Pascual v. Provincial Board before recourse to judicial action can be initiated.

However, this rule is not

October 31, 1959 | Gutierrez David, J. | Appeal | Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies
SUMMARY: 3 admin cases were filed against San Jose Mayor Pascual before the
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija. He filed an MD for the 3 rd charge alleging that the
wrongful acts were committed during his previous term and cannot be a ground for
disciplining him during his 2nd term. When his MD was denied, petitioner filed a
petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction. Respondent moved to dismiss
the petition since petitioner did not first appeal to the Executive Secretary, in
compliance with the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. SC held that
the said principle admits certain exceptions, as in this case, where the only question
to be settled is purely legal.
DOCTRINE: See Ratio 2.
FACTS:
1. 3 administrative charges were filed with the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija
against Arturo Pascual, mayor of San Jose, by the Acting Provincial Governor,
the 3rd charge of which was for “maladministrative, abuse of authority, and
usurpation of judicial functions” (he accepted a criminal complaint filed in
court, conducted prelim investigation, fixed the bailbond and issued warrant of
arrest. He also reduced the amount of the bail from 6k to 3k in defiance of the
express refusal of the justice of the peace to reduce said bond).
2. After the presentation of evidence for the first 2 charges, Pascual filed an MD
on the 3rd charge based on the ground that said wrongful acts were committed
during his previous term of office and could not constitute as a ground for
disciplining him during his 2nd term. The MD was denied.
3. He thereafter filed a petition for a writ of prohibition with prelim injunction to
enjoin the provincial board from taking cognizance of the 3 rd charge. The
petition was denied in a minute resolution, “without prejudice to action, if any,
in the CFI”. Accordingly, he filed with the CFI another petition for prohibition
with prelim injunction, alleging that the provincial board lacked jurisdiction.
4. The Provincial Board moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that it states
no cause of action because petitioner had not complied with the cardinal
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies before he could appeal to the
courts. CFI dismissed the petition “for being premature” since petitioner had
not first appealed to the Executive Secretary.
without exceptions.
2. The rule is inapplicable where no administrative remedy is provided. Likewise,
the rule will be relaxed where there is grave doubt as to the availability of the
administrative remedy; where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, and
nothing of administrative nature is to be or can be done; where although there
are steps to be taken, they are, under the admitted facts, merely matters of form,
and the administrative process, as a process of judgment, is really over; or
where the administrative remedy is not exclusive but merely cumulative or
concurrent to a judicial remedy. A litigant need not proceed with optional
administrative process before seeking judicial relief.
3. In this case, the only question to be settled is a purely legal one: WoN the
municipal mayor may be subjected to an administrative investigation of a
charge based on misconduct allegedly committed by him during his prior term.
4. As to the legality of disciplining an elective municipal official for a wrongful
act committed by him during his immediately preceding term of office, the
Court resorted to American authorities due to an absence of any precedent.
While there were conflicting cases on the matter, the weight of authority seems
to incline to the rule denying the right to remove one from office because of a
misconduct during a prior term, to which the Court fully subscribes. The
underlying theory is that each term is separate from the other terms, and that
reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.

ISSUE/S: WoN it was legally proper for petitioner to come to court without first
bringing his case to the Executive Secretary for review.

HELD/RULING: Order appealed from REVOKED. Writ of prohibition GRANTED

and preliminary injunction made permanent.

RATIO:
1. The settled rule, is that where the law has delineated the procedure by which
administrative appeal or remedy could be effected, the same should be followed