Desire in Hegel: An Exploration of Self-Certainty

Self-Consciousness, for Hegel, is desire. Though this definition is concise, it leaves a

lot to be unpacked. To understand Hegel's idea of self-consciousness and of desire (or

rather, self-consciousness as desire), the two ideas need to be situated within their logical

place in the Phenomenology – that is to say, within the sub-chapter 'self-certainty' – and

they need to be described independently of the overarching structure of the book. This will

entail describing the shortcomings of Hegelian desire, and will end up describing how a

non-destructive desire – desire not of an inanimate, submissive object, but instead of

another animate self-consciousness, an 'other' that can resist – is necessary for self-

consciousness. That is the goal of this paper: to unpack the definition of self-consciousness

as desire through the logical movements Hegel takes within self-certainty.

In a parallel to the previous chapter in the Phenomenology, 'Consciousness', 'Self-

Consciousness' begins with a sub-section called 'self-certainty'. As the former chapter tried

to prove the reality of what our senses tell us as purely observing subjects ('sense-

certainty'), self-consciousness tries to assert the primacy of a self above/before external

objects, or rather that those 'external' objects are conditioned and experienced by pure

subjectivity. Though, as the propositions in sense-certainty fell under the weight of internal

contradictions, self-certainty will not be able to reach its goal as well.

Sense-certainty failed to achieve its goal of experiencing an external object as 'what

truly is' because of contradictions between trying to talk about a singular, particular object,

and having to describe this object with multiple, universal terms (e.g. 'redness' or

'roundness'). These contradictions lead to the conclusion that the subject-object dualism is

to be done away with, or as Hegel puts it, “In the previous modes of certainty what is true

for consciousness is something other than itself. But the Notion of this truth vanishes in the
experience of it” (§166, p. 104). The destruction of such a dualism is the grounding for self-

certainty: in the absence of some externally existing object to ground a Truth, or the

'Absolute', the 'I', or self, becomes the object for inquiry. This association of self as the

Absolute Hegel says is a, “certainty which is identical with its truth” since, “the certainty is to

itself its own object, and consciousness is to itself the truth” (§166, p. 104). This is the first

grounding of what self-consciousness is; it is what is proposed to be certain in the wake of

sense-certainty, that is, that an 'I' is 'what-is', and that this singular 'I' is all there is.

This solipsism doesn't totally negate that there are 'other' things in the world of

experience though, “In this [self-certainty] there is indeed an otherness; that is to say,

consciousness makes a distinction, but one which at the same time is for consciousness

not a distinction” (§166, p. 104). What this seemingly paradoxical statement aims to say is

that other objects are there in some sense – even the greatest of solipsists still eat, and

bath, and make first to keep warm (a contradiction that becomes an issue for Hegel later in

the book, but which is rather irrelevant here) – but that their 'existence isn't something

independent of a self and is instead a very continuation of this 'being'. At this point, only

because there is an 'I' at all are there objects in the world. That's how the object can both be

a 'distinction' and 'not a distinction'.

This movement to the 'I', being the subject of this dialectical process, Hegel can thus

characterize as the “native realm of truth” (§167, p. 104). This is because self-

consciousness is the first fully mediated stage in the journey to the Absolute. Whereas

consciousness was simply the realm of 'common sense', pre-reflective and pre-

philosophical, self-consciousness is produced by the dialectical movement itself. Though

this is a movement forward, it is not an end, and thus self-consciousness is fraught with

contradiction. And as has been said beforehand, the contradiction lies in desire.
 As said before, self-consciousness has to make a non-distinctive distinction between

itself and objects. This becomes impossible though: if objects are just extensions of one's

being, of an 'I' (as is the claim of self-certainty), then those objects are indistinguishable

from the 'I'. As Hegel puts it, “self-consciousness is the return from otherness” and, “what it

[self-consciousness] distinguishes from itself is only itself as itself … the difference is not

and it is only the motionless tautology of: 'I am I'” (§167, p. 105). This is because two

indistinguishable objects are unable to be torn apart from each other, at least in the sense of

perceiving those objects in any way. For example, take two objects – two apples, let's say: if

all of their properties are the same (color, spatial dimensions, chemical makeup, etc.), then

there is no meaningful way to distinguish the one apple from the other. Similarly, if an object

is just an extension of the being of an 'I', then there's no meaningful way to tell the

difference between that object and the 'I'. This is problematic because the 'I' is then a

'motionless tautology', and as a tautology, the 'I' then becomes meaningless. Thus the

movement away from the subject-object dualism of sense-certainty amounts to a negation

of meaning for the self, the 'I' – an end that is the opposite of the intention of such a

movement.

To make this point a bit clearer, it has to be understood that Hegel posits two

different principles about the world (in the consciousness chapter): one, that an object is

only identical to itself, and two, that an object can only be distinguished in comparison to

another object. In other words, the 'blue' color of the sky is only identical with the notion of

'blue' itself, and only has meaning if it can be contrasted with something else, in this case

'red' (or really any other color, as long as it's something). The problem with the idea of the

'objects' of self-certainty being extensions of the self is that there is no opposing 'thing' that

clarify and define the 'self' at all, “The unity [of the self as Absolute] is divided within itself
because it is an absolutely negative or infinite unity; and because it is what subsists, the

difference, too, has independence only in it” (§170, p. 107). When only the self 'is', then

nothing else can meaningfully be said to be; in a world that was totally comprised of the

color 'red', the characterization of something as red would be meaningless, and the concept

of color would be moot.

Since the self cannot assume itself to be the Absolute without being able to

distinguish between objects and the self, a relation has to be created that deals with these

objects. This relationship is desire. As Hegel words this distinction, “[T]he simple substance

of Life is the splitting-up of itself into shapes and at the same time the dissolution of these

existant differences” (§171, p. 108) This means that consciousness has to mentally

separate itself from other objects, essentially realize the contradiction on some level, but

then has to destroy those objects to ensure that the subject is still the master of reality. This

is desire: a need for something 'external' that can give some sort of recognition to a 'self' as

master of reality. If an 'I' can destroy an external object, then it still has command over it; the

'I' can distinguish between itself and the objects it desires – by desiring – and thus has a

means toward escaping the contradiction of this solipsism.

Desire harbors a contradiction though: the goal of desire to not just to help get rid of

the contradiction present in distinguishing the 'I' from objects when they're solely extensions

of that 'I', it's also there to reassert the authority of the 'I', the independence of the self. Were

the self truly independent though, fully separated from any need for an external reality, then

it wouldn't need those external objects to confirm it's independence. In a movement to help

preserve independence, the self instead becomes dependent. As Hegel says, “Self-

consciousness which is simply for itself … or is primarily desire, will therefore … learn

through experience that the object is independent” (§168, p. 106). So not only is the self
dependent on external objects, but the objects themselves become independent (at least to

the philosophical audience of the book; the subject of 'self-certainty' is still raging against

the contradictions of his/her attempt to place the 'I' as the Absolute).

At this point, the 'I' has to come into contact with an object that somehow confirms its

independence, but that the 'I' cannot demolish. This movement is twofold: it takes place as

'genus' and in the encounter of another 'self-consciousness'. First, an explanation of genus:

genus is that transcendental thing which a person takes on in order to give meaning to a life

(for example, God, Nation, Liberalism, Communism, etc.). The genus is important because

it “does not exist for itself qua this simple determination,” that is, the 'I' determining it as an

object, giving it meaning, and because it points the 'I' toward “something other than itself”

(§172, p. 109). As a transcendental idea, it cannot be consumed by the 'I', but in giving

meaning to a person's life genus recognizes that person as something independent and

thus fulfills the goal of desire.

The confrontation with another self-consciousness performs a similar function. As

Hegel puts it, “Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-

consciousness” (§175, p. 110). This 'satisfaction' is twofold: one, the recognition of an 'other'

of some sort is the beginning of the movement towards the chapter on Reason, when

society becomes the important point of focus, instead of the individual self-consciousness.

This is why Hegel is able to say that “With this [recognition of another self-consciousness],

we already have before us the Notion of Spirit” (§177, p. 110), where 'Spirit' here simply

means community. The recognition of another self-consciousness is a step forward

dialectically for Hegel. Secondly, though, the 'other' is still an object to the solipsistic 'I', but a

non-threatening one. This is due to the fact that the encountering of the other is one in

which the 'other' is able to recognize the 'I' as independent, not through its destruction, but
simply in saying so, in language. In this way, the other self-consciousness fulfills the goal of

desire.

It may have become apparent at this point though that these 'others' aren't enough to

fully satisfy the goals of desire and self-certainty: they are still 'other' and thus challenge the

solipsistic 'I' in his domination. The point of the book that deals with this contradiction

though is the sub-section titled 'Lordship and Bondage', and is thus a dialectical move

forward beyond self-certainty. Therefore it's beyond the scope of this essay, though the end

should be semi-obvious: the contradictions of desire will continue until a point where the

distinction between the 'I' and the 'other' becomes moot and the examination of society can

begin in the 'Reason' chapter.

It's at this point we can understand the definition of self-consciousness as desire.

Self-consciousness is always desiring some other in order to confirm itself, but this desiring

always contradicts its intended goal by always needing some 'other' for the confirmation.

This is why the goal of desire is a failure: it can never produce it intended result. And

likewise, self-consciousness can only achieve satisfaction in another self-consciousness

because only this 'other' can confirm its independence, but only in a way that still preserves

its external nature. This is why the self-conscious project is doomed to a sort of failure, but

why out of that failure springs something beautiful: Spirit itself. But, it must be remembered,

that this failure isn't something unnecessary, a mistake that should be quickly forgotten; like

all of the past steps in Hegel's dialectic, self-consciousness is the ash necessary to bring

forth a phoenix.