ANGELITO L.

CRISTOBAL, Petitioner
-versus-
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., AND LUCIO TAN, Respondents
G.R. No. 201622 THIRD DIVISION, October 4, 2017, LEONEN, J:
FACTS: Cristobal became a pilot for PAL on 1971. In 1998, Cristobal applied for leave without
pay frim PAL to enter into a 4-year contract with EVA. PAL approved the application and
advised him them he would continue to accrue seniority during his leave and that he could
retire during the period. In 1999, Cristobal advised PAL of his intent to retire, in response PAL
advised him that he have lost his employment on 1998. Cristobal filed a complaint with the
NLRC.

The LA found Cristobal’s dismissal, illegal. He also held that Cristobal’s retirement should not be
less than the amount provided under the law. NLRC affirmed the LA’s decision but reduced the
award of moral and exemplary. Cristobal filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, PAL
likewise filed a motion for reconsideration. NLRC agreed that Cristobal was not yet 60 years old
when he retired, hence he was only entitled to receive P5,000 per year of service under the PAL
Retirement Plan. On June 24, 2011, Cristobal filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was
denied.

Cristobal filed a petition for Certiorari before the CA, which was dismissed. CA accepted the
National Labor Relations Commission's premise that petitioner's June 24, 2011 Motion for
Reconsideration was a second motion for reconsideration. Thus, it did not toll petitioner’s
period to file a petition for certiorari assailing the May 31, 2011 Decision. Consequently, the
petition for certiorari was filed out of time.

ISSUE: Whether the June 24, 2011 Motion for Reconsideration file by the petitioner assailing the
NLRC Decision was a prohibited second motion for reconsideration

HELD:NO, the National Labor Relations Commission Rules of Procedure prohibits a party from
questioning a decision, resolution, or order, twice. In other words, this rule prohibits the same
party from assailing the same judgment. However, a decision substantially reversing a
determination in a prior decision is a discrete decision from the earlier one.

Here, the National Labor Relations Commission May 31, 2011 Decision substantially modified
its September 30, 2010 Decision. Thus, petitioner was not precluded from seeking
reconsideration of the new decision of the National Labor Relations Commission, and it was
clearly an error for the Court of Appeals to find that petitioner's petition for certiorari was filed
out of time on that ground.
 NUEVA ECIJA II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., AREA I, Mr. REYNALDO VILLANUEVA,
President, Board of Directors, and Mrs. EULALIA CASTRO, General Manager, Petitioners
-versus-
ELMER B. MAPAGU, Respondent
G.R. No. 196084, THIRD DIVISION, February 15, 2017, JARDELEZA, J.
FACTS:Respondent Mapagu was employed with NEEC as a data processor since 1983, NEEC is
an electric cooperative which supplied electricity to household on Nueva Ecija, including where
Mapagu resides. NEA conducted a special audit on the power bills, as well as related internal
control and procedure of NEEC. The audit revealed unaccounted consumption or readings
which have accumulated due to under-reading and under-billing in prior years or months.
Mapagu's electric consumption was found to be under-read and under-billed. As a result, Notice
of Charges was sent to the petitioners, Mapagu denied under oath that his electric meter was
under-read and under-billed by 1,918 k Whrs. He asserted that he has no meter reading from
November 2002 to April 2005.

The IAC issued its findings and recommendations. It held that while the charges of under-
reading and under-billing were not established, Mapagu failed to observe the highest degree of
honesty as an employee. He did not take action to correct his kWhr consumption despite
knowledge that he has no reading from 2002 to 2005. The IAC found him guilty of the charges
against him, with the additional finding that he also violated Section 7.2.3 of the NEEC Code for
concealing defective work resulting in the prejudice or loss of NEEC. Nevertheless, and for
humanitarian reasons, the IAC recommended that Mapagu only be suspended for two years, on
the condition that he execute a waiver in favor of NEEC management against the filing of any
legal action regarding his suspension.

On January 2, 2007, however, Mapagu received a Notice of Dismissal from service. Hence, he
filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of allowances against petitioners. LA
ruled in favor of petitioners. Mapagu appealed to the NLRC, which reversed and set aside the
decision. It held that the penalty of dismissal is unwarranted. The NLRC concluded that Mapagu
is entitled to the twin relief of reinstatement and backwages. Considering, however, that the
trust reposed on Mapagu can no longer be restored, and reinstatement is no longer feasible, the
NLRC ordered the payment of separation pay reckoned from the time of Mapagu's employment
up to the finality of the Decision.

Petitioners elevated the case to CA via petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The CA dismissed
the petition outright, it found that the petitioners failed to sign the attached Verification and
Certification against forum-shopping. Petitioners seek recourse with us via a petition for review
under Rule 45. Petitioners fault the CA for dismissing the case on the ground that not all of the
petitioners signed the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping. They explained
that only Castro, the General Manager of NEEC, signed the verification and certification because
she was authorized and empowered by the NEEC Board of Directors.

Mapagu filed his Comment,32 claiming that the petition is filed out of time. He asserts that
petitioners themselves disclosed that they received the Resolution of the CA denying their
Motion for Reconsideration on March 17, 2011; hence, they only had until April 2, 2011 to file a
petition for review on certiorari. The petition was filed on May 5, 2011, well beyond the
reglementary period. Thus, the questioned Resolutions of the CA have become final and
executory.

ISSUE: Whether the petition for review on certiorari was, filed before the CA within the
reglementary period
HELD: YES. Petitioners received the September 2, 2010 Resolution of the CA on September 14,
2010. They filed a Motion for Reconsideration and received the Resolution denying the same on
March 17, 2011. Thereafter, they filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review
on Certiorari with Payment of Docket Fees.42 They sought an extension of 20 days from April 1,
2011 or until April 21, 2011 within which to file the appeal.

On May 6, 2011, they filed this petition. They allege that they have 60 days to file the appeal and
in fact, they claim that they are filing it 11 days ahead of the reglementary deadline. Petitioners
insist that following Republic v. Court of Appeals43 and Bello v. National Labor Relations
Commission,44 petitions for review on certiorari can be filed within 60 days from receipt of the
order denying the motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners are gravely mistaken. The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and must be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. One who seeks
to avail of the right to appeal must strictly comply with the requirement of the rules. Failure to
do so leads to the loss of the right to appeal.45 The case before us calls for the application of the
requirements of appeal under Rule 45.

Petitioners failed to comply with Rule 45 Sec 1 & 2. They confuse petitions for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 with petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. It is the latter which is
required to be filed within a period of not later than 60 days from notice of the judgment, order
or resolution. If a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed, the 60-day period shall be
counted from notice of the denial of the motion.
 JOY VANESSA M. SEBASTIAN, Petitioner
-versus-
SPOUSES NELSON C. CRUZ AND CRISTINA P. CRUZ and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE
PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN, Respondents
G.R. No. 220940, FIRST DIVISION, March 20, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS: Petitioner alleged that Nelson and Cristina, registered owner of a parcel of land.
Sometime in 2009, Nelson, through his father and attorney-in-fact, Lamberto then sold the
subject lot in favor of Sebastian, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Upon Sebastian's
payment of the purchase price, Lamberto then surrendered to her the possession of the subject
land, OCT No. P-41566, and his General Power of Attorney together with a copy of Tax
Declaration No. 9041 and Property Index No. 013-26-019-0322. Sebastian then paid the
corresponding capital gains tax, among others, to cause the transfer of title to her name.
However, upon presentment to the RD, the latter directed her to secure an SPA executed by the
Sps. Cruz authorizing Lamberto so sell the land to her. Lamberto promised but failed to comply.

According to Sebastian, it was only on July 14, 2014 upon her inquiry with RD-Pangasinan about
the status of the aforesaid title when she discovered that: (a) Nelson executed an Affidavit of
Loss dated September 23, 2013 attesting to the loss of owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. P-
41566, which he registered with the RD-Pangasinan; (b) the Spouses Cruz filed before the R TC
a petition for the issuance of a second owner's copy of OCT No. P-41566, docketed as LRC Case
No. 421; and (c) on March 27, 2014, the RTC promulgated a Decision granting Spouses Cruz's
petition and, consequently, ordered the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. P-
41566 in their names. In view of the foregoing incidents, Sebastian filed the aforesaid petition
for annulment of judgment before the CA on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Essentially, she
contended that the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of LRC Case No. 421 as the
duplicate copy of OCT No. P-41566 - which was declared to have no further force in effect - was
never lost, and in fact, is in her possession all along.

CA did not give due course to the petition and dismissed the same outright, it held that the
compliance by Spouses Cruz with the jurisdictional requirements of publication and notice of
hearing clothed the RTC with jurisdiction to take cognizance over the action in rem, and
constituted a constructive notice to the whole world of its pendency. As such, personal notice to
Sebastian of the action was no longer necessary.

ISSUE: Whether the CA correctly denied due course to Sebastian’s petition for annulment of
judgment, resulting in its outright dismissal

HELD: NO, the following requisites must be complied with for an order for reconstitution to be
issued: (a) that the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that the documents
presented by petitioner are sufficient and proper to warrant reconstitution of the lost or
destroyed certificate of title; (c) that the petitioner is the registered owner of the property or
had an interest therein; (d) that the certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost and
destroyed; and (e) that the description, area and boundaries of the property are substantially
the same as those contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of title. Verily, the reconstitution
of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or
destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of land.

Indubitably, the fact of loss or destruction of the owner's duplicate certificate of title is crucial in
clothing the RTC with jurisdiction over the judicial reconstitution proceedings. In Spouses
Paulino v. CA, the Court reiterated the rule that when the owner's duplicate certificate of title
was not actually lost or destroyed, but is in fact in the possession of another person, the
reconstituted title is void because the court that rendered the order of reconstitution had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

In this case, Sebastian's petition for annulment of judgment before the CA clearly alleged that,
contrary to the claim of Spouses Cruz in LRC Case No. 421, the owner's duplicate copy of OCT
No. P-41566 was not really lost, as the same was surrendered to her by Lamberto, Nelson's
father and attorney-in-fact, and was in her possession all along. Should such allegation be
proven following the conduct of further proceedings, then there would be no other conclusion
than that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of LRC Case No. 421. As a
consequence, the Decision dated March 27, 2014 of the RTC in the said case would then be
annulled on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Thus, the Court finds prima facie merit in Sebastian's petition for annulment of judgment before
the CA. As such, the latter erred in denying it due course and in dismissing the same outright.
 HEIRS OF SPOUSES TEOFILO M. RETERTA and ELISA RETERTA, namely: EDUARDO M.
RETERTA, CONSUELO M. RETERTA, and AVELINA M. RETERTA, Petitioners,
-versus-
SPOUSES LORENZO MORES and VIRGINIA LOPEZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 159941, FIRST DIVISION, August 17, 2011, BERSAMIN, C.J.

FACTS: The petitioners commenced an action for quieting of title and reconveyance, averring
that they were the true and real owners of the parcel of land, having inherited the land from
their late father. The respondents, as defendants, filed a motion to dismiss, insisting that the
RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case due to the land being friar land. RTC
granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the Director of Lands has the exclusive
administration and disposition of the friar land, and it had no jurisdiction. The petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration, but RTC denied the motion.

Therefore, the petitioners assailed the dismissal via petition for certiorari but CA dismissed the
petition holding that the basic requisite for the special civil action of certiorari to lie is that there
is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. When
the court rendered the assailed decision, the remedy of the petitioners was to have appealed the
same to this Court. But petitioners did not. Instead they filed the present special civil action for
certiorari on May 15, 2002 after the decision of the court a quo has become final.
 
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari

HELD: NO, the CA seems to be correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari, considering that
the order granting the respondents’ motion to dismiss was a final, as distinguished from an
interlocutory, order against which the proper remedy was an appeal in due course. Certiorari,
as an extraordinary remedy, is not substitute for appeal due to its being availed of only when
there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
For one, the order that the petitioners really wanted to obtain relief from was the order
granting the respondents’ motion to dismiss, not the denial of the motion for reconsideration.
The fact that the order granting the motion to dismiss was a final order for thereby completely
disposing of the case, leaving nothing more for the trial court to do in the action, truly called for
an appeal, instead of certiorari, as the correct remedy.

The concept of ‘final’ judgment, as distinguished from one which has ‘become final’ (or
‘executory’ as of right [final and executory]), is definite and settled. A ‘final’ judgment or order is
one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect
thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the
trial declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is
in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res
judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the
controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more
remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties’ next move (which among others,
may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal)
and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes ‘final’ or, to
use the established and more distinctive term, ‘final and executory.

Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court’s task
of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards
each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is
‘interlocutory,’ e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting
a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting
or denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection of documents or things,
etc. Unlike a ‘final’ judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an
‘interlocutory’ order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may
eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.