The Latvian Gambit Jeremy Wysakowski-Walters BSC, MA

The British politician Harold Wilson once said that “A week is a long time in politics”. For the
Polish politicians never has this been truer. At the beginning of the week Poland hosted the Russian
First couple with the Polish President meeting the Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev on Tuesday.
Bronislaw Komorowski, then went to the USA and met with US President Barack Obama at the White
House on Wednesday. In the midst of these two important meetings came new releases from the
Wikileaks website concerning NATO contingency plans, which had the potential to embarrass all three
presidents.
If we roll back the political clock somewhat; in 2004 the Baltic States joined NATO with the
full, and natural, understanding that this would entitle them to claim defence common self-defence in
line with Article V of the Atlantic Charter. Embarrassingly for NATO the Alliance somewhat dragged
its feet over drawing up any plans for such a defence. Thus for five years there was no official defence
plan for any of the three Baltic States. The announcement by Wikileaks that such a plan was finally
agreed on January 22 2010, does not come as a military surprise, but more an acknowledgement of
something long overdue. However, political it is dynamite for Russia. The plan called ‘Eastern
Guardian’ expands the previous contingency plan 'Eagle Guardian', which covered Poland, to include
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Russia has, as ever, expertly used this news to question the tokens of
friendship it received at the Lisbon conference and bi-laterally with Poland.
This has all put Poland in an awkward position; as ever sandwiched in between two great
(super) powers in a strategic game. While in Washington President Komorowski agreed with President
Obama to the establishment of a U.S. air detachment in Poland to support the periodic rotation of U.S.
military aircraft. They also re-confirmed the placement of patriot missiles in Poland by 2018 as part of
the development of the 2008 U.S.-Polish Declaration on Strategic Cooperation. Therefore, Poland is
visibly strengthening the US's position in Eastern Europe and its own as a result. However, this is a
gamble with conceivable repercussions. Only one year ago the Russian and Belarusian militaries
exercised against a “fictions' enemy closely resembling Poland. Exercise West 2009 saw the
deployment of Russian troops to boost Belarusian defence as well as simulated nuclear launched
against Poland and beach assaults.
The strengthening of NATO's eastern flank is a much over-due and predictable move.
However, its use as a pawn in a strategic power-play is something which has possible ramifications for
Poland Baltic States. The Russia-Georgia War of 2008 sent shock-waves through the former-Soviet
and Warsaw Pact region. Memories of the Red Army's annexation of large parts of Eastern Europe
came to the fore. It is understandable that Poland would wish to do everything in its Power to off-set
such a possibility for its future. The road it has chosen, consolidation of its defence with US strategic
interest, is a long one and one that will take time to journey upon. This journey is thwart with dangers,
as perhaps is any act within the foreign policy sphere. Poland can minimise these dangers by
continuing its policy of reaching out to Russia and developing stronger bonds, both bi-lateral and multi-
lateral as part of the EU and NATO.
The chess move referred to in the title is one which involves immense risk and as such is
avoided by seasoned players. If Poland wishes to also avoid such a possibility it needs to cover all of its
bases, to use yet another sorting term. To re-iterate this need let me return finally to Harold Wilson who
said: “I'm an optimist, but an optimist who carries a raincoat”. This is a good position for any
politician, but especially so for Poland's leaders.