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G& ' The City of Baguio filed on 25 April 1956, in the Court of First Instance of Baguio, a complaint for
declaratory relief against the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA), a public corporation
created by Republic Act 1383, contending that said Act does not include within its purview the Baguio
Waterworks System; that assuming that it does, said Act is unconstitutional because it has the effect of
depriving the City of the ownership, control and operation of said waterworks system without compe nsation and
without due process of law, and that it is oppressive, unreasonable and unjust to plaintiff and other cities,
municipalities and municipal districts similarly situated. On 22 May 1956, NAWASA filed a motion to dismiss.
On 21 June 1956, the Court, acting on the motion to dismiss as well as on the answer and rejoinder filed by both
parties, denied the motion and ordered NAWASA to file its answer to the complaint. On 6 July 1956,
NAWASA filed its answer reiterating and amplifying the grounds alread y advanced in its motion to dismiss. On
14 August 1956, the parties submitted a written stipulation of facts and filed written memoranda. And after
allowing the City to file a supplementary complaint, the Court on 5 November 1956, rendered decision holding
that the waterworks system of the City of Baguio falls within the category of ³private property,´ as
contemplated by our Constitution and may not be expropriated without just compensation. NAWASA filed a
motion for reconsideration, and upon its denial, it took the present appeal.

( ' Whether the Baguio Waterworks partakes of the nature of public property or private/patrimonial property
of the City.

)' The Baguio Waterworks System is not like any public road, park, street or other public property held in
trust by a municipal corporation for the benefit of the public but it is rather a property owned by the City in its
proprietary character. While the cases may differ as to the public or private character of waterworks, the weight
of authority as far as the legislature is concerned classes them as private affairs. (sec. 239, Vol. I, Revised,
McQuillin Municipal Corporations, p. 239; Shrik vs. City of Lancaster, 313 Pa. 158, 169 Atl. 557). And in this
jurisdiction, this Court has already expressed the view that a waterworks system is patrimonial property of the
city that has established it. (Mendoza vs. De Leon, 33 Phil. 509). And being owned by a municipal corporation
in a proprietary character, waterworks cannot be taken away without observing the safeguards set by our
Constitution for the protection of private property. The State may, in the interest of National welfare, transfer to
public ownership any private enterprise upon payment of just compensation. At the same time, one has to bear
in mind that no person can be deprived of his property except for public use and upon payment of just
compensation. Unless the City is given its due compensation, the City cannot be deprived of its property even if
NAWASA desires to take over its administration in line with the spirit of the law (Republic Act 1383). The law,
insofar as it expropriates the waterworks in question without providing for an effective payment of just
compensation, violates our Constitution.

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G& ' The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), a government owned and controlled entity, in accordance
with Commonwealth Act 120, is invested with the power of eminent domai n for the purpose of pursuing its
objectives, which among others is the construction, operation, and maintenance of electric transmission lines for
distribution throughout the Philippines. For the construction of its 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines,
NAPOCOR¶s lines have to pass the lands belonging to Matias Cruz, Heirs of Natalia Paule and spouses
Misericordia Gutierrez and Ricardo Malit (covered by tax declarations 907, 4281 and 7582, respectively).
NAPOCOR initiated negotiations for the acquisition of right of way easements over the aforementioned lots for
the construction of its transmission lines but unsuccessful in this regard, NAPOCOR was constrained to file
eminent domain proceedings against Gutierrez, et. al. on 20 January 1965. Upon filing of the corresponding
complaint, NAPOCOR deposited the amount of P973.00 with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga, tendered to
cover the provisional value of the land of the Malit and Gutierrez. And by virtue of which, NAPOCOR was
placed in possession of the property of the spouses so it could immediately proceed with the construction of its
Mexico-Limay 230 KV transmission line. In this connection, by the trial court¶s order of 30 September 1965,
the spouses were authorized to withdraw the fixed provisional value of their land in the sum of P973.00.
Meanwhile, for the purpose of determining the fair and just compensation due Gutierrez, et. al., the court
appointed 3 commissioners, comprised of one representative of NAPOCOR, one for the affected families and
the other from the court, who then were empowered to receive evidence, conduct ocular inspection of the
premises, and thereafter, prepare their appraisals as to the fair and just compensation to he paid to the owners of
the lots. Hearings were consequently held before said commissioners and during their hearings, the case of the
Heirs of Natalia Paule was amicably settled by virtue of a Right of Way Grant executed by Guadalupe
Sangalang for herself and in behalf of her co-heirs in favor of NAPOCOR. The case against Matias Cruz was
earlier decided by the court, thereby leaving only the case against the spouses Malit and Gutierrez still to be
resolved. Accordingly, the commissioners submitted their individual reports. With the reports submitted, the
lower court rendered a decision, ordering NAPOCOR to pay Malit and Gutierrez the sum of P10 per square
meter as the fair and reasonable compensation for the right-of-way easement of the affected area, which is 760
squares, or a total sum of P7,600.00 and P800.00 as attorney¶s fees. Dissatisfied with the decision, NAPOCOR
filed a motion for reconsideration which was favorably acted upon by the lower court, and in an order dated 10
June 1973, it amended its previous decision, reducing the amount awarded to to P5.00 per square meter as the
fair and reasonable market value of the 760 square meters belonging to the said spouses, in light of the
classification of the land to be partly commercial and partly agricultural. Still not satisfied, an appeal was filed
by the NAPOCOR with the Court of Appeals but appellate court, on 9 March 1982, sustained the trial court.
NAPOCOR filed the petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

( ' Whether the spouses are deprive of the property¶s ordinary use and thus the easement of right of way in
favor of NAPOCOR constitutes taking.

)' The acquisition of the right-of-way easement falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain.
Such conclusion finds support in similar cases of easement of right-of-way where the Supreme Court sustained
the award of just compensation for private property condemned for public use. Herein, the easement of right -of-
way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the
installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NAPOCOR against the
use of the land for an indefinite period deprives spouses Malit and Gutierrez of its ordinary use. For these
reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation, which should be neither more
nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just
compensation has always been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of
the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. The price or value of the land and its
character at the time it was taken by the Government are the criteria for determining just compensation. The
above price refers to the market value of the land which may be the full market value thereof. It appearing that
the trial court did not act capriciously and arbitrarily in setting the price of P5.00 per square meter of the
affected property, the said award is proper and not unreasonable.

REPUBLIC VS. TAGLE [299 SCRA 549; G.R. No. 129079; 2 Dec 1998]

Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Private respondent Helena Z. Benitez is the registered owner of two (2) parcels of land located in
Barangay Salawag, Dasmariñas, Cavite containing an area of 483,331 square meters more or less.

The Philippine Government, through the Philippine Human Resources Development Center (PHRDC),
negotiated with the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Survey Team on the technicalities of the
establishment of the ASEAN Human Resources Development Project in the Philippines. Among the five (5)
main programs of the proposed project was Program III (Construction Manpower Development) which involved
the establishment of a Construction Manpower Development Center (CMDC). PHRDC and private respondent
Helena Z. Benitez, signed a Memorandum of Agreement which provides, among others, that Benitez undertakes
to lease within the period of twenty (20) years and/or sell a portion of that property (which is no less than ten -
hectares) in favor of PHRDC which likewise agrees to lease within a period of twenty (20) years and/or buy said
property site.

The Philippine Women¶s University (PWU) and Benitez granted a permit to PHRDC to occupy and use the land
in question and to undertake land development, electrical and road network installations and other related works
necessary to attain its objectives. Pursuant thereto, the CMDC took possession of the property and ere cted
buildings and other related facilities necessary for its operations. A deposit made by the plaintiff with the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the amount of P708,490.00 which is equivalent to the assessed value of the
property subject matter hereof based on defendant¶s 1990 tax declaration, was made.

In view of the agreement on the sale of the land in question, PHRDC prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale with
Benitez, as vendor, and PHRDC and CMDC, as vendees, duly represented by then Undersecretary Glori a M.
Arroyo, for the signature of Benitez. Benitez in her own capacity did not sign the deed of absolute sale.

Failing to acquire the property involved through negotiated sale, petitioner, through the Department of Trade
and Industry, to which CMDC is attached, instituted a complaint for Eminent Domain, pursuant to the
provisions of Executive Order No. 1035, dated June 25, 1985.

A Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession was granted by the court but quashed it subsequently.

Issue: Whether or Not the respondent judge may quash a writ of possession on the ground that the expropriating
government agency is already occupying the property sought to be expropriated.

Held: No. Under Section 7 of EO 1035, when the government or its authorized agent makes the required
deposit, the trial court has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession. The expropriation of real property
does not include mere physical entry or occupation of land. Although eminent domain usually involves a taking
of title, there may also be compensable taking of only some, not all, of the property interests in the bundle of
rights that constitute ownership.

In the instant case, it is manifest that the petitioner, in pursuit of an objective beneficial to public interest, seeks
to realize the same through its power of eminent domain. In exercising this power, petitioner intended to acquire
not only physical possession but also the legal right to possess and ultimately to own the subject property.
Hence, its mere physical entry and occupation of the property fall short of the taking of title, which includes all
the rights that may be exercised by an owner over the subject property.


Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed complaints for the expropriation of sugarcane lands
belonging to the petitioners. The stated public purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the Dasmariñas
Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area. The
trial court rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of these lots and the payment of just compensation. The
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
A few years later, petitioners contended that respondent NHA violated the stated public purpose for the
expansion of the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project when it failed to relocate the squatters from the Metro M anila
area, as borne out by the ocular inspection conducted by the trial court which showed that most of the
expropriated properties remain unoccupied. Petitioners likewise question the public nature of the use by
respondent NHA when it entered into a contract for the construction of low cost housing units, which is
allegedly different from the stated public purpose in the expropriation proceedings. Hence, it is claimed that
respondent NHA has forfeited its rights and interests by virtue of the expropriatio n judgment and the
expropriated properties should now be returned to herein petitioners.

Issue: Whether or not the judgment of expropriation was forfeited in the light of the failure of respondent NHA
to use the expropriated property for the intended purpose but for a totally different purpose.

Held: The Supreme Court held in favor of the respondent NHA. Accordingly, petitioners cannot insist on a
restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by contending that the contract for l ow cost
housing is a deviation from the stated public use. It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no
longer limited to traditional purposes. The term "public use" has now been held to be synonymous with "public
interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and "public convenience." Thus, whatever may be beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use."

In addition, the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose
even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercials firms, entertainment and service
companies, and other private concerns. Moreover, the Constitution itself allows the State to undertake, for the
common good and in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and
housing which will make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless
citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. The expropriation of private property for the purpose of
socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in furtherance of social justice.

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G& ' Clarita Vda. de Onorio is th e owner of a lot in Barangay M. Roxas, Sto. Nino, South Cotabato with an
area of 39,512 square meters (Lot 1210-A-Pad-11-000586, TCT T-22121 of the Registry of Deeds, South
Cotabato). On 6 October 1981, Santiago Eslaban, Jr., Project Manager of the NIA, ap proved the construction of
the main irrigation canal of the NIA on the said lot, affecting a 24,660 square meter portion thereof. De Onorio¶s
husband agreed to the construction of the NIA canal provided that they be paid by the government for the area
taken after the processing of documents by the Commission on Audit. Sometime in 1983, a Right -of-Way
agreement was executed between De Onorio and the NIA. The NIA then paid De Onorio the amount of
P4,180.00 as Right-of-Way damages. De Onorio subsequently executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and
Fees whereby she waived any compensation for damages to crops and improvements which she suffered as a
result of the construction of a right-of-way on her property. The same year, Eslaban offered De Onorio the sum
of P35,000,00 by way of amicable settlement (financial assistance) pursuant to Executive Order 1035, §18. De
Onorio demanded payment for the taking of her property, but Eslaban/NIA refused to pay. Accordingly, De
Onorio filed on 10 December 1990 a complaint against Eslaban before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), praying
that Eslaban/NIA be ordered to pay the sum of P111,299.55 as compensation for the portion of her property
used in the construction of the canal constructed by the NIA, litigation expenses, and the costs. Eslaban admitted
that NIA constructed an irrigation canal over the property of De Onorio and that NIA paid a certain landowner
whose property had been taken for irrigation purposes, but Eslaban interposed the defense that: (1) the
government had not consented to be sued; (2) the total area used by the NIA for its irrigation canal was only
2.27 hectares, not 24,600 square meters; and (3) that De Onorio was not entitled to compensation for the taking
of her property considering that she secured title over the property by virtue of a homestead patent under
Commonwealth Act 141. On 18 October 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, ordering the NIA to pay to De
Onorio the sum of P107,517.60 as just compensation for the questioned area of 24,660 square meters of land
owned by De Onorio and taken by the NIA which used it for its main canal plus costs. On 15 November 1993,
the NIA appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on 31 October 2000, affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court. NIA filed t he petition for review.

( ' Whether the valuation of just compensation is determined at the time the property was taken or at the
time the complaint for expropriation is filed.

)' Whenever public lands are alienated, granted or conveyed to applicants thereof, and the deed grant or
instrument of conveyance [sales patent] registered with the Register of Deeds and the corresponding certificate
and owner¶s duplicate of title issued, such lands are deemed registered lands under the Torrens System and the
certificate of title thus issued is as conclusive and indefeasible as any other certificate of title issued to private
lands in ordinary or cadastral registration proceedings. The only servitude which a private property owner is
required to recognize in favor of the government is the easement of a ³public highway, way, private way
established by law, or any government canal or lateral thereof where the certificate of title does not state that the
boundaries thereof have been pre-determined.´ This implies that the same should have been pre-existing at the
time of the registration of the land in order that the registered owner may be compelled to respect it. Conversely,
where the easement is not pre-existing and is sought to be imposed only after the land has been registered under
the Land Registration Act, proper expropriation proceedings should be had, and just compensation paid to the
registered owner thereof. Herein, the irrigation canal constructed by the NIA on the contested property was built
only on 6 October 1981, several years after the property had been registered on 13 May 1976. Accordingly,
prior expropriation proceedings should have been filed and just compensation paid to the owner thereof before it
could be taken for public use. With respect to the compensation which the owner of the condemned property is
entitled to receive, it is likewise settled that it is the market value which should be paid or ³that sum of money
which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not compelled to sell, would agree
on as a price to be given and received therefor.´ Further, just compensation means not only the correct amount
to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking.
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered ³just´ for then the property owner is made to
suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more
before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. Nevertheless, there are instances where the
expropriating agency takes over the property prior to the expropriation suit, in which case just compensation
shall be determined as of the time of taking, not as of the time of filing o f the action of eminent domain. The
value of the property, thus, must be determined either as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of
the complaint, ³whichever came first.´

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G& ' Alejandro, Asuncion and Leonica Manosca inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada,
Taguig, Metro Manila, with an area of about 492 square meters. When the parcel was ascertained by the
National Historical Institute (NHI) to have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni
Cristo, it passed Resolution 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree 260, declaring the
land to be a national historical landmark. The resolution was, on 6 January 1986, approved by the Minister of
Education, Culture and Sports (MECS). Later, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice was asked on the legality
of the measure. In his opinion 133, Series of 1987, the Secretary of Justice replied in the affirmative.
Accordingly, on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through the office of the Solicitor-General, instituted a complaint
for expropriation before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig for and in behalf of the NHI. At the same time, the
Republic filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate possession of the
property. The motion was opposed by the Manoscas. After a hearing, the trial court issued, on 3 August 1989,
an order fixing the provisional market (P54,120.00) and assessed (P16,236.00) values of the property and
authorizing the Republic to take over the property once the required sum would have been deposited with the
Municipal Treasurer of Taguig, Metro Manila. The Manoscas moved to dismiss the complaint on the main
thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute
an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a
religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution. The trial court
issued its denial of said motion to dismiss. The Manoscas moved for reconsideration thereafter but were denied.
The Manoscas then lodged a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On 15 January
1992, the appellate court dismissed the petition/A motion for the reconsideration of the decision was denied by
the appellate court on 23 July 1992. The Manoscas filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme

( ' Whether the setting up of the marker in commemoration of Felix Manalo, the founder of the religious
sect Iglesia ni Cristo, constitutes ³public use.´

)' Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and, with less frequency, as condemnation, is,
like police power and taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty. It need not be clothed with any constitutional
gear to exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to
grant, the exercise of the power. Eminent domain is generally so described as ³the highest and most exact idea
of property remaining in the government´ that may be acquired for some public purpose through a method in the
nature of a forced purchase by the State. It is a right to take or reassert dominion over property within the state
for public use or to meet a public exigency. It is said to be an essential part of governance even in its most
primitive form and thus inseparable from sovereignty. The only direct constitutional qualification is that ³private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.´ This prescription is intended to provide a
safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well the individual against whose property the power is
sought to be enforced. The term ³public use,´ not having been otherwise defined by the constitution, must be
considered in its general concept of meeting a public need or a public exigency. The validity of the exercise of
the power of eminent domain for traditional purposes is beyond question; it is not at all to be said, however, that
public use should thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that ³public use´ is strictly limited to
clear cases of ³use by the public´ has long been discarded. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to
recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to
commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The attempt to give some religious
perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is the principal objective of,
not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power. The pract ical reality that greater
benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a
peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would
actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of
public use.

Due process

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 On May 20, 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Palimbang, Sultan
Kudarat proclaimed the petitioners as winning candidates for their Sangguniang Bayan.
The following day, herein private respondents were proclaimed winners as well. Private
respondents claimed that they should be recognized as the winners, and not the
petitioners. Upon receipt of such letter, the Commissioner-in-charge for Region XII asked
the Law Department, the Regional Election Registrar and the Provincial Elections
Supervisor to submit their reports on the matter. All of them found the second
proclamation valid. Hence, the COMELEC issued a Resolution ordering the immediate
installation of the private respondents as the newly elected members of the Sangguniang
Bayan, even though petitioners herein have already taken their oath and have assumed
office. Petitioners contend that such Resolution is null and void because they were not
accorded due notice and hearing, hence constituting a violation of the due process

Œ Ôhether or Not due the COMELEC has the power to suspend a proclamation or
the effects thereof without notice and hearing. 

·  No. The COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or
suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing. The proclamation on
May 20, 2001 enjoys the presumption of regularity and validity since no contest or
protest was even filed assailing the same. The petitioners cannot be removed from office
without due process of law. Due process in quasi-judicial proceedings before the
COMELEC requires due notice and hearing. Furthermore, the proclamation of a winning
candidate cannot be annulled if he has not been notified of any motion to set aside his
proclamation. Hence, as ruled in Fariñas vs. COMELEC, Reyes vs. COMELEC and Gallardo
vs. COMELEC, the COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation
or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing. 

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 Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen who has general
and the same interest, filed a complaint for a preliminary injunction. The Plaintiffs also
questioned the validity of enforcing Ordinance No. 532 by the city of Manila. Ordinance
No. 532 requires that the receipt be in duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed
showing the kind and number of articles delivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning
establishments. The permanent injunction was denied by the trial court. The appellants
claim is that Ordinance No. 532 savors of class legislation; putting in mind that they are
Chinese nationals. It unjustly discriminates between persons in similar circumstances;
and that it constitutes an arbitrary infringement of property rights. They also contest
that the enforcement of the legislation is an act beyond the scope of their police power.
In view of the foregoing, this is an appeal with the Supreme Court. 


1) Ôhether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532 is an act beyond the scope of
police power 

(2) Ôhether or Not the enforcement of the same is a class legislation that infringes
property rights. 

·  Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are permissible under
the police power. The police power of the City of Manila to enact Ordinance No. 532 is
based on Section 2444, paragraphs (l) and (ee) of the Administrative Code, as amended
by Act No. 2744, authorizes the municipal board of the city of Manila, with the approval
of the mayor of the city: 

(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following: xxxx
xxxxxlaundries xxxx. 

(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and
safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the moralit y, peace, good
order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants. 

The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532 was to avoid disputes
between laundrymen and their patrons and to protect customers of laundries who are
not able to decipher Chinese characters from being defrauded. (Considering that in the
year 1920s, people of Manila are more familiar with Spanish and maybe English.) 

In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court held that the ordinance invades
no fundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege. Under the guise of police
regulation, an attempt is not made to violate personal property rights. The ordinance is
neither discriminatory nor unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all public laundries
without distinction, whether they belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other
nationality. All, without exception, and each every one of them without distinction, must
comply with the ordinance. The obvious objection for the imp lementation of the
ordinance is based in sec2444 (ee) of the Administrative Code. Although, an additional
burden will be imposed on the business and occupation affected by the ordinance such
as that of the appellant by learning even a few words in Spanish or English, but mostly
Arabic numbers in order to properly issue a receipt, it seems that the same burdens are
cast upon the them. Yet, even if private rights of person or property are subjected to
restraint, and even if loss will result to individuals fro m the enforcement of the
ordinance, this is not sufficient ground for failing to uphold the power of the legislative
body. The very foundation of the police power is the control of private interests for the
public welfare.

Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the petition for a
preliminary injunction is denied, with costs against the appellants. 

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 The petitioner, Yu Cong Eng, was charged by information in the court of first
instance of Manila, with a violation of Act 2972, which provides that (Section 1) it shall
be unlawful for any person, company, or partnership or corporation engaged in
commerce, industry or any other activity for the purpose of profit in the Philippine
Islands, in accordance with existing law, to keep its account books in any language other
than English, Spanish or any local dialect. He was arrested, his books were seized, and
the trial was about to proceed, when he and the other petitioner, Co Liam, on their own
behalf, and on behalf of all the other Chinese merchants in the Philippines, filed the
petition against the fiscal, or prosecuting attorney of Manila, and the collector of internal
revenue engaged in the prosecution, and against the judge presiding.

Œ Ôhether or Not Act 2972 is unconstitutional. 

·  Yes. The Philippine government may make every reasonable requirement of its
taxpayers to keep proper records of their business transactions in English or Spanish or
Filipino dialect by which an adequate measure of what is due from them in meeting the
cost of government can be had. But we are clearly of opinion that it is not within the
police power of the Philippine Legislature, because it would be oppressive and arbitrary,
to prohibit all Chinese merchants from maintaining a set of books in the Chinese
language, and in the Chinese characters, and thus prevent them from keeping advised of
the status of their business and directing its conduct. 

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 The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the
Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy more
popular support but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with
all its perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest
between the two came to a head when several followers of the petitioner were
ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men. Seven suspects, including
respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders. Owi ng to what he claimed
were attempts to railroad the private respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went to
the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His
complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the
Second Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing
that the proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by the
Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the
strength of his proclamation, the private respondent took his oath as a member of the
Batasang Pambansa. 

Œ Ôhether or Not the Second Division of the Commission on Elections authorized to
promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaimin g the private respondent the winner
in the election.

·  This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that
requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also
appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just.
The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights
are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the
judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness,
otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Ôithout such confidence, there would be no
point in invoking his action for the justice they expect. 

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what
Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal justice. There
cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the
other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after
the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also
extra-judicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed
to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is
no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the
evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and
the pertinent law.

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 A petition was filed to reopen the Radio Station DYRE. DYRE was ³summarily
closed´ on grounds of national security. The radio station was allegedly used to incite
people to sedition. Petitioner, DYRE contends that they were denied due process. There
was no hearing to establish factual evidence for the closure. Furthermore, the closure of
the radio station violates freedom of expression. Before the court could even promulgate
a decision upon the Issue raised, Petitioner, through its president Mr. Rene Espina, filed
a motion to withdraw the petition. The rights of the station were sold to a new owner,
Manuel Pastrana; who is no longer interested in pursuing the case. Despite the case
becoming moot and academic, (because there are no longer interested parties, thus the
dismissal of the case) the Supreme Court still finds that there is need to pass a
³RESOLUTION´ for the guidance of inferior courts and administrative tribunals in matters
as this case. 


(1) Ôhether or not due process was exercised in the case of DYRE.

(2) Ôhether or not the closure of DYRE is a violation of the Constitutional Right of
Freedom of Expression.

·   The court finds that the closure of the Radio Station in 1980 as null and void. The
absence of a hearing is a violation of Constitutional Rights. The primary requirements in
administrative proceedings are laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Indu strial
Relation (69 Phil.635). The Ang Tibay Doctrine should be followed before any broadcast
station may be closed. The Ang Tibay Doctrine provides the following requirements: 

(1) The right to hearing, includes the right to present one¶s case and submit evidence
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented 
(3) The decision must have something to support itself. 
(4) Evidence must be substantial (reasonable evidence that is adequate to support
(5) Decision must be based on the evidence presented at hearing
(6) The tribunal body must act on its own independent consideration of law and facts
and not simply accept subordinate¶s views 
(7) Court must render decision in such a manner that the proceeding can know the
various issued involved and reasons for decisions rendered. 

The court stresses that while there is no controlling and precise definition of Due
Process, it gives an unavoidable standard that government actions must conform in
order that deprivation of life, liberty and property is valid. 

The closure of the radio station is like wise a violation of the constitutional right of
freedom of speech and expression. The court stresses that all forms of media, whether
print or broadcast are entitled to this constitutional righ t. Although the government still
has the right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently
overthrow it. The test for the limitation of freedom of expression is the ³clear and
present danger´ rule. If in the circumstances that the media is used in such nature as to
create this danger that will bring in such evils, then the law has the right to prevent it.
However, Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or signal a start
of widespread uprising. The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the
vitality of a representative democracy. The people continues to have the right to be
informed on public affairs and broadcast media continues to have the pervasive influence
to the people being the most accessible form of media. Therefore, broadcast stations
deserve the the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and
freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution. 

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 Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI for brevity), filed with the
Department of Labor and Employment a petition for certification election among the
supervisory employees of petitioner, alleging that as a supervisory union duly registered
with the Department of Labor and Employment it was seeking to represent the
supervisory employees of Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation. Mediator -Arbiter
Rodolfo S. Milado issued an order directing the holding of a certification election among
the supervisory employees of petitioner, excluding therefrom the superintendents and
the professional and technical employees. However, the PMPI filed an amended petition
with the Mediator-Arbiter wherein it sought to represent not only the supervisory
employees of petitioner but also its professional/technical and confidential employees.
The parties therein agreed to submit their respective position papers and to consider the
amended petition submitted for decision on the basis thereof and related documents.
Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued an order granting the petition and directing the holding of
a certification election among the "supervisory, professional (engineers, analysts,
mechanics, accountants, nurses, midwives, etc.), technical, and confidential employees.
PHILPHOS appealed the order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment who rendered a
decision through Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma dismissing the appeal. PHILPHOS
moved for reconsideration but the same was denied; hence, the instant petition alleging
denial of due process on the part of the DOLE to which the mediator -arbiter was under.

Œ Ôhether or Not there was denial of due process. 

·   There was no denial of due process. The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with the Mediator -
Arbiter and to consider the case submitted for decision on the basis of the position
papers filed by the parties, there was sufficient compliance with the requirement of due
process, as petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to present its side. Moreover,
petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted on a hearing to confront and examine the
witnesses of the other party. But it did not; instead it opted to submit its position paper
with the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the opportunity to ventilate its
arguments in its appeal to the Secretary of Labor. 

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 In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections, the COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 2323, ³Gun Ban´, promulgating rules and regulations on bearing,
carrying and transporting of firearm or other deadly weapons on security personnel or
bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of security agencies or police organizations,
and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the election p eriod. COMELEC
also issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of candidates
engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike
forces, and establishing spot checkpoints. Pursuant to the ³Gun Ban ´, Mr. Serrapio
Taccad, Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives, wrote petitioner for the
return of the two firearms issued to him by the House of Representatives. Petitioner then
instructed his driver, Arellano, to pick up the firearms from petitioner¶s house and return
them to Congress. The PNP set up a checkpoint. Ôhen the car driven by Arellano
approached the checkpoint, the PNP searched the car and found the firearms. Arellano
was apprehended and detained. He then explained the order of petiti oner. Petitioner also
explained that Arellano was only complying with the firearms ban, and that he was not a
security officer or a bodyguard. Later, COMELEC issued Resolution No.92 -0829 directing
the filing of information against petitioner and Arellano f or violation of the Omnibus
Election Code, and for petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified from
running for an elective position. Petitioner then questions the constitutionality of
Resolution No. 2327. He argues that ³gunrunning, using o r transporting firearms or
similar weapons´ and other acts mentioned in the resolution are not within the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, according to petitioner, Resolution No.
2327 is unconstitutional. The issue on the disqualification of petitioner from running in
the elections was rendered moot when he lost his bid for a seat in Congress in the

Œ Ôhether or Not petitioner can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to
return the firearms issued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered from the warrant
less search of his car 

·  A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by an appropriate
authority. However, a warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long
as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the
inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. In the case at bar, the guns
were not tucked in Arellano¶s waist nor placed within his reach, as they were neatly
packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Given these
circumstances, the PNP could not have thoroughly searched the car lawfully as well as
the package without violating the constitutional injunction. Absent any justifying
circumstance specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search
could not have been valid. Consequently, the firearms obtained from the warrantless
search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding. It was also shown in the
facts that the PNP had not informed the public of the purpose of setting up the
checkpoint. Petitioner was also not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the
Omnibus Election Code. He was not informed by the City Prosecutor that he was a
respondent in the preliminary investigation. Such constituted a violation of his right to
due process. Hence, it cannot be contended that petitioner was fully given the
opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not informed that he was
himself a respondent in the case. Thus, the warrantless search conducted by the PNP is
declared illegal and the firearms seized during the search cannot be used as evidence in
any proceeding against the petitioner. Resolution No. 92 -0829 is unconstitutional, and
therefore, set aside.