G.R. No.

231671 July 25, 2017 (Habeas Corpus 2017 - 1)

Padilla vs Congress of the Philippines

FACTS:
 Through Proclamation No. 216, President Duterte declared a state of martial law and
suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a
period not exceeding sixty (60) days effective from the date of the proclamation's
issuance on the grounds of rebellion and necessity of public safety pursuant to Article
VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution .
 In the Petition for Mandamus petitioners seek a ruling from the Court directing the
Congress to convene in joint session to deliberate on Presidential Proclamation No. 216,
and to vote thereon, and declare the initial refusal of the Congress to convene in joint
session for the purpose of considering Proclamation No. 216 to be in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction.
 Petitioners claim that there is an actual case or controversy in this instance and that their
case is ripe for adjudication. Allegedly, the resolutions separately passed by the Senate
and the House of Representatives, which express support as well as the intent not to
revoke President Duterte's proclamation injure their rights "to a proper and mandatory
legislative review of the declaration of martial law" and that the continuing failure of the
Congress to convene in joint session similarly causes a continuing injury to their rights.
 Respondents assert firmly that there is no mandatory duty on their part to "vote jointly,"
except in cases of revocation or extension of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In the absence of such duty, the
non-convening of the Congress in joint session does not pose any actual case or
controversy that may be the subject of judicial review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not it is mandatory for the Congress to automatically convene in joint session in the
event that the President proclaims a state of martial law and/or suspends the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in the Philippines or any part thereof.

HELD:
No. The Congress is not constitutionally mandated to convene in joint session unless in the case
where it were to vote jointly to revoke the President's declaration or suspension. By the language
of Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, the Congress is only required to vote jointly
to revoke the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. The use of the word "may" in the provision - such that "the Congress x x
x may revoke such proclamation or suspension x x x" is to be construed as permissive and
operating to confer discretion on the Congress on whether or not to revoke, but in order to
revoke, the same provision sets the requirement that at least a majority of the Members of the
Congress, voting jointly, favor revocation. Hence, the plain language of the subject constitutional
provision does not support the petitioners' argument that it is obligatory for the Congress to
convene in joint session following the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, under all circumstances.
G.R. No. 231658 July 4, 2017 (Habeas Corpus 2017 - 2)
Rep. Edcel Lagman vs Hon. Salvador Medialdea

FACTS:
 President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial
law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao
on the grounds that the terrorist attacks of the Maute group in Marawi City.
 In a petition authorized under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, petitioners
argue that President Duterte's declarations have no factual basis due to the supposed facts
that there is only a threat of rebellion in Marawi City which is akin to "imminent danger"
of rebellion, which is no longer a valid ground for the declaration of martial law; that
there was no sufficient factual basis because the President's Report contained "false,
inaccurate, contrived and hyperbolic accounts", as they were either from incidents that
did not actually take place or have no connection to the Marawi attacks; that the President
acted alone and did not consult the military establishment or any ranking official before
making the proclamation; and the successful pre-empting of the Maute groups plans as
well as the undetermined number of foreign terrorist reinforcement would not warrant
such declarations.
 The OSG acknowledges that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution vests the Court
with the authority or power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
declaration of martial law. The OSG, however, posits that although Section 18, Article
VII lays the basis for the exercise of such authority or power, the same constitutional
provision failed to specify the vehicle, mode or remedy through which the "appropriate
proceeding" mentioned therein may be resorted to. The OSG suggests that the
"appropriate proceeding" referred to in Section 18, Article VII may be availed of using
the vehicle, mode or remedy of a certiorari petition, either under Section 1 or 5, of
Article VIII. The OSG maintains that the review power is not mandatory, but
discretionary only. It contends that the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation
No. 216 should be reviewed by the Court "under the lens of grave abuse of discretion"
and not the yardstick of correctness of the facts. Arbitrariness, not correctness, should be
the standard in reviewing the sufficiency of factual basis.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitions are the "appropriate proceeding" covered by Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of review required by the Court

HELD:
Yes. It could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the phrase "in an
appropriate proceeding" would refer to a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section
5 of Article VIII. The standard of review in a petition for certiorari  is whether the respondent has
committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the
performance of his or her functions. Thus, it is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamationor suspension. It must be emphasized that under Section 18,
Article VII, the Supreme Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual  basis of the
President's exercise of emergency powers. If the Supreme Court applies the standard of review
used in a petition for certiorari, the same would emasculate its constitutional task under Section
18, Article VII.
G.R. No. 232413 July 25, 2017 (Habeas Corpus 2017 – 3)
In the Matter of the Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus with Petition for
Relief Integrated Bar of the Philippines Pangasinan Legal Aid vs DOJ

FACTS:
 The petition claims that as a result of jail visitations participated in by the IBP Legal Aid
Program, as well as a series of consultations with the Philippine National
Police (PNP) on the extant condition of detention prisoners, it was discovered that
several detention prisoners had been languishing in jail for years without a case being
filed in court by the prosecutor's office and without definite findings as to the existence or
nonexistence of probable cause.
 The IBP represents in this case its client, Jay-Ar Senin (Senin). Senin's rights were
allegedly violated because he has been detained for at least eight months without any
finding of probable cause or a case having been filed in court.
 The IBP claims that the waiver of Article 125 of the RPC does not make it allowable to
detain Senin indefinitely subject only to the whims and caprices of the reviewing
prosecutor of the DOJ. Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that
preliminary investigation must be terminated within 15 days from its inception if the
person arrested had requested for a preliminary investigation and had signed a waiver of
the provisions of Article 125. It follows, therefore, that the waiver of Article 125 must
coincide with the 15-day period of preliminary investigation. The detention beyond this
period violates Senin's constitutional right to liberty.
 The Office of the Solicitor General posits that the remedy of habeas corpus availed of by
the IBP and Senin is not appropriate considering that as of February 10, 2016, the SOJ
has found the existence of probable cause for the filing of information in court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would prosper

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court agreed with the OSG that this controversy has become moot and
academic as that upon filing of the information with the court, there was judicial determination
of probable cause against Senin; and that following such judicial determination, the court issued
a warrant of arrest and a commitment order. However, the court nonetheless agrees with the IBP
that the waiver of Article 125 of the RPC does not vest upon the DOJ, PPO, BJMP, and PNP the
unbridled right to indefinitely incarcerate an arrested person and subject him to the whims and
caprices of the reviewing prosecutor of the DOJ. The waiver of Article 125 must coincide with
the prescribed period for preliminary investigation as mandated by Section 7, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court. Detention beyond this period violates the accused's constitutional right to liberty.
Thus ordering that all detainees whose pending cases have gone beyond the mandated periods for
the conduct of preliminary investigation, or whose cases have already been dismissed on inquest
or preliminary investigation, despite pending appeal, reconsideration, reinvestigation or
automatic review by the Secretary of Justice, are entitled to be released pursuant to their
constitutional right to liberty and their constitutional right against unreasonable seizures, unless
detained for some other lawful cause.
G.R. No. 232395 July 3, 2018 (Habeas Corpus 2018 – 1)
Pedro Agcaoili, Jr. vs Hon. Rep. Rodolfo Farinas

FACTS:
 Invitation Letters dated April 6, 2017 were individually sent to petitioners for them to
attend as resource persons the initial hearing on House Resolution No. 882, which
petitioners sought to be excused from
 Because of petitioners' absence at the hearing, a subpoena ad testificandum was issued by
co-respondent House Committee directing petitioners to appear and testify under oath at a
hearing set on May 16, 2017 but since the subpoena was received by petitioners only one
day prior to the scheduled hearing, petitioners requested that their appearance be deferred
to a later date to give them time to prepare.
 Petitioners failed to attend the hearing scheduled on May 16, 2017. As such, the House
Committee issued a Show Cause Order asking why they should not be cited in contempt
for their refusal without legal excuse to obey summons. Additionally, petitioners and co-
petitioner Marcos were notified of the next scheduled hearing on May 29, 2017.
 Petitioners were thus cited in contempt and ordered to be detained.
 In response, petitioners filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondent House
Sergeant-at-Arms Lieutenant General Detabali (Detabali)
 While the Habeas Corpus Petition was still pending before the CA, petitioners and co-
petitioner Marcos filed the instant Omnibus Petition and they insist that the Habeas
Corpus Petition then pending before the CA can be transferred to the Court on the
strength of the latter's power to promulgate rules concerning the pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts and its authority to exercise jurisdiction over all courts as provided
under Sections 1 and 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution.
 Respondents argue that petitioners cannot compel the Court to assume jurisdiction over
the Habeas Corpus Petition pending before the CA as assumption of jurisdiction is
conferred by law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Court can assume jurisdiction over the Habeas Corpus Petition then pending
before the CA

HELD:
No. As the Habeas Corpus Petition was filed by petitioners with the CA, the latter has acquired
jurisdiction over said petition to the exclusion of all others, including the Supreme Court.
Petitioners are without unbridled freedom to choose which between this Court and the CA should
decide the habeas corpus petition. Mere concurrency of jurisdiction does not afford the parties
absolute freedom to choose the court to which the petition shall be filed. After all, the hierarchy
of courts "also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs." The administrative supervision of the Supreme Court merely involves
overseeing the operations of agencies to ensure that they are managed effectively, efficiently and
economically, but without interference with day-to-day activities, and that the administrative
function of the Court to transfer cases is a matter of venue, rather than jurisdiction as provided in
Rule 4, Section 3(c) of A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC.
G.R. No. 235935 February 6, 2018 (Habeas Corpus 2018 – 2)
Rep. Edcel Lagman vs Senate President Aquilino Pimentel III

FACTS:
 Petitiones were filed under the third paragraph, Section 18 of Article VII of the
Constitution, assailing the constitutionality of the extension of the proclamation of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire
Mindanao for one year from January 1 to December 31, 2018.
 Petitioners alternatively, but not mandatorily, invoke the Court's expanded jurisdiction
under Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution and pray for a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin respondents from
implementing the one-year extension.
 Petitioners argue that The Constitution allows only a one-time extension of martial law
and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, not a series of extensions
amounting to perpetuity. As regards the Congress' discretion to determine the period of
the extension, the intent of the Constitution is for such to be of short duration given that
the original declaration of martial law was limited to only sixty (60) days.29 In addition,
the period of extension of martial law should satisfy the standards of necessity and
reasonableness. Congress must exercise its discretion in a stringent manner considering
that martial law is an extraordinary power of last resort.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the extension of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas
corpus may only be allowed a one-time extension

HELD:
No. The provision is indisputably silent as to how many times the Congress, upon the initiative
of the President, may extend the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of habeas corpus. Such silence, however, should not be construed as a vacuum, flaw or
deficiency in the provision. While it does not specify the number of times that the Congress is
allowed to approve an extension of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, Section 18, Article VII is clear that the only limitations to the exercise of the
congressional authority to extend such proclamation or suspension are that the extension should
be upon the President's initiative; that it should be grounded on the persistence of the invasion or
rebellion and the demands of public safety; and that it is subject to the Court's review of the
sufficiency of its factual basis upon the petition of any citizen. Section 18, Article VII did not
also fix the period of the extension of the proclamation and suspension. However, it clearly gave
the Congress the authority to decide on its duration; thus, the provision states that that the
extension shall be "for a period to be determined by the Congress." If it were the intention of the
framers of the Constitution to limit the extension to sixty (60) days, as petitioners theorize, they
would not have expressly vested in the Congress the power to fix its duration.
G.R. No. 232006 July 10, 2019 (Habeas Corpus 2019– 1)
In Re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus for Michael Abellana vs Hon. Meinrado Paredes

FACTS:
 Petitioner was charged before Branch 13, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City (RTC) with
violation of Sections 11 and 12, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, being finally ruled by the RTC. He then
filed a Petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus before the Court. He claims
that a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus may be availed of as a post-
conviction remedy in such cases when a person is deprived of his Constitutional rights
during the court proceedings. 
 Specifically, he claims that he has been deprived of his rights to due process and to
competent counsel, further explaining that that he has been deprived of his right to due
process because of lack of notice of the proceedings in the RTC. He claims that the RTC
hastily submitted the criminal cases for decision even if there was no proof on record that
petitioner or his previous counsels, Attys. Rama and Albura, received any notice or order
from the court of the proceedings, thereby effectively depriving him of his right to be
heard and to present evidence on his behalf. Moreover, petitioner argues that he has been
deprived of his right to competent counsel due to the negligence of Atty. Albura.
 The OSG contends that petitioner was not deprived of his constitutional rights; hence, the
writ of habeas corpus cannot be issued to him as a post-conviction remedy. According to
the OSG, petitioner was afforded ample opportunity to be heard and to adduce his own
evidence. However, it was his and his counsel's negligence and fault that caused his
current predicament.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for the writ of habeas corpus should be granted

HELD:
No. Jurisprudence has recognized that the writ of habeas corpus may also be availed of as a post-
conviction remedy when, as a consequence sentence as to circumstance of a judicial proceeding,
any of the following exceptional circumstances is attendant: 1) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; 2) the court had no jurisdiction to
impose the sentence; or 3) the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the sentence as
such  excess. In this case, petitioner  is invoking  the first circumstance, but it would not be
applicable. Procedural due process entails that a party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to be
heard in support of his case and what is prohibited is the absolute absence of the opportunity to
be heard. When the party invoking his right to due process was in fact given several
opportunities to be heard and to air his side, but it was by his own fault or choice that he
squandered these chances, then his cry for due process must fail. Petitioner lost the remedies
available to him when he failed to appear at the promulgation of judgment despite being notified
of the same. He cannot shift the blame to his counsel, for while Atty. Albura was out of line when
he deliberately did not appear at the promulgation "as a sign of protest," it was still incumbent on
petitioner to attend the same.
G.R. No. 248035 November 27, 2019 (Adoption 2019 – 1)
Spouses Joon Hyung Park and Kyung Ah Lee vs Hon. Rico Sebastian D. Liwanag

FACTS:
 Petitioners, being foreigners, have been residing in the Philippines for at least 10 years
now and have been gainfully employed for the same length of time they've been reciding
in the Philippines. They sought to adopt a Filipino minor named “Mayca Alegado” and
wished to change her name to “Innah Alegado” as an addition to their petition for
adoption. They have also been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years
prior to filing for the petition for adoption
 Mayca was rescued by DSWD at the very young age of barely 22 days old when her
biological mother attempted to giver her away in exchange for transportation fare
 Petitioners have already adopted another girl, named Hannah, prior to this and was to be
considered as Mayca's older sister
 The RTC Judge decided to dispose of the case and transmit the petition to the Inter-
Country Adoption Board (ICAB) due to the fact that both petitioners were foreigners
pursuant to the provision of the Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995
 Petitioners argue that their case should be transmitted to the ICAB as adoption case
involving such would only be applicable to foreigners who are permanently residing
abroad.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were correct in claiming that RTC should not have disposed of
their petition for adoption

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court and the ICAB had entered into an agreement instructing that domestic
courts that endorse adoption cases of foreigners residing in the Philippines to ICAB would result
to the ICAB filing a manifestation so that the domestic adoption case before the trial court can
still be pursued. The endorsement of the case would only unnecessarily delay the adoption
proceedings which would be prejudicial to interests of the adoptee and the petitioners. The
Supreme Court finds that a relaxation of the rules of procedure is necessary in order promote the
best interest of the adoptee child. Therefore, the domestic adoption case is to be remanded to the
RTC for the pursuance of the proceedings to continue.
G.R. No. 207074 January 17, 2018 (Name Change 2018 – 1)
Republic of the Philippines vs Michelle Soriano Gallo

FACTS:
 Michelle Soriano Gallo was never named as "Michael Soriano Gallo" unlike what was
provided in Certificate of Live Birth. She has always been female but the certificate had
indicated therein that she was male. In her petition before the Regional Trial Court, her
Certificate of Live Birth contained errors which she sought to be corrected.
 There were also requested additions such as the inclusion of her middle name, "Soriano";
her mother's middle name, "Angangan"; her father's middle name, "Balingao"; and her
parent's marriage date, May 23, 1981, in her Certificate of Live Birth, as these were not
recorded.
 She attached copies of her diploma, voter's certification, official transcript of records,
medical certificate, mother's birth certificate, and parents' marriage certificate as proof.
 Proceedings commenced and the RTC ruled in favor of Ms. Gallo citing Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court, but the OSG appealed while claiming that the applicable rule should be
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court and that Gallo did not comply with the jurisdictional
requirements under Rule 103 because the title of her Petition and the published Order did
not state her official name, "Michael Gallo." Furthermore, the published Order was also
defective for not stating the cause of the change of name.
 CA denied the appeal of OSG explaining that the nature of the changes Ms. Gallo sought
were clerical, harmless and innocuous corrections which Rule 108 covered, unlike Rule
103 that covered substantive corrections

ISSUE:
Whether or not the nature of corrections Ms. Gallo were substantive corrections

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that Ms. Gallo's petition involves a mere correction of clerical
errors. A clerical or typographical error pertains to a mistake committed in the performance of
clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is
harmless and innocuous which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be
corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records. Considering that
Gallo had shown that the reason for her petition was not to change the name by which she is
commonly known, the court ruled that her petition is not covered by Rule 103. Gallo was not
filing the petition to change her current appellation. She was merely correcting the errors within
her Certificate of Live Birth. To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults
or error from." To change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or
with something that serves as a substitute.
G.R. No. 211435 April 10, 2019 (Name Change 2019 – 1)
Ramon Corpus Tan vs Office of the Local Registrar of the City of Manila

FACTS:
 Petitioner alleged that he was born on November 13, 1965 at St. Paul Hospital in the City
of Manila; that his birth was duly registered in the civil registry of Manila; that he had
been using his real name "Ramon Corpuz Tan" during his lifetime; that when he later
secured a copy of his Certificate of Live Birth, he discovered that his name was entered
as "Ramon Corpus Tan Ko" instead of his true and correct name which is "Ramon Corpuz
Tan"; that the aforesaid material errors and mistakes in the entries of his Certificate of
Live Birth were due to inadvertence and error of the hospital personnel who prepared the
subject certificate; that "Ko," which was the first name of his father, was inadvertently
included in his last name; and that the mistake was not immediately rectified because he
only discovered the same, after having his own children. All these claims supported by
sufficient documents.
 The RTC dismissed the subject petition for correction of entry. The RTC ratiocinated that
the petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of an adversarial proceeding noting
that the correction sought for, is a substantial correction and is governed by Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court, which is not summary, but an adversarial proceeding. Explaining that
both of his parents indicated their surname as “Tan Ko”. Noting that petitioner claimed
that his father was already dead, the trial court declared that petitioner's mother should
have been made a party to the case. Since his mother was not impleaded as a party,
petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of an adversarial proceeding.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the nature of petitioner's proceedings is adversarial thus failing to be complied
with

HELD:
Yes. The correction sought by petitioner involves a substantial change, not a mere clerical error.
The alleged error could not be considered a clerical error or a readily apparent mistake. Contrary
to petitioner's claim, the correction sought would definitely have an effect on his filiation with
the persons named in his Certificate of Live Birth. As aptly observed by the appellate court, the
name "Tan Ko" has been consistently used not only in the entries for petitioner's name, but also
for that of his parents. In entry No. 7, the name of petitioner's father was entered as "Tan Ko,"
while his mother's name was entered as "Trinidad Corpus Tan Ko" in entry No. 12. Furthermore,
his mother, as the informant for petitioner's birth certificate, signed as "T.C. Tan Ko" in entry No.
17. Verily, the "correction" of petitioner's name from "Ramon Corpus Tan Ko" to "Ramon
Corpuz Tan" would necessarily affect not only his name, but also the names of his parents as
entered in his Certificate of Live Birth. Altering petitioner's surname from "Tan Ko" to "Tan"
would, in effect, be an adjudication that the first name of his father is indeed "Ko" and his
surname "Tan." Clearly, the correction would affect the identity of petitioner's father. Moreover,
there would be a need to correct his mother's name from "Trinidad Corpus Tan Ko" to "Trinidad
Corpuz Tan." To effect the correction, it would be essential to establish that "Trinidad Corpus
Tan Ko" and "Trinidad Corpuz Tan" refer to the same person. A summary proceeding would
certainly be insufficient to effect such substantial corrections.