TECHNOLOGY OVER QUANTITIY OVER QUALITY

Lt. Col Scott McMichael is a retired U.S. Army officer who is a

profligate writer on military issues in general and light infantry in
particular. I have always really enjoyed his works on the latter
subject. His Historical Perspective on Light Infantry is a
particularly well-done analysis. I just ordered his Stumbling
Bear, a look into the Soviet experience in Afghanistan, although
I have not yet read it.

I suppose he retired as a colonel and not a brigadier general

because he dared to blaspheme the Party Line of technology
fixes and overwhelming firepower and instead spoke of those
pesky old-fashioned concepts of good training and good men.
Afghanistan in particular bears out his theories, but the
American military institution is incapable of learning from the
past nor deviating from the Party Line.

At any rate, I happened to stumble across an old article of his

from Military Review on Light Infantry Proverbs. Responses to it
by "professional" officers were pretty vicious in some cases.
When I first read it, I too thought it was a bit overdone, making
light infantry out to be a cross between Special Forces and
Superman.

Mulling it over, I came to realize that it was something that could

very well be done. In the past, the American military was capable
of producing and training such units...The First Special Service
Force, the Marine Raiders, Army Rangers and the 10th Mountain
Division in WWII, Merill's Marauders, the Alamo Scouts, LRRPs,
Hackworth's Hardcore Bn., modern Special Forces, etc.

Other nations have done it as well with specialized mountain

troops (Gebirgsjaeger, Alpini, Chassuers Alpin, Cazadores de
Montana, Vanatori de Munte, etc, etc, etc) Commandos, the
Chindits, the Long Range Desert Group, Popski's Private Army,
Gurkhas, Sissi, the Rhodesian Light Infantry and Sealous
Scouts, the Brandenberger Regiment, 502nd SS Jager Bn Mitte,
Royal Marines, etc. Need I go on?

So, if it could be done in the past, why not today?

The reasons are too numerous to even get into, but it all boils
down to high-level leadership, or the lack thereof. The
"professional" military has always stoutly resisted any kind of
special or elite forces. Conformists get promoted; non-
conformists win wars and then get the boot. Infantry training
isn't glamorous, doesn't get the big bucks the techno projects
do, and doesn't provide you with a six-figure income as a
"consultant" for a defense contractor after retirement. Moreover
it requires work, and an even dirtier word, change. In a zero
defect environment, no one benefits from lessons learned in
training, as no mistakes are allowed and any training tough
enough to do some good on the battlefield could cause a
training casualty, leading right back to the zero defect thing.
Check all the boxes, cross all the t's, and make the training
numbers all "good to go" on paper...it's the only safe way.

Additionally, all Americans are guilty, myself of course included,

to some degree of impatience, laziness, and looking for the
"quick fix". That quick fix is usually expected from high
technology.

A Finnish veteran of the Winter and Continuation Wars, Lt. Col.

Erkki Lahdenpera, called us on this even before the Vietnam
War.

“It is vital to have good equipment, but too much time,

effort, and funds have been devoted in the past to testing
and experimenting with new items of equipment and
clothing at the expense of combat training [original
emphasis]. In extreme environmental conditions it is far
more important to have well-trained troops with
satisfactory equipment than average [or mediocre] troops
with excellent equipment. First-class training with a high
state of morale is the foundation for successful operations
in rugged terrain and extreme climates. This is not to say
that we do not need the best possible equipment, but the
primary effort must be on tough, realistic combat training.
Wartime experience showed that success depended more
upon the knowledge of how to use available equipment
than upon the equipment itself.”

Over the centuries, the "professional" military experts and

theorists have pronounced the Infantryman "dead" on far too
many occasions in light of technological advances...the modern
magazine-fed rifle [Mauser!], the machine gun, modern artillery,
the tank, the airplane, the Atomic bomb, sensors, precision-
guided munitions, etc. Yet there he still stands on the streets of
Baghdad, the mountains of Afghanistan, and the DMZ in Korea.

So, without further ado, here are some of McMichael's Light

Infantry Proverbs and examples of how such goals are indeed
possible. There are examples of the use of high-tech to enhance
the soldiers' capabilities, but while extremely useful in some
cases, gadgetry in lieu of strategy still can't replace those boots
on the ground. Perhaps we could yet reverse our priorities
around to quality over quantity over technology.

1. There exists a “light infantry attitude” which can be

described in a few characteristic words offensiveness:
initiative, surprise, improvisation and total self-reliance.

“When he has finished his course, the mountain soldier is one

of the best trained soldiers in the German Army, and from that
time on he is likely to be one of the best equipped. Because
each mountain unit is largely recruited from one mountain
district, mountain soldiers are likely to add local pride to their
pride as select troops. The final result is high morale and esprit
de corps, although these attributes are likely to find expression
in an individualism that conceals the high degree of self-
discipline imposed by each man upon himself. This attitude is
probably the natural outcome of training designed to prepare
the mountain soldier for a virtually self-sustaining role in
combat.”

German Mountain Warfare, 29 February 1944

“A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an

invasion, butcher a hog, conn a ship, design a building, write a
sonnet, balance accounts, build a wall, set a bone, comfort the
dying, take orders, give orders, cooperate, act alone, solve
equations, analyze a new problem, pitch manure, program a
computer, cook a tasty meal, fight efficiently, die gallantly.
Specialization is for insects.”

Robert A. Heinlein

2. Historically, light infantry operations are mounted at

battalion level and lower. Light infantry operations are
highly dependent on squad, platoon and company-level
actions.

“The Aussies used squads to make a contact, and brought in

reinforcing elements to do the killing; they planned in the belief
that a platoon on the battlefield could do anything, ‘including get
out.’”
Lt. Colonel David Hackworth

“Although Finnish troops are organized into divisions, brigades,

regiments, etc., in the same manner as other modern armies,
their operations against an enemy emphasize use of small
units: patrols, attacking groups, and detachments.”

Intelligence Report, Finnish forces in the Russo-Finnish War

3. Light forces are undaunted by terrain. Terrain is viewed

as an ally, a combat multiplier for the light infantryman.
Light forces are terrain-oriented. Very little terrain is
impassable to true light infantry.

“Stress night cross-country movements and night attacks. Don’t

allow the units or individuals to use an road, path, trail or other
easy route of advance: in every case have them move by only
the most difficult and inaccessible terrain in the vicinity...Make
the men regard the most difficult ground as the natural route of
advance and it will save many casualties.”

Colonel Harry B Sherman, 7th Inf., Italian Campaign

“It is during this assault, when the enemy troops are fully
occupied defending their positions, that the infiltration units take
advantage of unguarded terrain, or move through the
breakthrough to establish themselves deep in the enemy rear
area. No type of terrain is considered an obstacle, and full
advantage is taken of routes over cliffs and other terrain
features normally considered by the enemy to be impassable.
Several infiltration units may move independently through the
same general area.”

Intelligence Bulletin, Soviet Infiltration Units in Mountain Warfare

“The Taliban used Afghanistan’s varying terrain to their

advantage when defending against Coalition offensives. In the
mountainous Gumbad valley of northern Kandahar, insurgents
fought from behind piles of rocks on a mountain face, fled
through irrigation ducts designed to channel snowmelt, and
disappeared over the ridgeline into a nearby mountain range
totally inaccessible to Coalition forces except by air. In Bulac
Kalay in Zabul province, insurgents fired heavy weapons from
the cover of an orchard, with small teams ensconced on the
 ridgeline above. Near the village of Chalbar in northeast
Kandahar, insurgents fought through airstrikes by taking cover
beneath large boulders on the side of a mountain. In
Kandahar’s lush and heavily cultivated Panjwayi valley, the
Taliban fired from the cover of fields and orchards, and moved
unobserved through the valley’s many irrigation canals.”

CNA Strategic Studies

4. Light infantry does best when it lives on, in and off the
land. It must be comfortable “in the bush.”

“Living in the field under adverse circumstances should be

taught. This means that the men should know how to cope with
cold, rain, snow, mud, and ice, when they are on the front line
for many days. The men should know how to put a shelter half
over a fox hole or slit trench, leaving a small hole through which
to observe and to fire. They should know that they must remove
the shelter half and re-camouflage the trench or hole whenever
the weather clears. They should also be trained to remove their
shoes and socks each day and massage their feet. Such
training will really pay dividends.”

Captain Robert C. Gates, Infantry, Italian Campaign

“They may, by choosing a circuitous path through difficult

country, attempt to overtake and cut the line of retreat of a force
withdrawing along a road, but mobility does not end there; if the
chances of living off the country are small, troops may carry as
much as seven days' rations with them, thus freeing
themselves during this period from the encumbrance of an
administrative tail. Impressed local inhabitants, with carts or
boats, if the country is suitable, supplement their carrying
powers, while opportunities to seize local supplies are never
neglected.”

U.S. Intelligence Report, Japanese Operations in China.

“General: The term jungle craft implies the ability of a soldier to

live and fight in the jungle; to be able to move from point-to-
point and arrive at his objective fit to fight; to use ground and
vegetation to the best advantage; and be able to “melt” into the
jungle either by freezing or intelligent use of camouflage; to
recognize and be able to use native foods; and possess the
ability to erect rapidly temporary shelters to ward off tropical
downpours.”

Australian Army report, Milne Bay Operations, WWII

5. Good intelligence is vitaI to light infantry. Intelligence is

obtained by the light infantry from every source from the
national level to the use of local inhabitants,
reconnaissance and patrolling.

“So what enables an intelligent government and a wise military

leadership to overcome others and achieve extraordinary
accomplishments is foreknowledge.

Foreknowledge cannot be gotten from ghosts and spirits,

cannot be had by analogy, cannot be found out by calculation.
It must be obtained from people, people who know the
conditions of the enemy.”

Sun Tzu

“The areas were selected after a meticulous intelligence profile

was made. Every intelligence profile was made. Every
intelligence source available to the battalion was used, from the
super-secret black box in the delta-winged jet to the wrinkled
brown farmer who tilled the rice paddy. When completed, the
intelligence profile blinked like a neon light that pointed a bright
red arrow at the enemy. The guerrilla companies conducted the
same exacting pre-operation preparations as the ambush
companies. Nothing was missed.”

Lt. Col. David Hackworth

“Villagers provide moving units with information regarding the

location of UN troops, and native guides may be used by the
enemy, taken by force if necessary.”
 Enemy Tactics, Techniques, and Doctrine, Korea

6. Conventional tactics are no good for light forces.

“War with insurgents, partisans, and bands is a new type of

war, new in its intensity and old in its origins, a war that uses
infiltration rather than attack, a war where victory is achieved by
taxing and exhausting the forces of the opponent rather than by
destroying him. It requires new strategy and tactics, specialized
forces and new forms of combat.”

President John F. Kennedy

“Pick your officers for common sense. Basic Field Manual

knowledge is fine, but it is useless without common sense.
Common sense is of greater value than all the words in the
book.”

Colonel Armorle R. Sims, 1st Marine Division, Guadalcanal

“Red Chinese operations were a vanishing act on the grand

scale… In the attack, their individuals were furtive, light of foot
and highly elusive; ours were not.”

General S.L.A. Marshall

“Adherence to dogma has destroyed more armies and lost

more battles and lives than anything else in war.”

General J.F.C. FULLER

7. Light forces need high-quality communication to

coordinate decentralized efforts into a coherent whole.

“To unify people’s ears and eyes means to make people look
and listen in concert so that they do not become confused and
disorderly. Signals are used to indicate directions and prevent
individuals from going off by themselves.”
 Sun Tzu

“Although the British steadily emphasized the individual, his

personal equipment, and his operation in the jungle on foot with
a rifle, they were not averse to taking advantage of more
complicated equipment. They were unusually successful in
adapting electronic communications to jungle conditions. Radio
communications in a rain forest are notoriously poor, but British
and Gurkha experience restored full range and clarity of
reception.”
Jac Weller, British Weapons & Tactics in Malaysia

“All planned signals must be kept simple, to a minimum, and

understood by every member of the unit…Keep radio traffic to a
minimum-don't let senior commanders interfere needlessly with
continuous uncalled-for traffic. As a last resort, tune them out, if
necessary.”

Lt. Col. Frank Herbert.

“The utilization of Sat phones undoubtedly enhanced the

platoon's ability to communicate effectively. The multiple
methods of communication enabled the platoon to negotiate the
terrain that would have otherwise been comms dead zones. Sat
phones should undoubtedly be used as communications fail
safe on all missions outside of built up areas.”

Cpt. Sean Trenholm, PPLI, Afghanistan

8. Light infantry forces must be masters of improvisation,

familiar with all kinds of weapons, vehicles, landing craft,
and so forth.
 “The idea that no type of operation is unusual is inculcated in
the men. At a moment's notice they should be able to ride
bicycles or motorcycles; drive automobiles and trucks of
unfamiliar types; ride horses and camels; and travel in aircraft,
ships, and boats of any sort, all depending on the nature of the
operation, the availability of means of transport, and the terrain
in the various theaters of war. Commandos are sometimes
carried as air-borne troops and receive special training for air-
borne operations.”

British Commandos, Special Series #1, August 9, 1942

9. Light infantry forces make use of whatever is at hand to

improve their combat capabilities.

“The use of a few riflemen at the ravine exit was sufficient to

halt an entire division. The Italians subjected this handful to
heavy machinegun and artillery fire. The riflemen were well
dug-in and the fire did little harm…Large fires provided the
necessary illumination during the night fighting at Fae, and the
ensuing lack of ammunition was made good by rearming with
captured Italian guns and ammunition. Both were accomplished
under the strongest hostile fire, a remarkable achievement by
the mountain troops.”
 Field Marshall Erwin Rommel

“Our troops [in Korea] were not conditioned to the expectation

of hearing such instruments as bugles, shepherds’ horns,
flutes, Congo drums, and rattles on the field of battle. When
they were employed initially in the night attack, the effect was
greatly unnerving mainly because of the attendant element of
mystery. Infantry companies which had survived the attack,
when later assembled, admitted this frankly…when they
discussed the features of the enemy attack which caused them
the greatest distress, the common reaction to the enemy’s
noise-making tricks was most frequently summed up in these
words: ‘That was what made our hair stand on end.’”
General S.L.A. Marshall

“In New Guinea the morale and spirit of an Allied unit

advancing under covering fire of friendly artillery was seriously
affected by this ruse. Every time our guns opened up to provide
covering fire for an advance, or fired on any target, the one
known Jap 70-mm gun in the Government Gardens area also
opened up and placed its rounds among our forward elements.
The Japanese timed the activity of their own gun to coincide
exactly with that of our supporting artillery. This made the
troops imagine that they were being fired on by their own guns.”

U.S. Army Intelligence Bulletin, WWII

 10. Due to a general shortage of combat support, light
forces must do an excellent job of combining arms when
they have a chance.

“Each time we fight with only one weapon when we could use
several weapons, we are not fighting and winning a battle; we
are making fools of ourselves.”
General George S. Patton, Jr.

“In the employment of our weapons, we must carefully select

targets, and then concentrate on them to gain local fire
superiority. For example, three riflemen should constitute a
group to concentrate on one particular target. Likewise, two
light machine guns may profitably be concentrated on one
target. Be sure to take every advantage of the mobility of these
weapons.”
Captured Japanese manual, “Use of Weapons to Negate
American Firepower Advantages.” WWII

11. Light infantry must remain flexible in mind and action,

capable of reacting quickly.

“So a military force has no constant formation, water has no

constant shape: the ability to gain victory by changing and
adapting according to the opponent is called genius.”

Sun Tzu

“It may be of interest to future generals to realize that one

makes plans to fit the circumstances, and does not try to create
circumstances to fit plans.”

General George S. Patton, Jr.

“Pick your officers for common sense. Basic Field Manual

knowledge is fine, but it is useless without common sense.
Common sense is of greater value than all the words in the
book.”
Colonel Armorle R. Sims, 1st Marine Division, Guadalcanal
“Our most important need is resourcefulness in individuals and
in leaders of small groups—squads and platoon. They must be
taught throughout their training—especially their early training
—to visualize and plan several ways to handle any situation
before them, and to be ready to act decisively and promptly
according to whichever of these plans is found most promising.”

General Walter Krueger

“Leaders of all ranks must be prepared to meet emergencies

and sudden changes in situations and to furnish the spark of
inspiration when their units have become discouraged. The true
leader is the one who takes the men and materials at hand and
gets the job done in spite of complications.”
Unnamed USMC officer, Gilbert Islands

12. Light infantrymen rely on camouflage.

“In defense, you hush your voices and obliterate your

tracks, hidden as ghosts and spirits beneath the earth, invisible
to anyone.”

Sun Tzu

“At night, when these groups [Taliban] heard a Predator or AC-

130 coming, they pulled a blanket over themselves to
disappear from the night vision screen. They used low-tech to
beat high-tech.”

General Franklin Hagenbeck

“The camouflage instinct is strongly developed in the Russian,
and his inventive ability is astounding. This gift is systematically
encouraged by thorough camouflage training which begins on
the first day of military training and is continued throughout the
whole period. Camouflage discipline is good even among
troops who otherwise might be well below the average as
regards weapon training. Infringements of camouflage
discipline are severely punished.”
German Army Report on Red Army Camouflage, WWII

“Individual enemy riflemen and observers were supplied with

hooded camouflage capes, which were made of light, rain-
repellant tan paper. The capes were about 9 by 6 feet, and
were tied with tie strings. Behind and under these capes,
riflemen and observers could sit for a day at a time, dry and
protected from wind and rain and indistinguishable from the
tundra.”

Intelligence Report, Operations on Attu Island, WWII

“One of the most effective weapons of defense employed by

the enemy in Korea was his use of camouflage.”
Enemy Tactics, 8th U.S. Army Korea
 13. Light infantrymen must be abIe to climb, crawl, swim,
ski, snowshoe, rappel, stalk, run and hide.

“The Germans set out minimum standards of proficiency which

all mountain soldiers must attain. They must practice until they
can make any kind of ascent (Steigen)' on a road or path free
of snow. They must also learn to walk on easy wooded, grass,
and scree slopes, until they can master fairly difficult terrain
which requires easy to moderately hard climbs. In the snow
they are required to walk with snowshoes on roads, over easy
and difficult terrain, and through woods and low, protected
draws. They must also be able to get over icy stretches and
make moderately hard climbs. The Germans teach that
individual training in mountaineering attains its goal only when
the regular mountain soldier under normal conditions of
marching and combat.”

German Mountain Warfare, 29 February 1944

 “Force members received rigorous and intensive training in
stealth tactics; hand-to-hand combat; the use of explosives for
demolition; parachuting; amphibious warfare; rock-climbing;
mountain warfare, and as ski troops.”

History of the First Special Service Force

14. Light infantrymen must be able marksmen, proficient in

the use and maintenance of many weapons.

“In training the individual rifleman, the most important thing is

marksmanship. The various firing positions will be practiced
with and without skis. Training as sharpshooters with rifles
equipped with telescopic sights, and with semiautomatic rifles,
will be particularly stressed. Every man must be trained in the
use of the light machine gun and the submachine gun. A
knowledge of the most common infantry weapons of the enemy
is desirable.”

German Ski Training & Tactics, 31 January 1944

“IA [Immediate Action] Drills are of little value unless the

standard of weapons handling and marksmanship is high…The
best plan, the best leadership and the most skilful fieldcraft will
avail nothing if the men cannot shoot to kill when they meet the
CT [Communist Terrorists].

British ATOM Manual, Malaysia

“He must learn to shoot in snow, among rocks, in extreme cold,

while wearing mittens, at night, and especially in fog. The
targets should be at varying distances, from thirty five to three
hundred, even five hundred yards. He must be able to register
hits on visible targets in from five to twenty seconds. In short,
he should be able to make each shot count.”
Captain Gallusser, Swiss Mountain Brigade

"It is rifle fire that ultimately takes ground, and it is rifle fire that
holds it after it's taken, by throwing back enemy counter-attack.
The man with the rifle is the man who wins wars; and accurate
 rifle fire from individual riflemen is the most effective factor on
any battlefield."i
General Merrit Edson, USMC

“You don’t hurt ‘em if you don’t hit ‘em.”

General Lewis M. “Chesty” Puller, USMC

15. Light forces rely on pioneer skills at all levels,

beginning with the squad, to properly exploit terrain.

“Even in the attack the spade is as important as the rifle.”

Field Marshall Erwin Rommel

“Terrain appreciation, to teach the men advantages and

disadvantages of terrain features. Teach them to visualize how
the ground on which you are located looks from the enemy’s
viewpoint, i.e., what he can see and what you can’t see; where
you can take positions unobserved, etc.”

Cpt. Robert C. Gates, Italian Campaign, WWII

“The requirement for an infantry soldier to possess excellent

field craft skills is not reduced. The ability to move and survive
—to master the intricacies of the physical environment—is
crucial. ‘Street smarts’ and a hunter’s instincts are both
essential.”
Lieutenant-Colonel Wayne D. Eyre, RCR, Afghanistan

16. Light infantry appreciates heavy fire support when it is

available but is not dependent on it.
“Fire fights of the infantry in snow-covered terrain take on
added importance because the terrain can be kept under
observation more easily and also because visibility is usually
better. In cases where ski troops have no artillery support, fire
fights alone are frequently the only means of securing the
success of the engagement.
Since it is difficult for ski troops to take artillery along, they must
frequently accomplish their missions without artillery support.
To gain fire superiority, therefore, it is necessary to stress
concentration of the fire of light and heavy infantry weapons as
well as the combined flat and high-trajectory fire on the point
where the main effort is made. The necessary limitation on the
number of weapons will be made up by increasing the allotment
of ammunition.”
German Ski Training & Tactics, 31 January 1944

17. Light infantry rarely uses roads or trails

“The main principles of combat procedure are-

(1) To get off the roads into the snow, and approach the enemy
cross country.

(2) To get out of the villages and march through woods.

(3) To remain mobile.”

German Ski Training & Tactics, 31 January 1944

"We have learned that when we get off the beaten trails, it
seems to confuse the Japs, and we have better success."

Gunner E. S. Rust, 5th Marines, Guadalcanal

 “Although extremely limiting in some respects, the Chinese
dependence upon the backs of animals and soldiers liberated
them from roads and permitted troops to fight anywhere they
could walk, whether in front, on the side, or behind the enemy
lines. UN forces, on the other hand, were tied to the roads
because their supplies arrived by truck. The roads, therefore,
were vulnerable to being cut by roadblocks.”

Enemy Tactics, Techniques, and Doctrine, Korea

18. Physical conditioning and mental strength are absolute

musts.

“The importance of physical condition is fully recognized in

German training doctrine…Other observers of a German
division in field exercises before the outbreak of war reported
that fitness and endurance were made a fetish by both officers
and men. For training purposes officers often went 24 hours
without food.”
German Military Training, 17 September 1942

“Your men have to be rugged and rough and to win they must
learn to disregard politeness and must kill."
Sergeant Metzger, 5th Marines, Guadalcanal

“The squad or platoon leader must have great physical strength

and initiative. He must frequently depend entirely on his own
judgment when the main body of his unit is distant and his
personal example has a decisive influence upon the conduct of
the men.”

German Ski Training & Tactics, 31 January 1944

“Excellent physical fitness is a requirement for all infantrymen.

Human interaction ultimately requires dismounted manoeuvre
with weapons and equipment in all types of terrain and climate
for extended periods of time by day and night. A high standard
of physical fitness breeds infectious optimism and offensive
eagerness—physically fit individuals are more prone to take
offensive action, and not to back down from a potentially
dangerous situation.”
 Lt. Col. Wayne D. Eyre, RCR, Afghanistan

“The unskilled man in the Services, as in

industry, is losing his utility. Quality
outweighs quantity on the modern
battlefield.”
Sir B.H. Liddell-Hart
i