President GW Bush in reaction to the tragic
events that occurred on 11 September 2001 (three commercial aircrafts were hijacked, flown and smashed into the twin
towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon building in Washington DC by terrorists with
alleged links to the al-Qaeda, a Muslim extremist organization headed by Osama bin Laden).

1 February 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando, joined by SANLAKAS and Partido ng Manggagawa
partylists, filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. It was also
assailed that certain members of their organization are residents of Zamboanga and Sulu, and hence will be directly
affected by the operations being conducted in Mindanao.

The Solicitor General claims that there is actually no question of constitutionality involved. The true object of the instant
suit, it is said, is to obtain an interpretation of the VFA. The Solicitor General asks that SC to accord due deference to the
executive determination that "Balikatan 02-1" is covered by the VFA, considering the President's monopoly in the field of
foreign relations and her role as commander-in-chief of the Philippine armed forces.

ISSUE:

W/N the Balikatan exercises, as a product of the VFA, a treaty, is favored over a municipal law.

RULING: YES

From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over municipal law pursuant to the principle of
pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept). Hence, every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must
be performed by them in good faith. Further, a party to a treaty is not allowed to invoke the provisions of its internal law
as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.

Sec. 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution states that the SC, among others, have the power to review, revise, reverse,
modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

Moreover, as stressed in Ichong v. Hernandez, the SC ruled that the provisions of a treaty are always subject to
qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, or that it is subject to the police power of the State. In Gonzales v.
Hechanova, it was stated that the Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the
fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.

1987 Constitution contains key provisions useful in determining the extent to which foreign military troops are allowed
in Philippine territory. Article II. Declaration of Principles and State Policies, provides the following:
SEC. 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation, and amity with all nations.

SEC. 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states the paramount
consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self- determination.

SEC. 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear
weapons in the country.

However the Constitution must also be construed in the context of the MDT and the VFA. In accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations, neither the MDT nor the VFA allow foreign troops to engage in an offensive war on Philippine
territory:

Article 2. The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with
the following Principles.

4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

In the case at bar, a nagging question remains: are American troops actively engaged in combat alongside Filipino
soldiers under the guise of an alleged training and assistance exercise? Contrary to what petitioners contend, the SC
cannot take judicial notice of the events as reported from the saturation coverage of the media. As a rule, the SC do not
take cognizance of newspaper or electronic reports per se, not because of any issue as to their truth, accuracy, or
impartiality, but for the simple reason that facts must be established in accordance with the rules of evidence. As a
result, SC cannot accept, in the absence of concrete proof, petitioners' allegation that the Arroyo government is engaged
in "doublespeak" in trying to pass off as a mere training exercise an offensive effort by foreign troops on native soil. It is
all too apparent that the determination thereof involves basically a question of fact. On this point, the SC must concur
with the Solicitor General that the present subject matter is not a fit topic for a special civil action for certiorari.

Hence, the petitions are dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a new petition sufficient in form and substance in
the RTC.

Other notes: A rather recent formulation of the relation of international law vis-a-vis municipal law was expressed in
Philip Morris, Inc. v. CA which states that the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does
not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine
of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to
national legislation.
Just and Dynamic Social Order - Promotion of Social Justice

Calalang v. Williams

Maximo Calalang as a private citizen and taxpayer of Manila, brought to this court the petition for writ of prohibition
against A.D. Williams as Chairman of the National and et al. In its resolution of July 17, 1940 the National Traffic
Commission recommended to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to
Dasmarinas Street from 7:30 AM to 12:30 PM and from 1:30 PM to 5:30 PM; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the
railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7 AM to 11 PM; one year from the date of opening of the
Colgante Bridge to traffic. that the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommended to the
Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned, in pursuance of the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of
and traffic on national roads; that on August 2, 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made
by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission as aforesaid, with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue
to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo
Street to Azcarraga Street; that on August 10, 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second
indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street
and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as above
indicated, for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of
Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus
adopted; that as a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up
passengers in the places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Commonwealth Act No 548 is constitutional

2. Whether or not the rules and regulations promotes Social Justice.

RULING:

1. Yes. The provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 648 do not confer legislative power upon the Director of
Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and
under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy
demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to
promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the
National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all
classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in
the public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law
shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be
predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a
national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements
of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National
Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of
determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such
discretion is the making of the law.
2. Yes. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power
of the state. Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote
safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting
said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was
inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare,
then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may
interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
state (U.S. v. Gomer Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority
because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the
individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind
through education and, personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means
peace and order and happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the government, logically so
much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the
apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.

In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So
ordered.

DEFINITION: Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of
laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of
the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through
the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est
suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a
combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of
promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest
number."
Just and Dynamic Social Order - Aspects of Social Justice : labor

Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services

Antonio Serrano was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. under a POEA approved
Contract of Employment entitling him with a position of Chief Officer with basic month salary of US$1,400, overtime pay
of US$700/ month and Vacation Leave with pay.

However, at the date of his departure (March 19, 1998) he was constrained to accept a downgraded
employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and
representation of respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.

Petitioner’s employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999.
However, when the respondents did not give him the position of Chief Officer as they promised, he refused to stay and
returned to the Philippines on May 26, 1998. Therefore, he was only able to serve 2 mos. and 7 days of his contract,
leaving an unexpired portion of 9 mos. and 23 days.

Petitioner then filed a Complaint before the Labor Arbiter against respondents for constructive dismissal.

Court Proceedings from the Labor Arbiter (LA), NLRC, and CA:

The Labor Arbiter, applying the provisions of the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, which
provides:

Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as
defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of
twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

granted Serrano’s Complaint awarding him the claim for his salary for three (3) months of the unexpired portion of the
aforesaid contract of employment instead of the unexpired portion of his contract which is 9 mos. and 23 days., the
former being the lower rate between the two. The Labor Arbiter included in the computation of Serrano’s salary not
only his basic salary but also his overtime pay and vacation leave pay.

Both petitioner (alleging that he is entitled for his salary for the entire unexpired portion of his contract) and respondent
(contending that the LA erred in finding that they illegally dismissed petitioner) appealed the Labor Arbiter’s judgment
to the NLRC. The NLRC then issued a judgment modifying that of the LA reducing the overtime pay and vacation leave
pay on the applicable salary rate Serrano is entitle to claim. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said
judgment in which he questioned the constitutionality of RA 8042 which was also denied.

The petitioner then filed a petition before the CA reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject clause.
However, the CA only affirmed the NLRC ruling without passing upon the constitutional issue raised by petitioner..

Hence, this petition before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042 is unconstitutional for allegedly (i)
impairing the terms of contract of the OFWs, (ii) depriving them of equal protection and (iii) denying them due process.

RULING:

The 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042 is unconstitutional but only on the grounds that it deprives
the OFWs of equal protection and due process.
(i) On the issue of whether 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042 is unconstitutional as it
impairs the terms of contract of the OFWs, the Court ruled in the negative. According to the Court “laws already in
existence prior to the execution of the contract shall be deemed a part thereof”. Therefore, as the enactment of RA No.
8042 preceded the execution of the employment contract between the parties, they were deemed to have incorporated
into it all the provisions of R.A. No. 8042. However even if the Court were to disregard the timeline it should be well to
understand that all private contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate measures taken by the State to promote
public welfare

(ii) On the issue that the said provision of R.A. 8042 is unconstitutional as it deprives OFWs of equal protection and
due process the Court ruled in the affirmative.

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the law.

Section 18, Article II and Section 3,] Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without distinction as to place of
deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.

Hence, Filipino workers of similar category are equally guaranteed with monetary benefits and obligation and none
should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like
circumstances.

However, such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to incorporate, when it sees fit, a
system of classification into its legislation; however, to be valid, the classification must comply with these requirements:
1) it is based on substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes of the law; 3) it is not limited to existing
conditions only; and 4) it applies equally to all members of the class.

There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a classification embodied in a law:

a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally
related to serving a legitimate state interest;

b) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the government must show that the challenged classification serves
an important state interest and that the classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest; and

c) strict judicial scrutiny in which a legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional, and the
burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and
that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.

In this case, the Court applied the 3rd level of scrutiny which is the strict judicial scrutiny because the challenge to RA
8042 is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favoured by the
Constitution with special protection which is the working class.

The court held that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two
levels:

I. OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year or
more;

II. Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and

III. Third, OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period employment;

I. OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year or more
In a matrix of cases involving claims from illegal dismissal already resolved by this Court it is clearly shown that only
OFWs with employment contract of less than one year were able to claim for the entire unexpired term of their
contracts while the OFW’s with one year or more were only entitled for the equivalent of their 3-month salary for every
year of the unexpired term of their employment contract.

To clearly illustrate the disparity in the treatment of these two groups, the Court assumes a hypothetical OFW-A with an
employment contract of 10 months at a monthly salary rate of US$1,000.00 and a hypothetical OFW-B with an
employment contract of 15 months with the same monthly salary rate of US$1,000.00. Both commenced work on the
same day and under the same employer, and were illegally dismissed after one month of work. Under the subject
clause, OFW-A will be entitled to US$9,000.00, equivalent to his salaries for the remaining 9 months of his contract,
whereas OFW-B will be entitled to only US$3,000.00, equivalent to his salaries for 3 months of the unexpired portion of
his contract, instead of US$14,000.00 for the unexpired portion of 14 months of his contract, as the US$3,000.00 is the
lesser amount.

Said disparity becomes more aggravating when the Court takes into account that prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8042
on July 14, 1995, illegally dismissed OFWs, no matter how long the period of their employment contracts, were entitled
to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts.

II. Among OFWs With Employment Contracts of More Than One Year

If the subject clause is to be applied it will create a sub-layer of discrimination among OFWs whose contract periods are
for more than one year: those who are illegally dismissed with less than one year left in their contracts shall be entitled
to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion thereof, while those who are illegally dismissed with one year or more
remaining in their contracts shall be covered by the subject clause, and their monetary benefits limited to their salaries
for three months only.

To concretely illustrate the application of the foregoing interpretation of the subject clause, the Court assumes
hypothetical OFW-C and OFW-D, who each have a 24-month contract at a salary rate of US$1,000.00 per month. OFW-C
is illegally dismissed on the 12th month, and OFW-D, on the 13th month. Considering that there is at least 12 months
remaining in the contract period of OFW-C, the subject clause applies to the computation of the latter's monetary
benefits. Thus, OFW-C will be entitled, not to US$12,000,00 or the latter's total salaries for the 12 months unexpired
portion of the contract, but to the lesser amount of US$3,000.00 or the latter's salaries for 3 months out of the 12-
month unexpired term of the contract. On the other hand, OFW-D is spared from the effects of the subject clause, for
there are only 11 months left in the latter's contract period. Thus, OFW-D will be entitled to US$11,000.00, which is
equivalent to his/her total salaries for the entire 11-month unexpired portion.

III. OFWs vis--vis Local Workers With Fixed-Period Employment

Prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment who were illegally discharged were treated
alike in terms of the computation of their money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire
unexpired portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject
clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their employment contract have since
been differently treated in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed
on local workers with fixed-term employment.

The Court found no compelling state interest that the subject clause may possibly serve.

The OSG’s contention that the purpose of the subject clause is to provide Filipino seafarers better chance of getting
hired by foreign employers and protecting the local placement agencies (because the obligation of payment of illegally
dismissed employee’s claims which the local agencies and foreign employers shall solidarily pay only end up as a burden
solely for the latter due to the limitation of the enforcement of judgment over the latter) is not enough to justify the
burden it imposes to the OFWs which is favoured by the Constitution as they have less means in life compared to their
employers.

Moreover, the Court held that there are other resorts which are less restrictive means of aiding local placement agencies
in enforcing the solidary liability of their foreign principals. Such as the POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the
Recruitment and Employment of Land-Based Overseas Workers which imposes administrative disciplinary measures on
erring foreign employers who default on their contractual obligations to migrant workers and/or their Philippine agents.

Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and
other OFWs to equal protection and substantive due process.
Just and Dynamic Social Order - Aspects of Social Justice : Agrarian Reform

Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform

Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by
the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the
right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the
case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was
promulgated in 1972 to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers
and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228,
declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands
covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a comprehensive
agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its (PP131’s)
implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
in 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory
effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. consolidated cases involving common legal questions
including serious challenges to the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988"

FACTS:

These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No.
6657 and related law, Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).

In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D No. 27 and E.O Nos. 228 and 229 on the grounds inter alia of
separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be
taken for public use without just compensation.

In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to the Congress and not to the President, the also allege that
Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No. 229 should be annulled for violation of the constitutional provisions on just
compensation, due process and equal protection. They contended that the taking must be simultaneous with payment
of just compensation which such payment is not contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O No. 229.

In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President and that the
said executive orders violate the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or
just compensation which was denied to the petitioners.

In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of
retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules of the decree. They
therefore ask the Honorable Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to issue the said rules.

In short, the Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land distribution scheme
provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do
not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to
distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till their own land.
In short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because they claim to belong to a different class.

Issues:

1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.

2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.

3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of cash.
RULING:

1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt from the agrarian reform
program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in
certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements:

(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;

(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights
conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled
to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to
share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two
classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In
any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded
recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of
Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian reform
program.

2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts. However, there is no law
which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just compensation. In fact, just compensation can
be that amount agreed upon by the landowner and the government – even without judicial intervention so long as both
parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then judicial
intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law however is that, the just compensation determined by an
administrative body is merely preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation by an
administrative body, then it can go to court and the determination of the latter shall be the final determination. This is
even so provided by RA 6657:

Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for
final determination of just compensation.

3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional exercise of eminent domain.
The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The program will require billions of pesos in
funds if all compensation have to be made in cash – if everything is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient
money hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just compensation.
Hacienda Luisita v. Luisita Industrial Park

In 1958, the Spanish owners of Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabacalera) sold Hacienda Luisita and the
Central Azucarera de Tarlac, the sugar mill of the hacienda, to the Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), then
owned and controlled by the Jose Cojuangco Sr. Group. The Central Bank of the Philippines assisted Tadeco in obtaining
a dollar loan from a US bank. Also, the GSIS extended a PhP5.911 million loan in favor of Tadeco to pay the peso price
component of the sale, with the condition that “the lots comprising the Hacienda Luisita be subdivided by the applicant-
corporation and sold at cost to the tenants, should there be any, and whenever conditions should exist warranting such
action under the provisions of the Land Tenure Act.” Tadeco however did not comply with this condition.

On May 7, 1980, the martial law administration filed a suit before the Manila RTC against Tadeco, et al., for them to
surrender Hacienda Luisita to the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) so that the land can be distributed to farmers
at cost. Responding, Tadeco alleged that Hacienda Luisita does not have tenants, besides which sugar lands – of which
the hacienda consisted – are not covered by existing agrarian reform legislations. The Manila RTC rendered judgment
ordering Tadeco to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR. Therefrom, Tadeco appealed to the CA.

On March 17, 1988, during the administration of President Corazon Cojuangco Aquino, the Office of the Solicitor General
moved to withdraw the government’s case against Tadeco, et al. The CA dismissed the case, subject to the PARC’s
approval of Tadeco’s proposed stock distribution plan (SDP) in favor of its farmworkers. [Under EO 229 and later RA
6657, Tadeco had the option of availing stock distribution as an alternative modality to actual land transfer to the
farmworkers.] On August 23, 1988, Tadeco organized a spin-off corporation, herein petitioner HLI, as vehicle to facilitate
stock acquisition by the farmworkers. For this purpose, Tadeco conveyed to HLI the agricultural land portion (4,915.75
hectares) and other farm-related properties of Hacienda Luisita in exchange for HLI shares of stock.

On May 9, 1989, some 93% of the then farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs) complement of Hacienda Luisita signified in a
referendum their acceptance of the proposed HLI’s Stock Distribution Option Plan (SODP). On May 11, 1989, the SDOA
was formally entered into by Tadeco, HLI, and the 5,848 qualified FWBs. This attested to by then DAR Secretary Philip
Juico. The SDOA embodied the basis and mechanics of HLI’s SDP, which was eventually approved by the PARC after a
follow-up referendum conducted by the DAR on October 14, 1989, in which 5,117 FWBs, out of 5,315 who participated,
opted to receive shares in HLI.

On August 15, 1995, HLI applied for the conversion of 500 hectares of land of the hacienda from agricultural to industrial
use, pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 6657. The DAR approved the application on August 14, 1996, subject to payment of three
percent (3%) of the gross selling price to the FWBs and to HLI’s continued compliance with its undertakings under the
SDP, among other conditions.

On December 13, 1996, HLI, in exchange for subscription of 12,000,000 shares of stocks of Centennary Holdings, Inc.
(Centennary), ceded 300 hectares of the converted area to the latter. Subsequently, Centennary sold the entire 300
hectares for PhP750 million to Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), which used it in developing an industrial
complex. From this area was carved out 2 parcels, for which 2 separate titles were issued in the name of LIPCO. Later,
LIPCO transferred these 2 parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) in payment of LIPCO’s
PhP431,695,732.10 loan obligations to RCBC. LIPCO’s titles were cancelled and new ones were issued to RCBC. Apart
from the 500 hectares, another 80.51 hectares were later detached from Hacienda Luisita and acquired by the
government as part of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway (SCTEX) complex. Thus, 4,335.75 hectares remained of the
original 4,915 hectares Tadeco ceded to HLI.

Such, was the state of things when two separate petitions reached the DAR in the latter part of 2003. The first was filed
by the Supervisory Group of HLI (Supervisory Group), praying for a renegotiation of the SDOA, or, in the alternative, its
revocation. The second petition, praying for the revocation and nullification of the SDOA and the distribution of the
lands in the hacienda, was filed by Alyansa ng mga Manggagawang Bukid ng Hacienda Luisita (AMBALA). The DAR then
constituted a Special Task Force (STF) to attend to issues relating to the SDP of HLI. After investigation and evaluation,
the STF found that HLI has not complied with its obligations under RA 6657 despite the implementation of the SDP. On
December 22, 2005, the PARC issued the assailed Resolution No. 2005-32-01, recalling/revoking the SDO plan of
Tadeco/HLI. It further resolved that the subject lands be forthwith placed under the compulsory coverage or mandated
land acquisition scheme of the CARP.

From the foregoing resolution, HLI sought reconsideration. Its motion notwithstanding, HLI also filed a petition before
the Supreme Court in light of what it considers as the DAR’s hasty placing of Hacienda Luisita under CARP even before
PARC could rule or even read the motion for reconsideration. PARC would eventually deny HLI’s motion for
reconsideration via Resolution No. 2006-34-01 dated May 3, 2006.

ISSUES:

(1) Does the PARC possess jurisdiction to recall or revoke HLI’s SDP?

(2) [Issue raised by intervenor FARM (group of farmworkers)] Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657, which allows stock transfer in lieu of
outright land transfer, unconstitutional?

(3) Is the revocation of the HLI’s SDP valid? [Did PARC gravely abuse its discretion in revoking the subject SDP and
placing the hacienda under CARP’s compulsory acquisition and distribution scheme?]

(4) Should those portions of the converted land within Hacienda Luisita that RCBC and LIPCO acquired by purchase be
excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution? [Did the PARC gravely abuse its discretion when it included
LIPCO’s and RCBC’s respective properties that once formed part of Hacienda Luisita under the CARP compulsory
acquisition scheme via the assailed Notice of Coverage?]

RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition of HLI and AFFIRMED the PARC resolution placing the lands subject of HLI’s SDP under
compulsory coverage on mandated land acquisition scheme of the CARP, with the MODIFICATION that the original 6,296
qualified FWBs were given the option to remain as stockholders of HLI. It also excluded from the mandatory CARP
coverage that part of Hacienda Luisita that had been acquired by RCBC and LIPCO.]

(1) YES, the PARC has jurisdiction to revoke HLI’s SDP under the doctrine of necessary implication.

Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, as implemented by DAO 10, the authority to approve the plan for stock distribution of the
corporate landowner belongs to PARC. Contrary to petitioner HLI’s posture, PARC also has the power to revoke the SDP
which it previously approved. It may be, as urged, that RA 6657 or other executive issuances on agrarian reform do not
explicitly vest the PARC with the power to revoke/recall an approved SDP. Such power or authority, however, is deemed
possessed by PARC under the principle of necessary implication, a basic postulate that what is implied in a statute is as
much a part of it as that which is expressed.

Following the doctrine of necessary implication, it may be stated that the conferment of express power to approve a
plan for stock distribution of the agricultural land of corporate owners necessarily includes the power to revoke or recall
the approval of the plan. To deny PARC such revocatory power would reduce it into a toothless agency of CARP, because
the very same agency tasked to ensure compliance by the corporate landowner with the approved SDP would be
without authority to impose sanctions for non-compliance with it.

(2) NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is not unconstitutional. [The Court actually refused to pass upon the constitutional question
because it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and because the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case.
Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition
under RA 9700.]

When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review over, and pass upon the constitutionality of, acts
of the executive or legislative departments, it does so only when the following essential requirements are first met, to
wit: (1) there is an actual case or controversy; (2) that the constitutional question is raised at the earliest possible
opportunity by a proper party or one with locus standi; and (3) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of
the case.

Not all the foregoing requirements are satisfied in the case at bar.

While there is indeed an actual case or controversy, intervenor FARM, composed of a small minority of 27 farmers, has
yet to explain its failure to challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 as early as November 21, 1989 when
PARC approved the SDP of Hacienda Luisita or at least within a reasonable time thereafter, and why its members
received benefits from the SDP without so much of a protest. It was only on December 4, 2003 or 14 years after approval
of the SDP that said plan and approving resolution were sought to be revoked, but not, to stress, by FARM or any of its
members, but by petitioner AMBALA. Furthermore, the AMBALA petition did NOT question the constitutionality of Sec.
31 of RA 6657, but concentrated on the purported flaws and gaps in the subsequent implementation of the SDP. Even
the public respondents, as represented by the Solicitor General, did not question the constitutionality of the provision.
On the other hand, FARM, whose 27 members formerly belonged to AMBALA, raised the constitutionality of Sec. 31 only
on May 3, 2007 when it filed its Supplemental Comment with the Court. Thus, it took FARM some eighteen (18) years
from November 21, 1989 before it challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 which is quite too late in the
day. The FARM members slept on their rights and even accepted benefits from the SDP with nary a complaint on the
alleged unconstitutionality of Sec. 31 upon which the benefits were derived. The Court cannot now be goaded into
resolving a constitutional issue that FARM failed to assail after the lapse of a long period of time and the occurrence of
numerous events and activities which resulted from the application of an alleged unconstitutional legal provision.

The last but the most important requisite that the constitutional issue must be the very lis mota of the case does not
likewise obtain. The lis mota aspect is not present, the constitutional issue tendered not being critical to the resolution
of the case. The unyielding rule has been to avoid, whenever plausible, an issue assailing the constitutionality of a
statute or governmental act. If some other grounds exist by which judgment can be made without touching the
constitutionality of a law, such recourse is favored.

The lis mota in this case, proceeding from the basic positions originally taken by AMBALA (to which the FARM members
previously belonged) and the Supervisory Group, is the alleged non-compliance by HLI with the conditions of the SDP to
support a plea for its revocation. And before the Court, the lis mota is whether or not PARC acted in grave abuse of
discretion when it ordered the recall of the SDP for such non-compliance and the fact that the SDP, as couched and
implemented, offends certain constitutional and statutory provisions. To be sure, any of these key issues may be
resolved without plunging into the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. Moreover, looking deeply into the underlying
petitions of AMBALA, et al., it is not the said section per se that is invalid, but rather it is the alleged application of the
said provision in the SDP that is flawed.

It may be well to note at this juncture that Sec. 5 of RA 9700, amending Sec. 7 of RA 6657, has all but superseded Sec.
31 of RA 6657 vis-à-vis the stock distribution component of said Sec. 31. In its pertinent part, Sec. 5 of RA 9700 provides:
“[T]hat after June 30, 2009, the modes of acquisition shall be limited to voluntary offer to sell and compulsory
acquisition.” Thus, for all intents and purposes, the stock distribution scheme under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is no longer an
available option under existing law. The question of whether or not it is unconstitutional should be a moot issue.

(3) YES, the revocation of the HLI’s SDP valid. [NO, the PARC did NOT gravely abuse its discretion in revoking the subject
SDP and placing the hacienda under CARP’s compulsory acquisition and distribution scheme.]

The revocation of the approval of the SDP is valid: (1) the mechanics and timelines of HLI’s stock distribution violate DAO
10 because the minimum individual allocation of each original FWB of 18,804.32 shares was diluted as a result of the use
of “man days” and the hiring of additional farmworkers; (2) the 30-year timeframe for HLI-to-FWBs stock transfer is
contrary to what Sec. 11 of DAO 10 prescribes.
In our review and analysis of par. 3 of the SDOA on the mechanics and timelines of stock distribution, We find that it
violates two (2) provisions of DAO 10. Par. 3 of the SDOA states:

3. At the end of each fiscal year, for a period of 30 years, the SECOND PARTY [HLI] shall arrange with the FIRST PARTY
[TDC] the acquisition and distribution to the THIRD PARTY [FWBs] on the basis of number of days worked and at no cost
to them of one-thirtieth (1/30) of 118,391,976.85 shares of the capital stock of the SECOND PARTY that are presently
owned and held by the FIRST PARTY, until such time as the entire block of 118,391,976.85 shares shall have been
completely acquired and distributed to the THIRD PARTY.

[I]t is clear as day that the original 6,296 FWBs, who were qualified beneficiaries at the time of the approval of the SDP,
suffered from watering down of shares. As determined earlier, each original FWB is entitled to 18,804.32 HLI shares.
The original FWBs got less than the guaranteed 18,804.32 HLI shares per beneficiary, because the acquisition and
distribution of the HLI shares were based on “man days” or “number of days worked” by the FWB in a year’s time. As
explained by HLI, a beneficiary needs to work for at least 37 days in a fiscal year before he or she becomes entitled to HLI
shares. If it falls below 37 days, the FWB, unfortunately, does not get any share at year end. The number of HLI shares
distributed varies depending on the number of days the FWBs were allowed to work in one year. Worse, HLI hired
farmworkers in addition to the original 6,296 FWBs, such that, as indicated in the Compliance dated August 2, 2010
submitted by HLI to the Court, the total number of farmworkers of HLI as of said date stood at 10,502. All these
farmworkers, which include the original 6,296 FWBs, were given shares out of the 118,931,976.85 HLI shares
representing the 33.296% of the total outstanding capital stock of HLI. Clearly, the minimum individual allocation of
each original FWB of 18,804.32 shares was diluted as a result of the use of “man days” and the hiring of additional
farmworkers.

Going into another but related matter, par. 3 of the SDOA expressly providing for a 30-year timeframe for HLI-to-FWBs
stock transfer is an arrangement contrary to what Sec. 11 of DAO 10 prescribes. Said Sec. 11 provides for the
implementation of the approved stock distribution plan within three (3) months from receipt by the corporate
landowner of the approval of the plan by PARC. In fact, based on the said provision, the transfer of the shares of stock in
the names of the qualified FWBs should be recorded in the stock and transfer books and must be submitted to the SEC
within sixty (60) days from implementation.

To the Court, there is a purpose, which is at once discernible as it is practical, for the three-month threshold. Remove
this timeline and the corporate landowner can veritably evade compliance with agrarian reform by simply deferring to
absurd limits the implementation of the stock distribution scheme.

Evidently, the land transfer beneficiaries are given thirty (30) years within which to pay the cost of the land thus
awarded them to make it less cumbersome for them to pay the government. To be sure, the reason underpinning the
30-year accommodation does not apply to corporate landowners in distributing shares of stock to the qualified
beneficiaries, as the shares may be issued in a much shorter period of time.

Taking into account the above discussion, the revocation of the SDP by PARC should be upheld [because of violations of]
DAO 10. It bears stressing that under Sec. 49 of RA 6657, the PARC and the DAR have the power to issue rules and
regulations, substantive or procedural. Being a product of such rule-making power, DAO 10 has the force and effect of
law and must be duly complied with. The PARC is, therefore, correct in revoking the SDP. Consequently, the PARC
Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, l989 approving the HLI’s SDP is nullified and voided.

(4) YES, those portions of the converted land within Hacienda Luisita that RCBC and LIPCO acquired by purchase should
be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution.

[T]here are two (2) requirements before one may be considered a purchaser in good faith, namely: (1) that the
purchaser buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such
property; and (2) that the purchaser pays a full and fair price for the property at the time of such purchase or before he
or she has notice of the claim of another.
It can rightfully be said that both LIPCO and RCBC are––based on the above requirements and with respect to the
adverted transactions of the converted land in question––purchasers in good faith for value entitled to the benefits
arising from such status.

First, at the time LIPCO purchased the entire three hundred (300) hectares of industrial land, there was no notice of any
supposed defect in the title of its transferor, Centennary, or that any other person has a right to or interest in such
property. In fact, at the time LIPCO acquired said parcels of land, only the following annotations appeared on the TCT in
the name of Centennary: the Secretary’s Certificate in favor of Teresita Lopa, the Secretary’s Certificate in favor of
Shintaro Murai, and the conversion of the property from agricultural to industrial and residential use.

The same is true with respect to RCBC. At the time it acquired portions of Hacienda Luisita, only the following general
annotations appeared on the TCTs of LIPCO: the Deed of Restrictions, limiting its use solely as an industrial estate; the
Secretary’s Certificate in favor of Koji Komai and Kyosuke Hori; and the Real Estate Mortgage in favor of RCBC to
guarantee the payment of PhP 300 million.

To be sure, intervenor RCBC and LIPCO knew that the lots they bought were subjected to CARP coverage by means of a
stock distribution plan, as the DAR conversion order was annotated at the back of the titles of the lots they acquired.
However, they are of the honest belief that the subject lots were validly converted to commercial or industrial purposes
and for which said lots were taken out of the CARP coverage subject of PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 and, hence, can be
legally and validly acquired by them. After all, Sec. 65 of RA 6657 explicitly allows conversion and disposition of
agricultural lands previously covered by CARP land acquisition “after the lapse of five (5) years from its award when the
land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes or the locality has become urbanized and
the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes.” Moreover, DAR notified
all the affected parties, more particularly the FWBs, and gave them the opportunity to comment or oppose the proposed
conversion. DAR, after going through the necessary processes, granted the conversion of 500 hectares of Hacienda
Luisita pursuant to its primary jurisdiction under Sec. 50 of RA 6657 to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters and its original exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform. The DAR
conversion order became final and executory after none of the FWBs interposed an appeal to the CA. In this factual
setting, RCBC and LIPCO purchased the lots in question on their honest and well-founded belief that the previous
registered owners could legally sell and convey the lots though these were previously subject of CARP coverage. Ergo,
RCBC and LIPCO acted in good faith in acquiring the subject lots.

And second, both LIPCO and RCBC purchased portions of Hacienda Luisita for value. Undeniably, LIPCO acquired 300
hectares of land from Centennary for the amount of PhP750 million pursuant to a Deed of Sale dated July 30, 1998. On
the other hand, in a Deed of Absolute Assignment dated November 25, 2004, LIPCO conveyed portions of Hacienda
Luisita in favor of RCBC by way of dacion en pago to pay for a loan of PhP431,695,732.10.

In relying upon the above-mentioned approvals, proclamation and conversion order, both RCBC and LIPCO cannot be
considered at fault for believing that certain portions of Hacienda Luisita are industrial/commercial lands and are, thus,
outside the ambit of CARP. The PARC, and consequently DAR, gravely abused its discretion when it placed LIPCO’s and
RCBC’s property which once formed part of Hacienda Luisita under the CARP compulsory acquisition scheme via the
assailed Notice of Coverage.

[The Court went on to apply the operative fact doctrine to determine what should be done in the aftermath of its
disposition of the above-enumerated issues:

While We affirm the revocation of the SDP on Hacienda Luisita subject of PARC Resolution Nos. 2005-32-01 and 2006-
34-01, the Court cannot close its eyes to certain “operative facts” that had occurred in the interim. Pertinently, the
“operative fact” doctrine realizes that, in declaring a law or executive action null and void, or, by extension, no longer
without force and effect, undue harshness and resulting unfairness must be avoided. This is as it should realistically be,
since rights might have accrued in favor of natural or juridical persons and obligations justly incurred in the meantime.
The actual existence of a statute or executive act is, prior to such a determination, an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored; the past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.

While the assailed PARC resolutions effectively nullifying the Hacienda Luisita SDP are upheld, the revocation must, by
application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified FWBs to choose whether
they want to remain as HLI stockholders or not. The Court cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that in 1989, 93% of the
FWBs agreed to the SDOA (or the MOA), which became the basis of the SDP approved by PARC per its Resolution No. 89-
12-2 dated November 21, 1989. From 1989 to 2005, the FWBs were said to have received from HLI salaries and cash
benefits, hospital and medical benefits, 240-square meter homelots, 3% of the gross produce from agricultural lands,
and 3% of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and the 80.51-hectare lot sold to SCTEX. HLI
shares totaling 118,391,976.85 were distributed as of April 22, 2005. On August 6, 20l0, HLI and private respondents
submitted a Compromise Agreement, in which HLI gave the FWBs the option of acquiring a piece of agricultural land or
remain as HLI stockholders, and as a matter of fact, most FWBs indicated their choice of remaining as stockholders.
These facts and circumstances tend to indicate that some, if not all, of the FWBs may actually desire to continue as HLI
shareholders. A matter best left to their own discretion.]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.

Separation of Church and State

Estrada v. Escritor 2003

Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City.  Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote
to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors
that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son.
Escritor’s husband, who had lived with another woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary.  On the other
hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.  Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a
resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite.   According to the complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain
employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract
Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their religious beliefs.  After ten years of
living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” which was approved by the
congregation.  Such declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their
union.  Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since 1991,
testified and explained the import of and procedures for executing the declaration which was completely executed by
Escritor and Quilapio’s in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central
Office.       

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of “gross and immoral conduct” and be
penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.

HELD:

A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the
Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation
of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation
of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.

The state’s interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high standard of
morality and decency.  “There is nothing in the OCA’s (Office of the Court Administrator) memorandum to the Court that
demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should override respondent’s plea of religious freedom.  Indeed,
it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The
burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor
General”.

In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an opportunity to demonstrate
the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondent’s position that her conjugal arrangement is
not immoral and punishable as it is within the scope of free exercise protection.  The Court could not prohibit and punish
her conduct where the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her
right to religious freedom.  Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing look at respondent’s claim of religious
freedom but must also apply the “compelling state interest” test.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor General is ordered to
intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent's
claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to override
respondent's religious belief and practice; and (c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the
least restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days from the Office of
the Court Administrator's receipt of this Decision.     

----

Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., requesting for an investigation of rumors that
respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter, is living with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of
eighteen to twenty years old. Estrada is not personally related either to Escritor or her partner. Nevertheless, he filed
the charge against Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court,
thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.

Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband having
died in 1998. She admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage for twenty
years and that they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch
Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten
years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness," insofar as the
congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio and
they remain members in good standing in the congregation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of "gross and immoral conduct."

HELD:

Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time
strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the
morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on
religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. It still remains to be seen if respondent is entitled to
such doctrine as the state has not been afforded the chance has demonstrate the compelling state interest of
prohibiting the act of respondent, thus the case is remanded to the RTC.

Benevolent neutrality is inconsistent with the Free Exercise Clause as far as it prohibits such exercise given a compelling
state interest. It is the respondent’s stance that the respondent’s conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable
as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection. Should the Court prohibit and punish her conduct where it is
protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Court’s action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to
religious freedom. The Court cannot therefore simply take a passing look at respondent’s claim of religious freedom, but
must instead apply the “compelling state interest” test. The government must be heard on the issue as it has not been
given an opportunity to discharge its burden of demonstrating the state’s compelling interest which can override
respondent’s religious belief and practice.

Estrada v. Escritor 2006

Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a man who is not
her husband, for more than twenty five yearsand had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before
she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. 

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to complainant, respondent
should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act. 

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and
the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the
approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple
to legalize their union.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

RULING: No.

The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The free exercise of
religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most
inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or
symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not
evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus
the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition.

Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The
jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming
arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the
least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the
legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the
law based on her right to freedom of religion.

---

Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., requesting for an investigation of rumors that
respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter, is living with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of
eighteen to twenty years old. Estrada is not personally related either to Escritor or her partner. Nevertheless, he filed
the charge against Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court,
thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.
Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband having
died in 1998. She admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage for twenty
years and that they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch
Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten
years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness," insofar as the
congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio and
they remain members in good standing in the congregation.

 ISSUE :

Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of "gross and immoral conduct."

 HELD :

The two streams of jurisprudence - separationist or accommodationist - are anchored on a different reading of the "wall
of separation." Separationist - This approach erects an absolute barrier to formal interdependence of religion and state.
Religious institutions could not receive aid, whether direct or indirect, from the state. Nor could the state adjust its
secular programs to alleviate burdens the programs placed on believers. the strict neutrality or separationist view is
largely used by the Court, showing the Court’s tendency to press relentlessly towards a more secular society
Accommodationist - Benevolent neutrality thus recognizes that religion plays an important role in the public life of the
United States as shown by many traditional government practices which An accommodationist holds that it is good
public policy, and sometimes constitutionally required, for the state to make conscious and deliberate efforts to avoid
interference with religious freedom. On the other hand, the strict neutrality adherent believes that it is good public
policy, and also constitutionally required, for the government to avoid religion-specific policy even at the cost of
inhibiting religious exercise First, the accommodationist interpretation is most consistent with the language of the First
Amendment. Second, the accommodationist position best achieves the purposes of the First Amendment. Third, the
accommodationist interpretation is particularly necessary to protect adherents of minority religions from the inevitable
effects of majoritarianism, which include ignorance and indifference and overt hostility to the minority Fourth, the
accommodationist position is practical as it is a commonsensical way to deal with the various needs and beliefs of
different faiths in a pluralistic nation. The "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the
whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state’s interests: some effects may be immediate and short-
term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a
substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether
respondent’s right to religious freedom has been burdened. There is no doubt that choosing between keeping her
employment and abandoning her religious belief and practice and family on the one hand, and giving up her
employment and keeping her religious practice and family on the other hand, puts a burden on her free exercise of
religion The second step is to ascertain respondent’s sincerity in her religious belief. Respondent appears to be sincere in
her religious belief and practice and is not merely using the "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness" to avoid punishment
for immorality. She did not secure the Declaration only after entering the judiciary where the moral standards are strict
and defined, much less only after an administrative case for immorality was filed against herIndeed, it is inappropriate
for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of
evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General. To
properly settle the issue in the case at bar, the government should be given the opportunity to demonstrate the
compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondent’s stance that her conjugal arrangement is not
immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection.

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC

Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or
trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in
2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership
base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition for registration with the COMELEC. On November 11, 2009,
after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds. On
January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the
COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlads application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a
preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin printing
the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.

Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated
the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well
as constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda
to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that
the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made
untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by
COMELECs field personnel.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC erred in denying the Ang Ladlad to be a party list.

HELD: Yes. They denied ang ladlad because they believe that it would hurt the youth sector especially they are living an
immoral life. COMELEC based their decision on two religious tests based on Biblical and Quranic scriptural quotations
about homosexuality. This is contrary to Law and a grave abuse of discretion since the exercise of civil and political
rights is specifically protected against the application of such religious tests.

The 1987 Philippines Constitution's Bill of Rights Article III Section 5 defines the Principle of the Separation of Church and
State in three key provisions: No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. (Nonestablishment Clause). The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. (Freedom of Religion clause). No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights. (No Test clause).

The denial of Ang Ladlad registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval
of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest. COMELEC blanket justifications give rise to
the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular
morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection clause. Despite the
absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides nor shall any person be denied equal protection of
the laws, courts have never interpreted the provision as an absolute prohibition on classification. Equality, said Aristotle,
consists in the same treatment of similar persons.[33] The equal protection clause guarantees that no person or class of
persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same
place and in like circumstances.[34]

Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will
uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end.[35] In Central
Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas,[36] we declared that [i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of
analysis of equal protection challenges x x x have followed the rational basis test, coupled with a deferential attitude to
legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach
of the Constitution.[37]

The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual conduct as immoral and
unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the
Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or
parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes
it, the asserted state interest here that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority is not a legitimate state interest
that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection clause. The COMELECs differentiation, and its
unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that would benefit the nation,
furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored group.

From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in
participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this
case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve
to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
Imbong v. Ochoa

Congress enacted, RA 10354, otherwise known as “Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012” (RH
Law) in December 2012. Right after the President’s concurrence to the law, and prior to its implementation, various
petitions were filed assailing the constitutionality of the RH Law.

The RH Law mainly focuses on the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save lives and keep women
and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. The RH Law emphasizes the need to provide
Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the full range of modem family
planning products and methods.

ISSUES:

Procedural:

1. Whether the court may exercise its Power of Judicial Review over the assailed RH Law?

2. Whether there’s actual case or controversy on the RH Law as alleged by the petitioners?

3. Whether the raised facial challenge petitions against the RH law must not prosper?

4. Whether petitioners have Locus Standi in filing petitions to assail the RH Law?

5. Whether the court has jurisdiction over the said petitions that were filed for declaratory relief?

6. Whether the RH Law violated the ‘One Subject/One Title’ provisioned in the Constitution?

Substantive:

Whether the RH law unconstitutionally violates:

A. Right to Life of the unborn child?

B. Right to Health?

C. Freedom of Religion?

D. The Family?

E. Freedom of Expression and academic freedom?

F. Due Process?

G. Equal Protection?

H. Involuntary Servitude?

I. Delegation of Authority to FDA?

J. Autonomy of the ARMM?

RULING:

PROCEDURAL RULINGS:

1) Yes, the Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within
its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a very
limited and specific point - to determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null because
they were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion.
While the Court may not answer the questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may perform judicial
review when it is alleged to be unconstitutional as a result of grave abuse of discretion. Therefore the Court can exercise
its judicial power to review the RH Law Bill.

2) Yes, an actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. The
controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests.

In this case, considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary
measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable
controversy. Therefore a controversy exists with the RH law and it is ripe for judicial determination.

3) No, a facial challenge (also known as First amendment challenge in the U.S.) is one that is launched to assail the
validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights such as religious freedom, freedom of
the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.

While the Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to
cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.

This is because the court is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

In this case, considering that the petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and
religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has
authority to take cognizance of the petitions and to determine the constitutionality of the RH Law.

4) Yes, Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. The doctrine of transcendental
importance, as invoked by the petitioners, applies appropriately to the case.

The concept of the doctrine is that (legal) standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional
plaintiffs (ordinary citizens, taxpayers, etc.) When the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

In this case, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of
religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Therefore, the Petitioners have raised issues that are of
transcendental importance hence legal standing based on the application of the doctrine of transcendental importance.

5) No, however as a general rule, where a case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the
Court may consider the petitions as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65 over which the court has jurisdiction.

In this case, it was evident that most of the petitions were praying for injunctive reliefs as petitioners’ main contention is
to declare the RH law as unconstitutional so as to eschew it from being implemented. Hence, the Court considered the
said petitions as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65 and took jurisdiction.

6) No, as a general rule the ‘one subject/one title rule’ expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be so
uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry
as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one
is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.
In this case, textual analysis shows that "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and
germane to the objective to control the population growth. Therefore the Court found no reason to believe that
Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

SUBSTANTIVE RULINGS

A) No, the RH law does not violate the right to life of the unborn as it recognizes that the fertilized ovum already
has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987
Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a
measure legalizing abortion. The RH law prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion through either the
destruction of the fertilized ovum or the obstruction of fertilized ovum from being implanted to the mother’s womb.

Though the RH Laws provision shows consistency with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, it was observed
that it’s Implementing Rules and Regulations needs to be amended so that it is consistent with the RH law in prohibiting
abortion. The word "primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void as without omitting the
said word will “open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn
from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution."

B) No, the RH Law does not trump on the constitutional right to health. The petitioners allege that since the RH Law
promotes contraceptives, there’s a risk of the proliferation of oral hormonal contraceptives which may contract fatal
side effects to its users such as breast cancer, etc.

Contrary to the Petitioner’s contention, the intent of the RH Law is to keep intact to the provisions of RA 4729 (which
regulates the sale and distribution of contraceptives through a duly licensed physician) and RA 5921 (a law requiring all
medicines, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices to be sold only through a prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy).
These laws were not repealed when RH law was enacted and both laws are consistent with Section 10 of the RH law and
are adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public.

C) No, the Court cannot identify whether the use of contraceptives or participation of the Reproductive health
provisions is morally right or wrong according to one’s dogma or religious point of view. This is mainly because these
concepts are limitless in the human mind. The court ruled though that it has the authority to determine if the RH Law
contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its
beliefs on the rest of the society. The principle is based on mutual respect; the State cannot meddle in the internal
affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and
discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and
the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are
good for the country.

The State may implement its legitimate secular objectives without being intruded upon by the policies of any one
religion. The State can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of
contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of the petitioners.

Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law obliges a hospital or medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking
health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections
based on religious or ethical beliefs. These provisions violate the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious
objector. They are contrary to Section 29(2), Article VI of the Constitution or the Free Exercise Clause, whose basis is the
respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.

The provisions in the RH Law compelling non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group and health care service providers to refer patients to other providers and penalizing them if they fail to
do so (Sections 7 and 23(a)(3)) as well as compelling them to disseminate information and perform RH procedures under
pain of penalty (Sections 23(a)(1) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24) also violate (and inhibit) the freedom of religion.
While penalties may be imposed by law to ensure compliance to it, a constitutionally-protected right must prevail over
the effective implementation of the law.

Excluding public health officers from being conscientious objectors (under Sec. 5.24 of the IRR) also violates the equal
protection clause. There is no perceptible distinction between public health officers and their private counterparts. In
addition, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protection of this freedom remains even if he/she
is employed in the government.

Using the compelling state interest test, there is no compelling state interest to limit the free exercise of conscientious
objectors. There is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the above-
quoted provisions. In addition, the limits do not pertain to life-threatening cases.

The respondents also failed to show that these provisions are least intrusive means to achieve a legitimate state
objective. The Legislature has already taken other secular steps to ensure that the right to health is protected, such as
RA 4729, RA 6365 (The Population Act of the Philippines) and RA 9710 (The Magna Carta of Women).

Lastly, Section 15 of the RH Law which requires would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning,
breastfeeding and infant nutrition as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, is a reasonable exercise of police
power by the government. The law does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the
seminar. Those who attend the seminar are free to accept or reject information they receive and they retain the
freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.

D) The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had
a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which
states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)
(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons
exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as it denies
the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is “non-surgical procedures.”

However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services. Parents are not
deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding whether
to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.

E) The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to
provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might raise their
objection to their participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be
filed before it.

Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet formulated a
curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.

Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their
children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the
State. The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than
supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.

By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in developing the
mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the
petitioners.

F) The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several terms as
observed by the petitioners are not vague. The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in
relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health care
institution” cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private health care service provider.

The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information and rendering of medical
procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family
planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures.

The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect”
and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and
effect of programs and services on reproductive health.

G) To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a violation of the equal
protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall
prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to
provide medical care to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor
and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does
not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to
have children.

The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor. The exclusion of private educational institutions from the
mandatory RH education program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of
private educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards
the teaching of reproductive health education.

H) The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service providers to
render 48 hours of pro bono RH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of
medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and
regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-
government RH service providers to render pro bono service. Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed
should they do otherwise.

However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow them to render
RH service, pro bono or otherwise (See Part 3b of this digest.)

I) No, the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a supply or product is to
be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid, as the FDA not only has the power but also the competency to evaluate,
register and cover health services and methods (under RA 3720 as amended by RA 9711 or the FDA Act of 2009).

J) No, the RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local governments. Par (c) of Section 17 provides a
categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services. Unless a local
government unit (LGU) is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which
funding has been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program
involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.

In addition, LGUs are merely encouraged to provide RH services. Provisions of these services are not mandatory.
Therefore, the RH Law does not amount to an undue encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy
enjoyed by LGUs. Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM merely delineates the
powers that may be exercised by the regional government. These provisions cannot be seen as an abdication by the
State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the general welfare.