Estrada vs.

Sandiganbayan (Jurisdiction)

FACTS

The Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada a copy of the complaint filed by the NBI and Atty. Baligod,
which prayed, among others, that criminal proceedings for Plunder as defined in RA No. 7080 be
conducted against Sen. Estrada.

Sometime after, the Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada a copy of the complaint filed by the FIO of the
Ombudsman, which prayed, among others, that criminal proceedings for Plunder, as defined in RA No.
7080, and for violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, be conducted against Sen. Estrada.

Sen. Estrada filed his counter-affidavit for both the said complaints. Eighteen of Sen. Estrada’s co-
respondents in the two complaints also filed their counter-affidavits between December 2013 and March
2014.

Sen. Estrada filed his Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other
Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings (Request). It was made "[p]ursuant to the
right of a respondent ‘to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been
furnished’ (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have access to the evidence on record’
(Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman).”

On March 27, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman (Office) found however that the provisions of Section
3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman do not entitle respondent Sen. Estrada to be furnished all the filings of the respondents.

It is to be noted that there is no provision under the Office’s Rules of Procedure which entitles Estrada to
be furnished all the filings by the other parties. Under the Rules of Court as well as the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, the respondents are only required to furnish their counter-
affidavits and controverting evidence to the complainant, and not to the other respondents.

Office of the Ombudsman’s Ruling:

The Office ruled that Estrada’s request to be furnished with copies of the counter-affidavits of the other
respondents, affidavits of new witnesses and other filings was denied. He is nevertheless entitled to be
furnished a copy of the Reply if the complainant opts to file such pleading.

The Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution which found probable cause to indict Sen. Estrada and his
co-respondents with one count of plunder and 11 counts of violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019.
Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s 27 March 2014 Order denying his
Request, Sen. Estrada filed the present Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and sought to annul and set
aside the 27 March 2014 Order.

ISSUE:

Whether the Office of the Ombudsman, in issuing the challenged order dated March 27, 2014, acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and violated Sen. Estrada’s constitutional right to due process of law.

HELD

Preliminary Investigation by the Ombudsman

A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial.

The purpose of the Office of the Ombudsman in conducting a preliminary investigation, after conducting
its own fact finding investigation, is to determine probable cause for filing an information, and not to
make a final adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties under the law. The Ombudsman and
the prosecution service under the control and supervision of the Secretary of the Department of Justice is
inherently the fact-finder, investigator, hearing officer, judge and jury of the respondent in preliminary
investigations. The technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and
control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation.

It should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the determination of
probable cause, and "probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a
summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an
accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his
accusers to establish his innocence." Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are
limited to those granted by procedural law.

It should lastly be noted that when the Ombudsman conducts a preliminary investigation, he exercises
administrative power, not quasi-judicial. It, however, becomes quasi-judicial when he addresses
disciplinary complaints against public officers.

Grave Abuse of Discretion on the Part of the Ombudsman

The Ombudsman’s denial in its 27 March 2014 Order of Sen. Estrada’s Request did not constitute grave
abuse of discretion. Indeed, the denial did not violate Sen. Estrada’s constitutional right to due process.

First, there is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the
counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.

Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter affidavits of his co-respondents violates
his constitutional right to due process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or rule which states
that it is a compulsory requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman
furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman supports Sen. Estrada’s claim. What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint and
the supporting affidavits and documents at the time the order to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to
the respondent.

Second, Section 4(b), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman states that "the
investigating officer shall issue an order attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and all other supporting
documents, directing the respondent" to submit his counter-affidavit. The affidavits referred to in Section
4(b) are the affidavits mentioned in Section 4(a). Clearly, the affidavits to be furnished to the respondent
are the affidavits of the complainant and his supporting witnesses.

Third, Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "[t]he respondent
shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been
furnished and to copy them at his expense." A respondent’s right to examine refers only to "the evidence
submitted by the complainant." Thus, whether under Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure or under Rule II of the Ombudsman’s Rules of Procedure, there is no requirement whatsoever
that the affidavits executed by the co-respondents should be furnished to a respondent.
Petition Dismissed.

Cantemprate, et. al. vs CRS Realty Development Corp.

FACTS

Petitioners were among those who filed before the HLURB a complaint for the delivery of certificates of
title against respondents CRS Realty Development Corporation (CRS Realty), Crisanta Salvador and Cesar
Casal.

The complaint alleged that respondent Casal was the owner of a parcel of land situated in General
Mariano Alvarez, Cavite known as the CRS Farm Estate while respondent Salvador was the president of
respondent CRS Realty, the developer of CRS Farm Estate. Petitioners averred that they had bought on an
installment basis subdivision lots from respondent CRS Realty and had paid in full the agreed purchase
prices; but notwithstanding the full payment and despite demands, respondents failed and refused to
deliver the corresponding certificates of title to petitioners. The complaint prayed that respondents be
ordered to deliver the certificates of title corresponding to the lots petitioners had purchased and paid in
full and to pay petitioners damages.

An amended complaint was subsequently filed impleading other respondents, among them, the Heirs of
Vitaliano and Enrique Laudiza, who were the predecessors-in-interest of respondent Casal, herein
respondents Bennie Cuason and Caleb Ang, to whom respondent Casal purportedly transferred the
subdivision lots and one Leticia Ligon.

The amended complaint prayed for additional reliefs, namely:

(1) that petitioners be declared the lawful owners of the subdivision lots;

(2) that the deed of absolute sale executed between respondent Casal and respondents Cuason
and Ang and the subject TCT from the transaction be nullified; and

(3) that respondents Cuason and Ang be ordered to reconvey the subdivision lots to petitioners.

HLURB’s Decision:

HLURB Arbiter Ma. Perpetua Y. Aquino rendered a decision primarily ruling that the regular courts and
not the HLURB had jurisdiction over petitioners’ complaint, thus, the complaint for quieting of title could
not be given due course. The Heirs of Laudiza and Ligon were dropped as parties on the ground of lack of
cause of action. However, she found respondents CRS Realty, Casal and Salvador liable on their
obligation to deliver the certificates of title of the subdivision lots to petitioners who had paid in full the
purchase price of the properties. She also found as fraudulent and consequently nullified the subsequent
transfer of a portion of the subdivision to respondents Ang and Cuason.

In addition, the sale of the subject property in whole to respondents Caleb Ang and Bennie Cuason is
hereby declared annulled and of no effect especially that which pertains to the portion of the subdivision
which have already been previously sold by the respondent CRS Realty to herein complainants, prior to
the sale made by respondent Cesar Casal to Caleb Ang and Bennie Cuason.

Lastly, the HLURB ordered the TCT from the transaction to be cancelled and reinstate the original one.

HLURB Board of Commissioners’ Decision:

From the decision of the HLURB Arbiter, respondents Casal, Cuason and Ang, as well as Leticia Ligon,
filed separate petitions for review before the Board of Commissioners (Board).
The Board rendered a decision, affirming the HLURB Arbiter’s ruling that the HLURB had no jurisdiction
over an action for the quieting of title, the nullification of a certificate of title or the reconveyance of a
property.

Furthermore, the Board ruled that to allow petitioners to proceed with the purchases of the subdivision
lots would be preempting the proceedings before the RTC of Bacoor, Cavite and compounding the
prejudice caused to petitioners.

Ligon, respondent Casal and herein petitioners filed separate motions for reconsideration whereby the
decision was modified:

“The complaint for quieting of title against Cesar Casal, Bennie Cuason, Caleb Ang, Heirs of
Vitaliano and Enrique Laudiza and Leticia Ligon is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.”

Office of the President’s Decision

Upon appeal, the Office of the President (OP) on 03 December 2003 affirmed in toto both the decision and
resolution of the Board.

ISSUE

Whether the HLURB has jurisdiction over petitioners’ complaint.

HELD

The HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over the complaint for specific performance to compel respondents
CRS Realty, Casal and Salvador as subdivision owners and developers to deliver to petitioners the
certificates of title after full payment of the subdivision lots. On this score, the Court affirms the
findings of HLURB Arbiter Aquino with respect to the obligation of respondents Casal, Salvador and
CRS Realty to deliver the certificates of title of the subdivision to petitioners pursuant to their
respective contracts to sell.

As regards petitioners’ prayer to declare them the absolute owners of the subdivision lots, the
HLURB correctly ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the same. Petitioners’ amended complaint
included a cause of action for reconveyance of the subdivision lots to petitioners and/or the quieting of
petitioners’ title thereto and impleaded a different set of defendants, namely, the Heirs of Laudiza and
respondents Ang and Cuason, who allegedly bought the subdivision lots previously sold to petitioners.

Under Section 19 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, the Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein.

In view of the aforequoted delineation of jurisdiction between the HLURB and the RTCs, as against the
Heirs of Laudiza who filed an action for reconveyance against respondent Casal, which is still pending
before the RTC.

However, nothing prevents the HLURB from adjudicating on the issue of whether the alleged subsequent
sale of the subdivision lots to respondents Ang and Cuason constituted a double sale because the issue is
intimately related to petitioners’ complaint to compel respondents CRS Realty, Casal and Salvador to
perform their obligation under the contracts to sell. Considering that the alleged subsequent sale to
respondents Ang and Cuason apparently would constitute a breach of respondents’ obligation to issue the
certificate of title to petitioners, if not an unsound business practice punishable under Section 1 of P.D.
No. 1344, the HLURB cannot shirk from its mandate to enforce the laws for the protection of subdivision
buyers.
The remand of the instant case to the HLURB is in order so that the HLURB may determine if the alleged
subsequent sale to respondents Ang and Cuason of those lots initially sold to petitioners constituted a
double sale and was tainted with fraud as opposed to the respondents’ claim that only the unsold
portions of the subdivision property were sold to them.

As already discussed, the Court affirms the ruling of the HLURB Arbiter insofar as it ordered respondents
Casal, Salvador and CRS Realty, jointly and severally, to cause the delivery of clean certificates of title to
petitioners at no cost to the latter.

Wherefore, without prejudice to the implementation of the other reliefs granted in this Decision, including
the reliefs awarded by the HLURB which are affirmed in this Decision, this case is REMANDED to the
HLURB for the purpose of determining:

(a) the prevailing or current fair market value of the lots and

(b) the validity of the subsequent sale of the lots to respondents Bennie Cuason and Caleb Ang by
ascertaining whether or not the sale was attended with fraud and executed in bad faith.
CIR vs Hantex

FACTS

The respondent is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. Being
engaged in the sale of plastic products, it imports synthetic resin and other chemicals for the
manufacture of its products. For this purpose, it is required to file an Import Entry and Internal Revenue
Declaration (Consumption Entry) with the Bureau of Customs.

Sometime in October 1989, Lt. Vicente Amoto, Acting Chief of Counter-Intelligence Division of the
Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), received confidential information that the
respondent had imported synthetic resin amounting to P115.5M but only declared P45.5M. The IIPO
issued subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum for the president and general manager of the
respondent to appear in a hearing and bring a series of books and records.

The respondent’s president and general manager refused to comply with the subpoena, contending that
its books of accounts and records had been investigated repeatedly by the BIR. The IIPO explained that
despite such previous investigations, the EIIB was still authorized to conduct an investigation pursuant to
Section 26-A of Executive Order No. 127. The EIIB was not able find any original copies of the importation
documents since the original copies of the said entries filed with the Bureau of Customs had apparently
been eaten by termites.

Bienvenido G. Flores, Chief of the Investigation Division, and Lt. Leo Dionela, Lt. Vicente Amoto and Lt.
Rolando Gatmaitan conducted an investigation. Based on the documents/records on hand, the
respondent had unreported sales in the amount of P63M , and its corresponding income tax liability was
P41.9M, inclusive of penalty charge and interests. EIIB Commissioner Almonte transmitted the entire
docket of the case to the BIR and recommended the collection of the total tax assessment from the
respondent.

The petitioner CIR sent a Letter to the respondent demanding payment of its deficiency income tax of
P13,414,226.40 and deficiency sales tax of P14,752,903.25, inclusive of surcharge and interest and the
respondent protested but was denied.

CTA Ruling

The CTA ruled that the respondent was burdened to prove not only that the assessment was erroneous,
but also to adduce the correct taxes to be paid by it. The CTA declared that the respondent failed to prove
the correct amount of taxes due to the BIR. It also ruled that the respondent was burdened to adduce in
evidence a certification from the Bureau of Customs that the Consumption Entries in question did not
belong to it.

CA Ruling

The CA held that the income and sales tax deficiency assessments issued by the petitioner were unlawful
and baseless since the copies of the import entries relied upon in computing the deficiency tax of the
respondent were not duly authenticated by the public officer charged with their custody, nor verified
under oath by the EIIB and the BIR investigators. The public officer charged with the custody of the
import entries was never presented in court to lend credence to the alleged loss of the originals. The CA
also ruled that the assessment was unlawful because they were based on hearsay evidence and lastly,
ruled that the respondent was denied the due process of law.

ISSUE

W/N the petition at bench is proper and complies with Sections 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
HELD

The Court found and ruled that the petition is sufficient in form. A verification and certification against
forum shopping signed by the Regional Director constitutes sufficient compliance with the requirements
of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 10 of the NIRC of 1997, the Regional
Director has the power to administer and enforce internal revenue laws, rules and regulations, including
the assessment and collection of all internal revenue taxes, charges and fees. Such power is broad
enough to vest the Revenue Regional Director with the authority to sign the verification and
certification against forum shopping in behalf of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. There is
no other person in a better position to know the collection cases filed under his jurisdiction than
the Revenue Regional Director.

Moreover, under Revenue Administrative Order No. 5-83, the Regional Director is authorized to sign all
pleadings filed in connection with cases referred to the Revenue Regions by the National Office which,
otherwise, require the signature of the petitioner.

According to Section 16 of the NIRC of 1977, as amended, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has the
power to make assessments and prescribe additional requirements for tax administration and
enforcement. Among such powers is provided in paragraph (b):

(b) Failure to submit required returns, statements, reports and other documents. – When a report
required by law as a basis for the assessment of any national internal revenue tax shall not be
forthcoming within the time fixed by law or regulation or when there is reason to believe that any
such report is false, incomplete or erroneous, the Commissioner shall assess the proper tax on
the best evidence obtainable.

In case a person fails to file a required return or other document at the time prescribed by law, or
willfully or otherwise files a false or fraudulent return or other document, the Commissioner shall
make or amend the return from his own knowledge and from such information as he can obtain
through testimony or otherwise, which shall be prima facie correct and sufficient for all legal
purposes.

The law allows the BIR access to all relevant or material records and data in the person of the taxpayer. It
places no limit or condition on the type or form of the medium by which the record subject to the order of
the BIR is kept. The purpose of the law is to enable the BIR to get at the taxpayer’s records in whatever
form they may be kept. Such records include computer tapes of the said records prepared by the taxpayer
in the course of business. In this era of developing information-storage technology, there is no valid
reason to immunize companies with computer-based, record-keeping capabilities from BIR scrutiny. The
standard is not the form of the record but where it might shed light on the accuracy of the taxpayer’s
return.
Ledesma vs Court of Appeals

FACTS

Petitioner was a commercial airline pilot holding the rank of Second Officer on the Boeing 747 aircraft of
the Philippine Airlines (PAL). To become a First Officer, petitioner must acquire an Airline Transport Pilot
License (ATPL). Pursuant to Civil Air Regulation Administrative Order No. 60, s. 1956, petitioner must
accomplish the following to secure from the ATO the issuance of the ATPL:

(1) 1,200 hours of accumulated flight and/or command time, including at least 300 hours of
accumulated night/instrument flight/command time;

(2) a successful completion of the written theoretical examination;

(3) Airmen Examination Board (AEB) Certification of Official Release evidencing that he has
successfully hurdled 6 (six) examination subjects;

(4) a first-class medical examination; and

(5) Proficiency Flight/Simulator Check.

Between 1998 and 2000, petitioner took the examination on the six subjects. In particular, petitioner took
the test in Theory of Flight in May 2000. Petitioner passed the five first subjects. After taking the test in
Theory of Flight, a certain Mr. Borja summoned petitioner and told him that he obtained a grade of 26%
in said subject. Petitioner complained and, thereafter, Mr. Borja clarified that he actually scored 55% on
the subject. Petitioner again took the examination in Theory of Flight and in Weight and Balance. After
some time, a certain Leopoldo Areopagita issued an ATO-AEB certification of Official Release to petitioner
which the latter submitted to PAL and ATO for purposes of obtaining a simulator training schedule and a
check ride permit for the aircraft training. Petitioner underwent training at the GECAT/CX Training
Center in Hong Kong.

After some time, petitioner received a subpoena requiring him to appear and testify before the five-
member panel of the ATO which was then investigating the alleged fabrication of the AEB examination
results. The ATO investigating committee issued a resolution finding that the control number on
petitioner’s ATO-AEB certification was exactly the same control number previously issued to a certain
Ernest Stephen V. Pante. The committee further revealed a disparity in the examination results entered in
the ATO-AEB certification presented by petitioner and in the entries of examination grades in the ATO-
AEB Index Card kept in the ATO records. Petitioner also admitted that he paid Areopagita ₱25,000.00 to
protect his grades from tampering.

ATO Ruling:

The committee recommended the banning of petitioner from taking theoretical examination in the future.
It was recommended that all the airmen licenses of F/O Ledesma be revoked and that he be banned from
taking any theoretical examination in the future at the Airmen Examination Board, without prejudice to
the filing of appropriate criminal charges against him, and those who later on will be found to have
participated, directly or indirectly, in the fabrication of the questioned document, subject matter of this
case.

Petitioner filed for a Motion for Reconsideration but was subsequently denied. Petitioner made an appeal
to the Civil Aeronautics Board but the CAB was denied for lack of merit.

CA Ruling:

Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, alleging that:

 (1) the ATO failed to observe administrative due process in the conduct of the investigation;

(2) the Board and the ATO erred in concluding that petitioner paid Areopagita in exchange for
securing the spurious ATO-AEB certification;

(3) the CAB erred in ruling that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration cleared any irregularities
in the proceedings before the ATO; and

(4) the ATO should have allowed petitioner to retake the examination in Weight and Balance.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the resolutions of the Board. It also denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. It was shown that petitioner was informed of the accusation against him through the
subpoena, his counsel was allowed to manifest in writing his observations on the proceedings albeit he
was barred from intervening therein, and any irregularity in the proceedings was cured by petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE

W/N the Airmen License granted to petitioner has evolved into a property right that cannot be taken away
capriciously and whimsically by the ATO and CAB without due process of law.

HELD

The tribunals correctly concluded that the minimum requirements of administrative due process have
been complied with. Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations
require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against
him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of
charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against
him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

The ATO has complied with the minimum standards of administrative due process in investigating
petitioner on the fabrication of his ATO-AEB certification and the conclusions arrived at by the ATO
were supported by evidence on record and affirmed by the CAB and the Court of Appeals. Thus, the
revocation of petitioner’s airman license was imposed in accordance with the requirements of due process.
Moreover, petitioner’s airman license cannot be considered a property right, it is but a mere privilege,
subject to the restrictions imposed by the ATO and its revocation if warranted.

The Court has reviewed the findings of the ATO and fully concurs with its conclusion. In reviewing
administrative decisions of the executive branch of the government, the findings of facts made therein are
to be respected so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Hence, it is not for the reviewing
court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its
judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. Administrative
decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of
discretion, fraud, or error of law. These principles negate the power of the reviewing court to re-examine
the sufficiency of the evidence in an administrative case as if originally instituted therein, and do not
authorize the court to receive additional evidence that was not submitted to the administrative agency
concerned.

Under Executive Order No. 125, Sec. 12, the ATO is vested with the function to establish and
prescribe rules and regulations for the issuance of license to qualified airmen. Corollary to this
function is the power to impose sanctions on erring airmen. The Court cannot fault the ATO for the
revocation of petitioner’s airman license because it is the bounden duty of the ATO to order the revocation
of licenses when warranted by public safety considerations.
Odchigue-Bondoc vs Tan Tiong Bio

FACTS

Tan Tiong Bio (respondent) had fully paid the installment payments of a 683-square-meter lot in the
Manila Southwoods Residential Estates, a project of Fil-Estate Golf & Development, Inc. (Fil-Estate) in
Carmona, Cavite, but Fil-Estate failed to deliver to him the title covering the lot, despite repeated
demands. Fil-Estate also failed to heed the demand for the refund of the purchase price.

Respondent, later learning that the lot "sold" to him was inexistent,2 filed a complaint for Estafa against
Fil-Estate officials including its Corporate Secretary Atty. Alice Odchigue-Bondoc (petitioner) and other
employees.

Petitioner alleged that she had no participation at all in the acts or transactions alleged in the Complaint-
Affidavit and that the handwritten approval and endorsement, are not hers. She had never transacted,
either directly or indirectly, with Mrs. Ona or Tan Tiong Bio.

On the basis of petitioner’s above-quoted allegations in her Counter-Affidavit, respondent filed a

complaint for Perjury against petitioner before the Pasig City Prosecutor’s Office which dismissed it by
Resolution for insufficiency of evidence, and denied respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration.

DOJ Ruling

On petition for review, the Department of Justice (DOJ) motu proprio dismissed the petition on finding
that there was no showing of any reversible error, following Section 12(c) of Department Circular No. 70
(National Prosecution Service [NPS] Rule on Appeal). Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

CA Ruling

He filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which set aside the DOJ Secretary’s
Resolution, holding that it committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Resolution dismissing
respondent’s petition for review without therein expressing clearly and distinctly the facts on which the
dismissal was based, in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.

The appellate court went on to hold that the matter of disposing the petition outright is clearly delineated,
not under Section 12 but, under Section of the NPS Rule on Appeal which directs the Secretary to
dismiss outright an appeal or a petition for review filed after arraignment; and that under Section 7, the
Secretary may dismiss the petition outright if he finds the same to be patently without merit, or
manifestly intended for delay, or when the issues raised are too unsubstantial to require consideration.

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the appellate court and subsequently filed the
present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE

W/N Sec. 14, Art 8 of the Constitution applies only to “courts of justice”, that the provision does not
extend to decisions or rulings of executive departments such as the DOJ.

HELD

A preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding since "the prosecutor in a preliminary

investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused."

[A prosecutor] does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is
merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably
charged [of] a crime and to enable the [prosecutor] to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial
of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the
[prosecutor] makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the
courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the [prosecutor].

Even the action of the Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutor’s order or resolution via
appeal or petition for review cannot be considered a quasi-judicial proceeding since the "DOJ is not
a quasi-judicial body." Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution does not thus extend to resolutions
issued by the DOJ Secretary.

When the Secretary of Justice is convinced that a petition for review does not suffer any of the
infirmities laid down in Section 7, it can decide what action to take (i.e., reverse, modify, affirm or
dismiss the appeal altogether), conformably with Section 12. In other words, Sections 7 and 12 are part
of a two-step approach in the DOJ Secretary’s review power.

In the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of a public prosecutor who alone determines the
sufficiency of evidence that will establish probable cause in filing a criminal information, courts will not
interfere with his findings.

CA is REVERSED. SOJ decision is REINSTATED.

Note:

Section 7 has an altogether different set of grounds for the outright dismissal of a petition for review.
These are:

(a) when the petition is patently without merit;

(b) when the petition is manifestly intended for delay;
(c) when the issues raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration; and
(d) when the accused has already been arraigned in court.

SEC. 12. Disposition of the appeal.—The Secretary may reverse, affirm or modify the appealed
resolution. He may, motu proprio or upon motion, dismiss the petition for review on any of the following
grounds:
xxxx
(a) That there is no showing of any reversible error;