Ac71648 2014 Battlegrouptactics PDF

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ARMY FIELD MANUAL VOLUME 1 PART 2

Battlegroup Tactics
Handling Instructions: For MOD Use Only

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Army Code 71648

(2014)
ARMY FIELD MANUAL

VOLUME 1 COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS
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PART 2
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BATTLEGROUP TACTICS
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This publication supersedes

AC 71648 (2007)
JULY 2014
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HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS & CONDITIONS OF RELEASE
COPYRIGHT
The information contained within this publication is British Crown Copyright and the intellectual
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contained in this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system and transmitted for MOD
use only, except where authority for use by other organisations or individuals has been authorised by
the officer whose details appear below.
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in the course of their duties. Any person finding this document should hand it to a British Forces unit
or to a police station for its safe return to the Ministry of Defence, Def Sy, Main Building, Whitehall,
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LONDON SW1A 2HB with particulars of how it was found.
This information is released by the United Kingdom Government to international organisations and
national governments for defence purposes only. The information must be afforded the same degree
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of protection as that afforded to information of an equivalent classification originated by the recipient
organisation or nation, or as required by the recipient organisation or nation’s security regulations.
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The information may only be disclosed within the Defence Departments of the recipient organisation
or nation, except as otherwise authorised by the UK MOD. This information may be subject to
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STATUS
This publication has been produced under the direction and authority of the Chief of the General Staff
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by Director Land Warfare in his capacity as sponsor of Army Doctrine. It is the individual’s
responsibility to ensure that he or she is using the latest version of this publication. If in doubt the
individual should contact the Directorate of Land Warfare (details below).
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DISTRIBUTION
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As directed by Director Land Warfare.
CONTACT DETAILS
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Suggestions for change or queries are welcomed and should be sent to SO1 Tac Doc Pubs,
Directorate of Land Warfare, Land Warfare Centre, Imber Road, Warminster BA12 0DJ,
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Telephone +44(0)1985 848764.

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RECORD OF AMENDMENTS
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Amendment Number Date Amended Initials

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CONTENTS
PREFACE
1. AFM Volume 1, Part 2 Battlegroup Tactics replaces the 2007 Edition. Its purpose is to
provide the doctrinal underpinning for the restoration of the Army’s contingent capability at
battlegroup level and to re-frame our understanding of war-fighting operations after extensive,
predominantly stabilisation, operations in recent years.
3. Battlegroup Tactics explains and illustrates the Tactical Actions of a war fighting battlegroup,
placing these within the operating environment as envisaged in the Future Character of Conflict.
Battlegroup combined arms manoeuvre within a brigade task organisation against hybrid
adversaries and within a populated battlespace, lies at the core of the document. This version has
sought to capture the essence of those tactics techniques and procedures developed during
stability operations that we believe have broader utility for future contingent operations, examples
being the application of precision fires, integration of joint effects including ISR capabilities into the
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Battlegroup , force protection and sustainment in the 360º threat environment and the transition
from Major Combat Operations to Hot Stabilisation. It has also sought to refresh thinking on some
less often practiced procedures such as area and all arms air defence, and briefly, responses to
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CBRN threats.
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4. This version of Battlegroup Tactics is written for battlegroup commanders, their staff and
subordinates, as well as students at the Defence Academy and Land Warfare School. It seeks to
provide updated combined arms tactical doctrine to support collective training and in particular,
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although not exclusively, the stand up of the Interim Lead Armoured Battlegroup (I-LABG).
Battlegroup Tactics does not seek to address medium to long term future capability developments
in any great detail, although in writing it the authors have remained mindful of the A2020 direction
of travel and have contributed to the conceptual work now underway to articulate how the Army will
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fight in a the future – some of which is reflected in Chapter 1.
5. Battlegroup Tactics draws from AFM Vol 1 Part 1B Brigade Tactics and the wider AFM
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series. It provides sufficient signposts to other doctrine where appropriate, but has been designed
to contain sufficient detail to be used by the battlegroup commander, his staff and subordinates in
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the execution of collective training and operations. It should be used in conjunction with the Staff
Officers Handbook.
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6. Doctrine has a finite life span and this doctrine is no exception. It is expected that Lessons
and Observations from Training collected over next two years by the field army, any future
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operational experience and the introduction and integration of new capabilities at battlegroup level
will all contribute to our understanding of battlegroup tactical actions. This version of Battlegroup
tactics will be revised regularly to reflect this.
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Preface i
Contents ii
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION TO THE BATTLEGROUP
Introduction 1-1
Part 1 Conflict and the Battlegroup 1-2
The Nature of Conflict 1-2
The Character of Conflict 1-2
The Operating Environment 1-3
Conflict and The Battlegroup 1-6
The British Approach to Conflict 1-7
Part 2 Battlegroup Organisation 1-11
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Part 3 The Roles and Tasks of Combat Arms 1-14
Reconnaissance 1-14
Armour 1-15
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Infantry 1-16
Infantry Support Platoons 1-17
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Part 4 The Roles and Tasks of Combat Support Arms 1-19
Artillery 1-19
Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD)
ED 1-21
Engineers 1-22
ISR Brigade 1-24
NTISR 1-25
CIS 1-26
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Part 5 Roles and Task of Joint Effects 1-26

ALI 1-26
Air 1-27
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Aviation 1-27
Special Forces 1-28
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Non-UK Forces 1-29

Annex A Armoured Cavalry 1-A-1
Annex B Light cavalry 1-B-1
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Annex C Mechanized Infantry 1-C-1

Annex D Light Protected Mobility Infantry 1-D-1
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Annex E Light Infantry 1-E-1

Annex F GBAD 1-F-1
Considerations for the use of Micro UAS 1-G-1
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Annex G
Annex H Considerations for the use of EW 1-H-1
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Annex I Considerations for the use of Attack Helicopters 1-I-1

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Chapter 2 COMMAND OF BATTLEGROUP OPERATIONS
Part 1 Command 2-1

Part 2 Roles, Structures and Organisations of Headquarters 2-3
Annex A Summary of Battlegroup HQ Staff – Duties & Responsibilities 2-A-1
Annex B Fighting the Digitised Battlegroup Headquarters 2-B-1
Chapter 3 ORCHESTRATING OPERATIONS
Part 1 Operational and Tactical Frameworks 3-1

Part 2 Characteristics of Battlegroup Operations in the Contemporary 3-4
Operating Environment
Command 3-4
Information & Intelligence 3-5
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Firepower 3-7
Information and Outreach Activities 3-9
Manoeuvre 3-10
Protection 3-11
Sustainment 3-12
Part 3 Planning Battlegroup Operations 3-13
Part 4 Dissemination of Orders 3-18
Part 5 Executing Battlegroup Operations 3-19
Annex A ISTAR Integration at Battlegroup Level 3-A-1
Annex B Combat ID Check List 3-B-1
Annex C CBRN Check List 3-C-1
Chapter 4 OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
Part 1 Principles 4-1
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Part 2 Organisation and Groupings 4-1
Part 3 The Battlegroup Attack 4-4
Battle Preparation 4-5
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The Approach 4-7
Types of Manoeuvre 4-9
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The Assault 4-13
Reorganisation 4-18
Part 4 Enabling Actions ED 4-20
Forward Passage Lines 4-20
Battlegroup Advance to Contact 4-24
Battlegroup Obstacle Crossing 4-29
Battlegroup Link Up 4-36
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Battlegroup Raid 4-38

Annex A Battlegroup Attack 4-A-1
Annex B Forward Passage of Lines 4-B-1
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Annex C Advance to Contact 4-C-1

Annex D Obstacle Crossing 4-D-1
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Annex E Link Up 4-E-1

Annex F Raid 4-F-1
Annex G Battlegroup Considerations for Air Manoeuvre 4-G-1
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Chapter 5 DEFENSIVE ACTIONS

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Part 1 Considerations and Principles 5-1

Types of Defence 5-5
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Part 2
Area Defence 5-5
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Mobile Defence 5-12

Key Point Defence 5-14
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Part 3 Conduct of the Defensive Battle 5-14

Preparation 5-14
Covering Force Action 5-15
Main Defensive Battle 5-18
Command and Control 5-21
Part 4 Delay 5-22
Part 5 Enabling Actions 5-28
Relief of Troops In Place 5-28
Rearward Passage of Lines 5-32
Withdrawal 5-36
Annex A Battle Drill – Area Defence. 5-A-1
Annex B Battle Drill – Mobile Defence. 5-B-1
Annex C Battle Drill – Delay. 5-C-1
Annex D Battle Drill – Relief of Troops in Place. 5-D-1
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Annex E Battle Drill – Rearward Passage of Lines 5-E-1

Annex F Battle Drill - Withdrawal 5-F-1
Anne G Control of Demolitions 5-G-1
Annex H Combined Arms Obstacle Integration 5-H-1
Chapter 6 SUSTAINING BATTLEGROUP OPERATIONS
Background 6-1
Pre-Planning 6-2
Concept of Operations 6-3
Planning 6-4
Groupings 6-5
Types of Commodity 6-8
Replenishment 6-9
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Medical Support 6-12
Equipment Support 6-15
Staff and Personnel Support 6-19
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Military Police Support 6-19
Captured Personnel 6-20
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Battlegroup Movement 6-22
Annex A Logistic Support 6-A-1
Annex B Medical Support ED 6-B-1
Annex C ES Support 6-C-1
Annex D CPERS Extract from JDP 1-10 6-D-1
Chapter 7 HOT STABILISATION

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Overview 7-1
Part 1 Environment 7-1
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Organisation 7-4
Part 2 Framework Security Operations 7-6
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Information Activity 7-6

Base Security and Key Point Defence 7-7
Patrolling 7-10
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Organisation 7-3
Cordon Operations 7-11
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Strike Operations 7-12

Convoy Protection 7-14
Assistance to Security Sector Reform and Military Capacity 7-15
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Part 3
Building
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Part 4 Support to the Delivery of Essential Services 7-17

Part 5 Support to Governance, Economic Development and 7-18
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Reconstruction
Annex A Battle Drill – Strike Op 7-A-1
Index Index-1
Abbreviations Abbr-1
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO THE BATTLEGROUP
1. Chapter 1 will establish an understanding of the battlegroup, its role in the

contemporary operating environment, its organisational construct and the context in which
it will operate.
2. The basic combined arms manoeuvre unit is the battlegroup, organised from a
combination of Combat, Combat Support (CS) and Combat Support Service (CSS) sub-
units. A battlegroup is based on the headquarters of a combat arm unit (i.e. Infantry,
Armoured, Aviation or Reconnaissance) and is the basic unit of tactical manoeuvre within
a formation. The fundamental benefit of the battlegroup is the synergy generated by a
combined arms grouping tailored for a specific mission. For task organisation to occur the
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battlegroup must:
a. Be able to regroup easily by day and night.
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b. Have common battlegroup and sub-unit drills which will allow the successful
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regrouping and employment of the redeployed elements. These drills should be
common across the parent formation. ED
3. The characteristics and employment of specific elements of the ground manoeuvre
battlegroup are considered throughout this manual. Together they form a combat unit that
combines manoeuvre and firepower under a coherent command system. It is a flexible
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fighting force that is capable of conducting any tactical activity in all environments.
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4. Regardless of its specific grouping, the full potential of a battlegroup can only be
achieved if it has trained collectively, achieved mandated levels of competence and
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the unit leadership is of the highest order. In particular:
a. The fundamentals of the Manoeuvrist Approach to Operations and Mission

Command must be fully understood and implemented at all levels.
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b. Offensive action should be undertaken whenever the opportunity arises, in

support of the overall commander’s concept of operations.
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c. The battlegroup must be capable of achieving and sustaining a high tempo of

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operations. This stems from effective training, strong leadership, understanding of

doctrine, well rehearsed drills and a sound logistic base. This is expressed in tactical
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terms through the use of a timely OODA, well practised battlegroup drills, and
effective battlefield procedures.
5. The complex and multinational nature of future operations suggests that the UK is
unlikely to deploy a battlegroup in isolation1. Recent operations have confirmed the value
of the formation level of command, most usually exercised at brigade level for simple
interventions and stabilisation operations, such as the LATF.
6. For more demanding and complex operations the UK may deploy a 2* headquarters
in order to provide the gearing between the tactical actions executed by brigades and the
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Notwithstanding the LABG concept.
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operational and strategic level decision making within a multinational and interagency
environment which will be required to enable these to be achieved.
PART 1 - CONFLICT AND THE BATTLEGROUP
THE NATURE OF CONFLICT
7. The Future Character of Conflict (FCOC) tells us that whilst the character of conflict
changes, its nature endures and therefore it will always be defined by friction, uncertainty,
chaos, violence, danger, and human stress.
a. Friction. As the force which frustrates action, friction may be mental (an
inability to decide) or physical (an inability to act). It may also be externally imposed
by an adversary, the environment, or self-induced by poor planning/communication.
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b. Uncertainty and Chaos. No matter how much information is available, the fog
of war will descend, bringing uncertainty and chaos. Chaos is an inevitable feature of
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conflict, and whilst it may be deliberately exacerbated by adversaries, it presents
opportunities for the bold to seize.
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c. Violence and Danger. The threat or use of violence is the means by which
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battlegroups seek to impose their will on adversaries. Whilst influence can often be
achieved without employing violence, it is rarely accomplished without a credible
threat; in this regard, a battlegroup’s capacity and resolve to deliver violence must
never be in doubt.
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d. Human Stress. Despite technological advances, human stress will always be a

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feature of land warfare. To that end, battlegroups must strive to reduce the impact of
human stress on their own personnel, whilst exploiting the influence opportunities it
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presents amongst opposing, often less disciplined, forces.
THE CHARACTER OF CONFLICT

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8. FCOC Considerations. FCOC asserts that the battlespace in which battlegroups

now operate is congested, cluttered, contested, connected and constrained2. These
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descriptions apply equally to both Major Combat Operations (MCO) and Stabilisation
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Operations and have implications for how the battlegroup will operate in a future
‘contingent operation’. An overview of these characteristics is outlined below.
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a. Congested. Future interventions are likely to be conducted in densely

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populated urban or littoral3. areas, in which many of the population will be

dissatisfied, disadvantaged and armed.
b. Cluttered. A cluttered environment will hinder our ability to distinguish

individuals, items or events and will offer our adversaries the opportunity to blend into
the background and shield themselves from our sensors and observers, using their
local knowledge to do so.
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Future operations will most likely be Joint, Intra-Governmental, Inter Agency and Multinational (JIIM), in which battlegroups must be
able to inter-operate at the lowest level, with other levers of national power and a wide range of allies and partners.
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Littoral is defined as those land areas [and their adjacent sea and associated air space] that are predominantly susceptible to
engagement and influence from the sea. This may typically be thought of as being those areas within 100 km of the coast. It is likely
that up to 60% of humans will live on or near coastal regions by 2040. DCDC Global Strategic Trends, Edition 3.
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c. Contested. Freedom of manoeuvre will be contested in all environments by

agile adversaries with increasing access to technological advances and low-tech
innovations. Adversaries are likely to pursue asymmetric advantages throughout the
traditional spectrum of ground, air and littoral manoeuvre and in the cyber and
information domains.
d. Connected. The densely populated centres of activity in which future

interventions are likely to be conducted are becoming increasingly inter-connected,
particularly through the global information space provided by mobile
telecommunications and the World-Wide Web. Inter-connection is also significantly
enhanced by the wide range of global transport options.
e. Constrained. Operations are likely to be constrained by Western legal and
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societal norms, and the implications of their application within a populated
battlespace.
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THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT
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9. Overview. Battlegroup operations will be conducted in two types of physical terrain,
open and close, and against two types of enemy forces, regular and irregular. The
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combination of terrains, opponents and local populations form a complex environment.
a. Open Terrain. Open terrain is likely to be sparsely populated, for example

desert, prairie or agricultural land and is characterised by good visibility and
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unrestricted manoeuvre space. Engagements by direct fire weapons will be at or

close to maximum range giving an advantage to the force able to acquire and
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prosecute targets at a greater range than its enemy. Positions of vantage will
therefore remain key terrain for ground forces but observation from the air will also
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offer excellent opportunities for reconnaissance and target acquisition. Conversely

the ability of the enemy to also acquire and prosecute targets at range will require
excellent Operational Security (OPSEC).
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b. Close Terrain. Close terrain may be densely populated in urban areas, or

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sparsely populated in dense vegetation such as jungle. It is characterised by

restricted visibility and constrained manoeuvre space. Engagements by direct fire
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weapons will often be fleeting, sporadic and at close quarters requiring combined
arms groupings at the lowest levels. Indirect fires and air delivered munitions will
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offer opportunities to fix and strike the enemy in depth, but will require precision
during execution. Concealment will be easier to achieve and finding the enemy in
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detail will be difficult.
c. Regular Forces. Regular forces will be organised and equipped to secure

ground including infrastructure, and oppose other military forces. They will be
predominantly infantry-based, with hierarchical command structures, and equipped
with a range of small arms, heavy machine guns, rocket propelled grenades and
Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS). They may also possess technically
sophisticated weapons such as guided anti-tank missiles, guided surface to air
missiles, Air, AH and UAS systems. Regular forces may possess a credible armour
capability, but are unlikely to seek to mass them, preferring to disperse them in
smaller detachments to protect them against our ground and air attack. Observed
artillery and mortar fire will be organic, possibly supported by UAS integrated into fire
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control systems. Communications will mostly consist of insecure VHF/HF radios and
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) phones. Recognising Western
technological advantages in fires, air power and ISTAR most regular force enemy will
seek to defend in close terrain and conduct offensive operations against our
perceived force vulnerabilities. These include raids and ambushes against isolated
detachments or convoys and direct and indirect fires to destroy high value targets
such as headquarters, aircraft and bases. The force may have access to sufficient
chemical/biological capabilities to conduct limited area contamination or denial.
d. Irregular Forces. Irregular forces are likely to come from or be similar to the
local society in which they operate. Their reasons for opposing UK forces will range
from those who have been ‘accidentally’ disaffected, to fanatical insurgents.
Focussing on the population, irregulars will conduct attritional campaigns aimed at
influencing local nationals and Western domestic audiences, as well as attracting or
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satisfying regional sponsors and donors. Irregulars will seek to attack or erode
weaknesses such as casualty tolerances and perceived legitimacy etc, in order to
force a withdrawal. The more capable groups will synchronise and coordinate their
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attacks at multiple points and demonstrate their own freedom of action. Rather than
the traditional military command hierarchy, irregular forces are likely to employ
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resilient networks designed to limit the effectiveness of our targeting.
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Hybrid Threat. A mix of Regular and Irregular forces operating in a unified
manner is referred to as a Hybrid threat.
f. Complex Operating Environment. Complexity is derived from both physical

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and cognitive characteristics of the environment in which the battlegroup operates. A

hybrid enemy operating in a mix of open and close terrain will require the battlegroup
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to regularly adapt its tactics and organisation to most effectively counter and defeat
the threats presented against it. These complexities include: a non-combatant
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civilian population, political and operational constraints on the use of force (ROE),
(in)tolerance of casualties and collateral damage, and the influence of international
and domestic public opinion on the conduct of operations. All of these can be
conveyed through the local, international and social media which will similarly add
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cognitive complexity. A Complex Operating Environment4 is currently defined as

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existing when:
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 It is physically and mentally challenging to operate in.

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 Forces cannot readily achieve situational awareness out to the maximum

effective range of their weapons.
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 Identifying and tracking adversaries is difficult.

 Servicemen are easily separated from each other and from supporting
capabilities.
 Communications are difficult.
 Movement is canalised and/or highly constrained.
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As defined in The Future Operating Environment and Threat for Expeditionary Operations in the land Environment - DFD AC 71999
March 2013.
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Fig 1-1 - Complex Operating Environment
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10. Partner Forces. Battlegroups will often be partners with indigenous security forces
where strategic, operational and tactical aims align. Partner forces will often be organised
as an infantry centric force operating with varying degrees of control and expertise. They
will bring cultural context and benefits to battlegroup operations particularly in their ability
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to converse with the local population and observe presence of the abnormal and absence
of the normal in the pattern of life. The provision of battlegroup support will be mission
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specific and may range from training in tactics, techniques and procedures, advising on
plans or the provision of specialist expertise such as Joint Fires or Counter Improvised
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Explosive Devices (C-IED). When operating alongside partner forces battlegroup

personnel should work to build sound working relationships based on trust and mutual
respect, including developing an awareness of the cultural norms/practices which are
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acceptable or unacceptable to their partners. Partner forces will seek to achieve their own
goals through partnering including the ability to influence the conduct and outcome of
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partnered missions. This must be managed carefully at the highest levels within the
battlegroup and will require a flexible and adaptable approach to planning and executing
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partnered operations.
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11. Allied Forces. Allied forces may represent formal alliances such as NATO or ad hoc
coalitions of the willing, where common foreign policy and national interests align as was
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the case during the 1991 Gulf War. At battlegroup level, coalition operations may
introduce the requirement to task organise an allied force element into the battlegroup or
operate alongside allied forces within the same or adjoining battlespace. Key
considerations will be:
a. Interoperability. Addressing and allowing for differences in organisation,

weapons, vehicles, logistic support and communications equipment.
b. Language differences. Ensuring that orders, instructions and reports are

communicated clearly across a language barrier, often by the exchange of liaison
officers.
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c. Tactics and ROE. Establishing a common understanding on tactical norms and

interpretation of national or coalition ROE.
12. Other Actors.
a. Local Nationals. Local nationals will likely live in conditions of poor

governance, economic depravation and inequality where civil rights and life support
may be neglected by civil authorities. They may be linguistically and culturally
different from UK forces and may support or resent their presence (or both
simultaneously). Many may regularly alter their views as support will often be
predicated on their own personal circumstances and current needs. In a complex
mix of competing agendas and narratives, it is likely that the majority of local
nationals will listen to all sides and remain circumspect. Local nationals will
undoubtedly offer a source of raw information and intelligence, but will also pose an
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enduring threat to OPSEC given their proximity to battlegroups, particularly in urban
environments.
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b. Non Government Organisations. Non-government organisations (NGO) will
wish military forces to establish and maintain security, as this allows them greater
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access to those they are trying to help. Some may wish to constrain military activity
or at least tailor it where possible to their own programmes, agendas or outcomes,
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many of which may endure beyond military operations. Battlegroups should expect
some NGOs to have unrealistic aspirations of what military action can achieve. Early
liaison and expectation management will be key.
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CONFLICT AND THE BATTLEGROUP

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13. Mosaic of Conflict. Most conflicts will require concurrent, overlapping or connected
military activities, sometimes in close proximity. The relationships between these activities
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makes a mosaic a more accurate way of visualising the environment than a spectrum, in
which all of the small contributing dynamics must be understood to appreciate the full
operating picture. This concept is very similar to Krulak’s description of the 3-Block War5
in which MCO, stabilisation and humanitarian assistance all take place simultaneously and
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require battlegroups to show agility by transitioning between these activities at high tempo.
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In this context, battlegroups are likely to be predominantly in one environment or another

(i.e. MCO or stabilisation) but the distinction will often be blurred and transition between
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the two will be unpredictable and often rapid.

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14. Defence Engagement. Defence engagement is a term which covers a broad array of
activity where defence contributes to Her Majesty’s Government’s ‘Building Stability
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Overseas Strategy.’ (BSOS) There are three pillars: ‘ early warning’, in order anticipate
instability and potential triggers for conflict; ‘rapid crisis prevention and response’ which
includes taking fast, appropriate and effective action to prevent a crisis or stop it
escalating; and ‘investing in upstream prevention’ by helping to build strong and legitimate
institutions and robust societies in fragile countries. Many Defence Engagement tasks will
fall outside the remit of the battlegroup; however others, such as the conduct of joint or
partnered overseas training exercises, the conduct of short term training teams and the
provision of skills and military education are likely to take place in or close to conflict
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The Three Block War was a concept devised by Gen Charles Krulak in the late 1990s to describe the complex spectrum of challenges
likely to be faced by soldiers on the modern battlefield. In three contiguous city blocks soldiers may be required to conduct full scale
military action, peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief. The Three Block War concept is not restricted to an urban
environment, but does articulate military operations of varying intensity taking place in close proximity to each other.
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affected countries. Battlegroup personnel involved in defence engagement activities will

need to consider and apply appropriate tactics, techniques and procedures to ensure that
they are able to operate effectively within such environments; the distinction between a
conflict and non conflict environment is likely to be blurred. A robust method of monitoring
and assessing threats to the mission and implementing appropriate force protection
measures will be key. Similarly the ability to warn and report upwards on the current
situation in the early hours or days of a conflict must also be maintained, as must the
ability to act in self defence and ultimately to re-organise, regroup and respond to re-
tasking as a first or early responder to an emerging crisis.
15. Major Combat Operations. MCO tends to be characterised by a series of force on

force engagements, orchestrated by formations and requiring high rates of combat activity
and logistic consumption. Danger, fear and stress are normally at their greatest; the
tempo of operations is normally high and often sustained, and they demand the highest
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levels of collective performance and training. When conducting this type of warfighting
against a peer adversary, battlegroups will focus on defeating the will of the adversary to
fight which will usually require the destruction of at least an element of the enemy force.
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However, future MCO may not resemble what has gone before, as traditional boundaries
between warfighting and stabilisation are blurred6. Within MCO it is likely that state-centric
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forces will choose to use a mixture of conventional and unconventional methods of attack
while adopting symmetric and asymmetric approaches. It is also likely that planning and
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execution will need to take greater account of the requirements to conduct concurrent and
subsequent stabilisation.
16. Hot Stabilisation. Hot Stabilisation refers to a period of transition between MCO
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and Stabilisation during which there is a requirement to enable and manage the immediate
consequences of military operations in a populated battlespace. Whilst the immediate
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tactical priority may be a warfighting opponent, hot stabilisation acknowledges the

requirement for land forces to contribute to a population focussed security solution in
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which other lines of activity (Governance, Rule of Law and Development) can begin to
prosper. Battlegroups organised and equipped for MCO will need to reorganise rapidly for
stabilisation activity as or if a campaign transitions.
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THE BRITISH ARMY APPROACH TO CONFLICT

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17. The Manoeuvrist Approach. The Manoeuvrist Approach focuses on applying

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strength against weakness, achieving surprise and superior tempo and bold exploitation of
success, whilst protecting our own vulnerability. It requires a mindset in which doing the
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unexpected, using initiative and seeking originality, is combined with the determination to
succeed. Examples of the Manoeuvrist Approach might include:
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a. Employing armoured manoeuvre and precision fires to target an enemy force

C2, logistics or reserves using precision fires (snipers, Javelin, GMLRS, Hellfire etc.)
in order to deny him freedom of action.
b. Employing own situational awareness and decentralised command to remain

dispersed whilst out of contact before rapidly concentrating force elements
immediately before an assault.
______________________
6
DCDC Future Land Operational Concept (FLOC) 2008.
1-7
CONTENTS
c. Employing deception and surprise to lure an enemy force to act whilst

employing OPSEC to manoeuvre elsewhere in order to then strike him from an
unexpected direction.
PY
O
C
ED
Fig 1-2 - The Manoeuvrist Approach
18. Multi-Dimensional Manoeuvre7. An emerging concept is “multi-dimensional

LL
manoeuvre" to describe how land forces at all levels, from corps to troop or platoon, act
(manoeuvre) in up to 5 dimensions (land, maritime, air, information and electromagnetic8)
O
to gain advantage over opponents and achieve the full range of objectives and effects. In
execution, actions in each dimension reinforce the others. This will be the general tactical
TR
doctrine for the Army across the full range of the "mosaic of conflict" and for every level of
command. The higher up the land forces hierarchy a commander and his or her
headquarters are, the more dimensions are applicable. A division can operate in all 5
N
dimensions, a platoon probably in up to 3 (land, air and information). An essential pre-

requisite for multi-dimensional operations is understanding. Understanding encompasses
O
the full breadth and depth of a situation, and must be continuous, as all human situations
are complex and dynamic.
C
19. Centrality of Influence. Achieving influence lies at the heart of the battlegroup’s
N
approach to operations. Whilst seeking to influence our adversaries’ perceptions and

behaviour through a range of direct and indirect methods, the battlegroup must also
U
influence local nationals, allies and partners, as well as our own domestic audience.
Influence is orchestrated through Joint Action which is a combination of fires, information
activities, outreach and manoeuvre. The choice over which combination of means to
apply, and any assessment of the effectiveness of these means, must be weighed up in
terms of the degree of influence we can expect each to achieve. The proof of effect is that
the outcome matches what we wished to make happen.
20. Mission Command. The Manoeuvrist Approach is underpinned by a decentralised

style of command which promotes initiative, freedom and speed of action. This is Mission
______________________
7
TD Note to be published in may 14.
8
Includes cyberspace and e.g. electronic warfare.
1-8
CONTENTS
Command, and it relies on a philosophy of centralised intent and decentralised execution.

The six key elements of Mission Command are:
a. Commanders, through their orders, must ensure that subordinates understand

the intentions, their own missions, and the context of those missions.
b. Subordinates are told what effect they are to achieve and the reason why.
c. Subordinates are allocated sufficient resources to carry out their missions.
d. Commanders impose minimum control measures to avoid undue limitations to

subordinates’ freedom of action.
e. Subordinates decide for themselves how best to achieve their missions.
PY
f. Commander’s intent binds the activities of a dispersed force into a whole, while
maximising his subordinates’ authority to act.
O
21. Factors for successful Mission Command. For Mission Command to succeed the
C
following factors must be present:
a. Unity of Effort.
ED
b. Specified Main Effort.
LL
c. Freedom of Action.
O
d. Trust.
TR
e. Mutual Understanding.
f. Timely and Effective Decision Making.

N
Top Tip: Mission Command requires commanders to express their intent to their
O
subordinates with absolute clarity using simple and uncomplicated language

aided where necessary by clear and uncomplicated visual aids that can be
C
understood throughout all parts of the battlegroup.

N
22. Use of Mission Command. The extent and manner to which a battlegroup
U
commander employs Mission Command will vary. Battlegroups will form and improve their
performance as relationships normalise and individual competencies increase through
training and practice. Trust and mutual understanding must be created before
commanders will be able to fully empower their subordinates. Commanders may vary
their approach from being highly prescriptive in circumstances where the factors for
successful Mission Command are weak to being more delegative in circumstances when
factors for success are strong. The application of Mission Command never absolves the
commander of his responsibility to check and satisfy himself that his orders and
instructions are being executed according to his intent. A useful tool to confirm a
subordinate’s understanding of his mission and tasks is the subordinate backbrief. See
Para 44 of Chapter 3.
1-9
CONTENTS
23. The Joint Expeditionary Force. UK battlegroups will invariably operate within a
Joint Expeditionary Force but will be configured exclusively for land operations at the
tactical level. Their operations will be supported by joint effects enablers such as UAS,
intelligence products form SIGINT and HUMINT, air, aviation, Electronic Warfare (EW),
indirect fires, combat engineers and logistics which are likely to be commanded and
controlled centrally by the brigade/division and apportioned to support the battlegroup
during MCO. Air Land Integration (ALI) procedures must be employed throughout the
battlegroup down to the lowest tactical level where sub-units, platoons and sections are
able to call for close air support or close combat attack and are familiar with the
exploitation of strategic to micro UAS platforms.
24. Levels of Command. The UK is in the process of resetting the divisional and
brigade levels of command following the experiences of recent operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq.
PY
a. The Division. The division is considered the lowest level at which the
operational art is practiced and the level through which the UK delivers this in the
O
land environment. Its purpose is to link tactical actions to meet strategic objectives.
It will do so by planning, sequencing and executing tactical engagements
C
simultaneously in an unlimited decision/action cycle in order to retain the initiative
and allow operational tempo to be maintained. The division may serve as the core of
ED
a multi-national 2* HQ with both UK and coalition force elements under command.
The division fights the Deep battle, resources the Close battle and protects the Rear
in both the physical and information domains.
LL
b. The Brigade. The brigade is the level where task organisation between combat
and combat support units takes place to create all arms battlegroups to execute
O
tactical actions. The brigade will concurrently plan and execute tactical actions within
a limited decision/action cycle, execute manoeuvre within a space generally
TR
determined by the range of its organic fires, command up to four (five in extremis)
points of command and exercise C3I9 delivered primarily by tactical CIS. The
brigade is the lowest level of command where joint and multinational capabilities are
integrated in most circumstances, and is capable of sustaining up to two tactical
N
engagements without resupply.

O
c. The Battlegroup. Battlegroups will routinely operate within a brigade

C
architecture designed to command, apportion and control assigned joint and land
capabilities that enable the battlegroup to execute tactical actions10. Where a single
N
battlegroup deploys under command of a UK brigade headquarters the organisation

is commonly referred to as a Task Force (TF).
U
25. The Expeditionary Approach. The expeditionary approach is a mindset that

emphasises readiness to embark upon a contingent operation. It includes:
a. Readiness. Meeting the individual and collective Notice to Move requirements

as directed by Op VANGUARD, the Army’s Readiness Order.
______________________
9
Command, control, Cyber (including EW and SIGINT) and information.
10
This is not to say that brigades do not operate at the Tactical level, they do, however their role can be described as enabling
battlegroups to execute tactical actions where close combat is required.
1-10
CONTENTS
b. Call in Procedures. Practicing the call in of personnel and the conduct of pre
deployment checks including documentation, equipment, fit to deploy medicals and
training standards.
c. Horizon Scanning. Studying unstable regions of the world where the UK

maintains strategic interest and the inter government, inter agency activities that may
already taking place within them.
d. Training. Focussing on doing the basics well, taking opportunities to integrate

with other arms and reserves and planning and executing training in changing
scenarios where the threat, posture, presence, profile and force protection measures
vary and life support is austere.
e. Interoperability. Taking opportunities to practice re-grouping drills and
PY
developing understanding of other arm and allied force structures, capabilities and
tactics in order to improve interoperability.
O
PART 2 – BATTLEGROUP ORGANISATION
C
26. The capabilities of a specific battlegroup will be determined by a range of factors,
including groupings and task organisation and will be influenced by the nature of the
ED
operation or specific task being undertaken. Any battlegroup task organisation should
contain elements that can FIND, FIX, STRIKE and EXPLOIT, as well as having sufficient
capacity to act as a reserve. Having an uncommitted reserve is critical as a battlegroup
commander may need to react to an unexpected tactical development. This will have an
LL
impact on the overall number of tasks that a battlegroup can simultaneously perform.
O
27. The battlegroup will normally comprise:

TR
a. Battlegroup Headquarters. Battlegroup headquarters will normally sub-divide

into Main, Tactical (Tac) and Step Up. Further detail regarding structure, roles and
responsibilities of key staff personalities may be found in Chapter 2 - Command of
Battlegroup Operations.
N
O
b. Manoeuvre Sub-Units. A battlegroup will normally comprise of up to five

manoeuvre sub-units from Armoured and Light Cavalry, Armoured, Armoured
C
Infantry, Mechanized and Light Protected Mobility (PM) Infantry and Light Infantry
units.
N
c. ISTAR Group. The battlegroup’s primary reconnaissance asset is its Close

U
Reconnaissance Platoon/Troop, however this will often be reinforced by elements of

the anti-tank platoon and snipers, Fire Support Teams (FST), engineer
reconnaissance, technical ISTAR systems such as LEWT, LCMR and Unmanned
Aerial Systems (UAS). See Chapter 3 for further details on the employment of the
ISTAR Group.
d. Support Platoons. Infantry battalions have a number of specialist platoons

including the Mortar Platoon, Anti-tank Platoon, Sniper Platoon and Assault Pioneer
Platoon; Light Role battalions also have a Machine Gun platoon. The battlegroup
commander may choose to group some of these assets into Fire Support Groups
(FSG). Armoured battlegroups do not possess an organic fire support squadron.
1-11
CONTENTS
e. Offensive Support. Offensive support is provided through the provision of an

Artillery Tactical Group (Tac Gp), consisting of a BC, a Joint Fires Cell (JFC), a
Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) and a number of Fire Support Teams (FST) into
which Forward Observation Officers (FOO), Forward Air Controllers (FAC) and
Mortar Fire Controllers (MFC) will be integrated.
f. Manoeuvre Support. At battlegroup level, manoeuvre support is provided by

elements from the Close Support Engineer Squadron’s Field Troop or Armoured
Troop. These assets will be task organised for a specific mission and assigned to the
battlegroup by the brigade headquarters.
g. Intelligence Support. The battlegroup is likely to get a Battlegroup Intelligence

Support Section (BGISS) of Int Corps personnel to reinforce battlegroup
headquarters.
PY
h. Aviation. An aviation sub-unit may be made available to the battlegroup for
specific missions. In these circumstances the battlegroup is likely to receive an Avn
O
LO who will advise the commander on aviation matters.
C
i. Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and Electronic Warfare (EW). The
battlegroup is likely to be supported by a UAS troop which provides a number of
ED
MUAS detachments. In addition the battlegroup may be supported by a Light
Electronic Warfare Team (LEWT). Both of these capabilities are likely to be grouped
within the ISTAR Group.
LL
j. Close Air Defence (CAD). Depending on the situation, the battlegroup may be
assigned a CAD troop equipped with HVM.
O
k. Logistics. Integral logistics are delivered by HQ Company/Squadron

TR
consisting of A1, A2 and B echelons, the Light Aid Detachment (LAD) and Unit Aid
Post (UAP). Task organised sub-units will also bring a slice of their logistic support
(i.e. CRARRV).
N
l. Brigade Support. Additional logistic elements may be provided from the

O
parent brigade, usually comprising:

C
(1) A Medical Troop from the Medical Regiment, which together with the Unit
Aid Post (UAP), forms the battlegroup's Medical Group.
N
(2) Forward Repair Teams (FRT) from the brigade Equipment Support (ES)
U
Battalion, to reinforce the battlegroup LAD.
28. Outline BG Structures – Army 2020. Battlegroups are tasked organised for
operations and thus are not fixed. However below are some examples of generic
battlegroup structures.
1-12
CONTENTS
PY
O
C
Fig 1-3 - An Example of an Armoured Infantry Battlegroup
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
N
Fig 1-3a - An Example of an Armoured Battlegroup

U
1-13
CONTENTS
PY
O
C
Fig 1-4 - A Light Infantry Battalion
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
N
U
Fig 1-5 - An Air Manoeuvre Infantry Battalion
29-30. Reserved
PART 3 – ROLES AND TASKS OF THE COMBAT ARMS
GROUND MOUNTED RECONNAISSANCE
31. Ground Mounted Reconnaissance (GMR) offers a persistent, all weather

reconnaissance capability with a range of protection. It is most effective when integrated
with technical ISTAR platforms into the battlegroup STAP. In addition to its primary role of
1-14
CONTENTS
acquiring information, its tasks may include the screening and masking of own forces,
support to a guard force and providing a guiding and controlling function for the movement
of a unit as it manoeuvres.
a. Armoured Cavalry (Armd Cav). Armd Cav battlegroups are FIND,

UNDERSTAND and EXPLOIT assets that are able to fight for information, in
extremis, if required. Armd Cav Recce squadrons may be required to battlegroup
with other elements of the Armd Inf Brigade, and to operate in the Formation
Reconnaissance role at brigade, division or corps level. They are often used to
perform enabling tasks such as Flank Protection and Route Selection. Further
details can be found at Annex A
b. Light Cavalry. Light Cavalry will normally be grouped with Light Role Infantry
battalions in the Adaptable Force (AF) but could just as easily be included in RF
PY
formations. Their principal role will be light reconnaissance in support of the AF
battlegroup. This will include close support, manoeuvre and firepower support
including Mounted Close Combat (MCC). Due to their limited protection compared to
O
Armoured Cavalry, Light Cavalry predominantly conduct recce by stealth, but are
able to employ vehicle-mounted weapons systems in MCC against lighter forces.
C
Further details can be found in Annex B.
ARMOUR
ED
32. The primary role of armour is close combat in conjunction with the infantry. Armour
will deliver the infantry to the objective through a tactically appropriate blend of
LL
Manoeuvre, Firepower and Protection; optimised for high-tempo mobile operations and it
has the lethality to deal with a wide array of targets. To enable this, Armour must be
O
appropriately task organised to maximise their provision of:

TR
a. Close Combat in Conjunction with Infantry. The presence of MBTs adds

momentum and significantly enhances direct precision firepower therefore securing
the initiative with the benefit of a reduction in casualties. Close combat in conjunction
with infantry requires flexible task organisation and small groupings (minimum of a
N
pair of MBT) to meet the specific mission requirement. Tanks co-operating with
O
infantry on the objective are said to be in ‘Intimate Support.’

C
b. Shock Action. Shock action is the sudden, concentrated application of

violence. It is the combined effect of surprise, mobility and firepower concentrated in
N
time and space. By attacking in strength at a weak spot at an unexpected moment

and from an unexpected direction, an armoured force can destroy large numbers of
U
the enemy. Shock action can paralyse the enemy, helping to seize the initiative.
Shock action can be particularly effective if it can be achieved at night or at a place
that the enemy thinks is secure. Like surprise, the effects of shock action may be
transient and local. It should be exploited vigorously.
c. Aggressive Mobile Action to Destroy Enemy Armour. The tank’s mobility,

survivability, durability and flexibility combined with the firepower to destroy enemy
armour accurately whilst on the move, gives it the leading role in the destruction of
enemy AFVs (and strong points) during the advance and withdrawal. Above
battlegroup level the use of armour in this role is being supplemented by the use of
attack helicopters. Tanks provide the mobile element of the anti-armour plan in
1-15
CONTENTS
defence and should be concentrated and used offensively in support of the positional
element.
d Surveillance, Target Acquisition & Reconnaissance (STAR). The sighting

systems on armoured vehicles provide a protected, constant and all-weather STAR
capability, including thermal imaging and elevated fields of view.
e. Exploitation. Armour, along with armoured infantry, is particularly useful for

rapid exploitation into the enemy’s depth, exploiting a combination of mobility,
firepower and shock action.
INFANTRY
33. The primary role of the infantry is to close with the enemy and bring about his defeat.
PY
The infantry is the primary ground holding arm.
a. Armoured Infantry (Armd Inf). The manoeuvrability and protection of a
O
Warrior IFV provides a high degree of protection for the infantryman in the close fire
zone. It enables the infantry to conduct high tempo manoeuvre in conjunction with
C
armour. Although Warrior can provide a viable close/intimate support platform it
requires protecting by dismounted infantry especially in close terrain.
ED
b. Mechanized Infantry (Mech Inf). Mechanized battalions may fight in concert
with armoured force elements by providing a pivot around which they can
manoeuvre. Mech Infantry vehicles are not fighting vehicles and should not be
LL
involved in high intensity close combat against a well equipped adversary. Mech
Infantry is often used to protect logistic/medical routes in offensive operations;
O
provide additional infantry mass, force protection and CPERS duties. Further details
can be found at Annex C.
TR
c. Light Protected Mobility (PM). Lt PM infantry are equipped and structured to

be optimised for low to medium intensity stability operations, most probably in peace
support or intervention operations requiring a lighter logistic footprint or a lower profile
N
in a more permissive threat environment. In MCO, Lt PM battalions will be

O
predominantly employed in lines of communication operations, supporting ground-

holding light infantry units and partnering indigenous forces. Lt PM could also be
C
battle grouped with Lt Cavalry and Lt Infantry as part of light combined arms
groupings. Further details can be found in Annex D.
N
d. Light Infantry. Light Infantry battalions are the most agile of infantry
U
organisations. They are suitable for rapid deployment to achieve a strategic effect in
a range of roles and operational scenarios. Lightly protected and armed, Light
Infantry are ideally suited to clearing close terrain in advance of Armour/Armd Inf,
holding ground, conducting framework operations, and partnering indigenous forces.
They can also be configured to conduct air manoeuvre operations. Further details
can be found in Annex E.
e. Air Manoeuvre Infantry. Air Manoeuvre Infantry are equipped with light
weapons and vehicles and are optimised for parachute or air manoeuvre operations.
They are especially suitable for rapid deployment over tactical and strategic
distances.
1-16
CONTENTS
f. Amphibious Forces. Amphibious forces are optimised for amphibious

operations and littoral manoeuvre and therefore ideally suited for strategic reach.
Once deployed in theatre Amphibious forces are ideally configured to conduct
operations as Light Role infantry.
34. Tasks. Key tasks for the employment of infantry include:
a. Find. Infantry collects information on adversaries, the human terrain, and the
environment through ground recce, particularly by its close recce platoon, which
provides a persistent, all weather but limited capability. This is supplemented by STA
devices within the rifle companies and support platoons. It is not unusual to group
additional assets such as Javelin, EW, UAS and Fire Support Teams (FST) to form
an ISTAR group.
PY
b. Fix. Infantry fixes the enemy by denying him freedom of manoeuvre, whether
by seizing terrain, manoeuvre or through deception operations, supported by a
battalion’s direct and indirect fire weapon systems.
O
c. Strike. All infantry units strike the enemy through close, usually dismounted,
C
combat. Armd Inf provides intimate support where possible; Warrior Infantry Fighting
Vehicles (IFV) provide significant firepower, mobility and protection although their
ED
capabilities are limited in complex terrain. The infantry battalion is organised to
deliver small scale area suppression with its organic mortar platoon and accurate fire
from direct fire weapons such as Javelin, HMG, GMG, GPMG, and sniper and
sharpshooter rifles.
LL
d. Exploit. Infantry is able to exploit fleeting opportunities, particularly in complex

O
terrain where armoured vehicles are restricted, although the dismounted soldier has
limited reach. Combined arms groupings are more effective in exploiting a situation,
TR
especially when capabilities are layered across an area.
INFANTRY SUPPORT PLATOONS

N
35. Infantry battalions are structured with an support company to provide intimate support
O
to manoeuvre during tactical actions. The support company consists of a number of

platoons, each being able to deliver a discrete capability at the appropriate moment.
C
Constituent support platoons can be summarised as follows:

N
a. Mortar Platoon. The aim of mortar fire is to support friendly forces by killing,
neutralising or suppressing the enemy and denying him the use of ground. The
U
81mm medium mortar can fire HE, smoke and illumination ammunition. OC Mortars
works closely with the BC to integrate mortar fire into the fire plan. MFCs control the
fire of the mortar sections and also conduct surveillance and target acquisition as part
of a FST, in accordance with the battlegroup Surveillance and Target Acquisition
Plan (STAP)11.
b. Anti Tank Platoon. The role of the Javelin equipped anti tank platoon is the
destruction of enemy armour and other high priority targets. A secondary role is
______________________
11
Detailed information on the deployment and operation of the mortar platoon may be found in CD Combat DCC Doctrine Volume II –
Tactical Employment of IWS – The Medium Mortar – 81mm L16 – 2001.
1-17
CONTENTS
surveillance. The anti tank platoon commander is a key member of the battlegroup
headquarters planning staff. For particular actions, the battlegroup commander may:
(1) Employ the platoon intact.
(2) Split the platoon to work with a maximum of three company groups.
(3) Split the platoon with elements, or all of it, working as part of the ISTAR
group.
c. Machine Gun Platoon. The Light Role Infantry have a machine gun platoon
integral to each Rifle Company whose role is to provide anti-personnel direct fire
support.
PY
d. Sniper Platoon. The role of the sniper is to locate, observe and destroy key
enemy personnel and equipment, with indirect and direct precision fire. As well as
target engagement, the sniper platoon forms a key element of the battlegroup ISTAR
O
effort12.
C
e. Assault Pioneer Platoon. The Assault Pioneer platoon can offer organic
manoeuvre support, counter mobility and basic infrastructure support to the
ED
battlegroup, including obstacle breaching, demolitions, simple field defences and
basic construction.
f. Close Reconnaissance Platoon. The Close Reconnaissance Platoon/Troop

LL
is present in both infantry and armoured battlegroups and is distinct from the
operational reconnaissance capabilities provided by Armoured and Light Cavalry. Its
O
role is to find the enemy and provide accurate, timely information, by day or night, in
all weathers and in all phases of war. The platoon commander also plays a key role
TR
in battlegroup planning. Depending on the task, the reconnaissance platoon/troop

may be reinforced with armour, an FST, engineer reconnaissance, or aviation. In
such circumstances this grouping is known as the ISTAR Group and may be
commanded by a nominated sub-unit commander. Key close reconnaissance tasks
N
include:
O
(1) Locating and reporting of enemy defences.

C
(2) The provision of a screen to the front/flanks.

N
(3) Find, select and report routes for infantry, armour in the advance.
U
(4) Provision of guides and markers to confirm routes into RVs, FUPs, Fire
Support positions.
(5) The establishment of mounted/dismounted Observation Posts (OP).
(6) Target acquisition and control of indirect fire.
______________________
12
Detailed information on the deployment and operation of the mortar platoon may be found in CD Combat DCC Doctrine Volume II –
Tactical Employment of IWS – Snipers – 2011.
1-18
CONTENTS
(7) Participation in a guard force usually in conjunction with armour, FSG and
FSTs.
(8) Find and report locations for assembly areas, FUPs, fire support positions,
routes, etc. during the advance to contact and the hasty/deliberate attack.
(9) Conduct CBRN recce and survey.
(10) Liaison, manning of coordination and contact points, as well as

communications tasks.
(11) Rear area security.
36. Battlegroups may wish to task organise their support assets into Fire Support Groups
PY
to reinforce one or more manoeuvre units directly should the situation require it.
37-39. Reserved.
O
PART 4 - THE ROLES AND TASKS OF COMBAT SUPPORT ARMS
C
ARTILLERY ED
40. Artillery is a major component of the battlegroup’s firepower with a 24 hour all
weather capability. The primary role of artillery is to destroy, neutralise, suppress and
demoralise the enemy, using concentrated indirect fire from widely dispersed positions, as
LL
part of the combined arms battle. Artillery can deliver area suppressive fires and precision
fires. The ‘Artillery System’ consists of five elements:
O
a. A family of Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA) systems.

TR
b. CIS.
c. Weapon platforms (guns and rocket launchers).

N
O
d. Ammunition – the weapon.

C
e. Ammunition resupply system.

N
41. Close Support (CS) Artillery. Provides the firepower to enable our own forces to
manoeuvre and to prevent the enemy from manoeuvring. Command of artillery is
U
exercised at the highest level, while its control is delegated to the lowest practical level.
CS artillery regiments deploy in two groups:
(1) The Artillery Tactical Group (Tac Gp). At battlegroup level the Tac Gp
consists of the Battery Commander (BC) and his Joint Fires Cell (JFC), along
with a number of Fire Support Teams (FST). The Tac Gp, augmented by a
TACP, provides specialist communications and is responsible for integrating
and coordinating offensive support and joint fires capabilities allocated to the
battlegroup. The FSTs are a combined grouping of artillery, infantry and other
arm specialists able to coordinate and integrate the most appropriate mix of
fires (artillery, rockets, mortars, air delivered munitions, AH etc) required by the
1-19
CONTENTS
battlegroup Fire Plan. They also play a key part in surveillance and target
acquisition as part of the battlegroup’s overall STA Plan. A FST comprises:
(a) FST Commander (Capt).
(b) Artillery Controller (Bdr).
(c) Forward Air Controller Cpl/Bdr – Sgt).
(d) Mortar Fire Controller (Cpl/Sgt).
(e) OPA Signaller (LBdr).
(f) 2 x OPA Sig (Gnr/LBdr).
PY
a. The Artillery Gun Group. The gun group comprises a Fire Direction Centre
(FDC), an unspecified number of artillery batteries and an Ammunition Control Point
O
(ACP). It is rarely placed under command of a battlegroup. More normally the Gun
Group is controlled at a higher level and allocated to the battlegroup for a given
C
period depending on the tactical situation. Artillery systems available to the
battlegroup include: ED
(1) Guns (AS90/Lt Gun).
(2) Rocket launchers (GMLRS/Exactor).

LL
(3) Naval Gunfire Support (NGS).

O
42. Tasks. Typical artillery tasks may be summarised as follows:

TR
a. Destruction: Such fires permanently render targets out of action. Destruction

generally requires the expenditure of large quantities of ammunition unless precision
fires are used.
N
O
b. Attrition: The reduction of the effectiveness of a force caused by the physical

loss of personnel and materiel (does not refer to an attritional style of warfare).
C
c. Neutralisation: Covers a wide spectrum of lethal and non lethal fires.

N
Neutralisation is designed to disrupt the enemy and prevent him from achieving his
intent i.e. fix him.
U
d. Harassing Fire. Designed to disturb enemy troops, curtail movement and

lower morale.
e. Suppression. Degrades enemy performance below the level needed for him to
achieve his mission. The effects last as long as the fire continues.
f. Additional Utility. Artillery can blind or screen using smoke (or illumination
against NVD), assist target acquisition with illumination and may also add weight or
credibility to a deception plan.
1-20
CONTENTS
43. Fire Planning. A fire plan coordinates the fires in support of a unit or formation
operation. At battlegroup level, the BC is responsible for the detailed planning and
implementation of any fire plan. The BC must have a sound understanding of the
battlegroup commander’s scheme of manoeuvre and offensive support (OS) /Joint Fires
requirements. At sub-unit level, the FST commander is responsible for the coordination of
fire support. The FST commander will also have a key role to play in the battlegroup
STAP. Key principles of fire planning are:
a. Concentration of Fire: Fire should be concentrated in accordance with the

battlegroup commander’s priorities. Concentration of fires is more easily achieved
when tactical actions are sequenced, but this is at the expense of simultaneity.
b. Flexibility. A plan may require modification during its implementation. The

battery commander must ensure that the fire of a ‘superimposed’ force element is
PY
available to engage unforeseen targets.
c. Simplicity. Simple fire plans are easier to modify and less susceptible to error.
O
d. Surprise. Adjustment of targets may compromise surprise, though this must be
C
balanced against the guarantee of accuracy.
e.
ED
Cooperation. Success depends on the cooperation of all arms and the
coordination of all weapon systems.
44. Reserved.
LL
GROUND BASED AIR DEFENCE (GBAD)

O
45. The battlegroup may be allocated an Air Defence Troop, depending on the
TR
operational scenario, equipped with the High Velocity Missile (HVM) system. The primary
role of AD is to nullify or minimise the effectiveness of hostile air action to friendly
manoeuvre forces. The system is optimised to counter an AH threat, but has limited
capability against fast jet and UAS. Fast jets can only realistically be engaged head-on
N
and UAS may often fly above the effective height of an HVM missile.
O
46. Tasks. Key AD tasks include:

C
a. Vital Point (VP) Defence. Such as command/control facilities, reserve

N
demolitions and concentrated sub-unit locations.

U
b. Route Defence. Main Supply Routes (MSR) and routes to a Line of Departure
(LD).
c. Limited Area Defence. Such as the defence of manoeuvre units, Forward

Operating Bases (FOB) and Drop Zones (DZ).
47. Command and Control. HVM is usually commanded at the highest practical level.
Control at battlegroup level is exercised through the Tac Gp, consisting of a troop
commander and his troop Command Post (CP), normally located at battlegroup
headquarters. Further details can be found at Annex F
1-21
CONTENTS
Engineers
48. The role of the engineers is to provide manoeuvre and survivability support, as well
as general engineering support to the battlegroup commander. The engineer task
organisation at battlegroup level may include the following:
a. Armoured Engineers. Equipped with Trojan (obstacle breaching), Titan

(bridge laying) and Terrier (Combat Engineer Tractor).
b. Field Engineers. Carrying out dismounted engineer tasks, supported by

specialist equipment including Terrier.
c. Engineer Recce. Often task organised with battlegroup Close Recce

Platoon/Troop.
PY
d. Explosive Ordnance Disposal & Search (EOD&S). Counters the Explosive
Ordnance Threat (footnote) through specialist search and route/area clearance,
O
rendering safe and exploitation of weapons intelligence.
C
e. Amphibious Engineers. Provide a wet gap bridging and ferrying capability
using the M3 motorised pontoon. ED
f. Geographic Support. It is likely that battlegroup headquarters will receive
dedicated support depending on the operation. This will include the provision of
geospatial advice, data collection, support to terrain analysis during the Intelligence
LL
Preparation of the Environment (IPE) process, and geographic products.

O
g. Specialist Team Royal Engineers (STRE). Where required the battlegroup

headquarters will received support from the STRE. This capability allows focussed
TR
planning dealing with critical infrastructure assessment within the urban environment
and specific infrastructure targeting advice.
49. Tasks. Likely tasks include:

N
O
a. Engineer Information and Reconnaissance. Analysis of engineer-related

information, available from open sources or collected by All Arms and RE assets, is
C
required as part of the planning process, particularly during IPE.

N
b. Mobility. Mobility support enables the force to manoeuvre on the battlefield

(e.g. breaching obstacles) and move around the AO (e.g. maintaining MSRs). It
U
includes Route Proving and Clearance (RP&C) and countering Improvised Explosive
Devices (C-IED). Engineers can conduct demolitions, explosive clearance and
explosive method of entry.
c. Counter-Mobility. Counter-mobility involves denial of manoeuvre and

movement to an adversary or channelling (by enhancing man-made and natural
terrain with obstacles) to shape the battlespace. This provides depth and freedom of
manoeuvre for friendly forces, while turning, disrupting, fixing and blocking the
adversary. The UK no longer has any mines in service to support counter mobility,
which must now be achieved by the time consuming construction of anti-vehicle
ditches or the combined use of plant and explosives, particularly in urban or wooded
environments.
1-22
CONTENTS
d. Survivability. Survivability includes all aspects of protecting personnel,

weapons and materiel from enemy weapons (e.g. hard cover), enemy STA (e.g.
cover from view) and environmental conditions. It may also include the delivery of
deception measures. While all elements of the force are responsible for their own
basic survivability, engineers can enhance unit survivability, for example by using
plant to build protective structures, field fortifications or drainage.
e. Infrastructure. Engineers may be involved in the provision, repair and

maintenance of infrastructure such as roads, ports and airheads, utilities and
essential services, buildings, operational and tactical infrastructure, protective works
as well as post conflict reconstruction and development.
f. Explosive Ordnance Disposal & Search (EOD&S). EOD&S counters the EO
PY
threat through command, control, recce, location, access, route clearance,
identification, on-site evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, intelligence exploitation,
disposal, site restoration and analysis of enemy capability to develop battlegroup
O
SOPs/TTPs.
C
g. Geo Support. Geo support includes the provision of geospatial information and
geographic products, data collection and terrain analysis during Intelligence
ED
Preparation of the Environment (IPE).
50. Principles of Employment. The following principles apply to the employment of

close support engineer assets:
LL
a. Foresight. The early involvement of engineer advisers in planning. This will

O
likely involve the engineer squadron commander and the Battlegroup Engineer
(BGE).
TR
b. Reconnaissance. Usually placed with close reconnaissance. Engineer recce

must always check a crossing or breaching site prior to the commitment of specialist
equipment.
N
O
c. Coordination. Coordination of Engineer tasks will be conducted at battlegroup

headquarters level involving the CS engineer squadron commander and the BGE.
C
d. Priorities. Engineer tasking must be prioritised in line with the operational

N
effect required.
U
e. Protection. Troops from the battlegroup should protect engineers while they
work, otherwise work rates will be drastically cut.
f. Economy of Use. It is usually more efficient to enhance existing natural or

man made obstacles than construct new ones.
g. Concentration. Engineers should seldom be split below troop level.
h. Infantry Role. Although a field troop’s secondary role is to fight as infantry,

they should be so tasked only as a last resort.
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CONTENTS
i. Time to Prepare. Some engineer equipment takes time to prepare, therefore

timely warning orders and hide selection close to the work site are essential.
j. Concealment. Engineer equipment is specialised and can compromise future

plans if seen. Close hides must provide suitable concealment.
51. Command and Control. The level of engineer support allocated to a battlegroup will
depend on the type and extent of engineer tasks. The two key engineers at battlegroup
level are the CS engineer squadron commander and the BGE.
a. Engineer Squadron Commander. If more than one engineer troop is under

TACOM of a battlegroup, a squadron commander may be appointed to exercise
command, particularly if the battlegroup is on the brigade Main Effort (ME), or if it is
conducting a task requiring increased engineer effort.
PY
b. BG Engineer (BGE). The BGE will be permanently OPCOM the battlegroup.
The BGE acts as the engineer advisor to the battlegroup commander and is LO to
O
the close support engineer regiment CO. The BGE will control the BGE party which
will consist of the BGE, EOD&S Coordinator (SO3 EOD&S), Senior Ammunition
C
Technical Officer (SAT) and a Royal Engineers Search Advisor (RESA). Where
operational imperative requires this party will grow to include Geo capability and
ED
STRE elements. Key tasks include:
(1) Keeping the brigade engineer operations cell informed of likely engineer
tactical developments.
LL
(2) Anticipating the battlegroup’s engineer requirements.

O
(3) Bidding for engineer resources.

TR
(4) Coordinating the regrouping of engineer assets to and from the

battlegroup.
N
(5) Technical, safety assurance and referral chain of command for EOD&S
O
tasks.
C
(6) Relaying information from engineer recce.

N
(7) Responsibility for terrain analysis and engineer subject matter expertise as
part of battlegroup planning.
U
c. Location. The BGE is normally found at Main HQ, though he should be

prepared to accompany the battlegroup commander if he deploys in Tac HQ. If an
CS Engineer Squadron Commander is present he is more likely to accompany the
battlegroup commander, whilst the BGE remains in Main HQ.
INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR) BRIGADE
52. The ISR Brigade will operate at the formation level and will provide a number of
specialist capabilities. This will include reach back to the Land Intelligence Fusion Cell
(LIFC) and the Defence Cultural Support Unit (DCSU). Depending on the mission, the ISR
1-24
CONTENTS
Brigade may task organise additional ISTAR elements to battlegroups. These might
include:
a. Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). The allocation of Tactical UAS (TUAS)

and Mini UAS (MUAS) task lines can considerably enhance a battlegroup’s STAP
through the provision of additional IMINT (mostly Full Motion Video) which can be
used to support ground manoeuvre, intelligence development and targeting or Force
Protection. A battlegroup is likely to be allocated a TUAS Tac Party to provide advice
to the commander and allow direct feeds from TUAS and other ISR platforms into
battlegroup headquarters. Further details of MUAS are at Annex G.
b. Electronic Warfare and Signals Intelligence (EWSI). EWSI has the capacity
to provide emission location and message content, given the appropriate level of
equipment and personnel, including interpreters. Single sensors in static locations
PY
are capable of providing a Line of Bearing (LoB) to emissions. Multiple static sensors
or highly mobile sensors (i.e. vehicle/airborne) can provide multiple LoB in order to
achieve a position fix. EWSI collection is passive. Targets must (generally) transmit
O
in order to be located, and range of detection is directly related to the power of the
transmission. Electronic Attack (EA) by air or ground means can be used to deny or
C
disrupt enemy communications to aid interception or achieve disruption effect. EA is
typically coordinated above battlegroup level to avoid fratricide. At brigade level, the
ED
command and tasking of EW assets will be conducted from within the Brigade EW
Co-ordination Cell (BEWCC). Battlegroups are likely to be given an EW detachment
comprising a number of LEWTs which will provide the battlegroup with its own EW
capability. LEWTs are normally integrated into the Technical ISTAR Group of the BG
LL
ISTAR company group. Further details can be found at Annex H.

O
c STA Battery. The STA Battery can provide both Base ISTAR (B-ISTAR) and
Weapon Locating but not at the same time. B-ISTAR consists of mast or aerostat
TR
mounted cameras such as Clambake or Dewdrop along with an operating team. B-

ISTAR can provide point or area coverage of NAI/TAI using EO/TI. Weapon Locating
comprises MAMBA weapon locating radar, Advanced Sound Ranging Programme
(ASP) and AN/TPQ-48 Light Counter Mortar Radar (LCMR). In addition 4/73 Battery
N
can provide specialist STA Patrols, usually 6 man, for static covert surveillance.
O
d. Human Terrain Analysis. Both cultural specialists and human terrain analysts
C
may be provided to battlegroups to support their wider understanding of the

environment.
N
e. Battlegroup Intelligence Support Section (BGISS). Each battlegroup

U
Intelligence Cell is likely to be reinforced with a detachment of Int Corps personnel to

provide resilience and mass to the intelligence analysis process.
NTISR
53. The term Non-Traditional Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, typically

refers to airborne sensors being employed to conduct an ISR task for which it was not
designed i.e. using the Litening 3 targeting pod on a Tornado GR4 to provide Full Motion
Video (FMV) for a ground unit via a Remote Viewing Terminal (RVT).
54. Weapon Locating (WL) Artillery. The function of WL artillery is to enable own
forces manoeuvre through the timely suppression, neutralisation or destruction of
1-25
CONTENTS
adversary indirect fire systems while ensuring the survival of our own. Whether acoustic
weapon locating or Weapon Locating Radar (WLR), the primary tasks of all WL sensors
are: determining Point of Origin (PoO) of hostile indirect fire; providing early warning of
incoming indirect fire to friendly forces (through Sense and Warn capability); assisting in
the adjustment of friendly indirect fire; and cuing other ISTAR assets.
55. Counter CBRN (C-CBRN) Reconnaissance. Detection of CBRN hazards

encompasses the employment of three techniques: reconnaissance, survey and
surveillance, which can be conducted against area or point targets. Generalist units (such
as battlegroup Close Reconnaissance platoons/troops), can perform C-CBRN
reconnaissance by conducting operations to confirm or deny the presence of
contamination. Specialist CBRN units can provide presumptive identification of an agent.
Once contamination is detected, survey techniques determine the area of contamination
and therefore the potential impact on operations. Surveillance is a systematic method of
PY
monitoring areas for potential contamination. These techniques can utilise both surface
and air assets.
O
CIS
C
56. Rear Link Detachment. Each battlegroup will include a Royal Signals Rear Link
Detachment (RLD) which provides the CIS links to the higher formation or in certain cases,
ED
the strategic CIS back to the UK.
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

LL
57. Combat Service Support (CSS). Battlegroup CSS, including specialist CSS relating
to combat support force elements, is covered in Chapter 6 ‘Sustaining Battlegroup
O
Operations’.
TR
58-59. Reserved.
PART 5 - THE ROLES AND TASKS OF JOINT EFFECTS

N
AIR LAND INTEGRATION

O
60. Air Land Integration (ALI). ALI seeks to achieve joint effects within the battlespace
C
through the coordination of air and land capabilities. The closer that coordination comes to
real time temporal and spatial control, the more demanding and resource intensive those
N
procedures will become. Coordination requires forces to plan and act together to achieve
shared objectives. It prevents fratricide and duplication, and ensures that effects
U
complement each other. The degree of coordination and integration required is defined by
the level of activity being conducted.
a. Independent Activity. The simplest way to integrate the use of air and land
within the same AO is to separate them in time and/or space. Sequencing activity, to
make sure that each action is completed and all assets are clear of a given volume of
battlespace before the next action begins, or physically separating activities, will
maximise the freedom of action of each asset and minimise the risk of fratricide.
However, the level of integration achieved is limited, there is little or no synergy and
concentration of force is minimal.
1-26
CONTENTS
b. Synchronised Activity. Synchronised activities are conducted simultaneously

(or as nearly so as possible), thus focussing resources and combat power at the
decisive moment, although they will still be separated in space. Synchronisation is
produced by detailed planning and centralised coordination during execution. The
separation is planned to be sufficient to achieve maximum freedom of action within
an allocated volume of battlespace and to minimise the risk of fratricide. During
execution good communications are essential to ensure simultaneity, since friction
will inevitably affect planned time schedules.
c. Integrated Activity. Integrated activity requires that actions are focussed in

both time and space. It requires synergy and simultaneity from all of the force
elements which are being integrated. Integrated activity is at the opposite end of the
range from independent activity. It requires a complete state of mutual awareness
and understanding between two or more elements of a force such that they can
PY
conduct simultaneous activity with impunity in the same portion of battlespace. It
typically requires fast and precise planning, with real time communications and
liaison.
O
AIR
C
61. Close Air Support (CAS). CAS is used against hostile targets in close proximity to
ED
friendly forces and requires detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and
movement of those ground forces. CAS missions are flown in direct support of ground
forces, in offensive and defensive operations, to destroy, disrupt, suppress, fix or delay
enemy forces in close proximity to friendly forces. They can also provide a show of force.
LL
The two key parts of the CAS definition are close proximity and detailed integration. The
term ‘close’ does not imply a specific distance; rather it is situational. To succeed, detailed
O
integration is required between each air mission and the fire and movement of surface
forces to maximise mission effectiveness and minimise the risk of fratricide. Control of
TR
CAS is performed by a qualified Forward Air Controller (FAC)13 in support of ground

forces. Joint Fires Integration (JFI) describes the integration with manoeuvre elements,
but also that of Close Air Support (CAS), Close Combat Attack (CCA), UAS, STA and
Surface-to-Surface artillery. CAS can be provided by any aircraft capable of dropping a
N
bomb or firing a gun, and in many operational cases will be provided by coalition partners
O
(further details are contained within AJP 3.3.2).

C
a. Close Proximity. Close proximity refers to the distance within which some
form of terminal attack control is required for targeting direction and fratricide
N
prevention.
U
b. Detailed Integration. CAS requires detailed integration with the fire and
manoeuvre of land forces for targeting guidance and to avoid fratricide. Coordination
and integration is the responsibility of ground-based forward air controllers but the
ground commander retains the responsibility for the use of CAS.
AVIATION
62. The function of aviation (Attack Helicopter and Support Helicopter) is to conduct
integrated operations as part of land manoeuvre within the brigade/formation commander’s
concept of operations. Further details of the employment of AH can be found at Annex I.
______________________
13
Also known as a Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) in some nations (AAP-6).
1-27
CONTENTS
63. Tasks. Key tasks include:
a. Find. Aviation can conduct Information, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

(ISR) operations as part of a planned matrix of all arms sensors, even in relatively
hostile environments. Attack Helicopters (AH) and Light Utility Helicopters (LUH) can
be used to integrate with other capabilities such as UAS and ground based manned
reconnaissance. LUH can also provide a command platform, although duration will
be limited by the requirement to move off station in order to refuel.
b. Fix. AH can use its firepower, or the threat of its firepower to fix the enemy
prior to a strike by another force element. Support Helicopters (SH) enable the
battlegroup to extend its reach and manoeuvre in depth or to the flanks of an enemy
position or force in order to deny the enemy freedom of manoeuvre, by for example
PY
positioning fire support or cordon positions.
c. Strike. Offensive tactical actions may seek to employ the strike capability that
O
AH is able to deliver, in order to respond swiftly once targets are identified and
confirmed, achieve surprise and maximise the destruction of the enemy. Strike
C
includes the ability to control and direct the fire of artillery and the fire of other indirect
systems. ED
d. Exploit. The speed and manoeuvrability of AH makes it a useful means of
exploitation, for example pursuing or ambushing an enemy force. Equally a Quick
Reaction Force (QRF) organised with SH can be a very effective means of enabling
LL
the battlegroup commander to manoeuvre forces to exploit gaps or discrete target

opportunities presented by an enemy force during offensive and defensive
O
operations.
TR
64. Air Manoeuvre Planning, Training and Advisory Team (AMPTAT). The AMPTAT
will normally be provided at brigade level but may be made available to assist the
battlegroup staff in the planning and execution of support and attack helicopter operations.
N
65. Mobile Air Operations Team (MAOT). The MAOT will normally be provided at
O
brigade level but may be made available to assist the battlegroup staff in the planning and
execution of air transport and support helicopter operations.
C
SPECIAL FORCES (SF)

N
66. SF constitute a further component operating in the land environment. SF, often
U
alongside coalition special operations forces, will frequently operate in close proximity to,
and in cooperation with battlegroups. SF are a scarce and valuable resource, and are
employed for strategic effect; commanded at the highest appropriate level; committed in a
timely manner; given access to the highest levels of intelligence and subject to high levels
of operational security. SF can be deployed within a battlegroup AO in order to support
campaign or tactical objectives. In such cases considerations will include:
a. Clarity of C2 , who is supporting and who is being supported by whom.
b. Battle management and de-confliction or integration of SF and battlegroup

operations by time and space.
1-28
CONTENTS
c. OPSEC and controlled or compartmentalised access to intelligence, targeting

and planning information.
d. Integration of SF effects within the battlegroup manoeuvre or information

operations plan.
f Interoperability of equipment, particularly communications equipment.
g. Real life and logistic support requirements.
h. Readiness, orders and rehearsals for reserves.
e. Exploitation opportunities.
PY
f. Consequence Management CONPLANS.
NON-UK FORCES
O
67. There may be times that a UK battlegroup has to work alongside or even take under
C
command non-UK forces. In order to achieve the maximum effectiveness of these troops
there are a number of steps that the battlegroup commander can take. These include:
ED
a. Meet the commander and introduce him to the battlegroup staff and his
counterparts where possible.
LL
b. Gain an understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the troops. This

might be understanding their ROE, national caveats or simply the ranges and
O
capabilities of their weapons systems.

TR
c. Assist Interoperability such as radio frequencies (and compatibility) , exchange

LOs where appropriate, ensure the unit is given a regrouping pack including the CEI,
ensure it understands the FSCM and other tactical control measure and that its
logistics can cope with the demands of the forthcoming operation.
N
O
d. Ensure that the unit is fully briefed on the mission and its commander included
in orders, ROC drill etc.
C
Further details on working alongside partnered forces can be found in AFM Vol 1 Part 9
N
Tactics for Stability Operations and AFM Vol 1 Part 10 Counterinsurgency.

U
Annexes:
A. Armoured Cavalry
B. Light Cavalry
C. Mechanized Infantry
D. Light Protected Mobility Infantry
E. Light Infantry
F. Considerations on the use of GBAD
G. Considerations for the use of MUAS
H. Considerations for the use of EW
I Considerations on the use of AH
1-29
CONTENTS
PY
O
C
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
N
U
CONTENTS
ANNEX A
TO CHAPTER 1
TO BG TACTICS
ARMOURED CAVALRY
References:
A. RAC Tactics The Brigade Reconnaissance Regiment May 2011.1
Role and Utility
1. Armoured Cavalry (Armd Cav) regiments equipped with CVR(T) provide the
capability to conduct aggressive reconnaissance and enabling tasks, organised as Armd
PY
Cav battlegroups or in smaller groupings in support of Armoured and Armd Inf
battlegroups. Armd Cav’s core task is conducting brigade FIND. As with any
reconnaissance, integration with other systems is critical, particularly UAS, EW, and
O
aviation. Scalability, flexibility and dispersal are also inherent to the utility of Armd Cav.
Due to its low ground pressure CVR(T) has excellent cross country performance in most
C
terrain types. CVR(T) is lightly armoured against direct and indirect fire but has enhanced
crew survivability against mines and IEDs.
2. The utility of Armd Cav is summarised below:

ED
a. Offensive Actions. Armd Cav contributes in particular to recce pull, the
LL
application of joint effects and to manoeuvre in depth. Armd Cav practises ground
mounted reconnaissance by stealth, providing a lower ground signature and less
O
logistic burden than heavy AFVs.

TR
b. Defensive Actions. Armd Cav provides depth and all round defence by
forming a covering force, often grouped with heavy AFVs and AH. It is key to the
conduct of offensive action linked to defence by cueing all arms and joint fires into TAIs.
Other tasks suited to Armd Cav mobility and flexibility include counter-descent and rear
N
area security including Lines of Communications (LoC).

O
c. Stabilising Actions. Armd Cav can provide mounted and dismounted ground
C
surveillance and reconnaissance and is ideally placed to act as the covering force
during security operations.
N
Grouping
U
3. The Armoured Cav regiment is structured around three reconnaissance squadrons,

supported by a Command and Support squadron, an HQ squadron and a regimental HQ.
Each reconnaissance squadron has three reconnaissance troops, each of four CVR(T),
and a support troop. The Command and Support squadron contains three Guided
Weapon troops (which may be task organised with the reconnaissance squadrons) and a
Surveillance troop. An Armd Cav BG usually also has an artillery Fire Planning Cell (FPC)
attached. A brigade commander may choose to group all ISTAR capabilities under the
centralised C2 of the Armd Cav BG in order to ensure a timely and well coordinated FIND.
______________________
1
Detailed TTPs for Armoured Cavalry (Armd Cavalry) are to be found in RAC Tactics The Brigade Reconnaissance Regiment May
2011 which describes the use of CVR(T) equipped recce units.
1-A-1
CONTENTS
Tactical Employment
4. Command. The Armoured Cav is optimised to command an independent

manoeuvre or ISR battlegroup but its battlegroup HQ retains the option of plugging into an
Armd Inf Bde HQ to provide an ISTAR hub.
5. Information and Intelligence. Mounted ground surveillance and reconnaissance is

the primary means by which Armd Cav collects information and generates intelligence.
Screening operations are likely to be a mix of mounted activity and dismounted
observation posts often remoted to vehicle lying up positions. Armd Cav can cover widely
dispersed NAIs with the ability to re-group, redeploy and reorganise at short notice. When
combined with UAS, EW and aviation this provides a capable mix to FIND and TRACK. As
a part of brigade FIND Armd Cav must be adept at reconnaissance handover to BG close
recce and ISTAR assets.
PY
6. Firepower. Armd Cav has sufficient organic firepower for self protection in a recce
by stealth role. However they lack organic indirect fire support and thus will be reliant
O
upon effective battlegrouping or joint support to provide fires beyond 2.5km. Armd Cav
provide a key air land fires enabler due to embedded joint fires observers in the form of
C
unit and sub-unit FAC. In terms of reconnaissance-strike this is the weapon system of
choice and is the key firepower element that Armd Cav delivers.
ED
7. Manoeuvre. The type of tasks that Armd Cav deliver for MCO are noted below:
a. Reconnaissance - screening, guarding, route recce, CBRN recce and

LL
scouting.
O
b. Offensive - raiding, counter recce and counter descent.

TR
c. Control of Movement – providing a controlling and guiding function that allows

formation staff to control units and formations during the march, approach or
advance.
N
8. Protection. CVR(T) is lightly armoured and vulnerable to accurate direct or indirect

O
fire. Survivability is enhanced by stealth, particularly through the intelligent use of terrain
and other cover. The tactical mobility of Armd Cav allows elements to disperse quickly for
C
force protection. Good situational awareness also increases force protection and
survivability by reducing the likelihood of surprise. In environments where these measures
N
cannot be adopted or for static guard tasks, Armd Cav must be augmented or battle
grouped with heavy AFVs or AH.
U
9. Sustainment. The Armd Cav echelon is structured to allow support to dispersed

operations at range. Aviation and air dropped replenishment can provide the critical
sustainment enabler if Armd Cav is to be freed from reliance on ground LoCs and allowed
to operate in a dispersed manner. The means available to support FWD MEDEVAC is of
importance and is likely to determine the range at which brigade reconnaissance
operations can be conducted. Aviation will often be the preferred method of FWD
MEDEVAC but there should be both ground and air MEDEVAC plans as SOP.
Contingency planning to provide prolonged field care must also be considered where Fwd
MEDEVAC is likely to be disrupted.
1-A-2
CONTENTS
ANNEX B
TO CHAPTER 1
TO BG TACTICS
LIGHT CAVALRY
References:
A. RAC Tactics The Brigade Reconnaissance Regiment May 20111
Role and Utility
1. The Light Cavalry (Lt Cav) is designed to provide a highly mobile ground-mounted
PY
FIND, UNDERSTAND and INFLUENCE capability. They do this by combining the
mounted reconnaissance skills of the Lt Cav crewman with combat-proven Armoured
Fighting Vehicles (Wheeled) to provide a force that can operate at reach and across a
wide range of different physical environments, and where necessary, with indigenous
O
forces. Lt Cav is organised in the Adaptable Force but also able to support Reaction Force
operations. Lt Cav is designed for employment across the spectrum of operations,
C
including: Deliberate and Focused Intervention; Stabilisation; Counter-Insurgency; and
Peace Support operations. Within these missions, Lt Cav will deliver a wide range of
ED
tactical actions including Enabling (reconnaissance, security, and link-up); Stabilising
Actions and Offensive (attack, raid, feint, demonstration).
LL
2. The Lt Cav vehicle fleet of JACKAL, COYOTE and RIDGEBACK offer excellent route
mobility with good cross country performance in most terrain types. The open top vehicles
offer good situational awareness with the ability to interact with the local population in the
O
conduct of mounted and dismounted operations. Although much more vulnerable to direct
and indirect fire than conventional AFVs they are well protected against mines and IEDs.
TR
3. The utility of Lt Cav is summarised below:

N
a. Offensive Actions. As part of battle group offensive operations Lt Cav

contribute in particular to recce pull, the application of joint effects and to manoeuvre in
O
depth. Lt Cav reconnoitre by stealth, providing a lower ground signature and less
logistic burden than conventional AFV mounted reconnaissance. Wheeled, open
C
topped vehicles are particularly suited to infiltration by night along enemy boundaries
and open flanks. As with any reconnaissance, integration with other systems is critical,
N
particularly UAS, EW, and aviation. Scalability, flexibility and dispersal are also
inherent to the organisation and equipment of Lt Cav.
U
b. Defensive Actions. In battlegroup defensive operations Lt Cav provide depth

and all round defence by forming a covering force, grouped with either other light or
heavy forces. It is also key to the conduct of offensive action linked to defence by
cueing all arms and joint fires into TAIs. As part of a delaying action Lt Cav is best
placed to exploit manoeuvre and maintain freedom of action as part of a light combined
arms grouping. Other tasks suited to Light Cav mobility and flexibility include counter-
descent and rear area security including Lines of Communications (LoC).
______________________
1
Detailed TTPs for Light (Lt) Cavalry are to be found in RAC Tactics ‘The Brigade Reconnaissance Regiment May 2011’ which
describes the use of wheeled, open top reconnaissance vehicles.
1-B-1
CONTENTS
c. Stabilising Actions. Lt Cav can provide mounted and dismounted ground

surveillance and reconnaissance and is ideally placed to act as the covering force
during security operations. Lt Cav can vary Presence, Posture and Profile as required
to improve awareness of the situation. Through mounted and dismounted patrolling it
can improve security by framework operations including VCP and route checking. Lt
Cav can also be employed for cordon operations, strike operations and convoy
protection dependant upon terrain and the threat.
Grouping
4. Grouping with other light forces including Lt Role and Lt PM infantry is likely to
provide the best matched combinations in terms of complementary mobility and lighter
logistic footprint. The most effective grouping for reconnaissance tasks is for units or sub-
PY
units to operate with UAS tactical parties, EW, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA)
patrols and aviation. Lt Cav can form a light ISTAR BG or provide ISR sub-units to other
arms BGs in order to increase the reach and flexibility of reconnaissance beyond organic
close reconnaissance platoons.
O
Tactical Employment
C
5. Command. Lt Cav is structured and resourced to deal with dispersed
ED
reconnaissance operations at range at both unit and sub-unit level. Additionally the ability
of Lt Cav to provide liaison to unit and formation HQs can provide additional support to the
execution of ISTAR.
LL
6. Information and Intelligence. Mounted and dismounted ground surveillance and

reconnaissance are the primary means by which Lt Cav collects information and generates
O
intelligence. Screening operations are likely to be a mix of mounted activity and

dismounted observation posts often remoted to vehicle lying up positions. Lt Cav can
TR
cover widely dispersed NAIs with the ability to reorganise, regroup and re-deploy at short
notice. When combined with UAS, EW and aviation this provides a capable mix to FIND
and TRACK.
N
7. Firepower. Lt Cav has sufficient organic firepower for self protection in a recce by
O
stealth role. As part of a light combined arms grouping they are also equipped to deliver
direct fire support from vehicle mounted GPMG, HMG, GMG and also snipers and
C
JAVELIN. However they lack organic indirect fire support and thus will be reliant upon
effective battlegrouping or joint support to provide fires beyond 2.5km. Lt Cav provide a
N
key air land fires enabler due to embedded joint fires observers in the form of unit and sub-
unit FST. In terms of reconnaissance-strike this is the weapon system of choice and is the
U
key firepower element that Lt Cav delivers.
8. Manoeuvre. The type of tasks that Lt Cav deliver for MCO are noted below:
a. Reconnaissance at Range. Operating at the end of extended LoCs Lt Cav

can utilise aviation and air delivered replenishment whilst having a high degree of
tactical flexibility and the ability to operate over a widely dispersed area, concentrating
quickly when required to focus on specific NAIs.
b. Economy of Force. Lt Cav can conduct a range of economy of force tasks

enabling other forces to be concentrated where the commander seeks a decision. This
may include raiding operations at range.
1-B-2
CONTENTS
c. Covering Force. When employed as a covering force, Lt Cav is able to provide

security by observing, identifying and reporting information on activity or intentions of
the enemy, indigenous forces and local population. Light Cav is able to do this at
reach, across a wide area and for extended periods due to its mobility and light logistic
footprint.
d. Security Operations. Lt Cav is capable of delivering wide area security in

security and communication zones of deployed formations. Lt Cav is able to operate in
all weathers and for 24 hours a day and is well suited to providing security to LoC.
Tasks will include route marking, picketing, vehicle checkpoints and road blocks as part
of cordon operations.
PY
e. Control of Movement. Lt Cav can provide a controlling and guiding function
that allows formation staff to control units and formations during the march, approach or
advance.
O
9. Protection. Lt Cav vehicle protection is optimised towards countering the effects of
mine and IED strike. When mounted it is particularly vulnerable to accurate direct fire or
C
indirect fire. Survivability is enhanced by stealth, particularly through the use of terrain and
other cover. The tactical mobility of Lt Cav allows elements to disperse quickly for force
ED
protection. Good situational awareness also increases force protection and survivability by
reducing the likelihood of surprise against the squadron or regiment. In environments
where these measures cannot be adopted, Lt Cav must be augmented or battle grouped
LL
to provide heavy armoured capability.
10. Sustainment. The Lt Cav echelon is structured to allow support to dispersed

O
operations at range. LoCs from sub-unit to echelons may be long and so squadrons could
typically deploy with 5-7 days of C-Sups on vehicles. Aviation and air dropped
TR
replenishment can provide the critical sustainment enabler if Lt Cav is to be freed from
reliance on ground LoCs and allowed to operate in a dispersed manner. The means
available to support Lt Cav CASEVAC is of central importance and is likely to determine
N
the range at which reconnaissance operations can be conducted. Aviation will often be the
preferred method of CASEVAC but there should be both ground and air CASEVAC plans
O
as SOP. Extended CASEVAC timelines may be mitigated by grouping additional medical

personnel and capability to sub-units.
C
N
U
1-B-3
CONTENTS
PY
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LL
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N
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C
N
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CONTENTS
ANNEX C
TO CHAPTER 1
TO BG TACTICS
MECHANIZED INFANTRY
References:
A. DCC Vol 1 Infantry Coy Group Tactics 2007
Role and Utility
1. The primary role of Mechanized Infantry (Mech Inf) is to provide manoeuvre support
as part of intervention operations. In MCO, Mech Inf can be employed in ground-holding
PY
dismounted close combat roles but also has utility in offensive actions given a suitable
mission, acceptable levels of threat and adequate terrain. Mech Inf is optimised for peace
support or intervention operations requiring mine/IED protected vehicles, but possesses
O
considerable direct and indirect fire support weapons. Mech Inf can be task organised
with Armour and Armoured Infantry (Armd Inf) or provide sub-units as required to
C
Armoured and Armd Inf battlegroups. The grouping of Mech Inf and Lt Cav along with
aviation assets provides a very useful medium force capability.
2.
ED
Mech Inf battalions are equipped with variants of mine/IED protected vehicles of the
MASTIFF type with support weapons carried by a mixture of JACKAL and HUSKY. Mech
Inf battalions strike a wide balance of employment between mounted and dismounted
LL
infantry, exploiting the benefits of both. However, although they will be widely employable
in support of ground manoeuvre forces in MCO, this is unlikely to include mounted
O
manoeuvre in contact.
TR
3. The utility of Mech Inf is summarised below:
a. Offensive Actions. As part of battle group offensive operations Mech Inf can
be considered as Lt Infantry when dismounted but with added ground reach and range
N
as a result of mechanisation. Vehicle mounted support weapons also offer a heavy

O
weight of direct firepower from standoff positions. Given a permissive threat

environment Mech Inf can conduct or provide manoeuvre support to the full range of
C
offensive actions. In particular isolation of objectives, seizing and clearing key terrain
and defiles, vulnerable points and areas, are suitable tasks.
N
b. Defensive Actions. Defensive actions for Mech Inf focus on ground holding
U
as part of area defence. In addition delay on alternative positions is possible, given

suitable terrain and the ability to mount/dismount vehicles out of direct fire range. Key
point protection is another task that Mech Inf is well structured to achieve given the
likelihood of a dispersed operating environment and the need to deploy and re-deploy
rapidly. Other tasks suited to Mech Inf include counter-descent and rear area security
including Lines of Communications (LoC) and convoy escort.
c. Stabilising Actions. Mech Inf is optimised to conduct framework security

tasks as part of stabilising action. It can vary presence, posture and profile as required
to improve awareness of the situation through mounted and dismounted patrolling and
can improve security by route operations including VCP and route checking. At unit
and sub-unit levels Mech Inf provide a potent grouping for cordon operations, raids and
1-C-1
CONTENTS
convoy protection dependant upon terrain and the threat. Additionally MASTIFF offers
a protected vehicle with better situational awareness and less aggressive posture than
conventional AFVs in the face of civil disorder.
Grouping
4. Rifle Coy. Mech Inf rifle coys have three rifle pls and a MG pl. Rifle pls are mounted
in MASTIFF with the capacity to carry additional assault pioneers, MWD, interpreters,
medics etc. Other support vehicles include HUSKY and RIDGEBACK.
5. Fire Support Coy. The fire support coy provides the battalion with a recce, anti-tank
and sniper pl mounted in JACKAL. In addition a nine barrel mortar pl is equipped with
HUSKY. An assault pioneer pl is also included but requires lift in rifle coy vehicles.
PY
Tactical Employment
6. Command. Mech Inf battalion headquarters are structured and resourced to
O
command combined arms at battlegroup and sub-unit level. They have the ability to
provide mounted command over dispersed operating areas and potentially at range given
C
sufficient communications reach.
7.
ED
Information and Intelligence. The combination of mounted and dismounted patrols
working in tandem is an effective mix across a variety of populated battlespace. Mech Inf
are able to collect information as a result of face to face contact with the local population,
whilst still able to redeploy rapidly as required.
LL
8. Firepower. As part of a combined arms grouping Mech Inf are equipped to deliver a
O
heavy weight of direct and indirect fire support (both suppressive and precision) in
cooperation with other arms. Rifle coys have the ability to mount GPMG, HMG and GMG
TR
on MASTIFF. However in-contact direct fire positions will rely upon terrain protection and
will more likely be dismounted if operating in a known direct fire zone.
9. Manoeuvre. Striking an effective balance of mounted to dismounted employment of

N
Mech Inf is critical. At sub-unit level there must be well tried and tested drills for mixing
O
mounted and dismounted action and efficiently grouping and commanding empty vehicles.
TTPs for ZULU mustering, movement and link up with empty vehicles is crucial. Well
C
rehearsed drills for route checking, VP awareness and long range road movement enable
Mech Inf to deploy over operational ranges by land more quickly and easily than tracked
N
AFVs. The types of tasks that Mech Inf delivers for MCO are noted below:
U
a. Provide Mass. Mech Inf can provide additional infantry mass and manoeuvre
support for offensive and defensive actions with Armoured and Armd Inf battlegroups.
In high threat mine or IED areas Mech Inf may act as advance guards to support
route proving and clearance tasks and to clear and secure key terrain ahead of the
main body. Mech Inf can also provide ‘presence’ in populated battlespace.
b. Operating on Flanks and at Range. Against light and irregular opponents

suitably battlegrouped Mech Inf can provide a mobile force to conduct seize and hold
tasks, flank guards and blocks in advance of main body link up.
1-C-2
CONTENTS
c. Economy of Force. Mech Inf can conduct a range of economy of force tasks
enabling other forces to be concentrated where the commander seeks a decision.
This may include feints, demonstrations and security tasks.
d. Area Security Operations. Mech Inf are capable of delivering wide area
security in security and communication zones of deployed formations. They are able
to operate in all weathers and for 24 hours a day and are well suited to providing
security to Lines of Communication, particularly as force protection for logistic
operations. Tasks will include route security (including route marking and picketing)
and vehicle checkpoints and road blocks as part of cordon operations.
10. Protection. Vehicle protection is limited but optimised towards countering the effects
of heavy mine and IED strike. Mech Inf primarily conducts force protection through the
appropriate use of terrain. In environments where these measures are not adequate,
PY
Mech Inf will operate largely dismounted and must be augmented or battle grouped with
heavy armoured support.
O
11. Sustainment. Mech Inf may be expected to operate in a more dispersed manner
than other elements of an Armd Inf Bde, and has a light logistic footprint relative to heavy
C
armour. This will have implications for how replenishment and CASEVAC is achieved and
will require consideration at battlegroup and brigade level. When the infantry are
ED
dismounted, MASTIFF offers additional lift to the battlegroup for sustainment,
transportation of casualties, CPERS and attachments.
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
N
U
1-C-3
CONTENTS
PY
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ED
LL
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TR
N
O
C
N
U
CONTENTS
ANNEX D
TO CHAPTER 1
TO BG TACTICS
LIGHT PROTECTED MOBILITY INFANTRY
References:
A. DCC Vol 1 Infantry Coy Group Tactics 2007.
Role and Utility
1. Light Protected Mobility (Lt PM) Infantry is optimised for low to medium intensity
stability operations, in peace support or intervention operations requiring a light logistic
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footprint in a low threat profile. In MCO, Lt PM battalions are predominantly employed in
ground-holding dismounted close combat roles but possess sufficient organic protected lift
for operational and tactical mobility. Lt PM may be battlegrouped with Lt Cavalry and Lt
O
Infantry as part of a combined arms grouping. When supported by aviation these
combined arms groupings can operate in a dispersed manner and at range whilst retaining
C
organic protected mobility and the flexibility to redeploy rapidly. There is also utility for
sub-units or units to be grouped with heavy forces where mission, threat and terrain
dictate.
ED
2. Lt PM battalions are equipped with a variety of vehicles with enhanced protection,
predominantly FOXHOUND (FHD) for the rifle pls and RWMIK+ for the support weapons
LL
pls. Lighter logistically than conventional armoured or heavy mechanised forces, they can
interact readily with indigenous forces and the local population whilst conducting
O
framework security operations in the contemporary operating environment.

TR
3. The Lt PM ORBAT is based directly on that of a Lt Infantry battalion, but with a

significantly larger LAD and with the addition of a SNCO fleet manager in each company.
Lt PM battalions strike a wide balance of employment between mounted and dismounted
infantry, exploiting the benefits of: a relatively light footprint; deployability by air, land or
N
sea; good situational awareness; mobility and mine/IED protection and broad utility across
O
the mosaic of conflict. However, although they are widely employable in support of ground
manoeuvre forces in MCO, this is unlikely to include mounted manoeuvre in contact.
C
4. Lt PM Infantry is suitable for employment in urban environments where the balance

N
of protection and mobility offered by FHD allows negotiation of close urban terrain with
adequate levels of protection against small arms.
U
5. The utility of Lt PM is summarised below:
a. Offensive Actions. As part of battlegroup offensive actions Lt PM have less

dismounted mass due to vehicle manning than Lt Infantry but have added ground
reach and range as a result of mechanisation. Vehicle mounted support weapons also
offer a heavy weight of direct firepower from standoff positions. Given an acceptable
threat environment Lt PM can conduct or provide manoeuvre support to the full range
of offensive actions. In particular isolation of objectives, seizing and clearing key
terrain, defiles, vulnerable points and areas are suitable tasks due to the high terrain
accessibility of FHD and RWMIK+.
1-D-1
CONTENTS
b. Defensive Actions. Defensive actions for Lt PM focus on ground holding as

part of area defence. In addition delay on alternative positions is possible, given
suitable terrain and the ability to mount/dismount vehicles out of direct fire range. Key
point defence is another task that Lt PM is well structured to achieve given the
likelihood of a dispersed operating environment and the need to deploy and re-deploy
rapidly. Other tasks suited to Lt PM mobility and flexibility would include counter-
descent and rear area security including Lines of Communications (LoC) and convoy
escort.
c. Stabilising Actions. Lt PM is optimised to conduct framework security tasks

as part of stabilising action. Lt PM can vary presence, posture and profile as required
to improve awareness of the situation through mounted and dismounted patrolling and
can improve security by route operations including VCP and route checking. At unit
and sub-unit levels Lt PM provides a potent grouping for cordon operations, raids and
PY
convoy protection dependant upon terrain and the threat. Additionally FHD offers a
protected platform with better situational awareness and less aggressive posture than
conventional AFVs in the face of civil disorder. It is also relatively light and compact for
O
use in permissive urban settings.
C
6. The tasks suited to Lt PM which can apply across all tactical actions are:
a. Operations in complex terrain.

ED
b. Securing lines of communication.
LL
c. Wide area security to rear areas of a deployed force.

O
d. CPERS escort force.

TR
e. Support to bulk logistics transport tasks.
f. Force protection for convoys, static military installations (such as HQs), critical
infrastructure (SPOD, APOD) or other installations.
N
O
Grouping
C
7. Rifle Coy. In common with Lt Infantry battalions, Lt PM rifle coys are cadreised and
must be brought up to strength with reserves to field three rifle pls and a support weapons
N
pl. Rifle pls are equipped with six FHD, which can break down into two multiples of three
teams each with their own vehicle. This facilitates depth and flexibility when conducting
U
mobile patrols. There is carrying capacity for a number of external attachments (such as
assault pioneers, local police, interpreters, medics, MWD and CPers). The Lt PM rifle coy
also has a support weapons pl equipped with eight RWMIK+ with a mix of GPMG, HMG
and GMG. This support weapons pl can manoeuvre to provide over watch and fire
support or act as another rifle pl.
8. Fire Support Coy. The fire support coy provides the battalion with recce, anti-tank,
sniper and mortar pls. In addition assault pioneers provide manoeuvre support.
Alternatively, if these capabilities are not required in role the coy can operate as a fourth
manoeuvre sub-unit.
1-D-2
CONTENTS
Tactical Employment
9. Command. Lt PM BG HQs are structured and resourced to command light

combined arms operations. They have the ability to provide mounted command over
dispersed operating areas and potentially at range given sufficient communications reach.
10. Information and Intelligence. The combination of mounted and dismounted patrols
working in tandem is an effective mix in populated battlespace. Lt PM is able to collect
information as a result of face to face contact with the local population, whilst still able to
redeploy rapidly as required.
11. Firepower. As part of a light combined arms grouping Lt PM are equipped to deliver
a heavy weight of fire support (both suppressive and precision) in cooperation with other
arms. However, in-contact direct fire positions will rely upon terrain protection and will
PY
more likely be dismounted if operating in a known direct fire zone.
12. Manoeuvre. The type of tasks that Lt PM delivers for MCO are noted below:
O
a. Operating on Flanks and at Range. Against light and irregular enemy Lt PM
C
can provide a mobile force to seize and hold ground, provide flank protection and deny
ground. ED
b. Economy of Force. Lt PM can conduct a range of economy of force tasks
enabling other forces to be concentrated where the commander seeks a decision. This
may include raiding operations, feints, demonstrations and infiltration.
LL
c. Area Security Operations. Lt PM is capable of delivering wide area security in

O
the security and communication zones of deployed formations. Lt PM can operate in

all weathers and for 24 hours a day and is well suited to providing security to Lines of
TR
Communication. Tasks include route security (including route marking and picketing),
and vehicle checkpoints and road blocks as part of cordon operations.
13. Protection. Lt PM vehicle protection is limited and optimised towards countering the
N
effects of mine and IED strike. Lt PM primarily conducts force protection through the
O
appropriate use of terrain. The tactical mobility inherent in a Lt PM BG allows it to

disperse quickly for protection. In environments where these measures are not adequate,
C
Lt PM infantry will operate largely dismounted. TTPs for ZULU mustering, movement and
link up with empty vehicles is crucial. Well rehearsed drills for route checking, VP
N
awareness and long range road movement enables Lt PM to deploy over operational
distances by land.
U
14. Sustainment. Lt PM infantry can be resupplied by ground dumped, hide or rolling

replenishment. For dispersed operations its light logistic footprint may allow air delivered
or SH resupply to be conducted. The means available to support Lt PM Fwd MEDEVAC is
of importance and is likely to determine the range at which operations can be conducted.
Aviation will often be the preferred method of CASEVAC but there should be both ground
and air CASEVAC plans as SOP. Planning for medical support to dismounted operations
must include the provision of Fwd MEDEVAC to adhere to medical planning timelines.
This makes use of a mixture of ground and aviation platforms as the tactical picture allows.
1-D-3
CONTENTS
PY
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C
ED
LL
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N
O
C
N
U
CONTENTS
ANNEX E
TO CHAPTER 1
TO BG TACTICS
LIGHT INFANTRY
References:
A. DCC Vol 1 Infantry Coy Group Tactics 2007.
Role and Employment
1. Light Infantry (Lt Inf) is well suited to operating within close, cluttered, congested
and complex terrain. As part of a combined arms grouping it closes with and defeats the
PY
enemy and can seize, deny and hold ground as required. In MCO, Lt Inf will have an
important role to play in clearing and holding complex and close terrain, often supported by
armoured, Mech or Lt PM forces; it will also provide security for HQs, Key Points and
O
LoCs. If suitably mounted it can also provide force protection for combat logistic patrols.
Lt Inf may be grouped with other light combined arms forces or with heavy armour in Armd
C
Inf Bdes. Lt Inf is well suited for air manoeuvre operations, but requires regular resupply
and support from joint fires, air and aviation.
ED
2. The utility of Lt Inf is summarised below:
a. Offensive Actions. Lt Inf is able to conduct the full range of offensive actions as
LL
part of a combined arms grouping against other light or irregular forces. This includes
the clearance of stronghold areas. Lt Inf are necessary for the destruction or clearance
O
of regular or irregular enemy seeking refuge in remote and inaccessible terrain,

including restricted urban areas (medieval/old town centres with very narrow streets
TR
and alleys) where AFVs cannot penetrate and also jungle, dense forests and cave
complexes. Against light and irregular opponents Lt Inf with aviation support can
conduct seize and hold tasks, flank guards and blocks in advance of main body link-up
with mechanised forces.
N
O
b. Defensive Actions. Lt Inf are well suited to area defensive actions and in close
terrain can prove difficult to dislodge. They are also capable of delivering point and
C
local area security to the security and communication zones of deployed formations.
Tasks include HQ security and life support, route security and cordon and search
N
operations. Lt Inf can also provide an effective CPERS handling and guard force.
U
c. Stabilising Actions. Lt Inf are capable of conducting security tasks across a wide
range of operations from humanitarian to stabilisation interventions. They can vary
Presence, Posture and Profile as required to improve awareness of the situation whilst
patrolling, and can improve security by route operations including VCPs and route
checking. At unit and sub-unit levels in complex terrain Lt Inf can conduct cordon
operations, raids and convoy protection dependant upon the mission and threat. Lt Inf
are also suitable for early partnering and mentoring of indigenous forces.
Grouping
3. The Lt Inf battlegroup is cadreised and will require reinforcement by its reserve
element to bring it to war establishment. This generates the structure described below.
1-E-1
CONTENTS
a. Rifle Coy. The integrated Lt Inf rifle coy consists of three rifle pls and a
GPMG(SF) equipped machine gun pl for MCO. This allows grouping for Find, Fix,
Strike and Exploit within the coy organisation.
b. Fire Support Coy. The Fire Support Coy provides the battlegroup with
Recce, Anti-Tank, and Sniper Pls. The Mortar Pl can provide 9 barrels after
reinforcement. In addition there is an Assault Pioneer Pl to provide breaching,
manoeuvre support and some CIED/Mine and search expertise.
Tactical Employment
4. Command. Lt Inf HQs are structured and resourced to command light combined
arms at battlegroup and sub-unit level. With the exception of Main HQ they operate
PY
primarily with man-packable tactical CIS allowing rapid strategic movement by Air
Transport (AT).
O
5. Information and Intelligence. Lt Inf recce pls are able to conduct dismounted
close reconnaissance, including static manned surveillance. Lt Inf is also readily able to
C
exploit close contact with local populations to develop Human Terrain information and
establish patterns of life. ED
6. Firepower. As part of a light combined arms grouping Lt Inf is equipped to deliver
direct suppressive fire by machine guns, precision fire by snipers, precision and anti-
armour fire by JAVELIN and indirect 81mm mortar fire. Its ability to establish fire support
LL
positions stealthily in complex terrain is enhanced by the fact that it is un-encumbered by

vehicles and must man-pack weapons. Ammunition carriage and resupply must be pre-
O
planned; i.e. man-pack, quad bike, aviation and air drop. Lt Inf has an extensive scaling of
NVDs and can operate and fight at night where this provides tactical advantage.
TR
7. Manoeuvre. The ability of Lt Inf to penetrate complex terrain and infiltrate by night
provides an essential manoeuvre element for battlegroups and brigades. It can dislocate
or envelope static defences allowing exploitation into enemy depth. Aviation support and
N
air land integration provide the most effective manoeuvre enabler for Lt Inf as it has no
O
organic vehicle troop lift. Thus it must be adept at rapidly regrouping to use aviation or
troop carrying vehicles provided by unit or formation level combat and CSS elements, both
C
UK and MN.
N
8. Protection. Lt Inf relies upon terrain and presence, posture and profile for force
protection. Given suitable terrain and sufficient preparation time it presents a low
U
detection signature for enemy ISR and when dug in has the ability to endure under direct
and indirect fires.
9. Sustainment. Lt Inf has lower logistic burden than mechanised forces but is reliant
upon inorganic CSS and aviation if expected to operate at range from a main body. In
particular Fwd MEDEVAC is dependant upon formation or force vehicle and aviation lift.
Planning for medical support to dismounted operations must include the provision of Fwd
MEDEVAC to adhere to medical planning timelines. This makes use of a mixture of
ground and aviation platforms as the tactical picture allows.
1-E-2
CONTENTS
ANNEX F
TO CHAPTER 1
TO BG TACTICS
GROUND BASED AIR DEFENCE
INTRODUCTION
1. Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD)1 is the employment of Surface-to-Air Weapons,

including All Arms Air Defence (AAAD), from the ground. GBAD normally forms the inner
layers of a comprehensive AD system. The outermost layer is usually provided by fighter
aircraft, but may also include Long-Range Surface to Air Missiles (LRSAMs). Inner layers
are provided by a combination of fighters and Medium-Range Surface to Air Missiles
(MRSAMs) in a multinational environment and, closer in still, Short Range AD
(SHORAD),Very Short Range AD (VSHORAD) and AAAD may be deployed.
PY
2. The Royal Artillery deploys two GBAD systems, the VSHORAD High Velocity Missile
(HVM) and the SHORAD Rapier. This can be supplemented where appropriate with
O
battlegroup provided AAAD.
C
PART 1 – AIR DEFENCE SYSTEMS
SHORAD - RAPIER
ED
3. Rapier is an area Tactical and Strategic mobile system capable of providing
continuous 24 hour all-weather AD against a wide array of aerial targets. It is highly mobile
LL
and air portable. Resistant to ECM and EOCM, it can operate using its search and track
radars or in a passive mode using its electro/optical sensors. Rapier employs a laser
O
‘beam riding’ system and is capable of dual engagement. Its maximum effective range is
8.2 km. Rapier is likely to be commanded at formation level although it may be sited in the
TR
battlegroup AO where local defence arrangements and camouflage and concealment must
be coordinated.
VSHORAD - HVM
N
O
4. HVM is a point air defence system and is the most likely AD system to be deployed in
the battlegroup AO and is occasionally task organized to battlegroups, particularly in the
C
LABG. HVM has three methods of deployment which are:

N
a. Self Propelled. SP HVM is mounted on the Stormer vehicle which enables it to

be employed within Armd Inf battlegroups to provide close air defence. In the SP
U
configuration there are 8 missiles ready to fire with a further 92 stowed below armour.
b. Shoulder Launch and Lightweight Multiple Launcher (LML). HVM can also
be deployed in the light, man-portable, role in support of non-armoured formations
including Royal Marines. In the light role HVM can be fired from the operator’s
shoulder using the Shoulder Launch Aiming Unit or using the LML which provides
greater stability and access to two additional missiles before re-loading. IFF is not
available in Shoulder Launch mode. Further data is shown in Table 1-X-1 below
______________________
1
JWP 3-63
2
If a fourth crewman is carried then only 8 missiles.
1-F-1
CONTENTS
Shoulder Launch Light Multiple Launcher

Aiming Unit Aiming unit
Man portable 3 Missiles
All Terrain Stable platform
Rapid Deployment Rapid re-engagement
Reload 9 seconds Identification Friend or Foe (IFF)
Table 1-F-1 - HVM SL & LML Data
5. Surveillance Air Defence Alerting Device (ADAD). In SP or ground mode, the

operator is assisted in acquiring the target by the ADAD which is employed for detection
and location of Fixed Wing and Rotary Aircraft. The device alerts the operator, either
PY
visually or mechanically, onto the azimuth and elevation of the target. Targets are
prioritised and the data passed to a remote display unit. The IR scanner is sensitive to
both IR engine heat and skin friction (caused by drag) though it is limited by bad weather
and poor thermal definition. The data is produced in the Vehicle Mounted (VM) and Free
O
Standing modes of operation. The primary difference, is that the VM version has a motion
C
sensing function component to compensate for attitude changes of the vehicle. Detection
ranges are shown in Table 1-X-2 below
ED
ADAD Detection Planning Data
Fighter Ground Attack - 9.0 Km
Moving Helicopters - 6.0 Km
LL
Pop-Up Helicopters - 3.5 Km.
Table 1-F-2 – ADAD Detection Planning Data

O
6. HVM Missile Characteristics. The missile ‘rides’ to the target on a laser beam
TR
directed by the operator. At approx 400m three hitiles also known as darts separate from
the missile. Once separated from the missile the darts autonomously seek the centre of
the laser beam which is also centred to the operator’s tracking cross wires. With a velocity
N
in excess of mach 3 the three darts can achieve their maximum range of 5.5km in approx
7.8 seconds. Within the centre section of the dart is the warhead coupled with an impact
O
delay fuse which allows penetration of a target before warhead detonation to give
enhanced behind armour effects. Using the new Lightweight Multi-role Missile, HVM can
C
also engage ground targets out to 7 km and is reasonably effective against light armoured
vehicles.
N
U
7. Additional Characteristics. Additional characteristics, that have an impact on the

handling of HVM in the BG, are as follows:
a. Protection. HVM (SP) is lightly armoured and has collective CBRN protection.
It is vulnerable to direct and indirect fire and where possible should not be exposed.
The SP and LML variants have a detachment of 4 soldiers and are reliant on the
supported formation for protection against dismounted attack. The HVM (LML) and
HVM (SL) variants can be operated from trenches, although vertical engagement
arcs are restricted by the danger to the detachment posed by back blast at high
angles.
b. Acquisition and Engagement. The HVM cannot be fired on the move. The
1-F-2
CONTENTS
HVM (SP) can be brought into and out of action within 30 seconds. Fixed wing
aircraft can only realistically be engaged when approaching head-on. Helicopters can
be engaged from all angles.
c. Rapid Re-engagement. HVM (SP) has 8 ready to fire missiles. HVM (LML)
has three ready to fire missiles. The speed of the missile, combined with the
availability of additional missiles allow for rapid sequential engagement of
targets.
d. Passivity. Each detachment is equipped with an Air Defence Alerting Device

(ADAD), which allows for passive acquisition (IR sensor) of targets out to 9 km. The
ADAD battery charging engine causes noise and thermal emissions. The ADAD can
contribute to the STAP.
PY
e. Sighting Systems. The Thermal Sighting System (TSS) for SP HVM provides
a 24-hour clear weather target detection, recognition, identification and tracking
capability to complement the performance of the existing Direct View Optics (DVO)
O
channel. In addition to its AD capability the SP HVM provides an excellent ground
surveillance platform and should be integrated into the battlegroup STAP.
C
8. Tactical Employment. HVM units are task organised for specific GBAD tasks. The
ED
standard HVM fire group consists of six Fire Units (FUs). The smallest tactical grouping
capable of undertaking an independent task is four FUs. All GBAD tasks should be
planned to have depth, mutual support, all-round defence, integration and co-operation.
The most likely tasks for CAD in the BG are:
LL
a. Vital Point (VP) Defence. Defence of vital points or capabilities such as C2

O
facilities, reserve demolitions, FARPS and concentrated sub unit locations

(gun positions and CSS concentrations).
TR
b. Route Defence. Defence of MSRs or routes to the LD.
c. Limited Area Defence. Defence of manoeuvre units, FOBs and DZs.

N
O
9. Command. HVM is typically commanded at the highest practical level by the HVM
regiment commanding officer, usually on behalf of divisional commander. At brigade level
C
the battery command post will co-locate with brigade HQ.

N
10. Control. At BG level control will be exercised through the Troop Tactical Group
consisting of a Troop Commander and his Troop Command Post, which should be
U
located with battlegroup HQ. HVM will normally be allocated as complete troops,
consisting of a Fire Group of six FUs.
11. Communications. FUs operate autonomously, have limited communications and

consequently lack situational awareness. This situation will improve with the
provision of the Bridging Capability (BriC) application on BOWMAN and integration
of the Ground Based Air Defence-Recognised Air Picture (G-RAP).
12. CSS. C Sups are normally provided by the battlegroup/unit being supported or
directly from the CAD Bty echelon if not integrated into a battlegroup/unit replenishment
system. The CAD Bty echelon resupplies HVM missiles to FUs in all situations. Limited
ES may be available from the battlegroup’s/unit’s LAD; however, specialist ES is provided
1-F-3
CONTENTS
by the CAD Bty fitter section. Additional ES is provided by the CAD regimental workshop
as required.
PART 2 – ALL ARMS AIR DEFENCE (AAAD)
13. The paucity of specialist GBAD resources dictates that it is unlikely that all units will
be protected from air attack by dedicated GBAD units. All ground forces must therefore be
capable of passive and active self-defence to counter an air threat, particularly that
presented by attack/assault helicopters and tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS).
THE ROLE OF AAAD WEAPONS
14. Small Arms. Small Arms (SA) fire can contribute significantly to the air defence of
ground forces and can provide an effective deterrent. When properly co-ordinated, small
PY
arms fire can:
a. Destroy or damage enemy aircraft and UAS.
O
b. Deter a pilot from completing a mission successfully.
C
c. Force enemy aircraft to climb to heights where they are vulnerable to other air
ED
defence weapons.
d. Maintain the morale of friendly troops.

LL
One British officer said of the Falkland Islands Conflict that everything fired at attacking
Argentine aircraft had good effect. “If the aircraft was not shot down, the tracers and
O
pyrotechnics intimidated the pilot into using his weapons prematurely, changing his
interest, or aborting the mission”. To ensure that the Argentine pilots knew they were
TR
being engaged by ground forces, the British re-linked their machine gun ammunition to
add more tracers. British ground forces were credited with downing three Argentine jet
aircraft with small arms.
N
THE AAAD WEAPON POSITION

O
15. The Weapon. The weapons currently available for AAAD include the SA-80, LSW,
C
LMG, GPMG, HMG and GMG. Vehicle main armaments are only marginally effective
against fixed wing aircraft due to their limited elevation and speed of traverse, but they can
N
engage with greater effect hovering or slow moving Rotary Wing (RW) targets. It is also
possible to use anti-tank guided weapons against RW.
U
16. The All Arms Air Defence Team. Units should ensure that all personnel are trained
in AAAD techniques and identify two man teams who can be used specifically in the AAAD
role when required. AAAD teams will normally operate only during daylight hours,
however it may be necessary for AAAD weapons to be manned at night if the air threat
requires and the ambient light levels are sufficiently high. Each team should be equipped
with:
a. An AAAD weapon.
b. A method of warning of air attack.
1-F-4
CONTENTS
c. Binoculars.
d. The air sentry list.
e. Ammunition (1 to 1 tracer for belt fed weapons is ideal).
f. A radio.
17. Air Sentries. Whenever an air threat exists an air sentry must be posted during the
hours of daylight. Air sentries should be positioned to provide all-round observation. AAAD
teams must have an air sentry whose sole responsibility is observing for enemy aircraft.
Air sentry duties should not exceed 30 minutes. Air sentries must be trained in aircraft
recognition.
PY
CONTROL OF ALL ARMS AIR DEFENCE
18. AAAD fire is ordered by the local ground commander using Weapon Control States
O
(WCS) and Rules of Engagement (ROE). Control is necessary in order to safeguard
friendly aircraft and neighbouring troops, to conserve ammunition and to prevent early
C
compromise of a friendly force location.
ED
19. The only WCS likely to apply for AAAD are:
a. Weapons Hold. Weapons may be fired only in self-defence, or in response to a

fire control order.
LL
b. Weapons Tight. Weapons may be fired only at aircraft identified as hostile or

O
committing a hostile act.

TR
20. A Weapon Control Order (WCO) can be applied to all weapon systems, and may be
limited by geographic area or types of aircraft, e.g. Weapons Tight Helicopters (weapons
may be fired only at RW identified as hostile). A commander may only impose the same or
a more restrictive WCS than that ordered by a superior commander. Therefore a local
N
commander cannot order WCS WEAPONS TIGHT if his superior commander has ordered
O
WCS WEAPONS HOLD.

C
21. Rules of Engagement. ROE has primacy over WCS and in certain circumstances
ROE may preclude the use of AAAD.
N
SITING PRINCIPLES
U
The Afghan Mujahideen proved to be a major threat to Soviet air combat operations during
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. An Afghan pilot of the Communist Afghan Army, who
defected in 1984, disclosed that the Soviet built MI-24 (Hind) was extremely vulnerable to
machine gun fire, especially when engaged from elevated positions in the mountains. The
Mujahideen's' effectiveness in engaging Soviet aircraft with all weapons systems forced
the Soviets to adopt the technique of engaging the Mujahideen at maximum range.
Between 1979 and 1984 the Mujahideen were credited with shooting down close to 300
Soviet helicopters using small arms and anti-tank weapons.
1-F-5
CONTENTS
22. The best AAAD defence of an area will be provided if weapons are sited outside the
area of aircraft weapon release. Weapon release for many types of attack is generally
between 1.5 and 8km or more. When AAAD weapons are sited at such distances from the
area they are defending, they should be able to bring fire to bear during the critical phase
when the pilot sights weapons but before weapon release. The number of AAAD teams
required to provide all round defence, if deployed in this manner, is likely to be more than
are available. AAAD weapons might, however, be sited either in conjunction with other AD
weapons, or to cover likely directions of attack.
23. Distance from the Vital Point. As stated above, ideally AAAD weapons should be
sited outside the range of aircraft weapon release because:
a. Maximum Effective Range. The maximum effective impact range for 7.62 mm
and 5.56 mm weapons in the AAAD role is 1000 metres. For 0.50 inch Browning
PY
HMG this range is extended to 1500 metres.
b. Engagement Time. A four second engagement of an aircraft is desirable
O
before it releases its weapons. In this time, an aircraft approaching at 250 metres per
second (450 knots) will have flown 1000 metres (1 Km).
C
24. Siting Factors. The commander will also need to take the following factors in to
ED
consideration when siting AAAD weapons:
a. The Location and Arcs of other Air Defence Weapons. To avoid

unnecessary duplication of effort or the creation of undefended arcs, air defences
LL
should be coordinated with neighbouring and GBAD units.

O
b. Number of Weapons. The number of weapons allocated to AD within a unit

will depend on the unit’s primary task. The further back from the forward area that a
TR
unit is deployed; the more emphasis should be put on siting automatic weapons in
the AD role.
c. Direction of Attack. It may be possible, after completing an Air IPE to identify

N
likely avenues of approach and site weapons in the AAAD role accordingly.
O
d. Concealment. Concealment from ground and air observation will be a factor

C
when siting AAAD. The requirements of a well-concealed position and a good AAAD
site are rarely compatible and a compromise may have to be accepted.
N
e. The Ground Threat. The local ground threat will influence the commander’s
U
decision on whether AAAD can be sited outside a ground defended area. In forward
areas AAAD weapons will normally have to be sited within the area they are
defending.
f. The Local Terrain. The best type of position is on fairly high ground with
minimum terrain screening. Ideally the position should offer the opportunity to
engage aircraft approaching from any direction and it should have an all round field of
view out to about 3 Km. This distance will allow for reaction time, identification and
engagement. However, although a 6400 mils engagement arc is desirable, a single
observer can properly observe an arc of no greater than 2200 mils.
1-F-6
CONTENTS
25. Defence on the Move. For defence of a packet of vehicles on the move, AAAD
weapons should be mounted, with an air sentry:
a. In the front vehicle, looking forwards and to the flanks.
b. In the rear vehicle, looking backward and to the flanks.
c. Throughout the vehicles of the column to alternate flanks.
PASSIVE MEASURES
26. All ground units should implement passive measures to defend against air attack.
Passive AD is achieved by a combination of measures, which include protection,
concealment, dispersion and warning. A unit or installation that cannot be found is unlikely
PY
to be attacked
27. Protection. Protection from air attack may be achieved when the situation permits
O
units to:
C
a. Deploy in positions difficult for aircraft to attack or monitor.
b. Dig and use protective cover.

ED
28. Concealment. Consideration of the following will increase challenges presented to
an enemy pilot:
LL
a. Camouflage.
O
b. Track Plans.
TR
c. Control of Movement.
d. Movement if Possible at Night or in Poor Visibility.

N
O
e. Deception.
C
f. AD Fire Withheld. (Enforced by a local commander as a passive air defence

measure).
N
29. Dispersion. Dispersion reduces the possibility of acquisition and reduces the level
U
of damage sustained once attacked.
30. Redeployment. In some circumstances it may be possible to redeploy.

Commanders should consider redeployment if:
a. There has been recent air reconnaissance of the area.
b. The unit has been in contact with the enemy.
c. The unit has been in one position for a significant period of time; how long will
depend on the type of unit, its function and the air threat.
1-F-7
CONTENTS
31. Warning System. Air sentries are needed to alert troops to take cover, or prepare to
open fire, as appropriate. Air sentries should be posted at all locations and to the front and
rear of moving packets of vehicles. Standard warning signals are described below, and
action to be taken when warning is given must be known by all.
32. Alarms. The standard air attack alarms are:
a. Visual Alarm Colour - Red (usually a square panel).
b. Visual Signal - Rapid crossing of arms above head (not a NATO Standard
signal).
c. Audible Alarm/Voice - Long whistle or horn blasts.
PY
ACTIVE MEASURES
33. When passive AD measures break down or become ineffective, it is necessary for
O
units to have an active capability; active air defence may be evasive or aggressive.
C
34. Dismounted Troops. Troops on foot should disperse into cover offering the best
possible protection. ED
35. Vehicles in a Hide. The commander of the group of vehicles in a hide must decide
whether to remain in the hide or to break out and disperse. The action he takes will largely
depend on the intensity of attack and the degree of danger from fire.
LL
36. Moving Vehicles. Vehicles moving along a road should drive into cover away from
O
the road. If no cover is available, vehicles should deploy to the left and right of the road
dispersing as quickly and as far apart as possible. Personnel in Armoured Fighting
TR
Vehicles should remain in the vehicle closed down. Personnel in soft skinned vehicles
should dismount, disperse and take cover. If attacked in open country vehicles may be
able to avoid damage by taking the following action:
N
a. Drive as fast as possible towards the attacking aircraft. This narrows the
O
aircraft’s angle of attack and in an armoured vehicle presents the thickest armour
towards the direction of attack.
C
b. In cases where this action is impossible, ‘zig zags’, or any sudden change of
N
course and speed may disrupt the pilot’s aim.

U
37. Controlled Fire. Controlled fire from all available AD weapons and other weapons in
an AD role must be brought to bear to destroy enemy aircraft and deter the enemy air
effort.
38. Coordination. Battlegroups must plan AAAD to optimise its effect and to ensure that
it complies with battlespace control measures and the OPSEC plan. This is particularly
important when aviation may be supporting the battlegroup. AD coordination should be
lead by the HVM Troop commander with assistance from the BC. Battlespace and local air
space management should be coordinated at BG Main linking in to the formation HQ.
Battlegroup SOIs need to detail the relevant weapon states that are to be used and other
coordination issues. Information on Battlespace Management (BM) can be found in
Chapter 3 and in the SOHB.
1-F-8
CONTENTS
ANNEX G TO
CHAPTER 1 TO
BATTLEGROUP TACTICS
THE USE OF MINI AND MICRO UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS AT BATTLEGROUP

LEVEL
1. At battlegroup level, organic Mini Unmanned Aerial Systems (MUAS) are employed in
direct support of the ISTAR Gp providing real time situational awareness, enhancing both
the FIND capability and force protection. The current MUAS in service with the British
Army is the Desert Hawk 3 (DH3). The DH3 MUAS capability is delivered by elements of
an Integrated Unmanned Aircraft Systems (IUAS) Bty1.
MUAS - DESERT HAWK 3
PY
ROLES
O
2. Surveillance and Target Acquisition. MUAS complement ground mounted recce
and can be used to support the STAP, BDA and detailed target analysis including
C
observing the pattern of life.
3.
ED
Force Protection. MUAS can provide early warning of an attack by providing
overwatch, surveillance in depth and support to manoeuvre.
4. Shaping. MUAS can assist in deception by exploiting its signature as part of a

LL
deception plan and reassurance in providing a presence in less accessible areas.

O
CAPABILITY
TR
5. General. DH3 is a man portable system that can be hand launched from an
unprepared site. The system consists of an Unmanned Aircraft (UA), Ground Control
Station (GCS) and Ground Data Terminal (GDT). DH3 capabilities are described in Table
1:
N
O
Ser MUAS Characteristics Remarks

(a) (b) (c)
C
1 Set Up Time 15 mins with 10 min turn around - dependant on

first time launch
N
2 Endurance Approx 60 mins with G1 battery. Environmental

factors will affect battery life
U
3 Range 15km Electronic LOS

4 Speed Max – 44 kts, Cruise – 32 Kts, Stall 23 Kts
5 Max Altitude 11,000 ft Density Altitude (DA)
6 Propulsion Battery powered electric motor
7 Payload Stabilised Generation 2 EO and IR
8 Max Wind Speed for Launch 25 kts
6. MUAS Products. DH3 is able to provide a variety of products to its supported

manoeuvre arm. The Electro Optical (EO) and Infrared (IR) payloads allow it to provide
both day and night Full Motion Video (FMV) imagery in real time to the GCS and to any
1
‘Integrated’ because the IUAS Bty also provides the Hermes 450/Watchkeeper Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System capability.
1-G-1
CONTENTS
Remote Viewing Terminal (RVT) within range. The GCS also facilitates the taking of still
photographs from the imagery, assistance with the production of imagery for target packs,
and primary analysis by the detachment. These stills can then be distributed on electronic
media to other parts of the battlegroup. The impact and utility of data collected by MUAS
assets can be significantly enhanced through exploitation by Imagery Analysts in order to
produce IMINT.
7. Crew. DH3 requires a minimum detachment of two to operate. These are the UAS
Commander (UAS-c) and UAS Pilot (UAS-p). Standard practice however is to employ a
third crewman, the UAS Operator. The addition of the third member of the detachment
allows the UAS-c and UAS-p to concentrate on commanding and flying the mission whilst
the operator assumes the duties of lookout and sentry when not carrying out his launch
and recovery duties.
PY
8. Limitations & Vulnerabilities. There are a number of limitations and vulnerabilities
that will affect the support that DH3 can provide to the battlegroup which will need to be
taken into account by battlegroup staff when creating their DSO. It is critical that the
O
battlegroup staff and sub unit commanders are informed of these limitations by the DH3
personnel prior to the planning phase of operations so that redundancy can be factored
C
into the ISTAR plan. The limitations that must be considered are:
a.
ED
Weather. DH3 currently cannot be operated in precipitation, lightning, icing
conditions or temperatures outside of its -10°c to +60°c operating envelope. It is also
limited to a maximum launch altitude of 10,000ft Density Altitude (DA). These
limitations currently have a severe impact on DH3 operations in wet climates, high
LL
altitudes and areas with extremes of temperature.
Bandwidth. DH3 operates in digital within the ?2 Band of the electromagnetic

O
b.
spectrum and requires a minimum separation of 40km between two GCS operating
TR
on the same uplink or downlink channels, 19km for unrestricted operation on

adjacent uplink or downlink channels and a minimum of 4km separation between two
GCS operating adjacent channels. There is no minimum separation for two GCS
operating with a clear channel of separation but as there are only six channels, this
N
can be hard to achieve when multiple detachments are operating in close proximity.
O
c. Launch and Recovery. DH3 currently requires launch and recovery sites of
C
specific dimensions (see Figures 1 and 2). The recovery site dimensions in particular
may prove restrictive when operating in heavily urbanised areas, forested or jungle
N
environments, mountainous terrain or low lying coastal areas such as river deltas and
marshland. Procedures are in place to allow recovery onto smaller sites, but the
U
necessary Operational Staff Work (OSW) takes significant time to produce which may
not be available at short notice. Smaller sites may also require de-confliction with
other assets within the battlespace as co-location with certain equipment within too
close a proximity may degrade the capability of both as well as placing personnel and
equipment at risk of damage or injury.
2
Frequency is classified.
1-G-2
CONTENTS
PY
Fig 1-G-1 – DH3 Launch Danger Area
O
C
ED
LL
O
TR
Fig 1-G-2 – DH3 Recovery Danger Area

N
MUAS ORGANISATION WITHIN AN ARMD INF BATTLEGROUP

O
9. ISTAR Tac Party. The ISTAR Tac Party consists of a subaltern or Warrant Officer
and an assistant (usually Gnr or LBdr). Their primary role is to assist in the management
C
of ISTAR assets allocated to the battlegroup, dissemination of ISTAR products and the
provision of FMV via a RVT. This team should be located within Main HQ. Although DH3 is
N
not their primary role, they are responsible for assisting in the planning of future DH3
U
allocation to the sub units, de-confliction of DH3 frequencies within the battlegroup and its
neighbouring formations via liaison with the IUAS Bty and Bde ISTAR cell, and acting as a
link between the DH3 detachment and the IUAS Bty should direct communications fail.
The ISTAR Tac Party should also act as a SME on the ISTAR assets available at
battlegroup level. The ISTAR Tac Party will usually be placed TACOM to the battlegroup
for the duration of their attachment. The ISTAR Tac Party must remain at Main HQ
throughout the operation. It play a key role in fusing the various of ISTAR feeds into the
plan.
10. UAS Tac Party. The UAS Tac Party consists of two personnel; a commander
(SNCO) and an assistant (LBdr/Gnr) who deploy specifically as part of the DH3 capability.
They will be best located attached to the sub unit (usually HQ ISTAR Gp) being supported
by the DH3 detachment and as they are equipped with an RVT they should form part of
1-G-3
CONTENTS
Coy Tac. As well as providing FMV feed to the supported sub unit, the UAS Tac Party will
have direct voice communications to the detachment in order to provide missions and
tasks, authorise flights and direct the payload on behalf of the supported arm commander
during missions. Like the ISTAR Tac Party, they should provide a level of redundancy
between the detachment and the IUAS Bty and act as an SME on wider ISTAR assets
available at sub unit level. The UAS Tac Party should remain TACOM to the sub unit for
the duration of their attachment. The UAS Tac party will be integrated into the HQ of the
ISTAR Gp providing OC ISTAR with an accurate ISTAR feed during operations and where
the various ISTAR assets can be crossed cued.
11. DH3 Det. The DH3 detachment is likely to be part of the ISTAR Gp and co-located
within the Tech ISTAR Gp. This offers the DH3 detachment the security, situational
awareness and geographic position it needs to support the battlegroup.
PY
TASKING
12. Manoeuvre. MUAS can greatly enhance the battlegroup’s ability to manoeuvre. The
O
ability to cover large areas of ground, at speed, and out to 15kms will greatly assist the to
maximise the benefits of the Manoeuvrist Approach to operations. But despite its speed
C
once airborne, the system is slow moving around the battlefield when not flying and this
should be understood by all commanders. ED
13. Area Coverage. Given that they are not restricted by ground manoeuvre MUAS can
play a key role in the advance or during preparation for an obstacle crossing operation.
Whereas armoured recce can be slow, vulnerable and difficult to re-task dynamically,
LL
MUAS can help mitigate these drawbacks. MUAS can cover a much larger area than
ground recce, at greater speed, and can be used to cue and prioritise tasks for ground
O
recce, whilst also providing them with a degree of protection. MUAS provides the
commander with vital information which has previously only been available through
TR
manned or map recce. Effective analysis of the MUAS downlink by suitably qualified and
experienced personnel will provide information on the size of the obstacle, likely crossing
points and alternate routes all of which can be investigated further by traditional armoured
recce. FMV can be viewed by commanders and used as a tool in further planning and
N
stills can also be disseminated to specific sub units via data networks or on orders
O
dependant on their individual role in the execution of the crossing.

C
14. Deception. Battlegroup deception plans are limited in scope but must be credible.
Deception can play a major part in the success of an obstacle crossing. Overt flying and
N
reconnaissance by MUAS could assist in making the deception plan more credible.
U
COMMUNICATIONS
15. The UAS Tac Party must consider their ability to communicate with both the DH3
detachment and the Officer Commanding Tactical Air Control Party (OC TACP). The UAS
Tac will be responsible for issuing missions to the detachment and de-conflicting airspace
with the OC TACP prior to authorising the launch of the UA. This critical link is vital
because it prejudices effective BM in the event of failure. Should the UAS Tac be unable
to communicate with the OC TACP or the detachment, vital airspace de-confliction
information may not be passed on. To mitigate this risk the UAS Tac Party should create
redundancy in their communications to both the detachment and OC TACP. By maintaining
direct communications with the FST the UAS Tac Party can retain a link to the FAC
situated with the FST. The link to the ISTAR Tac Party via the battlegroup net will also
1-G-4
CONTENTS
allow the ISTAR Tac Party to relay commands to the detachment until the UAS is
recovered and direct communications are restored. Alternatively, by giving the detachment
direct communications to the OC TACP, they can continue to be de-conflicted even when
communications with the UAS Tac Party are lost.
BATTLESPACE MANAGEMENT
16. Electromagnetic Spectrum Management. DH3 is dependent on available

frequencies and requires sufficient separation from other assets using the same or
adjacent frequencies to operate reliably. Failure to de-conflict frequencies between DH3
detachments and other users may result in the UAS failing to connect or losing link during
a tasking. The most effective way for DH3 detachments to be de-conflicted from other ?
Band users is for the UAS Bty BC to address this issue at Bde level. As friendly forces
may not be the only users of the frequency range, the UAS-c will as a matter of course
PY
also ensure that the chosen frequency is free from interference prior to every launch by
use of a spectrum analyser.
O
17. Airspace Management. During operations it is likely that there will be a significant
amount of air, aviation and UAS assets all working in support of the operation. Added to
C
this is artillery, rocket and mortar support. Thus the airspace over the AO could become
extremely busy. The battlespace is controlled by the BC through the Joint Fires Cell (JFC).
ED
It is therefore vital that robust communications are maintained between the OC TACP, UAS
Tac Commander and DH3 Det. The creation and use of allotted operating areas for DH3
dependant on battlegroup SOIs are will maximise the benefits of the DH3 system while
minimising its negative impact on operations.
LL
PROTECTION
O
18. DH3 detachments will either be mounted in a Landover or a WARTHOG dependent

TR
on which battlegroup they are supporting. Battlegroups must take into account the relative
vulnerability of the DH3 detachment when grouping and siting it. The has a top speed of
60km/h. Fitted with a PLATT mount for HMG, GMG or GPMG, it has the capability to
defend itself and add firepower to the battle if required. It also has the capacity to be fitted
N
with VHF, HF, and TAC SAT communications as well as ECM (Electronic Counter
O
Measures) fits.
C
SUSTAINMENT
N
19. Forward Loading of MUAS Spares. There is a need to shorten the supply chain to
the detachment which will typically hold eight Unmanned Air Vehicles (UA). As the IUAS
U
Bty could be located deep within the Bde rear, elements of the UAS echelon must be
grouped with their dependent detachments. This would enable the detachment to receive
replacements for damaged or lost UAS in a timely manner and reduce the impact of losses
on their ability to support the battlegroup.
20. MUAS Maintenance. One option that the BC should consider is detaching a REME
UAS technician to the A2 echelon with spare UAS. This would enable a greater level of
repairs to be completed close to the battlegroup AO, reducing the need for UAS to be
returned to the IUAS Bty and reducing turnaround times for unserviceable equipment.
However, consideration must be given to the impact on the wider repair chain across the
Bde if a UAS technician is reallocated to a specific battlegroup.
1-G-5
CONTENTS
MICRO UAS - BLACK HORNET
21. The Black Hornet is a micro UAS operated predominantly by the infantry at sub-unit
level. It is a complete stand-alone system consisting of an Air Element and a Ground
Element. The Air Element comprises two UAS, which are kept fully assembled and ready
to fly. The Ground Element consists of a Base station, hand Controller, and Display unit.
22. It provides the user with real time motion imagery and high resolution snapshots (still
images) of objects which typically are beyond user's line of sight. Missions may include
clearance of specific targets, reconnaissance of ingress and egress routes, surveillance
and intelligence gathering. Black Hornet cannot be operated indoors and has no night
capability.
PY
O
C
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
N
U
1-G-6
CONTENTS
ANNEX H
TO CHAPTER 1
TO BG TACTICS
ELECTRONIC WARFARE INTEGRATION INTO BATTLEGROUP OPERATIONS
INTRODUCTION
1. Electronic Warfare (EW). EW is defined as military action that exploits

Electromagnetic (EM) energy to provide situational awareness and achieve offensive and
defensive effects. EW is the conduct of EM Operations, i.e. warfare in the EM
Environment (EME).
Command and Control
PY
2. Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell (EWCC). The EWCC is responsible for
overall planning and coordination of all EW effects in the AOR. The EWCC will be
O
established at whatever level is deemed appropriate, but realistically will not be below Bde
HQ level. A typical EW detachment to a Bde is shown at Figure 1 below.
C
3. Troop Control and Analysis Detachment (TCAD). The TCAD provides the second
ED
line analytical function and troop level command and control of the EW baseline. The
TCAD will typically be established at the BG HQ.
4. Electronic Warfare Liaison Officer (EWLO). The EWLO typically forms part of the
LL
TCAD staff, deploying forward to support EW feeds into a BG ISTAR Gp Tac HQ.
O
EWCC
TR
N
TCAD EWLO
O
Snr Analyst SNCO EW SYS

4 x Jnr Analyst OP
C
N
Reachout
U
Support
SENSOR SENSOR SENSOR SENSOR
6 x PAX 6 x PAX 6 x PAX 4 x PAX
Fig 1-H-1 - Typical EWSI Baseline Organisation
1-H-1
CONTENTS
5. EW Effects. EW effects can be divided into:
a. Electronic Surveillance (ES). ES is the use of EM energy to provide

situational awareness and intelligence. ES can be used to support the following
effects; Find, Understand, Locate, Deny and Disrupt.
b. Electronic Attack (EA). EA is the use of EM energy for offensive purposes.

EA is employed to neutralise, deny, degrade, disrupt or deceive adversaries’ C2
capabilities and diminish their opportunities to shape or exploit the operational
environment. The application of EA is also a form of Fires in offensive operations.
c. Electronic Defence (ED). ED is the use of EM energy to provide protection and

ensure effective friendly use of the EM spectrum. In the land environment, ED is primarily
concerned in defeating Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Devices (RCIED) and with
PY
the provision of advice to ensure protection of our own communications systems.
CAPABILITIES
O
6. Seer 0. Seer 0 is a man-portable, modular EW system which is capable of providing
C
simultaneous intercept and direction finding against a number of frequencies at one time.
One Seer 0 system is operated by an EW sensor, as represented in Figure 1, four sensors
ED
form an EW baseline. Seer 0 equipment cannot currently be operated from a moving
vehicle platform and requires approximately five minutes to become operational once
static. As a man-portable equipment Seer 0 has a typical planning range of circa 5 km
omni-directional from the location of the sensor.
LL
7. Seer 0 EA. Seer 0 is also equipped with a limited EA capability; an EW baseline of

O
four sensors would be equipped with two EA capabilities. The effective range of a Seer 0
EA system is circa 1 km, therefore to be effective Seer 0 EA capability would need to be
TR
within 1 km of the EF target transmission.
8. WROTE. Project WROTE is a higher level collection asset, which may be fielded as
part of a Bde ISTAR collection plan. Information would be provided directly to EWCC at
N
Bde and filtered down to BG via the TCAD / EWLO.

O
C
N
U
1-H-2
CONTENTS
ANNEX I
TO CHAPTER 1
TO BG TACTICS
BATTLEGROUP CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE USE OF ATTACK HELICOPTERS
1. Although only allocated to battlegroups for specific tasks and for a limited amount of
time, employment of the unique versatility and firepower of Attack Helicopters (AH) should
always be considered in the planning and execution of battlegroup operations.
ROLES
2. The principal role of AH is the provision of Offensive Action (OA) - the delivery of
firepower in support of one (or more) Military Activity1. The mobility, agility and firepower
PY
of AH is well suited to a range of offensive tasks, including: Deliberate Attack, Hasty Attack
(Dynamic Targeting), Offensive Patrolling, Raids and Close Support Fires2.
O
3. In addition, AH can be utilised in the following secondary roles:
C
a. Control and Direction of Fire Power. Aircrew are frequently trained to
operate as Air Observation Posts (AOP) for artillery and as Forward Air Controller
ED
(Airborne) (FAC(A)) for the control of other Rotary Wing (RW) and Fixed Wing (FW)
aircraft.
b. ISTAR. The formidable sensor array of AH make it an excellent airborne ISTAR

LL
platform. When available for ISTAR tasking, AH must be incorporated into the BG
ICP and STAP.
O
c. Aviation Screen Tasks. An aviation screen can be used to observe, identify

TR
and report information, although AH is unlikely to be allocated directly to a

battlegroup for this task.
d. Command Support. AH can directly support the situational awareness of

N
commanders and provide a vital communications link in the absence of a fully

O
established ground network.

C
CONSIDERATIONS
N
4. Early liaison with AM planning staff is key in order to fully exploit the capability of AH.
The battlegroup staff should therefore seek to plan and integrate AH into the ground
U
commander’s plan at the earliest opportunity. Key considerations are:
a. Planning Timelines. To facilitate the correct battle procedure, the minimum

planning timeline for a new mission in a previously unplanned AO is 8 hrs3. There
may be situations that require the rapid deployment of AH. However, commanders
must be aware that if AH is committed without sufficient planning time, there is an
increased risk of mission failure.
1
For example, Intervention, COIN etc.
2
Aviation close support fires can be called for using one of two procedures: Close Combat Attack (CCA) or Close Air Support (CAS).
3
This is from the Warning Order from the BG to AH leaving the Forward Operating Base (FOB).
1-I-1
CONTENTS
b. Patrol Frontages. Although difficult to dictate, patrol frontages for AH

operations are typically 12-16 km.
c. Patrol Duration. It can be assumed that six AH will always be available to the
squadron commander, with each AH having two hrs endurance (one hr for ingress/
egress and one hr on task in the objective area).
d. Patrol Range. Ammunition, range and endurance are all affected by ambient
temperatures and altitude.
e. Fratricide Prevention. It is likely that AH will operate in close proximity to

battlegroup ground manoeuvre elements or key infrastructure (i.e. FOBs etc),
particularly for Close Support Fires. Combat ID, Battlespace Management (BM) and
effective communications are vital to avoiding fratricide.
PY
f. Limitations. AH are vulnerable to many factors and planners should look to
employ AH when and where it will be most effective. Limitations/constraints will vary
O
for each mission but include:
C
(1) Weather. Weather conditions may preclude the use of AH (as for other
Avn and Air assets). Night illumination and heat levels may also restrict flying
ED
operations and constrain sensor/weapon performance.
(2) Adversary. AH is a high value target for both regular and irregular
adversary forces. Although equipped with on-board Defensive Aid Suites, AH is
LL
vulnerability to high-end GBAD, MANPADS and other battlefield direct fire

weapons systems.
O
(3) Terrain. Close/mountainous terrain restricts AH sensors and the

TR
effectiveness of some weapon systems. Aircraft are extremely vulnerable to

direct fire weapons in such environments. Urban areas provide particular
challenges for AH in terms of target acquisition and collateral damage
estimates.
N
O
CLOSE SUPPORT FIRES PROCEDURES

C
4. Aviation close support fires can be called for using one of two procedures, which are
conducted in accordance with NATO guidelines4:
N
a. Close Combat Attack (CCA)5. A procedure which can be employed by all

U
personnel (who have received a minimum level of training)6.
b. Close Air Support (CAS)7. A procedure employed solely by qualified FAC8.
5. When conducting CCA, JHC BH crews who are Qualified Controllers (QC) retain
responsibility for weapons selection, engagement profiles, release authority and the
4
ATP-49 for Close Combat Attack and ATP 3.3.2.1 for Close Air Support.
5
CCA is defined as “the provision of close support fire to ground forces engaged in close combat where a FAC may not be available”
(ATP-49).
6
As a minimum, individuals have been briefed on CCA (currently conducted during Phase 2 training for Infantry) and this brief
reinforced during continuation and pre-deployment training
7
CAS is defined as “Air action against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed
integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces (AJP 3.3.2).
8
Where FAC is used, the terms FAC(A) and Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) are also implied.
1-I-2
CONTENTS
subsequent target effect . CAS procedures require a more integrated approach between
the BH crew and the controller (e.g. the FAC may, on behalf of the ground commander,
deny the use of a specific weapon). In all cases, the BH crew and FAC will each retain a
shared responsibility for both abort and engagement during all phases of the attack
sequence. There are additional subtleties in the ‘contract’ between BH crews and
controller when working with a FAC which are highlighted in Para 7. The ground
commander will retain the responsibility for consequence management of the engagement,
as he does for all other kinetic effects within his battlespace.
CCA PROCEDURE
6. General. The CCA procedure is designed to be as simple as possible in order to

enable all personnel (who have received the requisite training) to request and employ
aviation close support fires.
PY
7. CCA Call For Fire Procedure. CCA call for fire procedure has three key elements:
O
a. Initial SITREP. The initial SITREP provides the BH crew with up-to-date
tactical situational awareness. This may be passed to the platform on initial tasking
C
by a separate briefing agency prior to launch, or by the callsign on the ground
requesting the fire support mission directly to the BH crew as they transit to the AO.
ED
b. Aircraft Check-In. When communications are established between the callsign
requesting the close support fire mission and the aircraft, the BH crew will ‘Check-In’
and pass the following information to the ground callsign:
LL
(1) Aircraft callsign.

O
(2) Number and type of aircraft in formation.

TR
(3) Time of arrival on station.
(4) Weapons available.

N
O
(5) Time available on task.

C
(6) Any special equipment available to the aircrew.

N
c. CCA Mission Brief. The CCA mission brief is delivered in accordance with the
CCA card. The briefing consists of two parts as follows:
U
(1) Initial Information. Lines 1 - 5 of the CCA card provide the BH crew with
the information required to begin locating and identifying the correct target and
understand the positioning of friendly forces nearest to the target.
(2) Talk On. A detailed talk on is required to confirm that the BH crew have
correctly identified the intended target in order that they can deliver accurate,
effective fires. The talk on requires no specific voice procedure and is used to
confirm that both the ground callsign and BH crew have correctly identified the
intended target. On satisfactory conclusion of the talk on, the ground
commander will grant his clearance to fire, which permits the BH crew to then
conduct the engagement.
1-I-3
CONTENTS
CAS PROCEDURE
7. General. The CAS procedure, outlined ain ATP 3.3.2.1(C) Para 0412, is
differentiated from CCA because the controller is trained, qualified, current and competent
(TQCC) to both national and international standards and assured at all levels, including by
the Military Aviation Authority . The aviation commander’s ‘6 Step Engagement Process’
(SSEP) provides separate analysis of the engagement and any risks. Responsibility for
target effect is retained by the BH crew. Most importantly, while both the controller and the
BH crew may apply tighter restrictions than the other, the:
a. BH crew must obey the fire control imposed by the FAC on behalf of the ground
commander, and
PY
b. FAC (on behalf of the ground commander) cannot ‘order’ the BH crew to
engage if the aviation commander has assessed that the engagement fails to meet
the requirements of his SSEP.
O
8. CAS Briefing Procedure. The CAS briefing procedure is detailed in ATP 3.3.2.1(C)
C
Chap 3 Sect 4.
COMMON PROCEDURES
ED
9. The Engagement. Regardless of the close support fire procedure employed, the BH
crew will follow the SSEP. Should the tactical situation on the ground change at any point
LL
during this process, such that the ground commander or QC no longer wishes the aircraft
to fire (or wishes to change the target), the command “Stop, Stop, Stop” must be passed
O
immediately to the BH crew. If the ground commander wishes to prosecute a different

target, a new mission brief must be passed to the BH crew.
TR
10. Danger Close Engagements . Whilst conducting the SSEP, if the BH crew assess
that the Risk Estimate Distances (RED) to the closest friendly forces constitute a ‘Danger
Close’ engagement , the BH crew will:
N
O
a. Inform the requesting callsign that it will be a ‘Danger Close’ engagement;

C
b. Confirm that the ground commander is willing to accept the risk and potential
consequences of the engagement to their own troops; and
N
b. Record such confirmation by asking for the ground commander’s initials before
U
conducting the engagement. Receipt of these initials indicates that the ground
commander both understands and accepts the increased risk of weapons effect to
friendly forces.
1-I-4
CONTENTS
CHAPTER 2
COMMAND OF BATTLEGROUP OPERATIONS
1. The purpose of Chapter 2 is to set out principles for the exercise of command and
control of battlegroup operations. This chapter should be read in conjunction with Part 3 of
the SOHB.
PART 1 – COMMAND
2. Command. At battlegroup level, command is the authority vested in the battlegroup

commander for the direction, coordination and control of military forces. The
effectiveness, unity and morale of a battlegroup depends fundamentally on the personality,
professional ability and presence of its commander. He has to lead by personal example,
PY
have access to information upon which to base his decisions and be able to communicate
his intent and instructions effectively to his subordinates. The battlegroup commander
must know the people, capabilities, strengths and weaknesses of his command and must
O
understand the physical, human and political environment in which his battlegroup
operates. He must also be able to adapt force structures, Tactics, Techniques and
C
Procedures (TTP) quickly in response to changes in the TTPs of the enemy.
ED
3. Location of the Battlegroup Commander. The battlegroup commander must
consider where to position himself in order to command most effectively. His choice is
either to locate himself at Main Headquarters or to deploy forward in Tactical
Headquarters. Typically his choice will depend on:
LL
a. Where he is best positioned to gain situational awareness in order to read the

O
battle and exploit opportunities. This will be influenced by the robustness and quality
of his radio communications and any visual feeds he may receive from ISTAR.
TR
a. Where activity in support of the main effort is taking place which may require his
personal supervision and presence to galvanise activity.
N
b. Where co-ordination of battlegroup activity is most complex.

O
4. Control. At battlegroup level, control1 is exercised by the battlegroup staff on behalf

C
of the commander, in order to control the battle and coordinate the actions and effects of
the battlegroup’s sub-units and the supporting force elements task organised with the
N
battlegroup.
U
5. Challenges of Command in the Contemporary Operating Environment.

Battlegroup commanders must consider the environment in which command is exercised.
Particular issues include:
a. 24/7 Media. The ubiquitous nature of commercial and social media places the
commander under a degree of scrutiny that has increased exponentially in recent
years. Whether sought or not, command will be exercised in a public forum, subject
to comment, debate and interpretation by a broad spectrum of observers, including
______________________
1
That authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organizations, or other organizations not normally
under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be
delegated (AAP-6).
2-1
CONTENTS
the public, politicians, journalists and other commentators. This will lead strategic
decision makers to take interest in how decisions made and actions taken by the
commander influence the political and public debate. Higher headquarters will seek
to ‘protect’ and support the battlegroup commander in order to free him for the
execution of his duties, but the actions battlegroups take may be rapidly broadcast
across all media. Battlegroup commanders may find themselves and their actions
inadvertently becoming the ‘story’, and should strive to ensure that their actions in
this respect are consistent with the campaign themes and messages directed by the
national chain of command.
b. Command Compression. Operations will be subject to levels of scrutiny and

oversight that are consistent with the degree to which the outcome will have an
operational or strategic effect. This may vary greatly from one operation to another
but is unlikely to be completely absent from any operation. Consequently battlegroup
PY
commanders must first plan for scrutiny and then develop freedoms and permissions
with superiors. In addition the battlegroup must plan for, and be able to respond to,
legitimate requests for information or assessment from its brigade headquarters (or
O
higher) during the execution of offensive operations. The battlegroup commander will
need to judge when to direct activity in support of critical requests for information, for
C
example in response to a public accusation of collateral damage, whilst concurrently
maintaining focus on the successful execution of the battlegroup mission. This will
ED
require him and his staff to have worked through and agreed such scenarios with the
brigade staff beforehand.
c. Risk Appetite. Battlegroup commanders must seek to establish, clarify,

LL
understand and manage the risk tolerance of their superiors before and during
operations. Risk tolerances may be determined by public opinion and political
O
support, duty of care policy or the law and may include the risk of casualties,
collateral damage and damage to national and/or international image. Understanding
TR
how tactical activity may influence political and strategic perceptions will be key.
Exposing risks and identifying means to tolerate, treat, transfer or terminate it during
planning and back briefs to the brigade will enable tactical permissions to be shaped
and freedoms to be defined before operations commence.
N
O
d. Legal Considerations. Battlegroup commanders cannot ignore the multitude

and impact of legal issues that confront virtually every area of the operational
C
battlefield (Examples include: disciplinary issues; command investigations, rules of

engagement; detention issues, and the rule of law). Legal considerations present
N
both real constraints as well as opportunities to de-conflict operational dilemmas by

harnessing the LEGAD as a force multiplier. Commanders must exploit available
U
legal resources to accomplish objectives, establishing a trusting relationship with their

LEGAD in order to form a clear understanding of the practical application of both
national and international law; separating out where policy meets law in order to
maximize operational efficiency.
e. Measuring Effect. Understanding and measuring the effect and outcomes of

operations is increasingly a function of tactical as well as operational command.
Battlegroup commanders should therefore consider how they will assess, measure
and if necessary justify tactical actions in terms of their effect on the enemy,
population or protection of own forces and how such actions contribute towards a
given objective or endstate.
2-2
CONTENTS
PART 2 – ROLE, STRUCTURES AND ORGANISATIONS OF HEADQUARTERS
6. Role of Battlegroup Headquarters. The role of battlegroup headquarters is to:
a. Provide the battlegroup commander with the information and facilities required
to exercise effective command.
b. Carry out the essential staff work and coordination which translate the
battlegroup commander’s plans and decisions into orders and actions.
c. Provide sub units with the information and intelligence resources they need to
carry out their tasks.
d. Keep formation headquarters and flanking units informed of battlegroup
PY
activities and intentions.
7. Functions of Battlegroup Headquarters. Battlegroup headquarters conducts two
O
tasks: planning operations and coordinating the execution of operations, whilst managing
information to support both. A battlegroup headquarters is not structured or manned to do
C
both concurrently without augmentation. Planning and execution of operations is thus
conducted sequentially within the brigade scheme of manoeuvre. Information, both raw
ED
material and processed data, informs the battlegroup commander’s plan and enables him
and his staff to monitor the success of current operations. Mastery of the digitised tools
provided for information management is critical to this activity but reversionary modes
must be planned and practiced regularly. In order to carry out its roles, the battlegroup
LL
headquarters must fulfil eight critical and interrelated functions:

O
a. Receive, collate, manage and disseminate information.

TR
b. Identify and analyse critical information.
c. Make recommendations to the battlegroup commander.

N
d. Integrate force elements into the battlegroup.

O
e. Synchronise resources to produce maximum combat power at the decisive time

C
and place.
N
f. Control the current battle and anticipate future tasks.

U
g. Be prepared to provide discrete C2 to supporting activities, for example an

obstacle crossing, movement of echelon forces or regulating medical evacuation.
h. Learn and adapt to the tactical situation.
8. Structure of Battlegroup Headquarters. To optimise effectiveness the battlegroup

headquarters must be structured and manned in way that promotes these eight functions.
The structure of a battlegroup headquarters is dependent on the type of operation being
conducted. The manning may differ between manoeuvre operations characterised by high
tempo and relatively short duration missions and stabilisation operations where fewer,
more enduring missions may be executed. This has implications for the number of staff
required and the functions they will perform. As a principle a small number of well trained
2-3
CONTENTS
and cohesive battlegroup staff who know their commander’s mind can be highly effective
when employing a simple planning process followed by a set of clear and easily
understood orders. This approach should be applied when executing manoeuvre
operations within a brigade construct where ISTAR, Fires and CSS are centralised,
manoeuvre is conducted as a series of well practiced battle drills and SOPs are well
rehearsed. Conversely where the battlegroup is dispersed in a ground holding role
involving a broader span of stabilisation activities, ISTAR, Fires and CSS are likely to be
decentralised and other interagency, intergovernmental and coalition personnel will be
present. Consequently the number of staff required at both sub unit and battlegroup level
is likely to be greater. In both cases the battlegroup headquarters will comprise a small
number of core staff (their detailed responsibilities are listed at Annex A) and be structured
in the groupings described below.
9. Tactical Headquarters (Tac). Tac is a small, mobile headquarters which enables
PY
the battlegroup commander to move around his Area of Operation (AO) to the point where
he is best able to exercise command. The battlegroup commander will fight the battle from
Tac when his situational awareness and ability to influence the battle are improved by
O
doing so. This must be balanced against the risk to his security and his ability to
communicate. To do its job effectively, Tac must have access to reliable communications,
C
and is likely to be a key digital C2 node in its own right. It can be used as a Step Up (see
Para 13) where this does not constrain the battlegroup commander’s ability to command.
ED
The manning of Tac will vary according to the requirements of the mission and the
prevailing tactical situation. The following personnel will routinely accompany the
battlegroup commander:
LL
a. CO’s Staff Officer. Depending on the type of battlegroup and its mission the
commanding officer will normally require a staff officer to assist him in Tac HQ2. This
O
has traditionally been the Ops Offr. If deployed, he is the battlegroup commander’s
principal operations staff officer and will assist the battlegroup commander to
TR
coordinate and execute the plan. During planning the Ops Offr will be responsible for
the production of battlegroup control measures; he will work closely with the battery
commander to ensure that these are integrated into Battlespace Management (BM)
planning. During the execution of manoeuvre operations as the operation
N
progresses, the battlegroup commander may regularly express his intent to his
O
subordinate commanders as he observes the operation unfold from Tac; the Ops Offr
is then often best placed to conduct any supporting coordination that is required.
C
b. Battery Commander (BC). The BC provides Joint Fires and ROE advice, Joint
N
Fires communications and liaison to the battlegroup and is responsible for

coordinating all the battlegroup’s offensive support through his tactical group. He will
U
be involved in all stages of the planning process and will formulate a Joint Fires plan
which integrates indirect fires and air and aviation delivered munitions in support of
the ground manoeuvre plan. The BC will also advise on Air Land Integration (ALI)
and Battlespace Management (BM) working with the Ops Offr to detail the control
categories and control measures to be applied to each tactical action3. This
integration is essential in order to concentrate combat power so as to achieve the
effects required by the battlegroup commander. Should the battlegroup commander
______________________
2
Armd Regts may not routinely deploy the Ops Offr in Tac but he could act as the CO’s loader if required.
3
Further detail on BM including specific types of control and control measures can be found in AFM Vol 1 Part 11 Battlespace
Management, Nov 07 and the SOHB.
2-4
CONTENTS
become incapacitated, the BC may assume command until the battlegroup second in
command is in a position to do so.
c. Specialists and Advisers. The squadron commander of the CS Engineer

Squadron (or the Battlegroup Engineer (BGE) in his absence) and specialist
troop/platoon commanders may join Tac for particular tasks where their expertise and
advice is required personally by the battlegroup commander.
d. Protection Party. Depending on the threat it may be necessary to provide Tac

with a protection party which is normally a task allocated to the Regimental Provost
Staff led by the Regimental Sergeant Major (RSM).
10. Main Headquarters (Main). The majority of planning and coordination takes place
at Main, which will normally be located towards the rear of the lead sub units, or in a
PY
suitable position of communications vantage. Consideration should be given to the
relative advantages of siting Main in a building rather than tents. Siting considerations are
discussed in Paragraph 17 below. The following key staff will operate from Main:
O
a. Battlegroup Chief of Staff. The Regiment/Battalion Second In Command
C
fulfils the role of battlegroup Chief of Staff (COS). He supervises the running of Main
and is directly responsible to the battlegroup commander for the control, coordination
ED
and synchronisation of all staff effort within Main. He must be prepared to act as the
alternate battlegroup commander if required. The COS orchestrates the planning
and decision making processes within Main in order to enable the battlegroup
commander to command and give direction to the staff. This includes the
LL
coordination of the Combat Estimate, dynamic targeting cycles and the development
of contingency plans. The COS also coordinates the production of battlegroup
O
Operational Staff Work (OSW), ensuring that it is concise, clear and accurate and is
delivered in sufficient time to enable sub units to conduct their own extraction of
TR
orders, planning, issue of orders and conduct of rehearsals before the execution
phase begins. This is normally achieved by the application of the 1/3 – 2/3 rule4.
Where the tempo of current operations and staff capacity allows, the COS may direct
preparations for future planning, for example the preparation of a receipt of orders
N
brief or directing work to begin on question one of the combat estimate. He will do so
O
mindful of the staff capacity needed to execute the current operation effectively and
will consult closely with brigade or flanking unit staff to understand the scope, scale
C
and intent of any emerging task.

N
b. Battle Captain. The Battle Captain is responsible for maintaining Situational

Awareness (SA) across the battlegroup from Main Headquarters. He oversees the
U
watch keepers on the Battlegroup Command Net and Brigade Net and coordinates
and controls the flow of information to and from the sub units and coordinates their
movement when not in contact with the enemy. During planning he is responsible for
the production of battlegroup movement orders and the confirmation of battlegroup
Control Measures if the Ops Offr is not present. Traditionally this role has been filled
by the Adjutant but recent experience has shown that the he is more likely to be fully
involved in G1/Consequence Management and only available for limited periods of
______________________
4
The 1/3 – 2/3 rule states that each level of command should take no more than 1/3 of the time available between receipt of orders and
the commencement of preparatory moves, to plan and issue orders. The remaining 2/3 of the time available should be allocated to
subordinate units and sub units for their own battle procedure.
2-5
CONTENTS
time. The role of Battle Captain could be filled by a number of officers such as C
Anti-Tank Platoon or the Training Officer.
c. ISTAR Officer.5 Whilst not established in all battalions/regiments the ISTAR

Officer is responsible for planning and coordinating ISTAR capabilities within the
Battlegroup. He ensures that the battlegroup Surveillance and Target Acquisition
Plan (STAP), the Intelligence Collection Plan (ICP) and Fire Plan are resourced with
ISTAR according to the priorities directed by the battlegroup commander. He directly
controls or recommends the task organisation of ISTAR assets which are organic to
the battlegroup such as close recce, snipers, observation posts, tactical Unmanned
Aircraft Systems, Light Cav and Electronic Warfare teams. He also bids for the
allocation of any ISTAR assets or their products which are controlled at brigade level
or higher. During the execution he deploys forward to command the ISTAR Group
leaving a deputy (usually Fire Sp Coy 2IC) at Main.
PY
d. Intelligence Officer (IO). The IO is responsible for assessing the threat
environment in which the battlegroup intends to operate, a process known as
O
Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPE). He supports the ISTAR Officer in
producing Q1 of the Combat Estimate and uses a range of analytical tools6 to assist
C
the battlegroup commander’s understanding of the terrain, enemy forces, human
terrain and key infrastructure. He and his team gather, assess, analyse and
ED
disseminate intelligence and information to answer the battlegroup commander’s
CCIRs. This information can be drawn from a range of sources including feeds from
within the battlegroup (SITREP, Contact Reports, Patrol Reports etc) and its organic
ISTAR and external feeds from non-organic ISTAR, HUMINT, IMINT, SIGINT and
LL
SF/SOF reports delivered by the brigade or attached liaison officers. The IO must
analyse and fuse these products into a common intelligence picture that is updated
O
regularly in response to changes in the situation. Additionally the IO is required to

represent the enemy forces during Red Teaming, Wargaming and ROC drills. This
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requires a sound understanding of enemy TTPs and a willingness to express a

contrarian view that challenges convention and ‘group think’.
e. Regimental Signals Officer (RSO). The RSO is responsible for the planning,
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delivery and maintenance of effective CIS within the battlegroup. The RSO works
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closely with the OC/YoS of the Brigade Signal Squadron to ensure that the
battlegroup is fully integrated into the brigade communications plan. During planning,
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he provides advice on how the ground manoeuvre plan is to be supported with a

robust battlegroup communications plan after completion of a Comms Estimate. This
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includes advice on current and future CIS lay down, protection of CIS capability, use
of Radio Rebroadcast facilities, the application of Electronic Countermeasures and all
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aspects of COMSEC. The RSO is responsible for planning and siting future moves
of battlegroup Main and must therefore be able to balance the requirement for
effective communications with protection, concealment and accessibility. He may
also command Step Up Headquarters.
f. Battlegroup Engineer (BGE). The BGE acts as the engineer advisor/staff

officer to the battlegroup, and liaison officer for the Brigade Engineer Regiment
commanding officer. During planning the BGE works closely with the IO on IPE
______________________
5
ISTAR Offr not established. OC Fire Support Company may fill this role in Armd Inf Bns whilst OC C&R Sqn may fill it in Armd Regts
and OC D (Patrols Company) in the AMBG. Could also be designated as the Battlegroup Warfare Officer (BGWO).
6
Examples include, PMESII, ASCOPE, Human Terrain Mapping, Actor Mapping, Battlefield Area Integration, Threat Evaluation and
Threat Integration see SOHB for more detail.
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CONTENTS
products and advises on Combat Engineer capabilities. He is permanently OPCOM

to the battlegroup.
g. Battlegroup Logistic Officer (BGLO). The BGLO post is normally filled by OC

Headquarters Sqn/Coy supported by the Medical Group Comd and the REME LAD
Comd when available. The BGLO must ensure that sustainment planning is
conducted, normally by means of a logistics estimate, the results of which are
articulated as the 4Ds (Duration, Demand, Distance, Destination). Sustainment
planning including expected consumption rates, casualty estimates and the medical
evacuation plan must be integrated by the BGLO into the plan during COA
development and evaluation in order to ensure that the manoeuvre plan is
supportable and that any sustainment risks are exposed. CSS planning must not be
an afterthought. The BGLO will need to ensure that viable plans are in place to
recover and treat casualties (own and enemy), handle Captured Persons7 (he is likely
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to be the battlegroup’s Detention Officer), resupply the battlegroup with Combat
Supplies and replenish the echelon system. The SOHB should be consulted for
Logistic Support Planning data. Further details on the role of the BGLO are in
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Chapter 6.
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h. Specialist Pl Commanders. During planning the Recce, Anti-tank, Mortar,
Sniper and Assault Pioneer platoon commanders should be present in Main HQ in
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order to assist and provide specialist advice. Their role and position during execution
will depend on how the battlegroup commander chooses to task organise his
specialist platoons. OC Mortar Platoon is normally best situated in the Fire Planning
Cell or in Step Up where he can assist in the integration of fires and the execution of
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the Fire Plan. The remainder are more likely to be required to command their
platoons unless detachments have been task organised directly to the sub units.
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11. Step Up Headquarters (Step Up). Step Up will be required in specific

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circumstances to enable the battlegroup to maintain continuity of C2 during a move of

Main or to exercise a controlling function over a discrete element of a battlegroup
operation such as a Crossing Area Headquarters during an obstacle crossing. The
battlegroup headquarters will rarely have enough officers to man Step Up on a permanent
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basis; normally the duty will fall to the Operations Warrant Officer (Ops WO), AIO and
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Regimental Signals Officer (RSO) and the COS may move across from Main if required.
OC Mortar Platoon 2IC may control fires but this is often done by the BC from Tac. When
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Step Up is required the RSO will ensure that the headquarters is established, has viable
communications and is able to exercise its C2 responsibilities before it ‘Steps Up.’ In the
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case of a move of Main or during periods of taut manning, Tac may perform the function of
Step Up, however this option risks fixing the battlegroup commander and so must be
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considered carefully.
12. Echelon Headquarters.
a. A1 Echelon (A1 Ech). A small mobile headquarters commands and is

collocated with the A1 echelon. The headquarters acts on requests for
replenishment and is responsible for coordinating the defence and movement of the
A1 echelon. It is normally be commanded by the MTO. When stationary it is located
at the Battlegroup RV.
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7 nd
In accordance with JDP 1-10 Captured Persons (2 edition 2011).
2-7
CONTENTS
b. A2 Echelon (A2 Ech). A2 echelon is the focus for the battlegroup CSS effort
and is the controlling station on the battlegroup admin net. It is usually located with
other A2 echelons in the Brigade Support Group (BSG). It will normally be
commanded by the QM(T).
c. B Echelon (B Ech). B echelon, if deployed, is usually commanded by the QM

or RAO and will normally be located in the Divisional Support Group (DSG), if there is
one, or in the BSG if not.
13. Double Hatted Appointments. A number of staff functions are required but not
resourced. These include:
a. Information Activities (IA) Officer. Recent operations have highlighted the

utility of an officer who is responsible for the orchestration, integration and execution
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of non-kinetic activity within the battlegroup. Responsibilities of the IA Officer include
the planning of tactical psychological and media operations, key leader engagement
activities and developing contingency plans for consequence management. He
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should be aware of campaign narrative themes and ‘lines to take’ and understand
who his information targets are within enemy, local and domestic audiences and how
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they may be most effectively targeted. The IA Officer must be fully integrated into
planning and targeting cycles and will be regularly required to liaise upwards in order
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to align and clear battlegroup activity with brigade staff. He should seek to exploit
opportunities created by kinetic operations to achieve influence effect. The BC or OC
Mor Pl Comd might be suitable to act as the IA Offr.
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b. Detention Officer. Where Captured Persons (CPERS) are anticipated

battlegroups must appoint a Detention Officer to oversee and direct the handling of
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CPERS. The Detention Officer should be a commissioned officer who is readily

available within the battlegroup headquarters. The Detention Officer is not to be the
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intelligence officer or the unit tactical questioning co-ordinator, and the task is most
likely to fall to the BGLO. His role is:
(1) The co-ordination and management of CPERS.

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(2) To act as the focus on CPERS matters during mission-specific training.

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(3) To ensure the battlegroup is trained to handle CPERS.

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(4) To assist the commanding officer during operations by monitoring

compliance with timescales, record keeping and other CPERS handling.
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(5) To act as a clear point of contact with higher headquarters on CPERS

matters and liaising as necessary with the Military Provost Staff.
c. CBRN Officer. The Assistant Intelligence Officer (AIO) is tasked as the CBRN
officer and is responsible for advising the battlegroup commander and staff on CBRN
hazards that may affect the battlegroup operation. He should be familiar with CBRN
warning and reporting and be able to advise on the conduct of CBRN recce and
survey procedures. The CBRN officer can draw upon the technical knowledge of the
Unit Medical Officer, particularly on biological threats and toxic industrial hazards.
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CONTENTS
d. Liaison Officers (LOs) and Advisors. Various LOs and advisors may be
allocated to the battlegroup during MCO. These are usually military LOs from within
the force but might also include partnered force LOs or civilian LOs from specialist
agencies. LOs must be integrated as much as possible into the battlegroup
headquarters without compromising OPSEC. The battlegroup commander and his
staff must seek their advice and understand what capabilities they bring and how his
operations may be constrained or enabled by those of Partner or Allied Forces. LOs
should be offered a workspace and life support either within or close to Main, but are
normally responsible for the provision of their own communications. A list of LOs and
advisors provided during Stabilisation Operations which are covered in Chapter 7.
14. Battlegroup Headquarters Configuration. An example of how the Battlegroup

Headquarters may look on operations and the vehicle configurations is shown at Figure 2-
1 below.
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Fig 2-1 Generic Battlegroup Headquarters Layout for MCO

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15. Organisation of Battlegroup Headquarters. Battlegroup headquarters is not

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manned and equipped to plan and execute simultaneously. At best it must be capable of
concurrently executing operations and anticipating planning, usually limiting itself to a
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Receipt of Orders Brief (ROOB) and Q1 organised by the COS. To facilitate planning a
suitable space should be established away from the operations area; Tac can provide
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such a facility if not deployed. Within Main there are a number of discrete but inter-related
and co-dependent cells which must be fully integrated.
Top Tip: During the execution of operations the battlegroup staff should remain
focussed on the control of the current operation. Where tempo allows they may
anticipate subsequent operations for example by completing a Receipt of Orders
Brief or Q1 analysis. Dividing staff equally into an execute and plans team
usually leads to both functions being performed badly.
a. G3 Cell/Command Information Centre (CIC). The G3 Cell coordinates all

activities in Main and monitors and controls the battlegroup command net and the
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CONTENTS
rear link. It must be prepared to assume command in the event of Tac losing its
communications. It is permanently manned by radio operators and an officer/warrant
officer watch-keeper. In the digitised headquarters the G3 Cell is the lead cell within
the Command Information Centre (CIC). It is responsible for generating and
distributing the local operating picture (LOP). It brings together and focuses the effort
of all cells involved in executing the commander’s plan.
b. ISTAR Cell. The ISTAR Officer oversees the activity in the ISTAR Cell
supported by the STAR Officer, the Intelligence Officer (IO) and the BGE. The
ISTAR Cell is divided into two elements;
(1) The ISTAR Cell is responsible for the fusing of the STAR product (Collect)
together with the IO and his staff (Analyse) which feeds the DSO controlled by
the Ops Offr/Battle Captain. This in turn will help develop the shared SA and
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assist in the commanders decision making. The cell is controlled by the STAR
Officer (usually the 2IC Fire Sp Coy/C&R Sqn) and is supported by the TUAS
Tac Pty, EWLO, Tp Comd MUAS Det and other ISTAR SME.
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(2) The ISTAR cell assesses the enemy’s intentions, capabilities and
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vulnerabilities, continually updates the IPE and manages the Commanders
Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) on behalf of the COS. The cell is also
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responsible for managing and exploiting all information gathered or provided to
battlegroup headquarters and is the focus for the battlegroup’s CBRN warning
and reporting.
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c. Joint Fires Cell (JFC). The JFC controls and synchronises all forms of fire
support available to the battlegroup and coordinates Joint Fires with adjacent
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formations and units. It also coordinates BM issues in conjunction with the Battle
Captain. The JFC also coordinate and integrates non-kinetic effects with kinetic
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effects during the planning and execution of operations. The JFC prepares and
issues fire plans and target lists in support of the battlegroup and must include
representation from all elements of the battlegroup that provide fire support, such as
the mortar and direct fire support platoons, AD troop and assigned avn and air
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assets. The JFC is commanded by the BC or, in his absence, by the JFC WO2/SSgt.
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d. Battlegroup Logistics Cell. This cell is manned by the BGLO and a small staff
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who coordinate CSS in conjunction with the battlegroup commander’s plan. See
Chapter 6 for further details.
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e. Tactical Air Control Party (TACP). The TACP provides the air staff function
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within a Battlegroup Headquarters. It is a subordinate operational component of a

Tactical Air Control System (TACS) designed to provide liaison to Land forces and
the control of aircraft. Each TACP consists of four personnel, two of whom are FAC
trained. The balance of TACP activity is driven by the nature of the operational
environment in accordance with the Battlegroup Commander’s direction. Fully
integrated into the JFC and BC’s Tac, the TACP provides advice on issues such as
Airspace Management (ASM) and Air/Avn planning, as well as supervising and
supporting the FAC within the FST.
f. Avn Cell. When battlegroup operations involve extensive use of aviation the
battlegroup may set up an avn cell which will be manned by Avn LO and possibly a
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CONTENTS
Mobile Air Operations Team (MAOT). They assist the battlegroup staff in the
planning and execution of Support and Attack Helicopter operations.
Top Tip: Battlegroup staff officers must be prepared to speak on the Battlegroup
and Brigade Command Nets when their personal intervention is required to
inform, coordinate or direct activity on behalf of the battlegroup commander.
This should never be left to the Watchkeeper, whose task is to manage and
record routine traffic.
g. iHub/IM Cell. The iHub is the focus for all information administration within the
battlegroup and ensures effective IM. The iHub’s task is to ensure the effective
receipt, storage, distribution, archiving and disposal of information in the
headquarters. The iHub is usually run by the RAO Det Comd acting as the
Information Support Officer (ISO) and a number of clerks acting as Information
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Support Administrators (ISA). Their responsibilities are:
(1) ISO. The ISO is head of the iHub. The ISO will advise the Senior
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Information Officer and the IMgr on information related matters, and execute
their policies. The ISO may also be responsible for the maintenance of the
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registered files and other records in support of the IMgr. The ISO may be
supported by a number of iHub Information Support Administrators (ISA) usually
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clerical staff. More detailed responsibilities can be found in the SOHB.
(2) ISA. ISA work within the iHub. ISA are responsible to the ISO for IAdmin
activities. More detailed responsibilities can be found in the SOHB.
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16. Operation of a Battlegroup Headquarters. The keys to the efficiency and the
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survivability of battlegroup headquarters are size, simple well-rehearsed drills for

movement, concealment, defence and working routines. If a headquarters becomes too
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big, or it becomes over dependent on complicated CIS procedures, its flexibility, efficiency
and ultimately its survivability will be impaired. Where possible it is important to design
additional capacity into the headquarters to cater for attached personnel. The underlying
principle should be that all additions to the battlegroup are fully integrated and contribute to
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planning and the conduct of the operation. Further details about fighting the digitised
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battlegroup headquarters can be found at Annex B.

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17. Siting. The siting of battlegroup headquarters will be decided in consultation with the
COS after recce by the RSO. The principal factors are:
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a. Communications. The site must offer good communications to subordinate

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and other headquarters. Apart from the immediate command and control
implications, it is likely to form an important node for the tactical internet through
which messaging (including pictures/tracks) will be conducted. It should, if possible,
be screened from enemy offensive EW devices. Access to civil communication and
information systems may also be important.
b. Concealment. Built-up areas or woods offer the best cover from both aerial
and ground-based observation. Housing the headquarters inside a building of
opportunity helps to counter visual, Electro-Optical (EO), radar and Thermal Imagery
(TI) surveillance and provides some basic protection against chemical attack.
Isolated or predictable cover must be avoided. A carefully selected fold in the ground
plus skilful camouflage is often equally as effective as any other form of concealment
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CONTENTS
and provides significant protection against CBRN contaminants. Terrain screening

should be balanced against the need to maintain robust communications.
c. Security. Battlegroup headquarters must always provide its own local security.
Responsibility for security rests with the RSM supported by the unit provost staff and
reinforced by drivers and signallers from all vehicles deployed in a given location.
The best security, however, is achieved by concealment and in selecting sites
shielded by sub unit defences. A key vulnerability is the computer and
communications (COMPUSEC/COMSEC) domain. Measures to control devices
such as mobile phones must be rigorously enforced.
d. Accessibility. The site should be readily accessible with a comprehensive

track plan. It should not be liable to accidental discovery by enemy land or aerial
recce. The use of tac signs, a useful peacetime expedient, should be controlled
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carefully on operations. Escape routes and emergency RV points must be
nominated and evacuation drills rehearsed.
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e. Movement. In certain circumstances battlegroup headquarters may have to be
prepared to move frequently with little or no notice. This avoids detection by the
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enemy, mitigates unexpected developments and enables the headquarters to
support a mobile battle over a large AO. ED
f. Working Routine. Good organisation within the headquarters is vital if it is to
function efficiently and effectively. Comprehensive SOIs8 should be compiled to
provide the basic framework for its operation. These should contain the details of all
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routine procedures such as the layout of battle boards, information management,

briefing formats, composition of planning and operations teams, the contents of battle
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boxes and movement and staff tables. The routine must enable continuous manning
of the CIC.
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18. Fighting Battlegroup Headquarters. Staff need to understand a number of key

processes that allow them to effectively fight the headquarters. Mastery of the digitised
tools that aid these processes is a vital part of the staff’s ability to provide the command
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and control of operations. These are described in Annex B.

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19. Reversionary Modes. Staff must plan for and practise the use of reversionary
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modes to cater for the loss of power or a critical systems failure. Use should be made of
maps covered with acetate, with unit positions marked with pins, marker pens or ‘stickies’.
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Oral orders may have to replace radio orders and subordinates should be comfortable
with taking orders directly into their notebooks. Battlegroups should hold a reversionary
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battle box for such occurrences. Further details are at Annex B.
20. Internal Layout. The layout of battlegroup headquarters will vary according to the
type of unit, the tactical situation and the wishes of the commander. If the headquarters is
to remain static for periods of time, best practice dictates that key staff operate from a
central ‘birdtable’ that depicts the local operating picture, while retaining connectivity to
their particular cells. To be effective, staff at the birdtable must conduct regular internal
updates orchestrated by the COS. Headquarters should also be capable of operating from
within their vehicles for reasons of force protection and speed of movement. A generic
______________________
8
SOPs are mandated and universal. SOIs are local procedures at the discretion of the Unit but should be endorsed across the
formation.
2-12
CONTENTS
internal layout of a mobile Battlegroup headquarters is shown at Figure 2-2, whilst a

generic layout of full battlegroup HQ configured for both planning and execution is shown
at Figure 2-3.
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Fig 2-2 Generic Layout of a Mobile Battlegroup Headquarters
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Fig 2-3 Generic Layout of a Full Battlegroup Headquarters
Annexes:
A. Summary of Battlegroup HQ Staff - Duties and Responsibilities.

B. Fighting the Digitised Battlegroup Headquarters
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CONTENTS
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CONTENTS
ANNEX A TO
CHAPTER 2 TO
BATTLEGROUP TACTICS
SUMMARY OF BATTLEGROUP HEADQUARTERS STAFF – DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
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Appointment Receipt of Warning BG Planning BG Planning BG Preliminary Orders Subsequent Activity & Execution
Order/Bde Orders (Combat Estimate Q 1-3) (Combat Estimate Q 4-7) BG Confirmatory Orders
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
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1
Battlegroup Attends Bde Orders Assembles planning team Conducts recce with R Gp where Delivers overall Receives backbriefs from Commands the battle from either
2
Commander Carry out quick initial (usually 2IC/BG COS, appropriate . introduction to sub-unit and specialist MAIN or TAC as appropriate.
(BG Comd) mission analysis BGWO, Ops Offr, BC, BGE, Backbriefs planning team on results operation outlining the commanders and updates CO’s Decisions:
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with Ops Offr and IO, BGLO). of recce and/or on change in BG ‘plan for battle’. from Los (if present). Committal of the BG Strike
BC. Tasks Ops Offr Q2. Conducts mission Comd direction. Delivers Intent, SoM and Cfm Os. Confirms plan or Committal of the BG reserve.
to send an initial BG analysis – states initial Receives Decision brief on Msn details any change to his Requests for Bde reserve.
WngO (To include CCIRs. COA/COAs. statements. concept. BG wdr/break clean by time of
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:Phase of Q3. Directs which enemy Decides on COA/COAs which are Sums up - ‘summary of Mission Rehearsal. CE.
war/map folds, O Gp COA/COAs to plan against. to be developed further and execution’. Directs amendments to
time, NMB time/No Issues direction to staff to wargamed. the plan if necessary.
3
Recce Before Time. allow development of Backbriefs Bde Comd . Gives further direction for
Regping) COA/COAs. Direction to Outlines Intent. CONPLAN production, incl
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include: Intent (incl Wargame. Oversees wargame and timelines.
schematic), ME effect and directs amendments to plan as
likely end state. required
Finalises intent, SoM and Msn
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statements.
BG Chief of Assemble the Member of planning team. Oversees COA development, Preparation and Assembles planning team Runs MAIN. Runs the contact
Staff (COS) planning team. Contributes to mission directs production of Operational Rehearsal. when necessary. battle.
(2IC) Draws up BG
operational and
planning
timelines.
Oversee the Receipt
analysis.
Direct staff effort and
provide guidance for
information manager.
Reviews timelines
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Staff Work (OSW).
Coordinates and integrates staff
planning effort.
Makes recommendations on
COA(s) and supervises production
Orchestrates production of
orders and runs rehearsal.
Orders. As per SOI.
Makes amendments to
plan following questions
The composition of the
planning team will depend
on the nature of the
operation to be planned.
Heads CONPLAN
Ensures Up and Down Reps sent
regularly.
Gives direction to BGLO, In
particular the co-ordination of
MEDEVAC.
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of Orders Brief (ensuring adherence) and of draft DSO/DSM and Synch and backbriefs. process. Takeover from CO as required.
(ROOB) with staff. planning assumptions. Matrix. Completes a ‘visualisation’ Cfm Os. As per Prelims. Plans Future Ops as necessary.
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Initiates BG Act as a sounding board for Refines COAs and prepares for of the entire op from start Mission Rehearsal. Coordinates dynamic targeting
planning. the CO’s wargame. to finish to ensure all Conducts mission cycle.
Directs battle Intent. Wargame. Acts as referee. relevant control and coord rehearsal. Makes changes May command Step Up if
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procedure (replen/ Amends plan as a result of measures are included. as directed. Required.
start states etc). wargame.
Ensures production of final DSO/
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DSM and Synch Matrix.

Identifies timelines for CONPLAN
development.
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Suggested party to Bde HQ should comprise CO, BC, Ops Offr, IO, RSO and BGE. Bde SOIs will state attendance at Bde Orders – remainder to liaise with Bde staff.
2
BG Commander may elect to run the planning process and the wargame himself.
3
The timing of backbrief to the Bde Commander will depend on Bde battle procedure.
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CONTENTS
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
ISTAR Assists and Member of planning team. Refines DSO and assists with Orders. Gives STAP. Cfm Os. As per Prelim Responsible for resourcing STAP,
4
Officer deputises for BG Produces Draft DSO DSM. Issues STAP Os. ICP and Fire Plan with ISTAR
COS as directed. Produces outline STAP STAP co-ordination reconstitution plan. Mission Rehearsal. assets in accordance with BG
Liaises with Bde Plan to support DSO. Briefs Formulate STAP reconstitution Makes changes as Comd priorities.
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ISTAR staff to BG plan. directed. Physically confirms STAP in
establish availability Comd on ISTAR Wargame. Plays ISTAR assets. Confirms STAP after position.
of Div and Bde resources. Refines STAP as necessary. recce/backbriefs. Tracks Intelligence battle with IO.
resources. Tasks and confirms Bde assets.
Adjusts STAP as necessary.
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Assume responsibilities of BGWO
if required.
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STAR Offr Assists IO in Assists in production of Bids for allocation of ISTAR
answering PIRs and draft DSO with ISTAR Offr assets or their products,
CCIRs and IO controlled from higher formation.
Acts as focus for fusion of STAR
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Feeds and Products from ISTAR
Gp, Jt Fires and Bde to ensure
Shared SA across BG and
support to Comd Decision Making
Intelligence Collects Bde trace, Member of planning team. Refines IPE and HVTL to inform Orders. Delivers En Continues to refine the Must liaise closely with BC and
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Officer IPE products Delivers Int brief as part of the targeting process. Forces paragraph. IPE, High Priority Targets current Ops Bird Table. Monitors
(IO) Collate int/geo Q1. In conjunction with G3 Staff (HPT) and Int Collection radio net with reference to BG
products Establish enemy Intent, constructs DSO/DSM. Plan. STAP and DSO and advises BG
Liaises with Bde G2 MLCOA and MDCOA. Develop and refine the enemy COA Briefs significant changes Comd regarding situational
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staff. Advises on nomination of for inclusion in the sync matrix in the en situation. awareness.
G2 analysis and IPE Priority Information Wargame. Red Teaming. Fights as Regular and timely liaison Completes kill charts as reports
(with BGE). Requirements (PIR). the enemy MLCOA and MDCOA. with Bde G2 and MI Sect. are received. Liaises with higher
Prepares draft list of
PIRs and CCIRs.
Advises on CCIRs.
Contributes to mission
analysis.
Maintains IPE.
TR Cfm Os. As per Prelim
Os.
Mission Rehearsal. Red
mover.
fmn.
Especially Bde ISTAR assets.
Briefs BG COS on en
assessment & options.
Updates EN int picture.
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Advises in relation to ML/MD
COA and actual En activity.
Operations Attends Bde Orders. Member of planning team May accompany BG Comd on Prep and Rehearsal. Follow up action from Deploys to Tac HQ with CO.
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Officer (Ops Prepares/issues (scribe). Recce. Assists in writing Orders. orders. Coord/monitor input for SITREPs
Offr) initial WngO. Contributes to mission Drafts DSO/ DSM and Synch Distributes Orders. Drafts Cfm Os. on BG/Bde nets.
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analysis. Matrix. Orders. Assists in CONPLAN Issue amdts to plans.

Constructs and maintains Wargame. Scribe or Blue Mover5. Delivers: development. Advise CO on en use of CBRN.
RFI list. Updates the OpO. - Task Org Cfm Os. As per Prelim Maintains updates to TASKORG
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Issues further WngO if Issues further WngO if necessary. - Friendly Forces Os. and friendly forces Combat
necessary. - Coord Instrs Mission Rehearsal. Effectiveness board.
Coord BG Recce Plan. Assists 2IC/ BG COS in Makes changes as Updates avn flt briefing trace.
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making amdt to plan. directed.
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Normally filled by OC Fire Sp Coy in AI Bns and OC C&R Sqn in Armd Regts. Not currently established in Armd /Light Cav Regt.
5
Ops Offr acts as ‘Blue Mover’ in a BG (e.g. Armd/FR BG) where there is no BGWO.
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CONTENTS
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
BGE May attend Bde Member of planning team. May accompany BG Comd on Preparation and Confirms and updates Defence:
Orders. Briefs BAE as part of Q1. Recce. Rehearsal. Engr Annex - Monitor progress of obstacle
Conducts Engineer As part of mission analysis Develops engr ops for COA/COAs. Production of CAOI and and CAOI. emplacement.
assessment: briefs on Engr assets and Assists development of DSO, DSM, engr work Cfm Os. As per Prelim - Track asset capabilities effecting
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- Terrain analysis resources available. sync matrix and Engr Annex. tables. Os. - Track status of routes and lanes
and weather Send WngO to BG Engr Ident addl Engr resources reqd. Orders. Mission Rehearsal. in BG AO.
effects (BAE). units. Sends further WngO to BG Engr - Briefs BAE. Makes changes as Offence:
- En Mob/C Formulate commander’s units as necessary. - Delivers Engr Ops directed. - Insure task org link ups.
Mob/Survivability guidance for Engr effort and Wargame. Plays Engr. paragraph. - Monitor BG obstacle reduction.
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(with IO as part of the siting of NAIs and TAIs Confirms effects of CAOI. Assists 2IC/ BG COS in - Track asset capabilities effecting
IPE). relative to the ground. Backbriefs Bde Engr on BG Engr making amendments to BG mission.
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plan. plan following questions Both:
and backbriefs. - Support contingency planning.
Explains states/codes on - Coordinate reserve/situational
res dml form – AB 9811. obstacle execution.
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- Maintain the BG obstacle trace,
ensuring Ops map is up to date.
BC Attends Bde Orders Member of planning team. Accompanies BG Comd on Recce. Preparation and Confirms OS contribution Track Battle with BG Comd in
with CO. As part of mission analysis Provides OS input to DSO, DSM, Rehearsal. to STAP after recce & TAC.
LL
Discusses and extracts Bde NAI, TAI, DPs STAP. Finalises OS paragraph backbriefs. Execute AB545B and Amend as
receives direction on and briefs OS resources Produces HPTL. and AB545B and Can be employed as the necessary.
the OS plans & (AB545B, Air, Avn6, Mors Prepares Arty input for wargaming: produces the OS Annex to focus for CIMIC and Info Resource and Int Management
resources with Arty and AD). AB545B, AD deployment, FSCM the OpO. Ops (PSYOPS) activity. with Joint Fires Cell.
O
CO and BALO. Briefs on OS assets (incl air/avn). Orders. Delivers OS Cfm Os. As per Prelim Monitors DPs and Trigger pts.
Initial mission available to the enemy. Formulation of guidance for kinetic paragraph (incl air/avn and Os. Asst BG Comd with Fwd
analysis with CO. Recce with BG Comd and non-kinetic effects. AD). Mission Rehearsal. planning.
Battle Captain
May issue an Arty
WngO. Warn FSTs
of M-STAR trace
req for STAP plan.
Principal G3 Offr
where
appropriate.
Develops MovO and

TR
Wargame. Plays OS.
Assists Ops Offr in the production

Coord ‘Time’.
Orders. Delivers MovO.

Makes changes as
directed.
Conducts Tac Gp
Rehearsal.
Cfm Os. As per Prelim
Manage FSCM (3 dimensional).
Ensures OS coord in sp of sub
unit level attacks.
Participates in targeting cycle.
Principal G3 Offr resp for
N
resp for passage of advises on Mov issues. of Os. passage of information on BG
information on BG Establishes start-states, Wng Os. Comd Net.
7
Comd Net. Initiates reviews Attachments & Wargame. Scribe Tracks and coordinates
O
prelim Detachments and amends movement of friendly forces.

the Task Org if required. Oversees control of BG.
C
Adjutant Assists the COS as req Provides the G3 casualty estimate CAS tracking in conjunction with
RAO.
Responsible for the collection,
N
collation and dispatch of the BG

Operational Record (OR).
Responsible for Road Movement.
U
______________________
6
If Avn LO or Avn Comd present then he should give the Avn roles in plan.
7
In Armd and FR BGs, due to lack of BGWO.
2-A-3
CONTENTS
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
Regimental May accompany BG Prepares outline comms May recce future HQ/RRB locs. Preparation and Agrees final comms plan Occupy and secure initial HQ
Signals Comd to Bde HQ. plan. Advises BG staff on the freedoms Rehearsal. Oversees with BG locs.
Officer (RSO) Assesses EMCON and constraints of the comms prep of Orders area. Comd. Estb comms.
policy and structure. Orders. Delivers Comd Cfm Os. As per Prelim Site Step-up and next MAIN.
PY
implications i.e. LOs Develop and adjust comms support and Sigs Os. Wkpr.
and requirement to plan in coordination with COA paragraph. Issues CEI. Con Radio States.
lay line. development. Mission Rehearsal. Monitor COMSEC.
Map recces for Assists in the preparation of Wng Makes changes Activate comms deception plan.
future HQ locs. Os. as directed. Compile JAMREPs.
O
Changes to CEI. Acts as a scribe during the planning Supervise admin of BGHQ.
Regping packs. cycle. Liaises with Bde Sig Sqn to
C
Produce information Wargame. Review and refine ensure provision of specialist
management and comms plan. Briefs RSWO on comms and info systems equip
communications comms plan. req to complete the msn
support plans. Task comd tp with trace
ED
reproduction.
BG Logistics Attends DCOS OGp. Member of planning team. Integrates BG CSS staff in Preparation and Briefs BG CSS staff and Monitor the CSS state of the BG,
Officer Places initial bids As part of mission analysis developing CSS plan. Rehearsal. sub-unit 2ICs. in particular CASEVAC. Monitor
(BGLO) with HQ BSG. briefs CSS state. Quantifies CSS resources reqd. Writes CSSO. Cfm Os. As per Prelim CSS R2.
Continues staff After Q3 may amend initial Develops CSS COA/ COAs. Distributes CSSO. Os. Anticipate requirements. Initiate
LL
checks of BG CSS bids to HQ BSG. Wargame. Plays CSS in particular Orders. Delivers Service Mission Rehearsal. post battle replen plan and bids to
state. Issues further CSS WngO if CASEVAC. Support Makes changes BSG.
Issues initial CSS necessary Confirms bids with HQ BSG. paragraph. as directed. Monitors sub unit battle replen
WngO. Issues further CSS WngO as requests
O
necessary.
BG Detention Ensures CPERS is considered in Delivers CPERS plan Ensures CPERS Plan is Ensures CPERS are properly
Officer CSS plan coordinated dealt with as per JDP 1-10
Recce Tp
Leader
ATK Pl Rep
May be tasked for prelim
ops.
May be required for Q3.

TR
May attend wargame if available.
May accompany BG Comd on

Attends Orders if
available.
Orders. Delivers anti-armr

Cfm Os. As per Prelim
Os.
Mission Rehearsal.
Attends if available.
Confirms anti-armr
Adjust STAP plan within
resources where possible.
Takes under comd reconstituted
recce gp assets as required.
N
Recce. plan if contribution to STAP
Assists dev of DSO/DSM. appropriate. after recce/backbriefs.
Produces draft anti-armr plan/trace. Cfm Os. As per Prelim
O
Wargame. Plays anti-armr plan. Os.

Refines anti-armr plan and trace. Mission Rehearsal.
C
Makes changes as dir.

Mor Pl Rep Advises BC on Mors Assists BC. Attends Orders. Confirms mor contribution Track Battle with BG Comd in
resources. to STAP after TAC.
N
recce/backbriefs. Execute AB545B and Amend as

Cfm Os. As per Prelim Os nec.
Mission Rehearsal. Ammo management.
U
Makes changes as dir Monitors DPs and Trigger pts.
2-A-4
CONTENTS
ANNEX B
TO CHAPTER 2
TO BATTLEGROUP TACTICS
FIGHTING THE DIGITISED BATTLEGROUP HEADQUARTERS
1. The digitisation tools of the army, such as Bowman and its associated applications
and emerging IM/IX processes require battlegroup headquarters to adapt their working
practices to take advantage of digitisation. This annex is designed to make battlegroup
staff aware of some of these advancements, as well as their limitations, and how they
affect the C2 of a battlegroup.
2. Bowman Communication Information (CI) Plan. The Bowman CI plan is a
PY
complex process which underpins how a digitised headquarters is able to operate
effectively and be able to re-group when required. The key is to build in enough flexibility
and redundancy in the CI plan to allow for rapid re-orbatting. The CI plan should also
O
include dedicated LO assets with full data functionality to link into flanking formations.
Care must be taken with these assets and Prone to Capture (PTC) keys allocated
C
accordingly.
ED
Top Tip: Set preset 6 on all radios to a common net within BG to allow secure
voice re-grouping.
3. Situational Awareness (SA). Battlegroup SA can be enhanced by using Bowman

LL
Shared Situational Awareness (SSA) via OSPR and CPR Reports and, where available,
by use of HEaTs and GRaTs1 or similar tracking systems. These require to be set up and
O
properly managed. Battlegroup SOIs should define the OSPR/CPR settings to be used.
TR
4. Bowman Chat (B-Chat). B-Chat can be used for routine command and control and
certain Reports, Returns and Requests (R3). It is useful for keeping non critical
information off potentially busy radio nets but it is not all informed and therefore critical and
battle winning information must be passed across CNR. Battlegroup SOIs must dictate the
N
number of and participation in chat rooms, plus which information should be passed on
O
CNR and which is suitable for B-Chat. The Chat facility gives the user the ability to ‘Chat’
directly with one or more users within the network.
C
5. Use of DATA. ComBAT is the primary C2 CIS tool at brigade and below. All OSW,
N
R3 and SA should be managed using ComBAT to allow the maximum exposure. Data
passage is heavily reliant on robust RF links, primarily HCDR. File Transfer Utility (FTU)
U
should not be used if HCDR is not present (unreliable), although for small amounts of data,
VHF could be used (but should be avoided). Staff should minimise the use of FTU by
using ComBAT formatted messages (cut and paste as required from MS Office products).
Battlegroup planners must be cognisant of the amount of ‘product’ they are trying to send
over constrained RF bearers.
Top Tip: Know your network and any constraints on data passage that apply (use
Bowman monitoring tools (LASMIS/HCDR monitoring etc). Ensure staff are
aware of the impact on passage of information if the network degrades.
______________________
1
Linkage of GRaTs and HEaTs beacons into ComBAT COP only possible with BITS. GRaTs beacons need to be ‘managed’; with
beacon IDs being linked to ComBAT symbols (must be done by the local HQ staff and by the Formation Picture Manager).
2-B-1
CONTENTS
6. Interoperability. Bowman is compatible with most NATO radios in insecure voice

modes or by using bespoke equipment such as the KY99A NATO appliqué or Tactical
Voice Bridge (TVB). KY99A are however, only routinely held at brigade level therefore
maximum use of LO detachments is the norm.
7. IM/IX Definitions. The definitions of IM and IX are as follows:
a. Information Management (IM). IM is a set of integrated management

processes and services that enable and support the capability for collectors,
producers and users to store, locate, retrieve and transform information, allowing it to
become the right information in the right form and of adequate quality to satisfy the
demands of the commander or organisation.
PY
b. Information Assurance (IA). IA protects information by ensuring its
availability to those authorised to receive it, confidentiality from those not authorised
O
to receive it, integrity and authenticity. IA ensures that confidence is maintained in
the information when used.
C
c. Information Exploitation (IX). IX is the use of information to gain an advantage
ED
by improving situational awareness and understanding and which enables effective
planning, execution and decision making.
8. IM/IX procedures. Effective IM is directed by the ISO on behalf of the battlegroup

LL
commander and practiced by all battlegroup subordinate commanders. The effective

exploitation of information is crucial to managing the battle and to aid timely and effective
O
decision making. IM procedures should direct the management and production of:
TR
a. Operational Staff Work.
b. File Management and Distribution.

N
c. RFI Management.
O
d. Maintaining Situational Awareness.

C
e. Operational Record Keeping. This includes:

N
(1) The use of Watchkeeper and Radio logs.

U
(2) Publishing and subscribing for OSW production and key products (DSO,
DSM, Synch matrix). Consideration should be given as to whether these
products are produced on MS Office (for ease) or in ComBAT, which can then
be viewed on P-BISA platforms.
(3) All relevant documentation must be named and filed correctly (Confidential
and above in MOD 102) and all OSW hard copy signed by the commander.
Ideally copies must be electronically signed as well on ComBAT.
9. IM is not an end in itself. Commanders at all levels should challenge their people not
only to manage information effectively but also to exploit it to enable timely and better
2-B-2
CONTENTS
decisions. This, as ever, requires commanders to nurture innovative thinking, a

willingness to adapt and a strong sense of purpose. This is as much about reviewing the
organisation’s processes as it is about understanding the latest technologies and how to
get the best out of them.
Top Tip: Don’t underestimate the importance and rigour required for good IM and
IX. Use the relevant SOIs as a handrail.
10. Information Systems (IS) should be used with the following principles:
a. Ownership of Information – i.e. knowing who originated the information and

who is responsible for it.
b. Presentation of Information – considering the best means of presentation for
PY
the user.
c. Capture and Reuse of Information. Adopt the principle of collect and store
O
once but use many times.
C
d. Timeliness verses Precision of Information. Staff must consider:
(1) Time spent collecting.

ED
(2) Time spent in preparing information products.
LL
(3) Time required distributing the information, and

O
(4) Time required for assimilation by recipient.

TR
(5) Timeliness may be more important than precision, as information which

arrives too late to be useful to its recipient is of no value.
e. Record Keeping, Storage and Archiving Information. Information is to be

N
held in a form that facilitates its access, reuse, analysis and exploitation by all
O
legitimate users. Information that cannot be found is information lost.

C
f. Standardisation. Standard document templates, formats and structures are to

be followed as this contributes to understanding and increase in tempo.
N
g. Continuity. Information must be held in ways that allow its exploitation to

U
continue in all circumstances. This includes:
(1) Change of Control (ChoC).
(2) System degradation or failure.
11. Operational Record Keeping. LFSO 1120 details the requirement and procedures
for keeping Operational Records (OR). OR are a factual summary recorded at the time, of
key events and decisions in the course of an operation sufficiently comprehensive to
enable events to be accurately reconstructed and understood without reference to the
participants. They characteristically include a chronological overview, logbooks, nominal
rolls, incident reports, casualty reports, orders received and issued, and lessons identified.
2-B-3
CONTENTS
OR are submitted monthly to the relevant authority on form C2118/C2119 in hard or soft
copy through the chain of command in order to:
 Enable improved operational performance.

 Provide evidence of why decisions were made and actions taken.
 Assist with the validation of any claims.
 Protect against and be used in the course of litigation.
 Support the historical legacy, including official histories and classified
operational narratives.
 Provide the answers to Parliamentary Questions.
 Determine Battle Honours.
PY
 Support the formulation of policy.
O
Top Tip: Use the correct logs for the correct task and ensure they are
continually updated. They are a key element of ORK and a legal requirement.
C
12. Change of Control (ChoC). There are a number of reasons why a headquarters is
ED
required to move and retain command and control of the operation. This move may be
planned (i.e. to keep up with the flow of battle) or unplanned or hasty (such as receiving
IDF). Both require a set of drills which allows command and control to be passed to the
LL
unaffected headquarters (Step up or Tac) in order for operations to continue effectively.
a. The three types of ChoC are:

O
(1) Planned. In a planned ChoC, higher formations and subordinate units will
TR
be alerted to the ChoC though a warning order. The synchronisation of

information between Main and Step Up will be detailed within the relevant
Warning Order.
N
(2) Hasty. Where a headquarters has to conduct an unplanned or hasty

O
ChoC only a limited amount of time will be available to conduct ChoC

procedures. This will require best-effort measures in order to ensure that the
C
information held by the Alternate HQ is as up-to-date as possible. This is likely

to be constrained to any current MCI2 that the Alternate HQ lacks. Other
N
information is likely to have to move through physical transport of UDTS, EMD

U
or CD ROM.
(3) Emergency. An emergency ChoC may be executed if Main has a

catastrophic failure, or suffers an attack that prevents it from exercising C2. A
ChoC may be initiated by the Alternate HQ in the event of Main losing
communications or not being able to be contacted by subordinate units. In the
event of an emergency ChoC, the Alternate HQ will have to operate using the
information that it has to hand and continue the execution of the operation.
______________________
2
Mission Critical Information
2-B-4
CONTENTS
b. ChoC in the digital environment is complex and requires SOIs, training and
practice so that it is understood by all involved.
Top Tip: Key Data must be baselined and backed up by the I-Hub to the
Bowman EMD with the data carried across to the new headquarters by the
activation party.
13. Reversionary Modes. In the event of a ComBAT failure, cyber attack or similar
event battlegroups may no longer be able to rely on data to manage the battle. All
battlegroups should have SOIs for reversionary modes and should routinely practise them.
Battlegroup headquarters should always maintain a reversionary Common Operations
Picture (COP) such as a map board with positions marked on talc overlays with markers,
pins or stickies. This must be small enough to be man handled into the back of a vehicle if
PY
required to ‘bug out’.
a. Preparation. The processes for allowing a HQ to transfer to reversionary ways
O
of working should be embedded within the normal working practices of the HQ. The
compilation of the Operational Record (OR) provides the framework. The reason for
C
this is that the OR must contain all significant staff products generated and received
by the HQ. As a consequence as these products are produced or received they
ED
should be added to the OR. The aim should be, in the event of total systems failure,
to be able to open the OR and have mission critical information immediately to hand.
b. Documentation. As routine, a hard copy of any OSW produced should be

LL
printed off and added to the OR. Where the OSW requires signature on release,
(such as operations orders), then the signed copy must be retained.
O
c. Overlays and Mapping. Key operational overlays should be copied onto

TR
acetate as required. For example, where a formation boundary overlay is released

by higher formation. The location of major units should be updated as necessary
during the conduct of an operation.
N
d. Watchkeepers Logs. Where watchkeeper logs are maintained electronically,

O
then they should be periodically printed off, and added to the OR.
C
Top Tip: BGHQ should conduct regular training in BC2T to exploit ComBAT
and overcome skill fade.
N
U
2-B-5
CONTENTS
PY
O
C
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
N
U
CONTENTS
CHAPTER 3
ORCHESTRATING OPERATIONS
1. The Manoeuvrist Approach requires a number of mutually supporting effects to be

achieved. Since the 1990s the British Army has developed a number of doctrinal
frameworks to illustrate the relationships between these effects and to assist in developing
a concept of operation. The battlegroup will often default to a Tactical Framework of FIND,
FIX, STRIKE, EXPLOIT or Deep, Close and Rear – particularly during Major Combat
Operations (MCO). However, given the complexity of its challenges and the battlegroup
commander’s span of command, stabilisation operations may be better orchestrated
through the Operational Framework.
PART 1 - OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL FRAMEWORKS
PY
2. The Tactical Framework. The Tactical Framework provides a model for explaining a
commander’s scheme of manoeuvre for the conduct of tactical missions involving fire and
O
manoeuvre in close combat with the enemy and subsequent exploitation.
C
a. FIND. To FIND is to locate, identify, track and assess an enemy in order to
understand his intentions and support the commander’s decision-making. It is
ED
therefore vital that battlegroups allow sufficient time for their FIND activities to enable
appropriate understanding and are enabled by Recce-pull1. FIND assets are likely to
be collecting against a large number of concurrent Information Requirements (IR)
throughout the battlespace, however many of these will be actively contested by the
LL
enemy’s counter-surveillance and counter-intelligence efforts. Air superiority cannot

be assumed and any ground reconnaissance assets will require appropriate force
O
protection and/or be prepared to use ground in such a way so as to screen their

movement in order to provide their own protection.
TR
b. FIX. To FIX an adversary is to deny him his goals, distract him and deprive him
of his freedom of action. An adversary with no freedom of action is unable to take
positive action or dictate the course of events, he has therefore lost the initiative and
N
is only able to react. An agile adversary will seek to unfix himself and restore
O
freedom of action as quickly as possible, and therefore the continuing effectiveness

of a fix must never be assumed.
C
c. STRIKE. To STRIKE is to manoeuvre and then concentrate force, both physical

N
and psychological, to achieve the purpose of the mission. An effective STRIKE is

likely to be enabled by recce-pull, manoeuvring forces into a position of advantage
U
and then threatening or applying concentrated (and locally superior) force in an

unexpected place, direction and time to achieve surprise and induce shock, thereby
creating opportunities for exploitation. During MCO and to a lesser extent
stabilisation operations, STRIKE will involve the physical destruction of an
adversaries’ combat power.
d. Exploit. Exploitation remains the seizure of opportunities created by previous

activity in order to achieve an objective or to directly fulfil part of the commander’s
intent. This can be achieved by manoeuvre (i.e. a break out force), fires (i.e.
1
Recce-pull has been broadened to reflect the full range of assets which now contribute to the find i.e. close reconnaissance, snipers,
fire support group (FSG), unmanned aerial systems (UAS), EW, FHT and NTISR. This is also sometimes referred to as STAR-pull.
1
3-1
CONTENTS
accelerated targeting procedure to prosecute an opportunity or fleeting target) or

information (i.e. key leader engagement or Psychological Messaging). Exploitation
must be considered, pre-planned and resourced with battlegroup capabilities so that
opportunities can be acted upon rapidly when presented.
PY
O
C
ED
LL
Fig 3-1 The Tactical Framework

O
3. The Geographic Framework. The Geographic Framework may be used to

described how different aspects of battlegroup operations related to each other by time,
TR
space, resources and purpose as well as the enemy. This is done using the terms Deep,
Close and Rear. Equally battlegroups may be tasked to conduct Deep, Close or Rear
operations within a brigade or divisional scheme of manoeuvre.
N
a. Deep. Deep operations are those conducted at long range often over a
O
protracted period, against enemy forces not engaged in the close battle. Their
purpose is to FIND and FIX the enemy, and where possible also STRIKE. They are
C
executed to disrupt an enemy and prevent him from concentrating, so creating

favourable conditions for close operations. Examples include: disrupting enemy lines
N
of communication, isolating future objectives, fixing an enemy reserve or influencing

the perceptions of an enemy commander or population.
U
b. Close. Close operations are conducted at short range and within an immediate
timescale, usually within the direct fire zone during contact with the enemy. Close
operations are conducted to STRIKE and defeat an enemy often by the destruction of
his combat power. Close operations involve fires and manoeuvre.
c. Rear. Rear operations are conducted to protect and sustain the battlegroup
and retain freedom of manoeuvre for uncommitted forces such as a reserve. Rear
operations must be designed to create favourable conditions for close operations.
Examples include supply operations, training or mission rehearsal and operations to
defeat enemy deep operations.
3-2
CONTENTS
PY
O
C
Fig 3-2 The Geographic Framework
4.
ED
The Operational Framework. The Operational Framework helps to describe how
missions interact in terms of purpose. The commander identifies the activity which he
deems decisive, and then describes the other tasks required to support it as either
shaping, sustaining or protecting. The Operational Framework is generally employed at
LL
brigade or task force-level but may be used by the battlegroup during Stabilisation
Operations.
O
a. Shaping. Shaping operations create or preserve the conditions for success.

TR
They might include: reconnaissance, preparatory fires, preliminary moves, deception,

Key Leader Engagement (KLE) and psychological methods to weaken an enemy’s
ability or will to resist.
N
b. Decisive. Decisive operations are those that will lead directly to mission
O
success. A decisive engagement is the deliberate application of combat power in

order to destroy an enemy capability or seize an objective that will lead directly to
C
mission success. Decisive operations should STRIKE at the enemy’s critical

vulnerabilities, determined by a centre of gravity analysis and the 7Q process.
N
c. Sustaining. Sustaining operations enable the battlegroup to engage in close

U
combat and so retain freedom of action and the capacity to fight. They include
Combat Service Support activities.
d. Protecting. Protection operations are those which preserve the battlegroup’s

ability to fight. Protection may be active (i.e. targeting opposing threats) or passive
(i.e. protecting the force). Examples include: dispersion, OPSEC, flank protection
and STAP.
3-3
CONTENTS
PY
O
C
Fig 3-3 The Operational Framework
ED
PART 2 – CHARACTERISTICS OF BATTLEGROUP OPERATIONS IN THE
CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT
COMMAND
LL
5. Applying the Manoeuvrist Approach. Operations will often be conducted within

O
terrain that suits the enemy; often he may hold the initiative and seek combat in order to fix
and attrit the battlegroup. Therefore the application of a manoeuvrist approach to bring
TR
about his defeat will be critical and engaging in close combat will be one of a number of
activities that should be considered. Other considerations should include whether
objectives can be seized by pre-emptive manoeuvre or dislocated by using ground and/or
N
air manoeuvre to bypass the enemy and make his position irrelevant or untenable. If close
combat is required then the concentration of force on critical vulnerabilities or on a series
O
of isolated sub-objectives should be considered.

C
6. Maintaining Initiative and Achieving Tempo. Offensive operations are the way
through which a battlegroup commander seeks to gain advantage, sustain momentum and
N
seize the initiative. The initiative in this case is a battlegroup’s ability to dictate the course
of events, and is achieved by forcing adversaries into a reactive posture by out thinking
U
him and acting quicker than he can. This is known as tempo and is always measured
relative to the enemy’s ability to counter the battlegroup’s actions. Tempo is best achieved
through early target acquisition, rapid and accurate communications across the
battlegroup, agile and efficient decision making followed by equally rapid dissemination of
orders and efficient battle drills. This is often described as ‘Observe, Orientate, Decide
and Act’. Tempo is achieved when the battlegroup moves through this process quicker
than the enemy.
3-4
CONTENTS
PY
O
C
Fig 3-4 The Decision Action Cycle
INFORMATION & INTELLIGENCE

ED
7. Finding the Enemy. Locating a hybrid enemy requires the battlegroup to employ all
the means at its disposal to confirm the extent of the objective to be affected. Visual
LL
recognition of regular enemy units and equipment using target and AFV recognition
procedures, battlegroup ISTAR and brigade ISR feeds remains the primary means;
O
however such measures may be less effective where irregular forces and local nationals
are also present. In such cases confirmation of ‘friend or foe’ may require further
TR
corroboration through intelligence feeds, liaison officers or tactical manoeuvre. The

commander needs to consider and direct clear target assurance measures to his
subordinates in such cases and may consider retaining control of a decision to engage or
N
not where a miscalculation may damage campaign authority. Operations to FIND and
understand the human and physical environment include:
O
a. ISTAR & EW Soak. ISTAR and EW soaks may be conducted in order to refine
C
planning, particularly target sets before committing the battlegroup to close combat.
The battlegroup must be ready to refresh planning as information and intelligence
N
matures and hold forces at readiness to seize emerging opportunities.

U
b. Reconnaissance. Close Reconnaissance Troops and infantry/armoured

patrols should be tasked to look into specified NAIs and report on activity according
to the Commanders Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) and Priority
Intelligence Requirements (PIR). They are best employed where human
interpretation of events, capabilities and the future intentions of enemy and neutral
forces is required. They are often better positioned to provide target assurance and
collateral damage assessments than are staff in Main HQ. Reconnaissance troops
can be compromised and threaten OPSEC and must always be capable of self
defence and withdrawal.
c. HUMINT. Gathering and analysing Human Intelligence should be considered

as a means of improving an understanding of the operational area into which the
3-5
CONTENTS
battlegroup plans to advance. Specialist agencies may be able to assist if deployed,

although their knowledge and contacts may be immature at the outset of an
operation. Framework patrolling and KLE may offer other alternatives.
d. Understand. Battlegroup understanding flows from developing Situational

Awareness of the physical, human and cognitive environment into which the
battlegroup is or proposes to operate. Battlegroups must achieve understanding of
the operating environment individually and understand collectively how they will
successfully operate within it. This is achieved through the Combat Estimate
underpinned by the supporting plans and procedures described in Chapter 3.
8. Integrating ISTAR at Battlegroup Level. Battlegroup commanders may choose to

deploy an ISTAR Group as their principal method of finding and fixing the enemy. The
ISTAR Group is made up of a Recce Group consisting of the Close Reconnaissance
PY
Platoon, the Sniper Platoon, the Anti-Tank Platoon supported by an FST and Engineer
Recce and a number of Technical ISTAR Groups each consisting of a DH 3 detachment, a
Seer Detachment and a LCMR supported and protected by elements of the Anti-tank
O
platoon. A diagram showing the makeup is at Figure 3-5 below.
C
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
N
U
Fig 3-5 The Battlegroup ISTAR Group
9. The ISTAR Group. The ISTAR Group has a force multiplying effect consisting of the
layered Tech ISTAR assets cross cueing other Tech ISTAR assets or GMR allowing a
fused and streamlined STAR Cycle controlled by HQ ISTAR Gp. The product is fed across
the BG Comd Net and onto ComBAT via Situation Overlays enabling a shared
3-6
CONTENTS
understanding and awareness across the BG, but principally for the CO and key sub-unit
commanders. Further details of ISTAR Integration are shown in Annex A.
10. Intelligence. The battlegroup commander requires a good assessment of the

enemy strengths, positions and capabilities. He also needs to be able to make
judgements on enemy responses to the actions of the battlegroup in order to help decide
when and where to commit reserves or execute contingency plans. Assessments of the
physical terrain and the environment, particularly its suitability for approach routes, affect
on ISR operations and impact on command and control measures will also be necessary,
as will an understanding of how local populations will respond to battlegroup actions both
during and after offensive operations have concluded.
11. Exploitation. Opportunities to exploit an enemy should be pursued relentlessly

through ground manoeuvre, fires and information. An example is tracking a dispersing
PY
enemy force through ISTAR and air manoeuvre for follow up by precision strike and
ground manoeuvre. Another is conducting Materiel and Personnel Exploitation (MPE)2
during reorganisation to seize intelligence and reinforce a campaign narrative for the
O
consumption of local nationals. Successful exploitation requires an agile approach to
planning, mission command by junior commanders and a capable reserve which is able to
C
act quickly.
FIREPOWER
ED
12. The Challenge of Integrating Fires. The complex nature of offensive operations
necessitates both precision and suppressive fires to be used and for these to be integrated
LL
with non-kinetic activities, often referred to as information operations. The balance

between each is determined by the type and disposition of the enemy force and the effect
O
to be achieved. The battlegroup must seek to achieve sufficient suppression to enable it to

manoeuvre and sufficient precision to avoid or reduce collateral damage. Information
TR
operations may be employed to fix an enemy or exploit an opportunity to hasten his defeat
following a tactical action.
KINETIC FIRES
N
O
13. The Use of Fires. Direct and indirect fires offer the deliberate use of force to achieve
physical and psychological effects. In most cases fires are focussed on destroying an
C
adversary’s combat power i.e. enemy personnel, equipment, his will to fight and his
situational awareness. Fires are employed to neutralise or destroy enemy combat power
N
in order to set favourable conditions for close combat. Against an irregular enemy
operating amongst the population, battlegroup fires require high levels of target assurance
U
and positive identification and must be applied with precision. In any instance, the
employment of fires must match its intended effect (including tolerance for collateral
damage) with the most appropriate weapon system and munition.
14. Use of Joint Fires. Joint Fires (Air, AH, Arty) should be used to prosecute targets in
depth allowing the battlegroup to fight at ‘arms length’ until it chooses to close with the
enemy force. Joint Fires can be particularly useful for engaging and fixing enemy reserves
and destroying strong points using precision fires. Commanders should enable attached
2
MPE includes Tactical Questioning (TQ) and Interrogation, Forensics and biometrics (FABINT), Technical Exploitation (TECHINT),
Chemical Exploitation (CHEMEX) and Seized Media Analysis (SMA).
3-7
CONTENTS
Joint Fires observers to move to positions from where they can control Joint Fires once a
target has been identified.
15. Pre- Fires. Pre-fires can be planned and conducted by the BC and FSTs. They can
be employed to erode the enemy’s will and cohesion as a fighting force. They may be
area or point depending on the target effect to be achieved, and will usually be conducted
by indirect and air delivered munitions. Pre-fires can also be used to reinforce a deception
plan by suggesting an intention to attack elsewhere.
16. Deliberate Targets. The employment of direct and pre-planned indirect fires against
deliberate targets3 requires careful consideration during planning to ensure that they are
used discriminatingly and have the intended effect on the enemy, whilst minimising
collateral damage. Points to consider are:
PY
a. Fires should be focussed on key enemy vulnerabilities such as prestige
weapons, high value personnel such as commanders and specialists, headquarters
and logistic nodes.
O
b. Movement must be synchronised with the fire plan; the latter should be used to
C
enable the former.
c.
ED
ISTAR assets are used to identify and confirm targets and queue fires.
d. BM and combat identification procedures must be fully understood and

employed across the battlegroup in order to control fires and avoid fratricide.
LL
e. The employment of fires must be preceded by the target assurance and

O
collateral damage assessment measures stipulated within ROE.

TR
17. Emerging Targets. Battlegroups need to plan to execute Accelerated Targeting

Procedures against targets4 that might emerge during offensive operations. Within a
battlegroup this process is normally coordinated by the COS supported by the BC and
other staff, ending with a recommendation to the commander. It considers:
N
O
a. Intelligence related to the target to confirm target assurance.

C
b. Whether the risk of collateral damage is within authorised and accepted levels.
N
c. Whether the target can be prosecuted under existing ROE.

U
d. Whether the commander is authorised to prosecute the target.
e. Whether the effect to be achieved is possible with the weapons available.
f. Any BM and deconfliction requirements.
g. Any other go/no criteria.
3
A deliberate target is one which is known to exist in an operational area, which has been located and identified and against which
action or activity has been pre-planned and authorised.
4
Time sensitive targets are those targets requiring immediate response because they represent a serious and imminent threat to
friendly forces or offer a high payoff. Dynamic targets are known to exist in an operational area but have previously not been detected
and therefore their prosecution has not been pre-planned or authorised.
3-8
CONTENTS
18. Emergency Fires5. Deliberate fires are planned and executed by the battlegroup
Joint Fires Cell and FSTs. However there will be occasions when a FST is either
unavailable or unable to observe or acquire a target. Emergency fires procedures may
then be applied and must be understood by all. The following considerations apply:
a. ROE. Emergency procedures are normally required when there is an imminent

threat to life and self defence is required. However their employment must always be
proportionate and observers must always be mindful of the collateral damage that
may be caused to neutral or civilian bystanders. Where unqualified observers are
calling for fire, decisions over weapon release must be retained by qualified
observers or aircrew.
b. Target Effect. Observers need to understand and communicate to weapon
PY
controllers the effect that they require. These will normally be; Destroy, Neutralise,
Disrupt, Suppress or Deter.6
O
c. Combat ID (CID). All personnel conducting emergency procedures have a
responsibility to be situationally aware of own and other friendly force locations and
C
must be able to correctly identify a target as hostile before calling for or initiating fires.
A check list can be found at Annex B and further details can be found in the SOHB.
ED
INFORMATION ACTIVITIES AND OUTREACH
19. Key Leader Engagement (KLE). KLE provides the battlegroup commander with
LL
personal conduits through which he can influence decisive actors and key interlocutors.
Cultural awareness and bespoke strategies for engaging each leader are essential. KLE
O
activity must be synchronised with flanking units and higher headquarters, in order to
ensure coherence and consistency of messages. KLE can be conducted concurrently with
TR
other shaping activities as a means of reinforcing a message of strength or intent in order

to convince the enemy to take a desired course of action; i.e. withdraw, ceasefire,
negotiate.
N
20. Media Communication. Media Communication, often referred to as Media Ops,

O
provides factual information to a number of audiences, via the media, in support of a wider
Strategic Communications (STRATCOM) narrative. It is essential that coherence and
C
continuity are maintained by the battlegroup’s rigorous adherence to a top-down narrative

of key messages and lines to take.
N
21. Electronic Warfare. Man-portable and airborne electronic jammers can be

U
employed to identify an enemy threat and cue other battlegroup force elements onto it.
EW can also be employed to degrade enemy C2 including mobile phones and VHF radio
systems. Care must be taken to avoid C2 fratricide. Conversely the enemy may employ
its own jamming, electronic attacks or cyber attacks against our forces. Battlegroups must
be prepared for and train against these attacks. Counter measures may include:
a. GPS Jammed or Removed. Lack of SA due to loss of ‘blue force tracker’ and
navigation and survey limited to map and compass.
5
See the AATAM 2013 for details and aide memoires for each procedure.
6
See SOHB 12 Part 13 for definitions of each effect.
3-9
CONTENTS
b. Loss of Data. ComBAT failure due to cyber attack requires reversion to paper
map, overlays and pins/stickies to track the battle. Written or verbal orders replaces
orders delivered by data.
c. Loss of Radio through Jamming. Verbal orders backed up by op overlays.

Greater use of LOs, Coordination Points and runners.
22. Tactical Pysops. Tactical Psyops can be employed to weaken the will and
legitimacy of the enemy, reinforce the commitment of partner forces and local populations
and gain the support of uncommitted groups. The written word, spoken word and visual
images can all be used in a combination of leaflets, print articles, radio and TV broadcasts
and via loudspeakers.
MANOEUVRE
PY
23. Considerations. Some of the key manoeuvre considerations for battlegroup
commander during operations are:
O
a. Manoeuvre to Achieve Surprise. Opportunities to achieve surprise at the
C
tactical level are likely to be sporadic and fleeting. Successful exploitation requires
willingness by commanders to take risk and exploit opportunities to act while the
ED
enemy is off balance. Examples of surprise include manoeuvring in an enemy’s
depth and attacking from an unexpected direction. Deception can enable surprise.
b. Recce Pull. The identification of regular and irregular forces operating within
LL
complex terrain requires care and even with sophisticated ISR assets and manned
recce platforms, may require time to achieve an acceptable level of target assurance.
O
Where possible battlegroup manoeuvre is informed by the ISTAR group to confirm

manoeuvre space, locations of enemy forces, the presence of neutrals and vital
TR
ground. Recce by stealth and stand off platforms should be the preferred method to
ensure that when committed to close combat the battlegroup is concentrated against
an enemy force in order to achieve a decisive defeated.
N
c. Joint Fires. Where available the battlegroup should seek to employ air,
O
aviation and artillery to suppress or fix any reserve or depth positions while
manoeuvring in order to avoid a meeting engagement or ambush on unfavourable
C
terms. The employment of Joint Fires offers the battlegroup greater firepower, reach
and precision than is possible using only its organic capabilities.
N
d. Manoeuvre in Depth. The battlegroup should seek to manoeuvre in depth of

U
the enemy, exploiting gaps and infiltrating on narrow frontages in order to fix an
enemy force by denying it the opportunity to concentrate, deploy reserves or
reinforce positions that oppose the main assault. An enemy objective that is to be
destroyed may be enveloped beforehand in order to prevent reinforcement and
ensure that the destruction can be completed by a mix of direct and indirect fires.
e. Control Measures. Control measures including boundaries, liaison points and

limits of exploitation, must be clearly defined and situated on easily identifiable terrain
features in order to organise and control manoeuvre and fires by subordinate sub-
units. The use of spot maps can assist but care must be taken to avoid placing spots
on identified vulnerable points.
3-10
CONTENTS
24. Action-Reaction-Counter Action. Battlegroup operations are by their nature

adversarial; ‘the enemy also gets a vote’. Therefore they should be planned with a view to
considering how an enemy force will react to an initial battlegroup action or activity. Once
this has been considered, the counter action to be taken by the battlegroup should then be
determined in order to exploit the opportunity created. Examples include manoeuvring
ground forces to cause an enemy to unmask fires or deploy his reserve at which point he
is then engaged by fires. This is sometimes referred to as ‘Spike to Strike’.
25. Movement in Rear Areas. Tactical movement in rear areas should be treated as
manoeuvre in order to avoid or protect against threats from irregular forces. All moves
should be pre-planned and executed within a protective framework of offensive and joint
fires. Where necessary manoeuvre sub-units may be tasked to provide direct or close
support such as for MEDEVAC. All convoys should be organised to conduct their own
close reconnaissance, self defence and be able to call for emergency fires.
PY
PROTECTION
O
26. Operations Security (OPSEC). OPSEC is the discipline of protecting plans and
operations from disclosure and interference. Examples of threats to OPSEC include;
C
observation by local nationals with access to social media, the media, ‘off the shelf’
scanners, and micro UAS systems mounting cameras.
ED
27. Consequence Management. Protection of campaign legitimacy requires the
battlegroup to be able to address and mitigate the adverse consequences of own or
enemy operations, particularly where the affects are felt by non combatants.
LL
Consequence management may involve a range of measures including battle damage

repair, payment of reparations, internal investigation and defensive media operations.
O
Consequence management should always include the capture of lessons and where
necessary changes of behaviour to avoid repetition. Reputation may be the force’s ‘Vital
TR
Ground’ and the protection of it will necessitate battlegroup activity to prevent or mitigate
actions that undermine it; i.e. ROE infringements, poor behaviour or adverse media
reporting.
N
28. Deception. Deception is defined as measures deliberately designed to mislead an

O
adversary by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence and induce him to react

against his interests, in order to gain and exploit an advantage. In populated areas the
C
battlegroup should expect its activities to be observed and reported on by local nationals
and neutral forces. Camouflage and concealment and good OPSEC may not always
N
suffice. Achieving deception should therefore be central to the manoeuvre plan. To be

successful it must be well resourced and integrated into the overall plan from the outset.
U
Deception can be achieved in three ways:
a. The False Routine. Conditioning by repetition to lead an observer to believe

that an apparently standard routine will be pursued. The observer or enemy force must
be presented with the picture he expects to see; i.e. concealing a re-organisation or
concentration of forces and conduct of battle preparations within normal framework
activity.
b. Substitution. Leading an opponent to believe that nothing has changed by

covertly substituting the false for the real and vice versa; e.g. creating dummy
positions, field defences and thermal signatures whilst concealing the bulk of the force
in other counter attack positions.
3-11
CONTENTS
c. The Lure. Presenting an opponent with what appears to him to be a sudden or

ideal opportunity, whereas he is in fact being lured into a trap; e.g. a probing patrol that
is used to queue an enemy force to unmask and expose himself to counter fires or
ambush.
29. Combat ID. CID is the process of attaining an accurate and timely
characterisation of detected objects in the battlespace to support an engagement decision
or of combining Situational Awareness (SA), Target Identification (Tgt ID) and specific
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) to increase operational effectiveness of
weapon systems and reduce the incidence of casualties caused by friendly fire. The same
principles apply to minimising collateral damage and casualties among neutrals. Further
details can be found at Annex B.
PY
30. CBRN. Battlegroups are required to be able to maintain their freedom of action
despite the presence, threat or use of NBC weapons. A checklist for the preparation of a
battlegroup to be able to operate in this environment can be found at Annex C and full
O
details can be found in AFM Vol 1 Part 5 Operations in CBRN Conditions.
C
SUSTAINMENT
ED
31. Planning. The coordination of logistic support to the battlegroup falls to the BGLO
and his key advisors; OC Med Tp, EME and the other battlegroup CSS staff including the
QM (A), the QM (T), the UMO and the MTO. The BGLO must be involved throughout the
planning process advising the staff on the sustainability of their plans from a logistic point
LL
of view, while simultaneously ensuring that logistic effort is provided to the F Ech to enable
the plan to succeed.
O
32. Non-combatants and CPERS. In addition to the normal Med, ES and Log sp the
TR
battlegroup will have to take into account the requirement to deal with CPers, DPREs,
refugees and support humanitarian aid and hot stabilisation tasks within their ability and
remit. Further details can be found in Chapter 6.
N
33. Protection Parties. The battlegroup must consider how to protect its own critical
O
vulnerabilities while attacking those of the enemy. Key considerations include the
protection of headquarters, CQMS parties, Immediate Replenishment Groups (IRG),
C
Forward Repair Teams (FRT) and ambulances as they move around the area of
operations. All CSS groups must be equipped and prepared to defend themselves against
N
localised attacks and be capable of moving through un-cleared terrain. Where the threat
dictates, protection parties may also be required.
U
34. Recovery of Vehicles and Equipment. Crews and ideally vehicles disabled by
enemy action or mechanical failure must be recovered at the earliest opportunity to
prevent them becoming a captive or trophy for the enemy. In the absence of REME
recovery, vehicle crews must therefore be able to ‘hook and pull’ a disabled vehicle to a
place of safety when the opportunity permits. Disabled vehicles and crews should never
be allowed to become isolated and detached from the main force. If recovery is not a
viable option denial plans must be executed to prevent the enemy gaining information from
or exploiting such equipment.
3-12
CONTENTS
PART 3- PLANNING BATTLEGROUP OPERATIONS
35. Battle Procedure. The aim of battle procedure is to ensure that a soldier is sent into
battle without wasting time, knowing exactly what he has to do, how he is going to do it
and what support he is going to be given. The speed with which battlegroups can re-group
will significantly affect their tempo. The following principles of battle procedure must be
adhered to:
M
CAKE
a. Maximise Concurrent activity within the battlegroup for example through the
cascade of warning orders.
PY
b. Anticipation at all levels of the chain of command, so that all elements of the
battlegroup are as prepared as possible for the next mission.
O
c. A through Knowledge of the grouping system so that the battlegroup can task
organise quickly and efficiently and the capabilities of each sub-unit and attachments
C
are well understood beforehand.
d.
ED
Efficient drills, so that preparations for operations are conducted quickly and
nothing is overlooked or left to chance.
36. The Manoeuvre Plan. The British Army currently has three planning processes to
LL
assist the commander. Each is a modification of the others and each has been developed
to suit the purposes of the tactical or operational level headquarters involved in either
O
MCO or Stabilisation operations. They are:

TR
a. Operational Estimate. The Operational Estimate (OE) is carried out by

operational level HQs such as a JTFHQ in order to develop a Campaign Plan. It is
not suitable for battlegroup planning to solve tactical problems.
N
b. Tactical Estimate. The Tactical Estimate (TE) or 6 step estimate can be used
O
by divisional and brigade or battlegroup headquarters in circumstances where the

problem is complex and plans require significance sequencing in order to develop an
C
enduring operation. The TE emphasises the development of detailed plans and

understanding and is suitable for planning at the outset of an operation, for example
N
during RSOI.
U
c. Combat Estimate. The Combat Estimate (CE) or 7 Questions can be used at

all levels from division to platoon. It is best employed to develop simple plans
designed to solve single tactical problems where time is short and execution is
required in a matter of hours. The ground and enemy are the principal factors and
understanding of the wider operational situation is assumed.
37. Supporting Plans. Supporting plans are used to orchestrate the execution of
battlegroup operations and are owned by the relevant Subject Matter Expert within
battlegroup headquarters. These are:
a. Intelligence Collection Plan (ICP). The Commander’s Critical Information

Requirements (CCIR) will be confirmed during planning and then regularly reviewed
3-13
CONTENTS
during execution. The Intelligence Requirements Management (IRM) process is then

conducted by the battlegroup’s intelligence staff, and is the means by which the
intelligence related elements of these CCIRs are acquired. It is enabled by an
effective Intelligence Collection Plan (ICP) which translates direction into resourced
collection. The battlegroup should have access to limited ISTAR resources, yet will
be facing a complex environment, with many competing requirements to understand.
The commander will therefore face difficult priority decisions, and his intelligence
direction must focus effort on mission critical, or Priority Intelligence Requirements
(PIR); most often relating to adversary intent, dispositions and action. The ICP is
owned by the Intelligence Officer. Further details regarding the ICP are contained
within Chapter 3, Part 1 of SOHB.
b. Surveillance and Target Acquisition Plan (STAP). The STAP provides a

clear articulation of what to look for, when, where and with what ISTAR assets, in
PY
order to satisfy the commander’s intelligence requirements. The STAP flows out of
Q5 of the estimate and supports the Decision Support Matrix (DSM). The STAP is
owned by the ISTAR Officer. Examples are at Figures 3-6 & 3-7 below. The steps to
O
produce an effective STAP are:
C
(1) Conduct IPE.
(a)
ED
Look at ground from enemy perspective.
(b) Identify areas of weakness and threat.

LL
© Identify key terrain, Pattern of Life, Avenues of Approach, VA/VPs,

dead ground.
O
(2) Develop the DSO.

TR
(a) Identify NAIs, TAIs, DPs.
(b) Overlay dead ground traces from STA assets (day and night, good
N
and bad visibility).

O
(3) Develop the DSOM.

C
(a) Allocate assets to NAIs, TAIs.

N
(b) Prioritise resources.

U
(c) Consider redundancy.
(d) Identify and cover gaps by relocating existing assets, bidding for
additional ISTAR assets, clear fields of fire, use of Unmanned Ground
Sensors (UGS).
(e) Consider night as well as day.
(f) Link sensor to shooter (direct or indirect fire).
(g) Consider NTM of STA and fires assets.
3-14
CONTENTS
(h) Consider EMCON.
(2) Constant review process as a result of changes to G2 activity, Ground and

Environment and CCIRs.
PY
O
C
ED
LL
O
Fig 3-6 Example of a STAP in Defence

TR
N
O
C
N
U
Fig 3-7 Example of STAP in Advance
3-15
CONTENTS
c. Fire Plan. The battlegroup commander owns the fire plan. He selects the
targets to be engaged and states the effects required. This is translated into a fire
plan by the BC and his Tac Gp, who then control it during execution. Unless
delegated, the authority to modify the fire plan remains with the battlegroup
commander. Fire plans may be quick or deliberate, and controlled through a timed
programme, a silent timed programme, Time-On-Target (TOT) or simply be on-call.
Full details of fire planning is contained within Chapter 4, Part 4 of SOHB.
d. Communications Plan. Communications must be an integral part of all plans

in order to ensure that information flows across the battlegroup effectively throughout
the planning and execution of battlegroup operations. Communications planning
requires an analysis of the ground, enemy and electro-magnetic spectrum to ensure
that a robust and resilient set of communication measures are integrated into the
manoeuvre plan. The battlegroup staff should prepare an Information Exchange
PY
Requirement (IER) which articulates what communications capabilities are required
by each part of the battlegroup to execute their missions and tasks. Within
congested battlespace the need to protect assets such as radio-re-broadcasts should
O
not be underestimated. The Communications Plan is owned by the Regimental
Signals Officer.
C
e. Information Management (IM) and Information Exploitation (IX) Plan. In a
ED
digitised battlegroup the volume and flow of information across headquarters and
between levels of command is vast, and has the potential to inhibit battlegroups’
ability to identify and pass critical information when required. Throughout the
execution of operations, battlegroups need to strike an appropriate balance between
LL
sustaining routine information traffic and preserving enough space for critical
information reaching the point where it is required. Efficient staff drills in receiving,
O
processing, distributing and cataloguing information must be laid down, practised and
enforced if a battlegroup is not to be swamped. Data must be backed up regularly as
TR
an SOP and be easily accessible to those who require it. Continuity plans must be
developed and practised, including retaining a familiarity with reversionary mode
planning (map, marker pens and whiteboards) in the event of a power failure. The
IM/IX plan is usually owned by the RSO and enacted by the AGC Det Comd. See
N
Annex AB to Chapter 2 for further details.

O
f. Consequence Management Plan. The consequences of battlegroup actions

C
on the profile and perception of the campaign must be considered, particularly where
public and media interest is high. A Consequence Management Plan should
N
consider, direct and resource activity to mitigate adverse perceptions to undesirable

consequences of battlegroup activity. For example the death or injury of civilians, the
U
destruction of civic, cultural or heritage property or the exposure of poor or criminal

behaviour that may breach the LOAC. Immediate counter measures must be pre
planned and executed quickly; often this will involve the personal involvement of the
battlegroup commander or another senior battlegroup officer. Examples include the
provision of medical assistance, reparation payments, initiation of a service
investigation and KLE.
g. Sustainment Plan. A comprehensive and integrated Logistic Sustainment Plan

promotes freedom of action. It must be integrated with the ground manoeuvre and
fires plan and be sufficiently agile to enable rather than constrain manoeuvre and
exploitation. The requirement to deliver CSUPs, recover and repair equipment and
recover casualties and CPERS should be based on planning yardsticks and
3-16
CONTENTS
visualised throughout all phases of the operation. The Logistic Sustainment plan
should anticipate periods of high demand, the duration of the operation and the
distances over which the battlegroup will need to be sustained. Resilience should be
built in through the identification of logistic reserves. The BGLO owns the Logistic
Sustainment Plan.
38. Aids to Decision Making. The following processes are designed to assist the
battlegroup commander and his staff to make timely and effective decisions:
a. Decision Support Overlay. The DSO is the critical planning and execution
tool that displays on a map the most likely and most dangerous options for a
developing situation. Its purpose is to identify where the battlegroup will look, known
as Named Areas of Interest (NAI), where it will act, known as Target Areas of Interest
(TAI) and where a decision is required, known as Decision Points (DP) or Decision
PY
Lines (DL).
b. Decision Support Overlay Matrix (DSOM). The DSOM establishes what
O
effect (FIND, DISRUPT, DETER etc) is intended to take place in each NAI or TAI and
links these effects and any supporting activities such as movement to a DP or DL.
C
The DSM is a list of the commander’s decision points/lines with a corresponding
description of the event they relate to. An example is the decision to release the
ED
battlegroup’s strike group. The associated activities include:
(1) The associated Priority Information Requirements (PIR) such as the

location of the opposing force’s mobile reserve;
LL
(2) The Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIR) e.g. confirm intended
O
route towards the strike area has not been compromised;

TR
(3) The precise triggers being sought e.g. the movement of more than 6 x T72
in less than a 2km2 area;
(4) What action must be taken once these are observed e.g. move the strike
N
group on to immediate NTM.

O
Top Tip: During execution the DSO/ DSM and synch matrix should be used
C
to aid decision making and monitor the progress of the operation when the
battlegroup is in contact.
N
U
c. Synchronisation Matrix. During the execution of battlegroup operations the

synchronisation matrix is used to illustrate the relationship and activities between
each element of the battlegroup against a timeline. This provides a useful visual tool
for the battlegroup and sub-unit commanders and assists the staff in adjusting or
modifying activities in relation to the battlegroup commander’s direction or enemy
action. For MCO, a good DSO and Synchronisation Matrix should enable sub-unit
commanders to execute their part of the plan in a coordinated manner.
39. Reserved.
3-17
CONTENTS
PART 4 - DISSEMINATION OF ORDERS
40. Formal Orders Groups. Formal orders are the preferred means of disseminating
orders where it is possible to centralise the battlegroup commander, his staff and
subordinate commanders in one place. Formal orders groups allow the battlegroup
commander to deliver his intent personally and allow for immediate feedback and
confirmation of understanding by subordinates. Typically this will be possible during
Reception Staging and Onward Integration (RSOI) and during operational pauses when
the battlegroup is not in contact with the enemy. Formal orders should always be given
when a substantial change to the campaign or higher commander’s intent occurs and
following the production of a new Operations Plan (OPLAN).
41. Plan on a Page. Where possible Battlegroup Headquarters should issue a ‘Plan on
a Page’ which includes the Missions and tasks, Coordinating Instructions, the DSO and
PY
the Synch Matrix. An example is shown at Figure 3-8 below.
O
C
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
Figure 3-8 Example of a Plan on a Page

N
42. Data Orders. Data orders can be transmitted using ComBAT to alleviate the
U
requirement to centralise commanders and produce large quantities of paper documents.

They often enable planning products such as intent paragraphs and schematics to be
incorporated rapidly into an electronic order. However data orders are less useful where
confirmation of understanding and context are necessary through the personal interaction
of the battlegroup commander, his staff and subordinate commanders. Data orders are
best employed for the issue of Warning Orders and Fragmentary Orders.
43. Radio Orders. Radio orders can be issued verbally over the Battlegroup Command
Net. To aid accuracy, brevity and clarity, they should be issued using a Secure Orders
Card (SOC) Format. Radio orders are best used when the battlegroup commander wishes
to manoeuvre the battlegroup in order to exploit an opportunity through simple and well
understood battle drills and speed of reaction is of the essence. Examples are the
3-18
CONTENTS
conduct of a hasty attack, the seizure of an obstacle or a strike operation against a time
sensitive target.
44. Backbriefs. Backbriefs to the battlegroup commander by subordinate commanders

are an effective means of confirming understanding and resolving issues of co-ordination.
They should be used to confirm that a proposed Concept of Operation will meet the
battlegroup commander’s intent and can be supported by him. Ideally they should be
conducted after the subordinate commander has extracted his orders and developed his
plan, but before he has given orders to his own subordinates. Where possible principal
battlegroup staff should be in attendance in order to take action points requiring resolution
and further coordination.
45. Wargaming. COA Wargaming is a systematic method of analysing a plan in a

conscious attempt to visualise the ebb and flow of an operation or campaign. Adversarial
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by nature, COA Wargaming superimposes friendly, neutral and hostile elements together
to identify risks and shortcomings in potential or selected COAs. It pitches planners
against each other in a deliberate attempt to spark debate and generate insights into a
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plan. By COA Wargaming, commanders and staffs attempt to foresee the dynamics of
action, reaction and possible counteraction of battle. COA Wargaming is an essential part
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of the planning process.
ED
46. Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) Drill. The ROC drill is a visual representation of the
future operation used to ensure that the battlegroup staff and subordinate commanders
understand the plan and their role in it. The preliminary aspects of a ROC drill are similar
to a wargame but it is non-adversarial. Where the wargame is designed to validate key
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aspects of a proposed plan during course of action development, the ROC drill rehearses
the agreed plan for the benefit of its key participants. The ROC drill offers the battlegroup
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commander a final opportunity to sell his plan and confirm his subordinates’ understanding
of it before the plan is executed. Further details can be found in Chapter 3 of the SOHB.
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PART 5 - EXECUTING BATTLEGROUP OPERATIONS
47. Situational Awareness (SA). SA is sustained throughout the battlegroup by the

N
regular reporting of own situation as well as contact or sighting of enemy forces.

O
a. Combat Net Radio (CNR). CNR is the most reliable form of passing
C
information to all users within the battlegroup. SA is gained through a combination

of:
N
(1) SITREPS that should be sent as per BG SOIs. A suggestion is every 15

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minutes when in contact and every 30 minutes at other times.
(2) Reverse SITREPS are passed back down the chain of command from BG
HQ. These can vary from a relatively simple verbal brief from the Battle Captain
or Watchkeeper through to a more formal SITREP coordinated by the COS.
They include updates from each principal staff officer i.e. G2 from the IO, G3
from the Battle Captain, Fires from BC and G4 from BGLO etc.
(3) CONTACT Reports should be given immediately once in contact with the
enemy and then followed up with a full report within 5-10 minutes.
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CONTENTS
(4) 9 Liner (CASREP) Reports should be sent in order to initiate concurrent

activity and contingency planning for the receipt of casualties.
b. Bowman CHAT (BCHAT). Situational awareness can be enhanced across the

battlegroup when BCHAT is employed. BCHAT is point to point communications by
e mail between the sender and the recipient and anyone in a position to read a
screen in an operations room. However many parts of the battlegroup will be unable
to use BCHAT during operations and therefore it cannot be relied upon as a single
source of all informed information. The list of authorised and supported BCHAT
rooms should be included in brigade and battlegroup SOIs including those call signs
who should be authorised users.
c. Conference Calls. A regular conference call initiated either at the same point
in a daily battle rhythm or when commanders are available and unlikely to be
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distracted by current operations is a useful means of formally taking stock during
protracted operations. The call is normally initiated by the battlegroup headquarters
and conducted as a formal DOWNREP covering recent, current and future activity by
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the battlegroup staff to the sub-units followed by SITREPs back to the battlegroup
headquarters. The call is normally concluded by the battlegroup commander who will
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provide his assessment of the situation and emphasise any issues of concern or
future intent. ED
Top Tip: Critical Information must be passed across the Battlegroup by voice
on Combat Net Radio
LL
d. Reports, Returns and Requests (R3). Situational awareness is enhanced

through the use of clear report formats by which information is relayed. Sub-units
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should employ the OWN SITUATION Report, CONTACT Report and SIGHTING
report formats for routine reporting and all other reports such as the COMBATREP,
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FINDREP, PATROLREP, PERSREP and REPLENDEM as the situation dictates or

according to a formal reporting schedule set by SOIs. An overview of R3 is
contained within the SOHB.
N
48. Control. The execution of operations is controlled using the DSO, DSM and
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Synchronisation Matrix. The progress and execution of orders by subordinates is

continually monitored and confirmed, as are the full range of Indicators and Warnings
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(I&W) which may trigger the implementation of CONPLANs. Sustained SA enables key
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decisions to be made in accordance with identified DPs, and both Tac and Main continue
to communicate and direct coordination across the battlegroup.
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49. Battlespace Management (BM). Mission Command’s philosophy of centralised

intent and decentralised execution is enabled by effective BM7. Given the congestion of
operational battlespace, and battlegroups’ use of multiple ISTAR, fires (including EW/CNA)
and CIS assets/systems, BM is increasingly important in order to reduce the likelihood of
frequency fratricide and other interference; particularly when operating alongside multi-
national allies and partners. In order to sustain a battlegroup’s agility, and its ability to
respond quickly to opportunities and surprises, Dynamic Procedural Control8 should be
regularly rehearsed and widely understood; particularly in regard to the employment of
precision fires and aviation MEDEVAC. At battlegroup level, BM predominantly consists of
7
Outlined in detail within Chapter 3, Part 12, SOHB.
8
Full details of which are outlined in AFM Vol 1 Part 11 ‘Battlespace Management’, but summarised in Chapter 3 Part 12 of SOHB
3-20
CONTENTS
Fire Support Control Measures (FSCM) including Combat Identification9 (CID), limited
Airspace Management (ASM) and adherence to the Battlespace Spectrum Management
(BSM) plan. An example is at Figure 3-9 below and further details can be found in SOHB.
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Fig 3-9 Example of Common Battlespace Management Procedures

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50. Accelerated Targeting Cycles. Accelerated Targeting Cycles (ATC) are used
during the execution of battlegroup operations to prosecute emerging targets where the
level of delegated authority is held by the battlegroup commander or higher. Usually this
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will be where the target presents no imminent threat to life. For example an ATC could be
used where irregular forces are identified moving within the battlegroup area of operations
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but out of contact with own forces or local nationals. ATC offer the battlegroup
commander the opportunity to consider if and how such a target should be prosecuted and
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by what means. The freedom to prosecute targets may differ according to the type of
target to be engaged, the level of delegated authority and the rules of engagement. The
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battlegroup commander must therefore be familiar with any targeting instructions given to
him through the orders process, normally referred to as the Targeting Directive, and
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should ensure that targeting decisions are practiced during mission rehearsal and ROC
drills. A diagram showing the ATC is at Figure 3-10 below and full details of ATC are in
Chapter 3, Part 7 of SOHB.
9
CID is the process of attaining an accurate and timely characterisation of detected objects in the battlespace to support an
engagement decision or of “combining Situational Awareness (SA), Target Identification (Tgt ID) and specific Tactics, Techniques and
Procedures (TTPs) to increase operational effectiveness of weapon systems and reduce the incidence of casualties caused by friendly
fire” – JDP 3-62 Combat Identification.
3-21
CONTENTS
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Figure 3-10 Accelerated Targeting Cycle
. ED
51. Consequence Management. In circumstances where the campaign narrative is
likely to be threatened, the battlegroup may have to act to mitigate the consequences of
either own or enemy action before the execution of the mission has been completed. This
requires the battlegroup staff to have considered under what circumstances such action
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would be necessary and to have developed consequence management CONPLANS

beforehand. Detailed discussion to agree potential actions, resources and lead with the
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brigade beforehand is advisable. Examples include:

TR
a. Collateral Damage. Examples of collateral damage are death or injury to

civilian non combatants, the destruction of critical national infrastructure, for example
water or power supplies, or damage to sites of cultural or historical importance to the
N
civilian population. In such circumstances the threat to campaign legitimacy may

require both urgent confirmation of what has occurred and the provision of
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reparations and mitigation measures, possibly while combat remains underway.

C
b. Civilians and Refugees. The movement of large numbers of civilians and

refugees within the direct fire zone may necessitate battlegroup action in assisting
N
them to a place of relative safety. This may include the provision of escort parties,
guides and interlocutors with civilian leaders. Consideration should also be given to
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the provision of basic life support (shelter, food, water and medical care) if combat
operations prove to be prolonged.
c. Fratricide. Fratricide incidents should ideally be avoided through the

application of good BM and Combat ID. If they occur, lessons must be urgently
identified and implemented in order to prevent repetition and to deny the enemy the
opportunity to attack our reputation and credibility as a competent military force. This
may require the battlegroup to conduct enquiries to establish the facts while
concurrently conducting combat operations.
52. Chain of Command Enquiries. The near real-time public scrutiny of tactical
operations made possible by the presence of news and social media requires the chain of
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CONTENTS
command to rapidly establish facts where such reporting attracts political or strategic
interest. Battlegroups must therefore be prepared to devote time and effort to answering
urgent enquiries from the chain of command whilst concurrently executing operations.
Both brigade and battlegroups need to understand the necessity of such activities which
are often required to protect campaign legitimacy, whilst minimising the risk in executing
concurrent tactical actions.
Annexes:
A. ISTAR Integration at Battlegroup Level.

B. Combat ID Check List.
C. CBRN Checklist.
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O
C
N
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3-23
CONTENTS
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CONTENTS
ANNEX A
TO CHAPTER 3
TO BG TACTICS
ISTAR INTEGRATION WITHIN THE BATTLEGROUP
1. The integration of the feeds and products from ISTAR assets into battlegroup
planning and execution is identified as a key enabling activity for successful prosecution of
operations. The key to unlocking and focussing this potential is the ability to group BG
ISTAR assets to achieve maximum effect whilst retaining a focus for fusion at Main HQ.
One method is to create a ISTAR Group commanded at sub-unit level within the
battlegroup utilising organic and task organised ISTAR assets.
2. The integration of technical ISTAR assets available to the battlegroup with the
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organic Close Recce Troop, Anti-tank Platoon and Snipers provides a very powerful
configuration, capable of providing a Covering Force in the advance which can be
supported by armour if required. The Covering Force has the ability to FIND, IDENTIFY,
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FIX and STRIKE at range, enabling the battlegroup to have an effect on enemy forces
without committing limited integral STRIKE elements.
C
3. The provision of an ISTAR Officer1 allows the fusing of the information gathered at
ED
battlegroup level together with the flow of information/intelligence from Bde HQ across the
Bde Comd Net, the ISTAR BCHAT room or, if utilised the Bde ISTAR Net. This becomes
a very powerful tool to assist the battlegroup commander and sub-unit commanders in
their decision making and allowing the application of targeted effects.
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Organisation
O
4. ISTAR Group. The composition of the ISTAR Group is likely to be task organised
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to suit the operation. It will usually consist of a sub-unit HQ, a Ground Mounted
Reconnaissance Group and a Technical ISTAR Group. A diagram of a possible
organisation is shown below at Figure 3A-1.
N
a. ISTAR Group HQ. The ISTAR Group HQ is made up of a sub-unit HQ

O
normally based on Fire Sp Company or C&R Sqn plus a CSS element that includes,
where available, ES support for the technical ISTAR assets.
C
b. Ground Mounted Reconnaissance (GMR) Group. The GMR Group is

N
based upon the Close Recce Troop/Platoon usually supported with an FST and
Engineer Recce. It may also contain elements of the Anti-tank Platoon and Sniper
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Platoon and could be supported by armour.
c. Technical ISTAR Group. The Technical ISTAR Group consists of a those

non-organic battlegroup ISTAR assets task organised for the mission. These might
include a MUAS detachment, an EW detachment, an STA detachment and possibly
Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar (LCMR) when available.
1
OC Fire Sp Coy in an Armd Infantry BG and OC C&R Sqn in an Armd BG.
3-A-1
CONTENTS
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Fig 3-A-1 - ISTAR Group
Roles and Employment

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5. The ISTAR Group works as an integrated whole with each element assisting the
others to locate, identify, cross cue and develop targets to support the battlegroup
commander’s intent, contribute to answering his PIRs and CCIRs and enable a shared
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understanding and awareness across the battlegroup. They will provide the bulk of the
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assets supporting the STA Plan.
6. The Ground Mounted Reconnaissance (GMR) Group. The GMR Group is based
upon a recce screen provided by the Close Recce Troop/Platoon supported by direct and
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indirect fire assets which enables the GMR to manoeuvre. The direct fire assets could
come from either Javelin or CR2 dependent on the threat, posture and the task
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organisation. Both groups will operate slightly to the rear of the Recce Troop/Platoon in
C
order to provide overwatch and to thicken the ISTAR screen with additional surveillance
devices (TOGS/BGTI/Jav CLU). Snipers can be integrated into the screen to further
N
increase the surveillance capability and provide a precision strike; especially effective in an
urban environment. The GMR Group will be supported by an Engineer Reconnaissance
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detachment and elements of an FST who provide additional STA assets as well as the
means to call for indirect and air delivered fires. The whole GMR is usually commanded
by OC Recce Pl/Tp. The GMR Group always report key information on the BG Net to
ensure wider Situational Awareness but routinely operate on the BG ISTAR Net. A
diagram showing the likely layout of the GMR in the advance is at Figure 3A-2 below.
3-A-2
CONTENTS
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Fig 3-A-2 - Deployment of the Ground Mounted Reconnaissance Group
7. Technical ISTAR Group. The Technical ISTAR Group may contain a number of
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capabilities such as MUAS with DH3, LEWT, BISTAR and possibly LCMR. These can be
task organised into detachments to support the ISTAR effect and resource the STAP. The
Technical ISTAR detachment vehicles have different levels of protection and this provides
LL
a conflict between the tactical positioning required to provide protection and the ideal
location for technical exploitation. The battlegroup must take steps to provide force
protection for these groups. Options include grouping them with elements of an Anti-Tank
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Section in the advance and within the protected perimeter of a sub-unit in defence. It
should be noted that most technical ISTAR assets have to dismount to operate which will
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further increase their vulnerability. The set up and tear down times will have to be factored
into the tactical movement plan.
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C
N
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Fig 3-A-3 - Deployment of the Technical ISTAR Group
3-A-3
CONTENTS
7. Technical ISTAR Capabilities.
a. EW. The LEWT is best employed in baselines exploiting its range and
attached EW staff are best placed to advise on ranges as these will vary as a result
of terrain. It has an ability to search a 3600 radius which makes it a useful addition
to flank protection. The LEWT also has an Electronic Attack (EA) capability with
limited range that can be synchronised with other effects to disrupt the enemy.
Further details are in Chapter 1, Annex G.
b. MUAS. Desert Hawk 3 (DH3) has three main roles within the BG: it can
provide a limited ISTAR soak of known objectives to confirm enemy dispositions, it
can be tasked to operate ahead of the GMR Group ensuring that they do not
inadvertently enter enemy killing areas and lastly it can be cross cued by (or in turn
cross cue) other assets to further develop the target. It has a 15 km operating
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radius with a 60 minute duration. However, it cannot operate if there is any
precipitation or in fog or mist. Further details can be found in Chapter 1 Annex F.
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c. STA Detachment. The STA Battery can provide both Base ISTAR (B-
ISTAR) and Weapon Locating but not at the same time. B-ISTAR consists of mast
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or aerostat mounted cameras such as Clambake or Dewdrop along with an
operating team. B-ISTAR can provide point or area coverage of NAI/TAI using
ED
EO/TI . Weapon Locating comprises MAMBA weapon locating radar, Advanced
Sound Ranging Programme (ASP) and AN/TPQ-48 Light Counter Mortar Radar
(LCMR) In addition 4/73 Battery can provide specialist STA Patrols, usually 6 man,
for static covert surveillance.
LL
d. LCMR. With a nominal detection range of projectiles up to 9 km the LCMR

O
can extrapolate firing points considerably further, enhancing counter battery fire if
required. However given its large electronic signature, careful siting and adherence
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to SOIs is required to provide it sufficient protection especially against enemy IDF.
8. HQ ISTAR Group. The HQ ISTAR Group is based on the headquarters of Fire Sp

Coy/C &R Sqn. It will provide the STAR component of the plan, assisting in the production
N
of the DSO together with the IO and will be responsible for ensuring the monitoring of
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NAI/TAI by organic/non-organic ISTAR capabilities in order to help answer the Comd’s

CCIRs/PIRs and support the DSO. It will have a major role in coordinating the cross
C
cueing of Tech ISTAR assets and the GMR, feeding their information into a fused and
streamlined STAR cycle. The product of this cycle is then fed onto the BG Comd Net
N
and/or onto ComBAT via Situation Overlays, enabling a shared understanding and
awareness across the battlegroup but designed to support the commanders decision
U
making. It is capable of splitting into two elements; the ISTAR Group TAC HQ and the BG
ISTAR Cell.
a. ISTAR Group Tac HQ. This is a small mobile HQ deployed forward to

command and manoeuvre the ISTAR group. It is commanded by OC ISTAR
supported by CSM possibly supported by the EW Liaison Officer (EWLO) and the
2IC of the DH3 Tp.
b. BG ISTAR Cell. This cell remains in Main HQ and is responsible for the
fusing of the STAR product (Collect) together with the IO and his staff (Analyse)
which feeds the DSO controlled by the Ops Offr/Battle Captain. This in turn will
help develop the shared SA and assist in the commanders decision making. The
3-A-4
CONTENTS
cell is controlled by the STAR Officer (usually the 2IC Fire Sp Coy/C&R Sqn) and is
supported by the TUAS Tac Pty, EWLO, Tp Comd MUAS Det and other ISTAR
SME.
9. CIS. The ISTAR Group will maintain an ISTAR net and the ISTAR BCHAT Room
for the movement, control and passage of information within the ISTAR Group. Critical
information will be passed on the BG Comd Net. In Main HQ, the STAR Offr will monitor
both the battlegroup and brigade ISTAR Net and ISTAR BCHAT Rooms and in conjunction
with the IO and the Joint Fires Cell ensure the fusion of battlegroup product (via the ISTAR
Coy Group) and product from brigade to support shared SA and decision making.
10. CSS Element. The ISTAR Group can be a large organisation (over 200 pax and 40
vehicles of a complex mix) and its sustainment is critical. Consideration should be given
to grouping the appropriate echelon slice including ES elements that support the EW,
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MUAS and LCMR detachments with the ISTAR CSS Group. Where appropriate
battlegroups should consider enhancing the sustainment capability of this important asset.
O
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ED
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N
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3-A-5
CONTENTS
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CONTENTS
ANNEX B
TO CHAPTER 3
TO BG TACTICS
COMBAT IDENTIFICATION (CID)
1. CID is the process of attaining an accurate and timely characterisation of detected

objects in the battlespace to support an engagement decision or of combining Situational
Awareness (SA), Target Identification (Tgt ID) and specific Tactics, Techniques and
Procedures (TTPs) to increase operational effectiveness of weapon systems and reduce
the incidence of casualties caused by friendly fire. The same principles apply to
minimising collateral damage and casualties among neutrals. CID therefore affects all
aspects of a JF across the AO. The Land Component Commander is responsible for
ensuring CID is established to an appropriate degree prior to all Surface to Surface,
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Surface to Air and Air to Surface engagements and working with the Air Component
Commander and Maritime Component Commander to minimise the risk of fratricide in
cross-component engagement.
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2. CID minimises unintended consequences of engagements. The repercussions of
C
ineffective CID may be profound and disproportionate to the actual effects on life, limb and
property. The impact of fratricide, or a significant fear that it may occur, will damage
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morale and undermine trust and cohesion. Domestic and political relations between the
Host Nation and allies may be affected and collateral damage can undermine Host Nation
support. Furthermore, confidence in CID can improve speed of orientation and reaction
times, thereby increasing the ability to seize opportunities to engage fleeting targets and
LL
decreasing the possibility of missed opportunities.

O
3. Human Factors (HF) (i.e. fatigue, fear, mental capacity, personality, experience,
expectation and briefing, culture and survival) and operational characteristics (i.e.
TR
sensitivity, complexity, environmental impact and flux in ORBATs and groupings) impact on
an individual’s ability to understand and judge the situation and establish CID. Aides to
achieving CID sit across the three domains of SA, Tgt ID and TTP.
N
a. Situational Awareness (SA). SA affects the expectation of an object’s

O
presence in space and time being friendly or enemy. Familiarity with both the plan
and the current situation are essential and may be aided automatically (i.e. OSPR
C
detected by BOWMAN and displayed on ComBAT) or by interaction (i.e. CNR voice

comms). Observation (including use of ISTAR and reports from inorganic assets)
N
and visualisation (i.e. plotting on a map) increase SA. Threats to SA include

‘blindness’ across boundaries; different ‘pictures’ within different FEs (as a result of
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different visualisation tools, different plans or different interpretations); alternate

versions of mapping; lack of knowledge of reference points, nicknames and
objectives; and reliance on voice comms which may not be universally accessible
across all FEs.
b. Target ID. Target ID involves recognition of the tgt or a component part (e.g. an
indicator beacon). Positive ID (PID) is established when the observer identifies an
object. He may PID it as enemy, friendly or neutral. Negative ID is established when
the observer is certain the object is not of a certain type but cannot confirm which
type it is. Threats to Target ID include lack of commonality or ubiquity across
platforms (including the dismounted soldier) and lack of recognition across all
sighting systems and spectrums. They can also come from misinterpretation of
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CONTENTS
sensor data (e.g. UAS EO/IR collected imagery). This threat can be mitigated by the
employment of specialist sensor analysts to interpret data (e.g. imagery analysts).
c. Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP). TTPs affect the speed at which
CID can be established and include aspects of positive control, e.g. ensuring all FEs
report their current location or when they are clear of an area prior to targeting, and
procedural control through BM measures, e.g. boundaries/RFLs and OOB boxes.
TTPs for IM/IX assist with the rapid visualisation and dissemination of the Common
Operations Picture. Communications TTPs assist in ensuring commonality of the
picture and SA. Threats to TTP methods of CID include a lack of training; variance
between FEs, especially in a multinational context and between FEs working together
unexpectedly or infrequently; language barriers; and step up commanders with
incomplete knowledge of TTPs.
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4. CID Comd Responsibilities.
a. Pre-Action. Check:
O
(1) You understand the ROE.
C
(2) CID measures and FSCM are in place.
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(3) You are familiar with CID measures employed by own and allied forces,
and vice versa.
LL
(4) Likely location and intent of EF units, vehicles and aircraft.

O
(5) Location and intent of close FF units, vehicles and aircraft.

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(6) Action to be taken if lost.
(7) All above info is current.

N
b. In Action. Check:
O
(1) You are where you expected to be.

C
(2) You have informed the CoC and adjacent units if you are not where you
N
expect to be.
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(3) Any potential target is in a location and acting in a way that makes sense
in accordance with the operations picture.
(4) You only engage potential tgts that you PID as EF. Any potential target
that cannot be PID as EF, FF (incl allies and partners) must be assumed neutral
or civilian until EF PID can be established.
(5) ROE and CDE permit engagement.
(6) Backstop is free of FF, neutrals and civilians.
3-B-2
CONTENTS
Combat Identification – Case Studies
Two battalions occupied positions on either side of a river line with a Restricted Fire Line (RFL)
separating them. The battlegroup to the south were involved in a number of engagements
during which they identified Enemy Forces (EF) moving towards friendly locations north of the
river. EW intercepts were assessed by the battlegroup to indicate that EF were intending to
conduct coordinated attacks on both banks of the river with the aim of enveloping and
overrunning the northern compounds. One platoon south of the river believed they had
identified EF mounting an assault on the neighbouring battlegroup and requested authority to
fire across the RFL in support. The two battlegroups agreed the engagement and four Javelin
missiles were fired at a position believed to be held by EF. However the platoon engaged a
friendly force in one of the compounds resulting in a number of injuries and two deaths.
A patrol PID 6 members of an enemy force moving into the area of a known firing point. The
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patrol engaged with GPMG, 81mm mortars and one Javelin missile. They reported that the
Javelin missile had struck the intended target. Two hours later a civilian casualty arrived at the
patrol base escorted by a host nation policeman. The man had been driving a tractor in fields
beyond the intended target when it was hit by the Javelin missile.
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Friendly forces attempted an ambush on an IED team that had been planting IEDs over a
C
period of five weeks in the vicinity of a track junction some 800 metres north-west of a Check
Point (CP). An FST and a javelin post were on overwatch inside the CP, when the FST
Commander, using a Sophie sight, observed two individuals arriving by vehicle at what he
ED
believed to be the road junction and guided the Javelin gunner onto the target. The individuals
were seen acting suspiciously and were assessed to be digging in an IED. The vehicle was
engaged with one Javelin missile. The following morning it was assessed that the vehicle
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engaged was not actually at the road junction but in a field some 350 metres beyond on the
same line of sight. One local national driving a tractor was killed.
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The lessons drawn from these engagements are:

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 Good situational awareness is required especially of the locality of friendly forces.

 Any potential target that cannot be PID as EF, FF (incl allies and partners) must be
assumed neutral or civilian until EF PID can be established.
 Firers need to fully understand the capability of the weapon systems employed.
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 Firers need to understand the potential collateral damage especially beyond the target.
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3-B-3
CONTENTS
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CONTENTS
ANNEX C
TO CHAPTER 3
TO BG TACTICS
CBRN CHECKLIST
1. Threats. The CBRN threat to UK forces may include (but is not limited to) any of the
following which may or may not be directly targeted against our forces:
a. State release of radiological or biological weapons to deny ground or destroy

adversaries.
b. State or non state actor release of chemical agents to achieve informational
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effect, defeat adversaries’ will/cohesion.
c. Non state actor release of ‘dirty bomb’ to achieve informational effect, defeat
adversaries’ will/cohesion.
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d. Accidental release of toxic industrial hazard.
C
2. Actions and Considerations. ED
a. Assess. Assess threat to own operations, including industrial CBRN/toxin
hazards within AO and around critical national infrastructure.
LL
b. Plan and Prepare.

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(1) Establish a CBRN cell in BG HQ.

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(2) Train troops in operation of basic sensors.
(3) Train medical staff to detect symptoms of appropriate or likely hazards

N
(Chemical, Biological and Radiological) and threats.

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(4) Integrate sensors into STAP.

C
(5) Pre-exposure medical countermeasures.

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b. Warn and Report.

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(1) Provide simple local alarm systems (mess tins, klaxons, horns).
(2) R2 across BG.
(3) Reach back to specialist advice within CoC or UK home base, i.e.
DSTL/SCIAD.
(4) Use NATO ATP - 45 warning and reporting procedures.
(5) Link into local/host nation warning and response mechanisms.
c. Protect.
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CONTENTS
(1) Physical protection (PPE and COLPRO). Protect water and food sources.
(2) Confirm, cordon and contain CBRN hazards and contaminated areas in
the event of attack or incident.
(3) Establish decontamination areas within BG AO.
(4) Revise actions for immediate medical treatments.
(5) Risk management and delegated authority down CoC.
PY
O
C
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
N
U
3-C-2
CONTENTS
CHAPTER 4
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
1. Purpose. The aim of this chapter is to explain the principles, planning

considerations, organisation and execution of battlegroup offensive actions in a
contingent environment. The purpose of offensive action is to defeat the enemy through
the use or threat of force. It requires the enemy to be found, to be fixed, successfully
struck and the situation to be decisively exploited.
PART 1 PRINCIPLES
2. Principles.
PY
a. Seek surprise.
b. Maintain security.
O
c. Seize key terrain or targets vital to influence perceptions.
C
d. Achieve superiority of fires and other effects.
ED
e. Exploit manoeuvre.
f. Concentrate the effects of force or the threat of force.

LL
g. Plan to exploit success.

O
h. Keep it simple.
TR
PART 2 – ORGANISATION & GROUPINGS
3. The Covering Force. The Covering Force (CF) is normally made up of two
N
groups; the ISTAR Group whose job is to find the enemy and an Advance Guard to fix
O
the enemy, clear smaller objectives and protect the Main Body.
C
a. The ISTAR Group. The ISTAR Group is normally task organised from the
Close Reconnaissance Platoon augmented by elements of the Anti-Tank Platoon,
N
engineer recce and additional ISR capabilities such as tactical UAS, snipers, FSTs
and LEWTs. It is often commanded by a sub-unit commander. It is critical to
U
enabling battlegroup manoeuvre and should have a high degree of tactical

mobility. In complex or urban terrain the ISTAR Group may be augmented by
additional dismounted infantry. The ISTAR Group FINDs the enemy and locates
and marks approach routes, obstacles, FUPs, Fire Support Positions and Lines of
Departure for the Assault Force.
b. The Advance Guard. The Advance Guard is task organised for the mission
and can contain both infantry and armour. It employs both direct and indirect fires
to FIX an enemy identified by the ISTAR Group. It should manoeuvre so that it
can protect the ISTAR Group and expedite the movement of the Main Body by
preventing it from becoming decisively engaged until the battlegroup commander
so chooses. In complex terrain it may also be grouped with engineers in order to
4-1
CONTENTS
clear and over-watch vulnerable areas or force gaps in an obstacle belt in order to
allow the Main Body to manoeuvre. The Advance Guard may subsequently be
employed to FIX and STRIKE enemy positions in order to seize the initiative and
enable the battlegroup commander to develop an attack or bypass the enemy in
order to maintain the momentum of the advance.
Top Tip: The Covering Force must be organised to FIND and FIX concurrently,
the Advance Guard to FIX the enemy whilst the ISTAR Group locates depth
positions, FUPs, Fire Support Positions and Lines of Departure and then guides
the Assault Force to these during the assault.
4. The Main Body. The Main Body comprises the bulk of the battlegroup’s combat
power and is combined arms where possible. It remains balanced and out of contact
with the enemy until committed by the battlegroup commander. The Main Body should
PY
monitor the ISTAR Group and Advance Guard reporting and be able to plan and
execute simple battle drills using radio orders where necessary in order to maintain
tempo and achieve surprise once committed. It consists of three elements:
O
a. Assault Force. The Assault Force strikes the enemy. It is normally an all
C
arms grouping based on one or more infantry rifle companies grouped with
armour, combat engineers1 and fire support teams. The assault force is
ED
responsible for closing with the enemy and employs direct, indirect and intimate
fire support to enable assault troops to manoeuvre, seize ground and break in to
an objective. Control of the Assault Force relies on clear and easily identifiable
boundaries and limits of exploitation to ensure that the force maintains critical
LL
mass and does not over extend itself or become isolated from the echelon force.
O
b. Echelon Force. An Echelon Force strikes and exploits subsequent

objectives in order to sustain the momentum of the assault. The echelon force
TR
may conduct a Forward Passage of Lines (FPol) through the assault force or
manoeuvre to strike directly into the depth of the enemy force. It should be
committed deliberately by the battlegroup commander when he judges that
conditions are right, and will be supported by direct and indirect fires queued by
N
ISR, reconnaissance forces and the assault force to FIX the enemy. Once the
O
echelon force is committed the original assault force should reconstitute as a

subsequent echelon force. Rapid committal of the Echelon Force is necessary in
C
order to maintain momentum.

N
c. Flank/Rear Guard. The Flank/Rear Guard PROTECTs the Main Body

during the advance by moving on parallel routes and screening to the flanks and
U
rear of the battlegroup. It is usually formed from the anti-tank and machine gun
platoons and may be augmented with elements of the recce platoon and FSTs as
necessary. Flank Guards must be able to find and report enemy activity in
sufficient time to allow the battlegroup to react. They may thus operate at some
distance from the Main Body and must be mobile and able to defend themselves
against likely threats. The Rear Guard may also act as the Reserve.
Top Tip: The Echelon Force must be committed rapidly once the initial assault
force has culminated in order to maintain momentum.
1
Or Infantry in the assault pioneer role.
4-2
CONTENTS
5. The Reserve. The battlegroup should constitute an uncommitted Reserve task

organised to exploit success and also counter the enemy’s most dangerous course of
action. The Reserve requires good mobility and may be held ready close to the
battlegroup commander in order to react quickly. If committed, a new reserve should be
formed in order to retain the ability to react to the unexpected.
PY
O
C
ED
LL
O
Fig 4-1 Organisation of an Armd Inf Battlegroup for Offensive Operations

TR
N
O
C
N
U
Fig 4-2 Organisation of a Lt Inf Battlegroup for Offensive Operations
4-3
CONTENTS
PART 3 - THE BATTLEGROUP ATTACK
6. Purpose. The purpose of the Battlegroup Attack is to defeat an enemy by

physical destruction.
7. Types of Attack. There are two types of Battlegroup Attack. They are:
a. The Hasty Attack. An attack launched with minimum preparation which is

reliant on battle drills for execution. The Hasty Attack is used to seize fleeting
opportunities and is executed by those forces that are readily to hand to defeat an
enemy force. The Hasty Attack lends itself to the defeat or destruction of isolated
or disorganised detachments of regular and/or irregular forces who threaten own
force operations. It is best employed where favourable force ratios clearly lie with
PY
the attacker. The Hasty Attack relies on boldness, good situational awareness and
the execution of a simple plan based on well understood drills and procedures.
O
b. The Deliberate Attack. An attack launched at a time of own choosing. The
Deliberate Attack is used to defeat an enemy force by massing combat power and
C
intelligence over time. The Deliberate Attack may be employed where regular
and/or irregular enemy forces occupy prepared positions within open, close or
ED
complex terrain. Their defeat is sought through the precise orchestration of
tactical activities to induce submission. These activities include indirect and direct
fires, raids, demonstrations, electronic attack, influence activities and close
combat. The battlegroup Deliberate Attack may be preceded by brigade shaping
LL
operations to isolate and coerce the enemy force. Close combat is employed to
destroy the enemy force as opportunities occur.
O
Principles
TR
Hasty Attack Deliberate Attack
Boldness Seek Surprise

N
Surprise Concentration of Force

Speed Maintain Security
O
Intelligence Exploit Manoeuvre

Simplicity Seize Key Terrain
C
Shock Effect Achieve fire superiority

Drills and procedures Exploit success
N
Rapid manoeuvre Keep it simple

U
8. Conduct. The stages of a battlegroup attack are:
a. Battle Preparation.
b. The Approach (comprising of some or all of the following Enabling Actions):
(1) Forward Passage of Lines.
(2) Advance to Contact.
(3) Obstacle Crossing.
4-4
CONTENTS
(4) Link Up.
c. The Assault.
(1) The Final Approach.
(2) The Break in.
(3) The Fight Through.
d. Exploitation.
e. Reorganisation.
PY
BATTLE PREPARATION
9. Battle Preparation. There will never be enough time for battle preparation.
O
Battlegroups should thus apply well rehearsed procedures to prepare for offensive
operations, underpinned by a rigorous adherence to time management and maximum
C
concurrent activity. The following should be considered:
a.
ED
The use of the 1/3 – 2/3 rule for planning and cascade of orders in order to
ensure that all elements of the battlegroup understand implicitly what is required of
them and have time to prepare.
LL
Top Tip: Breaking the 1/3-2/3 rule and issuing orders to multiple levels is often a
false economy as it leaves subordinate commanders little time to extract their
O
orders and understand their part in the plan.

TR
b. Regrouping drills for newly attached or reorganised forces to the battlegroup;

including confirmation of orders, communications instructions and combat ID
procedures, cross briefings on capabilities, tactics and procedures (particularly
N
when other national contingents are attached to the battlegroup) and integration of
O
newly attached forces into ROC drills and mission rehearsals.

C
c. Configure personal and vehicle mounted equipment and loads to mission

essential only and make preparations to bring forward non essential equipment
N
during reorganisation.
U
d. Conduct a resupply of CSUPs to ensure that the battlegroup is able to

sustain offensive operations while minimising the requirement to conduct battle
replenishment.
e. Drip feed information to sub-units and issue timely warning order updates as
the situation becomes clearer, rather than wait until it is too late to act.
10. Finding the Enemy. Preliminary actions may include:
a. ISTAR. ISTAR (including EW) soaks lasting from a few hours to a number of
days may be conducted in order to refine planning, enable manoeuvre, deliver
understanding of future objectives and overwatch with recce before committing the
4-5
CONTENTS
battlegroup to close combat. EW can be used to listen to the enemy in order to

understand his organisation, future intentions, locations and strengths and
weaknesses. EW can also be used to cross cue ground and ariel reconnaissance
assets to develop the enemy picture further. Examples include; confirm and
identify details of enemy locations and defences including obstacle belts,
understand routine pattern of life, identify any restrictions on approach routes and
terrain and confirm suitable LS/LZ, FUPs and Fire Support positions. The
battlegroup must be ready to refresh planning as information and intelligence
matures and hold forces at readiness to seize emerging opportunities.
b. Ground Mounted Reconnaissance. Specialist and battlegroup Close

Reconnaissance Platoon/Troops, snipers and infantry/armoured patrols should be
tasked to look into specified NAIs and report on activity according to the
Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) and Priority Intelligence
PY
Requirements (PIR). They are best employed when on-scene interpretation of
events, capabilities and the future intentions of enemy and neutral forces is
required. They are often better positioned to provide target assurance and
O
collateral damage assessments than are staff in Main HQ, and can provide options
to move swiftly to assault enemy forces where opportunities arise.
C
c. HUMINT. When time allows gathering and analysing Human Intelligence
ED
(HUMINT) should be considered as a means of improving an understanding of the
operational area into which the battlegroup plans to advance. Specialist agencies
may be able to assist if deployed, although their knowledge and contacts may be
immature at the outset of an operation. Framework patrolling and KLE offer other
LL
alternatives.
O
11. Preliminary Fires. Preliminary Fires may include:

TR
a. Pre- fires. Pre-fires can be planned and conducted by the BC and FSTs.
They can be employed to erode the enemy’s will and cohesion as a fighting force.
They may be area or point depending on the target effect to be achieved, and will
usually be conducted by indirect and air delivered munitions. Pre-fires can also
N
be used to reinforce a deception plan by suggesting an intention to attack

O
elsewhere.
C
b. Electronic Attack. Where deployed, man-portable and airborne electronic

jammers can be employed to degrade enemy C2 including mobile phones and
N
VHF radio systems. Care must be taken to avoid C2 fratricide.

U
c. Tactical Pysops. Tactical Psyops can be employed to; weaken the will and
legitimacy of the enemy, reinforce the commitment of partner forces and local
populations and gain the support of uncommitted groups. The written word,
spoken word and visual images can all be used in a combination of leaflets, print
articles, radio and TV broadcasts and via loudspeakers.
12. Preliminary Moves. Preliminary Moves may include:
a. Demonstration. A Show of Force can be used to distract or intimidate the

enemy without becoming decisively engaged. i.e. a demonstration of firepower or
manoeuvre to demonstrate freedom of action, or destroying an enemy prestige
weapon or facility at a time and place of own choosing.
4-6
CONTENTS
b. Reconnaissance in Force. Reconnaissance in force is used to induce the

enemy to disclose his location, size, strength, disposition and intentions by
drawing his fire. It may be used when enemy fires are poorly executed and largely
ineffective as a means of acquiring targets and queuing counter strikes. A
decision to conduct a reconnaissance in force requires careful judgement on the
risk to own forces.
c. Raiding. Raiding is a means of striking at the enemy force with ground or air
mobile forces in order to achieve a limited objective such as the capture or
destruction of enemy personnel or equipment. It is a discrete and pre planned
activity that is unlikely to be decisive but will degrade enemy capabilities (i.e. by
killing or capturing key enemy personnel or equipment and attacking his will and
cohesion). It can be used as part of a broader shaping operation to convey intent
PY
including the willingness to use force if other shaping activities prove unsuccessful.
13. Sustainment Preparations. Offensive operations demand a great amount of
O
sustenance and thus the F Echelon must be fully re-supplied before offensive
operations begin. This may necessitate a ground or air delivered resupply in place, or
C
the use of a rolling replenishment as part of a preliminary battlegroup move. The staff
must estimate the consumption rates of combat supplies (ammo, fuel, water, rations,
ED
NBC PPE) and ensure that the resupply, MEDEVAC/CASEVAC and CPERS plans are
configured and resourced to sustain these rates. The casualty handling chain and
CPERS chain should be cleared and if necessary reinforced at each level to ensure that
sufficient capacity exists within both to handle the expected numbers of personnel.
LL
Where offensive operations are of an enduring nature, the ability of the medical or
CPERS chain to accommodate and handle expected numbers of personnel may
O
become a critical constraint on the timing of offensive operations.

TR
THE APPROACH
14. General. During the approach the battlegroup must strike a balance between
maintaining security, surprise, tempo and control. Consideration should be given to how
N
manoeuvre will be best achieved using a mix of tracked, wheeled and dismounted
O
approaches. Separate routes may be required for each, but where possible sub-units
should be able to mutually support or reinforce each other by using lateral routes.
C
Reconnaissance troops should be employed to protect approach routes by providing

overwatch, flank protection, and a screen or guard. The use of Air Manoeuvre should
N
be considered where it is available. Part 4 of this chapter (Enabling Actions) covers the
types of approach that may be used.
U
15. Dispersal & Concentration. Security and surprise can be promoted by remaining
dispersed in combined arms groupings when out of contact with the enemy. This
applies especially in complex terrain where the ability to remain unobserved is limited.
Dispersal plans must allow the rapid concentration of force prior to an assault in order to
achieve surprise and mass at a time and place which the enemy does not expect.
16. Security & Surprise. Security must be maintained in order to conceal intentions
and maximise opportunities for surprise. Enemy reconnaissance forces, sympathetic
observers and local nationals all present threats to maintaining security. In complex
terrain it is unlikely that the battlegroup will be able to remain unobserved for long, even
at night, and thus consideration must be given to how future intentions may be
4-7
CONTENTS
otherwise concealed. Masking or disguising preliminary moves as routine

administrative movements may aid deception, while rapidly concentrating force
elements from dispersed positions may offer opportunities to achieve surprise. A clear
understanding of the enemy’s dispositions, routine and pattern of life (movements,
locations, periods of alert and stand down) will also assist.
17. Generating Tempo. Tempo can be achieved through the application of efficient
and well rehearsed drills which allow the battlegroup to manoeuvre and concentrate in
readiness for an assault. The use of verbal orders issued using Standard Orders Cards
(SOC) over the Battlegroup Command Net is a very effective way of achieving the
maximum activity within the shortest possible time. SOCs are equally applicable to light
and armoured battlegroups.
18. Maintaining Control. Control measures must achieve a balance between
PY
enabling sub-units to exploit opportunities to defeat, capture or isolate the enemy, while
ensuring that sub-units remain mutually supporting. In close terrain or during night
operations guides and markers are required to assist sub-units to negotiate obstacles or
O
position themselves correctly for an assault. Examples to consider are:
C
a. Control Measures. Control measures allocated by Main HQ include:
ED
(1) Assembly Areas, Holding or Lie Up Areas, RVs and Routes for wheels,
tracks, aviation and dismounted troops.
(2) Boundaries, Limits of Exploitation, Report lines and Restricted Fire

LL
Lines.
O
(3) Actions-on contact, break down, lost, etc.

TR
(4) Order of march, speed and timings and actions on arrival.
b. Guides and Markers. Guides and/or markers should be used to confirm and
mark:
N
O
(1) Routes, obstacles and defiles.

C
(2) Form Up Positions, Fire Support Positions, Lines of Departure.

N
19. Defiles, Vulnerable Points and Vulnerable Areas. Defiles, Vulnerable Points
(VP) and Vulnerable Areas (VA) are obvious choke points where an enemy might seek
U
to impose delay or conduct an ambush. When it is necessary to move through such

areas the battlegroup must do so deliberately ensuring that the area and approaches to
it are covered by observation and fires before forces are committed. Engineers and
protection parties may be required to conduct mine or IED clearance operations
beforehand.
20. Route Clearance. Routes may need to be confirmed and cleared before
signature equipment such as tactical bridging is brought forward. Dismounted infantry,
engineers and ISTAR capabilities may be required to find and clear VPs or defiles of
IEDs, mines, booby traps or enemy lying in ambush.
4-8
CONTENTS
a. Route Clearance out of Contact with the Enemy. Out of contact,

consideration should be given to the conduct of VP 360 clearance drills on all
identified VPs including the positioning of an over watch party and the use of
engineers to clear mines, UXO or IEDs. Such operations must seek to preserve
OPSEC and should be silent in nature, however the commander must be prepared
to go ‘noisy’ if compromised and/or engaged by the enemy.
b. Route Clearance in Contact with the Enemy. When in contact with the
enemy the commander must balance the requirement to maintain the momentum
of an assault with the requirement to manually clear a VP of UXO or IEDs. In such
circumstances he may also consider:
(1) Use of engineer assets to conduct a deliberate breach of an obstacle

belt.
PY
(2) Use of WARRIOR or CR2 main armament to disrupt and destroy
suspect IEDs or UXO laid in a defensive pattern.
O
(3) Suppression of an enemy force while assaulting infantry mark and avoid
C
a suspected IED site.
ED
21. Recovery of Disabled Vehicles. Crews and ideally vehicles disabled by enemy
action or mechanical failure must be recovered at the earliest opportunity to prevent
them becoming a captive or trophy to the enemy in accordance with any denial plan.
Vehicle crews must therefore be able to ‘hook and pull’ a disabled vehicle to a place of
LL
safety when the opportunity permits. Disabled vehicles and crews should never be
allowed to become isolated and detached from the main force.
O
TYPES OF MANOEUVRE
TR
22. Infiltration. Infiltration may be used to penetrate around or into the depth of an
enemy position in order to:
N
a. Strike at enemy vulnerabilities in depth (i.e. HQs, logistics or communications

O
nodes).
C
b. Fix an enemy reserve force.

N
c. Bypass enemy positions which are of little or no tactical consequence.

U
d. Surprise an enemy force by appearing in a location or from a direction which

is not expected.
e. Pre-empt an enemy force by seizing vital ground or key terrain (i.e. a

crossing site, defile or critical infrastructure).
23. Considerations for Infiltration on a Broad Front. Considerations for advancing

on a broad front include:
a. The CF will advance on a broad front of three or four avenues selected

during IPE. The battlegroup commander normally decides upon which avenue to
use for the Main Body once the CF have conducted their initial reconnaissance.
4-9
CONTENTS
b. Maximum use should be made of echelon forces including attached Joint

Effects to support the CF and if necessary prove or force a route by defeating
minor resistance or breaching obstacles. This may require separate Advance
Guards to be allocated to each route.
c. A strong reserve including armour where available should be maintained in

order to exploit a chosen route or enable a force in contact to break clean and
bypass an enemy force.
d. Report lines should be used to generate a recce gap and control movement
of the Main Body, enabling the majority of the battlegroup to remain out of contact.
e. Engineers may be employed to conduct route improvements and should
PY
therefore be attached to the Advance Guard.
f.
O
C
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
N
U
Fig 4-3 Infiltration on a Broad Front
24. Infiltration on a Narrow Front. Considerations for advancing on a narrow front

include:
a. The infiltrating force must be sufficiently resilient to be able to complete its

mission even if compromised. It will therefore normally not be smaller than a sub-
unit.
b. Light infantry are often best employed to infiltrate in urban or close terrain, or
to clear enemy ahead of armoured forces, and can be deployed by SH in depth to
seize an objective.
4-10
CONTENTS
c. Armour and armoured infantry can be employed to infiltrate along boundaries

into the enemy’s depth in order to disrupt enemy movement or fix an enemy
reserve.
d. Infiltration forces should always be supported by organic battlegroup fires

and CSS, enhanced where available by brigade Joint Effects.
PY
O
C
ED
LL
O
TR
Fig 4-4 Infiltration on a Narrow Front
25. Envelopment. Envelopment may be used to pass around or over an enemy’s

principal defensive position in order to attack a vulnerable point in his defences. It
N
normally requires a diversionary or fixing attack such as a demonstration, raid or feint

O
against the main defensive area in order to prevent the enemy withdrawing or
redeploying in response. Successful envelopment requires the battlegroup to identify
C
weaknesses and deploy the assault force at speed against them. Air manoeuvre can be
employed to achieve this and is referred to as vertical envelopment.
N
U
4-11
CONTENTS
PY
O
C
Fig 4-5 Envelopment
26.
ED
Double Envelopment. A double envelopment is an envelopment operation
mounted on two axes which is designed to outflank an adversary from both sides with a
view to forcing him to abandon his intentions, redeploy or withdraw. It may also be used
as a prelude to encirclement and destruction of the trapped forces. It can be
LL
complemented by a diversionary or fixing attack.

O
27. Encirclement. An encirclement may be employed if the battlegroup is strong

enough to do so and the ground is suitable for the prevention of enemy exfiltration. It
TR
offers the opportunity to threaten and coerce an enemy force into submission and
reduce its fighting power over time. Encirclement therefore offers an opportunity to
improve relative force ratios before committing to close combat. However, an
N
encirclement may reduce the battlegroup’s ability to manoeuvre and expose static
locations to localised attacks. In such a case the Close Recce Troop/Platoon and flank
O
guards will be required to FIND and FIX external threats.

C
N
U
4-12
CONTENTS
PY
O
C
Fig 4-6 Encirclement of an enemy force in Complex Terrain
28.
ED
Turning Movement. In a turning movement the attacking force passes around
or over the enemy’s principal defensive positions to force him to abandon his position or
divert major forces to meet the new threat. A turning movement should make those
forces more vulnerable to attack. The attacking force is organised into a turning force, a
LL
main body and a reserve. The turning force’s manoeuvre causes the enemy to leave
his positions. The main body may initially distract the enemy from the turning
O
manoeuvre and then subsequently exploit the success of the turning force.
TR
29-34. Reserved
THE ASSAULT
N
35. Types of Assault. The assault may be conducted on a narrow front, a broad front
O
or by infiltration. The choice depends on the depth and breadth of the objective and the
nature of the terrain. Where an enemy force is arranged in depth but lacks the ability to
C
concentrate fires across his front, an assault on a narrow front with maximum
echeloning of assaulting troops will be necessary. In such circumstances direct fire
N
support may be unable to suppress the whole position and should be prepared to move
to an alternate position as the assault progresses. OS or air delivered fires can assist in
U
suppressing depth positions and preventing reinforcement. An assault on a broad front

is best employed where the enemy position is shallow and assaulting troops can
concentrate fires and offer mutual support across the enemy’s front in order to suppress
defensive fires. In close terrain where the enemy has sacrificed mutual support for
depth, or in complex terrain where precision fires are preferred to area suppression, an
infiltration assault may be preferable in order to take advantage of covered routes and
envelop individual enemy positions before the final assault. In such circumstances
intimate direct fire support will be necessary for each Assault Group.
4-13
CONTENTS
PY
O
C
Fig 4-7 Types of Assault
36. Stages of the Assault.

ED
a. Final Approach. The Advance Guard will normally provide direct and
indirect fire support and may be reinforced by additional armour, infantry or AH as
LL
necessary. The Assault Force should conduct the final approach in assault
formation and may use a Form Up Position (FUP) to do this if necessary. The
O
FUP should be sited so that it is covered from enemy view and fire. FUPs are
usually marked and protected by the Close Reconnaissance Troop/Platoon which
TR
is able to guide the Assault Force into position and indicate the assault direction.
Time in the FUP must be minimised as the Assault Force will be vulnerable to
counter attack and IDF, particularly if surprise has been lost.
N
b. Break In. The Break In is conducted by the Assault Force in order to rupture
O
the outer defences of the enemy position and enable penetration of the enemy
position. It should be conducted at points where enemy defences are judged to be
C
weakest. The maximum combat power available should be applied at these

points. Other considerations include:
N
(1) Fire Support. The Assault Force should be supported by dedicated

U
direct and indirect fire support which is able to suppress enemy positions
able to oppose the Break In. Fire support must be observed and carefully
controlled to maximise the protection it affords to the assaulting troops whilst
avoiding fratricide. It will be employed to protect the Assault Force as it
manoeuvres in view of the enemy once a Line of Departure has been
crossed.
Top Tip: All Force Elements should confirm their own fire support
arrangements and arrange fire support for their own subordinates.
(2) Engineers / Assault Pioneers. Engineers and/or assault pioneers

must be positioned forward and suitably equipped to provide manoeuvre
4-14
CONTENTS
support by dealing with field defences, mines or IEDs laid as perimeter

defences and other obstacles such as barricades, wire or ditches. The
momentum of the assault must be maintained at this point, and thus defeat
and suppression of enemy defences must take precedence over exploitation
of materiel. Engineers require intimate support during the Break In to ensure
their protection.
(3) Intimate Support. Infantry and armour must work in intimate support
to each other. Where infantry lead, tanks provide direct fire support and
protection to dismounted infantry platoons as they encounter enemy
positions. Infantry provide intimate support to armour against hand held anti-
armour weapons and clear routes to allow armour to penetrate into the
objective. Effective intimate support requires clear and regular
communication between tanks and dismounted infantry and is often best
PY
achieved through regular face to face communication. Communication may
be further enhanced by the use of link men and runners, and clear means of
identifying the locations of own troops, for example by the use of flags in
O
urban terrain or coloured smoke in woods and forests.
C
c. Fight Through. The Fight Through is a series of minor actions often
conducted in low visibility and chaotic confusing surroundings. These actions
ED
must be controlled by coordination measures applied by sub-unit commanders
across boundaries and directed by junior commanders within those boundaries.
Top Tip: The Fight Through needs careful control by Battlegroup Main in
LL
order to avoid fratricide caused by uncontrolled flanking manoeuvre by

sub units.
O
(1) Fire & Movement. Assaulting troops should not move without direct
TR
fire support to suppress enemy positions. In complex terrain assaulting

troops should keep close to the enemy and deny him the opportunity to break
clean or manoeuvre freely. Where gaps occur and the enemy does break
clean, assaulting troops must be prepared to clear abandoned positions of
N
booby traps and IEDs before occupying them.

O
(2) Envelopment. The Assault Force should seek to envelop individual

C
enemy positions to prevent them being reinforced and to suppress them so

that they are unable to prevent further penetration occurring. Infantry and
N
armour should look to manoeuvre into the depth and flanks of each position
and use precision direct or indirect fire to destroy it before assaulting it with
U
infantry.
(3) Fires. All troops must be able to call for fires from artillery, mortars or
AH and be able to hand off the target to a trained observer (FST, MFC, FAC)
when the observer is in a position to assume control. The whole force
(Ground and Joint Fires) should aim to destroy enemy prestige and heavy
weapons as a priority as these will be most effective at breaking up the
integrity of the assault. Assaulting troops must be able to identify and
indicate targets through clear target indication orders, tracer or laser target
designators. Armour may be brought forward to suppress or destroy well
defended fortifications or field defences. Assaulting troops must also be
aware of NFAs and Sites of Cultural Significance. Such sites will be subject
4-15
CONTENTS
to restricted targeting measures and engagement, other than in self defence,

is unlikely to be permitted.
(4) Control. Control of the assault must be maintained through the

imposition of clear control measures which impose boundaries and limits of
exploitation for each sub-unit. These must be clearly understood and
recognisable on the ground in conditions of limited visibility. Assaulting sub-
units must establish co-ordination points on shared boundaries in order to
exchange intelligence and information on the locations of enemy positions,
other friendly forces, future intentions and to tie up cross boundary fire
support arrangements. Boundaries are Restricted Fire Lines and the
conditions and coordination required to permit firing across them should be
pre-arranged during orders. Commanders should issue orders confirming
the procedures for establishing the Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT), and
PY
for marking objectives that have been cleared and which now occupy friendly
forces. Regular SITREPs should be passed to Main HQ by the Assaulting
Force confirming own and enemy situations.
O
(5) Commitment of Echelon Forces. The commander must be prepared
C
to commit Echelon Forces in order to maintain momentum by either
reinforcing the assault or exploiting a gap or collapse of the enemy position.
ED
Echelon Forces must therefore be positioned close enough to the Assault
Force to be able to take over the assault without any loss of momentum, but
must not become decisively engaged until ordered. This can be achieved
through the siting of commanders and Tac parties forward with the Assault
LL
Force, with the remainder of the Echelon Force held one tactical bound to the
rear. Once the Echelon Force is committed the Assault Force may be
O
required to re-organise as the new Echelon Force.

TR
Top Tip: The Echelon Force OC may collocate and move with BG Tac in
order to speed up the commitment of the echelon force when ordered.
N
(6) Sustaining the Assault. The Assault Force must be sustained

O
throughout the attack. This might be through the regular delivery of CSUPs,
BCRs and vehicle replacement/repairs or the use of the Echelon Force or
C
Reserve. Casualties and Captured Persons (CPERS) should be removed as

soon as possible without causing the Assault Force to loose momentum.
N
Battlefield replenishment should therefore be pre-planned and quickly

executed during pauses in the assault. CSUPs should be held forward, on
U
wheels or pallets where possible, and broken down and distributed to reflect
the Assault Force groupings. Every opportunity should be taken to move
casualties within the medical planning timelines; either by ground ambulance
to a Role 1 Medical Treatment Facility or by helicopter direct to deployed
hospital care. The battlegroup Security Force, where deployed, will be
responsible for maintaining freedom of movement for battlefield
replenishment, opening, clearing and securing routes to and from the Assault
Force as necessary.
(7) Commitment of the Reserve. The commander must be prepared to

commit his reserve if required. The conditions under which he will do this
should have been exposed during planning and be recorded in the DSM.
4-16
CONTENTS
The reserve should be a combined arms grouping, task organised to counter

the enemy’s most dangerous course of action and will be held out of contact
and preferably concealed from enemy observation. If committed, a new
reserve must be formed as soon as is practicably possible.
PY
O
C
ED
LL
Fig 4-8 The Fight Through in Close Terrain

O
37. Exploitation. Once an objective has been secured or seized the battlegroup must
ruthlessly exploit the opportunity in order to retain the initiative, keep the enemy off
TR
balance and develop further opportunities to progress campaign aims. Exploitation

should be conducted locally by sub-units applying mission command within clear limits
of exploitation in order to prevent fratricide or over extension. Exploitation can take a
number of forms including: continued manoeuvre against a withdrawing enemy force in
N
order to pursue and inflict further attrition on its combat power; the seizure of persons
O
and materiel in order to develop further opportunities to continue offensive operations;

and the use of information activities to promote own campaign legitimacy. Plans for
C
exploitation must be developed during the initial planning process and be executed
wherever possible.
N
a. Pursuit. Exploitation through the pursuit of a withdrawing enemy force is

U
likely to be an echelon or reserve task and may rely on quick battle orders to clarify
final details along with coordination measures for fire support, boundaries and
limits of exploitation. The most mobile elements of the battlegroup such as
Armour/Armoured Infantry and AH are often best employed in such roles. Care
must be taken to ensure that the battlegroup does not become too unbalanced and
disorganised with the pursuing force isolated from the main body and vulnerable to
enemy counter attack. Equally however, the commander must guard against
being over cautious. This will be a balance of opportunity versus risk that
demands good situational awareness and judgement.
b. Material & Personnel Exploitation (MPE). The battlegroup should be

prepared to conduct MPE during the reorganisation. MPE is conducted on the
4-17
CONTENTS
battlegroup objective in order to capture items of evidential or intelligence value

(i.e. written plans and orders, maps, electronic media and weapons). These
should be collected and labelled with details of the handler and a short written
description of the circumstances in which they were seized, accompanied by
photography of the scene. Specialist agencies such as Weapons Intelligence,
Royal Military Police, Tactical Questioners and Explosive Ordnance Disposal may
be called forward to assist.2 Movement of MPE rearwards should be expedited
swiftly and every opportunity taken to act upon it where the intelligence produced
is of a time sensitive nature.
c. Information Activities. Rapid exploitation of battlegroup tactical actions

through the use of Media or Tactical Psyops can promote own campaign
legitimacy and degrade the will of an enemy force. Equally it can be used to
protect campaign legitimacy by offering a means of rebutting accusations of
PY
collateral damage. Such opportunities should be planned for with the brigade staff
at the outset and the move forward of accredited media or combat camera teams
should be included in plans for the re-organisation.
O
REORGANISATION
C
38. Transition to Hasty Defence. Once the assault has culminated or the objective
ED
has been achieved, the Assault Force and Echelon Force should be prepared to
transition to hasty defence prior to an order to reorganise. The ISTAR Group should
deploy as a screen in order to maintain contact with any residual enemy and to give
warning of a counter attack. This should be done before reorganisation is commenced.
LL
The remainder of the Assault Force should organise into all round defence, tie up arcs,
site support weapons and coordinate defensive fires. The Echelon Force should remain
O
a tactical bound to the rear acting as an immediate reserve. Defensive positions should
be sited under hard cover where possible whilst in open country field defences and
TR
battle trenches should be prepared.
Top Tip: The Assault Force should adopt a hasty defence, including the
preparation of basic field defences, before re-organising for subsequent
N
operations.
O
39. Replenishment. Replenishment should take place as soon as practicable. If the

C
battlegroup is to remain in hasty defence then hide replenishment or air delivered

replenishment should be employed. Where further manoeuvre is required, the
N
battlegroup should transit through a rolling replenishment. Further details are contained
in Chapter 6.
U
40. Recuperation. Recuperation occurs after contact with the enemy has concluded
and is intended to restore combat effectiveness. It includes the receipt of BCR who
must be briefed on the current situation, any standing operating procedures and control
measures and future intentions before being deployed to their posts. Equipment
failures and casualties must be identified and centralised ready for the attention of
FRTs.
41. Repair. Vehicles and weapons must be repaired or recovered or replaced as a

priority in order to maintain the fighting ability of the battlegroup. The LAD and FRTs
2
See JDN 2/09 Materiel and Personnel Exploitation for further details.
4-18
CONTENTS
from the brigade ES Battalion are deployed to achieve this, with the priority dictated by
Fmn and BG orders. Further details are contained in Chapter 6.
42. Casualties. Casualties are recovered through the MEDEVAC chain. During
reorganisation the tactical situation may allow one or more of the battlegroup's Role 1
Medical Treatment Facilities to be deployed further forward in order to maintain clinical
timelines. Further details are contained in Chapter 6.
43. Captured Persons (CPERS). CPERS should be disarmed, searched, guarded

and evacuated through the handling chain as soon as possible. The battlegroup should
be prepared to establish a Unit Holding Area where CPERS can be protected and
sustained until their onward movement is possible. Further details are contained in
Chapter 6 and JDP 1-10.
PY
44. The Battle Drills for the attack can be found at Annex A.
O
C
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
N
U
4-19
CONTENTS
PART 4 – ENABLING ACTIONS
BATTLEGROUP FORWARD PASSAGE OF LINES
45. Purpose. A Forward Passage of Lines (FPoL) is an operation in which one force
advances through another. A battlegroup FPoL is commanded and controlled by a
brigade and is considered in more detail in Chapter 6 Annex F to AFM Vol 1 Part 1,
Brigade Tactics. The following considerations refer to a battlegroup executing a simple
FPoL with its own sub-units. A FPoL will be used when:
a. An echelon change is conducted with fresh or more suitable forces.
b. The force to be relieved is closely engaged with the enemy.
PY
c. A breakout force moves through a bridgehead force.
46. Principles. The principles of an FPoL are:
O
a. Simplicity. An FPoL should be executed as a drill to allow the Advancing
C
Force to pass quickly and easily through the In Place Force.
b.
ED
Security. The battlegroup is vulnerable and off balance during an FPoL.
Security, in particular good OPSEC, should be maintained.
c. Control. Clear C2 arrangements for movement and coordination of fires are

LL
required.
O
d. Flexibility. The Advancing Force and In Place Force must be able to

respond to enemy activity and avoid becoming fixed.
TR
e. Offensive Action. The enemy must be prevented from interfering with the
FPoL through either the execution or threat of offensive action.
N
ORGANISATION
O
47. Controlling Headquarters. Battlegroup Main HQ plans, coordinates and

C
commands the FPol. Responsibilities include:

N
a. The manoeuvre plan and coordination measures including directing BM

procedures, CSCM, routes, traffic control, RVs and timings.
U
b. The tasking of reconnaissance and liaison parties.
c. Confirmation of Combat ID and recognition procedures.
d. The organisation and resourcing of a deception plan.
e. Requests for Joint Effects, particularly air and aviation.
f. The sustainment plan including responsibilities for resupply, handover or

recovery of equipment and provision of CASEVAC/MEDEVAC.
4-20
CONTENTS
g. Arrangements for handling, screening and protecting civilians and refugees.
Top Tip - 7 Armd Brigade Big 5

The ‘Big 5’ applicable to any Relief of Troops and initiated by the Controlling
HQ are as follows:
a. Passage Point(s).
b. Routes.
c. Boundaries.
d. Restricted Fire Line, (if not the boundary and when activated).
e. Support:
(1) Command Support, (co-location of HQs, timings, liaison).
(2) CSS.
(3) Fire Support.
PY
48. In Place Force. Typically the In Place Force consists of elements of the
O
battlegroup ISTAR group deployed in a Screen or Guard or an infantry company group
in area defence. The In Place Force:
C
a. Provides the advancing force with up to date intelligence on the enemy,
ED
physical and human terrain.
b. Secures and protects the LD.

LL
c. Recces, confirms and controls routes to the LD including separate routes for
tracks, wheels and dismounted infantry.
O
d. Provides guides and if required traffic control to the advancing force.

TR
e. Integrates direct and indirect fire support into the advancing force fire plan.
f. Replenishes the advancing force with CSUPs especially fuel if required.

N
O
g. Evacuates casualties and CPERS from the advancing force.

C
h. Recovers disabled vehicles and equipment from the advancing force.

N
49. The Advancing Force. The Advancing Force is typically an infantry company or
armoured squadron group. The Advancing Force:
U
a. Co-locates the Coy/Sqn HQ with the In Place Force HQ to enable

coordination and maintain good situational awareness.
b. Regroups into ORBATs and Order of March required forward of the LD in an

Assembly Area.
c. Controls fires, including fire support from the In Place Force.
d. Controls movement of troops across the LD.
e. Co-ordinates the deception plan.
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CONTENTS
PY
O
C
ED
Fig 4-9 The Forward Passage of Lines
50. Conduct. The conduct, in sequential order, is as follows:

LL
a. Main HQ issues orders to conduct a FPoL and designates the In Place Force
and Advancing Force. If available, an area out of direct contact or observation of
O
the enemy should be selected and the timing should be during hours of darkness.
TR
b. The In Place Force establishes or maintains CSCM and EMCON as well as

routine pattern of life activity to enhance deception.
N
c. The Advancing Force organises for its mission and co-locates its HQ with the
In Place Force. Final confirmation of the enemy picture, direct and indirect fire
O
support coordination, routes and resupply of the Advancing Force are confirmed.
C
d. Main HQ tracks the progress of the Advancing Force and manages the
support of Joint Effects (UAS and AH) to screen or guard forward of the Advancing
N
Force.
U
e. The Advancing Force advances from its assembly area through the In Place
Force on two or three routes, maintaining combined arms groupings and assault
formations.
f. The In Place Force suppresses or prepares to suppress any know enemy

groupings that might threaten the Advancing Force and screens or denies civilians
who may threaten OPSEC. Once across the LD the Advancing Force commander
controls the fire of the In Place Force until it is no longer able to provide direct Fire
Support.
g. The Advancing Force inform the In Place Force when the passage is
complete.
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CONTENTS
51. The Battle Drills for the Forward Passage of Lines (FPoL) can be found at Annex
C.
PY
O
C
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
N
U
4-23
CONTENTS
BATTLEGROUP ADVANCE TO CONTACT
52. Purpose. An Advance to Contact seeks to gain or re-establish contact with the
enemy under the most favourable conditions for the main force. It is normally executed
in preparation for a subsequent offensive operation and therefore ends when the main
force is positioned for the attack. A typical mission requiring an Advance to Contact will
be to advance in order to seize/secure/hold/clear or destroy.
53. Principles. The following should apply:
a. Balance. Balance is the ability to react to a changing situation. In the

advance it is achieved by ensuring that forces are not over extended and are
capable of providing mutual support, and that forces operate within the OS
envelope. The ISTAR Group will be deployed at reach but within the battlegroup
PY
direct or indirect fires envelope. Reach may be extended by the employment of
organic UAS and feed from formation UAVs and EW. Brigade Joint Effects (AH
and OS) can be used to extend the protective fires envelop for the ISTAR Group
O
where these are in direct support. Control measures (boundaries, report lines and
holding areas) must be employed to sequence and control the movement of the
C
main body so that it can always react promptly to sightings or enemy contacts
reported by the ISTAR Gp or Flank Guards (Flk Gd).
ED
b. Momentum. The battlegroup should seek to keep an enemy force off
balance by pushing along its chosen axis quicker than the enemy can organise to
counter attack. This is best achieved by the use of primary and secondary routes
LL
appropriate to mobility i.e. dismounted inf, wheels or tracks. Combined arms

groupings at sub-unit level must be able to exploit fleeting opportunities to defeat
O
enemy forces. The application of common TTPs across the battlegroup is

essential. In addition the co-location of the Reserve/Echelon commander with Tac
TR
HQ may help to reduce reaction times once tasked.
c. Security. The Covering Force (ISTAR GP and Adv Gd ) should clear or

N
bypass obstacles, isolated enemy positions and potential ambush sites as the
O
battlegroup progresses. Local nationals may need to be searched and vulnerable

areas and defiles through which the battlegroup must pass will require VP 360
C
clearance drills and overwatch. Potential threats should always be handed off
from the Covering Force to the Main Body or Reserve as the battlegroup
N
progresses.
U
d. Flexibility and Maintenance of a Reserve.
(1) The plan must be sufficiently flexible to allow the commander to switch
effort from one route or axis to another in order to reinforce a sub-unit in
contact, seize an objective or to exploit a gap in the enemy force. This can
be achieved by the use of multiple parallel routes and air manoeuvre if
available.
(2) The maintenance of a reserve allows the commander more flexibility

since it can be used to mask or screen a bypassed enemy force, secure a VP
or reinforce the Main Body, Advance Guard or Flank Guard as appropriate.
4-24
CONTENTS
PY
O
C
Fig 4-10 - The Advance to Contact (Single Axis)
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
N
U
Fig 4-11 - The Advance to Contact (Double Axis)
CONDUCT
54. ISTAR Group. The ISTAR Group advances on a broad front, centred on the
battlegroup axis. The frontage will vary according to terrain and the force elements
involved (mounted/dismounted) but should allow for mutual support laterally between
each element. All elements of the ISTAR Group must report on the Battlegroup
Command Net to aid situational awareness.
4-25
CONTENTS
a. During the Advance. The ISTAR Group looks into NAIs, identifies and if
necessary clears Vulnerable Points or where possible avoids them and hands
them off to the Advance Guard in order to maintain momentum. Report lines
should be used to confirm the extent of advance and NAIs/VPs should be
recorded as Red (enemy present), Amber ( possible enemy present, not
confirmed) and Green (enemy not present). The ISTAR Group must be regularly
informed of the location and situation of friendly forces such as brigade
reconnaissance forces to their front.
b. In Contact. Even when in contact, the ISTAR Group commander must

allocate force elements to continue the FIND of enemy positions in depth and
reserves and also to confirm and guide assaulting troops to their positions. Where
enemy positions or crossing sites over obstacles are lightly defended, the ISTAR
Group must be prepared to seize them, supported if required by the Advance
PY
Guard, in order to maintain the momentum of the advance.
55. The Advance Guard. The Advance Guard over watches and protects the ISTAR
O
Group with direct and indirect fires.
C
a. During the Advance. The Advance Guard manoeuvres one tactical bound
behind the ISTAR Group to allow them to manoeuvre by stealth. This is referred to
ED
as the ‘recce gap’ and is normally achieved using the caterpillar method of
movement to ensure that both forces remain balanced. The Advance Guard must
also maintain over watch of cleared areas and vulnerable points until they can be
handed off to the Main Body. If over watch is lost, such areas must be re-cleared.
LL
Tactical UAS can be employed to cover gaps as each force element manoeuvres
forward.
O
b. In Contact. When in contact the Advance Guard must move to a position

TR
from which it can concentrate fires and suppress the enemy in order to allow the
ISTAR Group and Main Body to continue manoeuvring.
56. The Main Body. The Main Body manoeuvres on one or more routes according to
N
the ground and the requirement to achieve balance across the battlegroup’s avenue of
O
approach.
C
a. During the Advance. The Main Body must monitor the Covering Force
reporting and anticipate future taskings. When static it should seek to maximise
N
security by the use of hides. The Main Body must be prepared to assume over
watch of Vulnerable Areas until the whole battlegroup has passed and deal with
U
bypassed enemy forces. During a prolonged advance, the Main Body must plan to
replenish the Covering Force.
b. In Contact. On contacting the enemy the Main Body can be used to conduct
a Hasty Attack or provide a blocking force to prevent a bypassed enemy from
counter-attacking the battlegroup. In both cases the Covering force hands off the
enemy to the Main Body to deal with. Bypassing allows momentum to be
maintained but the enemy must be fixed whilst the Main Body continues the
advance. The Main Body must be prepared to generate a new Advance Guard if
the original is worn down or given a fixing task.
4-26
CONTENTS
Top Tip: Bypassed enemy positions must be fixed by fires or isolated by

manoeuvre so that they do not present a threat to echelon forces
57. Flank Guards and Reserves. Flank Guards must be able to Screen or Guard the
battlegroup flanks. Which mission is selected will depend on whether the Flank Guard
is expected to impose delay using its own capabilities or simply report enemy activity in
sufficient time for the Main Body to react.
a. Flank Guards. Flank Guards should be mobile and able to look forward as
well as to the flanks of the axis. They contribute to the overall STAP. Air defence
assets can be employed with Flank Guards to generate the reach to interdict
hostile aircraft or UAVs. Flank guards are deployed to prevent enemy interference
with the Main Body by conducting blocking actions or ambushes to protect the
PY
Main Body’s freedom of action during the advance. Flank Guards can be
reinforced by the Main Body or Reserve if necessary.
O
b. Reserves. The battlegroup commander must retain a reserve that may be
tasked to support the battlegroup as required. This task may be holding a VA until
C
relieved by other forces, fixing bypassed enemy positions, reinforcing a flank or
reinforcing the Main Body during or after a hasty attack. To speed up reaction
ED
times the reserve commander may be co-located with Tac HQ to increase his SA.
58. Command & Control. Command and control arrangements must be sufficiently
agile to reach all parts of the battlegroup and avoid constraining opportunities to re-
LL
organise, exploit or manoeuvre in depth of an enemy force. Planning must therefore

consider the resilience of the C2 architecture and its ability to keep pace with the
O
advance. Particular considerations are:

TR
a. Tac. The commander will normally deploy forward in his Tac HQ and should
be located where he can best observe events and make and communicate prompt
decisions on the committal of the main body. He needs to liaise closely with the
Covering Force and Flank Guards to understand the situation to his front and
N
flanks and give direction on his immediate priorities. He must equally be able to
O
reach back to Main HQ to receive situation reports and direct when supporting
activity such as movement, resupply and re-organisation should take place.
C
b. Main HQ. Main HQ should control the progress of the advance and ensure
N
that balance across the battlegroup is maintained. It must ensure that objectives,
VPs and bypassed enemy are not overlooked and be prepared to direct responses
U
to local counter attacks when the commander is focussed on the main effort. BG
Main should avoid becoming isolated or unable to communicate across the
battlegroup as the advance progresses; it should therefore plan to move as
necessary. The reach of communications should extend beyond the CF and the
Flank Guards, this will require the positioning of rebro or relay stations well forward
and to the flanks and where necessary the use of HF as well as VHF
communications. Feeds from UAS and EW must be relayed across the
battlegroup using the reverse SITREP.
c. Step Up. A Step Up HQ will usually be necessary to enable Main HQ to

move. This must be pre planned and ideally conducted when contact with the
enemy is least expected. Where manning and the situation allow, Main should
4-27
CONTENTS
leapfrog forward of Step Up, rather than collocate with it in order to maximise the
reach of battlegroup C2.
59. Sustainment. Sustainment planning must be integrated into and enable the
manoeuvre plan.
a. Duration. For enduring operations resupply must be factored into the

advance to ensure CSUPs do not become exhausted as contact with the enemy is
made or an opportunity to exploit emerges. Rolling replenishment on the line of
advance should be established to resupply the Advance Guard and Main Body in
sequence. Isolated groupings such as the ISTAR Gp and Flank Guards may
require CSUPs to be pushed forward for hide replenishment. If allocated and with
adequate security, Air Delivery may be used. The ISTAR GP and Flank Guards
must be relieved of casualties quickly in order to maintain security and momentum,
PY
normally a task for the Advance Guard or Reserve.
b. Demand. Planning yardsticks (see SOHB) tempered by contemporary
O
experience covering ammunition and fuel consumption rates, vehicle failure rates
and casualty rates should be used to determine the frequency of resupply and
C
equipment recovery required to keep the Battlegroup replenished. Battlegroup
Log RVs and Equipment Collection Points (ECP) should be established on the axis
ED
to facilitate resupply and recovery. The battlegroup should also anticipate the
demand for future missions, for example a move into hasty defence following the
seizure of an objective.
LL
c. Distance. Extending lines of supply during the advance presents challenges

to resupply and the recovery of casualties and CPERS. A1 echelon may need to
O
task organise CQMS parties to directly support elements of the battlegroup by

operating one tactical bound behind with stocks carried on wheels. Pre ground
TR
dumping of CSUPs on the axis may also be considered. CASEVAC loops should
be minimised by the forward positioning of medical assets. Forward MEDEVAC
chains should be established and routes to ambulance exchange points and
emergency HLS promulgated during orders. These should be regularly updated
N
as the battlegroup advances.

O
d. Destination. Any changes in terrain over which the battlegroup will advance
C
should be considered to ensure that sustainment plans are sufficiently agile. For
example a break out from close to open terrain or a break into contested complex
N
terrain will require the forward loading of CSUPs close to the terrain boundary to
accommodate the changes in demand. Plans should also be made to handle and
U
where necessary assist, screen and protect civilians and refugees moving
rearwards in order to prevent interference with the advance.
60 The Battle Drills for the Advance to Contact can be found at Annex C.
61-63. Reserved.
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CONTENTS
BATTLEGROUP OBSTACLE CROSSING
64. Purpose. An obstacle crossing operation is required whenever a force seeks to

breach or cross a natural or man made obstacle in order to continue an approach, and
the crossing may be opposed by an enemy force. Such operations should always be
pre planned and controlled by the battlegroup. Examples of an obstacle crossing
include the crossing of a river and the breaching of a minefield, an IED belt, or a
defensive berm.
Top Tip: During an advance the Advance Guard must always be ready to pre-
empt the enemy by seizing and holding a crossing site where the enemy is
unable to defend in sufficient strength.
65. Principles. The Principles of an Obstacle Crossing are:
PY
a. Balance. The In Place Force, Bridgehead Force and Breakout Force are
mutually supporting. Balance is required to maintain the cohesion of the
O
Battlegroup as it crosses the obstacle.
C
b. Momentum. The Battlegroup should flow across the obstacle and avoid
losing momentum in order to achieve its subsequent objective.
ED
c. Security. Crossing areas are likely to be known to an enemy and should be
treated as defiles and vulnerable points.
LL
d. Surprise. Achieving surprise through pre-emption will enable momentum

and security to be maintained.
O
e. Simplicity. An obstacle crossing can be complex, it should therefore be

TR
executed as a drill and adhere to recognised groupings and practices.
f. Control. Well organised and clear C2 arrangements at the critical points and
times will promote success.
N
O
66. Groupings. The battlegroup organises into an In Place Force, Bridgehead Force
and Break Out Force, usually grouped around manoeuvre sub-units. A Crossing Area
C
HQ, Battlegroup RV and Engineer RV must also be established.

N
a. In Place Force. The In Place Force defends the crossing area by providing
overwatch, home bank security and fire support to the Bridgehead Force during
U
the assault and build-up. Depending on the terrain and threat, it may be required
to deploy protection forces to the crossing sites, Crossing Area HQ, Battlegroup
RV and Engineer RV.
b. Bridgehead Force. The Bridgehead Force is responsible for establishing

crossings over or through the obstacle. It consists of an assault force and an
echelon force. The assault force’s mission is to establish crossings and seize a
lodgement on the far bank, whilst the echelon force’s mission is to build up and
consolidate the bridgehead to allow the breakout operation to be mounted.
c. Breakout Force. The Breakout Force is tasked with the breakout from the
bridgehead and the subsequent exploitation beyond the lodgement onto a
4-29
CONTENTS
subsequent objective. This task is usually allocated to a separate force element,

but can be given to the bridgehead force if the crossing is unopposed. The
Breakout Force should be the most mobile element of the battlegroup. Once the
break out force has achieved its task the ISTAR Group should seek to re-establish
the recce gap if the advance is to continue.
d. Crossing Area HQ. The Crossing Area HQ controls of movement into and
out of the Crossing Area and is established, normally by the COS, using Step Up.
In some circumstances a sub-unit commander may be tasked. The Engineer
Squadron Commander collocates his SHQ with the Crossing Area HQ.
e. Battlegroup RV. The Battlegroup RV is established adjacent to the Crossing

Area HQ. It is used as a fixed point through which force elements are called
forward from hides, checked and deployed along marked routes to the Crossing
PY
Site.
f. Engineer RV. The Engineer RV is established within the Crossing Area,
O
under the Command of the Engineer Squadron Commander. It is used to prepare
bridging and/or breaching equipment before establishing the crossing sites.
C
67. Establishing the Crossing Area. ED
a. Overwatch. Once an obstacle is identified an In Place Force, normally the
Advance Guard or a Company/Squadron group, is tasked to provide over watch
and security of the crossing area whilst crossing sites are located and confirmed
LL
by the engineer reconnaissance. They will be assisted by the ISTAR Group who
will employ the Technical ISTAR Group to provide additional ISTAR coverage of
O
the far bank, and if time permits, an ISTAR soak of the crossing area. Other
elements of the battlegroup should disperse to hides and commence battle
TR
preparation.
N
O
C
N
U
Fig 4-12 ISTAR Group Overwatch of Obstacle
4-30
CONTENTS
b. Selection of Crossing Area. The Crossing Area should be:
(1) Concealed. Considerations include conducting the operation at night,

sequencing the crossing with brigade operations to fix an enemy reserve,
and use of deception to distract an enemy’s ISTAR. Crossing Areas should
ideally contain hides into which waiting elements of the battlegroup can
disperse.
(2) Cleared. The Crossing Area is likely to contain Vulnerable Points which
must be cleared of IEDs and UXO. Civilians who may compromise OPSEC
should be moved away from the crossing site where possible or alternative
sites selected. Approach routes to the crossing sites should be cleared of
battlefield debris and other obstacles to movement in and around the
crossing sites.
PY
(3) Contained. The Crossing Area should be sited so that it can be
defended by the In Place Force who must be able to bring fires to bear on
O
both sides of the obstacle. Gaps in the perimeter must be covered by
observation and if necessary local reserves. The Crossing Area must be
C
easy to recognise by the dispersed force elements that will use it.
c.
ED
Crossing Sites. At least two crossing sites will be selected and Crossing
Site HQs established at each Site, normally manned by an Engineer Troop
Commander. The selection of alternative crossing sites for armour/wheels and
dismounted infantry can promote a higher tempo. Ideally each Crossing Site
LL
should be separated by a tactical bound and may contain more than one crossing
point. A reserve crossing point should be established where possible and each
O
Crossing Site should be allocated the means of recovering stranded or disabled

vehicles which may obstruct the crossing.
TR
d. Control. Confirmation of crossing sites and the earliest time for them to be
opened should be confirmed as soon as possible and passed to Main HQ and the
Crossing Area HQ. The Crossing Site HQ will provide regular SITREPS to the
N
Crossing Area HQ confirming the state of the Crossing Site, estimated time of
O
opening and traffic flow once the Crossing Operation begins. Concurrently a
Battlegroup RV should be established within the perimeter of the In Place Force
C
and adjacent to the battlegroup access routes to the crossing sites. Once the
Crossing Sites are established the In Place Force is responsible for marking routes
N
and providing guides to assist the Bridgehead and Break Out Forces as they move
towards them. Until the Crossing Sites are confirmed the Bridgehead and Break
U
Out Forces remain dispersed in hides until called forward to the crossing site by
the Crossing Area HQ.
Top Tip: Signature equipment such as Trojan or Titan must be concealed from
the enemy and held near the axis ready to move to a confirmed crossing site
when ordered.
68. Establishing The Bridgehead. At H Hr the engineer equipment leaves the

Engineer RV and a crossing or breach is established. As soon as the Crossing Site is
open the Crossing Area HQ orders the Bridgehead Force to cross their LD and
commence the crossing of the obstacle. Two methods may be employed:
4-31
CONTENTS
a. Direct Approach. The direct approach is used for a hasty obstacle crossing
where speed and surprise can be used to force the crossing quickly. This usually
involves the Assault Force assaulting the crossing site directly from the home bank
and then establishing a lodgement once the obstacle has been breached. This will
be carried out by engineer or assault pioneer troops and breaching/ bridging
equipment such as Titan, Trojan or assault bridging, accompanied by armour and
infantry in intimate support. Once the crossing sites are established, the echelon
force comprising infantry and armour will cross the obstacle and consolidate in the
lodgement as far as their LOE in order to secure the far bank of the crossing area.
Top Tip: The lodgement must extend to the limit of the enemy’s ability to bring
direct fire or observed indirect fire onto the Crossing Sites.
b. Infiltration. Infiltration is used where it is necessary to deny or dislodge an
PY
enemy force on the far bank in order to protect the establishment of the crossing
sites, or where it is necessary to protect a crossing site in order to clear it of IEDs
or mines or repair an existing crossing point before a breach can be effected. This
O
task is normally carried out by dismounted infantry who may cross the obstacle
using covered routes or support helicopters in order to establish themselves on the
C
far bank before engineer bridging or breaching assets are deployed to the
Crossing Sites. ED
c. Control. Crossing Site HQs confirm that crossings are open. SOIs should
provide detailed coordinating instructions such as the routes, markings, and
illumination required to enable vehicles and troops to cross safely and efficiently.
LL
Consideration must be given to the recovery of disabled equipment which must not
be allowed to block the crossing site, and the provision of resupply and MEDEVAC
O
to the lodgement area. The Crossing Area HQ calls the Bridgehead Force and
Breakout Force forward.
TR
Top Tip: Sub units should inform the Crossing Site HQ when they are set in
their hides. It is critical that they also give their 'run in time' to the BG RV in
order to allow efficient coordination of the crossing
N
O
d. Fire Support and Battle Management. The In Place Force suppresses any
identified enemy forces which may threaten the lodgement. This may include the
C
suppression of depth or reserve enemy forces through the employment of brigade

Joint Fires. From H Hour each Crossing Site should be designated as a
N
Restricted Fire Area, exclusive to the Bridgehead Force and a Restricted Fire Line
should be enforced along the obstacle.
U
4-32
CONTENTS
PY
O
C
Fig 4-13 Establishing the Bridgehead
ED
69. The Breakout.
a. Exploitation. Once the lodgement area is established the Breakout Force is

LL
called forward to the Crossing Sites by the Crossing Area HQ and directed to
exploit through the Bridgehead Force and out of the lodgement, normally to seize
O
an objective or secure a limit of exploitation on which the Battlegroup can then

rebalance.
TR
b. FPoL. In close terrain, the Break Out Force may be required to conduct a
FPoL with the Bridgehead Force as it passes through the Lodgement. This may
N
require detailed co-ordination of fire support, routes and handover of contact with
the enemy. Clear BM and Combat ID procedures must be enforced. The forward
O
edge of the lodgement should be the Handover Line with the Bridgehead Force.
C
c. Release of the ISTAR Gp. Where the ISTAR Gp have been employed in
marking routes to the crossing site as part of the In Place Force, this task must be
N
transferred to the In Place Force (or Reserve) if exploitation beyond the obstacle
crossing is to be achieved without delay.
U
d. Rebalancing. The remainder of the battlegroup then follow across the

obstacle in a designated order of march as directed by the Crossing Area HQ. The
In Place Force reorganises and crosses the obstacle once the remainder of the
battlegroup has crossed. Combat assault bridging should be recovered by the In
Place Force unless required by a follow on force. This should be clarified with the
brigade HQ.
4-33
CONTENTS
PY
O
C
Fig 4-14 - The Breakout
ED
70. The Battle Drills for Obstacle Crossing and Breaching can be found at Annex D.
2 MERCIAN BG Assault Crossing – Helmand 2007

LL
O
TR
N
O
C
N
U
Fig 4-15 - 2 MERCIAN BG Assault Crossing
4-34
CONTENTS
2 MERCIAN BG Assault Crossing – Helmand 2007
The BG plan hinged upon a deception operation to convince the Taliban that the main effort of
the attack would be from the south of the Green Zone, conforming to the ground and previous
operations. The desired effect was to draw the bulk of Taliban fighters to occupy their southern
battle positions and fix them there. The BG main body would meanwhile assault across the
Zumbelay Canal from the east, seizing the dominating terrain at Zumbelay Village in the rear of
the enemy. Simultaneously B Coy and a Czech Special Operations Group (Cz SOG) were to
fire from their positions across the Helmand River upon a known Taliban command and control
location in an old fort in Qadar Kalay. The resulting confusion was designed to delay the Taliban
reoccupying their positions in the bridgehead and buy time for C and A Coys to seize Zumbelay
Village against as little opposition as possible. Actions to the north by the Task Force and
another BG, added tactical depth. The plan relied on the construction of a heavy bridge across
the canal at Zumbelay in order to get Viking and Danish M113 APCs into the Green Zone. The
PY
Taliban had made the most of the canal as an obstacle, destroying all the vehicle bridges in the
area and effectively mining all the approaches and crossing points with IEDs. BG air and
ground reconnaissance had identified and confirmed the canal crossing point and the bank
conditions as suitable, the latter being confirmed in the dark by BG close recce and RE.
O
In the late afternoon of 18th September the BG main body departed FOB Price and began the
C
long and torturous approach march from Gereshk to a FAA in the desert east of Zumbelay.
Elements of Fire Sp and A Coy had already deployed into the battle area occupying prominent
high ground to the south of the Green Zone with an FSG. This had not been without incident as
ED
a young Sapper was struck by an AP mine whilst clearing the fire support positions for
occupation. All of this activity had been noted by the Taliban who had deployed and stood-to in
positions in the southern Green Zone fringe. C Coy were poised with attached Warrior AFVs
LL
and light vehicles five kms to the east whilst the BG main body and bridging equipment wound
through soft sand and numerous wadis in the pitch dark. The Danish Mech Coy had been
given the tough task of making a feint attack onto the Taliban battle positions to the south and
O
keeping their attention fixed there whilst the BG crossed and assaulted in the north.
From 0400hrs on 19th September the Danes began the feint into the southern end of the Green
TR
Zone. They rapidly crossed a wide and deep irrigation ditch and had penetrated 300 metres
into thick vegetation before the Taliban engaged. The ensuing contact lasted some three hours,
fixing the Taliban to their positions with support from BG mortars and Javelin. As the Danes
N
broke into the south of the Green Zone, across the river B Coy and the Cz SOG began a
systematic fire attack onto the old fort in Qadar Kalay. Within the first few hours they had killed
O
and wounded a number of Taliban commanders and runners who fell to sniping, Javelin and
mortar fire. Combined with a Task Force electronic attack on Taliban push to talk
C
communications this further confused and delayed the enemy response to the main break-in
over the Zumbelay Canal. Before first light C Coy supported by 20 Sqn RE and Warriors from
N
RF Coy Scots Guards secured the near bank and crossed using an infantry footbridge.
U
With sporadic fire now being aimed at the crossing site by infiltrating Taliban, C Coy formed a
bridgehead on the far bank, encountering increasingly heavy resistance from compound and
bunker positions. Close air support was used to reduce some of these strong points. Once the
heavy bridge was in place, A Coy in their Vikings pushed into the bridgehead and began the
breakout to clear and seize Zumbelay Village. Although the main body of Taliban fighters had
been lured away and fixed in the south there was still sporadic resistance to overcome and
enemy small arms fire was still reaching parts of the crossing site, requiring support from AH to
suppress identified firing points. By midday the Danes had been ordered to break off their feint
in the south and move into the bridgehead to support the clearance operation. By the close of
19th September the BG was poised to push southwards, seize Qadar Kalay, and begin clearing
the extensive trench and bunker positions on the Green Zone fringe. Estonian Mechanised
Infantry had taken control of the bridgehead and crossing site whilst A, C and the Danish Coys
were preparing to begin clearance operations at first light.
4-35
CONTENTS
BATTLEGROUP LINK UP
71. Purpose. A battlegroup link up operation is conducted where an advancing force

seeks to join with an in place force, in order to conduct a subsequent offensive action,
complete an encirclement or to assist a break out of encircled forces. Examples include
a battlegroup link up with brigade reconnaissance, airborne or local forces during an
advance, or the relief of an isolated detachment no longer able to manoeuvre in
complex terrain. Link ups most likely occur in enemy controlled territory and may be
conducted with allied or partner forces.
72. Principles.
a. Coordination. Coordination of Battlespace Management, FSCM and
PY
Combat ID is necessary to control fires and avoid fratricide.
b. Security. A link up between two forces operating in enemy controlled
O
territory will be expected. OPSEC and the use of surprise and deception will
assist in maintaining security.
C
c. Situational Awareness. Both forces must be able to communicate and
keep each other aware of progress and the current situation in the vicinity of the
ED
static force or force to be relieved.
d. Tempo. Successful link ups exploit opportunities created by a gap in enemy

LL
defences or a lack of enemy responsiveness. Once a decision to link up forces

has been taken, the operation must be executed before the enemy can counter.
O
73. Conduct.
TR
a. Preliminary Actions. Preliminary actions include:
(1) Advancing Force establishes communications and confirms situation of

N
the In Place Force.

O
(2) Confirm routes, BM and FSCM and link up points to be manned by the In
Place Force.
C
N
(3) Confirm OOM and Combat ID / recognition features of the Advancing

Force.
U
(4) Confirm C2 arrangements of forces once link up has occurred.
(5) Provision and control of Joint Fires – normally retained by both forces
either side of a Restricted Fire Line.
b. The Advance. The advance will include the following actions:
(1) The Advancing Force is organised for and conducts an Advance to

Contact.
4-36
CONTENTS
(2) The Advancing Force reports forward line of own troops to the In Place
Force.
(3) The In Place Force provides regular SITREPs to the Advancing Force.
(4) The Advancing Force achieves surprise through manoeuvre and

firepower or by approaching from an unexpected direction.
(5) Enemy forces en route are fixed and by passed.
(6) The Advancing Force clears and then holds vulnerable points, defiles
and key terrain en route if required for extraction of In Place Force.
PY
c. Establish Contact
(1) In Place Force establishes link up points (RVs) to which Advancing
O
Force lead elements move. Lead elements establish local area security,
flank protection and communications with link up points before occupation.
C
(2) The Advancing Force confirms situation, routes, holding areas and
ED
FSCM with In Place Force then calls forward Main body.
(3) C2 arrangements and control of fires are confirmed between In Place

Force and Advancing Force HQs.
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
N
U
Fig 4-16 The Link Up
74. The Battle Drill for a Link Up Operation can be found at Annex E.
75-79. Reserved.
4-37
CONTENTS
BATTLEGROUP RAID
80. Purpose. A raid is launched as a swift penetration of hostile territory to; secure
information; confuse the adversary; seize a high value individual or target; destroy
physical positions, equipment or a discrete part of the enemy force. Raids end with a
planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. They are likely to be
conducted by Air Manoeuvre using Light Infantry and Aviation or by ground manoeuvre.
In certain circumstances raids can also be conducted by amphibious means such as
assault boats3. In all raids will be supported by Joint Fires and other enabling effects.
81. Principles. The principles of a raid are:
a. Good Intelligence. Accurate and timely intelligence is fundamental to the

planning and prosecution of a raid.
PY
b. Surprise. A successful raid will depend on surprise to achieve the aim.
Security of routes to and from the target and hide areas are vital, as is security
O
from enemy air observation and attack.
C
c. Concentration of Force. Most raiding missions require that fire should be
brought to bear on the enemy. Shock action will only be achieved if this fire is
ED
concentrated and coordinated.
d. Simplicity. Excessively detailed plans and control measures will hinder

flexibility and may cause confusion. Planning measures should concentrate on the
LL
primary target, leaving sufficient flexibility for the instances of changing

circumstances.
O
CONDUCT
TR
82. Groupings. The groupings for a raid will be similar to those used in any other
offensive action; a Recce/ISTAR group, an assault group and a reserve. However given
the distances that a raid may have to cover, a sustainment group may be required to
N
ensure the integrity of the force either prior to and almost certainly after the offensive
O
action.
C
a. ISTAR Group. The ISTAR Group could be used to confirm the target
(usually through a close target recce), provide overwatch and warn of any enemy
N
counter moves and assist the ground manoeuvre force on its infiltration/exfiltration
routes.
U
b. Fire Support Group. The Fire Support Group will provide both indirect and
direct fires to support the raiding force both during the actual assault and, if
required, during both the infiltration and exfiltration.
c. The Assault Group. The Assault Group will carry out the actual attack and
usually consists of the majority of the personnel and vehicles in the raiding party.
3
Further reading on Amphibious Operations can be found in BRd 9400 Amphibious Operations.
4-38
CONTENTS
d. Reserve. The Reserve will be tasked to either support the Assault Group or
provide a counter to any enemy moves that threaten the force either during its
assault or on its withdrawal.
e. Sustainment Group. The Sustainment Group will provide the raiding force
with the aid required to conduct both the fight and the withdrawal. It may consist
of a reserve of fuel, recovery assets and medical treatment and evacuation
facilities.
83. Sequence of Actions. The conduct of a raid is likely to follow this sequence:
a. Infiltration. The raiding force is likely to have to move over a considerable

distance at least partly over enemy controlled territory. This infiltration could be by
ground manoeuvre or by air using SH to move Light Infantry or a combination of
PY
both. The key consideration is for the force to arrive at the FAA unseen by enemy
forces.
O
(1) Ground Routes. The raiding force is likely to exploit the organic lift of a
battlegroup moving over a number of routes to ensure a successful infiltration
C
to the Forward Assembly Area (FAA). These routes will have been identified
during the IPE process and confirmed during an ISTAR soak. In addition
ED
elements of the Recce Group will likely prove the route allowing forces to
switch between routes if one or more proves impassable or unsuitable.
Raiding forces will rarely use the same routes to withdrawal and thus the
Withdrawal/Exfiltration route may need to be recce'd before the raid to
LL
ensure security.
O
(2) Air Routes. The raiding force will be moved by SH from a secure LZ to
the FAA. These routes will be selected to avoid known enemy locations and
TR
AD assets and aid in the security of the raid.
(3) Amphibious Routes. The raiding force could be carried by assault

boats crewed by Royal Engineers when utilising coastal or riverine
N
environment.
O
b. Forward Assembly Area. The FAA will be selected to allow the

C
concentration of the raiding force prior to the assault. It will be close enough to the
target to allow the assault force a reasonable approach but far away enough not to
N
give away surprise. It must be out of sight and sound of the objective and any
other enemy forces. In complex terrain it must also be far enough away from the
U
local population to prevent them raising the alarm. It will be secured by the first
troops arriving in it, which might be the Recce/ISTAR Group if moving by ground
or the first lift of the air delivered force. Sustainment of the force may be required
prior to the assault especially if the infiltration has been carried out over a long
distance.
c. The Assault. The actions required to set the conditions for a successful
assault are:
(1) Securing the Fire Support Location. The Fire Support Group will
move into position to support the assaulting force in a similar manner to that
supporting any other attack. However care must be taken not to warn the
4-39
CONTENTS
enemy of an approach and compromise the assault. Careful consideration

must be given to the adjustment policy for indirect fire and any illumination
plan.
(2) Securing of the FUP. The FUP can be secured either by the Recce
Group or the assaulting force depending on the levels security and surprise
required.
(3) The Assault. Although the sequence of the assault will follow those of
any other attack it must be stressed that the key to success is the shock and
surprise of the assault. This is achieved by the application of overwhelming
firepower and a violent assault or similar action to overcome the defenders
and secure the target. Thereafter swift actions on the objective followed by a
rapid exit, allows the raiding force to maintain the initiative.
PY
d. Reserve. The reserve will be positioned to be able to intervene to support
either the assault force or the fire support group. It may have to assist either to
O
withdraw and prevent the enemy follow up allowing the other troops to break
clean. If there is a strong likelihood of an enemy force follow up an additional
C
security force may have to be created to deal with this known threat which is
separate from the reserve. ED
e. Exploit and Reorganisation. Immediate exploitation may not be possible
given the circumstances of the raid but should be considered by commanders.
Most likely the raiding force will re-group on the FAA (or other designated area)
LL
prior to withdrawing. It is during this phase that wounded will be treated and
evacuated and other immediate sustainment action undertaken prior to withdrawal.
O
However this action should be kept to the minimum as the security of the force will
become endangered the longer the raiding force remains stationary.
TR
f. Withdrawal. The raiding force should start to withdraw as soon after the
reorganisation is complete. Separate routes should be used for exfiltration than
used for the infiltration if possible. The reserve/security group should prevent any
N
enemy follow up by establishing a blocking or delaying position astride the

O
withdrawal routes and make maximum use of joint fires and demolitions to effect a
break clean. Refer to Chapter 5 Annex C for details on delaying operations.
C
N
U
4-40
CONTENTS
RHODESIAN BUSH WAR

Ninety-six SAS and 48 RLI paratroopers and an additional 40 helicopter-borne RLI troops
attacked the camps at 07h45 in the morning to exploit the concentration of forces on the
parade ground for morning parade, directly after a strike by the Rhodesian Air Force's ageing
Canberra and Hunter strike aircraft. To strike as many ground targets as possible, six
mothballed Vampire jets dating from the 1940s were brought back into use for the operation.
A Douglas DC-8 airliner was flown over the Chimoio camps 10 minutes before the airstrike
as part of a deception plan in which the insurgents were dispersed in a false air raid alert, so
that when the aircraft participating in the actual airstrike approached, they did not cause
alarm. When the first Air Force jets arrived, the assembled ZANLA forces, as planned, did
PY
not take cover again as they assumed it was the DC-8 that was returning from its first pass,
four Canberra bombers dropped 1200 Alpha bombs (Rhodesian-designed anti-personnel
cluster bombs) over an area one kilometre long and half a kilometre wide
O
Following the initial air strikes by the Canberras, Hunters and Vampire FB9s, ten Alouette III
helicopter gunships engaged opportunity targets in allocated areas that together inflicted the
C
majority of the casualties, while two Vampire T11 flew top cover. The paratroopers and
heliborne troops were deployed on three sides of the objective into various stop groups and
ED
sweep lines, and were also effective in killing large numbers of fleeing ZANLA cadres.
Nevertheless, the small size of the ground force and the lack of a complete envelopment
allowed a number of fleeing ZANLA cadres to escape.
LL
The Rhodesian force withdrew in good order having suffered one SAS member being shot
and killed at Chimoio, and a Vampire pilot was killed trying to crash land his Vampire in a
field after his plane was damaged by ground fire. It was reported that more than 3,000
O
ZANLA fighters were reported as killed and 5,000 wounded along with several tons of
equipment destroyed or captured and taken to Rhodesia.
TR
TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
N
84. Command and Control.

O
a. Command. Given the uncertainty of a raid, C2 must be de-centralized with

C
all subordinate commanders aware of the chain of command in the event of

casualties or comms failures. The proper use of Mission Command will be vital
N
during a raid when groups may be out of touch with others for considerable
periods of time.
U
b. Communications. Raids are often carried out at extreme range and thus
communications links to own forces must be considered especially if go/no go
criteria are held by a higher headquarters separated from the raiding force. A
Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) communication plan may be required. In addition
special/ separate communications with air/aviation forces may be required.
Communication within the raiding force can be conducted by VHF.
c. Go/No Go Criteria. The criteria for a successful raid will often depend on
the supporting elements being available. To ensure the greatest chance of
success a set of Go/No Go criteria should be agreed as part of the plan (risk
management) and rigidly adhered to. A time should be set at which the criteria are
4-41
CONTENTS
checked and the decision made to launch or continue the raid. If the Go/No Go
criteria are not met, the raid should be aborted. Factors might include the weather
which will affect air/avn support and thus also casevac of casualties; changing
circumstances in the target area such as enemy locations or reinforcement; and
the availability of key assets such as avn, med and joint fires. A example of a
Go/No Go check list is shown below:
Ser Event Est Go/No Remarks Informed by Actioned

Time Go
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
1 RECCE/ISTAR Gp Awaiting/All Support staff OCs
and Fire Sp Gp in in position
position
2 Weather Met Update Over flight OCs/TOC
Conditions Check
PY
3 MEDEVAC Med Treatment Facilities UMO/TOC
process in position open
at all locs
4 Radio checks Fresh Batteries/ Maintain All
O
complete Control COMD
function in place
C
5 Stat Air call sign Radio Check JHC
established
6 ISTAR soak Any route change
ED OC ISTAR
complete required disseminated
7 FAA & FUP secure Marking reported up OC RECCE
Gp
8 VCPs & CPs in HN support if required Route OC
LL
posn all barriers

open
9 Reserve in position On orders BLOCK or OC Reserve
O
CUTOFF
10 Assault Group On Call LO
TR
moving on task
11 LO in posn for In TOC TOC
upward reporting to
Bde HQ
N
12 TOC QRF vehs & In TOC TOC

dvrs in place
O
13 Any DPs Require Decisions reported down CO

Action
C
14 Sustainment Gp OC Sustainment BGLO

recy assets spotted
N
Table 4-1 – Example Go/No Go Check List

U
d. Control Measures. Given the relative fluidity of a raid, decentralization of

command is inevitable as the commander wishes to retain the maximum flexibility
to achieve success when circumstances inevitably change.
85. Information and Intelligence.
a. The successful planning and execution of a raid relies heavily on intelligence.

This will include route planning, enemy force locations and reaction times and
target packs. An ISTAR soak of the routes, FAA and the target will usually be
required. The establishment of a pattern of life will greatly assist the raiding force.
4-42
CONTENTS
b. The target may be time sensitive and thus the raiding force may have to be
fed real time information as the raid proceeds right up to the point of the assault.
The raiding force may have to develop CONPLANs in the case of an aborted or
failed raid or a compromise of infiltration and exfiltration routes.
86. Manoeuvre.
a. The careful selection and proving of routes will greatly aid both infiltration and
exfiltration. Sufficient lift must be provided to move the force to the objective and
recover it. The recovery will have to include plans for casevac and the movement
of CPERS and exploitable material.
b. If using SH to move the force then marrying up with air/avn assets will have
to be rehearsed.
PY
c. Multiple routes may be required to aid deception and ensure the raiding force
is not prevented from reaching its objective by a single blocked or compromised
O
route. Routes should be selected that offer good covered approaches, away from
centres of population and enemy forces that may compromise security. Movement
C
by night may be required unless the move is using a routine pattern of life as part
of the deception plan. ED
d. Engineers or Assault Pioneers can be used for any demolition tasks either on
the objective or in providing route denial or other counter mobility tasks to hamper
any enemy pursuit of the raiding force during the withdrawal.
LL
87. Firepower.
O
a. When Joint Fires are being used to support the raid then an adjustment and
TR
use policy must be agreed to ensure security and surprise are not compromised.
b. Joint Fires Assets must be positioned and sustained so that they are in range
to support the raiding force. If this is beyond the FLOT then this location must be
N
secured and protected for the duration of the raid which may require a separate
O
but coordination operation.

C
c. A target list must be drawn up so that all elements of the raiding force can
call for fire as a required. An example is shown below:
N
Phase 1: Infiltration
U
Target # Type Grid Description Purpose Trigger Observer

AB1005 60mm TA97103180 Linear Danger Suppress Enemy Contact Recce Gp
Area; Canal Xing during MVMT
Phase 2, 3, 4: Actions on Objective
AB1000 60mm TA96133265 Target Building Suppress Enemy Contact 7 Pl, FAC
from Target
Phase 5: Withdrawal
AB1035 60mm TA96003290 Danger Area; Suppress Enemy Contact Reserve
Possible Ambush during the Wdr Comd
during Wdr
Table 4-2 - Example Raid Target List Worksheet
4-43
CONTENTS
88. Sustainment.
a. If the force has to travel a long distance they will need to re-fuel and carry out
essential maintenance during the raid. Ideally this is carried out before the assault
so that the raiding force is able to withdraw straight after the re-organisation.
However security may prevent this and the sustainment may have to be carried
out well away from the target either on the infiltration or exfiltration routes. In
either case a robust casevac plan must be enacted.
b. A recovery and equipment denial plan is required to ensure that the raiding
force is not compromised and is capable of achieving its aim.
c. Sustainment package can be moved with the main body, ground dumped by
PY
another organisation or Air Delivered by helicopter or aircraft. Each method has
its advantages and disadvantages. However all must be protected and worked
into the plan from the beginning. The sustainment of the force should not
O
compromise the mission.
C
d. Casualty treatment and evacuation are a vital part of maintaining both the
physical and moral element of the fighting force and are especially important to the
ED
latter when raiding as the distances from other friendly forces are likely to be
greater. Careful consideration must be given to the casevac plan at each stage of
the raid, including infiltration, the assault and the exfiltration.
LL
89 Protection.
O
a. A raid will often rely on security and surprise to achieve its effect. A robust
OPSEC plan will be required including an EMCON policy especially during the
TR
operation.
b. Deception plans may assist the raiding party especially if they are built into
the plan from the beginning. These may require other forces to distract the enemy
N
whilst the raiding force infiltrates to the objective. Alternatively the raiding force
O
may use normal military activity to mask its moves by blending into the accepted
pattern of life.
C
c. The protection of the force during the raid will be crucial with the reserve or
N
security force ensuring that the assaulting force remains unmolested by other
enemy forces.
U
d. The use of CAS and AH along with OS may assist the force to withdraw.
4-44
CONTENTS
Op PYTHON was a BG strike operation to detain several insurgent leaders in AL QURNAH

some 40km to the north of Basra. The BG operated within a Brigade Scheme of Manoeuvre
with the Danish BG responsible for the north of Al QURNAH and the Force Reserve the
south, with the inter BG boundary falling along the SHATT AL ARAB river. The principle
planning issues addressed the question of how to achieve surprise and simultaneity in order
to capture and detain the greatest number of insurgents and so rip the heart out of the JAM
insurgency in AL QURNAH.
PY
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The ground allowed for only one approach by armour from the south-east, along a highway
N
with the village of AD DYRE, which was known to contain JAM sympathisers, some 45
minutes to the south. The Scheme of Manoeuvre involved a preliminary series of moves by
O
elements of the BG departing their base and moving in a wide arc to the west of BASRA.
Once north of the RUMAYLAH oil fields they concentrated under cover of darkness in FAA
C
AMANDA out in the desert and reconfigured into tactical groupings. The aim was to conduct
simultaneous strikes into AL QURNAH at H-Hr from the south, east and west. Two strikes
N
were carried out by TF SPARTAN (UKSF) and 2 LANCS Recce Pl, each following an
insertion by helicopter and a dismounted approach through the desert to report lines just
U
outside the town. The third, from the southeast was a mounted approach in WR and SN by
Blenheim and C Coys whose vehicles were intermingled with HET, CET and DROPS to
present the profile of a routine resupply convoy en-route to Maysan Province. Once on their
report line the strike troops peeled off and made their way to the objective.
90. The Battle Drill for a Raid is at Annex F.
Annexes:
A. Battle Drill - Battlegroup Attack

B. Battle Drill - Forward Passage of Lines
4-45
CONTENTS
C. Battle Drill – Advance to Contact

D. Battle Drill - Obstacle Crossing
E. Battle Drill - Link Up
F Battle Drill - Raid
G Battlegroup Considerations for Air Manoeuvre
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4-46
CONTENTS
ANNEX A TO
CHAPTER 4 TO
BG TACTICS
THE BATTLEGROUP ATTACK
Purpose Types & Principles Types of Manoeuvre

To defeat an Hasty: Seize opportunity, en Deliberate: Time to gain int,  Infiltration – to penetrate in
enemy force by disorganised, fav force ratios, mass own cbt power, degrade depth, fix en res, seize
physical rely on drills. en, asslt when ready. terrain.
destruction  Boldness  Seek surprise  Envelopment – to by pass
 Surprise  Concentrate Force en str, strike at VP, requires
 Speed  Maintain security fixing force.
 Intelligence  Exploit Manoeuvre  Encirclement – to fix en iot
 Simplicity  Seize Key Terrain threaten, coerce and
 Shock Effect  Achieve fire superiority reduce fighting power over
PY
 Drills & procedures  Exploit Success time.
 Rapid Manoeuvre  Keep it simple
Groupings
ISTAR Gp Advance Guard/Fire Sp Assault Force Ech Force/Res
O
 Finds En posns, strs  Enables manoeuvre  Conducts Break In  Supports Asslt Force
 Find rtes, FUPs, FSp  Suppress en during Battle & Fight through. CPERS/Casevac
 
C
posns final app & break in Secures initial Conducts FPOL with
 Guide Asslt Force to  Controls OS/Jt Fires objectives Asslt Force on Os
LD/FSp posn on depth posns  Controls intimate FSp  Secures subs objs
 May reform as BG Res  Protects Flanks ED & OS/Jt Fires
with Adv Gd observers
Conduct
Final Approach Break In Fight Through Exploitation
LL
 Covered rtes & guides  Direct precision FSp at  Envelop, isolate &  Pursuit
 Coord with break in point destroy en posns.  Level 1 MPE
suppression  Engr/Asslt Pnr for  Move armr and Jt  Info Activities
 Concentrate Asslt obstacles fires/OS obs fwd for
O
Force in FUPs – briefly  Intimate sp from Armr precision attack Reorganisation

 Armr lead in open  Clear BM, Fire control  Hasty def first then
TR
terrain, Inf lead in and tgt indication, exploit, unless in pursuit.

close terrain. NFAs.  Influence follow up.
 Overwatch by AH and  Cas & CPERS moved  Replen pris
ISTAR rear, CSUPs fwd o CSUPs
N
quickly. o Cas
 All round defence o CPERS
when static. o A Vehs
O
Considerations by Tactical Functions

C
Command Firepower
 KLE to set conditions where appropriate  Advancing Force and In Place Force control own Jt
 Understand Risk Appetite Fires within bdrys
N
 BG Comd fwd, Ech/Res Comd collocates  Clear delineation of Fires by BM

 Msn comd within bdrys/LOE  ROE
U
 Committal of Ech/Res to maint momentum

 Consequence Management Plan
Information and Intelligence Protection
 Recce pull, inform manoeuvre, opportunities for  Seek local air superiority or CCA overwatch
exploitation  CSCM on final apps
 Attack en C2, cohesion and will concurrent with  Watch flanks, don’t all look in
physical destruction  On Reorg –all round defence
 Max use of Comd net, regular R2 plus BG
assessment & future intentions
Manoeuvre Sustainment
 BG enabled Man Sp for break in by Asslt Force  Asslt Tps fight light – pri ammo/fuel
 Asslt throughout posn simultaneously to fix en  Medevac fwd via axis, secure CSS infil/exfil to A1
res/CAttk.  Anticipate exploitation
 Combined arms infiltration to lowest level.  Plan to deal with non-combatants
 Estab CPERS holding area and evac plan
4-A-1
CONTENTS
BATTLE DRILL – THE BATTLEGROUP ATTACK
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4-A-2
CONTENTS
ANNEX B TO
CHAPTER 4 TO
BG TACTICS
BATTLE DRILL – FORWARD PASSAGE OF LINES (FPOL)
Purpose and Principles Concept Conditions

Purpose  An operation in  The force to be relieved is in close contact with en
To continue an attack or which a force  The adv force has to take possession of suitable terrain
advance with fresh troops. advances or in order to cont battle
Principles attacks through  Must be executed quickly, fluidly, and with a rapid
 Simplicity another in-place transfer of accurate information
 Security force, which is in  Incoming force organized for mission immediately after
 Control contact with the the FPoL
 Flexibility enemy.  In-place force posture to facilitate passage and provide
 Offensive action sp
PY
Groupings and Tasks
In-place Force Advancing Force
 Provide intelligence on enemy, ground, and coordinate recce  Co-Loc HQ with In Place Force.
 Secure and maintain routes & provide guides; Secure LD  Re-group in AA
O
 Integrate Fire Plan into Adv Force plan  Control mov of troops across LD
 Allocate real estate  Once across LD control fires of In Place
 Force
C
Recover disabled vehs and eqpt from Adv Force
 Evacuate cas and CPERS from the Adv Force  Coord the deception plan
Command ED Firepower
 Detailed reconnaissance and coordination are vital to  FSTs to co-locate to coordinate fires
a successful FPoL  Handover of fires between units on Battle Handover
 Co-locate the command groups and BCs of the Line
advancing and in-place forces  Direct and Indirect fires of in-place force integrated
LL
 Agree routes in/out for both units and determine with the fire plan of the advancing unit
responsibility for securing them  All fire responds to commander responsible for the
 In-place force provides Advancing force with suitable attack
FUP de-conflicted from own posn
O
 Specify Comd Relationships

 Centralised control of Check Points and Routes Protection
TR
 Comds and staff of both units coord the fol: Int (incl  In place force provide protection until Adv BG crosses
info on Obs); plans; Comms; arrangements for recce; LD.
security during passage; areas and provision of  Deception: conduct move forward at night (where
guides; pri for routes and MovCon; Time or conditions possible); maintain normal pattern of activity; EMCON
N
for transfer of responsibility; Fire and other combat and EW

support to be provided by the in-place force; CSS to
be provided by in-place force; Exchange of LOs; C2
O
Manoeuvre
between advancing CS/CSS assets and in-place
force; Tactical cover and deception plans  BM, combat id and control measures are critical to
avoid fratricide and neutralisation of fire
C
 Coord measures to include: AAs; Battle Handover

Line (BHL); Attack positions; Timings; Recognition  Passage of lines to take place in unoccupied areas
signals/Combat ID; Contact points; Routes (incl SP  Prescribe OOM once FPoL is complete, agree number
N
and RP); FSCM of Check Points, degree of security required, the en

 Comd of advancing force to establish contact with sit, and the terrain
U
enemy on crossing LD. LD should be FLOT

 CO of Adv BG takes responsibility for the attack when
his lead elms reach the Release Points
Sustainment
Information and Intelligence  Full fuel replen for advancing unit from in-place unit in
 Full understanding of dispositions of unit being passed contact before moving through
 Early deployment of LOs to in-place force to develop  Support for move forward provided by in-place force
detailed and full SA  Advancing unit assumes full responsibility for CSS
forward of LD
 Artillery log must be carefully planned. Pre-position
stocks for assault, plan to retain UMS for ops after H-
Hr
 Med: Coord between 2 forces
4-B-1
CONTENTS
BATTLE DRILL – FORWARD PASSAGE OF LINES (FPOL)
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4-B-2
CONTENTS
ANNEX C TO
CHAPTER 4 TO
BG TACTICS
BATTLE DRILL – THE ADVANCE TO CONTACT
Purpose Principles Conditions

 Seeks to gain or regain contact with the  Balance  Advance in order to seize
enemy under the most favourable  Momentum  Advance in order to secure
conditions.  Security  Advance in order to hold
 May enable a subsequent BG attack or  Flexibility  Advance in order to clear
shape a Bde action  Maintain Reserve  Advance in order to destroy
Groupings and Tasks
ISTAR Gp Advance Guard (Adv Gd) Main Body (MB) Flank Guard (Flk Gd)
 Finds the en  Protects the ISTAR Gp  Monitors BG Comd Net,  Finds en threat to
PY
 Finds gaps and  Maintains ‘Recce Gap’ anticipates tasks. flanks
reserves in depth  Overwatch of VPs  Secure and controlled  Integrated with ISTAR
 Seizes lightly held bypassed en and move out of contact. Gp for STAP
crossing sites defiles  Switches to alt rtes to  Fixes en pen for MB
 
O
Clear/Confirm NAIs, Handoff VPs and bypass on Os assault
VPs and routes bypassed en to  Organises and conduct
 Select routes, FUPs, MB/follow on force Hasty Attack on Os
C
Fire Sp posn and LDs  Fixes en when located  Generates new Advance
 In contact, guides Gd as nec
MB/assault Force into  Replenish ISTAR

posn
All elms report on BG
ED 
Gp/Adv Gd as req
Anticipates and defeats
Comd Net local counter attacks
Command Firepower
LL
 Control Measures: NAI, report lines, bdrys  Overwatch of ISTAR Gp within DF envelope of Adv
 Balance speed with security Gd
 Clear Orders- Use SOC 03  All FEs operate within organic OS envelop, extd if Jt
O
 Anticipate at all levels Fires in sp

 Simple plan based on drills and flexibility  Cue fires to suppress when ready to manoeuvre
  Pre-planned DFs on likely en posns, flanks, key and
TR
BG Comd in TAC HQ fwd for SA

 Reserve Comd with BG Tac HQ vital terrain
 Maintain Tempo  If precision fires only avail then consider deliberate
attack
N
 Use Recce Pull  Screen: Observe, identify and report info on threats to
 Integrate Bde (AH, Recce, UAV) and BG ISTAR into MB
O
Common Operating Picture  Guard: Protect the MB by fighting to gain time, while
 Integrate STAP across BG observing and reporting info. Operates within FSp of
 main force.
C
Maint SA of NAIs, VPs and bypassed posns (Red,

Amber, Green)  VPs and defiles to be cleared, overwatched and
 Tech ISTAR (UAS/EW) integrated into ISTAR Gp and handed off as BG progresses
N
support Flk Gds

U
 Use of ground, avoid becoming channelled, maint  Where multiple axis, consider splitting A1 Ech
mutual support.  Maint CSUPs fwd on wheels to enable rapid resup
 ISTAR Gp on broad front, but maint mutual sp with  Estb BG log RV and Eqpt Collection Points on axis,
adv gd. protect with ech or res
 MB on narrow front, use of hides when static  Plan rolling Replens for ISTAR Gp, Adv Gd and MB in
 Clear VPs & defiles sequence
 Handoff and SA of VPs & bypassed en  Be prepared to handle and protect civs, refugees and
CPERs moving rear
 Main balanced Med cover fwd, split UAP and Med
sections to main momentum and flexibility
4-C-1
CONTENTS
BATTLE DRILL – THE ADVANCE TO CONTACT
Battlegroup Advancing On A Single Axis
PY
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O
Battlegroup Advancing On Two Or More Axis

TR
N
O
C
N
U
4-C-2
CONTENTS
ANNEX D TO
CHAPTER 4 TO
BG TACTICS
BATTLE DRILL – OBSTACLE CROSSING AND BREACHING
Purpose Principles
 To breach or cross an obstacle that may be opposed  Balance
in order to continue the advance.  Momentum
 Conducted as a drill  Security
 Surprise
 Simplicity
 Control
Groupings and Capabilities
In-Place Force. Bridgehead Force Breakout Force Battlegroup RV
  
PY
Defends Xing Area Establishes xings Exploits across obstacle Point where BG FEs
(Overwatch, Home  Assault Force to seize and through lodgement. called fwd and checked
bank sy) Protection of lodgement Most mobile elm of BG, before xing obstacle
Xing Site(s) & HQs  Echelon Force to Armr, Armd Inf & AH,
 Fire support to Brhd consolidate the regroup with recce/ISTAR. Engr RV
O
and Breakout Forces bridgehead  Where Engr eqpt
Armr, Inf with direct  Armr/Inf escorting Xing Area HQ prep and launched
C
and indirect fire support Engrs or Asslt Pnr  Controls Xing Area and at H Hr
and AH call fwd of BG FEs  Within Xing Area
 Normally Step Up, BG
ED Conduct
COS & Engr Sqn OC
Establish the Xing Area Establish the Bridgehead The Breakout

 In Place Force conducts overwatch  Direct Approach: Assault Xing Site from  Exploits across
and defence of Xing Area home bank, max surprise and firepower. obstacle to LOE
LL
 Recce FIND Xing Sites Echelon force consolidate lodgement once  Conducts FPOL with
 Xing Area breech/xing estb. Brhd Force (if
- Concealed  Infiltration: Used to dislodge en on far required – i.e. close
O
- Cleared bank and protect Xing Area for deliberate terrain or in contact
- Contained clear and breech. Inf infiltrate to far bank with en)
Estb Xing Area HQ, BG & Engr RV on foot or by SH.  Rebalance on LOE
TR
Other FEs move to hides & prep  Xing Site HQs conf Xing open, Xing Area with Covering Force
HQ calls FEs fwd and allocates xing sites
and routes
N
Command Firepower
 Adopt simple plan. Preferably use SOC 4.  Sequence Xing with deep fires to fix en reserve
 
O
CO Comds Op (not Engr) Lodgement in range of In Place Force

 Xing Area HQ controls Xing Area in detail  In Place Force suppress far bank when Brhd Force is
 Engr OC COLOC at Xing Area HQ Xing
C
 Xing Sites controlled by Engr Tp Comds  ROE

 Xing points are loc of breach or Xing
N
Information and Intelligence Manoeuvre.

 
U
Select concealed xing site where possible ISTAR Gp/Adv Gd seize xing if lightly defended
 Recce pull to conf sites and maint tempo  Use of SH or covered routes to infiltrate Brhd Force to
 ISTAR soak if time allow and threat requires far bank
 Separate Xings for Wheels/Tracks and dismtd inf
 Consider impact of refugees on freedom of mov
Protection Sustainment
 Seek local air supremacy during Xing.  CONPLAN civ activity, DPRE & breakdowns on Xing
 Assume 360º en threat; hide when static; move at Pt
speed  Understand and prep 1st line CSup for subsequent
 Treat Xing Sites as VP/VA ops, post-breakout
 Maintain flank protection  All replen activity should occur separate to the Xing
 Use darkness for xing drill
 Estb a reserve Xing Site  A1 Ech move hide to hide
 RAP on home bank COLOC A1 Ech during Xing
 Ensure a recovery asset is at each Xing pt
 Estab RAP and ES assets on both banks asap
4-D-1
CONTENTS
BATTLE DRILL – OBSTACLE CROSSING AND BREACHING (SOC 04)
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4-D-2
CONTENTS
ANNEX E TO
CHAPTER 4 TO
BG TACTICS
BATTLE DRILL – THE LINK UP
Purpose Principles Conditions

 Conducted when an advancing force  Coordination  Often in Enemy held
seeks to join an in place force in order  Security territory
to conduct subsequent offensive action  Situational Awareness  Often with allied or partner
or assist a break out  Tempo forces
Groupings
Advancing Force In Place Force
 Conducts Advance to Contact  Clear & estb link up points
 Controls Fires for Advance up to RFL  Controls Fires fwd of RFL
PY
 Bypasses & fixes en on route
 Clear and hold VPs, defiles etc if req for
extraction of forces
O
Conduct
Preliminary Actions The Advance Establish Contact
  
C
Advancing Force estb comms Organise for Attack In Place Force cfm Link up
& cfm sit, rtes, BM, FSCM &  Cfm fwd line of own troops points estb and clear
Link Up Points, OOM & Cbt id  App from unexpected  In Place Force cfm Link Up
 Cfm/agree C2 once forces
have linked up.
ED
direction or use manoeuvre
and firepower 
points estb and clear
Advancing Force, covering
 Cfm time fwd FEs expected  Bypass, fix and handoff en force deploys sy and flank
and dir of app en-route protection, cfm sit, hold areas
LL
 Clear & hold VPs, defiles and for MB and FSCM
key terrain en-route if reqd for  Call fwd of Main Body
re-supply or extraction
O

Command Firepower
 Single Commander designated once link up has  Advancing Force and In Place Force control own
TR
occurred Jt Fires within FSCM

 Clear BM and FSCM estb and agreed  Clear delineation of Fires by BM
 Simple Cbt id procedures agreed  ROE
N
 Understand Risk Management

 Consequence management plan
O
 KLE plan to set conditions where appropriate

 Advancing Force use Recce Pull  Cbt id must be clear to both forces
C
 Integrate Bde (AH, Recce, UAV) and BG ISTAR  CSCM and sy to preserve OPSEC during
N
into Common Operating Picture advance

 Integrate STAP with In Place Force  Deception plan?
 Maint SA of NAIs, VPs and bypassed posns  Clear Link Up points
U
(Red, Amber, Green)  Estb Flank protection before Link Up

 CF on broad front with Adv Gd in mutual sp  Advancing Force to conduct re-supply of In
 MB on narrow front, use of hides when static Place Force
 Main overwatch and hand off VPs and bypassed  Maint routes for MEDEVAC and Resupply
en  Anticipate requirements of subsequent msn
 Hold VPs/defiles req for resupply or extraction  Plan for evac of Non-Combatants
 Breech Friendly Force obstacles at link up points
4-E-1
CONTENTS
BATTLE DRILL – THE LINK UP
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4-E-2
CONTENTS
ANNEX F TO
CHAPTER 4 TO
BG TACTICS
THE BATTLEGROUP RAID
Purpose Principles Types of Manoeuvre

A raid is launched as a swift penetration of hostile  Simplicity  Ground Infiltration
territory to secure information, confuse the adversary,  Security  Air manoeuvre
seize a high value individual or target or destroy  Surprise  Withdrawal/Exfiltration
physical positions, eqpt or a discrete part of en force
Groupings
Recce/ISTAR Group Fire Support Group Assault Force Reserve/Security
 Finds En posns, strs  Enables manoeuvre  Conducts Break In  Supports Asslt Force
 Find rtes, FUPs, FSp  Suppress en during Battle & Fight through. CPERS/Casevac
posns final app & break in  Secures initial  Conducts FPOL with
PY
 Guide Asslt Force to  Controls OS/Jt Fires on objectives Asslt Force on Os
LD/FSp posn depth posns  Controls intimate FSp  Secures subs objs
 May reform as BG Res  Protects Flanks & OS/Jt Fires
with Adv Gd observers
O
Conduct
Infiltration Sustain Conduct Raid Re-organisation
C
 Multiple Routes to aid  Refuel vehs if required  Assault posn  Re-group off position
security and deception and carry out essential  Sp assault with fire  Immediate Casevac
 Recce/ISTAR Group maint before assault if
ED from Fire Sp Group  Level 1 MPE if time
prove routes possible  Withdraw to FAA or re-
 Prepare to switch  Robust casevac plan org area as soon as Withdraw
routes if blocked throughout assault complete  Exfiltration routes
 Secure LZ on arrival if  Recovery and Denial  Res/Security Force
LL
delivered by air. Plan effected prevent follow up
 Secure FAA on arrival  Demolitions considered
to allow break clean
O

Command Firepower
 
TR
Decentralize command Understand adjustment policy for Joint Fires and Illum
 Robust comms plan especially BLOS and Ground/Air  Ensure Joint Fires established in range and sustained
 Alternative Commander known to all for whole op
 Msn comd
 Go/No Go criteria understood by all
N

 Use ISTAR elements to build target pack, pattern of  Robust OPSEC and EMCON policy to main surprise
O
life, , plan routes and loc en res and response time  Multiple routes to aid deception
 Time Sensitive Targeting/CONPLANs  Deception built into plan from beginning

C
Immediate Exploitation if possible  Consider using routine pattern of life to disguise

preliminary moves
 Use Reserve/Security Group to prevent en c-attack or
N
follow up
 Sustainment group will have to be protected if not with
U
Main Body
 Reorg off objective usually on exfiltration route
 Use multiple routes to FAA  Asslt Tps fight light – pri ammo/fuel
 Use separate routes for Exfiltration  Robust casevac plan for all phases incl infiltration
 If using air insertion rehearse marrying up/load plans  Refuel and maint vehs before assault if poss
etc  Robust recovery and denial plan
 Ensure sufficient lift for CPERS and Exploitable  Robust CPERS plan
Materiel  Consider Air Delivery or Ground Dumping as
alternative to carrying stocks with raiding force
4-F-1
CONTENTS
BATTLE DRILL – THE BATTLEGROUP RAID
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4-F-2
CONTENTS
ANNEX G
TO CHAPTER 4 TO
BG TACTICS
BATTLEGROUP CONSIDERATIONS FOR AVIATION ASSAULT OPERATIONS
1. The tactical speed, mobility and flexibility of aviation offers all types of battlegroup the
opportunity to exploit the third (air) dimension in moving ground forces over extended
distances and terrain barriers, in order to achieve decisive advantage in both time and
space over the enemy. A battlegroup that executes concurrent air and ground manoeuvre
will generate considerable tempo and surprise. In this context, Aviation Assault may be
conducted as a discrete operation or as the precursor to subsequent ground manoeuvre
operations, potentially involving a subsequent link-up.
PY
2. However Aviation Assaults are not without their limitations. Adverse weather
conditions hinder helicopter operations and once inserted the assault forces are
constrained by reduced mobility and heavy reliance on air Lines of Communication.
O
Aviation Assaults also require detailed planning and precise synchronisation with success
often dependent on the availability of secure HLS and Forward Arming and Refuelling
C
Points (FARP).
PLANNING
ED
3. Simplicity. As with any type of operation, the plan should be kept as simple as
possible and understood at all levels and by all participants – particularly the aircrew, who
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are key to its successful implementation. The more complicated the insertion or extraction
plan, the higher the risk involved with the operation. Although joint planning is essential, it
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is inevitable that there will be a requirement for parallel planning at certain stages, in
particular for coalition operations, making simplicity important in ensuring coherence
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across all aspects of the plan.
4. Air Manoeuvre Planning Training and Advisory Team (AMPTAT). An AMPTAT

will often be deployed to support the planning and execution of Aviation Assault
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operations. AMPTAT provide an invaluable source of staff expertise and planning advice
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to battlegroup headquarters and should be requested whenever feasible. For routine air
manoeuvre coordination, a Mobile Air Operations Team (MAOT) may be deployed to
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provide low-level planning support. The presence of a MAOT on the ground provides a
greater degree of assurance to aircrew that HLS have been appropriately surveyed and
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enhances the confident insertion during resupply or MEDEVAC.

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5. Planning Sequence. Planning for battlegroup Aviation Assault missions tends to be

iterative, based on the ‘Reverse Planning Principle’, working from front to rear. The
positioning of the force on the ground to achieve the Ground Tactical Plan should drive
HLS selection. Working backwards, HLS selection should determine the air movement
plan, which in turn drives the loading and staging plans.
a. The Ground Tactical Plan. This is the Ground Tactical Commander’s (GTC)
preferred method of achieving the required effect. In principle, it has primacy, but it
must take into account all other plans; it cannot be produced in isolation. The
estimate process should identify the end-state and critical activity to be achieved.
This will allow the staff to identify what force package is required, where they are
required and in what order to achieve the mission. In particular, it should consider:
4-G-1
CONTENTS
the requirement for any ISTAR soak of HLS; the identification of primary and
secondary HLS; pre-assault shaping activities (including the use of EW); the
provision of fire support throughout; landing formations and offload procedures.
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Fig 4-G-1 – Example of Ground Tactical Plan
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b. The Landing Plan. The landing plan is the manner in which the ground forces
are committed to the objective area. Aviation assaults can be either enemy or terrain
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orientated, and delivered either on or offset from the objective depending on terrain,
threat, risk and the Rules of Engagement (ROE). Consideration must be given to:
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infiltration direction; separation of incoming/outgoing aircraft (lateral and altitude);

landing heading and offload directions (considering door-gunner constraints); pattern
setting by subsequent waves; and exfiltration direction.
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c. The Air Movement Plan. This covers the routing to the objective, the ingress,
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the in load of logistic supplies and the egress. The plan should select one ingress
route and one egress route for the assault aircraft. Consideration should be given to:
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the Air Movement Plan on insertion supporting the GTC’s deception plan; enemy
anti-air capabilities; the use of masked air routes; airspace control measures;
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emergency HLS for MEDEVAC; separate MEDEVAC routes and co-ordination with
air assets.
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d. The Loading (or Staging) Plan. The loading plan provides detail on where
every individual is positioned on each airframe. It also ensures the tactical integrity of
each serial by ensuring each load is a self-contained fighting force, taking into
account the requirement for balance in case of the requirement for bump plans i.e.
alternate loading plans should aircraft become unserviceable and key personnel
need to be ‘bumped’ onto other flights. It is necessary to load mission-critical
passengers or stores across a number of aircraft, in the event that one is lost en-
route. This organisation must be done in advance because confusion will rapidly
become chaos if the HLS becomes hot. A staging plan will be used in more complex
assaults, in which multiple staging points may be employed.
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CONTENTS
6. Mission Planning Conference (MPC). The MPC is the key event during any
Aviation Assault planning cycle. Coordinated by the Joint Helicopter Force (JHF) or Joint
Aviation Group (JAG) SO2 J5 and as a minimum attended by the CO JHF, Air Mission
Commander (AMC) (generally AH), SH Lead, JHF J2, JHF Ops Offr and the GTC, this
conference is the forum where the fundamental elements of the Aviation Assault plan are
refined. Key topics covered during the MPC are forecast meteorological implications
(including Red Illum, Green Illum timings), J2 implications, GTC SoM, infiltration and
exfiltration HLS selections, key timings, overwatch and escort requirements, bump plans,
ROE, Command and Signal and Go/No go criteria. The key product from this meeting is
the Aviation Operation Order which will produced by the JAG/JHF SO2 J5 on completion
of the MPC and prior to the Joint Mission Order. If genuine Joint Planning has occurred
from the outset of the estimate phase, between the GFC and the JAG/JHF HQ, then the
MPC may not be required, as much of this information will be covered during Q1-3.
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EXECUTION
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7. Joint Mission Orders (JMO). The JMO is the forum for the AMC to deliver the
approved Air Movement Plan for the Aviation Assault to all aircrew, GTC and other key
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personnel taking part. Prior to the JMO, AH, BH, SH and ground commanders will have
been conducting battle procedure or engaged on other flying tasks, and hence may not
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have been involved in earlier planning groups. The JMO should be an inclusive forum,
with the BGE and IO briefing the ground and enemy situation and the GTC briefing his
Intent, SoM and Main Effort. The FST and TACP should also attend. In this way, SH
crews can understand the context of where they are landing and why, and the AH can
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visualise the plan post-landing, in order to provide effective ISTAR and fire support. The
JMO must always be followed by comprehensive aviation rehearsals and a joint ROC drill.
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8. ‘Go/No Go’ Check. This is the final check of conditions and criteria required to
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launch the mission. All relevant details must be considered and a risk assessment made
balancing mission success against those conditions, with the AMC/GTC ultimately
responsible for the ‘go/no go’ decision.
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9. Joint Fires. Fire support for an Aviation Assault can consist of both organic and
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allocated assets. The commander should consider that whilst artillery fires are more often
available, they are less precise than AH fires and require clearance of large amounts of
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airspace and careful coordination in the wider context of the operation. When operating in
organic Restricted Operations Zones (ROZ) and Operations Boxes, battlegroup mortars
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offer the most responsive form of indirect fire support. However these assets significantly
increase the load placed on aviation (both in terms of load plan and under-slung loads)
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and must be considered carefully in terms of priority. They will often follow in a second
wave.
10. Battlespace Management. This is a key part of successful ALI and fire support
planning. There will often be no Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) in the traditional
sense, but Fire Support Control Measures (FSCM) are particularly important because
troops can be dropped on opposite sides of an objective and may require indirect fire in
one area while requesting air support in another. Deconfliction can be achieved through
the use of detailed operational graphics with predefined phase lines and colour-
differentiated spot codes. These allow ad hoc boundaries to be imposed quickly and,
together with assault angles, are used to mitigate against potential fratricide.
4-G-3
CONTENTS
11. Actions On. Both the aviators and ground forces will have extensive lists of ‘actions
on’. Some will be mutually compatible, whereas others will be exclusive to each
component. It is essential that each understands and agrees which are common to both,
removing any ambiguity.
12. Disembarkation Drills. Commanders must be conscious of the potential for

disembarking troops to sustain ankle and knee injuries in the adrenaline-fuelled rush to get
off the aircraft. There will clearly be a balance of risk but troops should be made aware of
the risk of dislocated knees and broken ankles.
13. Abort Criteria. Actions on should include the possibility of SH being shot down or
forced to execute a forced landing due to mechanical failure. The AMC and GTC need to
agree the abort criteria and ensure it is fully briefed to all, including the SH leader, who
may have been delegated the right to abort up to the point of insertion. It should not be a
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matter for negotiation once the operation has commenced.
SUSTAINMENT
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14. Maximising sustainability post-landing can often be overlooked, and may compromise
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mission success if ground forces are in contact from L Hour onwards and resupply plans
need to be brought forward. For prolonged operations, the ground force can expect to be
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resupplied every 24 hours. This places a considerable constraint on aviation assault
operations and a major burden on SH. It therefore requires careful planning prior to an
operation and the possibility of A1 Echelon to deploy to form logistic nodes from where
aviation resupply can be conducted within a shorter loop. Alternatively, resupply can be
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conducted at night because it reduces risk, but there is a concomitant burden placed on
the ground troops who have to secure and guard the HLS which detracts from their ability
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to support the main force.

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COMMAND AND CONTROL
15. The complexity of Aviation Assault operations emphasises the need for early
engagement by aviation SMEs, joint planning, close coordination and communication
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between participating units. The directing or establishing headquarters allocates assets,

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defines authority and assigns responsibility by designating command and support

relationships. The headquarters responsible for an Aviation Assault operation will form a
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planning team as early as practicable. National aviation assets may be inadequate for the
scale of operation envisaged, therefore additional aviation resources will be requested
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through the appropriate higher headquarters (normally SO2 Aviation at Bde).

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16. Command Arrangements. The importance of a clear command chain is vital.

Shared risk and thus decision making are essential within well-defined command
arrangements. The following appointments are used:
a. All Arms Task Force (AATF) Commander. Normally the battlespace-owning

CO.
b. Air Mission Commander (AMC). The aviation regiment CO, a detachment

commander or his delegated representative, such as the AH lead for the mission.
4-G-4
CONTENTS
c. Ground Tactical Commander (GTC). The GTC is the CO of the unit or

subunit who commands the assault force, once on the ground. This individual may
also be the AATF Comd if battlegroup Tac HQ deploys forward.
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4-G-5
CONTENTS
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CONTENTS
CHAPTER 5
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
1. Chapter 5 describes defensive operations and the associated enabling actions at

battlegroup level. The purpose of defence is to defeat or deter a threat, thereby setting the
conditions for subsequent tactical actions. The objects of defensive actions are:
a. To gain time.
b. To increase the enemy’s vulnerability to fires by forcing him to concentrate his

forces.
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c. To defeat or disrupt the enemy’s offensive capability.
d. Fix the enemy as a prelude to offensive operations elsewhere.
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e. Retain or deny key or vital ground.
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f. To provide a secure environment within which to conduct Stabilisation
Operations. ED
PART 1 – CONSIDERATIONS AND PRINCIPLES
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2. Considerations. Some of the key considerations are:
a. Understand what needs to be defeated and why. This may be a combination of

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regular and irregular forces which may require different techniques to counter each.
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b. Buy time to create opportunities to seize or regain the initiative.
c. Hold ground (area or key point) in order to protect a vulnerability such as the
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population, an installation, or a flank.

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d. Seize or regain the initiative.

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e. Hold off the attack while maintaining the cohesion of the defending force.
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f. Look for opportunities to break the enemy’s cohesion by the use of surprise,
shock action, dislocation, disruption and destruction of discrete parts of his force
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through offensive action.
3. Principles. The principles of defence are:
a. Achieve Depth. Major enemy thrusts may lead to penetrations which could
result in a breakthrough. These penetrations should be blocked by pre-planned
positions or striking forces in depth. The wider the frontage the greater is the need
for depth. Positions in depth will surprise and unbalance the attacker thus providing
opportunities for counter attacks. If defending forces are deployed on a wide front, a
greater proportion of the force should be dedicated as a reserve for a range of
counter attack, blocking and reinforcement tasks. Depth will also hide the extent of
5-1
CONTENTS
the position from the enemy, especially those relying on ground observation for
information.
b. Maintain All Round Defence. An attack from any direction must be

anticipated. This requires comprehensive reconnaissance and the preparation of
alternate positions to counter the 360 degree threat. The defensive plan should be
inherently simple and flexible to counter the enemy’s actions. When faced by a
hybrid enemy using irregulars or guerrillas additional protection might need to be
provided to isolated detachments and route security to ensure the battlegroup’s
freedom of action. Extensive use of screen and guard forces acting as a covering
force may also be required.
c. Achieve Mutual Support. Mutual support, where gaps between positions are
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covered by fire, increases the strength of any defence. This support is provided by
interlocking1 and overlapping2 arcs of fire from direct fire support weapons such as
GPMG (SF) and GMG. There will often be a conflict between the need for depth and
the demands of mutual support. Where depth is considered more important, gaps
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between sub-units must at least be covered by surveillance and indirect fire. If gaps
are unavoidable they should be between sub-units; within the sub-unit troops or
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platoons must be mutually supporting.
d.
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Maintain a Reserve. The use of a reserve to counter enemy penetration,
conduct local counter attacks or in the case of mobile defence to act as the striking
force is a vital part of the defence. A well employed reserve can prevent the enemy
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from exploiting an advantage or achieving a breakthrough.
e. Conduct Offensive Action. Opportunities for offensive action within defence

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will be limited but must be seized when the opportunity is available. Examples of
such offensive actions are spoiling attacks, counter penetrations, counter attacks and
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aggressive patrolling to prevent the enemy from establishing himself. Battlegroups

must maintain a striking force assigned to conduct offensive action against enemy
penetration and to exploit opportunities such as snap ambushes in complex terrain.
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The size of the force will depend on the concept of operations, but without one the
battlegroup commander has no flexibility or means of influencing the battle, or
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wresting the initiative from the enemy. The key to achieving offensive action is to
maintain an offensive mindset and encourage an offensive spirit in the battlegroup.
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f. Concealment and Deception. The enemy must be denied intelligence about

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the defensive plan. This offsets the attacker’s inherent initiative by forcing him to
attack blind into prepared defences. Deception can play a role in achieving this but
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any deception plan must be credible (i.e. properly resourced and enabled) to achieve
the desired effect. The battlegroup must adopt effective Operations Security
(OPSEC) measures and conduct aggressive actions against enemy reconnaissance
including against Electro-optical and Thermal Imaging, EW and surveillance from
both ground and air. Consideration must also be given to counter dickers and fifth
columnists who may attempt to disrupt battlegroup operations.
1
Interlocking arcs are achieved when fire from two or more positions cross over each other. This increases the numbers of positions
that the enemy can be engaged from and reduces his ability to fire and manoeuvre.
2
Overlapping arcs are achieved when the fire from one position overlaps the frontage of another position. This prevents the enemy from
assaulting one position until he has also suppressed the other, reducing the combat power he can bring to bear on each position.
Overlapping arcs are most often achieved within sub units but may be achieved with longer ranged weapons between one sub unit and
another.
5-2
CONTENTS
Op HERRICK 4 – 3 PARA
3 PARA battlegroup’s mission was to create the necessary security conditions to enable the Afghan
Government and PRT to provide economic development and improved governance to the people of
Helmand Province. 3 PARA battlegroup’s initial mission was rapidly overtaken by events and the urgent
need to prevent the northern towns of NOWZAD, MUSA QAL’EH and SANGIN and the KAJAKI DAM
from falling into the hands of the Taliban. Consequently, the battlegroup quickly found itself conducting
near continuous combat operations to defend theses locations from attack in order to preserve the
Afghan Government’s authority in this area of the Province. Initial operations were restricted to
GERESHK and conducting reactive operations into the SANGIN VALLEY. However, in order to counter
the Taliban threat the battlegroup occupied company group sized positions in each district centres and a
platoon sized defensive position over-looking the dam. The outstations were garrisoned by individual
company groups and were supported and sustained by helicopter re-supply, indirect fire support and
battlegroup manoeuvre operations. In Aug Manoeuvre Outreach Groups (MOGs) were created from
mobile troops and operated on a long-range reconnaissance basis in the desert areas between the main
provincial centres. The MOGs disrupted Taliban lines of communication and the unpredictability of their
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movement served to distract Taliban activities against the district centres. The battlegroup also
conducted a number of deliberately targeted air assault operations to disrupt the Taliban’s C2 structure.
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Defensive Lessons from Op HERRICK 4:
Offensive Spirit: Overmatch and Unpredictability: First impressions in combat count. It was important
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to think overmatch; being bold, closing with the enemy quickly to hit him hard and early within the
prevailing ROE paid dividends. Conversely remaining static for too long gave the enemy time to
organise and invited attack. Consequently, it was important to try and remain dynamically unpredictable
ED
and avoid setting patterns. In all planning and execution it was imperative to avoid isolating combat
elements that lacked sufficient integral and external mutual support, as the need to be prepared for a
360 degree fight was ever-present. This was demonstrated by the fact that the Taliban consistently
attempted to probe our flanks in the majority of BG operations where the concept of a front line did not
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exist. In turn, cut offs and interdiction of enemy exfil/infil routes also needed to be planned in all offensive
operations as the Taliban would withdraw and reinforce as the opportunity to do so presented itself.
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Combined Arms and Joint Operations: Virtually all operations were combined arms affairs. Well-
established lessons continued to apply throughout the operation, such as vehicles (including armour)
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operating in close country must be supported by Infantry. It reinforced the point that commanders must
have all-arms experience. Companies also benefited from being grouped early during training (with
integral 81mm mortars, HMG, ATW, snipers, LEWT detachments, FST/JFAC and vital logistic
sustainment elements: RMOs and CMTs) and became the basic building block of combat. Experience
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also reinforced the point that non-Infantry must be prepared to fight and survive in close combat. In the
COE everyone is a potential fighter. Virtually all troops deployed forward with the outstations were
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employed in close combat in the Infantry role regardless of capbadge.
Air Land Integration: Air/Land integration is essential and was one of the key successes of HERRICK
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4. The concept used was based on the FST (Fire Support Team) which was embedded in the FSCC
(Fire Support Coordination Centre) under the umbrella of the Battery Commander. On the ground that
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translated into every ground element, whether at battlegroup, company or even platoon level, having its
own FST, bringing together the Mortar Fire Controller, Forward Observation Officer and JTAC into one
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group, capable of concentrating and coordinating indirect, direct and air-delivered fires quickly and
accurately. This system also gave the battlegroup commander the ability to prosecute fires extremely
rapidly, as the control mechanism required was already deployed.
Air Manoeuvre (AM): The AM concept was demonstrated successfully at the tactical level using AH for
the first time. However, the complexities attached to AM should not be underestimated and it is not a
capability that can be grown overnight. Many of the necessary building blocks required considerable
investment (time, Joint training, Air Ops Officers, established air cells, HHIs and LPCs etc). The Joint
Mission Brief (JMB) process was a vital element of planning and execution of all AM operations, as were
Condition Checks and the establishment of specific ‘Go/No Go’ criteria when landing in a potentially hot
HLS.
4. The Organisation of Defence. When deploying forces within his Area of Operations
(AO), the battlegroup commander’s aim should be to create as much depth as possible.
5-3
CONTENTS
He should therefore plan to organize the battlefield into a Covering Force Area (CFA), a
Main Defensive Area (MDA) and a Rear Area. Battlefield shaping, decisive and sustaining
operations (FIND/FIX/STRIKE and EXPLOIT) may not coincide exactly with the
organisation of the AO, but there is a strong conceptual and practical link between them.
In Major Combat Operations (MCO) the AO is likely to be organised on a linear framework
as shown in Figure 5-1 below.
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ED
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Fig 5-1 - Linear Framework of Area Defence

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a. Covering Force Area (CFA). The CFA extends forward from the Forward
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Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA). A Covering Force (CF) will be deployed in the CFA
and may be given a screen or guard mission.
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(1) A screen force’s task is to observe, identify and report information on the
enemy’s advance whilst at the same time deny the enemy useful information.
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(2) A guard force’s primary task will be to protect the main force to gain time
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by delaying, defending and counter attacking within their capabilities. The CF

must be strong enough to impose the necessary security and delay.
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(3) Where the battlegroup’s flanks are not covered by friendly forces then the
CFA may have to cover both front and flanks and the commander may have to
commit more than a single sub-unit to the CF. Consideration should be given to
using the ISTAR Group reinforced by FSTs and supported by OS, Avn and UAS
to extend their reach. AH are particularly useful in covering large sectors of
terrain.
b. Main Defensive Area (MDA). The MDA extends rearwards from the FEBA and
it is where the decisive action is likely to be fought. It is traditionally delineated by the
FEBA and the lateral boundaries of the AO. The MDA is where the battlegroup
commander deploys the bulk of his combat power (the main defensive force). In area
defence the majority of the troops initially deployed in the MDA will be static, i.e.
infantry dug in or within strongpoints protecting Key Terrain or Vital Ground with
5-4
CONTENTS
direct fire anti-tank and anti-personnel weapons. In mobile defence the minimum
force required to achieve the aim is allocated to static positions. Both area and
mobile defence retain mobile elements; the striking force and/or reserves. In area
defence these are usually held in the rear area ready to deploy into the MDA when
required.
c. Rear Area. The Rear Area extends from the rear boundary of the MDA (if it has
one) to the battlegroup’s rear boundary. Echelon and reserve forces such as mobile
Armd Inf/Mech Inf/Armr or even AH are often held in the rear area ready to deploy
into the MDA; together with indirect fire support, CS and CSS elements. Operations
in the Rear Area include security, sustainment, terrain management and movement
and protection of reserves. Whilst they may play little part in the execution of the
decisive act, forces allocated to the rear area are critical to the battlegroup’s ability to
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exploit any situation without delay, and become increasingly important if the MDA is
to be occupied for long periods. There may be occasions where there is no Rear
Area and the functions normally carried out here are conducted in the MDA.
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PART 2 - TYPES OF DEFENCE
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5. There are four types of defensive action; Area Defence, Mobile Defence, Key Point
Defence and Delay. The type of defence employed depends on the mission and the
ED
circumstances. In all defensive operations the battlegroup commander will conduct
shaping operations, within his Area of Operations, that include preparing the area over
which the battle will be fought. These might be physical in nature such as the preparation
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of obstacles to channel the enemy, or a combination of other joint effects that will shape
the enemy’s ability to operate. The defending force must not allow the enemy to dictate
the pace. Every opportunity must be exploited to retain or regain the initiative and force
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the attacker to comply with the defenders plan by the use of activities such as local
counter attacks, aggressive patrolling and ambushes.
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AREA DEFENCE
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6. Purpose. Area defence focuses on the denial of terrain and the wearing down of the
enemy’s combat power. It does this by absorbing the enemy into a framework of mainly
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static, mutually supporting positions, from which he can be destroyed by fire and local
counter attacks. Unlike mobile defence, area defence may not necessarily defeat an
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enemy outright; it may require some other simultaneous or subsequent mission to achieve
that end. Within a brigade context, one battlegroup might be conducting area defence
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whilst other battlegroups are simultaneously conducting the covering force action, mobile
defence or providing the striking force. Key considerations are:
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a. Own mobility is equal to or less than enemy’s. Light Role and Mechanized
Battlegroups are particularly suited to conduct area defence if appropriately task
organised.
b. Deny ground to the enemy through concentration of force and counter mobility.
c. Deploy mutually supporting positions.
d. Defend by fixing the enemy with maximum force.
5-5
CONTENTS
e. Retain a mobile reserve for local counter attacks and limited counter
penetration.
7. Layout. In area defence most of the defending force is deployed to retain ground
(using a combination of defensive positions) with a striking force and small reserves. The
battlegroup commander positions his forces on suitable terrain with a specific orientation
and direction of fire. The defence is organised around a static framework provided by
defensive positions, seeking to destroy enemy forces by interlocking/overlapping fire or by
local counter attack of enemy penetrating between defensive positions (see Figure 5-2). A
striking force should be employed for local counter attacks or blocking enemy
penetrations.
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Fig 5-2 – Area Defence Layout

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8. Planning Considerations.
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a. Areas of Interest (AI). The Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPE)

process indicates how the enemy may use the ground and environment to his
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advantage. It not only identifies the likely physical avenues of approach but also the
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psychological actions that the enemy may seek to exploit. When conducting Area or
Mobile defence at battlegroup level there is likely to be greater emphasis initially on
the physical approaches but the psychological actions must not be ignored and may
come into greater focus as the campaign matures. The battlegroup commander
designates TAIs where he wishes to have a direct effect on the enemy and deploys
his forces in positions to concentrate effects into these areas. He also selects NAIs
into which he will arrange ISTAR forces to look in order to track enemy progress and
trigger actions in the TAIs.
5-6
CONTENTS
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Fig 5-3 – Example of Selection of Physical NAIs & TAIs
ED
b. Shaping the Battlefield. The battlegroup commander may use a number of
methods to shape the battlefield, not all of them kinetic. In the physical domain he
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may choose to shape the battlefield by defending in one sector to deny terrain to the
enemy while delaying in another area to create the illusion of success in the
opposing commander’s mind. Using obstacles to disrupt, turn, fix, or block the
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enemy attack can separate the enemy’s leading elements and establish conditions to
counter attack and destroy isolated enemy elements. All obstacles must be covered
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by fire. In addition to the physical shaping, other Joint Effects may be utilised to
shape the battlefield; KLE, Info Ops and other key messaging will shape how the
enemy is able to prosecute his attack and how effective it is. Where time permits
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shaping may broadly follow three steps; an ISTAR soak to gather information,
Influence Activity to shape the narrative and the positioning of forces to enforce the
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message with kinetic effect if and when required.

C
c. Combined Arms Obstacle Integration (CAOI). Both mobile and area defence
rely on the skilful integration of natural and artificial obstacles into the design for
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battle, alongside direct and indirect fires and manoeuvre to ensure the desired effect
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on the enemy. Whilst the battlegroup obstacle plan has to conform to the overall
brigade barrier plan, the battlegroup commander and OC CS Engineer Squadron (or
the BGE in his absence) will be responsible for the detailed siting of major obstacles
within the battlegroup AO. The principal forms of artificial obstacle used in CAOI are
ditches, wire obstacles, demolitions, route and area denial measures. This may
include the denial of key infrastructure, routes and defiles, tree felling, cratering and
flooding. Such effects must be considered against the wider campaign plan and if
physical destruction is chosen, then the impacts on the host nation infrastructure and
population may have to be mitigated. The control of demolitions and CAOI are
described in detail at Annexes G and H respectively. The principles to be observed
are:
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CONTENTS
(1) The use of obstacles must be fully integrated into the overall battlegroup
scheme of manoeuvre so that they constrain enemy but not own force
movement.
(2) Obstacles should be sited with offensive operations in mind, for example
channelling enemy forces into a killing area or ambush.
(3) All obstacles must be covered by observation and indirect fire. If possible
they should also be covered by direct fire.
(4) Artificial obstacles should be sited to complement and take advantage of

natural obstacles where possible.
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(5) Consideration must be given to whether obstacles will cause accidental
civilian casualties and plans made to minimise these by measures such as.
posting sentries, erecting signs or removing obstacles promptly once no longer
required.
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(6) Time must be allowed to gain authority to permit the destruction of HN or
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key infrastructure.
ED
Top Tip: Site appropriate weapons to cover the obstacle i.e. anti-tank weapons
to cover anti-tank obstacles
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d. Battlespace Management. Control measures must be carefully applied to

ensure that they reinforce the defensive plan and aid the battlegroup in bringing fires
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to bear on the appropriate targets. Although boundaries between defending forces

should follow identifiable terrain features, they must not split avenues of approach.
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Battlegroup headquarters will control the defence by using battle positions, sectors,
strong-points and report lines. Use of the appropriate FSCM will also prevent
unwanted collateral damage by use of No Fire Areas and Restricted Fire Lines whilst
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ROZ/HiDACs will assist in the coordination of air delivered effects.

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e. Fire Control. Direct fire control measures include Trigger Lines, TAIs,
Engagement Areas (EA)3, and Target Numbers4. The battlegroup commander may
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designate one trigger line for all weapons systems or multiple trigger lines for each
weapon or type of weapons system.
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f. Deception. Successful deception measures increase the survivability of the

U
defending battlegroup by causing the enemy to waste combat resources by, for
example, persuading him to manoeuvre into a well prepared engagement area.
Deception must be carefully planned, coordinated, fully resourced and properly
executed to be credible. Likely deception measures include:
(1) Dummy Positions. The siting, construction and manning of dummy

positions may cause the enemy to concentrate his intelligence gathering assets,
firepower and offensive actions against these rather than the real positions.
3
An Engagement Area (EA) is a complementary fire control measure. It is an area that is to be covered by the fire of a specific weapon
or sub unit. It used to be called a Killing Area.
4
A target number is an easily recognisable natural or man-made point on the ground such as a building or road junction. It is used to
direct fire onto targets in a similar manner to DFs.
5-8
CONTENTS
However, to be effective they must be credible. The battlegroup will have to

invest significant resources including manpower, time and equipment to prepare
and operate such dummy positions. Considerations include the presentation of
realistic personnel movement and electromagnetic signatures.
(2) False Fronts. The use of the covering force to suggest a false front may
induce the enemy to deploy in a position that makes him vulnerable to offensive
actions. In order to be effective the false front will have to be secure enough to
prevent penetration by ground troops (especially ground recce) and the main
defensive positions camouflaged and concealed against other enemy
intelligence gathering assets such as UAV, EW and dickers. The false front
withdraws once the enemy is committed to the attack.
PY
(3) False Routine. The enemy may be deceived by an overt show of fixed
routine whilst forces prepare for other operations.
g. Counter Reconnaissance Plan. Plans should be made for the early
O
destruction or neutralisation of enemy reconnaissance throughout the AO. Measures
that can be taken to seek out and neutralise or destroy enemy reconnaissance
C
include:
ED
(1) Good camouflage and effective deception measures such as false fronts
and dummy positions. Positions should be concealed from both ground and
aerial reconnaissance and against both electro-optical and thermal imaging
LL
sensors. Protection against EW sensors and the application of OPSEC and
CSCM measures should be applied throughout the battlegroup.
O
(2) Use the covering force to neutralise ground reconnaissance so that main
defensive positions are not disclosed.
TR
(3) Protect and conceal reserves through measures such as aggressive

patrolling and camouflage and concealment measures.
N
(4) Consideration must be given to prevent irregular forces, dickers and other
O
local nationals from obtaining intelligence and passing it to the enemy. The use
of local guard forces and security elements such as standing patrols, VCPs and
C
possibly physical barriers should be balanced against the need to preserve

OPSEC.
N
h. Anti-Armour Plan. Planning the anti-armour defence should be the first

U
consideration. Anti-armour weapons must be sited by the battlegroup commander, to

destroy enemy armour by day and by night. The following points apply:
(1) They should be concentrated on likely approaches. Early detection of the

enemy is essential to allow for timely employment.
(2) Siting of obstacles must be integrated with the anti-armour plan to canalise
enemy armour into areas where coordinated fire of anti-tank weapons, tanks,
artillery, aviation and air assets will be more effective.
(3) Integrate anti-armour and anti-infantry fire support weapons such as

Javelin and machine guns to neutralise the enemy.
5-9
CONTENTS
(4) Anti-armour weapons must be located in depth as well as forward, to

counter any penetration of the forward positions. If available, AH may be the
most quickly deployable means of countering tank attacks.
Top Tip: Layering anti-armour weapons allows for redundancy when some are
destroyed by enemy action
i. Terrain and Positions. The battlegroup commander must identify any

important terrain within his AO. This may be classed as Vital Ground or Key Terrain.
(1) Vital Ground. Vital Ground is a piece of terrain, the loss of which would
PY
make the position untenable and therefore must be held. It is of such
significance that if it is lost and the defence is to continue, it must be retaken.
The presence of Vital Ground within the AO will have significant impact on the
siting and conduct of the defence.
O
(2) Key Terrain. Key Terrain is a piece of terrain, the seizure or retention of
C
which offers a marked advantage to either combatant. It does not have to be
held but must be denied to the enemy. It should not be abandoned lightly and
ED
counter-attack plans should be prepared and enacted if required.
(3) Primary Positions. A primary position is a defensive location situated on

likely enemy avenues of approach. Primary positions should be sited two down
LL
i.e. the battlegroup commander should site platoons and the sub-unit
commander should site sections5. This promotes mutual support within a
O
coherent defence. Alternate and secondary positions should be designated and

prepared as time permits.
TR
(4) Alternate Positions. Alternate positions provide additional lines of sight

similar to those of the primary position and are principally used for crew served
N
weapons. They increase the effectiveness and survivability of a weapon

system by enabling it to engage the enemy from multiple positions. A weapon
O
may fire one or two rounds from one position before moving to the next in order
to complicate enemy target acquisition.
C
(5) Secondary Positions. Secondary positions provide the means to

N
accomplish a task that cannot be conducted from the primary or alternate

positions. They allow a unit or a weapon system to engage enemy forces
U
approaching from another direction, such as the rear or the flank. They are
particularly useful where the enemy may be capable of attacking from a number
of directions.
(6) Strong Points. A typical strong point is a heavily fortified position located
on terrain critical to the defence. The battlegroup commander may establish a
strong-point when he anticipates that enemy actions might temporarily isolate a
location critical to the defence. The construction of a strong-point requires
significant engineer support. Positions are prepared for all round defence
5
Noting that the Bde Comd will have sited sub-units.
5-10
CONTENTS
especially if the commander anticipates the strongpoint being surrounded.

Strong-points are often used in Urban Operations.
(7) Reverse Slope Positions. Outside of urban areas reverse slopes will
often provide the best positions for defence (See Figure 5-4). However the
choice of reverse or forward slope positions should be decided on individual
merit. The pros and cons of a reverse slope position are:
(a) Offers opportunity to surprise and deceive an enemy about the true
location and layout of the defensive position.
(b) Offers protection from enemy observation and indirect engagement.
PY
(c) Enemy assaulting troops will be sky lined within the range of small
arms and direct fire weapons.
(d) Observation to the front will be limited for most of the battlegroup and
O
will require rear reporting by Recce and ISTAR.
C
(e) Gaps and obstacles forward will need to be covered by infantry and
armoured groups which are detached from the main defensive position.
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
Fig 5-4 Reverse Slope Defence

N
(8) Forward Slopes. Whilst recognising that reverse slopes are the default
siting, there may be times when a commander will choose to deploy on a
U
forward slope. These may include:
(a) When observation, long range direct fire are critical to the defence.
(b) When posture and presence are important to the operation, such as
the separation of two hostile factions.
(c) When FSTs and support weapons protected by small units of infantry
must be sited forward, with the bulk of the force remaining on the reverse
slope ready to strengthen the forward line when required.
5-11
CONTENTS
Life in a Platoon House on Op HERRICK 4
“Having normally inserted by heli into the compound in light scales, conditions improve once
the men’s bergens can be lifted in – although this can be a week or so later dependent upon
operational circumstances. Everyone sleeps on the floor either within the compound buildings
or in the numerous sangars and trenches that have been constructed to fortify each location
and help protect against incoming mortar, rocket and RPG fire. The first men in worked around
the clock to fortify the compound - building sangars, digging shell-scrapes and trenches and
filling sandbags; all the time protected by colleagues on guard or near-constant patrols.
After two weeks of snatching rarely more than 30 mins sleep at a time, the soldiers were
completely shattered. Soldiers from the Platoon on guard catch their sleep on the floor of their
sangars and at the feet of their colleagues who continue to observe their arcs. Others sleep at
the bottom of trenches or in shell-scrapes, next to their colleagues manning the mortar barrels
PY
or Heavy Machine Guns in order to reduce their reaction times – all have become used to
going from asleep to fighting in a few seconds. Everyone sleeps in their body armour with
many still wearing their helmets as others work around them. The defensive positions are
constantly checked to make sure they are as robust as possible – no-one wants to be on the
O
receiving end of a RPG or an accurate burst of HMG fire. They are kept tidy and clutter-free
like any other living space apart from the piles of spare ammunition kept to immediate hand
C
and the miniature stockpiles of water.
ED
Living conditions as an issue pale into insignificance compared to the near-constant threat to
life and limb. In Sangin, the relentless attacks of varying coordination occurred regularly,
breaking up the monotony of single round snipes that happened most other nights. Fatigue
would often start to set in, only to be banished by the adrenaline flow associated with another
LL
attack. These soldiers were often in prolonged contact for hours at a time, and only able to
achieve respite once attacks had been finally broken up by a heavier weight of accurate
firepower that included Claymores, 51mm and 81mm mortars, 105mm artillery, CAS and AH
O
fire support. Frustrations under such conditions have been kept to a minimum by the nature
and professionalism of those involved. That said, it has proven difficult for such men to have
TR
found themselves at times relatively fixed and unable to mount offensive operations into the
town, while being engaged most nights by an enemy attempting to wear them down”.
N
MOBILE DEFENCE
O
9. Purpose. The purpose of Mobile defence is to defeat the enemy by the destruction
of discrete parts of its combat power rather than defending terrain.
C
N
10. Mobile Defence Considerations. Mobile defence may be used when a unit is
defending a large AO without well defined avenues of approach, such as flat open terrain,
U
large conurbations or woods and forests. It offers the opportunity to strike throughout the
depth of the enemy formation in order to defeat him through the destruction of critical
vulnerabilities in his second echelon or rear. Key considerations are:
a. Own mobility must equal or exceed the enemy’s. This role is particularly suited
to Armoured and Armoured Infantry Battlegroups in open terrain and Light Role and
Mechanized Battlegroups in more complex terrain.
b. Mobile defence requires considerable depth but mutual support between sub-
units is less likely to be achieved.
5-12
CONTENTS
c. Terrain will be traded to divert attention from the friendly main force and to over-
extend the enemy, thus diminishing his ability to react to the striking force.
d. Use minimum force to fix the enemy, and be prepared to mount local counter
attacks onto previously held positions.
e. The maximum combat power is allocated to the mobile striking force which is
usually retained under the control of the battlegroup commander. This strikes at the
decisive point, simultaneously throughout the depth of the enemy’s forces, as the
enemy attempts to overcome the fixing force. The striking force therefore requires
equivalent or greater mobility than that of the enemy.
f. The battlegroup must have sufficient situational awareness to select the
PY
appropriate point and time of committal for the strike.
g. The battlegroup must retain freedom of movement/manoeuvre to deliver the

strike force to its target.
O
h. The commander should retain a small reserve to cope with the unexpected and
C
to provide flexibility.
ED
Top Tip: Mobility is relative. Light troops are just as mobile as mechanized
troops in urban and other close terrain.
LL
11. Layout. The layout of the Mobile Defensive Battle is shown below:
O
TR
N
O
C
N
U
Fig 5-5 – Mobile Defence
5-13
CONTENTS
KEY POINT DEFENCE
12 Key Point defence is usually provided to a fixed locality such as an airstrip, logistic
node, own HQ, or key infrastructure. In all cases the location to be guarded will be clearly
defined although the posture and presence of the guard force may vary. However, to be
effective the key point must continue to execute its function and thus the defensive
measures have to be coordinated closely with the activities of the site being defended.
Full details can be found in Chapter 7 Paragraphs 8-16.
PART 3 - CONDUCT OF THE DEFENSIVE BATTLE
13. The defence is divided into a number of phases which may overlap. These are:
Preparation, Covering Force Action, Battle Handover, and Main Defensive Battle.
PY
PHASE 1 - PREPARATION
14. Siting the Defence. Although the higher commander in his mission is likely to
O
specify an area or mobile defence, the battlegroup’s specific mission (and its implied
tasks) may impose limitations on the battlegroup commander’s freedom of action to site
C
his defences e.g. time, security or the retention of certain areas. The ideal form of area
defence is compact, with effective mutual support existing throughout the width and depth
ED
of the position. However, freedom to site the defence may be limited by the characteristics
of the AO; e.g. natural obstacles, vegetation, urban areas with the attendant population,
key installations and the situation of the enemy forces as well as the brigade commander
LL
siting two down i.e. company locations.
15. Sequence of Siting a Position. The sequence of siting a position should be:
O
a. Establish a Covering Force. This force provides security to the battlegroup

TR
whilst it occupies and prepares the defensive position.
b. The commander decides the effect to be achieved on the enemy and the local
N
population and then sites NAI and TAI to achieve this.

O
c. The obstacle plan is integrated with the engagement areas to best achieve the
effect on the enemy (i.e. channel him into Engagement Areas).
C
d. The indirect fires and illumination plans are integrated into the direct fire
N
engagement areas to achieve the desired effects.

U
e. Direct fire weapons are sited to fire into the engagement areas. Where time
allows secondary positions will determined. BM, ROE and FSCM should be
considered during the siting especially where likely TAI include elements of the local
population, infrastructure and sites of cultural, religious or historical significance.
f. Company defensive positions will be sited to protect the main defensive

weapons and assist in the direct fire battle.
g. Positions should be sited with mutual support between sub-units achieved by

overlapping longer ranged weapons and all round defence provided by alternate
positions.
5-14
CONTENTS
h. Counter attacks and counter penetration tasks should be planned and recced.
i. Camouflage and concealment of the positions should be considered.
j. The battlegroup commander should issue preliminary orders and the position
occupied.
PY
O
C
ED
LL
(1) Establish Covering Force/ISTAR Group.

O
(2) Decide effect to be achieved on En, then site TAIs where best able to achieve this.
(3) Integrate Obstacle Plan with TAIs to support intended effects.
TR
(4) Integrate Fire and Illum Plans with direct fire TAIs.
(5) Site direct fire Support Weapons and OS Observers.
(6) Site Inf Coys to protect direct fire Sp Wpns and OS Observers.
N
(7) Ensure Mutual Support & All Round Defence.

(8) Plan and recce Counter Attacks.
O
(9) Consider camouflage and concealment of positions.

(10) Issue Preliminary orders s then commence preparation of positions.
C
Figure 5-6 - Siting a Defensive Position

N
U
Top Tip: When siting a position in the dark, check all arcs of fire in daylight to
ensure the correct coverage has been achieved. Re-site if necessary.
16-23. Reserved
PHASE 2 - COVERING FORCE ACTION
24. Purpose. A battlegroup may conduct a covering force action as part of its own
defensive plan or it may be the covering force for a brigade defensive plan. The covering
force tries to deceive and disrupt the enemy whilst in the CFA so that he arrives at the
MDA ill prepared for the assault. The Covering Force (CF) may be required to act as a
5-15
CONTENTS
Guard or Screen Force. The CFA must be sufficiently deep to allow the CF to achieve its
task without becoming decisively engaged.
25. Size and Composition. The size and composition of the CF depends on the
mission, enemy, terrain and available forces. Wherever possible, the forces used to fight
the CF action should not be required immediately afterwards for the main defensive battle.
They should be self-contained and mobile. In an Armd Inf battlegroup, the CF is likely to
consist of the Close Reconnaissance Platoon, ISTAR assets, armour and armoured
infantry supported by direct fire support weapons, Joint Fires and engineers.
26. Tasks. The CF should accomplish the following tasks:
a. Provide early warning and information about the enemy’s size and the location,
PY
direction and weight of his attack (his main effort). (FIND).
b. Make early contact with the enemy and destroy his reconnaissance elements.
(FIND).
O
c. Delay, disrupt and canalise the enemy’s advance, gaining time for the main
C
force to react. (FIX).
d.
ED
Deceive the enemy about the location of the main defensive area and force him
to deploy before he wants to. (FIX).
LL
27. Joint Fires. Joint Fires should be extensively utilised by the CF to strike the enemy
force in depth and disrupt his attack by targeting likely FUPs, AAs, combat support and
logistic force elements. The CF will fight with standoff precision attacks where possible to
O
avoid being decisively engaged in close combat.

TR
28. Battle Handover. On orders the CF hands over to the Main Defensive Force in the
main defensive area and withdraws. The battlegroup commander must consider under
what circumstances the CF should disengage and handover the battle. For example when
N
the enemy lead elements reach a designated phase line or when the CF has suffered a
significant number of casualties. The withdrawal of the CF through the forward positions
O
of the main defence area must be carefully planned and coordinated to avoid fratricide and
conducted as Rearward Passage of Lines (RPoL) of which full details are at Paragraphs
C
65-69.
N
a. Battle Handover Line. A Battle Handover Line (BHL) is established which is

easily recognisable to both the Main Defensive Force and the CF. This may be a grid
U
line or a linear topographical feature. Both the Main Defensive Force and the
Covering Force will FIND and STRIKE the enemy with direct fire and indirect fire
weapons forward of this line. Once the Covering Force arrives at the Battle
Handover Line it may break contact with the enemy and the Main Defensive Force
will continue any further engagements.
b. The battlegroup establishes some Battlespace Management (BM) controls to

enable the CF to break clean and handover contact with the enemy to the Main
Defensive Force in a controlled manner. A Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL)
should be established forward of the Covering Force. The Main Defensive Force
executes indirect and air delivered fires forward of the FSCL in order to support the
CF as it withdraws. The FSCL may be redrawn several times as the CF approaches
5-16
CONTENTS
the Battle Handover Line. Fires forward of the FSCL should be concentrated as the
CF breaks clean in order to allow it to cease contact with the enemy and prepare to
cross the Battle Handover line.
c. The Battle Handover Line should be a Restricted Fire Line. Fires from the Main
Defensive Force across the Handover Line may only be executed when enemy
targets have been handed off from the CF to the Main Defensive Force and direct co-
ordination between both forces has occurred. The Battle Handover Line should
cease to be a Restricted Fire Line once the CF has withdrawn across it.
d. Conduct. The following sequence of events should be applied:
(1) The Main Defensive Force screens along and forward of the Battle
PY
Handover Line and monitors the CF’s command net.
(2) The Main Defensive Force establishes lanes through obstacles and
defensive positions and establishes coord points on the forward edge.
O
(3) The CF confirms with the Main Defensive Force which of its forces will
C
enter the MDA at which coord point and sends Liaison Officers to the coord
point to facilitate this. ED
(4) The CF moves quickly through RVs and is then led or directed along
routes to the rear, while overwatched by the Main Defensive Force. The CF
LL
commander is responsible for confirming when the last element of the CF has
passed through the coord point.
O
(5) The Main Defensive Force ensures that good situational awareness of the
CF movement is maintained and that all troops are aware of and can recognise
TR
friendly force elements forward of their position. The default recognition is ‘guns
rear’ i.e. driver pointing towards the MDA (direction of travel) and the armament
pointing towards the enemy or over the back deck if out of contact.
N
(6) The battlegroup organises medical assistance, vehicle recovery and

O
resupply of CSUPs to the CF once through the MDA to enable it to reconstitute

quickly.
C
N
Top Tip: Ideally the coordination point is sited in dead ground to the
U
enemy allowing withdrawing troops the chance to change formation

and enter the Start Point in column.
5-17
CONTENTS
PY
O
C
ED
Fig 5-7 - Covering Force Handover to Main Defensive Force
e. Handoff of Targets. During the handover between the CF and the MDA the
LL
enemy must continue to be tracked. Initially this is the responsibility of the CF but as
it breaks clean this responsibility is passed to the MDA forces. BG HQ should
O
coordinate the handoff of targets between the CF and the MDA assisted by extensive
use of UAS and ground observers identifying, designating and tracking enemy
TR
groups in order to ensure that troops in the MDA are not surprised. Once the
handover of targets is effected, the troops in the MDA continue to prosecute the
targets by a combination of their own direct fire assets, battlegroup OS and other
N
Joint Fires as allocated. At a lower level this handoff procedure also work as targets
cross sub-unit boundaries.
O
PHASE 3 - MAIN DEFENSIVE BATTLE

C
29. Initial Action. After the enemy has reached the MDA he might try to find weak
N
points in the defence and attempt to force a passage through the position, possibly by a
series of probing attacks. As the battle progresses the enemy advance may be slowed
U
due to canalising and bunching, presenting good targets for defensive fire and Joint Fires.
The maximum weight of direct and indirect fire must be brought to bear at this stage of the
battle. At all times the enemy must be tracked by a combination of UAS, other aerial
platforms and ground observers. This allows the cueing of fires and the handoff of targets
from sub-unit to sub-unit as they cross boundaries. It also assists the commander in his
decision making, especially with regard to the launching of any counter move.
30. Use of Fires. The battlegroup uses fires during the Main Defensive Battle to destroy
attacking forces. Fires from mutually supporting positions should be synchronised onto
enemy concentrations in order to destroy him before he can assault friendly defensive
positions. Fires and counter attacks should be synchronised to defeat the enemy force
before it can assault friendly defensive positions. Smoke can be used to isolate portions of
5-18
CONTENTS
the attacking enemy force and neutralise his overwatch elements. If the enemy succeeds
in his assault, the defending battlegroup initiates its Final Protective Fire (FPF) to kill
enemy dismounted soldiers and suppress his armoured vehicles. Selected crew-served
weapons fire along pre-designated Final Protective Lines (FPL) to break up dismounted
assaults.
31. Counter Attack. The battlegroup commander should have a reserve and may have
a dedicated strike force to counter enemy incursion into his AO. Counter attack options
should be planned and rehearsed but occasionally may be ad hoc if the enemy manages
to achieve an unexpected breakthrough. There are three main options:
a. Counter Penetration. Gaps may have to be accepted between positions, but

they must not be left where the main enemy thrust is expected. They must be kept
PY
under surveillance, covered by fire and, where possible, blocked by obstacles. If the
enemy succeeds in penetrating the MDA, action may be required in depth in order to
counter enemy penetrations which cannot be stopped further forward. In a mobile
defence the battlegroup commander may allow penetration in a particular area so he
O
can then launch his striking force at the appropriate time and place.
C
b. Local Counter Attacks. When faced with enemy penetration, for example in
urban terrain, sub-units should conduct local counter attacks into the enemy’s depth
ED
or flank. Local counter attacks are conducted swiftly with maximum violence and
seek to exploit enemy confusion and disorganisation. They will be executed
according to quick battle orders, with limited objectives and as much fire support as is
LL
available.
c. Battlegroup Strike. The battlegroup commander retains a strike force for

O
commitment at the decisive moment to defeat the enemy. The size and organisation
of the strike force will vary depending on whether the battlegroup employs area or
TR
mobile defence. Battlegroups should strike when the enemy is most vulnerable, i.e.
while he is organising to overcome friendly defensive positions. Counter attacks
seize the initiative by restoring the original position, blocking an enemy penetration
N
and/or attacking by fire into a TAI to defeat or destroy an enemy force. Upon
committal the counter attack becomes the Main Effort (ME). All counter attacks rely
O
on speed of action and speed of decision to achieve success. The key

considerations are:
C
(1) ISTAR and recce elements must track and maintain contact with the
N
enemy force in order to inform the battlegroup commander’s decision to initiate

the counter attack.
U
(2) Joint Fires should be synchronised to support the counter attack once
launched.
(3) The Strike Force should be a combined arms grouping i.e. a

company/squadron group and may be task organised with its own close
reconnaissance, engineers, ISTAR and flank protection.
(4) The enemy force must be channelled into a pre designated engagement
area by a mix of in place forces and obstacles. The in place defensive force is
normally best situated to cue the strike force and direct joint fires into the
engagement area.
5-19
CONTENTS
(5) Consideration must be given to how local nationals, refugees and DPERS
may interfere with the movement of the strike force. Alternative routes should
be recced, and consideration should be given to population movement controls
such as VCPs and barriers, and close coordination with local authorities such
as police.
d. Exploitation. Once the counter attack has been successful the effect must be
exploited. This might result in one or more of the following actions:
(1) Re-establishment of the regained position.
(2) Further attacks to throw back, destroy or disrupt the remaining enemy
PY
force.
(3) Conduct a break clean by the defending/delaying force.
O
(4) Pursue the beaten enemy.
C
(5) Material and Personnel Exploitation.
(6) Information Activities.

ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
N
U
Fig 5-8 - Counter Attack Options
5-20
CONTENTS
Top Tip: The counter attack should be conducted as an advance to contact as

the enemy will rarely be in a single identifiable position.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
32. Wide frontages and multiple actions make it impossible for the battlegroup
commander to be present at every significant action. The following BM measures can be
used to assist C2:
a. AO is divided into sub-unit AOs with boundaries extended to the rear.
PY
b. NAIs, TAIs and Engagement Areas as well as trigger lines and target
numbers are used as in defence to coordinate fires.
c. Contact points on boundary lines are used to help units tie in with each other.
O
d. Report lines are used to control movement.
C
e. Disengagement lines are used to prevent selected units within delay (or
ED
defensive) positions from being overrun.
f. The Handover Line is where troops in the MDA assume responsibility for the
battle, allowing the covering troops to break contact cleanly. The Handover Line will
LL
have some or all of the following characteristics:

O
(1) The line should be forward of the feature from which the enemy can first
engage the next defensive position with observed fire, and be situated so that
TR
crossings and defiles used by the force moving rearward can be protected.
(2) The line should be in an area which can be defended, at least temporarily.
N
(3) Good lateral routes should exist behind the handover line to allow the use
O
of alternative entry points.

C
(4) The line location should be easily identifiable on the ground.

N
g. Appropriate FSCM are imposed including the use of NFAs around key
infrastructure or friendly positions and RFLs to cover boundaries between sub-units.
U
Top Tip: TAC HQ should be sited where the commander can gain the most up to
date SA in order to command the battle and launch the reserve or striking force.
33-41. Reserved.
5-21
CONTENTS
PART 4 – THE DELAY
42. Purpose. The purpose of delay is to slow the enemy’s advance in order to buy time
for other operations to be conducted. The delaying force trades space for time, slowing
down the enemy’s momentum and inflicting maximum damage on him, while not becoming
decisively engaged. Battlegroup delaying actions may be undertaken as part of a covering
force action or as a separate action as part of a brigade defensive operation.
43. Principles. The principles are:
a. Keep it Simple. Delaying operations are difficult especially when faced by a

numerically superior enemy, and thus plans must be simple enough to conduct under
pressure and adapt in the face of the unexpected.
PY
b. Exploit Manoeuvre. The battlegroup must not only retain the freedom of
movement between delaying positions but also be prepared to act aggressively
against any part of the enemy force that over extends itself.
O
c. Conduct Offensive Action. Every opportunity must be taken to cause attrition
C
and disruption on the enemy forces, especially when they over commit. Limited
counter attacks and other offensive actions should be mounted in order to achieve
ED
this.
d. Deceive the Enemy. Deceiving the enemy as to the intentions and/or true
LL
composition of the delaying force can impose delay. However, any deception
measures must be resourced properly and applied across the whole force to be
credible. Deception measures might include convincing the enemy that the position
O
is more strongly held than it actually is or the use of false fronts to entice him to
deploy early.
TR
e. Maintain Contact with the Enemy. Once contact is made with the enemy it
must be maintained until a break clean is effected. Recce troops and sub-units must
N
ensure that a handover or handoff of the enemy to the Main Body takes place.
O
f. Maintain Freedom of Action. Delaying forces must not get decisively

engaged or be forced to react to the enemy’s initiative. Retaining freedom of
C
movement between delay lines and delay positions facilitates the ability to conduct
counter attacks or strikes.
N
44. Phases. The delay has three interlinked phases. These are the preparatory phase,
U
the delaying action itself and breaking contact. The battlegroup drills for Delay can be
found at Annex C.
45. Considerations
a. Information and Intelligence. A continuous flow of intelligence is vital to

success in delaying operations. During the estimate process the battlegroup
commander has to decide which areas he will use, which parts he may abandon
earlier than others and which ones only need to be monitored. The IPE and DSO
contribute to the battlegroup commander’s ability to make timely decisions.
5-22
CONTENTS
b. Situational Awareness. The battlegroup commander must ensure that he has

a good grasp of the situation stemming from a thorough STAP, a well organised
reconnaissance screen backed up by UAV, uninterrupted communications and a flow
of sound and timely intelligence including that from non-organic sources.
Top Tip: When using non-organic ISTAR assets, consider layering in order to
provide redundancy in case they are re-tasked elsewhere.
c. Area of Operation. An AO for delay will often be deeper than that for defence
in order to allow enough space for the necessary manoeuvre. The forward boundary
is the FLET and the rear boundary is the Handover Line, normally on the proposed
FEBA of the MDA. If depth is reduced, the delay will be shortened unless there is a
PY
compensating increase in the strength of the delaying force, or an acceptance of high
losses that might lead to a decisive engagement by the whole force.
O
d Task Organisation. Forces must be organised to balance a range of tasks
including maintaining surveillance, delaying the enemy aggressively, withdrawing to
C
the next delaying position and having a reserve. Gaps must be kept under
surveillance and provision made for redeployment to cover them. A reserve must be
ED
kept to contain enemy penetrations between delay positions; to reinforce fire into an
EA or to help a unit disengage from the enemy. The size of the reserve depends on
the situation and forces available.
LL
e. Control Measures. The battlegroup commander may impose a series of

control measures to help coordinate the battle (see Chapter 3 Para 47 for examples).
O
These may include:

TR
(1) Delay Lines. Selected report lines may be designated as delay lines,
which mandate the delaying force to prevent the enemy from crossing until a
specified time or event.
N
(2) Disengagement Lines. The battlegroup commander may designate other

O
report lines as disengagement lines. When a large enemy force approaches to

within a specified distance of a disengagement line, sub-units may move from
C
their delay positions to subsequent positions.

N
(3) FSCM. FSCM play a crucial part not only to ensure that fires are
employed to their maximum effect but also to assist troops in identifying enemy
U
locations and occasionally their own positions in relation to the enemy.
(4) Coordination Points. Coordination points that are pre-selected and

manned appropriately are a vital tool in establishing good SA and thus help
control the battle. They are particularly important for flanking units that may be
conforming to the battlegroups moves and for the passage of lines into the
MDA.
f. Security and Protection. Security and protection are essential to avoid

delaying forces being surprised and forced into an unwanted decisive engagement.
This involves the maximum use of concealment, deception, communications security,
EW and counter surveillance measures and also the protection of critical points
5-23
CONTENTS
required for movement. However, while OPSEC is a vital tool to protect the
battlegroups plans and help deceive the enemy it must not be allowed to detract from
establishing good SA across all informed nets. The acceptance of gaps is inherent in
delaying operations, and often a delaying force will have to provide its own flank
security.
g. Sustainment. The CSS footprint should be minimised in the delay AO and be

able to move rearwards supporting the delaying force. The dumping of logistic stocks
should be kept to a minimum and the denial of any such dumps considered.
Ambulances may need to be echeloned to enable the swift evacuation of personnel.
Extra consideration should be given to the delay force’s requirements if it is to
subsequently perform a new defensive or offensive task. Maximum use should be
made of all available recovery assets to keep routes open and withdraw broken down
PY
vehicles. Consideration should be given to the protection of CSS assets during the
operation especially when the threat from irregular forces operating in the rear of the
battlegroup area is high.
O
Top Tip: Consider rolling replenishment if troops are using alternate delaying
C
positions. Battle replenishment may be needed if using successive positions.
h.
ED
Maintaining Morale. A delaying operation may be conducted in an
unfavourable air and ground situation and constant withdrawal will place high
demands on the cohesion of the battlegroup. The threat of undermining the morale
LL
of the battlegroup will be high and the battlegroup commander should pay particular
attention to the cohesion and discipline of his force. Clear and unambiguous orders,
good situational awareness and exemplary leadership assist in this process.
O
Because failure to comprehend the battlegroup commander’s intent may lead to

rumour and alarm, special emphasis should be placed on explaining what is
TR
happening and why.
i. Selecting Positions. As in defence, the battlegroup commander assigns his

N
delaying force battle positions. Using the IPE process, he selects delay positions on
key terrain astride likely enemy avenues of approach. If possible, ground should be
O
selected which has good natural barriers, provides good observation and fields of
fire, and allows easy disengagement of the delaying force. Alternate or successive
C
delay positions should be selected throughout the AO. The battlegroup commander
may position his delaying sub-units in depth on alternate positions or, when the AO is
N
wide and forces are insufficient to cover it, he may be forced to position most of his
forces well forward and achieve some depth through manoeuvre alone. Time and
U
resources often limit a battlegroup to preparing only the initial positions.
46-50 Reserved
51. The Delaying Action. The delaying action is conducted by three components: the
screen, the delaying force and the reserve.
a. Screen. The screen will normally consist of reconnaissance forces, ISTAR

assets and, if available, AH supported by Joint Fires. Its primary task will be to
provide early information on the location, strengths and movement of the enemy.
Although it should avoid prejudicing its primary task, every opportunity should be
exploited to disrupt and inflict casualties on the enemy.
5-24
CONTENTS
b. Delaying Forces. The delaying forces usually consist of manoeuvre sub-units

supported by artillery and engineers. At the earliest opportunity they must engage
the enemy by providing concentrated and coordinated direct and indirect fire, in
combination with mobile actions. Every advantage offered by the terrain should be
exploited. Gaps are inevitable and should be covered by surveillance and indirect
fire. In order to trade space for time, elements of the delay force will have to attack
and defend; thereby forcing the enemy to concentrate repeatedly against successive
battle positions. The delay force fight their battle by delaying on alternate positions
(leapfrogging); by delaying on successive positions (caterpillar); or by a combination
of these two techniques. In executing these manoeuvres it is crucial that the delaying
force maintains contact with the enemy between delay positions. The timing of
various elements withdrawing from set positions is critical and requires robust
PY
command and control.
c. Reserve. The reserve is committed to counter an unexpected enemy incursion,

provide an additional delaying force or strike an isolated force.
O
C
Top Tip: In order for the reserve force commander to receive the most up
to date SA he may be co-located with Tac HQ.
ED
52. Delaying on Alternate Positions. A delay from alternate positions involves two or
more sub-units in a single AO occupying delaying positions in depth (See Figure 5-10). As
LL
the first sub-unit engages the enemy, the second occupies the next position in depth and
prepares to assume responsibility for the operation. The first sub-unit disengages and
passes around the second. It then prepares to re-engage the enemy from a position in
O
greater depth while the second force takes up the fight. A delay from alternate positions is
useful on particularly dangerous avenues of approach. It offers greater security than a
TR
delay from successive positions. However, it requires more forces and continuous
coordination and there is the risk of losing contact with the enemy between delay
positions.
N
O
C
N
U
Fig 5-9 - Delaying on Alternate Positions
5-25
CONTENTS
53. Delaying on Successive Positions. A delay from successive positions occurs

when the AO is so wide that available forces cannot occupy more than a single tier of
positions. Manoeuvre units delay continuously on and between positions throughout their
AO. (See Figure 5-11). This technique is simpler to coordinate than the delay from
alternate positions and, although it has vulnerabilities, it is useful in less dangerous AOs.
It is easier to penetrate than a delay from alternate positions because the force has less
depth and less time to occupy subsequent positions. In selecting positions, the
battlegroup commander should consider the location of natural and artificial obstacles. To
ease the rapid occupation of positions, sub-units normally recce subsequent positions
before occupation and post guides on one or two subsequent positions. In restricted
terrain, where dismounted infantry conducts the primary action, successive positions may
be close together. In more open terrain, delay positions can be further apart although they
should be within direct fire range.
PY
O
C
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
Fig 5-10 - Delaying on Successive Positions

C
54. Local Reserves. Local reserves must be held to support forward positions, assist
the extraction of delaying forces and to destroy weak enemy forces that may have
N
infiltrated between these positions.

U
55. Termination of the Delay Operation. A delay operation terminates when the
delaying battlegroup passes through another force; the delaying force reaches defensible
terrain and changes to the defence or the advancing enemy force reaches a culminating
point. If the enemy reaches a culminating point, the delaying force should maintain
contact with the enemy unless ordered to withdraw, or move to the offence. A change of
echelon by the enemy may be a particularly effective moment to break clean.
56. Breaking Contact. Troops withdrawing from a position must attempt to break
contact in a manner that leaves the enemy surprised and thus unbalanced. This is
achieved by withdrawing through another unit or by suddenly disengaging leaving the
enemy off guard and unable to follow up immediately. The key decision is to identify the
correct moment to withdraw; too early would result in failure to achieve maximum delay
5-26
CONTENTS
and too late would risk unnecessary casualties or being overrun. Counter attacks may be
necessary to achieve disengagement. The handover between a delaying force and an in
place force can be a critical operation, especially if the delaying force has been unable to
disengage. A handover line must be given; the elements of the in place forces may have
to deploy forward of this line to take over the battle and assist in the RPoL of the delaying
force.
PY
O
C
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
N
U
5-27
CONTENTS
PART 5 – ENABLING ACTIONS
RELIEF OF TROOPS IN PLACE (RiP)
57. Purpose. The purpose of relief in place is to relieve all or part of a force in a sector
by an incoming battlegroup. Relief in place is normally conducted in defensive or
stabilisation operations and might occur in any of the following circumstances:
a. When an existing force is depleted or exhausted and needs to be replaced.
b. When troops of one capability or role need to be replaced by troops of a

different role.
PY
c. For routine rotation of troops.
d. To re-establish primacy of local security forces.
O
58. Principles.
C
a. Security. OPSEC is vital to the RiP to prevent the enemy being able to take
ED
advantage of the situation.
b. Protection. The deployment of a guard force to prevent enemy interference is

LL
vital.
c. Information. The proper and complete handover of information from the in

O
place battlegroup allows the relieving battlegroup to be able to conduct its mission
from the outset, and prevents the enemy taking advantage of gaps in knowledge to
TR
seize an advantage. It also allows the relieving force to understand the local pattern
of life.
N
59. Considerations. Intelligence on likely enemy intentions and activity is key to the
planning of a relief and will determine how the operation is to be conducted. Other factors
O
include:
C
a. Command and Control. The in place battlegroup commander is responsible

for the defence of his sector until command passes. The moment when command is
N
to pass is determined by mutual agreement between the two battlegroup

commanders within the overall direction of the brigade commander, though this
U
would normally be when two or more sub-units have been relieved and the relieving
force has established communications with its higher headquarters. The following
points should be noted:
(1) The battlegroup commanders should be collocated through the operation

where possible. If not, LOs who are in communication with their parent
battlegroup must be exchanged.
(2) Engineers and/or assault pioneers must formally assume responsibility for
obstacles such as minefields and reserved demolitions.
5-28
CONTENTS
(3) Following the Transfer of Authority (TOA) the relieving battlegroup

commander assumes command of all elements of the outgoing force within the
AO regardless of which battlegroup they belong to.
(4) TOA must be reported upwards and internally to all affected sub-units.
(5) There are a number of important coordination points that refer, in

particular, to the responsibilities of the superior or controlling headquarters. It is
responsible for:
(a) The time frame in which the operation is to be conducted.
(b) Designation of control lines and routes.
PY
(c) Arrangements for liaison, recce, and advance parties.
(d) BM including FSCM.
O
(e) Deception plans.
C
(f) Air Defence. ED
(g) EMCON measures.
LL
(h) Combat service support.
b. Information and Intelligence.

O
(1) Liaison at an early stage, which should include reconnaissance by the

TR
incoming force, is vital. Close cooperation and coordination at all levels are
required.
N
(2) The force being relieved must ensure that critical information and
understanding of the operational environment is preserved and handed to the
O
incoming battlegroup. A full handover of information on enemy forces including

locations, intentions, strengths, equipment and local routine must be carried out.
C
This allows the incoming battlegroup to be able to react appropriately to any

enemy threat from the outset.
N
(3) Key personnel from the relieving force should deploy early and conduct
U
extensive handover (including training where appropriate) with their

counterparts from the in place force. Other personnel from the in place force
should remain with the incoming forces beyond the immediate handover period
to preserve continuity. This may include indigenous forces, CS elements and
key SA personnel such as ISTAR operators and intelligence personnel.
(4) The in place force continues to provide STAP until the incoming force’s
assets are in place. Where appropriate ISTAR equipment and operators remain
with the relieved force.
(5) Consider leaving behind key equipment and operators where these are
otherwise not available to the relieving force. This will ensure that the relieving
5-29
CONTENTS
battlegroup is able to conduct its mission without loss of information or

continuity.
c. Firepower. The incoming artillery Tac Party must co-locate both BC and FST
commanders in order that:
(1) All artillery information including location of DFs, FSCM is handed over.
(2) The control of fires continues throughout the RiP.
d. Manoeuvre. The in place force designates, marks and protects routes

allocated to the incoming battlegroup. Routes should be allocated to both incoming
and outgoing battlegroups. Where routes are limited they can use the same routes
PY
but flow of movement along them will need to be tightly controlled, either by timings,
or the use of hides and holding areas to enable deconfliction.
e. Protection. The intention to conduct a relief must be concealed from the
O
enemy and often the local population in order to preserve OPSEC. Deception
measures should be employed which include continuing with the normal pattern of
C
activity. If it is impossible to conceal the intention to conduct a relief, an increase in
the tempo of operation by the in-place or flanking forces will enhance protection.
ED
f. Combat Service Support. During a relief operation the in place force should
assist, where possible, with MEDEVAC evacuation, traffic control, vehicle recovery
LL
and fuel and ammunition re-supply for the relieving force. After TOA similar provision
should be made to the relieved force.
O
(1) The relieving force should be fully replenished before the operation to
reduce the burden on the relieved force before TOA.
TR
(2) The relieved force is responsible for its own recovery or should agree a
denial plan (if authorised) with the relieving force in conjunction with its higher
N
headquarters.
O
(3) The retention by the relieving force of specialist location/task specific

equipment must be agreed between the two forces and the higher
C
headquarters. ES provision and expertise for these equipments must also

remain in situ where applicable.
N
(4) The handover of Role 1 Med Support can be eased by the use of opening
U
and closing times of the incoming and outgoing Medical Treatment Facilities.
60. Conduct. The relieving force normally assumes the mission of the relieved force,
usually within the same boundaries and, at least initially, with a similar disposition of forces
where possible. The Transfer of Authority (TOA) should take place without loss of
operational capability.
61. Execution. The execution of the relief in place depends essentially on the time
available and the local conditions. Where possible, commanders at all levels of the
relieving force should operate alongside their counterparts in the in-place force prior to the
arrival of the main body. This allows commanders to concentrate on and assimilate critical
aspects of the operation. Combat support troops should not be relieved at the same time
5-30
CONTENTS
as combat troops. It will normally be the case that night and limited visibility will be utilised
and exploited for the relief. It is important that the incoming force conducts
reconnaissance, where possible, in daylight. Communications must be maintained,
unaltered if possible, for the entire duration of the relief. CSS troops of the relieved force
will be sent back as early as possible.
62. Battle Drill. The RiP Battle Drill can be found at Annex D.
63-64 Reserved
PY
O
C
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
N
U
5-31
CONTENTS
REARWARD PASSAGE OF LINES
65. Purpose. The Rearward Passage of Lines (RPoL) is a withdrawal of one force
through another friendly force in a direction away from the enemy. A rearward passage of
lines may be conducted:
a. As part of a withdrawal operation.
b. As part of a delay operation.
c. As a means of changing the type of force facing the enemy.
d. As a means of relieving a force unable to continue with its mission.
PY
66. Principles.
a. Keep it Simple. A RPoL is one of the most complicated activities, especially if
O
done when in contact with the enemy. Simple plans, well coordinated between the
withdrawing force and the in place force, work better when under pressure.
C
b. Security. The withdrawing force is most vulnerable when trying to break clean
ED
from the enemy. Maintaining OPSEC and support from the in place force will assist
in protecting the withdrawing force.
LL
c. Control. The use of clear easily identifiable control measures assists in
coordinating the movement of the withdrawing force and the supporting fires from the
in place force.
O
d. Flexibility. Pressure from the enemy may well force a change in plans, by
TR
denying routes etc. A flexible plan enables the withdrawing force to compensate for
these pressures.
N
e. Offensive Action. The withdrawing force needs to be capable of executing

local offensive actions in order to effect the break clean, assisted by the in place
O
force. The enemy must not be allowed to follow up the withdrawing force into the
main defensive position.
C
67. Considerations. A RPoL is potentially one of the most difficult activities to conduct
N
as it is the only one in which the withdrawing force is likely to be in contact from enemy
direct and indirect fires throughout. Unlike the relief in place or the forward passage of
U
lines, it is doubtful whether commanders from the withdrawing force will be able to conduct
face to face liaison with the in place force due to the requirement to continue to fight the
battle. Reliance on 2ICs and LOs at all levels is thus vital. The key considerations are:
a. Command and Control.
(1) Co-location of HQ. The withdrawing battlegroup establishes its Step Up

co-located with Main HQ of the in place battlegroup. This allows good
coordination and shared SA. At the very least an LO with suitable comms
should be established with the in place force.
5-32
CONTENTS
(2) Liaison. The commander of the in place battlegroup designates the

contact point(s) for coordination and notifies the retiring unit of its location if this
has not been designated by higher headquarters. The contact point is normally
on an easily identifiable terrain feature forward of the handover line. At the
prescribed time liaison parties from the two units meet and do the following:
(a) Exchange.
(i) Recognition signals.
(ii) Signs and countersigns.
(iii) Comms information.
PY
(b) Verify.
(i) Provisions for and placement of guides.
O
(ii) Estimated time of main body arrival, and numbers and types of
C
vehicles to pass.
(iii)
ED
Time or event for handover.
(iv) Minefield and obstacle information.

LL
(v) Passage points, lanes, and alternates.

O
(c) Coordinate.
TR
(i) In place battlegroup’s security force positions to support the

handover.
N
(ii) Supporting direct and indirect fires.

O
(iii) Passage and accounting for movement of vehicles through

check points.
C
b. Information and Intelligence. The battlegroups exchange the latest enemy

N
information (size and type of force, location and direction of movement).

U
c. Firepower. The coordination of fires is the most crucial aspect of a RPoL. Too
little fire support from the in place force allows the enemy to push close to the
withdrawing battlegroup as they start to break clean and inflict additional casualties.
Too much and there is a danger of fratricide. The following measures will assist:
(1) Agreed FSCM between battlegroups.
(2) Fires over the Handover Line are controlled by the withdrawing
battlegroup.
(3) As the withdrawing battlegroup crosses the Handover Line the in place
battlegroup take up the fight.
5-33
CONTENTS
d. Manoeuvre. Once over the Handover Line the withdrawing battlegroup should
make best speed until it passes the rear boundary of the in place force. Measures
that will assist include:
(1) Clearly designated route through the in place force with recognised start
point and release point.
(2) Check points manned by withdrawing battlegroup to verify all expected

vehicles have passed.
e. Protection. The in place battlegroup should provide protection for the

withdrawing battlegroup once inside their AO. Additional measures might include:
PY
(1) Agreed recognition signals to prevent fratricide.
(2) In place force secure routes through their AO.
O
(3) In place force might consider mounting a spoiling attack if the enemy over
C
extends himself.
f.
ED
Sustainment. The following considerations should be made:
(1) The withdrawing battlegroup should self recover its own equipment,
LL
although access to the Equipment Collection Point (ECP) of the in place force
might be made available.
O
(2) Access to the in place force medical facilities should be provided in

emergency.
TR
(3) Replenishment should take place once the withdrawing battlegroup has
reached the Assembly Area. However, emergency replenishment can be
N
provided by the in place force if required.

O
68. Conduct. The following is a suggested sequence of events:

C
a. The in place battlegroup close recce screens along the handover line and
monitors the passing unit’s command net.
N
b. After verification that the check points are occupied, recce or liaison parties
U
make contact at each check point. The withdrawing battlegroup’s recce must know
which sub-units are to pass through their respective check points. The withdrawing
sub-unit should pass in the order: CSS elements, Main HQ, combat support
elements, Tac HQ, and manoeuvre sub-units. For ease of control, the withdrawing
unit temporarily collocates its recce with the Tac HQ of the in place battlegroup.
c. The check points should be manned by the withdrawing battlegroup recce and
representatives from the forward sub-units of the in place battlegroup. Lanes through
obstacles are marked and provisions are made to quickly close them. Both recce
platoon leaders collocated near the handover line monitor the progress of the
passage. The recce platoon of the in place force may not have sufficient combat
5-34
CONTENTS
power to screen the Battle Handover Line and may be placed under command of a
sub-unit acting as a guard force.
d. The mission of the sub-unit on the handover line is to assume responsibility for
the fight from the forward battlegroup. If withdrawing sub-units are in contact, their
manoeuvre elements must be a bound behind the handover line, covered by the
withdrawing unit. The withdrawing units must quickly redeploy into column formation,
display the proper visual signal, orientate weapons toward the enemy, and move
rapidly to the check point and the release point. Care must be taken to avoid friendly
obstacles emplaced in the MDA. The handover line should also be far enough
forward to allow the withdrawing battlegroup room to move into column, yet close
enough to permit overwatch by units along the FEBA (see Figure 5-7).
PY
e. The in place battlegroup recce platoon notify their forward sub-units that friendly
forces are at the handover line and are en route to the check point.
f. The withdrawing battlegroup’s vehicles move quickly through check points and
O
are led along the routes to the rear, while overwatched by the in place battlegroup.
The in place battlegroup commander, and sub-unit commanders must carefully
C
observe this passage. The only time the in place battlegroup should fire is when
positive enemy identification is made. The commander of the withdrawing
ED
battlegroup is responsible for identifying the last element of his command as it
passes through the in place battlegroup’s positions.
LL
g. Disabled vehicles are self-recovered or assisted by other elements of the
withdrawing unit. Equipment may only be destroyed in accordance with an agreed
denial plan. The in place unit provides medical assistance, fuel, and maintenance as
O
required until after the passage is complete.

TR
h. Because of potential congestion at passage points, withdrawing units must

move rapidly to minimise exposure time.
N
69. Battlegroup Drill. Battlegroup drills for the Rearward Passage of Lines can be found
at Annex E.
O
70. Reserved
C
N
U
5-35
CONTENTS
WITHDRAWAL
71. Purpose. A withdrawal occurs when a force disengages from an enemy force in
accordance with the will of its commander. It seeks to disengage its combat forces from
the enemy although contact may be maintained through other means such as
indirect fire, reconnaissance or surveillance. Success depends on tight control, security,
balance and maintenance of morale. The order to withdraw is not normally given by the
battlegroup commander without the agreement or direction of his superior commander.
72. Principles. The battlegroup commander should note the following principles:
a. Simplicity. The plan must be simple, and normal organisations should be

retained as far as possible. Regrouping during the operation must be avoided.
PY
b. Security. This can be achieved by a combination of surprise and deception,
possibly including noise coverage by artillery, maximum use of cover and
concealment and a strong security element.
O
c. Control. Suitable control measures including timings and report lines to allow
C
the control of the withdrawal and prevent it turning into a rout.
d.
ED
Flexibility. Given that the enemy may well follow up a withdrawing force the
commander must retain the flexibility to alter the plan and to intervene with his
reserve to stabilise a situation.
LL
e. Offensive Action. Despite the battlegroup withdrawing, an offensive mindset

must be maintained and any opportunity to strike at an over extended enemy should
O
be seized. Offensive action counters any drop in morale caused by a withdrawal.

TR
73. Considerations. The commander should consider:
a. Command. Withdrawal especially in contact is one of the hardest operations to

N
conduct and firm control is required for it not to become a rout. The key decision is
whether to conduct a silent withdrawal or a noisy one. Any deception measures
O
supporting either should be built into the plan from the outset. The commander
should consider:
C
(1) Control. The battlegroup commander should prescribe specific control

N
measures to maintain order during the withdrawal. These measures may

include:
U
(a) Battle positions.
(b) Report lines.
(c) Routes/Alternative routes.
(d) Contact points.
(e) Checkpoints.
(f) Handover line.
5-36
CONTENTS
(g) RVs.
(h) FSCM.
(2) Timings. The commander controls the withdrawal by imposing two key
timings. Two other timings which are desirable, although are not mandatory:
the time at which foremost troops may start thinning out; and the time by which
all troops will be clear of a line behind the position. These timings will be
particularly useful for coordination of fire support. The key timings are:
(a) Denial Time. The time up to which the position has to be denied to
the enemy. This timing will form the basis of the withdrawal plan.
PY
(b) No Rearward Move Time. The time before which there will be no
rearward movement except for normal traffic and reconnaissance parties.
O
(3) Location of HQ. The pre positioning of Step UP HQ to cover the
withdrawal of Main HQ should be either behind the intermediate position or on
C
the new position depending on the distances involved. TAC HQ should move to
a position from which it can gain the best SA to deploy the reserve if required.
ED
(4) Maintain Cohesion and Morale. The act of withdrawing can lead to a
loss of morale especially as sub-units become separated. A clear
LL
understanding of the plan at all levels, rigid enforcement of battlefield discipline
and good leadership at both battlegroup and sub-unit level is vital to maintaining
cohesion. In addition the retention of an offensive mindset helps maintain
O
morale.
TR
b. Information and Intelligence. Good SA on own forces is vital during the

withdrawal and comes from monitoring the movement of sub-units through
Checkpoints, RVs and across report lines. Although the Main Body seeks to break
N
clean from the enemy, a screen may be required to ensure that enemy does not
follow up without warning.
O
c. Firepower. The use of firepower to cover the withdrawal should be dovetailed

C
into the deception plan and tailored to the enemy’s reactions. The OS fire plan may
be noisy or silent but should be poised to go noisy instantly. Firepower in the form of
N
direct and indirect fire may be required to repel an attack right up to the moment
when the forward troops begin to thin out. At this stage indirect firepower is more
U
appropriate and FSTs must be in a position to call for and control the fires.
d. Manoeuvre. Maintaining own freedom of movement is vital in withdrawal.

Routes should be cleared and if necessary secured to allow easy passage by
withdrawing troops while at the same time denied to any enemy follow up. The use
of demolitions should be carefully controlled and reserved demolitions over vital
defiles considered. The movement plan should provide for:
(1) Secure and concealed withdrawal routes from all sub-unit areas preferably
using darkness as cover but recognising that this is especially important if the
enemy are equipped with NVG or have UAS. Separate routes may be
necessary for the withdrawal of dismounted infantry, wheeled and tracked
5-37
CONTENTS
vehicles. Vehicle recovery plans should enable the free flow of traffic on
designated routes and clear orders for abandoning and/or denying equipment
must be given.
(2) Platoon and company checkpoints through which any dismounted infantry
will be checked before embussing.
(3) Troop/platoon and sub-unit RVs at which vehicles gather before

continuing.
(4) Report lines to assist in monitoring the withdrawal.
(5) Route signing, traffic control and guides.
PY
(6) Allocation of routes and an appropriate traffic control system.
e. Protection. The protection of the withdrawing force is critical to a successful
O
operation. The following considerations apply:
C
(1) Deception. In order to break clean from the enemy it is vital that he be
given no understanding that a withdrawal is planned or underway. In order to
ED
achieve the necessary surprise the enemy must be deceived into thinking that
the force is still fighting. The deception plan should be the first thing that the
commander thinks of and not the last.
LL
(a) Offensive actions including patrolling raids and the use of OS should
continue to paint a picture of a force remaining in its positions.
O
(b) All withdrawing movement must be concealed either by covered

TR
routes, under the cover of darkness or disguised within normal routine.
(2) OPSEC Measures. Although the usual OPSEC measures should be

N
considered, no additional measures should be enforced if they change the

pattern or routine and make the enemy suspicious. Measures may include:
O
(a) Passive Measures.

C
(i) Radio Security. No reference should be made to the

N
withdrawal over any insecure radio net. Unless radio silence is

already in force, every effort should be made to maintain the normal
U
pattern of routine radio traffic until the withdrawal is complete.
(ii) The Maintenance of Routine. Any established routine for

harassing fire, artillery adjustment, and vehicle and echelon
movement must be maintained.
(iii) Movement. Very firm control must be imposed on rearward

reconnaissance and thinning out.
(b) Active Measures.
5-38
CONTENTS
(i) The use of artillery, mortars, tank fire and illumination can
defeat enemy NVGs, disrupt organised attempts to withdraw, screen
friendly movement and mask true intent.
(ii) Improvised fire simulation, lights and noise can simulate the
continued occupation of defences after withdrawal is complete.
(iii) Patrols should be maintained at least up until denial time.
(3) Security Element. The commander should designate a security element

to take up position between the current position and the new one. Its purpose is
to prevent the enemy from following up the withdrawal and enable a clean break
by the main body. It may have to conduct a fighting withdrawal
PY
(4) Reserves. The commander should retain a reserve to counter the
unexpected. Its likely tasks are to assist the security element or counter attack
an enemy who has broken through.
O
f. Sustainment. As a rule troops should have been resupplied before the
C
withdrawal begins and all non-essential CSS elements withdrawn. In addition:
ED
(1) Recovery assets should be positioned to cover the routes and especially
at defiles.
LL
(2) A denial plan for all equipment left behind should be prepared in line with
the deception plan (if authorised).
O
(3) The treatment and evacuation of casualties needs careful consideration.

TR
74. Multinational Elements. Conducting a withdrawal through another nation’s forces

requires additional planning and coordination, recognition awareness to prevent fratricide,
effective communications especially at the sub-unit level and an understanding of the
N
differences in procedures. It may require interpreters to assist LOs.

O
75. Grouping and Tasks.

C
a. Security Element. Covering troops are required between positions to impose

delay and caution upon the attacker. At the start of the withdrawal they take up
N
station behind the old main position ready to hold the front when that position is
abandoned. Thereafter they cover back between positions imposing as much delay
U
as possible.
b. Main Body. The main body of the force moves back to pre-determined
intermediate or main positions which they prepare and occupy. As they move they
must ensure that forces are allocated to the protection of flanks as well as the front
and rear.
c. Reserves. Likely reserve tasks are to counter penetration of the front, assist
with the extraction of troops in contact, reinforce threatened areas and protect
withdrawal routes.
5-39
CONTENTS
d. Aviation. The versatility and long-range firepower of AH make them

particularly suitable to support the operations of the security element, particularly as
they disengage.
e. Joint Fires. Artillery and mortars are required for all their normal defensive fire
and illuminating tasks and may also be needed to provide noise, smoke, or blinding
illumination to cover movement. FOOs and MFCs should therefore remain forward,
with their respective commanders, until the last troops vacate the position. The use
of Air and Aviation to support the withdrawal needs careful coordination by the TACP
and FACs.
f. Engineers. The majority of engineers will have been despatched to the rear at
an early stage. Some engineers, however, should remain until the end to delay the
PY
enemy follow up by demolitions and to ensure continued freedom of manoeuvre. Self
help should augment this engineer effort.
76. Conduct. In the withdrawal, the battlegroup commander has the difficult task of
O
extracting his force from a position where it may be in close contact with the enemy,
retiring a suitable distance and possibly occupying a new defensive position.
C
a. Out of Contact. The battlegroup commander should always seek to conduct
ED
the withdrawal out of contact, thereby retaining the initiative. When conducting a
withdrawal out of contact the commander can take the decision as to when to begin
the operation. He should make the best use of secrecy and deception through, for
LL
example, taking maximum advantage of darkness and other conditions of reduced
visibility.
O
b. In Contact. Circumstances may dictate that a withdrawal is conducted in

contact. The enemy may have both ground and air superiority and will attempt to
TR
harass the withdrawing force continuously. This is probably the most difficult type of
operation to conduct and requires strong leadership and firm discipline if it is not to
become a rout. Despite its difficulty, however, it should be regarded as a manoeuvre
N
designed to create a more favourable situation before resuming the offensive.

Delaying tactics will be needed in order for forces to fight their way to the rear. The
O
greater the mobility and the longer the range of own firepower, the easier it will be for
the formation to conduct the withdrawal successfully.
C
77. Sequence. Once the basic framework of timings and routes has been decided,
N
planning concentrates largely on battle procedure, drills and movement control. The
sequence of withdrawal should be based on:
U
a. The despatch of reconnaissance parties as soon as this is permitted to

reconnoitre the battlegroup’s next task. This might include Step Up HQ to establish
an alternate headquarters at an intermediate location.
b. The withdrawal of non-essential and slow moving vehicles and personnel.
c. The withdrawal of rear sub-units and air defence elements.
d. Finally, the withdrawal of forward sub-units and support weapons. Armour and
infantry may withdraw in a number of ways:
5-40
CONTENTS
(1) Infantry first, if they are dismounted and the threat is predominantly from
armour.
(2) Concurrently if AIFVs are forward and the armour threat is lower.
(3) Rarely, with tanks moving first in close country or with a dismounted
threat.
78. Execution. The conduct of a planned withdrawal, especially by night, demands:
a. Excellent Battle Discipline. Any slip in battle discipline regarding radio

security, light or noise may sacrifice surprise and expose the withdrawal to enemy
reaction. Commanders at all levels must insist on the highest standards.
PY
b. Well Controlled Movement. The use of report lines, RVs and checkpoints
enables the progress of the battlegroup to be controlled by Main HQ. The use of
separate routes for foot, wheels and armour, planned alternative routes and the use
O
of hides all contribute to effective control.
C
c. Effective Reaction to the Unexpected. Commanders at all levels must show
initiative and determination in overcoming unexpected developments and movement
ED
problems.
79. When withdrawing by day, troops in contact must be prepared to use fire and
LL
movement. This can be achieved by either withdrawing the forward elements through the
fire of those in depth, or by the forward elements acting alone. As a general guide, when
the enemy is pressing hard, it is unlikely that the forward troops will have the strength to
O
withdraw unaided. Against a less active enemy, however, this will often be possible. In
both instances the aim must be to achieve a clean break.
TR
80. Every effort must be made to conceal the withdrawal by good security and
imaginative deception, and to slow the enemy advance by the use of obstacles and fires.
N
81. Withdrawal in Contact. In the worst case, defending forces may be forced to
O
withdraw without adequate warning. Normal battle procedure will be impossible and
commanders and troops at all levels will have to improvise in a rapidly developing
C
situation. The battlegroup commander must aim to maintain an intact front at all costs.
N
82. Success of the withdrawal in contact depends on achieving disengagement of the

main body by effective fire and manoeuvre. To assist withdrawing elements, the security
U
force must be strong enough to detect and engage the enemy on all avenues of approach.
The battlegroup may form its security force from forward sub-unit elements. Missions of
the security force are:
a. Deny, block, or disrupt the enemy’s capability to pursue.
b. Deny, the enemy’s capability to observe movement of the battlegroup through

smoke, suppressive fires and the intelligent use of ground.
c. Rapidly concentrate additional combat power in critical areas.
5-41
CONTENTS
83. As the order to withdraw is given, the battlegroup must engage the enemy with
concentrated direct and indirect fire to enable the first withdrawing element to disengage,
conduct a rearward passage through the security force, assemble, and move to their next
position. Limitations imposed by ROE, NFA, CDE etc must be taken into consideration
when working out the fire plan.
84. The security force assumes the fight from the forward elements. This includes
delaying the enemy advance while the bulk of the battlegroup conducts movement to the
rear. On orders or when other predetermined criteria are met, the security force
disengages itself and moves to the rear as a rear guard. Depending on the battlegroup’s
next mission, the security force may be required to maintain contact with the enemy
throughout the operation.
PY
85. Every opportunity should be taken to deny the enemy an advantage. Denial of
positions by delaying action, ambush and local counter attacks should be considered. Use
of OS to slow down the enemy along with the use of Air and AH strikes will further delay
the enemy and cause him to slow his advance, allowing troops to break clean. Use of
O
obstacles, command initiated devices (such as Claymores) and demolitions can further
diminish the enemy’s ability and will to pursue the withdrawing force.
C
86. The Battle Drill for Withdrawal can be found at Annex F.
ED
Annexes:
LL
A. Battle Drill - Area Defence.

B. Battle Drill - Mobile Defence.
O
C. Battle Drill - Delay.

D. Battle Drill - Relief of Troops In Place.
TR
E. Battle Drill - Rearward Passage of Lines.

F. Battle Drill - Withdrawal.
G. Control of Demolitions.
N
H. Combined Arms Obstacle Integration.

O
C
N
U
5-42
CONTENTS
ANNEX A TO
CHAPTER 5 TO
BG TACTICS
BATTLE DRILL - TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR AREA DEFENCE
Purpose Principles
 Retain or deny key or vital ground  Achieve Depth *
 Shape en for subsequent attack  Maintain All Round Defence
 Fix the enemy to allow offensive operations elsewhere  Achieve Mutual Support *
 Increase the enemy’s vulnerability to fires by forcing him to concentrate  Maintain a Reserve
his forces  Conduct Offensive Action
 Wear down the enemy’s offensive capability  Concealment and Deception
 Gain time * Select depth over mutual support if
 Provide secure environment for Stabilisation Operations both cannot be achieved.
Stages of Defensive Action
PY
Preparation CF Action Main Battle
 Establish CF  CF ident en intentions, routes,  Take over battle on
 Decide effects req incl deception and strengths and ME Handover Line
site NAI and TAI  Delay, disrupt and canalise en  Fight battle from prepared
O
 Integrate Obs plan with EAs  Deceive en about loc of MDA posns by fires from
 Integrate OS incl illum with EAs  Force en to deploy early mutually supporting posns
 
C
Site direct fire wpns to fire into EAs Battle Handover Gaps covered by fire and
 Site Coy posns to protect wpns  Comd confirm wdr criteria & counter pen
 Plan and recce c-attk & c-pen plans Handover Line  Local counter attacks to
 Issue prelim Os and occupy posn  Coord pts manned
ED regain key/ vital terrain
 Establish liaison with flanking units  Conduct internal BG RPOL  BG strike to destroy en pen
 Cam and conceal posn  MDA fires across Handover Line and ensure integrity of def
 Establish STAP to support CF wdr
 CF wdr to become reserve.
LL
Replen/Refurb as req
Command Information and Intelligence
 
O
Identify Vital Ground and Key Terrain IPE – Ident en axis and intent
 Site def posns 2 down  ISTAR focus on avenues of approach, TAI and gaps
 Set conditions for handover of CF to MDA between posns
TR
 Consider loc of BG Comd  STAP – Adjust for day/ni/low vis

 CONPLAN for en MDCOA  Understand Pattern of Life if non-combatants remain
 Understand Risk Appetite in area.
 KLE to set conditions for evacuation of non-
N
combatants
Firepower Manoeuvre
 
O
Integrate fires with Obs Plan and STAP Maintain freedom of movement for CF through MDA
 Apply BM to coordinate battle incl: NFA, Bdrys,  Canalise en by use of CAOI
Handover Line etc  Control of any reserve dmls
C
 Minimise collateral damage  Group mobility assets with reserve/strike forces

 Understand ROE  Consider and mitigate effect of refugees on freedom
N
 Integrate joint effects such as EW against en recce, of movement

C2 etc
U
 Deception plans resourced and credible: Dummy  Anticipate req for Def stores
Posn, False Front, False Routine  Ground dump reserves of CSups in def posn (but not
 Appropriate OPSEC measures in place with CF)
 Cam and Concealment against multi-spectral threats  Consider casevac procedures and alternative
 Consider wrapping CFA around MDA if flanks not Medevac routes esp for CF
strongly held  Quick refurb of CF once RPoL complete.
 Cover gaps with ISTAR assets and fires  Forward repair and recover of eqpt
 Prevent irregular forces, dickers and LN form gaining  Main flexible CPERS plan esp to support CF
access to MDA by use of standing and mobile patrols,  Provide assistance for evacuation of non-combatants
VCPs and barriers.  Protect CSS convoys and small dets against 360
 Consider using strongpoints where applicable degree threat esp against irregular forces in rear
 Integrate AD & CBRN where appropriate areas
5-A-1
CONTENTS
Handling
BATTLE DRILL Instructions:
- TACTICAL For MOD Use Only
CONSIDERATIONS FOR AREA DEFENCE
PY
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5-A-2
CONTENTS
ANNEX B TO
CHAPTER 5 TO
BG TACTICS
BATTLE DRILL - TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR MOBILE DEFENCE
Purpose Principles
 To destroy discrete part of en force  Achieve Depth *
 Wear down the enemy’s offensive capability  Conduct Offensive Action *
 Fix the enemy to allow offensive operations elsewhere  Maintain All Round Defence
 Gain time  Achieve Mutual Support
 Maintain a Reserve
 Concealment and Deception
* Considerable depth required. Strong forces required for
strike operation
Stages of Defensive Action
PY
Preparation CF Action Main Battle
 Establish CF  CF ident en intentions, routes,  Fight battle to shape en
 Decide effects req incl deception strengths and ME prepared posns by
and site NAI and TAI  Delay, disrupt and deceive and combination of obs and fires
O
 Integrate Obs plan with TAIs destroy en recce  Gaps covered by fire and
 Integrate OS incl illum with TAIs  Deceive en about loc of MDA counter pen tasks
   Shape and canalise en for
C
Site direct fire wpns to fire into TAIs Force en to deploy early
 Site Coy posns to shape en  Shape en for handover to MDA counter strike
 Plan and recce strike, c-attk & c-pen Battle Handover  Local counter attacks
plans  Comd confirm wdr criteria &
ED conducted only to gain time
 Issue prelim Os and occupy posn Handover Line and to force en into TAI for
 Establish liaison with flanking units  Coord pts manned strike
 Cam and conceal posn  Conduct internal BG RPOL  BG strike to destroy en ME
 Establish STAP  MDA fires across Handover Line
LL
to support CF wdr
 CF wdr to become reserve.
O
 Identify Key Terrain for shaping and strike  IPE – Ident en axis and intent and TAI for strike
 Site MDA posns to assist in shaping op  ISTAR focus on en movement, avenues of approach,
TR
 Maintain good SA for DP to launch Strike TAI and gaps between posns
 CONPLAN for en MDCOA  STAP – Adjust for day/ni/low vis
 ME with strike once launched
 Understand Risk Appetite
N
Firepower Manoeuvre
 Integrate fires with Obs Plan and STAP  Maintain freedom of movement for Strike Force
 
O
Apply BM to coordinate battle incl: NFA, Bdrys, Canalise en by use of CAOI

Handover Line etc  Control of dmls
 Minimise collateral damage if using area weapons  Group mobility assets with Strike Force
C
 Integrate joint effects such as EW against en recce,  Consider and mitigate effect of refugees on freedom
C2 etc of movement
N
 Concentrate fires in support of Strike

 Apply ROE
U
 Deception plans resourced and credible: Dummy  Anticipate req for Def stores (less than Area Def)
Posn, False Front, False Routine  Consider casevac procedures and alternative
 Appropriate OPSEC measures in place Medevac routes esp for CF
 Cam and Concealment against multi-spectral threats  Quick refurb of CF once RPoL complete
 Cover gaps with ISTAR assets and fires  Forward repair and recovery of eqpt
 Prevent irregular forces, dickers and LN form gaining  Protect CSS convoys and small dets against 360
access to MDA by use of standing and mobile patrols, degree threat esp against irregular forces in rear
VCPs and barriers. areas
 Integrate AD & CBRN where appropriate  Main flexible CPERS plan
 Support evacuation of Non-Combatants
5-B-1
CONTENTS
Handling
- TACTICAL For MOD UseFOR
CONSIDERATIONS OnlyMOBILE DEFENCE
PY
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5-B-2
CONTENTS
ANNEX C TO
CHAPTER 5 TO
BG TACTICS
BATTLE DRILL - TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR DELAY
Purpose Principles
 Slow en advance  Keep it simple
 Determine en’s ME  Exploit Manoeuvre
 Channel en into potential Killing Areas  Conduct Offensive Action
 To avoid combat under unfavourable conditions  Deceive the enemy
 Maintain Contact
 Maintain Freedom of Action
Grouping of Forces and Selection of Delaying Positions
Screen/ISTAR Gp Delaying Forces Alternate Posns Successive Posns
 Establish  Occupy initial delay  Requires two or more  Use when AO is too
PY
Screen/ISTAR Gp to posn sub-units in single AO wide that forces cannot
identify en intentions  Recce successive  First occupies initial occupy more than a
routes, strengths and delay posn posn and others single tier of posns
ME.  Use minimum force to occupy subsequent  Sub-units delay on
O
 Coord with flanking achieve fix whilst position initial posn then fall
units retaining ability to  Sub-units leapfrog back to subsequent
 STAP focussed on manoeuvre subsequent posns posns when forced to
C
enemy advance and  Max use of obstacles when disengaging do so.
gaps between sub- to canalise en and slow  Initial unit then  Simpler to control
units him down. ED occupies second  Contact maintained
 Rehearse  Combination of indirect subsequent position throughout action
disengagement plan fires and direct fires  Delaying force must  Units vulnerable to en
 Prep CSS plan from delay posn to maintain contact with action when
 Site Obstacle Plan slow enemy and fix him and ‘handover’ en disengaging.
LL
before disengaging from one sub-unit to  Little chance to prep
 Strike using local another subsequent positions.
reserves if en over  Greater chance to chance of
extended prep subsequent
O
posns
TR

 Balanced TASKORG allows each group to maintain  IPE – Identify en axis and intent, potential delaying
surveillance, delay en aggressively, manoeuvre and posns and routes to and from each
wdr  ISTAR focus en avenues of approach
 Consider location of Comd  STAP – Focus on en advance
N
 CONPLAN for enemy’s MDCOA

 Control measures to include delay lines,
O
disengagement lines etc

 Maintain Morale
C

 Consequence management plan
Firepower Manoeuvre
N
 Apply appropriate BM to operation within ROE  Use Engr to enhance natural obstacles and ensure
 Integrate fires with the Obs Plan and support CAOI
U
DSO/STAP  Maintain Freedom of Movement for delaying force

 Consider collateral damage  Group mobility assets with each force
 Integrate non-kinetic effects  Consider effect of refugees on freedom of movement
 Be prep to support strike with CAS and AH if avail
 Cover gaps between posns and routes with ISTAR  CSS footprint reduced, ground dumping minimised.
assets and Indirect fire  Consider Casevac procedures and alternative
 Use Engr to improve natural obstacles Medevac routes
 Integrate AD protection of Delay Force and routes  Forward repair and recovery of equipment
 Deception plans resourced and credible  Eqpt and material denial plan
 Appropriate OPSEC measures in place  Force protection of CSS elements
5-C-1
CONTENTS
Handling
BATTLE DRILLInstructions:
- TACTICAL For MOD Use Only FOR DELAY
CONSIDERATIONS
PY
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LL
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N
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5-C-2
CONTENTS
ANNEX D TO
CHAPTER 5
BG TACTICS
BATTLE DRILL - TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR RELIEF IN PLACE
Purpose Principles
 When an existing force is depleted or exhausted and  Security
needs to be replaced  Protection
 When troops of one capability or role need to be  Information
replaced by troops of a different role
 For routine rotation of troops
 To re-establish primacy of local security forces
Sequence of Events and Coordination Measures
Battle Prep Conduct Coordination Measures
 Advance party from  Establish Guard Force  The time frame in which the operation is to be
PY
incoming  Co-location of conducted
 Briefing to all ranks commanders at all  Designation of control lines and routes
and Order of Relief levels.  Arrangements for liaison, recce, and advance parties
stated  Incoming Sub-units  FSCM
O
 Allocation of Routes relieve Outgoing Sub-  Tactical air support
and areas by in place Units.  Deception plans
force  Engineers/Asslt Pnrs 
C
Airspace control measures
 Timings agreed must formally assume  Air Defence
responsibility for dmls  EMCON measures
 TOA when two or more 
ED CSS
sub-units have

LL
 Comds co-locate throughout op  Full handover of information on enemy forces, incl
 Transfer of Command – when two or more sub-units locs, intentions, eqpt, local routine, etc.
have been relieved  In place force continues to provide STAP until
 Clear command responsibility at all stages. Once incoming BG assets in place
O
TOA has passed, incoming comd will assume op  ISTAR assets owned by Outgoing BG until handover
comd of all outgoing sub-units not yet relieved.  Control of ISTAR assets passes on TOA
TR
Firepower Manoeuvre
 Co-location of BC/FST to control fires until Handover  Allocation of areas to Incoming BG by In Place force
 ROE  Routes allocated to Incoming and Outgoing BGs
N
(may use same routes)

 Deception plan agreed between Incoming and  Handover plan for any equipment and material
O
Outgoing BGs remaining with Incoming BG

 Maintain identical OPSEC measures until RiP  Outgoing BG to provide own recovery assets
C
complete
 Use of Guard Force to prevent physical interference
by enemy
N
U
5-D-1
CONTENTS
Handling
- TACTICAL For MOD Use FOR
CONSIDERATIONS OnlyRELIEF IN PLACE
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5-D-2
CONTENTS
ANNEX E TO
CHAPTER 5 TO
BG TACTICS
BATTLE DRILL - TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR REARWARD PASSAGE OF

LINES (RPOL)
Purpose Principles
 As part of a withdrawal  Keep it Simple
 As part of a delay operation  Security
 As a means of changing the type of force facing the  Control
enemy
 Flexibility
 As a means of relieving a force unable to continue
with its mission  Offensive Action
Grouping of Forces Conduct
PY
Liaison Force Conduct
 Wdr Force Step Up HQ co-locates with In Place Force  Handover Line Established
HQ  Coordination Points established with In Place Force.
 Wdr force establish coord points with In place force  Wdr Force man Coord Points
O
 HQ co-locate
 In Place Force assist Wdr Force by coordinated fire
across Handover line
C
 Wdr Force break clean and wdr to Assy Area
Command ED Manoeuvre
 Co-location of HQ with In Place Force  Entry Point into In Place force area agreed between
 Coordination Points established forward of the co-located HQs
Handover Line  Routes allocated to Wdr Force by In Place Force
 Wdr Force man Coord points at agreed time  SP established behind Handover Line
LL
 Wdr Force use designated entry points and routes  Release Point established in Assy Area
allocated by In Place Force  Consideration should be given for In Place Force to
 FSCM agreed between both forces mount a Spoiling Attack if enemy over extends himself
 Understand Risk appetite  Rapid Movement through in place force
O
 Consider effect of refugees on freedom of movement

Information and Intelligence Firepower
TR
 Wdr Force hands over enemy to In Place Force  Co-location of BC/FST to control fires until RPoL
without losing contact complete
 Access to ISTAR feeds passed to In Place Force  In Place Force coordinate fires across CFL to allow
 Coord points monitor flow of Wdr Force WDR Force to break clean

N
In Place Force take on battle

 ROE
O
 In Place Force provide Route Protection for Wdr Force  Self Help Recovery of Equipment by Withdrawing
 In Place Force assists break clean by firing across Force
C
Handover Line  Medevac may be assisted by In Place Force

 Recognition signals agreed. Default is Gun Rear on  Refuelling provided by higher HQ within In Place
N
wdr vehs Force area

 Rehabilitation takes place within Assy Area
U
5-E-1
CONTENTS
BATTLE DRILL - TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR REARWARD PASSAGE OF LINES (RPOL)
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5-E-2
CONTENTS
ANNEX F TO
CHAPTER 5 TO
BG TACTICS
BATTLE DRILL - TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL
Purpose Principles
 Break contact with en force  Keep it Simple
 Security
 Control
 Flexibility
 Offensive Action
Grouping of Forces and Key Control measures
Security Element Main Body Timings Control Measures
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 Take up station  Move back to pre-  Denial Time – Time  Checkpoints estb on
behind old main determined posn which posn must be wdr routes to confirm
posn  Protect own flanks denied until all expected troops
 Cover back between  No Rearward Move have passed point
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posns imposing Reserves Time. – Time before  RV estb to exert
delay  Be prep to assist which there will be control over each
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 Protect main body security element no rearward mov group
from en  Counter en pen except for normal  Embussing point
 Assist in extractionED mov and recce party used to mount vehs
of Main Body  Fwd troops start for move back to
Protect routes thinning out – Time subsequent posn
after Denial Time
when forward troops
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start wdr
 Clear of Line by –
Time when troops
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must be behind a
report line
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 Clear timings for withdrawal of forces given  Use of UAS to observe flanks and en follow up
 Site Step Up behind Intermediate posn forces after wdr of ground troops
 Control wdr by use of Report Lines, Check  Monitor progress of wdr via info from RVs,
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Points, RVs and Wdr Routes Check Pts and report Lines
 CONPLAN for enemy’s MDCOA
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 Maintain Morale
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Firepower Manoeuvre
 Enact Fire Plan to cover wdr. May be noisy or  Maintain Freedom of Movement for wdr forces
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silent to conform to deception plan and enemy  Control demolitions including reserved
actions demolitions
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 In place troops capable of repelling attack up to  Consider the effect of refugees on freedom of
and including the time for forward troops to thin movement
out
 ROE
 Deception actions to disguise intention built into  Early wdr of non-essential CSS elements
plan  Plan to recover battle winning equipment
 Appropriate OPSEC measures in place to  Site recovery assets at defiles, dmls etc.
disguise intentions  Denial plan for material and equipment left
 Security element to protect wdr of main body behind to conform to deception plan
 Reserves to deal with en penetration or  Flexible CASEVAC plan
breakthrough
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CONTENTS
Handling
– TACTICAL For MOD Use Only
CONSIDERATIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL
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5-F-2
CONTENTS
ANNEX G TO
CHAPTER 5 TO
BG TACTICS
CONTROL OF DEMOLITIONS
1. Introduction. A number of key features will be critical to the movement of a

battlegroup. These may include bridges or routes that must be denied to the enemy.
Closure of such features requires either preliminary1 or reserved2 demolitions. Because
the implications of mistakes are self-evident the orders concerning all aspects of
demolitions must be simple, clear, easily understood and rigidly adhered to. Commanders
and staff must be fully conversant with all aspects of the operation.
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2. Terminology. The following terms must be clearly understood:
a. Authorised Commander. The authorised commander is the commander who
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has the authority to order the firing of a demolition. He may delegate this authority to
a subordinate commander, in which case the subordinate becomes the authorised
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commander.
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b. Preliminary Demolition Target. A preliminary demolition target is a target,
other than a reserved demolition target, (see paragraph 4 below) which is earmarked
for demolition and can be executed immediately after preparation, provided that prior
authority has been granted.
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c. Reserved Demolition Target. A reserved demolition target is a target for

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demolition, the destruction of which must be controlled at a specific level of

command because it plays a vital part in the tactical plan, or because of the
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importance of the structure itself, or because the demolition may be executed in the
face of the enemy.
d. Demolition Guard. A demolition guard is a force positioned to ensure that a

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demolition is not captured or sabotaged by an enemy before it has been successfully

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fired. The demolition guard commander is responsible to the authorised commander

for the operational command of all troops on the demolition site including the
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demolition firing party.

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e. Demolition Firing Party. A demolition firing party is technically responsible for

a demolition. It is normally an engineer party and is required for preliminary as well
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as reserved demolitions.
3. Engineer Commander. The engineer commander’s responsibilities include:
a. Advising the authorised commander on the technical factors that affect the
choice of reserved demolition targets.
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A Preliminary Demolition is a target, other than a Reserved Demolition, which is earmarked for demolition and which can be executed
immediately after preparation provided that authority has been granted. AAP-06.
2
A Reserved Demolition is a target for demolition, the destruction of which must be controlled at a specific level of command because it
plays a vital part in the tactical or strategic plan, or because of the importance of the structure itself, or because the demolition may be
executed in the face of the enemy. AAP-06.
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CONTENTS
b. Ordering the charging of the demolition targets when this is carried out by
engineers.
c. Providing the demolition firing parties when ordered by the authorised

commander.
d. Providing, where necessary, reserve firing facilities, e.g. by the use of a standby
air mobile firing party.
e. Maintaining communications with the firing party commander for all preliminary
demolitions.
4. Documentation. Orders for the firing of all demolition targets are recorded on an AF
W9811. These forms are prepared by the authorised commander's G3 staff and contain
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orders and coordinating instructions for the demolition guard commander and the firing
party commander. They also contain procedures for the delegation of authorised powers.
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5. Procedures. The authorised commander, having made his plan, selects those
demolition targets which he wishes to be reserved to him and those which he considers to
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be preliminary. The list of targets is then passed to subordinate formation commanders,
who may select further demolitions to suit their own tactical situations. These extra targets
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are normally subject to the approval of the authorised commander.
6. Preliminary Demolitions. Three options are available to the authorised commander

for firing preliminary demolitions:
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a. Immediately after preparation, provided that appropriate clearance has been

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given.
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b. Upon receipt of a code from higher formation.
c. By delegating the order to fire to a subordinate commander. The authorised

commander may also include in the AF W9811 the proviso that the demolition may
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be fired on the initiative of the firing party commander if the enemy is in the act of
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capturing the demolition.

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In order to fire preliminary demolitions there must be direct communications between the
firing party and the engineer commander, who will pass down the authorised commander's
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order to fire. It is the responsibility of the engineer commander to ensure that

communications are provided and maintained.
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7. Reserved Demolitions. More detailed instructions are required in the case of

reserved demolitions and will be issued on AF W9811. A number of points must be
considered when completing AF W9811:
a. Demolition Guard. A demolition guard must be provided to ensure the security

of a reserved demolition. The size and composition of the guard will be decided by
the authorised commander, who will also issue orders to the demolition guard
commander on AF W9811.
b. Firing the Demolition. Two options are available to the authorised

commander for firing the demolition: the demolition may be fired upon receipt of a
5-G-2
CONTENTS
code, or by delegation of the order to fire to a subordinate commander. He may also

add the proviso that the demolition may be fired without the receipt of a code if the
enemy are in the act of capturing the demolition. Once the demolition is fired, the
demolition guard commander should sign the AFW 9811 and return it to the
authorised commander. He and the firing party commander are also required to
report the success or otherwise of the demolition.
c. Communications. It is the responsibility of the authorised commander to

provide and maintain communications between himself and the demolition guard
commander. In practice this is often best achieved by the use of a liaison officer with
suitable communications. Delegation of authorised powers from one commander to
another should not take place until the latter has established his own communications
with the demolition guard commander.
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8. States of Readiness. A demolition target on which all charges have been placed is
said to be ‘charged’. It is at one of the following states of readiness:
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a. State of Readiness 1 (Safe). The demolition charges are placed and secured.
The vertical and horizontal ring mains are installed and the charges connected to the
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vertical ring main, but the vertical and horizontal ring mains are not connected
together. Detonators and initiation sets are not installed or connected.
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b. State of Readiness 2 (Armed). The demolition is ready for immediate firing.
The vertical and horizontal ring mains have been connected together, cross-over
leads have been connected and initiation sets have been placed into the demolition
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circuit. The danger of premature firing, caused by the close explosion of a munition
or induced electric currents, when the demolition is at State of Readiness 2 (Armed)
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must be balanced against the time needed to bring the demolition from State of
Readiness 1 (Safe) to 2 (Armed).
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9. Changes of State. Demolitions are normally prepared to State 1 (Safe). Preliminary

demolitions are normally changed to State 2 (Armed) immediately before firing. Reserve
demolitions are normally changed to State 2 (Armed) some time before the anticipated
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time of firing in the interests of ensuring prompt reaction when firing is ordered. Changes
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of state may only be ordered by the authorising commander.

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10. Time to Fire. Changes of state take time to implement and there may also be a time
delay between receipt of the order to fire and the actual firing of the demolition. Such
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timing delays must be passed to the authorised commander by the demolition guard
commander and allowance must be made by authorised commanders to permit adequate
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time for orders to be put into effect.
11. Conclusion. Procedures for the firing of demolitions are necessarily prescriptive and
must be clearly understood by commanders, staffs and parties at the demolition sites.
NATO standardisation agreements are to be enforced and will be particularly relevant
when demolitions involve forces of different nations. ln all cases, the provision of suitable
liaison and communications is of vital importance.
5-G-3
CONTENTS
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CONTENTS
ANNEX H TO
CHAPTER 5 TO
BG TACTICS
COMBINED ARMS OBSTACLE INTEGRATION
1. Introduction. Combined Arms Obstacle Integration (CAOI) is an all arms approach

to obstacle planning that ensures the effective integration of direct and indirect fire,
manoeuvre, engineer effort and ground to achieve the commander’s desired effect on the
enemy. Obstacles only have a military purpose when they are fully integrated into the
commander’s defensive plan, sited and controlled to limit the enemy’s scope for
manoeuvre without unduly inhibiting the manoeuvre of friendly forces.
2. Obstacles are classified as either existing or reinforcing:
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a. Existing Obstacles. Existing obstacles can be subdivided into natural or man
made.
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b. Reinforcing Obstacles. Reinforcing obstacles are classified as tactical or
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protective.
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(1) Tactical Obstacles. Tactical obstacles contribute to the commander’s
plan by reducing the enemy’s ability to manoeuvre.
(2) Protective Obstacles. Protective obstacles are primarily designed to

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improve survivability through close force protection.

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OBSTACLE PLANNING
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3. Intent. The key to effective obstacle planning is for the commander to specify what
effect he seeks in a specified area, and hence the obstacles required supporting his intent.
Obstacle intent defines the end result that a combination of fire, manoeuvre and obstacle
effects must achieve. When forming his obstacle intent, the battlegroup commander
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should consider the target, the obstacle locations and the obstacle effects.
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a. Target. Commanders and their staff must understand which element of the
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enemy force is being targeted so that obstacles can be designed and sited to
obstruct it.
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b. Location. Obstacle location is a vital component of obstacle intent because it

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ties the obstacle effect and the target into the scheme of manoeuvre. Commanders
and their staff must understand the relative location of obstacles to ensure that the
desired effect occurs at the right place.
c. Obstacle Effect. An obstacle effect1 is the effect that a specific obstacle group
is required to have on the enemy to support the commander’s tactical intent.
d. Siting. Major obstacles are planned at the highest level. Detailed siting is
confirmed by supported commanders.
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SOHB(L), Sect 4.5.2 – CAOI provide more information.
5-H-1
CONTENTS
e. Integration. The Obstacle plan must be considered early and be fully

integrated into the overall operational design with artificial obstacles sited to
complement natural obstacles.
f. Gaps. Obstacles must contribute to offensive action with gaps that draw enemy
into engagement areas and concurrently allow counter strokes by friendly forces.
g. Persistent Observation. All obstacles must be covered by persistent

observation and fire. CAOI must therefore be integrated with the STAP and Joint
Fires plan.
h. Engineer Priorities. Never hold engineers in reserve, but always list an

engineer priority of effort.
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OBSTACLE EFFECTS
4. An obstacle effect may be to DISRUPT, TURN, FIX or BLOCK the enemy. A
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combination of disrupting, turning, fixing, and blocking may be used to develop the overall
intent of an obstacle belt.
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a. Disrupt. Disruption is designed to break up the enemy formation, thus reducing
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his tempo, slowing his rate of advance and encouraging the premature commitment
of his breaching assets. It should also create an element of surprise and uncertainty,
by deceiving the enemy as to the exact location of the MDA. The effect of disruption
is illustrated in Figure 5-H-1.
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Figure 5-H-1 - The Disrupt Effect
b. Turn. Turning aims to divert an enemy towards ground of our own choosing, i.e.
into a killing area or towards an alternative avenue of approach (AA). This effect is
developed by placing a series of obstacles, combined with direct and indirect fires,
that encourage bypassing in the direction desired. At the start of the turn, obstacles
should be tied into restrictive terrain and should appear more complex than those in
the direction of the turn. The enemy force should bounce off successive obstacles in
the desired direction. Commanders may use the turn effect on the flanks of killing
areas. The turn effect is shown in Figure 5-H-2.
5-H-2
CONTENTS
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Figure 5-H-2 - The Turn Effect
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c. Fix. The intention of fixing is to slow an attacker within a specified area,
normally a killing area. It is used to give formations time to detect, acquire targets,
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and destroy enemy forces throughout the depth of the killing area using air, aviation,
and both direct and indirect fire. The fix effect is shown in Figure 5-H-3.
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Figure 5-H-3 - The Fix Effect

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d. Block. A blocking effect requires complex obstacles to stop an attacker along a

specific AA, thus assisting in his complete destruction in a killing area. Commanders
may use the blocking effect to close an AA which leads out of a killing area, in order
to ensure the maximum destruction of the enemy force in the killing area. The block
effect is shown in Figure 5-H-4.
5-H-3
CONTENTS
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Figure 5-H-4 - The Block Effect
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5. Obstacle Resources. The scale of the obstacle plan is entirely dependant on time
and resources. The timely availability of resources is a critical aspect of the planning
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process. Given limited lift capability, early planning increases the chance of stores being
available when engineers move into the area. An accurate assessment of resource
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requirements is made through Battlefield Area Evaluation (BAE). Planning is based on
linking the obstacle effects required by the commander to the width of the AAs. Early
engagement with the BGE in the planning process will identify what specific obstacle
options are available.
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PLANNING GUIDELINES
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6. Consideration should be given to the following types of battlegroup level obstacles:

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a. Tank Ditch. Anti-tank ditches need not be frontal obstacles; they can be used
for flank protection, either on their own or in conjunction with other obstacles. At
least one end of an anti-tank ditch is usually tied-in or anchored to a terrain feature or
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obstacle to help canalise the enemy in a given direction or seal the end of a killing
area.
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b. Route Denial. Route denial is the engineering process required to deny to the
enemy the unrestricted use of particular lengths of a route. Permanent denial is
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rarely possible and the work undertaken must aim to impose the degree of delay and
nuisance required with the minimum expenditure of engineer effort. All route denial
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obstacles must be tied into existing obstacles so that they cannot be easily bypassed.
Methods available are:
(1) Cratering.
(2) Destruction of the road surface by plant.
(3) Mined charges.
(4) Bridge demolitions.
(5) Abatis (felled trees).
5-H-4
CONTENTS
(6) Non-explosive obstacles.
(7) Roadblocks.
c. Wiring. The decision as to the type of wire obstacle to be constructed in any

particular instance must be made by the commander on the ground.
d. Walls and Barriers. Protective obstacles could include earth filled walls, hastily
erected fences and concrete blocks with controlled access.
7. Constraints. Obstacles are only effective when fully integrated into the plan,
effectively sited and contribute to limit the enemy’s scope for manoeuvre, without unduly
inhibiting friendly manoeuvre. The following factors may constrain CAOI:
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a. Time (for planning, recce, forward movement of materials and emplacement).
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b. Materials (explosives, defensive stores, lack of dedicated engineer lift
capability).
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c. Political, legal and ethical (ROE or other HN factors, including the influence plan
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and tolerance of collateral damage, may further constrain CAOI).
d. UK retains the MLRS delivered AT2 SCATMIN programmable anti-tank mine.

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5-H-5
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CONTENTS
CHAPTER 6
SUSTAINING BATTLEGROUP OPERATIONS
BACKGROUND
1. Chapter 6 provides an overview of sustainment at the battlegroup level. Its purpose

is to provide an understanding of the framework, functions and capabilities that sustain the
battlegroup and the links to parent brigade or task force.
2. The assured sustainment of battlegroup activity is vital to achieving success on

operations. Sustainment is the actual business of maintaining a force by enhancing and
prolonging its capability and resilience. It includes the C4I to enable sustainment, the re-
supply of materiel and spares, the control and administration of personnel, the medical
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treatment and evacuation of personnel and the control and processing of CPERS.
Although a G3 function, the control of movement around the battlefield is also considered
in this chapter. Infrastructure support is not considered at battlegroup level.
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3. The Principles Of Logistics. There are five principles of logistics1 which are equally
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applicable across all sustainment activities. These are:
a.
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Foresight. Foresight is the ability to predict and manage critical constraints to
the battlegroup commander’s freedom of action. Such constraints may be imposed
by the requirements for personnel, materiel, equipment and services; these need to
be anticipated and mitigated.
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b. Agility. Logistic agility provides the commander with the ability to respond
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quickly to the unexpected, maintain sharpness of thought, remain effective under

arduous conditions, be flexible in overcoming the unforeseen and adjust rapidly. A
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balance should be struck between the use of rigid systems and structures, which can
meet the requirement for simplicity and assist with co-operative measures and the
need for functional agility.
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c. Co-operation. Cooperation is necessary, from planning to execution, to make

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the most of shared facilities, capabilities and services throughout the battlegroup, its
adjacent units and its parent formation.
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d. Efficiency. Efficiency involves achieving the maximum level of support for the
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least logistic effort, and making best use of the finite battlegroup resources, transport
assets and lines of communication.
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e. Simplicity. In order to ensure that support arrangements are robust and as

readily understood as possible, they should be simple, both in their concept and
execution.
4. The Operating Environment. The operating environment described in Chapter 1

provides a number of challenges for sustainment operations not least of which is force
protection. While this is a G3 lead and is a wider issue than just battlegroup level it is
useful to describe how force protection might be provided to sustainment elements moving
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The NATO principles for Sustainment are: Authority, Cooperation, Coordination, Efficiency, Sufficiency, Simplicity, Flexibility, Assure
Provision, Visibility and Primacy of Operational Requirement.
6-1
CONTENTS
around the battlegroup AO. The threat level dictates which is the most suitable based
upon the likelihood of attack, the type of attack, the level of vehicle protection
(armoured/unarmoured/ECM etc), the ability to manoeuvre and the importance of the
sustainment mission. The following methods are those most likely to be used in the
battlegroup AO sometimes in combination:
a. Self Protection. Self protection is where the vehicle crews provide their own
protection using a combination of the platform’s integral protection (including armour
and ECM), mobility and crew served/individual weapons to provide deterrence and
protection against attack. This method is favoured when the threat of attack is low or
the protection provided by the vehicles is high enough to make a successful attack
unlikely.
b. Convoy Protection. Convoy protection is where groups of vehicles are
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provided with a dedicated protection party, whose job is to deter attacks or protect the
convoy against attacks. This method is likely to be used where the threat is high and
where the protection provided by the sustainment vehicles is relatively low. Convoy
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protection can be found from any element of the F Echelon but is best provided by
mechanized infantry. In the most hostile threat areas convoys may have their own
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Recce/ISTAR element and an FST/FAC capable of Joint Fires support.
c.
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Route Protection. Route protection is provided by an in place force whose job
it is to clear and secure routes to be used for movement. These forces are likely to
provide mobile and static elements whose job is the security and picketing of the
route, especially at Vulnerable Areas (VA)and Vulnerable Points (VP). This method is
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likely to be used outside of MCO and may facilitate both convoy and self protection
methods. It is most likely to be found in the Force AO rather than the battlegroup AO.
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Further details can be found in the RLC publication Operational Road Transport (AC
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71307).
PRE-PLANNING
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5. Priming Equipment Pack. At the outset of operations the battlegroup receives a

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standard Priming Equipment Pack (PEP). This is designed to provide Combat Supplies (C
Sups), General Service (GS) materiel, Unit Aid Post (UAP) modules, environmental
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clothing and Equipment Support (ES) materiel sufficient for it to operate until a reliable
supply chain is established and allows preparation and re-supply times to be kept to a
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minimum.
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6. Planning Yardsticks. Standard loads of all CSS natures should be set by unit SOIs.
G3 casualty estimates are essential for medical pre-planning. G3 key equipment attrition
estimates, anticipated activity levels and G4 predicted failure rates are essential for
materiel planning. G2 Captured Persons (CPers) estimates are essential for both medical
pre-planning and the allocation of resources to tasks such as guards and CPers holding
facility construction. Further details on planning yardsticks can be found in the SOHB.
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OP SERVAL –French Operations in Mali 2013
French forces deployed to Mali on Op SERVAL in Jan 2013 in response to a request

made by the government. The purpose of the deployment was to assist the Malian
armed forces to halt the advance of insurgent groups which had taken over much of the
northern half of the country.
The French drew on forces stationed in neighbouring countries including Chad, Ivory
Coast and Senegal as well as troops from France. All these troops had to move
considerable distances many of them by land. For example the troops stationed in the
Ivory Coast moved over 1400 km by road to Bamako and then a similar distance to
Timbuktu.
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At the height of operations France had about 4000 soldiers and operations had to be
sustained over long distances with a very austere logistic chain. Although few risks
were taken with PPE, other logistic risk was managed by commanders requiring hard
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decisions on prioritising of, amongst others, medical support.
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The key sustainment lessons to emerge from OP SERVAL include:

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Austerity – Soldiers lived out of their vehicles and carried forward supplies
required to operate for extended periods: there was no establishment of Forward
Operating Bases.
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 Equipment Use – Heavy use of equipment in demanding conditions placed a
larger than normal first-line maintenance burden on the force. The ability to
adapt equipment to demanding environments is vital.
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 Air Sustainment - Air delivered logistics by strategic and tactical aircraft was
critical to tactical mobility and a key skill.
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 Protection – Convoy protection and medical support to convoys were significant

challenges over extended ground lines of communication.
 Contractors – Mali’s economy is poorly developed and this and the tempo of
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operations made contracted support unsuitable.

 Water- Water resupply was a dominant issue, both for French forces and to deny
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access to water sources to the enemy.

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CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
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7. The concept of the 4Ds (Duration, Demand, Distance and Destination) is applicable
to battlegroup logistic planning. Consideration of these four factors, against the backdrop
of the nature and character of the operational situation that is being faced by the
battlegroup, shapes the logistic requirement and the plan. For instance, the outcome of
formal consideration of 4D analysis as it might relate to an armour heavy battlegroup
conducting high tempo, combined arms manoeuvre is likely be markedly different from the
deductions drawn from a brigade conducting Military Assistance to Stabilisation and
Development (MASD) operations. The constant is the 4Ds; this must form the basis, or
the foundation estimate, of all battlegroup logistic planning.
a. Duration. The expected duration of the deployment, operation or mission.
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b. Demand. The quantity of C Sups, materiel, defence stores, etc. required – and
at what rate of consumption (routine/high intensity).
c. Distance. The likely length of the line of communication and predicted combat
distance, which has a direct influence on quantity of distribution assets.
d. Destination. Factors such as HNS, climate and terrain, which influence CSS
requirements, together with guidance on anticipated ‘Battlefield Day’ (Km per vehicle)
for A and B vehicles.
8. Drawing the right conclusions from the 4Ds to reinforce opportunities and/or constrain
the battlegroup commander’s plan is the core responsibility of the Battlegroup Logistics
Officer (BGLO). Those officers commanding the battlegroup echelon system are
accountable for the execution of logistic support to the battlegroup; but logistic planning is
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the raison d’être of the BGLO. He must position himself at battlegroup Main HQ, at the
centre of the planning process and, through experience borne from intimate knowledge of
the battlegroup including an up to date picture of its logistic status at any point in time, be
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adept in providing accurate and insightful input into the emerging plan. The resultant plan
must be logistically supportable; this, coupled with the issuing of clear direction on the
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logistic plan to be executed, is the crux of the BGLO’s business. It requires a clear and
objective understanding of the current and anticipated logistic status of each of the sub
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units; an absolute comprehension of what operations, or activities, the battlegroup and its
sub-units will be conducting in the future; and, having framed the problem, an ability to
translate the logistic requirement into an executable order on behalf of the commander.
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PLANNING
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9. Planning. The BGLO is a critical member of the battlegroup planning team and
develops the logistic concept of operations in parallel with the development of the
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manoeuvre plan.
a. CSS planning must support and sustain the commander’s plan by anticipating
ammunition and fuel consumption, the requirement for MEDEVAC and medical
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support, anticipated equipment failures and the provision of any other critical
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requirements as the plan matures. The impact on A1 and A2 Echelons of any

significant attachments to the battlegroup should also be considered; additional CSS
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assets may be needed or reorganisation required.

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b. The type of re-supply (including delivery by air) must be considered and

depends on the nature of the operation, terrain, weather, etc. Whenever possible
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and for as long as possible, planning should allow for routine resupply as per
battlegroup SOIs. If any aspect of the plan is likely to be difficult, e.g., distribution
and storage of defence stores, then a staff check will quantify the requirement.
Subsequently troops and transport must be identified for the task.
c. The BG Sustainment Plan should constantly be tested against the tactical

situation to confirm that it fits the immediate and future operations.
10. Subsequent Missions. Planning must include potential CSS requirements after the
current mission. This includes locations for A1 and A2 echelons and RAP, the re-
constitution of battlegroup stocks and equipment, specific requirements on reorganisation,
e.g. defence stores on moving from offence to defence; and any transport needed to re-
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distribute men and equipment. In addition, policies are needed for dealing with ground
dumped stocks when vacating positions and for the possible handover to a new force
during any relief of troops.
GROUPINGS
11. The Echelon System. On operations, battlegroups are organised into the following
groupings:
a. F Echelon. F Echelon consists of all the fighting forces of the battlegroup

together with their weapons and vehicles; battlegroup and sub-unit headquarters,
Combat Support (CS) arms elements and integral sub-unit support including REME
fitter sections, treatment teams and ambulances. The BGLO operates from Main HQ
along with the Med Gp Comd.
PY
b. Battle Echelon. Battle Echelon consists of a vehicle(s) with immediate
supplies on board. It is used to meet urgent requirements for basic commodities
O
such as SA ammunition. It is normally commanded by the RSM (or MTWO) and is
likely to be held forward in a harbour location.
C
c. A1 Echelon. A1 Echelon consists of four to six trucks per sub-unit carrying
ED
combat supplies (C Sups), Unit Support Tankers (UST), Role 1 Medical Treatment
Facility(s) (MTF). The A1 Echelon is commanded by the Motor Transport Officer
(MTO) and usually also contains sub-unit SQMS/CQMS. The majority of C Sups held
by the unit are kept at A1 Echelon. It is typically sited directly behind F Echelon but
LL
outside the direct fire capability of the enemy.

O
d. A2 Echelon. A2 Echelon contains the remaining battlegroup CSS troops and

vehicles that are still required to be close at hand in the battle area. It is normally
TR
commanded by the QM (T) and consists of the parent unit’s technical stores and the
HQ of the REME LAD. Sub-unit Tech Reps are located in A2 and can move between
A2 and the Equipment Collection Point (ECP) and dependant sub-units to deliver
spares. The A2 Echelon is normally sited within the Brigade Support Group (BSG)
N
up to 50 km behind the F Echelon. Units normally site their deployed logistic

O
Information Systems (IS) (i.e. MJDI, JPA, JAMES) at A2 Echelon. The requirement
of these systems for dedicated communications bearers of sufficient bandwidth
C
means that it is difficult to split up A2 Echelon assets. Indeed within the BSG it is
common to site A2 echelons from several units close together so that provision of
N
these comms bearers is made easier.

U
e. B Echelon. The role of the B Echelon is to provide non-urgent CSS to the

battlegroup, including the reception of battlefield reinforcements and battle casualty
replacements, monitoring the flow of personnel in and out of the battlegroup and the
management and security of individual personnel effects. The echelon consists of a
small number of vehicles and be commanded by a battlegroup officer or warrant
officer, possibly the QM (A) or RAO. Due to echelon rebalancing and the reduction in
unit echelon vehicles, it is now common practice to back load surplus unit stock to the
brigade logistic regiment rather than the B Echelon. On occasions the B Echelon will
not deploy but its functions will be subsumed into the Rear Ops Group. If deployed,
the B Echelon is normally located within the DSG/BSG as appropriate.
6-5
CONTENTS
f. Rear Operation Group (ROG). The ROG (Rear Party) typically operates from
the home base. It is commanded by a major and is responsible for the administration
and preparation of Battle Casualty Replacements (BCR), the repatriation of
casualties and support to the families.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
12. Battlegroup Logistics Officer (BGLO). The role of the BGLO is to act as the single
point of contact for the battlegroup commander for all CSS matters within the battlegroup
HQ, working alongside the battlegroup COS. The appointment is normally filled by OC HQ
company/squadron working in battlegroup Main HQ, drawing on advice from the Med Gp
Comd, QM(T), MTO and the REME LAD Comd. The responsibilities of the BGLO are:
a. Conducting the sustainment element of the estimate and quantifying the
PY
battlegroup requirements.
b. Devising the BG Sustainment Plan in conjunction with the commander’s plan
O
and confirming it conforms to the higher formation’s plans.
C
c. Delivery of the sustainment content of orders including the CSS Scheme of
Manoeuvre and Main Effort in support of the commander’s plan.
ED
d. Passing current information and warning of future plans to the RAP and A1, A2
and B echelons.
LL
e. Providing regular sustainment feedback and backbriefs to higher formation.

O
f. Monitoring changes to the Sustainment Plan.

TR
g. Informing the battlegroup commander of significant sustainment issues.
h. Forward planning including anticipation of future requirements for assets

and stores.
N
O
i. Co-ordination of sustainment led activities and requests for assistance from

higher formation.
C
13. QM (T). The role of the QM (T) is to provide the technical support to the battlegroup
N
coordinating and accounting for the flow of technical stores to support the LAD, managing
the vehicle fleet, weapons and technical stores. His responsibilities are:
U
a. Consignment Tracking. The A2 Echelon tracks and records successive

positions of a moving freight consignment, providing visibility which underpins the
logistic assurance offered to the battlegroup commander in terms of his logistic
freedoms and/or constraints.
b. Materiel Accounting. The A2 Echelon creates and maintain records of the

type, quantities and condition of materiel, including the means to record, investigate
and report discrepancies between the record of account and the physical stock held.
c. Inventory Management. Inventory management is conducted in order to

provide the required level of operational capability with the minimum level of
6-6
CONTENTS
resources. It is a continuous process, as the inventory is refined and adapted to

meet the battlegroup’s current and future operations.
14. QM (A). The role of the QM (A) is to provide the overall G4 advice to the battlegroup
commander. He oversees the accommodation, clothing and feeding of the battlegroup.
15. OC LAD. The role of the OC LAD is to provide ES advice to the battlegroup
commander and comd the LAD which is responsible for providing L2 ES to the BG. He
supports the BGLO in carrying out the ES part of the estimate and sustainment plan.
16. UMO. The role of the UMO is to act as the battlegroup principal medical advisor on
health, healthcare and medical support. He is responsible for the quality of all clinical
activity with the battlegroup.
PY
17. Med Gp Comd. The role of the Med Gp Comd is to act as the principal medical
planner, support the BGLO in the execution of the medical plan and provide liaison with
the Medical Regiment.
O
18. RMP LO. The role of the RMP LO is to provide Military Police advice to the
C
battlegroup, which includes CPERS activity, traffic regulation (e.g. convoys, bridge
crossings), and host nation police liaison as required.
ED
19. RAO. The role of the RAO is to provide personnel administrative support to the
battlegroup. He is responsible for Information administration, support to casualty and
CPERS reporting and all financial matters within the battlegroup.
LL
20. LSD. A2020 re-structuring sees the insertion of Logistic Support Detachments (LSD)
O
into the echelons of battlegroups. LSDs are fully integrated into the unit structure in the
same way as is seen with RLC chefs, AGC (SPS) clerks and REME LADs. The
TR
delineation of Joint Support Network responsibilities between unit QM staff and the LSD
personnel should be viewed similarly to that traditionally observed in the relationship
between sub-unit CQMS/SQMS staff and their parent QM/QM(T) departments. The QM
department’s focuses inwards on managing equipment dispersal within the unit, reviewing
N
ETs, EC and defining demand. This demand is relayed to the LSD which is then
O
responsible for executing demand on behalf of the unit. Each LSD consists of four
personnel commanded by a SSgt RLC Logistic Specialist (Supply).
C
21. CIS Systems. There are a number of dedicated CSS CIS systems that are used to
N
plan and coordinate the sustainment of the battlegroup. These include:

U
a. Battlegroup Admin Net. This is the principal net provided within the
battlegroup for all sustainment issues and links BG Main, A1 Echelon, A2 Echelon,
OC LAD, UAP and the sub-units through the Coy 2IC. Depending on the distances
between the F Echelon and the BSG, A2 Echelon may not always be able to use the
BG Log Net.
b. Brigade Admin Net. The Brigade Admin Net is usually provided by HF over
Bowman. This is the principal net provided by brigade for all sustainment issues.
Within the battlegroup it is found at BG Main, A1 Echelon, A2 Echelon and B
Echelon.
6-7
CONTENTS
c. CSS Specific Bowman Chat Rooms. These are provided at battlegroup by

the RSO and at brigade by the YofS. They are a useful method of maintaining SA but
mission critical information must be passed by voice across the relevant net.
Battlegroup and brigade SOIs should detail who is mandated to use a chat net and
the type of information that should be passed across it.
d. CSS Functional Nets. In addition to the Brigade Log Net there may be
functional nets provided by the brigade ES, Log, Med and MP units to which certain
elements of the battlegroup sustainment elements may be an outstation.
d. Joint Asset Management and Equipment Solutions (JAMES). JAMES is the

primary CIS system for the management of vehicles within the battlegroup. It is
found at A2 Ech and HQ LAD.
PY
e. Management of the Joint Deployed Inventory (MJDI). MJDI is the primary
Accounting System to support the demanding and accounting of all commodities of
supply within the BG. It is found at A2 Ech and HQ LAD.
O
f. Joint Personnel Administration (JPA). JPA is used to process personnel
C
information and is used by the battlegroup G1 staff.
22-24. Reserved
ED
TYPES OF COMMODITY
LL
25. Combat Supplies (C Sups). The quantity of C Sups to be held by units at first line is
determined by the staff based on an estimate of likely consumption and availability of re-
O
supply. Planning is based on specified Daily Consumption Rates (DCR). The stocks that
a unit can carry on its fighting vehicles in F Echelon and its B vehicles in A1/A2 Echelons
TR
are known as the Unit Mobile Stocks (UMS). Where the first line scales exceed the UMS
the difference must be ground dumped.
26. Equipment Support (ES) Materiel. A small, finite range of fast moving technical
N
stores is held by each of the REME fitter sections operating alongside the F Echelon sub-
O
units. When these technical stores require replacing the fitter section demands the items
via the Unit Spares Account (USA) located within the battlegroup A2 Echelon. Other
C
spares are demanded when required via the USA. Additionally, 3 days of common ES Mat
is provided within the unit PEP, held by the USA. It is essential that the USA accurately
N
provisions spares in order to meet the anticipated demand, and this requires ES input and
advice, and a thorough understanding of the battlegroup commander’s plan and intent.
U
Accurate provisioning (and hence the ability to repair failed equipments whilst the mission
is in progress) is a critical factor in the mission success of the battlegroup.
27. Clothing and General Service (GS) Materiel. Each CQMS/SQMS holds a small
range of important items, such as helmets, boots and CBRN suits, to ensure immediate
replacement as required by sub-units. Additional holdings are found at A2 Echelon and
with the CSLR GS squadron. To replace lost or damaged equipment the sub-unit CQMS
demands replacements via A2 Echelon. Delivery is usually on an opportunity basis on any
available transport going forward. A maintenance scale of clothing is held in B Echelon
and CQMSs normally hold a small range of important items such as helmets and boots to
ensure immediate replacement if required.
6-8
CONTENTS
REPLENISHMENT
28. Replenishment of the battlegroup is routinely carried out by A1 Echelon. Routine

replenishment may be carried out on a 24-hour basis, but is conducted normally at night.
While there are variations in how battlegroups achieve replenishments depending on the
tactical situation, distances, time available and status of CSS assets determine where and
when C Sups are cross-loaded between F and A1 Echelons, and RLC 2nd line assets.
While not a rigid template, it generally occurs as follows:
a. A1 Echelon delivers C Sups to suitable locations in the forward area, normally

replenishing one sub-unit at a time.
b. Once the re-supply is complete, A1 Echelon moves to a suitable location where

C Sups, delivered by a Close Support squadron from the Brigade LSR, are
PY
positioned. This may be at A2 Echelon but is normally conducted within the
battlegroup AO.
O
c. A1 Echelon is then replenished, either by cross-loading stocks or exchanging
vehicles; it will then move forward to a suitably secure hide location, ready
C
to conduct subsequent resupply.
d.
ED
Throughout this sequence, A1 Echelon moves as a convoy under the
command of the MTO.
29. Types of Replenishment. A1 Echelon employs two main methods of routine

LL
replenishment; Running and (Hide) Static Replenishment, and a Battle (Emergency)

Replenishment.
O
a. Running Replenishment. Running replenishment occurs when sub-units

TR
move through a static supporting CSS element, usually en route to a hide or harbour
or while moving forward to commence a new phase of a particular operation. A
diagram of a running replenishment is at Figure 6-1. This is the preferred method of
replenishment because it requires the least amount of time to complete. When A1
N
Echelon delivers C Sups to sub-units, running replenishment occurs in the following

O
sequence:
C
(1) A1 Echelon CP selects primary and alternate sites from the map and
clears them with the BGLO in battlegroup Main HQ. Sites are selected based
N
on: the tactical situation, camouflage and concealment, space available,

accessibility, local security, and routes in and out. Ideally, running
U
replenishment sites should be along tracks in close or broken country where the
terrain gives cover from indirect fire and concealment from observation.
(2) A1 Echelon moves to the site in convoy, ideally at night. Security is the
responsibility of the MTO (or provided by a sub-unit) and, following a security
sweep and the posting of local sentries, A1 Echelon moves into position. They
often need to manoeuvre in close and restrictive terrain in order to maximise
cover and concealment. In the event of enemy action, vehicles perform a crash
action, dispersing rapidly and regrouping at predetermined ERVs.
6-9
CONTENTS
(3) Sub-units arrive at the site and move into a concealed waiting area. After
linking up with the site guide at the RV, the sub-unit moves through the site
receiving supplies directly from A1 Echelon vehicles, with a minimum
of noise and light and in the shortest possible time. The sub-unit regroups in a
designated area and moves through an established release point. A1 Echelon
re-deploys as rapidly and stealthily as possible once replenishment of the sub-
unit(s) is complete.
PY
O
C
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
Fig 6-1 - Layout of a Running Replenishment

C
b. Hide (Static) Replenishment. Static replenishment occurs when sub-units are

static, usually in a hide/harbour or leaguer. A1 Echelon moves to and around them.
N
Static replenishment involves the dumping of rations and ammunition centrally

and the movement of fuel vehicles around the perimeter of the hide/leaguer. This
U
form of replenishment is time consuming, may compromise the position, and should
only be used when running replenishment is not possible (i.e. when vehicles cannot
be moved).
c. Battle (Emergency) Replenishment. Emergency replenishment, also known

as ‘In Battle’ Replenishment (IBR), is the urgent re-supply of ammunition and fuel.
Emergency replenishment may be needed at any time in the battle. The sequence is
as follows:
(1) A sub-unit submits an emergency demand for ammunition and fuel to

battlegroup Main HQ, specifying quantities of supplies, timings, RV and routes.
6-10
CONTENTS
(2) If approved, A1 Echelon is tasked to despatch a replenishment element,

normally consisting of fuel and ammunition vehicles, to the specified RV where
they can marry up with an escort provided by the sub-unit. This slice of A1
Echelon is commonly referred to as Battle Echelon and is normally commanded
by the RSM.
(3) Battle Echelon’s vehicles move into a covered location to the rear of the
fighting position, as close to the fighting element as the tactical situation
permits.
(4) Vehicles are sent back to the replenishment point at intervals, until
resupply is complete. This type of replenishment increases the vulnerability of
armoured vehicles and should only be used in an emergency, and then only if
packed fuel is unavailable.
PY
(5) Depending on OPSEC, it may be necessary for the ammunition and fuel to
be taken to individual vehicles in location, rather than moving them back to a
O
central replenishment point.
C
30. Other Methods. Other methods of replenishing a battlegroup include:
a.
ED
Through Running. In ‘through running’, RLC vehicles pass through the A1
Echelon where stores are cross-loaded or vehicles are simply exchanged.
Alternatively, RLC vehicles could through run direct to the sub-units. This is a flexible
system.
LL
b. Immediate Replenishment Group (IRG). An IRG is a temporary

O
reinforcement of a battlegroup A1 Echelon by elements of an RLC LSR to ensure that

a battlegroup is replenished when the demand, distance or duration of the mission
TR
requires increased sustainment over and above normal battlegroup holdings. For the
duration of the mission the IRG is detached TACOM to the A1 Echelon commander.
c. Air Delivery. Replenishment by air can provide a useful method of resupply

N
when long distances are involved or when the threat to ground force movement is
O
high. They are ideally suited to resupply lighter forces and may be the primary
method of sustaining raiding forces. Supplies can be delivered by air using a
C
combination of:
N
(1) Air Despatch. Supplies are dropped by aircraft at designated points and
collected by units for distribution. Delivery of supplies by Air Despatch (AD)
U
requires a large, secure Drop Zone (DZ), which needs to be marked. The DZ
needs to be selected carefully to avoid collateral damage and loss of supplies.
(2). Air Transport. Where airfields are available, greater quantities of

supplies, materiel and manpower may be provided with a greater degree of
security than by air despatch. However the security of an airfield is a significant
undertaking and may become the battlegroup’s main effort during the re-supply.
(3) Aviation. Re-supply by Support Helicopters (SH) and the use of Under
Slung Loads (USL) is flexible with short preparation, loading and unloading
times. However USL reduces helicopter agility, and therefore carries more risk
when crossing unsecured ground. Internal loads can be used, but with a
6-11
CONTENTS
consequent reduction in lift capacity. An efficient system for the recycling of

Helicopter Underslung Load Equipment (HUSLE) is essential. Helicopters can
also assist in the evacuation of casualties, especially from detached or raiding
forces.
31. Resupply of A1 Echelon. Quantities delivered normally equate to the DCR figure
and are referred to as a Default List. Demands are submitted by exception. In this way A2
Echelon must submit changes in quantities required for specific items, otherwise it will
receive the Default List. There are a number of methods whereby A1 Echelon can
replenish its own stocks once it has re-supplied the battlegroup. These include but are not
limited to:
a. RLC vehicles deliver direct to A1 Echelon in a secure location inside the

Battlegroup AO.
PY
b. RLC vehicles may unload at A2 Echelon, where C Sups are split into subunit
loads and picked up by each CQMS.
O
c. The brigade LSR establishes a Distribution Point (DP) from which units in the
C
brigade collect C Sups. Where only one commodity is supplied, i.e., fuel, the DP is
called a Commodity Point (CP). ED
Further details of the Logistic Support at 2nd Line can be found at Annex A.
32-34. Reserved.
LL
MEDICAL SUPPORT
O
35. The importance of effective medical support contributes directly to both the physical
TR
and moral component of the fighting power of the battlegroup. At the strategic level any
perception of poor management of sick and injured personnel may erode support of the
general population in the home base. Medical support is provided by a number of medical
and non-medical assets acting together as a fully integrated healthcare network.
N
O
36. Medical Elements in the Battlegroup. Medical support to the battlegroup is

provided by a combination of the following:
C
a. Sub-unit Aid Post. The Sub-unit Aid post provides the immediate treatment
N
and evacuation of casualties.

U
b. Unit Aid Post (UAP). The UAP is commanded by the Unit Medical Officer
(UMO) and provides Primary Health Care (PHC) and Pre-Hospital Emergency Care
(PHEC).
c. Medical Troop HQ. The Med Troop HQ is based at battlegroup Main HQ and
supports the BGLO with specialist medical advice.
d. Medical Section. The Med section reinforces the UAP and sub-unit aid posts.
e. Ambulance Troop. The Ambulance Troop provides additional armoured and

wheeled ambulances to reinforce the battlegroup.
6-12
CONTENTS
f. Medical Reception Station (MRS). The BG may be reinforced with a MRS

which provides a more comprehensive PHC, which may include bedding down
facility, basic physiotherapy and dental care when tactically appropriate. It provides
additional PHEC capacity.
37. Roles and Responsibilities. The role of medical advisor within a battlegroup no
longer sits solely with the Unit Medical Officer. There are numerous other methods of
support provided to the battlegroup both directly and indirectly. These are shown in the
table below.
Ser Post Role Location
(a) (b) (c) (d)
01 BG Comd Overall responsibility for the health of the BG. BG HQ
02 BGLO Provides a coherent sustainment plan for the BG. BG HQ
PY
03 COS/Ops Offr Execution of the BG plan and operations BG HQ
incorporating the Med Plan and the G3 casualty
estimate.
O
04 RMO BG Comd’s principal advisor on health, healthcare UAP
and medical support.
C
Contributes to medical planning (especially Q1 & 3).
Functional responsibility for the quality of all clinical
05 Med Tp Comd
ED
activity within the BG.
Principal medical planner. (especially Q2 and 4 - 7) BG HQ
Supports BGLO in the execution of the Medical
Plan.
LL
Liaison with Med Regt through the Med Sqn.

06 Med Sqn OC Inform and subsequently resource BG Medical Plan. Bde AO
O
Controls Med assets across 3-4 BGs and allocates

resources to meet the operational requirements.
TR
07 SMO Functional responsibility for the quality of all clinical Bde AO

activity with the Bde.
Provides Professional mentorship to RMOs.
08 Med Regt CO Bde Comd’s principal advisor on all health, Bde AO
N
healthcare and medical support.

O
Controls Med assets across the Bde AO and

allocates resources to meet the operational
C
requirements.
N
38. Treatment and Evacuation of Casualties. The treatment and evacuation of

casualties will be the most important medical effect on operations. The Medical FEs
U
described above form part of the Casualty Transfer Chain, which is a dynamic and
integrated Air-Land network designed to best meet clinical planning timelines. A diagram
showing the casualty transfer chain is below at Figure 6-2.
6-13
CONTENTS
CASEVAC Forward MEDEVAC Tactical MEDEVAC

Non‐permissive Treat
Treat in
in Transit
Transit Semi‐permissive
MERT (Air) Treat in
Treat in Transit
Transit
Critical Care Air
E‐HLS HLS HLS Support Team (CCAST)
E‐HLS Transit Transit
Transit
Treat
Treat Transit Treat
Treat Treat
Treat
+
Scoop
Scoop &
& Run
Run
H H
11stst Aid
Aid
Treat
Treat then
then
Transit
Transit
Treat
Treat then
then
Transit
Transit
or
Transit
Transit
Treat
Treat Treat
Treat in
in Transit
Transit
HLS
Scoop &
Scoop & Run
Run MERT (Air)
PY
F Ech BG A1 Ech BSG FSG
10 minutes - Enhanced First Aid. 1 hour – Enhanced Field Care. 2 hours – Damage Control Surgery.
O
(Individual care) (Treatment Teams) (Surgical Teams)
•Primary Triage •Secondary triage •Ongoing resuscitation
Self Help/ •Stabilisation and initial resuscitation •Damage Control Surgery
•Bleeding & Airway Control
Buddy Aid •Prioritisation for MEDEVAC •Re-prioritisation for onward MEDEVAC
C
Fig 6-2 - Casualty Transfer Chain
ED
39. Treatment Timelines. The ideal treatment timelines are:
LL
a. At the point of wounding or injury the casualty receives immediate first aid from
his buddy, team or sub-unit medic.
O
b. Within 10 minutes the casualty receives enhanced first aid which includes
primary triage, bleeding and airway control and prioritisation for MEDEVAC.
TR
c. Within one hour the casualty receives secondary triage, stabilisation and initial
resuscitation and re-prioritisation for onward MEDEVAC.
N
d. Within two hours the casualty receives damage control surgery and ongoing
O
resuscitation.
C
40. Casualty Transfer. The method of transfer of casualties between medical treatment
facilities varies depending on the tactical situation.
N
U
a. In a non-permissive environment initial casualty transfer is likely to be by

tracked armoured ambulances from the sub-unit aid post to the UAP. Thereafter
evacuation is by the most suitable means back through the casualty chain. This
might be by tracked ambulances to an ambulance exchange point where casualties
are transferred to wheeled ambulances or by aviation.
b. In a more permissive environment, and when available, critical casualties may

be moved from the point of wounding by SH which may contain a Medical Evacuation
Response Team.
41. Location and Movement of UAP. The UAP and Med Sect must be positioned as
far forward as possible to facilitate early casualty treatment and evacuation but without
exposing itself to enemy direct fire weapons. The location of these MTFs may therefore be
6-14
CONTENTS
in the A1 Ech when the battlegroup concentrates or in the Battle Echelon when the sub-
units are dispersed.
a. The BG may be reinforced with a Med Tp which together provides the ability to
conduct manoeuvre. This is achieved by; allowing either the UAP or the Med Tp to
remain open and receive casualties while the other moves and establishes.
b. The BGLO on advice from the Med Tp Comd may open and close battlegroup
MTFs to support manoeuvre and must be in line with the Med Plan.
42. Medical Logistics. Medical resupply to a BG normally occurs via the single supply
chain through the BG. While the volume of medical materiel may be small, there may be
occasions where resupply of certain items is critical. Furthermore, there are often specific
constraints on the handling of medical materiel (e.g. security of controlled drugs;
PY
temperature controlled storage, disposal etc). Consequently the BG must have a system
to ensure that such requirements are identified and adhered to.
O
43. Other Medical Issues. Other medical issues such as health, hygiene and force
support are dealt with in Annex B to this chapter.
C
44. Reserved. ED
EQUIPMENT SUPPORT
45. Groupings. Equipment Support (ES) to the battlegroup is provided from a number of
LL
formed elements or attached tradesmen to the Battlegroup. These elements include:

O
a. Attached Tradesmen. Units (usually Lt Role Infantry Battalions) with a limited

number of technically simple equipments have a section of attached tradesmen to
TR
conduct organic Level 2 ES. Attached tradesmen are part of the parent unit’s
establishment.
b. Fitter Section. Each fighting sub-unit has a Fitter Section which is TACOM of
N
the sub-unit, but remains OPCOM of the OC Light Aid Detachment (LAD). The IC
O
Fitter Section is responsible for provision of ES advice to the sub-unit commander,

coordination of ES resources to achieve ES effect for the supported sub-unit, request
C
for additional recovery and repair reinforcement or back loading of damaged

equipment to the Unit/ Battlegroup LAD main.
N
c. Light Aid Detachment. Each battlegroup has an LAD which is OPCOM to the
U
battlegroup but remains under functional control of the SO2 ES in Bde HQ. The role
of the OC LAD2 is to command the unit/battlegroup LAD. The OC LAD exercises
command and technical control of REME soldiers in the unit and has the ability to flex
resources and change their mission in accordance with the plan. He offers ES
advice to the battlegroup commander and supports the BGLO in carrying out the ES
part of the estimate and sustainment plan. Where he lacks sufficient resources to
deliver the required effect, he may request Forward Repair Team (FRT)
reinforcement via the Brigade Electrical and Mechanical Engineer (BEME).
2
Usually referred to as EME.
6-15
CONTENTS
d. SO2 Equipment Support.3 The SO2 ES is a brigade staff officer who has an
essential role in contributing to ES planning and delivering Intimate Equipment
Support (IES) to BGs. He is the conduit for all Bde ES Task Requests4 passing from
LAD at unit level to the supporting REME Bn.
46. Levels of Equipment Support. The level of ES is determined by the extent of the
engineering complexity or depth of the task. Factors include the time required to carry it
out, and the resources available. Depending on the tactical situation, the ES commander
is able to direct that higher levels of ES are carried out closer to the point of failure (the
pragmatic application of the principle of Repair Forward). These levels of support are:
a. Level 1. The least complex and is delivered by the equipment user which
includes servicing, functional testing and minor modifications and repair. Equipment
Care (EC) is a universal responsibility.
PY
b. Level 2. ES planning and maintenance conducted at unit level, by
replacement, adjustment or minor repair using generally provisioned resources, such
O
as ES Mat spares battle boxes. This is the first level of ES delivered by REME.
C
c. Level 3. ES planning and maintenance conducted at formation level, generally
by REME Armd Close Support (Armd CS), Close Support (CS) and Force Support
ED
(FS) Bns within the theatre of operations. It contains such operations as brigade
level ES planning, resupply of ES Mat, repair, partial reconditioning and modification
requiring special skills or equipment, but short of a complete strip, reconditioning and
re-assembly.
LL
d. Level 4. Full overhaul, reconditioning, major conversions or major repairs,

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usually outside the theatre of operations and usually conducted by defence

contractors and the Defence Support Group (DSG).
TR
47. Delivering ES Effect. The LAD concentrates on providing fit equipment to the sub-
units by delivering In-Mission Effect. If battle-winning equipment can be repaired in time to
influence the current mission then it will be repaired forward, otherwise it will be recovered
N
to a location or level where the appropriate repair can be undertaken. The LAD completes
O
the full spectrum of maintenance functions including Level 2 repairs to equipment

(excluding signals equipment) and provides first line recovery support. Repairs conducted
C
by the LAD are limited by the duration of the mission, their complexity and the availability
of resources.
N
a. In-Mission. Fitter sections or Forward Repair Team (FRT) conduct ES activity

U
that contributes to maintaining/restoring combat power to allow a unit to continue with

the current mission.
b. Inter-Mission. LADs or FRTs conduct ES activity that contributes to

maintaining/restoring combat power to allow a unit to contribute to the next planned
mission.
3
Also commonly referred as the Brigade Electrical and Mechanical Engineer (BEME).
4
LCH Report 28 – BATRECEVACREQ; LCH Report 29 – BATRECEVACTASK. NATO ratified AAP 9 formats for
requesting and tasking ES.
6-16
CONTENTS
c. Subsequent Mission. REME Armd CS or CS Bns conduct ES activity that

contributes to restoring equipment availability to prepare a unit to contribute to likely
future missions.
d. Sustaining. REME Bns and contractors in the deployed space conduct ES

activity that contributes to the long term sustainment of the force by the rehabilitation,
regeneration and restoration of combat power to allow the continued long term
operation of the force.
48. Forward Repair. Intimate equipment support is formation level close equipment
support provided in the battlegroup area. It involves REME Armd CS or CS Bn assets
going forward to provide direct support or reinforcement to LADs through the provision of
Forward Repair Teams (FRT).
PY
49. Reinforcement. The LAD is designed to provide in-mission effect and (sequentially)
inter-mission effect, but has finite resources. Thus battlegroups require reinforcement
either to allow them to regenerate for a subsequent mission, or to deliver ES effect to
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support the plan. This reinforcement is provided via an FRT. An FRT is an ES capability
or grouping that can move forward from REME Bns independently5 and conduct:
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a. Level 3 Repair6. A Level 3 ES capability, generally a single armoured or
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wheeled repair vehicle, which contributes to the delivery of Inter-Mission Effect and/or
Subsequent Mission Effect by repair by replacement of Power Packs (PP) and
Engines and Major Assemblies (E&MAs). This capability is self contained and carries
its own lift and spares.
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b. ES Reinforcement. A bespoke ES grouping designed to deliver ES

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reinforcement to a unit to complete a specific Level 2 ES task. It is formed in

response to a capability shortfall required to deliver in-mission, inter-mission and/or
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subsequent mission ES effect as identified by the LAD commander, as part of the ES

estimate within the unit level battle planning cycle. Requests should define the effect
required, rather than numbers of REME soldiers or repair equipment; this capability is
then task organised for the duration of the task.
N
O
50. Recovery. The REME is responsible for keeping much of the Army's equipment
operationally fit and recovery is one element of this task. Non-REME personnel concerned
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with operating unit transport must be able to support this task by utilizing the recovery
resources available at unit level. Effective recovery procedures restore the equipment to
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action with minimum delay and also deny its possible use by the enemy. Recovery also
helps to prevent equipment deterioration through exposure and lack of maintenance and
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makes an important contribution to keeping routes clear for tactical troop movements. The
unit contribution to equipment recovery is important in two ways, each of which directly
benefits the unit. Firstly, the equipment is restored to normal use with the least delay, and
secondly, the available REME resources are freed for other recovery tasks, again to the
direct benefit of user units.
5
Supported if necessary by additional ES Bn or other arms assets.
6
As close to the point of failure as tactically possible.
6-17
CONTENTS
51. Limitations on the User Recovery Task. User recovery is restricted to the
capabilities of the user recovery equipment and its Complete Equipment Schedule (CES).
All other recovery tasks are specialised and undertaken by REME personnel.7
52. REME Recovery Systems. REME recovery systems utilise, as their component
parts, two essential resources. These are:
a. Level 2 REME Resources. Comprising the recovery equipment and personnel

in an LAD and unit workshops.
b. Level 3 REME Resources. Comprising the recovery equipment and personnel

from REME Battalions.
53. Recovery Chain. These resources give an effective recovery system where
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equipment casualties can be moved in any direction, even forward, when operationally
required. The chain of recovery facilities thus links Equipment Collection Points
(ECP)/Equipment Casualty Collection Points (ECCP), LADs, Back Loading Points (BLP)
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and REME Battalions to provide an integrated system.
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54. ES Laydown to Support Battlegroup Operations. A diagram showing the ES
support to battlegroup operations is at Figure 6-3. ED
LL
O
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N
O
C
N
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Fig 6-3 - ES Laydown

55. Further details of Equipment Support at 2nd Line can be found at Annex C.
7
Details on recovery for each vehicle type are given in the appropriate equipment support publication for that vehicle and the All Arms
Equipment Recovery Manual, Support Publication 0200-A-307-013, 2nd Edition May 2012.
6-18
CONTENTS
56-59. Reserved.
STAFF AND PERSONNEL SUPPORT
60. The deployment of unit G1 and Staff Personnel and Support (SPS) staff is dependent
upon the direction given by the CO. On operations, unit personnel administrative support
is coordinated from the unit Field Administration Office (FAO) by the Regimental
Administration Officer (RAO).
61. Rear Party/Rear Operations Group. Typically commanded by a major, the ROG is
a unit’s crucial rear link. It plays a key role in administration, the preparation of BCRs, the
repatriation of casualties and support to families.
62. Command and Control. Command and control of deployed SPS personnel by the
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RAO is best enabled from the A2 Echelon, where established deployed units have access
to communications infrastructure which supports the use of Joint Personnel Administration
(JPA). If a unit has no communications for JPA back to the UK, then it must use other
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proxy methods of administration. SPS personnel are normally attached to all sub-units to
provide first line staff and administration support, as well as to battlegroup HQ to provide
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command and staff support. The RAO is responsible for all aspects of military
administration on operations, including: ED
a. Information Administration (I Admin).
b. Support to Casualty Reporting.

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c. Captured Persons (CPERS) Reporting.

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d. Command and Staff Support.

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e. Personnel Reporting and Tracking.
f. Banking Support.
N
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g. Cash Disbursement.
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i. UK and non-UK Pay Support.

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j. Public and Non-Public Accounting.

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h. Audit.
63-64. Reserved.
MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT
65. Any deployment involves personnel from the Royal Military Police (RMP) often
including the Special Investigation Branch (SIB) and potentially Military Provost Staff
(MPS). The scale of deployment varies dependent on the nature of the operation, and the
RMP Liaison Officer assigned to a battlegroup is thus rank-ranged from SNCO to Lt.
6-19
CONTENTS
66. Duties. Military Police support covers the two general headings of policing the force
and providing police support to the force:
a. Policing the Force. The RMP provides a deployed criminal investigation

capability, adhering to the same legislation that governs policing activity in the UK,
and replicating the capability as near as conditions allow. The conduct of
investigations in theatre enhances the credibility of UK Forces on deployment.
b. Police Support to the Force. The primary police support role is provision of
surety to CPERS activity, and either RMP or MPS should be present in some
capacity at every stage of the CPERS handling chain. Particular focus should be
given to the point of capture, so it is likely that a proportion of RMP personnel will be
located forward with either the battlegroup F or A1 Echelon. The remainder are likely
to be employed in the B Echelon enabling traffic regulation tasks, which involves
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maintaining oversight of lines of communication, controlling the execution of
Movement Orders where required, and ensuring traffic flow is unrestricted. This may
require the establishment of Traffic Posts along routes, suitably force protected, and
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co-located with Med and ES assets where necessary.
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67. Command and Control. RMP and SIB assets are always centrally controlled in
order to ensure investigative independence8. The Force Provost Marshal (the most senior
ED
RMP in theatre) reserves the option to pool RMP assets away from other force elements
where required for succinct phases of operation (e.g. FPoL).
68-69. Reserved.
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CAPTURED PERSONNEL (CPERS)

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70. During the course of military operations UK Armed Forces must be prepared to
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capture, detain, or hold individuals for a wide variety of reasons. The treatment of these
individuals is of critical importance, not only from a legal and policy perspective but also in
terms of maintaining the legitimacy of the operation. The proper handling and treatment of
CPERS is an essential element of campaign authority, which is itself a condition for long
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term success. The reference document for all detention operations is JDP 1-10 Captured
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Persons, a summary of which is at Annex D.

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71. Planning. The battlegroup commander must take into account the likelihood of
CPERS during his planning and produce a G3 CPERS estimate to help determine the
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resources required to process the expected CPERS.

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72. Responsibility. CPERS handling requires firm command, leadership and a strong
commitment to treating individuals humanely. Battlegroup activity covers the highest risk
areas for potential abuse and it is essential that the commander’s expression of intent and
an instilled ethos of individual and collective responsibility, backed up by firm discipline, is
used to deter destructive behaviour. Commanders must ensure that all personnel under
their command are fully aware of the obligations to treat CPERS humanely and of the
prohibition on torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment including the five prohibited
techniques. To achieve this the battlegroup commander must appoint a Detention Officer
(separate from the MP LO) who must be a commissioned officer in battlegroup HQ. His
roles are:
8
RMP are rarely placed higher then TACOM to the BG.
6-20
CONTENTS
a. The co-ordination and management of CPERS.
b. To act as the focus on CPERS matters during mission-specific training.
c. To ensure the battlegroup is trained to handle CPERS.
d. To assist the commanding officer during operations by monitoring compliance

with timescales, record keeping and other CPERS handling.
e. To act as a clear point of contact with higher headquarters on CPERS matters

and liaising as necessary, with the Military Provost Staff and Royal Military Police.
73. Dealing with CPERS. There are three stages of dealing with CPERS at battlegroup
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level. These are:
a. Initial Point of Capture. CPERS are to be disarmed and searched for items of
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intelligence value. Only women are permitted to search female CPERS. Unit
identification should be passed to battlegroup HQ as soon as possible. Officers,
C
NCOs and men /women must be segregated and a capture report, giving a short brief
on the circumstances of capture, completed for each CPERS. All property, including
ED
items of intelligence value should be labelled, using Annex 7 to JDP 1-10, placed in a
container and clearly identified as belonging to a particular CPERS. The following
must not be removed:
LL
(1) Uniform, including badges of rank and identity tokens i.e. discs and cards.
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(2) Helmets, respirators and ground sheets.

TR
(3) Pay books.
(4) Private property, including religious artefacts, unless it is of escape use or of

intelligence value. All money should be handed over to a field cashier and a
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receipt given to the CPERS.

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b. Unit Holding Area (UHA). CPERS, with any documents or equipment found in
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their possession, should be moved as soon as possible under escort to the

battlegroup’s UHA. This will have been established by the RSM and the battlegroup
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Provost Staff but may have to be reinforced if there are large numbers of CPERS to
guard. Maps and documents are then handed over to the IO. Wounded CPERS are
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moved through the casualty transfer chain. Depending on the severity of the wound
they may also need guarding. The construction of a holding area and the detailed
procedures for handling CPERS within it are contained in JDP 1-10 Chapter 9 Annex
A. An example of a holding area is below at Figure 6-4.
6-21
CONTENTS
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O
C
ED
Fig 6-4 - Example of a Unit Holding Area
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c. Tactical Questioning. Tactical Questioning and Interrogation is separate to
CPERS handling and must only ever be carried out by suitably trained, qualified and
current personnel.
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d. Onward Movement to Collecting Point. There are legal requirements on how

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long a CPERS can remain at a UHA. Arrangements must be made to move CPERS
to the Bde Collecting Point, the location of which should be communicated through
Bde Orders. Bde HQ therefore must be informed as a priority that the BG has
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received CPERS.
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74. Advice on CPERS. Immediate advice on CPERS is available at battlegroup level by

the attached RMP LO. Further advice and support can be found through the Army Legal
C
Services, Royal Military Police and Military Provost Staff. Full details can be found in JDP
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1-10 an extract of which is at Annex D.

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75. Reserved.
BATTLEGROUP MOVEMENT
76. Battlegroup movement or march9 is conducted to move the battlegroup efficiently to

its place of tactical employment. The requirement for efficient movement, often over long
distances, should be balanced against the probability of encountering the enemy. No
movement therefore should be regarded as non tactical or simply routine.
77. Organisation. The battlegroup organises into the following groupings:

9
ADP Ops and AFM Vol 1 Part 1 Bde Tactics refer to March as an Enabling Action. For the purposes of the battlegroup, the terms
Battlegroup Movement and March are interchangeable.
6-22
CONTENTS
a. Covering Force. The Covering Force (CF) is task organised to conduct route
reconnaissance to determine route details, travel time, route capacity and flow rates.
The CF is likely to include engineer recce and RMP if attached and should be
capable of operating well in advance of the remainder of the battlegroup. It must
pass information back to the remainder of the battlegroup in good time for
adjustments to the plan to be made and communicated in good time. Attention
should be given to the Military Load Classification of bridging and minor roads as well
as choke points or defiles through which battlegroup intends to pass.
b. Advance Party. The advance party includes personnel required to enable the
arrival of the battlegroup at its next destination including its deployment into hides or
leaguers and any staff required to recce or plan subsequent activity. It is likely to
consist of battlegroup HQ and sub-unit representatives, often the so called ‘Second
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Eleven’ of BG COS, RSM, sub-unit 2ICs and platoon sergeants, together with the
RSWO and nominated guides. For longer moves elements of A1 echelon may
deploy with the CF to provide refuelling and equipment support en route.
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c. Main Body. The Main Body consists of the remainder of the battlegroup other
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than the Rear Party. Packets are often be grouped into wheels and tracks rather
than a mix of each although sub-unit integrity is important. Command Nets should be
ED
manned and troops equipped to dismount and fight if necessary. The main body may
be further protected by Flank Guards or a Quick Reaction Force able to deal with any
incidents.
LL
d. Rear Party. The Rear Party is the last force element to move along the route.
It normally consists of equipment support, medical and recovery assets and sweeps
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the route to repair or recover disabled or stranded vehicles and assist with the
recovery of casualties.
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78. Planning Considerations. The following should be considered:
a. Time and Space Planning. Movement should be a planned activity which is

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executed in accordance with a movement plan. As a minimum the plan should be

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based on an IPE which helps select the route or routes to be used and includes the
Start Point (SP) and Release Point (RP), order of march, timings (including start
C
times and pass times), and actions on halts, break down and enemy contact. Where
the threat warrants it a STAP should also be developed and resourced to cover
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vulnerable areas along the route. Further details including formulae for calculating
this data can be found in section 4.4.2 of the SOHB 13.
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b. Control. Battlegroup Main HQ may establish a Movement Control Cell (MCC),

usually centred around the Adjutant and MTO in order to control and coordinate the
move. The MCC must have communications with all parts of the battlegroup and
monitors progress and directs changes to the movement plan should they be
necessary.
c. Routes. Multiple routes offer the opportunity to shorten the overall duration of
the march, but may reduce the ability of the battlegroup to control or monitor progress
of all elements. Alternative routes should be identified onto which the battlegroup can
switch to bypass unforeseen obstacles. Routes should generally avoid defiles, urban
centres of population and heavily used arterial roads where possible.
6-23
CONTENTS
d. Halts. Areas in which to conduct halts should be identified during planning and
confirmed by the CF. Such areas should offer alternative entry and exit points, cover
from view off the main route and must be defendable. Opportunities for
administration, refuelling and maintenance should be identified in advance.
e. Protection. If warranted by the threat, flank guards should tasked to clear and
overwatch vulnerable areas along the route that have been identified during planning
in order to enable the main body to pass through them unhindered and without
prolonged delay. Such tasks may be suitable for air defence, engineer or assault
pioneers.
f. Firepower. Integration of OS or Joint Effects into the movement plan offers

additional protection to each grouping. In such cases the Movement Control Cell
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should be augmented by the Joint Fires Cell and trained observers should travel
within each grouping in order to shorten response times.
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79. A diagram showing the outline of battlegroup movement is below at Figure 6-5. Full
details of Road Movement are contained in the SOHB.
C
ED
LL
O
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N
O
C
N
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Fig 6-5 – Example of a Road Movement
Annexes:
A. Logistic Support
B. Medical Support
C. ES Support
D. CPERS Extract from JDP 1-10
6-24
CONTENTS
ANNEX A
TO CHAPTER 6
TO BG TACTICS
LOGISTIC SUPPORT
ARMD INFANTRY BRIGADE
1. The Close Support Logistic Regiment (CSLR).
a. Role. The role of the CSLR is to provide intimate logistic support to its affiliated
brigade. Additionally the CSLR RHQ shares the command of the CSS Gp of the
Lead Armoured Task Force (LATF) with the Armd CS Bn REM BHQ.
PY
b. Structure. The CSLR structure is shown below:
O
Close Support Logistic Regiment RLC
C
ED
LL
O
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N
O
C
c. Capabilities.
N
(1) General Support Squadron (GS Sqn). The supply function and custody
of the major accounts is exercised through the GS Sqn. The GS Sqn is a key
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node in the Joint Support Chain (JSC) and is responsible for the receipt and
breaking of CSups and materiel bulk stocks to configured loads, for both bulk
and detailed stores. It is normally the last node in the JSC to execute this task.
The level of stock held by the GS Sqn is directed by the Sustainment State
(SUSTAT) but this must be confirmed by the GS Sqn in consultation with the
brigade staff. The Sqn is located within the BSG, normally but not always co-
located with RHQ. The Sqn requires access to strategic communications to
support its Log IS. Although units within the brigade area try to remain mobile,
it is likely that the GS Sqn will be less so than the CS Sqns due to the
requirement to ground dump stores. The GS Sqn is also responsible for the
operation of the Bde Log RV.
6-A-1
CONTENTS
(a) Stores Troop. The functional areas within a Stores Troop include a
Provision Control and Accounts (PC&A) section (sometimes referred to as
Mat Ops), Receipts and Issues (R&I) (inclusive of a packing bay and
Consignment Tracking Node), Returned Stores Group (RSG), CSups
Section and a Depot Management cell (typically for stock and location
maintenance as well as SHEF compliance). Reconciliation of stock is not
a Stores Troop task; this is performed by the Stocktaking and
Reconciliation (S&R) Team which is an RHQ asset that works directly to
the RTO (for convenience it may be co-located with Stores Troop to obtain
access to accounting records). The troop may also have a detachment
from 84 Medical Supply Squadron (84 MSS) to provide medical stores to
the brigade. The Stores Troop contains:
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(i) Detailed Stores Section.
(ii) Bulk Stores Section.
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(iii) Combat Supplies (CSups) Section.
C
(b) Brigade Logistic Rendezvous Troop (Bde Log RV Tp). The Bde
Log RV Tp is responsible for running the Bde Log RV. The Troop is
ED
equipped with VITAL and TAV(-) which allows the chain of command to
maintain consignment visibility within the support chain. The Bde Log RV
Tp can conduct a form of supply ‘triage’ enabling high priority supplies to
LL
be identified for rapid onward movement. Doctrinally, the Bde Log RV is
often shown on the brigade rear boundary adjacent to a Main Supply
Route (MSR). While this can be the case, more commonly the Bde Log
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RV will be established adjacent to GS Sqn Main within the BSG. The Bde
Log RV also has a key role to play in the operation of the reverse supply
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chain with stocks for back-load being consolidated at the Bde Log RV prior
to back-loading.
N
(c) Transport Troop (Tpt Tp). The Tpt Tp is generated from the
brigade’s affiliated Reserve Transport Regiment and is the only part of the
O
CSLR that is a Non-Regular Deployable Component (NRDC).

C
(2) Close Support Squadron (CS Sqn). Each CSLR is established with two
CS Sqns whose primary role is the distribution of CSups and Mat to the Bde
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dependencies. Tasks for the CS Sqns include:

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(a) Delivery of unit loads to battle-group and brigade unit echelons.
(b) Operating Distribution Points (DPs).
(c) Operating Ammunition Control Points (ACPs).
(d) Delivery of general engineer Stores, artillery natures and bulk fuel.
(e) Holding a mobile (on wheels) reserve of CSups for the brigade.
(f) Support to battlegroup IRGs.
6-A-2
CONTENTS
(3) Troops within the CS Sqn are:
(a) Fuel & General Transport Troop (F&GT Tp).
(b) Combat Support Troop (Cbt Sp Tp).
2. The Theatre Logistic Regiment (TLR)
a. Role. The TLRs is part of the Reaction Force, providing formation level support
to their affiliated AI Bde. The TLR will routinely command the Rear Support Area
(RSA) and as such will command not only its own sub-units, but must be capable of
providing C2 to theatre enabling capabilities as directed. The TLRs will deploy for
the first three roulements of an enduring operation during which time they will assist
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in the establishment of a robust theatre architecture which can be handed over to
other elements of the Total Support Force by the end of the third roulement.
b. Structure. The TLR structure is shown below:
O
Theatre Logistic Regiment RLC
C
ED
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O
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N
O
C
N
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c. Capabilities.
(1) Sustainment Fusion Cell (SFC). The SFC is an integral capability within
the RHQ responsible for the co-ordination and tasking of non-military FEs within
the RSG; primarily non-military transport assets, including aviation. It should be
noted that the SFC is not responsible for the setting of contracts, but will utilise
capabilities established through the enabling contracts set up by formation G8
staff. Included within the SFC are:
6-A-3
CONTENTS
(a) Local Resources Section (LRS). The LRS provides a unit or force
with a local procurement capability to provide supplies, services and co-
ordination of Host Nation Support (HNS).
(b) Labour Support Unit (LSU). This is an NRDC capability provided

by the Reserve Logistic Staff Unit. The LSU is responsible for the
recruitment and management of Locally Employed Civilians (LEC) in
accordance with extant theatre and more general policies.
(2) Supply Squadron (Sup Sqn). The Sup Sqn is organised to receive, and
subsequently issue CSups, Mat and Eqpt arriving in a theatre of operations. It
also holds the balance of stock required to match the difference between the
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stock holding capacity of the CSLR and its dependencies, and the SUSTAT.
Once triaged, the Sup Sqn either holds the material within the RSG or pushes
the material through to the Bde Log RV via the TLR’s Tpt Sqn. In order to
achieve this, the Sup Sqn has the following sub-units:
O
(a) Theatre Rendezvous Troop (TRV Tp). This troop undertakes an
C
identical role to the Bde Log RV Tp but at the theatre level.
ED
(b) Material Troop (Mat Tp). The Mat Tp holds the theatre reserve of
materiel and theatre loan pool items. In the early stages of deployment
the troop will handle a significant quantity of 1st line stores belonging to
LL
units yet to deploy and marry up with their equipment. Where appropriate,
the troop can deploy elements forward to establish an enhanced stock
taking capability in the FSA, however, this stock would routinely be
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managed by the CSLR.

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(c) Ammunition Troop (Ammo Tp). The Ammo Tp is capable of

establishing an ammunition storage area of up to 5000T. Two ammunition
storage sites may be established in the RSA to provide redundancy, or a
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forward site may be established in the FSA if the LOC becomes extended.
The majority of stock will be in support of the Land FEs, but common
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natures in support of joint units will also be stored. The troop has both
suppliers and Ammunition Technicians (AT) on strength. The Ammo Tp
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may be reinforced by the Ammunition Technical Support Group (ATSG)

drawn from DE&S in order to provide addition technical capacity to
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inspect, maintain, repair, modify, repackage and disposal of in-theatre

ammunition stocks. During redeployment the Ammo Troop is responsible
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for running the Returned Ammunition Group (RAG).
(3) Transport Squadron (Tpt Sqn). The TLR Tpt Sqn is generated from its
twinned Reserve Transport Regiment. The primary role of the squadron is to
move stocks from the Rear Supply Area (RSA) to the Bde Log RV. Tpt Sqns
are equipped with PLS vehicles and long wheelbase trailers. Although a PLS is
of medium mobility, when pulling a trailer it is reduced to low mobility, and will
therefore normally be restricted to MSRs and paved roads. The squadron can
be tasked with moving all classes of materiel (less bulk fuel), but will normally
only carry bulk stores. Typical tasks include:
6-A-4
CONTENTS
(a) Clearance of stocks from the SPOD to RSA.
(b) Movement of stocks from the RSA to the BSG.
(c) Movement of defence and engineer stores.
(4) Fuel and General Transport Squadron (F&GT Sqn). The F&GT Sqn
has the capability to both store and distribute bulk fuel and water, while
retaining a GT capability for the movement of CSups.
(a) Bulk Fuel Installation Troop (BFI Tp). The BFI Tp is capable of
establishing two BFIs. If aviation is operating within the force area, the BFI
Tp may establish a single BFI within the aviation Main Refuelling Area
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(MRA), although this is a task more usually done by 13 AA Sp Regt RLC
or Tactical Support Wing (TSW) from the RAF.
(b) Bulk Liquids Transport Troop (BL Tpt Tp).
O
(i) Water. RLC sections are responsible for the distribution of bulk
C
potable water from a water source to a water DP. The water sections
are not responsible for stockpiling or distributing bottled water.
ED
(ii) Fuel. The troop is responsible for the distribution of bulk fuel
from either the BFIs or HN source. The troop routinely operates fuel
LL
XPs with CSLR tankers from the Fuel & GT Troop behind the brigade
rear boundary, but can deliver direct to the BSG if required.
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(c) Transport Troop (Tpt Tp). The Tpt Tp provides the TLR’s regular
transport capability.
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(5) Additional Squadron. Two of the three TLRs have an additional task
squadron which provides FEs to deployments as required. In both cases, the
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squadrons will have to manage an internal readiness cycle to ensure they have
troops at the appropriate notice to move in support of the Reactive Force.
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While the SHQ would not normally deploy at anything below best effort, they
could deploy as an additional C2 node if required. The additional sqns are:
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(a) Medical Supply Squadron (MSS). The core role of the MSS is to
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hold the theatre reserve of medical materiel, including blood products,

controlled drugs and medical equipment. The Sqn will normally be co-
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located with the main Field Hospital within the RSA with a forward medical
capability in the BSG as required.
(b) Heavy Equipment Transporter Squadron (HET Sqn). The primary

role of the HET Sqn is to move MBTs in order to reduce wear and tear.
Secondary roles include the movement of other bulk stocks / Campaign
Infrastructure Equipment and the recovery of aviation assets.
6-A-5
CONTENTS
INFANTRY BRIGADE
3. The Force Logistic Regiment (FLR).
a. Role. FLRs sit within the Adaptable Force, primarily task organised to provide
log sp to the deployed force during roulements 4 and 5 of an enduring operation. By
this time, many supporting functions will be operated by non-military members of the
Total Support Force. During its deployment, the FLR may be the only RLC unit
deployed and as such contains significant supply and transport assets; a proportion
of which will be NRDC in line with its likely warning time to deploy. Of particular
importance for the FLR will be the Sustainment Fusion Cell (SFC).
b. Structure. Many of the sub units contained in the FLR provide a similar
function to those in the TLR.
PY
Force Logistic Regiment RLC
O
C
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
N
c. Capabilities.
U
(1) Sustainment Fusion Cell (SFC). As described in Para 8a.
(2) Supply Squadron. As described in Para 8b.
(3) Transport Squadron. As described in Para 8c.
(4) Fuel and General Transport Squadron. As described in Para 8d.
6-A-6
CONTENTS
ANNEX B
TO CHAPTER 6
TO BG TACTICS
MEDICAL SUPPORT
1. Capabilities of Care.
a. Force Health Protection (FHP). FHP encompasses force preparation

measures, environmental health advice, in-theatre preventative measures (hand
washing, sanitation, and education, etc), post exposure measures, and the
rehabilitation of the force. FHP is focused on prevention, rather than cure, and has a
significant impact on the preservation of fighting power. Like all force protection
PY
measures, FHP is a Command responsibility. Table 6-B-1 details the FHP capability
within a deployed BG:
O
Ser Role Ratio Capability
C
(a) (b) (c) (d)
01 Combat Health 1:30 or 1 per loc Enables the BG to conduct their own local
Duties (CHD) (whichever is environmental assessment and implement
ED
personnel smaller) appropriate preventative measures:
● Implementation and maintenance of
appropriate operational sanitation measures
and procedures.
LL
● Identification and safe control of disease

vectors and pests.
● Maintenance of unit potable water supplies.
O
02 Combat Health 1 Per Unit – Non- The CHA provides the unit with:
Advisor (CHA) dispersed ● Completion of the Tier 1 Environmental and
TR
1 Per Loc - Industrial Hazards (EIH) Risk Assessment.

Dispersed ● Management of the UEHD trained personnel.
● Medical Force Protection using the Health
N
Risk Management Model.

● Involvement with Operational/OTX planning.
O
03 RMO 1 Per Unit The unit medical officer is the adviser to the
commanding officer on all matters pertaining to the
C
prevention of sickness and the maintenance of health

of all personnel1.
N
04 QM(M) 1 Per Unit Lead for SHEF within BG AO.

05 EH Tech Variable, usually Specialist advice on medical force protection
U
1x EH Sect per measures.

Bde
Table 6-B-1 FHP Capability within a BG
b. Primary Health Care (PHC). Deployed PHC is focused on minimising Disease

& Non-Battle Injury (DNBI) and working days lost through early identification, diagnosis
and treatment. In the firm base Defence Primary Health Command aims to provide
routine PHC within 24 hrs (to Cbt Med Tech or Nurse) or 48 hrs (to Medical
Officer/Nurse Practitioner). Deployed PHC seeks to match, and where possible
1
Queens Regulations for the Army Para 5.327.
6-B-1
CONTENTS
exceed this level of access to PHC. PHC delivery within a deployed BG operates as a
layered network as shown in Table 6-B-2. This can be supplemented where required
by peripatetic clinics from mental health, dental (if not permanently attached),
Physiotherapy/Remedial Instructor, Genito-Urinary Medicine or Occupational Health.
Ser Role Clinical Capability

(a) (b) (c)
01 Cbt Med Tech and Provide basic PHC within strict protocols
Nurses
02 GDMO and Nurse Provide PHC on Occupational Health within the limits of their
Practitioners individual competencies.
May independently prescribe under the supervision of a
General Practitioner.
May supervise Cbt Med Tech or Nurses.
PY
03 RMO Provides the full range of PHC and Occupational Health
required of a military population.
Supervises all PHC providers within the BG.
O
Fig 6-B-2 Primary Health Care Capability within a BG
C
c. Pre-Hospital Emergency Care (PHEC). In medical emergencies and following
trauma, effective early interventions have a dramatic positive effect on long-term
ED
survival and residual disability. PHEC within the BG is delivered through a layered
approach, based on 10-1-2 Guidelines2, starting at the Point of Injury (PoI) as shown in
Table 6-C-6.
LL
Ser Time Clinical Capability Delivered by

(a) (b) (c) (d)
01 POI All military personnel should be trained in basic first All
O
0 aid (MATT3) and Care Under Fire (CUF) drills.

min
TR
02 <10 Provide life & limb saving interventions in the first 10 Team Medic
mins mins following battlefield trauma.
03 Provide life & limb saving interventions in the first 10 Cbt Med Tech
N
mins in a broader range of clinical scenarios.

04 < 60 Advanced resuscitation. Role 1 Treatment
O
mins Team
05 Higher level of advanced resuscitation. MERT-E
C
Table 6-B-3 PHEC Capability within a BG

N
d. Deployed Hospital Care (DHC). The laydown of DHC at the operational level is
U
configured to maximise freedom of manoeuvre of BG at the tactical level. The clinical

ideal is to evacuate casualties requiring life-saving surgery (or medical intervention) to
a hospital facility (Role 2 Enhanced (Role 2E)/Role 3) in under 60 mins from the time
of injury. This may be extended, at increasing risk balanced against clinical need, up
to 120 mins; thereafter the risk of death or long-term disability increases dramatically.
Where there is a risk these timelines may be exceeded, a forward surgical facility
(Role 2 Light Manoeuvre (Role 2LM)) may be deployed forward; however such
facilities have restricted clinical capability, very limited capacity & sustainability and no
holding capability and therefore involve clinical risk.
2
10 mins to Life Saving First Aid; 1 hour to Advanced Resuscitation; 2 hours (ideally 1 hour) to Damage
Control Surgery.
6-B-2
CONTENTS
e. Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC). The clinical ideal is for a casualty to be

moved, with the appropriate medical escort, directly from POI to DHC by the quickest
possible means (this may not necessarily be by air). However, in reality, such a single
move is often not possible and the MEDEVAC pathway will need to balance speed,
physical safety and clinical care, whilst seeking to maximise freedom of manoeuvre for
the BG. The most appropriate pathway will be highly dynamic and involves significant
variables including clinical (e.g. number, nature, severity and flow of casualties);
environmental (e.g. terrain, weather, light), tactical (e.g. threat) and political (e.g. risk
tolerance) factors. In a complex FCOC environment, these factors may vary in time
and space across the BG AO. There are three types of evacuation that may occur
within the BG AO:
PY
(1) Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC). CASEVAC is the movement of
casualties to the first point of professional medical care. Whilst often a tactical
necessity, CASEVAC should be minimised or, ideally, avoided altogether.
O
(2) Forward MEDEVAC. Forward MEDEVAC is the evacuation of casualties
to DHC and requires a professional medical escort and a designated
C
MEDEVAC platform. Normally the BG will be responsible for Fwd MEDEVAC to
the A1 Echelon and the Med Regt will be responsible for onward MEDEVAC to
ED
the DHC.
(3) Tactical MEDEVAC. Tactical MEDEVAC takes place further in the chain
and is the transfer of stabilised casualties between echelons of DHC. This
LL
would only occur within a BG where a Role 2LM is deployed forward.

O
f. Medical Logistics. Medical resupply to a BG will normally be via the single

supply chain through the BG. Whilst the volume of medical materiel may be small,
TR
there may be occasions where resupply of certain items is critical. Furthermore there
are often specific constraints on the handling medical materiel (e.g. security of
controlled drugs; temperature control storage, disposal etc). Consequently the BG
N
must have a system to ensure such requirements are identified and adhered to.
O
g. Medical C4IRM. The BG must be prepared to support health surveillance,

remote clinical supervision & advice to healthcare providers, intelligent tasking and
C
monitoring the status of medical facilities.

N
2. Other Medical Support Considerations.

U
a. Secondary Roles of AMS Personnel. AMS personnel are expected to

undertake secondary duties. However, these must comply with their legal constraints
as non-combatants and must not prevent them from performing their primary duties if
required.
b. CBRN. Handling of casualties arising from CBRN attacks will put severe strains
on the BG medical system and it may be necessary to assign non-medical personnel
to assist in casualty handling and decontamination.
6-B-3
CONTENTS
c. The Red Cross. The wearing of the Red Cross by entitled personnel should be
considered mandatory3 unless the tactical situation presents a specified risk for
medical personnel. In such circumstances the BG Comd, with input from the RMO
and Med Regt CO, may direct the temporary concealment of the Red Cross (except
where medical personnel are treating civilians or handling CPERS when the Red
Cross should be displayed at all times). However, any concealment of the Red Cross
removes the protected status of medical personnel under International Law.
d. Self Defence.
(1) Medical Personnel. Medical personnel are permitted to carry “light

individual weapons” for the purpose of necessary self-defence. Light individual
weapons are personal weapons such as sub-machine guns, self-loading rifles,
PY
and handguns. In no circumstances should UK medical personnel use heavier
weapons whilst wearing a protective emblem.
(2) Medical Personnel And Patients In Ambulances. Signatory nation
O
ambulances displaying the Red Cross are protected under the Geneva
Convention from attack by the forces of other signatory nations. The individuals
C
operating such platforms are permitted to carry light individual weapons for their
own self defence and for the defence of those in their care, but those platforms
ED
must not carry a mounted weapon system. Where a threat exists from non-
signatory states or actors, commanders are empowered to remove the Red
Cross insignia and to fit a mounted weapon system for the protection of that
platform and those within their care. Such a platform is no longer recognisable
LL
as an ambulance and users lose their protected status. Under no

circumstances may the Red Cross emblem be displayed on an ambulance
O
platform at the same time as a weapon system is mounted on it. It should be

stressed that the provision and use of such arms must only be for defensive
TR
purposes, and the Rules of Engagement issued to armed medical personnel

must reflect these limited purposes, as should their training.
N
e. Eligibility of Care. Treatment of civilians and others is laid down in the Theatre
Medical Eligibility Matrix. Any questions regarding the Medical Eligibility Matrix should
O
be referred to the medical chain of command.

C
N
U
3
NATO/IRC entitlement
6-B-4
CONTENTS
ANNEX C
TO CHAPTER 6
TO BG TACTICS
EQUIPMENT SUPPORT
ARMD INFANTRY BRIGADE
1. Armd CS Bn REME Bn HQ. The CO of the REME Armd CS Bn has OPCOM of the
sub-units including the LAD. Commander ES has OPCOM of the Bn and other supporting
Formation Level ES assets deployed. The REME Armd CS Bn is likely to be placed
TACOM to its supported Armd Inf Bde for all operational definitions. For specific
operations, it may be placed OPCON to the brigade.
PY
2. REME Armd CS Bn Structure. A REME Armd CS Bn provides intimate Level 3 ES
and Level 2 reinforcement of LADs in support of a brigade. Its structure allows the
O
decentralisation of resources and assets, which combined with the deployment of robust
Command and Control (C2) systems, minimises logistic drag and maximises the ES
C
options available to the CO and Comd ES to support the brigade plan. ES capabilities are
by company type and where applicable subdivided into key platoon
capabilities. ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
Fig 6-C-1 -Armd Close Support Battalion REME

N
a. Bn HQ. The Bn HQ provides C2 capability to direct the overall ES effect

U
delivered by the REME Armd CS Bn supporting the brigade. It also provides an ES

planning and if deemed necessary CSS planning1 capability for its supported brigade
HQ. Bn HQ is the C2 building block for additional ES capabilities which may be task
organised to the REME CS Bn for operations. The Bn HQ is structured so that it can
plan and execute operations concurrently including independent ES Manoeuvre in a
non permissive environment. It is equipped with armd vehicles to afford protection
throughout the battlespace to enable it to be best located to execute its command
function. The Bn HQ has the capability to command a CSS grouping in support of
small scale complex intervention operations.
1
For supporting simple and complex operations a CSS Group may be established comprising ES, Log and Medical sub-
units, commanded by one of the unit HQs.
6-C-1
CONTENTS
b. Armd Coy. The role of the Armd Coy is to provide both forward Level 3 ES
capability to the supported brigade and Level 2 reinforcement of LADs. Each REME
Armd CS Bn has two Armd Coys, which provide forward support to the formation
units/BGs. The Armd Coys deliver ES effect through repair and recovery of battle
winning equipment. In addition, through the use of FRTs, they provide reinforcement
of LADs, in support of the brigade commander’s ME. In general Armd Coys deliver
Subsequent Mission Effect (normally tasks should not exceed 12 hours); by
reinforcement through FRTs. Armd Coys also assist LADs in delivering In Mission
and Inter Mission Effect. Specifically, Armd Coys contribute to delivery of ES effect
through:
(1) Conducting forward Level 3 repair by replacement of Power Packs (PP),

Engines and Main Assemblies (E&MA) and Line Replacement Units (LRU), by
PY
FRTs in support of battle winning equipments.
(2) Level 3 ES and Level 2 reinforcement to brigade units and CS/CSS

affiliated units.
O
(3) Provision of armoured and wheeled recovery in support of specific Bde
C
and BG tactical operations.
(4)
ED
Commanding the brigade level ECCPs, as required.
(5) Expedient repair of battle winning equipments.

LL
(6) Provision of Level 2 ES reinforcement of BGs, by FRTs, to contribute to In

Mission Effect at unit level.
O
c. Fd Coy. The role of the Fd Coy is to provide depth Level 3 ES capability to the
TR
supported Bde and Level 2 reinforcement to LADs. In general, the Fd Coy

contributes to the delivery of ES effect through:
N
(1) Provision of Level 3 Repair of equipment in the BSG area, including

equipment back loaded from the Armd Coys and the Level 2 ES supporting the
O
REME CS Bn’s own equipment.

C
(2) Control of PP and LRU assets and resupply of Armd Coys.

N
(3) Execution of the Regeneration Loop between the REME FS Bn’s Fd Coy
and the REME CS Bn, including the resupply of the REME CS Bn from the FS
U
Fd Coy.
(4) Leading the provision of Intimate Level 2 ES within the BSG, through
FRTs.
(5) Controlling the Bde BLP.
3. Support to the LATF. The Armd CS Bn REME supports the deployment of the Lead
Armoured Task Force (LATF) with an augmented Armd Coy. The Armd Coy provides its
core Level 3 and Level 2 reinforcement roles. It also provides ES Mat through
augmentation from the Armd CS Bn’s RLC Stores Tp. The Armd Coy deploys as part of a
CSS Group comprising Log, ES and Med capabilities under the command of a CSS unit
6-C-2
CONTENTS
HQ; this HQ could be provided by the Armd CS Bn. Force Level repair capabilities from
the FS Bn REME will be commanded by the CSS Group.
4. Off Platform Repair. The Off Platform Repair (OPR) capability is drawn from the FS
Bn REME. It is force level repair conducted in order to both regenerate sub-systems of
PPs and LRUs by replacement of their subsystems and to replenish the Forward Repair
Pool (FRP). The failed sub-system is replaced at or near the point of failure from a fit FRP
stock by FRTs from REME Bns. These sub-systems are then returned to the Fd Coy via a
regeneration loop for repair and subsequently to restock the FRP. Each Fd Coy contains a
Power Pack Platoons (PP Pl) and an Electronics Platoon (Elec Pl) which are structured to
provide OPR. The OPR capability supports current armoured vehicle systems, control
systems, communications equipment and specialist electronic capabilities by means of:
PY
a. Power Pack Regeneration. Operating a PPRF system providing OPR
capability to regenerate PPs currently in service, with the flexibility to support future
equipment. A failed PP or assembly is delivered to the Fd Coy, via the ES
Regeneration loop, from the REME Armd CS Bn supporting the Armd Inf Bde. The
O
PP Pl regenerates the PP, by splitting the engine and gearbox and replacing the
failed subsystem. The PP is then rebuilt and tested before being released as fit to
C
restock the FRP. Commander ES and his staff control release of the fit PPs to a
REME Armd CS Bn. The Fd Coy’s RLC Stores Section, using the normal supply
ED
chain, demands replacement Engines and Major Assemblies (E&MAs) and spares
from the UK to support regeneration. REME retains one military PP Platoon with
sponsored reserves and contractors providing PP repair after Roulement 1 of an
LL
enduring operation.
b. Specialist Repair And Electro-Optical LRU Regeneration. The Elec Pl is

O
employed to sustain the physical component of fighting power by screening,

diagnosing and repairing electro-optical systems for battle winning equipments. The
TR
Elec Pl in each Fd Coy has the capability to repair in-service communications,

control/weapon systems, optronic/sighting systems as well as the plethora of
specialist electronic capabilities (such as B-ISTAR, ECM, C-IED). LRU repair follows
N
the same process as that for PPs. If diagnosis reveals No Fault Found (NFF), the
LRU is returned directly to the fit FRP stock. BOWMAN repair is provided by
O
contractor from Roule 4 of an enduring operation.

C
5. Regeneration Loop C2. The LCC Commander ES controls the regeneration loop.
The REME Armd CS Bn owns the resources required to execute the regeneration loop,
N
allowing the REME Armd CS Bn to pull the loop forward and hence increase
responsiveness to brigade usage and tempo. There is a direct correlation between the
U
length of the regeneration loop and the FRP stocks required.
6-C-3
CONTENTS
PY
O
C
Fig 6-C-2 – FRP Regeneration Loop Bde Level Operations
INFANTRY BRIGADE ED
6. REME CS Bn. As Per Armd CS Bn discussed in Para 1 a.
LL
7. REME CS Bn Structure. The Adaptable Force (AF) is supported by two REME CS
Bns which are structured to support enduring stabilisation operations. Each CS Bn has
two Fd Coys that deliver ES effect through repair and recovery of battle-winning
O
equipment. The CS Bn is optimised to support enduring stabilisation operations but needs

to also be prepared to support the AF tasks of upstream capacity building and UK
TR
resilience operations. It provides intimate Level 3 ES and Level 2 reinforcement of LADs

in support of a Bde. Its structure allows the decentralisation of resources and assets,
which combined with the deployment of robust Command and Control (C2) systems,
N
minimises logistic drag and maximises the ES options available to the CO and
Commander ES to support the brigade commander’s plan. ES capabilities are by
O
company type and where applicable sub divided into key platoon capabilities. The AF CS
Bns are structured to support wheeled formations. Given sufficient warning times the CS
C
Bn can be restructured to support AI Bdes; but would need to be either reinforced by the
N
RF or retrained to provide the required level of competence on armoured vehicle systems.

U
6-C-4
CONTENTS
PY
O
Fig 6-C-3 - Close Support Battalion REME
C
a. Bn HQ. The Bn HQ provides C2 capability to direct the overall ES effect
delivered by the REME CS Bn supporting the brigade. It also provides an ES
ED
planning and if deemed necessary CSS planning, capability for its supported Bde
HQ. Bn HQ is the C2 building block for additional ES capabilities which may be task
organised to the REME CS Bn for operations. The Bn HQ is structured so that it can
LL
plan and execute operations concurrently, but it will require reinforcement to be able
to plan and execute independent ES manoeuvre in a non permissive environment.
O
b. Fd Coy. The role of the Fd Coy is to provide both forward Level 3 ES capability
to the supported Bde and Level 2 reinforcement of LADs. Each REME CS Bn has
TR
two Fd Coys, which provide forward support to the formation units/BGs. Fd Coys
deliver ES effect through repair and recovery of battle winning equipment. In
addition, through the use of FRTs, they provide reinforcement of LADs, in support of
N
the brigade commander’s ME. In general, the Fd Coy contributes to the delivery of
ES effect through:
O
(1) Conducting forward Level 3 repair by FRTs in support of battle winning

C
equipments.
N
(2) Level 3 ES and Level 2 reinforcement to Bde units and CS/CSS affiliated
units.
U
(3) Provision of wheeled recovery support in support of specific Bde and BG

tactical operations.
(4) Commanding the Bde Level ECCPs, as required.
(5) Expedient repair of battle winning equipments.
(6) Provision of Level 2 ES reinforcement of BGs, by FRTs, to contribute to In

Mission Effect at Unit Level.
6-C-5
CONTENTS
(7) Provision of Level 3 Repair of equipment in the Bde Support Group (BSG)
area, including equipment back loaded from the Armd Coys and the Level 2 ES
supporting the REME CS Bn’s own equipment.
(8) Leading the provision of Intimate Level 2 ES within the BSG, through
FRTs.
(9) Controlling the Bde BLP.
PY
O
C
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
N
U
6-C-6
CONTENTS
ANNEX D
TO CHAPTER 6
TO BG TACTICS
CAPTURED PERSONS (CPERS)
This section must be read in conjunction with the current edition of JDP 1-10,
Captured Persons (CPERS) and any mission specific orders/policy.
1. General. During the course of military operations UK Armed Forces must be

prepared to capture, detain or hold individuals for a wide variety of reasons. The treatment
of these individuals is of critical importance, not only from a legal and policy perspective
but also in terms of maintaining the legitimacy of the operation. The proper handling and
PY
treatment of CPERS is an essential element of campaign authority, which is itself a
condition for long term success.
O
2. Introduction. JDP 1-10 Captured Persons is the capstone UK doctrine publication
for all captured persons (CPERS) activities and must be followed. It provides clear and
C
detailed guidance on treatment standards as well as command and staff responsibilities,
planning, reporting and monitoring requirements. The Annexes to the various chapters
ED
contain Aide Memoires, Guidance Cards, Planning Yardsticks and sample Documentation
for use at the planning phase, through all stages of the CPERS handling chain from Point
of Capture to Release or Transfer.
LL
3. CPERS. The term CPERS covers all individuals who are captured and held by UK
Armed Forces on operations overseas whether prisoners of war, internees or detainees.
O
Irrespective of the category, UK and international law requires that all CPERS must be
treated humanely at all times.
TR
4. Responsibility and Governance. CPERS handling requires firm command,

leadership and a strong commitment to treating individuals humanely. BG activity covers
the highest risk areas for potential abuse and it is essential that the commander’s
N
expression of intent and an instilled ethos of individual and collective responsibility, backed
O
up by firm discipline, is used to deter destructive behaviour. Commanders must ensure

that all personnel under their command are fully aware of the obligations to treat CPERS
C
humanely and of the prohibition on torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment

including the Five Prohibited Techniques. These prohibitions must be stated in the
N
operational directives and regulations and in unit standing orders which are to be
displayed and available to all UK Armed Forces; particularly those working within CPERS
U
facilities1.
THE FIVE PROHIBITED TECHNIQUES
5. The Five Prohibited Techniques2 must never be used as an aid to tactical questioning
or interrogation, as a form of punishment, discriminatory conduct, intimidation, coercion or
as deliberate mistreatment. They are:
1
JDP 1-10 Ch 2 Annex 2A Guidance on Standing Orders
2
Whilst not in JDP 1-10, the taking of trophy photographs should also be prohibited.
6-D-1
CONTENTS
a. Stress Positions. Any physical posture which a CPERS is deliberately

required to maintain will be a stress position if it becomes painful, extremely
uncomfortable or exhausting to maintain.
b. Hooding. Placing a cover, including a sandbag, over a CPERS head and face.
HOODING IS PROHIBITED AT ANY TIME, FOR WHATEVER PURPOSE
c. Subjection to Noise. Holding a CPERS in an area where there is unnecessary

excessive noise.
d. Deprivation of Sleep and Rest. Depriving a CPERS of the minimum

requirement of sleep and rest.
PY
e. Deprivation of Food and Water. Depriving a CPERS of the minimum
requirement of food and water.
O
6. Handling, Tactical Questioning (TQ) and Interrogation. There is a fundamental
difference between the handling of captured persons and the questioning and interrogation
C
of such individuals. CPERS Handling describes all aspects of dealing with persons who
fall into the hands of UK Armed Forces during operations. Tactical Questioning is the
ED
obtaining of information from captured or detained persons, the value of which would
deteriorate or be lost altogether if the questioning was delayed. Interrogation is the
systemic longer term questioning of a selected individual by a trained and qualified
LL
interrogator. To reflect this distinction, handling and questioning activities are subject to
separate doctrine and training. Tactical Questioning and Interrogation (TQ & I) must only
ever be conducted by specially trained, qualified and ‘in date’ TQ & I experts, who have
O
been properly authorised to engage in such activity.

TR
7. Advice on CPERS. As detailed above, JDP 1-10 Captured Persons addresses the
entire range of CPERS issues likely to be encountered by UK forces across the spectrum
of military operations. CPERS handling on operations will be subject to specified SOIs
N
and SOPs. Commanders should also seek advice from Army Legal Services and/or the
Royal Military Police and/or Military Provost Staff who are available to assist both in
O
advance of, and during, CPERS handling operations.

C
N
U
6-D-2
CONTENTS
PY
O
C
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
N
U
Fig 6-D-1 Captured Persons Handling – Potential Abuse Incident Risk Indicator
Matrix
6-D-3
CONTENTS
PY
O
C
ED
LL
O
TR
N
Fig 6-D-2 Commanders Guide to Governance and Risk Throughout the CPERS
O
Handling Chain
C
8. CPERS Handling Reference Guidance (see JDP 1-10 for detail)

N
a. Planning for CPERS Activity. (see JDP 1-10 Ch 6) Failure to adequately

plan and resource for CPERS at an early stage can severely impact operational
U
effectiveness. The CPERS estimate requires input from all areas of the HQ to
ensure that operational tempo can be maintained.
b. Training for CPERS Tasks. (see JDP 1-10 Ch 5) Commanders will be held
accountable for ensuring their units are adequately trained to conduct CPERS
handling including assessment and selection of appropriate personnel to deal with
CPERS.
c. Minimum Standards of Treatment. (see JDP 1-10 Ch 2) All CPERS must be

treated humanely at all times and are entitled to respect for their person, honour and
religion. CPERS must not be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or violence in any form.
6-D-4
CONTENTS
(1) CPERS must be provided with the following to the same levels as UK
forces:
(a) Protection. From the dangers of conflict and the environment.
(b) Sustainment. Accommodation, water, food (three meals a day), and

medical care.
(2) CPERS must be allowed to:
(a) Rest for 8 hours per 24 (including one unbroken period of 4 hours).
PY
(b) Exercise one hour per day in the open air.
(c) Observe their religious practices.
O
(d) Complain about their treatment.
C
(e) Communicate with the ICRC.
ED
If personnel cannot ensure minimum standards within resources, they must
request help from the chain of command.
LL
No photographs or video unless authorised for official purposes.
d. Individual, Collective and Command Responsibility (See JDP 1-10 Ch 4).

O
(1) Detention Officer. Each battlegroup should have a detention officer (see
TR
JDP 1-10, Para 428).
(2) Unit Holding Officer. All Unit Holding Areas (UHA) must have an
N
appointed UHO (See JDP 1-10, Para 429).

O
(3) Detention Sergeant. (As defined in JDP 1-10, Para 430).

C
All members of the unit must receive training and education in the law
applicable to dealing with captured or detained persons.
N
e. Determining the Status of CPERS. (See JDP 1-10 Ch 1). The determination
U
of an individual’s status is the process by which UK Armed Forces will establish the
additional protection and privileges to which the individual is entitled, and therefore
resource the requirement.
f. Information Management & Record Keeping. (See JDP 1-10 Ch 3, 5, 7, 9,

12, 13). Numerous documents will be raised during the detention process and it is
vital that throughout that process and beyond, they remain easily accessible to
ensure we are complying with our international and domestic legal obligations.
g. Multinational Issues, Transfers & Release. (See JDP 1-10 Ch 12). Captured
persons must only be released into a safe environment and must not be transferred
6-D-5
CONTENTS
to the custody of any other nation (including the Host Nation) unless specifically
authorised by the Detention Authority.
h. Medical Matters. (See JDP 1-10 Ch 3). Medical support must be provided
with impartiality. There shall be no discrimination on grounds of race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion. Medical care provided must be ethical
and comply with best practice.
i. Movement of CPERS. (See JDP 1-10 Ch 8). Moving Captured Persons

(CPERS) between locations constitutes the highest risk of all the various CPERS
handling activities. Escorts must be thoroughly briefed on their task, clearly
understand their Rules of Engagement and the degree of force they may exercise to
prevent the escape of CPERS.
PY
j. CPERS Handling Chain. (See JDP 1-10 Ch 7). Once a person has been
captured, the priorities are to: disarm; search; guard; evacuate through the PH chain;
and document. Tactical Questioning and Interrogation is separate to CPERS
O
handling and must only ever be carried out by suitably trained, qualified and current
personnel.
C
k. Unit Holding Area (UHA). (See JDP 1-10 Ch 6, Fig 6.2 and Ch 9). The UHA
ED
is likely to be at the forward edge of the battlefield and CPERS should be moved
along the handling chain as soon as possible to minimise risk of injury and
interference with operational tempo. Despite its temporary nature, the UHA must
LL
afford necessary protection, feeding, water and ablutions. The maximum time
CPERS should spend in the UHA is 12 hrs. Extensions to the 12 hr period must be
authorised by the detention chain of command (and ultimately the detention
O
authority).
TR
l. CPERS Property. (See JDP 1-10 Ch 7). CPERS should be allowed to retain
items that do not represent a threat to security or the safety of the individual or that
do not have evidential value, for example, clothing, personal effects and religious
N
artefacts. CPERS in possession of protective items such as helmets and body-

armour should be allowed to retain them.
O
m. Adverse Incidents and Allegations of Abuse. (See JDP 1-10 Ch 13).

C
Commanders must ensure that formal procedures are in place to deal with any
adverse incident (including death or injury) involving CPERS. Such procedures will
N
not only ensure the protection of CPERS but also ensure the protection of the UK
Armed Forces. They will also guarantee compliance with the Geneva Conventions.
U
It is therefore, essential that planning encompasses procedures, orders and plans for
UK Armed Forces to follow in the event of an adverse incident involving CPERS.
6-D-6
CONTENTS
CHAPTER 7
HOT STABILISATION
1. Overview. Security is a precondition for stability. ‘Hot Stabilisation’ refers to the

localised activities that may be required of the battlegroup immediately following MCO if a
campaign transitions to Stabilisation. It is defined the requirement to enable, and manage
the immediate consequences of military operations in populated battlespace. Whilst the
immediate tactical priority may be a war-fighting opponent, hot stabilisation seeks to
manage the threats and opportunities to campaign legitimacy from the human terrain and
acknowledges the ultimate requirement, post kinetic operations, to contribute to the
conditions for a population-centric security solution1.
2. During Hot Stabilisation the battlegroup is unlikely to be optimally task organised or
PY
equipped to execute these tasks and is unlikely to have sufficient support from other
interagency actors to develop these activities fully. Hot Stabilisation is thus directed at
setting the conditions and enabling Stabilising Actions to begin, mostly through the
O
provision of a secure environment.
C
PART 1 - ENVIRONMENT
3.
ED
Stabilising Actions. There are four Stabilising Actions:
a. Framework Security.
LL
b. Security Sector Reform and Military Capacity Building.

O
c. Support to the Delivery of Essential Services.

TR
d. Support to Governance, Economic Development and Reconstruction.
4. The Challenges. The most immediate challenges facing a battlegroup commander

will be:
N
O
a. Campaign Transition. Recognition that the campaign has transitioned from

MCO to ‘hot stabilisation’ may not be immediately apparent. The boundaries
C
between the two will be blurred at the tactical level and may occur sporadically and
unexpectedly across the battlegroup area of operations. Indicators are likely to be a
N
ceasefire or surrender of enemy forces, an increase in population movements and

requests for assistance, and a reduction in violence or the threat of violence directed
U
at the battlegroup by an enemy force There will not necessarily be a reduction in

other forms of violence, for example criminal, or terrorist initiated violence.
b. Command Compression. The boundaries between the tactical and

operational levels of command are likely to be compressed during ‘hot stabilisation’ in
several ways. Joint effects such as ISTAR, SF, Aviation and Offensive Support may
be placed under command or control of the battlegroup for specific operations.
Interagency activities to initiate development, governance and rule of law
programmes or deliver strategic or political influence objectives will require
battlegroup support if they are to be successful. Command responsibilities and
1
Resetting for Contingency in the Land Environment; a joint paper by DFD and DLW dated April 2013
7-1
CONTENTS
demands will both compress and may also broaden concurrently. The battlegroup
will increasingly become the supporting rather than the supported organisation.
c. Legal Ambiguities. During the transition the legal framework of the state may
not have re-asserted itself sufficiently and there may be a judicial vacuum or a state
of legal uncertainty which will be filled by a combination of national, international and
local laws.
d. Establishing a Secure Environment. Establishing a secure environment in

which other stabilisation and development activities can flourish is likely to be the
primary roll of the battlegroup. This will require a change from an approach that
emphasises maintaining the battlegroup’s own security and exploiting opportunities
to employ violence to defeat an enemy threat, to one where the security of local
nationals takes primacy. Restraint and a more centralised control of fires by the
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battlegroup chain of command will characterise such operations. The exact
approach will differ according to circumstance but is likely to include tasks such as:
O
(1) Imposing Rule of Law. This may be required in the absence of a viable
indigenous or international police force or other forms of implementing law and
C
order which are accepted by the population, for example tribal law. This will
require clarification of the legal framework under which the battlegroup will
ED
operate, the powers delegated to it and the legal and corrections processes for
dealing with perpetrators. Curfews and riot control measures should be
considered where violence is in danger of escalation.
LL
(2) Separation of Forces. Regular or irregular forces may still seek to

resolve their difference through violence against each other which threatens the
O
security of local nationals and civilian agencies. The battlegroup may be

required to separate such forces by a mix of interposition, deterrence,
TR
interdiction and negotiation. Communication and coordination will be required

with all parties. Marking of boundaries and arrangements for dealing with
intentional and unintentional infringements will be required.
N
(3) Protection of Critical National Infrastructure. A breakdown in the rule

O
of law leading to increased criminality may require urgent local responses to

protect critical national infrastructure until rule of law can be re-imposed.
C
Defending or guarding communications, power and water installations may be

necessary in the short term. The generation and organisation of local security
N
forces to relieve own troops from static guarding tasks will be necessary in
order to avoid becoming fixed and unresponsive as a result of such tasks.
U
“Another surprising phenomenon was the degree to which the population resorted to systematic looting of
every movable item of public infrastructure that they could get their hands on. A backlash against the
Ba’ath party had been expected, and damage to public buildings associated with party infrastructure was
predictable, but the looting of hospitals, orphanages and other such public buildings surprised not only
ourselves but a large number of the population. This looting had the effect of slowing progress in getting
infrastructure up and running in the aftermath of the warfighting.
Brig A J Bradshaw OBE Comd 7 Armd Bde Op Telic
(4) Intelligence Operations. Attacks against civilians is a favoured tactic by

an enemy force seeking to undermine the legitimacy of state sponsored forces.
7-2
CONTENTS
Early opportunities may be present during ‘hot stabilisation’ to gather significant

amounts of raw intelligence on organisations and individuals who might present
a threat to the mission. Opportunities to gather, process and if necessary act
on such intelligence should be taken in order to disrupt the formation of
opposition groups in order to deny them the opportunity to thrive.
(6) Civil Military Operations Centre (CMOC). A CMOC is likely to be set up

to allow greater cooperation between civil and military authorities. Although the
battlegroup will not be required to man it, it may be established in their AO.
d. Boundaries. Where possible military areas of operation should be established

with contiguous boundaries aligned to existing national, regional, governmental and
police boundaries which will help the re-establishment of normality. If boundaries
have to be different then consider using tribal/ethnic boundaries or ceasefire lines,
PY
but advice from POLAD and LEGAD as well as IOs and NGOs will be required to
ensure that unwanted precedence is not set that will be detrimental to the long term
stability of the region or the campaign.
O
5. Understanding the Issues. During Hot Stabilisation the battlegroup commander will
C
need detailed knowledge of his area of operations and the information and intelligence
required to improve his understanding of the situation. If no uniform method of collecting
ED
that data has yet been implemented, the commander will have to determine what
indicators are likely to give him the answers he needs. A simple framework assessment
can help solve the initial understanding gaps. Getting locals to answer four questions and
analysing the answers will help him gain an understanding of the situation, determine the
LL
most pressing needs of the community and help prioritise scare resources. The four
questions are:
O
a. Has the population of the area (village, town, suburb) changed in the last
TR
twelve months? Understanding population movement is crucial to understanding

the operational environment. Population movement often provides a good indicator
of changes in relative stability. People usually move when deprived of security or
social well-being. The sudden arrival of displaced civilians can produce a
N
destabilizing effect if the operational area lacks sufficient capacity to absorb them or
O
if there is local opposition to their presence.

C
b. What are the greatest problems facing the area (village, town, suburb)?
Providing the local populace with a means to express problems helps to prioritize
N
and focus activities appropriately. The local populace is able to identify their own
problem areas, thus avoiding mistaken assumptions by the intervening forces. This
U
procedure does not solicit needs and wants, but empowers the people to take
ownership of the overall process.
c. Who is trusted to resolve the problems? Identifying the individuals or

institutions most trusted to resolve local issues is critical to understanding
perceptions and loyalties. Responses may include the host-nation government, a
local warlord, international forces, a religious leader, or other authority figure. This
question also provides an indication of the level of support for the host-nation
government, a key component of stability. This often serves as a measure of
effectiveness for stability tasks. It also identifies key informants who may assist with
vetting or help to develop messages to support information engagement activities.
7-3
CONTENTS
d. What should be done first to help the area (village, town, suburb)?
Encouraging the local populace to prioritize their problems helps to affirm
ownership. Their responses form the basis for local projects and programs.
ORGANISATION
6. Re-grouping. Battlegroups may need to re-task sub units out of their primary role
in order to generate additional mass and reinforce some specialist capabilities. Re-rolling
non infantry sub units to conduct a ground holding infantry role may be required to achieve
sufficient presence across a battlegroup AO. Drivers, medics, combat engineers
logisticians and intelligence analysts may need to be centralised. A1 Echelon is likely to
be a supported, rather than supporting element and may be regularly employed on the
battlegroup main effort.
PY
7. Augmentation. During ‘hot stabilisation’ the battlegroup may be augmented with
additional personnel and capabilities. A layout of an augmented battlegroup is at Figure
7-1 below. Typical augmentation personnel include:
O
a. Cultural Advisor (CULAD). The CULAD advises the battlegroup commander
C
and his staff on cultural norms and practices of the host nation to further Key Leader
Engagement (KLE) activities and assist the battlegroup in understanding the
ED
environment in which they are operating. He is a key member of the battlegroup
planning team and can be used as a Red Team player offering contrary views of
operations from the HN aspect.
LL
b. Political Advisor (POLAD). While normally held at brigade or divisional level

the POLAD may be task organised with a battlegroup for specific missions or
O
activities. He is responsible for advising on aspects of UK defence policy and

practice that affect decision making.
TR
c. Legal Advisor (LEGAD). The LEGAD is usually a military lawyer, normally

held at brigade or divisional level but may be task organised with a battlegroup for
specific missions or activities. He is responsible for offering legal advice on matters
N
involving international or humanitarian law including LOAC. He is often used as part

O
of the dynamic targeting process.

C
d. Stabilisation Advisor (STABAD). The STABAD is either a serving officer or

warrant officer from the Security Assistance Group (SAG) or a deployed civilian
N
expert from the Stabilisation Unit2. He is responsible for advising the battlegroup
commander and integrating cross government stabilisation strategies and
U
programmes into battlegroup planning. He is a key member of the battlegroup

planning staff.
e. Royal Engineers Search Advisor (RESA). The RESA advises the battlegroup
commander on the employment of specialist search capabilities, such as the Royal
Engineers Search Team (REST) or the All Arms Search Teams and is part of the BGE
party.
2
The Stabilisation Unit is a tri departmental (FCO, MoD, DFID) unit charged with delivering stabilisation effects in support of HMG
Foreign, Defence and Development policy and programmes.
7-4
CONTENTS
f. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Operator. The EOD Operator advises

the battlegroup commander on the destruction or exploitation of explosive ordnance
and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). He deploys with an EOD team and
equipment to conduct EOD operations within the battlegroup area of operations.
g. Stabilisation Response Team (SRT). The SRT is deployed with the

battlegroup by the Security and Assistance Group. It is responsible for identifying,
planning and resourcing tactical stabilisation programmes that support or are
supported by battlegroup operations. The SRT normally works to the STABAD.
h. Combat Camera Team (CCT). The CCT is deployed by the Media Advisory
Group. It deploys with the battlegroup to record video and voice data that supports
media operations. It is often tasked by media staff within either the brigade or
division.
PY
i. Tactical Psyops Team (TPT). The TPT normally deploys to conduct discrete
Psychological Operations within the Battlegroup area of operations. This may
O
include messaging, information campaigns and target audience analysis. TPTs are
normally tasked by brigade or divisional staff.
C
j. Base ISTAR Operators. Base ISTAR operators deploy to provide dedicated
ED
ISTAR to patrol bases and forward operating bases. They may be military personnel
specifically trained for the task, or in larger or multinational bases, they could be
civilian contractors.
LL
k. Female Engagement Teams. Female Engagement Teams are deployed to

assist the force in improving the interaction with and welfare of the female population.
O
l. Military Working Dogs. Military Working Dog teams can reinforce the search
TR
capability of the force.

N
O
C
N
U
Fig 7-1- Battlegroup Configured for Transition from MCO to Hot Stabilisation
7-5
CONTENTS
8. The battlegroup headquarters could also expect to receive an increase in CIS

capability with which to manage stabilisation operations. This may include Mission Secret
CIS and specialist CIS provided by the CJIIM agencies such as FIRECREST (a Foreign
Office CIS system). They are also likely find themselves in static locations operating from
buildings of opportunity where available, until more permanent accommodation is
provided. An example of a generic layout of a battlegroup headquarters configured for
Stabilisation Operations is shown at Figure 7-2 below.
PY
O
C
ED
LL
O
Fig 7-2 Generic Layout of Battlegroup Headquarters for Stabilisation Operations

TR
9. Reserved.
N
PART 2 - FRAMEWORK SECURITY OPERATIONS

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INFORMATION ACTIVITY
C
10. Information Activity during Hot Stabilisation will refocus to place more emphasis on
engaging with local nationals and both international and UK audiences. Local national
N
consent and support will be fragile and fickle and may benefit from early interaction. Some
key considerations include:
U
a. Target Audience Analysis (TAA). TAA is conducted in order to understand

the composition, structure, motivations, cultural norms and perceptions of the target
audience and its reaction to own influence activities. These will be a mix of local
nationals, partners, proxies, and regular or irregular enemy forces. It is important to
understand and seek out those who hold the most influence within local communities,
remembering that often such people may be reluctant to reveal themselves until a
secure environment has been established.
b. Outreach and Engagement. Commanders should be careful not to promise

what cannot then be delivered (indeed in many cases under-promising in order to
over-deliver can be far more effective). Early discussions with local nationals should
7-6
CONTENTS
address the immediate needs and wants of the population rather than appealing to
longer term outcomes: remembering that longer term or vague promises of future
improvements carry little weight in post-conflict societies where the immediacy of day
to day survival is paramount.
c. Messaging. Messages should be kept simple, unambiguous and consistent –

ideally no more than three headline themes. Battlegroups must recognise that they
will quickly become engaged in a contest of narratives, in which speed, accuracy and
consistency of messaging is vital i.e. ‘first with the truth’. However, within this contest
it is inevitable that any messaging will be interpreted, accepted or rejected. ‘Lines to
Take’ and campaign themes should be regularly distributed across the battlegroup.
d. The Threat to Interlocutors. The presence of a residual, potentially dormant

enemy (or insurgent) component within the local area often enables opposing forces
PY
to identify potential ‘collaborators’ in the immediate aftermath of MCO. There is a
danger that in our enthusiasm to transition early into hot stabilisation through
activities such as Key Leader Engagement (KLE) and Quick Impact Projects (QIP)
O
(utilising the most receptive local nationals); we risk losing the individuals upon which
our enduring success will most rely. A battlegroup’s enthusiasm for outreach must
C
always therefore be balanced against the risk of early exposure of vital local assets,
and always underpinned by a thorough understanding of the local security
ED
environment.
e. Measures of Performance and Effectiveness. Any messaging must be

appropriately supported by a simple mechanism through which to measure its
LL
performance (i.e. reaching the target audience) and effectiveness (i.e. affected the
Target Audience’s behaviour – changing attitudes is irrelevant if it does not lead to a
O
change in behaviour).
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BASE SECURITY AND KEY POINT DEFENCE
11. Purpose. The purpose of Key Point defence is to provide security to a fixed locality
such as an Forward Operating Base (FOB), airstrip, logistic node, HQ, or key
N
infrastructure. In all cases the location to be guarded will be clearly defined although the
O
posture and presence of the guard force may vary. However to be effective the key point
must continue to execute its function and thus the defensive measures must be
C
coordinated closely with the personnel responsible for the operation of the site being
defended.
N
12. Protection. The continued operation of the Key Point is the most important factor in
U
its defence. Both the Key Point itself and the personnel who use it or operate it must be
protected against a range of threats. These include:
a. Direct Fire. Direct attack including small arms fire and sniper fire can be
countered by building barriers, walls, sangars and other physical screens which
should be employed to protect both the defending troops and the key point
personnel. Technical defensive measures can be incorporated into the defence such
as the siting of Base ISTAR, LEWT and weapon locating sensors. Heavy weapons
can be mounted in protected sangars.
b. Indirect Fire. Indirect fire and/or air delivered weapons should be countered by
hardened structures for those working and defending the Key Point. If that is not
7-7
CONTENTS
possible then the provision of trenches, blast walls and blast proof shelters should be
considered. Technical defensive measures could include the use of mortar locating
radar, AD assets and counter battery fire.
c. IED. IEDs are best countered by strict access control to prevent both Vehicle
Borne IEDs (VBIED) and Suicide IEDs (SIED) penetrating the base.
d. Insider Threat. Insider threats including subversion, sabotage or terrorism may

manifest themselves by physical or psychological attacks. Screening of Key Point
personnel, workers and other authorised personnel should be considered. In
addition internal security measures such as lockdown procedures, planned searches
of all areas (Op WIDEAWAKE) and safe areas for affected personnel should be
implemented.
PY
e. CBRN Attacks. Consideration should be given to wearing Individual Protective
Clothing (IPE) and erecting Collective Protection (COLPRO). Water and food must
also be protected.
O
f. Cyber Attacks. While not necessarily the remit of the defending force, cyber
C
threats to the functioning of the Key Point should be considered especially by the Key
Point personnel. Counter measures include restricting access to information and C2
ED
areas by LN, and a ban on the use of mobile phones and unofficial IT.
13. Defensive Layout. The disposition of the guarding force for Key Point defence
follows a similar design to area defence in that the guarding deploys a covering force, a
LL
main defensive force and a reserve. A typical framework for a battlegroup conducting Key
Point defence is shown at Figure 7-3 below.
O
TR
N
O
C
N
U
Fig 7-3 Framework for a Battlegroup conducting Key Point Defence
7-8
CONTENTS
14. Covering Force (CF). The role of the CF is to screen and guard the approaches to
the Key Point in order to prevent the enemy from gaining a position from which it can
attack the Key Point. Its tasks are:
a. Provide early warning and information about enemy approaches, strengths and
likely intentions.
b. Prevent enemy reconnaissance from gaining an understanding of the main

defensive positions and, ideally, the location of the defended Key Point.
c. Delay, disrupt and canalise the enemy’s advance, gaining time for the main
force to react. Ideally it will prevent the enemy from attacking the MDA.
d. Control population access to the defended locality to prevent dickers and fifth
PY
columnists from interrupting the operation of the Key Point while allowing free
passage to friendly forces and neutrals.
O
15. Conduct of the Covering Force. The CF is likely achieve its tasks by a combination
of:
C
a. The layering of ISTAR assets to assist ground force observation and a
ED
continually updated STA plan.
b. Obstacles, barriers and an integrated fires plan to slow down, canalise and
disrupt enemy approaches.
LL
c. OPs, standing patrols, framework patrolling, VCPs and defended positions

O
covering key routes in.

TR
d. A strong mobile element should be available to move to battle positions from

where it can assist the screen and fix the enemy by the use of direct fires.
e. Concealment and camouflage, which denies the enemy opportunities to build

N
up a picture of the defence.

O
f. Where actions need to be overt, such as a VCPs, they should be provided with
C
local protection and may need to be re-sited from time to time to avoid routine.
N
16. Main Defensive Force. Defensive positions should be sited to guard the immediate
approaches to the Key Point and prevent direct attack on it. They should be sited far
U
enough away from the Key Point so that enemy action does not directly threaten continued
functioning. Ideally defensive positions should have mutual support. If the length of
perimeter of the Key Point makes this impossible then defensive positions must be sited to
block the obvious approaches and strong mobile forces must be positioned in depth to
cover the gaps. All gaps between positions must be covered by observation and indirect
fire and should also be covered by OPs and patrols to prevent infiltration. Further
population control measures may need to be conducted by the main force to prevent
unauthorised access to the Key Point.
17. Reserves. The battlegroup must retain a reserve to deal with any enemy threat that
manages to penetrate both the covering force and the MDA. This might be a QRF to
bolster a defended locality, block enemy penetration of the MDA or counter-attack an
7-9
CONTENTS
enemy force that is attacking the Key Point. It should be mobile and contain sufficient
direct fire weapons to counter the likely threat. Provision of an internal QRF within the site
should also be considered.
18. Coordination. The key to any successful Key Point defence is good coordination
between the guarding force and the personnel being guarded. This ensures that those
being guarded can contribute meaningfully to their own defence and/or to react
appropriately to an attack on the Key Point. A coordination point should be established
and manned by representatives of both the guard force and the Key Point staff to
coordinate military and non-military activities for the benefit of both.
19. Further information about Key Point Defence can be found in the RAF Force
Protection Doctrine 3241.
PY
PATROLLING
20. Patrolling. Patrolling is conducted in order to dominate ground, gather information,
O
protect key infrastructure, reassure and gain the trust of the population, and support other
operations or deployed troops. Framework Patrols may be conducted by sections,
C
multiples or platoons/troops depending on the task and nature of the threat.
a.
ED
Posture. Patrolling offers a means of influencing local populations and gaining
their consent. Commanders must give careful consideration to their force posture in
terms of protection and messaging, for example berets worn rather than helmets and
camouflage cream, but patrols must be able to rapidly harden their posture if the
LL
threat dictates.
O
b. Awareness. Patrols should gain an understanding of the normal Pattern of

Life (PoL) within their AO in order to be able to spot the abnormal or sense when the
TR
mood of the population may have changed in response to an imminent threat. An

understanding of cultural norms and behaviours is critical to recognising such
abnormal behaviour.
N
c. Mounted versus Dismounted Patrolling. A balance should be struck

O
between mounted and dismounted patrolling. Mounted patrolling offers increased

speed, protection, mobility, depth and a platform to carry CSUPS, ECM and
C
additional firepower. However, dismounted patrolling enables greater interaction with

the local population and allows reassurance and local intelligence gathering to be
N
conducted. A combined foot and mobile patrol offers the greatest flexibility.
U
d. Pattern Setting. Patrols should seek to avoid setting patterns which can be
observed and exploited by an enemy. A ‘Patrol Master’ should be employed to task,
monitor and debrief patrols in order to coordinate, de-conflict and exploit patrol
activity. Patrol traces must be kept.
e. Attachments/Detachments. Patrolling is often supported by interpreters,

police, search teams, female engagement teams, Military Working Dogs (MWD) and
indigenous forces. During Hot Stabilisation patrol tasking will often be in support of
these capabilities rather than supported by them.
7-10
CONTENTS
f. Counter IED. Counter IED skills should be employed to deter or defeat a

threat. These include observation of unusual ground signs and the application of 5
and 20 metre checks during halts.
21. Route Protection. The protection of routes may be required as an own force
protection measure, to enable local populations to go about their business or to deny
freedom of movement to an enemy. Route protection operations include:
(a) VCPs. VCPs are used to control and monitor the movement of vehicles and
pedestrians in order to disrupt enemy activity. VCPs may be either permanent,
deliberate or snap. Snap VCPs may be conducted by infantry deployed by vehicle,
aviation or boat. Some of the planning considerations for VCP operations include
depth, mutual support, all round defence, mobile elements, ROE, the provision of
search and other equipment such as caltrops and signs.
PY
(b) Route Checks. Transit routes within and through a battlegroup AO must be
maintained to enable own freedom of movement and that of the population. Route
O
checks are conducted by infantry or armoured sub units with engineers in support. If
available RE Search Teams may also be employed. Route checks must be pre-
C
planned activities and subject to an IPE and Threat Assessment in order to determine
high risk areas know as Vulnerable Points or Vulnerable Areas. These must be
ED
subject to a deliberate and controlled check employing ground sign awareness and
Vulnerable Point isolation drills.
CORDON OPERATIONS
LL
22. Cordon Operations. Cordon operations are usually mounted to obtain evidence or
O
deny weapons and equipment to an enemy. They can be deliberate or hasty operations
in response to an enemy attack, where preservation of the scene and control of the
TR
incident is required. Cordon operation have four elements:
a. Confirm. First actions are to confirm the location and nature of the threat,
weaponry or equipment for which a response is required. This may be done by a
N
visual check by a patrol or using ISTAR. The incident commander then develops a
O
plan for both a cordon and an incident control point. When cordoning a suspected
IED he should consider the distance any fragmentation will travel should a detonation
C
occur and site the cordon perimeter beyond that distance.

N
b. Clear. Once the plan for the cordon has been confirmed, orders must be
issued to clear all friendly forces and local nationals within the cordon starting in the
U
centre and working outwards. Troops employed in this task must be protected where
possible by the use of armour or protective personal equipment. Civilians must be
moved to hardened shelter and then out of the cordon area as quickly as possible.
c. Cordon. The cordon should be established concurrently with the clearance of

the area. Means by which this can be done include the use of mine tape, mine
markers and sentries. The cordon perimeter should ideally be clearly marked and
observed throughout its length. Cordon sentries should face outwards, be positioned
behind cover, be mutually supporting and be able to protect themselves against local
attack. Consideration should be given to providing external mobile patrols able to
deter or disrupt an enemy and rapidly reinforce a cordon position under threat.
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CONTENTS
d. Control. Once cleared, access to the cordoned area must be controlled by

positioning Force Elements in overwatch and guarding entry/exit points to the cordon
where it crosses access routes. An Incident Control point should be established
outside of the cordon to which all responding agencies should report for briefings and
control of access. An example layout of a cordon is shown at Figure 7-4 below.
PY
O
C
ED
Fig 7-4 Example Layout of a Cordon
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STRIKE OPERATIONS
O
23. The purpose of strike operations should be to provide greater overall security for the
population by removing undesirable elements from it. This can be: to search a building or
TR
site to remove illegal weapons, sensitive material (Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE)) or
munitions; to search a building to gain evidence with which to enable an internment or
successful prosecution through the appropriate justice system; to detain an individual for
N
subsequent questioning, internment and prosecution; the exploitation of action taken or

information gained for Information Activities purposes.
O
24. Criteria for Success. The target area is likely to be non-permissive, and any cordon
C
or strike team should remain aware of the rapidity with which the insurgents can react to
operations, including: ambushes on withdrawal routes, public order incidents, indirect fire
N
attacks and any subsequent re-organisation.

U
25. Coordination. A counterinsurgent strike should not be conducted in isolation from

the wider campaign objectives. For example, strike operations might need to be
harmonised with information operations that explain the rationale for the activity.
26. Principles. The principles applicable to strike operations are:
a. Offensive Spirit. A successful strike operation will have a positive effect on

friendly forces morale; furthermore success will also stamp our own force’s authority
onto opposition groups and the wider population. Within the principle of offensive
spirit is tempo. A rapid operation, conducted with spirit and tempered aggression, will
aid the element of surprise and help dislocate the insurgent’s response, especially
7-12
CONTENTS
when supported by a timely information operation and Key Leader Engagement

(KLE).
b. Flexibility. The timeliness and quality of the intelligence feed often mean that
much of the target detail is uncertain. Enemy reactions and the potential for follow-up
from tactical questioning mean that the full task will sometimes not be confirmed until
the force is on the ground and may change at very short notice. Flexibility should be
included in the planning and embraced in the command and conduct of the operation.
c. Surprise and Security. In a hostile environment complete surprise is unlikely;

however, some relative tactical surprise will potentially dislocate the enemy forces
and thus reduce the effectiveness of their reactions. Surprise is most likely to be
achieved by deception, both physical and conceptual, and its effects will be
enhanced by aggressive action and a high tempo, thus achieving greatest security for
PY
the force. Rigorous OPSEC is essential throughout.
d. Simultaneity. In order to achieve the highest level of security and tempo the
O
operation should be planned to achieve simultaneity. The cordon and strike forces
should arrive on task at the same time, which reinforces the limited opportunity to
C
achieve surprise, and also reduces the time on task and therefore the time available
to insurgent forces to shoulder effective counter operations.
ED
e. Simplicity. Strike operations are often reactive and when involving other
agencies, have the potential to be complex, often occurring in areas where
communications are difficult. The plan should not rely on continuous
LL
communications but should instead reinforce the essentials of mission command

based around a sound but simple plan. Where junior commanders have a thorough
O
understanding of a simple scheme of manoeuvre and particularly the intent, and are
appropriately empowered, they are better able to react to the unforeseen
TR
circumstances.
f. Reserves. The use of reserves remains a sound military principle. However

unless they can be inserted in a timely and secure manner, either by armour or
N
aviation, their committal may cause greater problems then they are intended to
O
resolve. They should be held as near to the operation as possible but where they do
not become a target themselves.
C
27. Service Support. The areas in which such operations take place are often hostile.
N
Insurgent reactions can be fast and aggressive and leave very little time for reactive CSS
planning. Thus CSS should be embedded from the outset and cover the following areas:
U
a. Casualty Extraction. Casualty extraction, of both personnel and vehicles,

should be pre-planned to ensure that waiting times are minimised.
b. Detainees. The operation will almost certainly detain personnel who require
further questioning. Plans should be in place for their immediate extraction and
transport back to a secure location and then on to the base location using appropriate
restraints and means to deny them information.
28. Conduct. The normal sequence of events is:
7-13
CONTENTS
a. Find. The FIND is usually conducted by HUMINT, ISTAR or EW and then

developed into a target pack. Clearance to proceed is normally through briefing a
CONOP to Bde HQ or higher. The brief must include go/no go criteria.
b. Insertion and Cordon. Insert cordon first, either by infiltration or burst onto
the objective. Destroy or mark and avoid IEDs on route in. Lock down objective and
immediate area and plan to deal with persons who try to flee the cordon. Cordon
must face in and out and self protect in case it becomes a target. Dismount from
vehicles and give local protection. The principles of defence apply to the siting of
cordons.
c. Strike. Conducted by assault force as soon as cordon is in place. If target

goes mobile, track, hold off and re-launch once contained. Hard or soft knock is
threat dependant. Use urban skills to enter buildings and be prepared to escalate
PY
and de-escalate as the threat dictates. Consider options to utilise local SF. Preserve
evidence and detainees. Exploit on site and be prepared to re-launch onto new
objectives.
O
d. Extraction. By an alternative route which must be secured. Cover and clear
C
VP/VAs then maintain under observation and fire. Echelon force escort casualties
and CPERS. ED
29. Further details can be found in AFM Vol 1 part 10 – Countering Insurgency. Battle
Drills for a Strike Operation are at Annex A.
LL
CONVOY PROTECTION
O
30. Convoy Protection. Convoys either manoeuvre employing organic recce elements
and are able to control organic and joint fires, or they conduct moves controlled and co-
TR
ordinated by the in place force or battlespace owner. Convoys consist of five elements:
Command, Vanguard, Close Protection Group, Logistic Elements and the In Place Force.
a. Convoy Command. The convoy commander plans all aspects of the convoy
N
and commands its execution; controls ISTAR/Joint Fires/LOs and control nodes;
O
coordinates battlespace and assets with higher headquarters (brigade/task force) and
the battlespace owners.
C
b. Vanguard. The Vanguard navigates pre-planned and alternate routes;

N
identifies, clears, marks and secures VAs, VPs and RVs; conducts detailed terrain
and route analysis; and secures the gap between vanguard and main body. It should
U
operate one tactical bound ahead of the convoy main body (2 to 3 km in open
country but much closer in built up areas) and maintain constant communications
with the convoy commander. The Vanguard should be capable of employing organic
ISTAR where available.
c. Close Protection Group (CPG). The CPG provides immediate protection to

the convoy. It should be able to respond immediately to any requirement for
suppressive fire or counter attack. The CPG also controls critical points, conducts
reliefs-in-place with the vanguard at VAs/VPs as required, and supports CASEVAC
and vehicle recovery. The CPG should be capable of calling for joint fires.
d. Logistic Element. The logistic elements of the convoy carry the load.
7-14
CONTENTS
e. In Place Forces. The convoy will often be directly and indirectly supported by
in place forces as it transits through their battlespace. Battlegroups are likely to
piquet routes, clear and secure VA/VPs ahead of the convoy to aid its progress, and
provide depth protection as required. Battlespace owners will also provide enhanced
situational awareness within their own battlespace. External support is also likely to
include aviation, air and ISTAR assets.
31-33. Reserved.
PART 3 - ASSISTANCE TO SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND MILITARY CAPACITY

BUILDING
34. Operations with Local Forces. Operations with local forces present both threats
PY
and opportunities which must be considered before such operations commence.
Establishing an understanding of the relationship between local forces, the population and
other influential actors such as religious, tribal or government leaders helps to inform such
O
judgements.
C
a. Opportunities. Opportunities include enhancing the profile of own forces with
local nationals, increased opportunities to gather information and intelligence and
ED
better co-ordination of activity within the same area of operations.
b. Threats. Threats include alienation of local nationals where local forces are
perceived to be malign or a threat. This may lead to ‘insider attack’ and reputation
LL
damage by association with local forces conducting Law of Armed Conflict

infringements.
O
35. Partner or Enable. The precise relationship with local forces will depend on the
TR
degree of interoperability required by both parties and judgements over balance of

opportunities versus threats. Two models may be employed.
a. Partnering. Partnering requires a single, integrated force where local forces

N
and elements of the battlegroup align within a single structure. It requires agreement
O
of tactical objectives, tactics, techniques and procedures and may require a plentiful
supply of local interpreters. It offers opportunities for local forces, especially the
C
leaders, to improve their military skills.

N
b. Enabling. ‘Enabling’ emphasises the provision of discrete capabilities to

support local force operations, for example transport, fires or intelligence. The
U
battlegroup’s freedom to pursue complementary but not necessarily integrated

operations will be less constrained.
7-15
CONTENTS
Op HERRICK 7 – 2 YORKS – Op MAR KARADAD
The Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) BG CO would be directed by

Commander Task Force Helmand to influence the ANA towards in order to achieve a specific
effect. The CO would then brief his ANA Brigadier and outline the situation and possible
courses of action, back briefing the Task Force Commander accordingly. By the time the two
met formally (usually every fortnight), the foundations for agreement had been laid. The same
process happened in reverse, when the ANA had been tasked and needed the Task Force’s
support. A similar process was followed between the OMLT subunit commanders, who
worked with the ANA Kandak commanders.
The OMLT would invariably accompany the ANA on operations. Once an operation had been
agreed, the OMLT CO would sit down with the ANA Brigade commander, and his staff, to
produce a plan. For Op MAR KARADAD, this procedure was taken to its limit. Task Force
PY
Helmand encouraged the greatest possible involvement in the construction of the plan by the
ANA. The ANA Brigade Commander was given access to all aspects of the baseline plan and
was encouraged to amend those aspects that his forces would not be able to deliver. The
OMLT assisted in this process, mentoring the ANA and liaising with the UK Battlegroups, the
O
American Special Forces involved and other agencies, to ensure that the ANA Brigade’s
activities were resourced and coordinated with the rest of the operation. Once the operation
C
commenced the ANA were initially heavily involved and enthusiastic, but as time wore on and
the complexities became more obvious, many of the ANA Brigade staff drifted into the
background and the OMLT took on a more visible lead.
ED
36. Conduct. Techniques for the successful conduct of operations with Local Forces
include:
LL
a. Exchanging LOs.
O
b. Cross briefing capabilities, communications, tactics, techniques and procedures.

TR
c. Sharing intelligence.
N
d. Planning together.
O
e. Conducting Joint Mission Briefs.

C
f. Coordinating Battle Management.

N
g. Conducting post-patrol activity together.

U
37. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-Integration (DDR). While DDR is a pan

agency activity within the campaign, the military may be given a prominent role at certain
stages. This might include the provision of camps, the security of the personnel therein
and the storage and security of weapons. During Hot Stabilisation it may be the case that
not all the agreements on DDR are in place, which may create difficulties. For example,
there may be no change in the status of the former combatants but local commanders may
be faced with a situation where a large number of them have gathered. Some of these
may wish to be re-integrated and others may not. To leave them to their own devices may
provoke unrest and instability as could they use their weapons to intimidate local nationals
or otherwise undermine the fledgling political framework. Commanders should seek
urgent advice through their chain of command as to their responsibility in dealing with
these situations especially local disarmament. However, until the political status of DDR is
7-16
CONTENTS
finalised former combatants should be classed as CPERS and dealt with accordingly.
Commanders should consider the following:
a. Security (including local disarmament and securing of weapons.
b. Accommodation.
c. Feeding.
d. Provision of hygiene and medical services.
e. Transport.
38. For further details see JDP 3-40 Stabilisation Operations and the pamphlet
PY
Reintegration and Reconciliation Theory and Practice issued by the Warfare Development
Team, DLW. Also AFM Vol 1 Part 10 Countering Insurgency - Chapter 10 Military Capacity
Building.
O
39-40. Reserved.
C
PART 4 - SUPPORT TO THE DELIVERY OF ESSENTIAL SERVICES
ED
41. Purpose. Gaining the consent and support of local populations in the immediate
aftermath of MCO can be enhanced by activities to maintain or re-establish the delivery of
essential services, for example, electricity, water, sewerage and food delivery. Planning
LL
should address immediate requirements to restore essential services where local or

international civilian agencies are unable to do so. Such activities should be handed to a
O
civilian agency lead as soon they are able to take over. Possible tasks include:
TR
a. Clearing Debris and Improving Key Routes. Battlegroups may need to employ
engineer plant, EOD and Search teams to clear and repair arterial routes and
infrastructure damaged by own or enemy force activity.
N
b. Fixing Power Supplies. Maintaining a supply of power to local populations will

O
assist in maintaining local consent. The repair of electricity sub stations, power cables or
enabling the delivery of fuel are examples of activities to consider.
C
c. Supplying Clean Water. The provision of emergency supplies of potable water to

N
the local population may be necessary where supplies have been damaged or
contaminated by combat operations. Quick Impact Projects (QIP) to establish a
U
sustainable supply by, for example, digging bore holes should also be considered.
d. Erecting Temporary Shelters. Depending upon the severity of MCO, a large

number of Displaced Persons (DPERS) may be expected to reside within the battlegroup
AO, or to gravitate towards battlegroup locations. Although the battlegroup must avoid
becoming fixed by the presence of DPERS, due consideration should be given to the
provision of suitable shelter. Where possible, local buildings such as school halls and
warehouses should be utilised rather than committing limited battlegroup resources.
e. Delivering Humanitarian Aid. The military should consider all requests to support
the delivery of humanitarian aid where required. Consideration should be given to
whether military vehicles and manpower deliver the aid or if they act in support of the
7-17
CONTENTS
international or non-governmental organisations providing the aid. Advice should be

sought through the POLAD before agreeing to requests from outside the military chain.
Top Tip: Any action taken by the military must be sustainable by the local
government or it will raise expectations unduly and lead to tensions later in the
campaign .
PART 5- SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND

RECONSTRUCTION
42. Whilst a major part of stability operations, the line of development of support to
Governance, Economic Development and Reconstruction is likely to be relatively minor
PY
battlegroup activity in the immediate period of Hot Stabilisation. Plans for elections, the re-
constitution of a judicial system and the long term economic development and
reconstruction plan are unlikely to have been formulated or enacted at this stage of the
O
campaign. However the battlegroup should be prepared to assist where directed by its
chain of command.
C
Annexes: ED
A. Battle Drill – BG Strike Operation
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
N
U
7-18
CONTENTS
ANNEX A TO
CHAPTER 7 TO
BG TACTICS
BATTLE DRILL – STRIKE OP
Purpose Principles
 To destroy or capture enemy personnel  Seek surprise
and/or materials that are a threat to the  Maintain security
mission  Exploit manoeuvre
 May enable a subsequent BG attack or  Concentrate the effects of combat power
shape a Bde action  Plan to exploit success
 Keep it simple
Groupings and Tasks
PY
Command Firepower
O
 Prep must he confined to essentials  Considered and resourced fire support plan
 Plan must be simple but considered; flexible and  CDE/ROE/LOAC considerations
 Targeting and psychological fires
C
based on drills
 Tac well fwd in MBT/AIFV/foot  Degrade en comms/decision-making
 BG/Coy Comd mainly mounted. Pl Comds  Demonstrate/disrupt to allow negotiated entry
dismount
 Decentralise control to enable quick reaction to
ED
changing sit
 Max use of radio (SOCs) SOC orders: En;
LL
Missions/Tasks; Co-ord Instructions (H-Hr; fire
plan; FUP; Re-Org; LoE)
 Consequence management
O

 IPE – identify all VP/VA, civilian locs, targets for  Allocation of force protection FEs to CSS elms
KLE, critical vital Civ Infra  Cbt engrs/asslt pioneers att lead groupings
TR
 HUMINT  VA/VP; 5/20m checks; ‘mark and avoid’

 Pattern of Life  Combat id
 ISTAR soak  Deception to enable surprise
 Offensive EW coverage  Clear FUP/LD
N
 Dynamic STAP/fusion of feeds/opportunity  C-IED/EOD

 Re-Org (adjust atk def; dig in or disperse on obj;
O
targeting
 Assess/anticipate of effects of assault on en locs link up with WR; CSup replen; CPERS evac)
 Biometrics and Human Terrain  Secure/sustain own LoC (CASEVAC; Log)
C
 ISTAR identify poss CAttk

 Protect own FUP/routes/posns
N
 Allow enough time for BG to deploy into  Creation of grouping to protect/sustain rear,
U
positions BM and control measures vulnerable areas and routes

 Inf F+M/infil into complex terrain  Prioritisation of CSups for replen
 Dispersal of force until req to concentrate  Be prepared to deliver CSups to rear of F Ech
 Quick mov to FUP or assy area during attack
 Min time in FUP to avoid conc
 Use of res to maint momentum
7-A-1
CONTENTS
BATTLE DRILL – STRIKE OPERATION
PY
O
C
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
N
U
7-A-2
CONTENTS
INDEX
Subject Page
Advance Guard 4-1

Advance to Contact 4-26

Purpose and Principles 4-24
Conduct 4-25
Advance Guard and Main Body 4-26
Flank Guards and Reserve 4-27
PY
Sustainment 4-28
Battle Drill 4-C-1
O
Air
Air land Integration 1-25
C
Close Air Support 1-26
Close Air Support Procedures 1-H-2
Airspace Management (MUAS) ED 1-F-5
Air Superiority 3-1
Air Routes for Raid Insertion 4-39
Air Delivery of Sustainment 6-11
Air movement of Casualties (CASEVAC/MEDEVAC) 6-14
LL
Air Defence (AD)

Enemy MANPADS 1-3
O
Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) 1-20

TR
Withdrawal 5-29
March 6-24
N
Air Manoeuvre
Air Manoeuvre Infantry 1-16
O
Air Manoeuvre Planning, Training and Advisory Team (AMPTAT) 1-27

Exploitation 3-7
Approach 4-7
C
Raid 4-38
N
Considerations for Aviation Assault Operations 4-G-1

U
Amphibious Forces 1-16

Raid 4-38
Approach, The 4-7
Area Defence 5-5

Battle Drill 5-A-1
Artillery (see also Fires and Joint Fires)

Roles and Tasks 1-18
Offensive Operations 4-15
Relief in Place 5-30
Withdrawal 5-36
Index - 1
CONTENTS
Assault, The 4-13
Assault Force 4-2
Assembly Areas 4-8
Attack, The 4-4

Principles
Battle Drill 4-A-1
Aviation
Roles and Tasks 1-27
Use of Attack Helicopters 1-H-1
Aviation Cell 2-10
Raid 4-38
PY
Aviation Assault Operations 4-G-1
Replenishment by Aviation 6-11
MEDEVAC/CASEVAC 6-14
O
Axis
C
Of advance 4-24
B ED
Battlegroup 1-1
Operational Context 1-2
Organisation 1-11
LL
Combat Units 1-14

Combat Support 1-18
Combat Service Support 6-5
O
Battle Handover 5-16

TR
Battle Preparation
Offensive Action 4-5
N
Obstacle Crossing 4-30

Strike Operations 7-11
O
Battlespace Management
MUAS 1-F-5
C
BG Staff Responsibilities 2-4

N
Orchestrating Operations 3-20

Link Up Operations 4-36
U
Air Assault Operations 4-G-3

Defensive Operations 5-8
Block
Defensive Actions 5-7
Breaching Actions (Also see Crossing and Breaching Obstacles) 4-29
Breaking Contact 5-26
Break in, the 4-14
Bypassing 4-26
Index - 2
CONTENTS
Captured Persons (CPERS) 6-20, 6-D-1

CPERS Estimate 6-2
Responsibility and Governance 6-20
Unit Holding Area 6-21
Advice 6-22
CBRN
C-CBRN Reconnaissance 1-25
BG Responsibilities 2-8
Protection 3-12
Checklist 3-C-1
CBRN Casualties 6-B-3
Key Point Defence CBRN Protection 7-6
PY
Combat Identification 3-B-1
Battlespace Management 3-21
O
Combined Arms Obstacle Integration 5-7, 5-H-1
C
Command
Mission Command ED 1-8
Levels of Command 1-9
Battlegroup Operations 2-1
Command Compression 2-2
Attack 4-A-1
LL
Forward Passage of Lines 4-20, 4-B-1

Advance to Contact 4-27, 4-C-1
Obstacle Crossing 4-D-1
O
Link Up Operations 4-E-1

Raid 4-41, 4-F-1
TR
Air Assault Operations 4-G-1

Defence 5-21
Area Defence 5-A-1
N
Mobile Defence 5-B-1

Delay 5-C-1
O
Relief of Troops In Place 5-28, 5-D-1

Rearward Passage of Lines 5-32, 5-E-1
Withdrawal 5-36, 5-F-1
C
N
Commander
Position 2-1
U
Responsibilities 2-A-1
Communications
Bowman CI Plan 2-B-1
Media Communication 3-9
Communications Plan 3-16
Attack 4-A-1
Raid 4-41, 4-F-1
Conflict
Character of 1-2
Conflict and the Battlegroup 1-6
Counter Intelligence 3-1
Index - 3
CONTENTS
Counter Mobility
Engineer capabilities 1-22
Area Defence 5-5
Mobile Defence 5-12
Withdrawal 5-39
Covering Force
Light Cavalry 1-B-1
ISTAR Integration 3-A-1
Obstacle Crossing and reaching 4-D-1
PY
Covering Force Area 5-4
Covering Force Action 5-15
Delay 5-22
O
Battlegroup Movement 6-23
C
Crossing ad Breaching of Obstacles (See also Combined Arms
Obstacle Integration) ED
Overwatch by ISTAR 1-F-4, 4-30
Role of Step Up 2-7
Obstacle Crossing Drill 4-29, 4-C-1
LL
Deception
O
Deception Planning 3-11, 4-20

Offensive Operations 4-6, 4-8,
TR

Obstacle Crossing 4-31, 4-D-1
Link Up Operations 4-36, 4-E-1
N
Raid 4-43, 4-F-1

Air Manoeuvre Operations 4-G-2
O

Siting a Defensive Position 5-8
Area Defence 5-A-1
C

N
Delay 5-22, 5-C-1

Relief of Troops in Place 5-28, 5-D-1
U

Strike Operation 7-A-1
Defensive Actions
Considerations 5-1
Principles 5-1
Area Defence 5-5, 5-A-1
Planning Considerations 5-6
Mobile Defence 5-12, 5-B-1
Key Point Defence 7-
Preparation 5-14
Delay 5-22, 5-C-1
Index - 4
CONTENTS
Demolitions
Control of 5-G-1
Enabling Actions
Crossing and Breaching Of Obstacles 4-29, 4-D-1
Link Up Operations 4-36, 4-E-1
Raid 4-38, 4-F-1
Relief in Place 5-28, 5-D-1
PY
Electronic Warfare
EW Organisation 1-24,
Integration into Battlegroup Operations 1-G-1
O
ISTAR Officer Roles 2-6
Information Activities 3-9
C
Engineers
Roles and Capabilities ED 1-21
Role of BGE 2-6, 2-A-3
ISTAR Group 3-A-1, 4-1
Offensive Operations 4-1, 4-8, 4-14
LL
Obstacle Crossing 4-29,

Raid 4-39
O
Construction of Strong Points 5-10

Delay 5-25
TR
Withdrawal 5-40
Relief in Place 5-D-1
N
Exploit
Tactical Framework 3-1
O
Exploitation
By Armour 1-15
C
By AH 1-27
N
Information Exploitation 2-B-2, 3-16, 4-18

By ISTAR Group 3-7
U
By Manoeuvre 3-10
In the Attack 4-17, 4-A-1
Material & Personnel 4-18
Obstacle Crossing 4-33
Raid 4-40, 4-F-1
Counter Attack 5-20
Feint 4-1
Fight Through, the 4-15
Find
Index - 5
CONTENTS

ISTAR Integration 3-A-1
Covering Force 5-16
Fire Power (See also Artillery, Offensive Support and Joint Fires)
Raid 4-43, 4-F-1
Attack 4-A-1
Forward Passage of Lines 4-B-1
Advance to Contact 4-C-1
Obstacle Crossing and Breaching 4-D-1
Area Defence 5-A-1
PY
Delay 5-C-1
O
C
Fix ED
Flank Protection
LL
Link Up Operations 4-37

O
Forward Passage of Lines 4-20

TR
Framework
Tactical 3-1
Geographic 3-2
N
Operational 3-3
Defensive 5-5
O
Security 7-1
Patrolling 7-8
C
G
N
Ground Manoeuvre Forces

U
Reconnaissance Forces 1-14

Armoured cavalry 1-A-1
Light Cavalry 1-B-1
Armour 1-15
Armoured Infantry 1-15
Mechanized Infantry 1-C-1
Light Protected Mobility Infantry 1-D-1
Light Infantry 1-E-1
Handover Line 4-33, 4-B-1,5-16, 5-21,

5-23, 5-27, 5-33, 5-A-1,
5-B-1, 5-E-1
Index - 6
CONTENTS
Handoff (of Targets) 4-15, 4-C-1, 4-E-1, 5-

18,
Hot Stabilisation (See also Stabilising Actions)

Definition 1-7, 7-1
Sustainment 3-12
HUMINT 1-19, 2-6, 3-5, 4-6, 7-

11
Headquarters
Battlegroup 2-3, 2-9, 5-8, 7-5
Main 1-11, 2-5,
Tac 2-4,
Step Up 2-7, 5-40
Controlling 4-20, 5-29,
PY
Formation 1-1, 1-10,
Echelon 2-7,
O
I
C
Infiltration 1-B-1, 1-D-3, 4-9, 4-13,
4-32, 4-39, 4-A-1, 4-D-
ED 1, 4-F-1, 4-G-2, 7-8, 7-
11
influence
Centrality of 1-8,
LL
Media Communication 2-2

Information Activities 2-8, 7-15
KLE 3-9
O
Attack 4-4
Defence 5-7
TR
Information and Intelligence 1-6, 1-A-2, 1-B-2, 1-C-

2, 1-D-3, 1-E-2, 2-1, 2-
N
3, 2-6, 3-5, 4-6, 4-42,

4-A-1, 4-B-1, 4-C-1, 4-
O
D-1, 4-E-1, 4-F-1, 5-22,

5-29, 5-33, 5-37, 5-A-1,
5-B-1, 5-C-1, 5-D-1, 5-
C
E-1, 5-F-1, 7-12, 7-A-1

N
Preparation of the Environment (IPE) 1-21, 2-6, 5-6, 3-14, 4-

10, 4-39, 5-6, 5-22, 5-
U
24, 5-A-1, 5-B-1, 5-C-1,

6-23, 7-6, 7-9, 7-A-1
ISTAR (See also STAP)

Enemy Threat 1-4
ISTAR Group 1-11, 3-6, 3-A-1, 4-1, 4-
21, 4-25, 4-30, 4-38, 5-
4, 5-16, 5-24, 5-29,
Assets 1-12, 1-14, 1-24, 1-25,
1-F-1, 1-G-1, 1-H-1, 7-
4,
ISR Brigade 1-24
Officer 2-6
Cell 2-10, 3-A-1
Index - 7
CONTENTS
Soak 3-5, 3-A-1, 4-5, 5-7, 7-

A-1
Integration 3-6, 3-14, 3-20, 3-A-1,
5-11, 5-A-1, 7-6, 7-10
Joint Fires
Joint Fires Cell 1-19, 2-10
Fire Planning 1-20
Air Integration 1-26
Role of BC 2-4, 2-A-3
Raid 4-38
Aviation Operations 4-G-3
PY
Targeting Cycle 3-21
O
K
C
Key Leader Engagement (KLE) 3-3, 3-6, 3-9, 3-16, 4-6,
4-A-1, 5-7, 5-A-1, 7-3,
ED 7-15, 7-A-1
L
Legal 1-3, 2-2, 5-H-5, 6-20,

6-D-1, 7-2
LL
Liaison 1-5, 1-6, 1-18, 1-26, 2-

6, 2-8, 3-5, 3-10, 3-A-4,
O
4-20, 5-17, 5-29, 5-33,

5-A-1, 5-E-1, 5-G-3, 6-
TR
7, 6-19,
Line of Departure (LD) 1-21, 4-14, 4-21, 4-31,

N
4-A-1, 4-B-1, 4-F-1,

O
Link Up 4-5, 4-36, 4-E-1, 4-G-1

C
M
N
Main Body 4-2, 4-10, 4-26, 4-C-1,

5-22, 5-30, 5-39, 5-F-1,
U
6-23, 7-11,
Manoeuvre
Forms of 3-10, 4-9, 4-11, 4-12,
4-13
Freedom of 1-3, 5-13,
Support 1-11,
Air 1-14, 1-27, 4-G-1, 5-3
Advance 4-24, 4-29, 4-C-1
Attack 4-13, 4-A-1
Link Up 4-36, 4-E-1
Index - 8
CONTENTS
Raid 4-38, 4-42, 4-F-1

Defence 5-7, 5-A-1, 5-B-1
Delay 5-22, 5-C-1
Strike Op 7-A-1
Major Combat Operations 1-7
March 4-21, 4-33, 6-22
Mission Command 1-8, 1-9, 4-17, 4-41,
PY
Mobility
Mobility 1-15, 1-22, 4-24, 4-G-
1, 5-5, 5-12, 6-2,
O
Counter-Mobility 1-17, 1-22, 4-33, 5-5,
5-G-1, 5-H-1
C
Mortars 1-3, 1-11, 1-16, 7-6
N
ED
Named Areas of Interest (NAI) 1-24, 3-17, 3-A-4, 4-C-
1, 5-14, 5-A-1,
LL
O
O
Obstacle(s) (Also see Obstacle Crossing and Breaching)

Assault Pioneer capability 1-17
TR
Engineer capability 1-21

Obstacle Belts 4-6, 4-9
Crossing 4-27, 4-D-1
N
Combined Arms Obstacle Integration 5-7, 5-H-1

Planning 5-14, 5-H-4
O
Rearward Passage of Lines 5-33

Delay 5-C-1
Effects 5-C-2
C
N
Offensive Operations (Actions)

Purpose and Principles 4-1
U
Types 4-4, 5-2, 5-22, 5-32, 5-

38,
Offensive Support (OS) (See also Joint Fires)

Components 1-11, 1-19, 1-20
Planning and Coordination 1-20, 2-4, 2-A-1, 6-24
Supporting Offensive Actions 4-13, 4-24, 4-44, 4-A-1,
4-B-1, 4-C-1, 4-D-1, 4-
E-1, 4-F-1, 4-G-1
Supporting Defensive Operations 5-4, 5-15, 5-18, 5-37,
5-42, 5-A-1, 5-B-1, 5-
C-1, 5-D-1, 5-E-1, 5-F-
1, 5-G-1, 5-H-1
Index - 9
CONTENTS
OPSEC 1-3, 1-6, 1-28, 2-8, 3-3,

3-11, 4-6, 4-9, 4-20, 4-
31, 4-36, 4-44, 5-2, 5-
9, 5-24, 5-28, 4-32, 5-
38, 5-A-1, 5-B-1, 5-C-1,
5-D-1, 5-E-1, 5-F-1, 6-
11,
Principles
Fire Planning 1-20,
Engineer Employment 1-22
Battle Procedure 3-13,
Combat ID 3-B-1
PY
Offensive 4-1
Attack 4-4, 4-A-1
Forward Passage of Lines 4-20. 4-B-1
O
C
Link Up 4-36, 4-E-1
Raid 4-38, 4-F-1
Defence ED 5-1, 5-A-1, 5-B-1
Combined Arms Obstacle Integration 5-7
Delay 5-22, 5-C-1
LL

Logistics 6-1
Strike Op 7-A-1
O
Protection
TR
Protection 3-11, 4-44, 5-23,

Force Protection 1-7, 1-14, 1-16,
1-24, 1-D-2, 1-F-1, 2-
N
12, 3-1,
Protection Parties 2-5, 3-12, 4-8, 4-15, 4-
O
29,
Flank Protection 3-3, 3-A-4, 4-7, 4-37, 4-
D-1, 4-E-1, 5-19, 5-H-
C
4,
N
Attack 4-A-1,
Forward Passage of Lines 4-B-1
U
Advance to Contact 4-C-1

Obstacle Crossing and Breaching 4-D-1
Link Up 4-E-1
Raid 4-F-1
Protection of CSS assets 5-24, 6-2
Defence 5-11, 5-A-1, 5-B-1
Delay 5-23, 5-C-1
Health Protection 6-B-1
Self Protection 6-2, 6-B-4
Base and Key Point Defence 7-6
Route Protection 5-E-1, 6-2, 7-9,
Index - 10
CONTENTS
Convoy Protection 1-B-2, 1-C-1, 1-D-2, 1-

E-1, 6-2, 7-11
Pursuit 4-17, 4-43, 4-A-1,
Raid 4-11, 4-38, 4-F-1
Rearward Passage of Lines 5-16, 5-32, 5-E-1
Reserves
Offensive Operations 4-3, 4-9, 4-16, 4-17, 4-
PY
24, 4-27, 4-31, 4-39, 4-
40, 4-C-1, 4-F-1
Defensive Operations 5-2, 5-6, 5-13, 5-19, 5-
O
25, 5-36, 5-39, 5-A-1,
5-B-1, 5-C-1, 7-8,
C
Delay
Risk ED
Risk Appetite 2-2, 4-A-1, 5-A-1, 5-B-
1, 5-C-1,
Management of 1-26, 3-8, 3-C-2, 4-41,
4-E-1, 6-B-3,
LL
S
O
Screen
Offensive Actions 3-1, 3-A-2, 4-A-2, 4-18,
TR
4-21, 4-24, 4-27, 4-C-1

Defensive Actions 5-2, 5-4, 5-16, 5-34, 5-
37, 5-39, 7-7
N
Delay 5-24, 5-C-1

Aviation 1-H-1
O
Security Sector Reform 7-1, 7-12

C
Shaping 3-3, 3-9, 4-4, 4-7, 4-G-

N
2, 5-5, 5-7, 5-B-1 ,

U
Siting
Defensive Positions 5-8, 5-14, 7-6
Headquarters 2-5, 2-11,
Obstacles 5-7, 5-9, 5-H-1
Stabilising Action (See also Hot Stabilisation)

Framework Security 7-1,
Security Sector Reform and Military Capacity Building 7-12,
Support the Delivery of Essential Services 7-14
Support to Governance, Economic Development and 7-1
Reconstruction.
Strike
Index - 11
CONTENTS
Strong Points
Surveillance
Counter
Sustainment
Capability Sustainment 1-A-2, 1-B-3, 1-C-3, 1-
D-3, 1-E-2, 1-F-5, 3-A-
5,
Responsibilities for 2-7, 6-6, 6-7
Orchestrating Operations 3-12,
Planning 3-16, 6-4
Attack 4-7, 4-A-1
FPoL 4-20, 4-B-1
PY
Obstacle Crossing 4-D-1
Link Up 4-E-1
Raid 4-39, 4-43, 4-F-1
O
Air Assault 4-G-4
C
Area Defence 5-A-1
Delay ED 5-C-1
Relief in Place 5-D-1
RPoL 5-34, 5-E-1
Principles 6-1
LL
CIS Systems 6-7,

Replenishment Systems 6-9,
Medical 6-12
O
ES 6-15
TR
Target Areas of Interest (TAI) 1-24, 3-17, 3-A-4, 5-14,

N
5-A-1,
Targeting
O
Accelerated targeting 3-2, 3-8, 3-21, 3-22

Capabilities 1-4, 1-24, 1-25, 1-26,
1-28, 1-H-1
C
Responsibilities 2-5, 2-8, 2-A-1, 7-3

N
Restricted 4-15
U
UAS
MUAS 1-12, 1-24, 1-F-1, 2-10,
3-A-1,
TUAS 1-24, 2-10, 3-A-5,
Tac Pty 1-F-3, 2-10, 3-A-5,
Withdrawal 1-4, 1-15, 3-5, 4-6, 4-

40, 5-16, 5-24, 5-36, 5-
F-1
Index - 12
CONTENTS
ABBREVIATIONS
4Ds Duration, Demand, Distance, Destination

5Cs Congested, Cluttered, Contested, Connected, Constrained
AH Attack Helicopter
ALI Air Land Integration
AM Air Manoeuvre
AMPTAT Air Manoeuvre Planning and Advisory Training Team
AO Area of Operations
Avn Aviation
Assy Area Assembly Area
B-Chat Bowman Chat

BC Battery Commander
BDA Battlefield Damage Assessment
PY
BG Battlegroup
BGE Battlegroup Engineer
BGISS Battlegroup Intelligence Support Section
O
BGLO Battlegroup Logistic Officer
BHL Battle Handover Line
C
BLP Backloading Point
BM Battlespace Management
BSG Brigade Support Group ED
C2 Command and Control
CAD Close Air Defence
CAOI Combined Arms Obstacle Integration
LL
CAS Close Air Support

CASEVAC Casualty Evacuation
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radioactive and Nuclear
O
CCA Close Combat Attack

CCIR Commanders Critical Information Requirement
TR
CDE Collateral Damage Assessment

CE Combat Estimate
CF Covering Force
N
CFA Covering Force Area

CI Communication Information
O
CID Combat Identification

COA Course of Action
CNR Combat Net Radio
C
CPERS Captured Personnel

N
CS Combat Support
CSCM Counter Surveillance Control Measures
U
CSS Combat Service Support

CSups Combat Supplies
CULAD Cultural Advisor
DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

DSM Decision Support Matrix
DSO Decision Support Overlay
ECP Equipment Collection Point

ECCP Equipment Casualty Collection Point
EMCON Emission Control
EO Electro-Optical
ES Equipment Support
Abbreviations - 1
CONTENTS
EW Electronic Warfare
EWSI Electronic Warfare Signals Intelligence
F3EA Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit and Analyse

FAA Forward Assembly Area
FAC Forward Air Controller
FCOC Future Character of Conflict
FLOT Forward Line of Own Troops
FOB Forward Operating Base
FOO Forward Observation Officer
FPOL Forward Passage of Lines
FRT Forward Repair Team
FSCM Fire Support Control Measures
FSG Fire Support Group
FST Fire Support Team
PY
FUP Forming Up Point
GMR Ground Mounted Reconnaissance
O
GS General Service
GTC Ground Tactical Commander
C
HLS Helicopter Landing Site
HUMINT Human Intelligence ED
IA Information Activities
IED Improvised Explosive Device
IM Information Management
LL
IMINT Image Intelligence

IPE Intelligence Preparation of the Environment
IRG Immediate Replenishment Group
O
IST Intimate Support Team

ISTAR Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
TR
IX Information Exploitation
JAMES Joint Asset management for Equipment Support

N
JFC Joint Fires Cell

JIIM Joint, Interagency, Inter-Governmental and Multinational
O
JMO Joint Mission Order

C
KLE Key leader Engagement

N
LAD Light Aid Detachment

U
LCMR Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar

LEGAD Legal Advisor
LEWT Light Electronic Warfare Team
LO Liaison Officer
LoC Lines of Communication
LZ Landing Zone
MANPAD Man-Portable Air Defence Systems

MAOT Mobile Air Operations Team
MCC Mounted Close Combat
MCO Major Combat Operations
MDA Main Defence Area
Mech Mechanized
MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation
Abbreviations - 2
CONTENTS
MFC Mortar Fire Controller

MJDI Management of the Joint Deployed Inventory
MPE Material and Personnel Exploitation
MTF Medical Treatment Facilities
MTO Motor Transport Officer
NAI Named Area of Interest

NFA No Fire Area
NGS Naval Gunfire Support
NGO Non Governmental Organisation
OE Operational Estimate
OPSEC Operational Security
PEP Primary Equipment Pack
PY
PIR Priority Information Requirement
PM Protected Mobility
O
RF Reaction Force
RFA Restricted Fire Area
C
RFL Restricted Fire Line
RiP Relief In Place
ROC Review of Concept ED
ROE Rules of Engagement
ROG Rear Operations Group
ROOB Receipt of Orders Brief
RPOL Rearward Passage of Lines
LL
RVT Remote Viewing Terminal
SA Situational Awareness
O
SSA Shared Situational Awareness

TR
SH Support Helicopter
SIGINT Signals Intelligence
SITREP Situation Report
N
SOC Secure Orders Card

SOI Standard Operating Instructions
O
STABAD Stabilisation Advisor

STAP Surveillance and Target Acquisition Plan
C
TACP Tactical Air Control Party

N
TAI Target Area of Interest

TE Tactical Estimate
U
TF Task Force
TI Thermal Imaging
TOA Transfer of Authority
TOT Time on Target
UAP Unit Aid Post

UAS Unmanned Aerial System
UMS Unit Mobile Stocks
UST Unit Support tankers
VA Vulnerable Area
VP Vulnerable Point
WLR Weapon Locating Radar
Abbreviations - 3
CONTENTS
PY
O
C
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
N
U
Abbreviations - 4
CONTENTS
PY
O
C
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
N
U
PY
O
C
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
Comments and suggestions for improving this document

are welcomed.
N
The sponsor of this publication is:

SO1 Tac Doc Pubs
U
Directorate of Land Warfare, Land Warfare Centre,

Imber Road, Warminster BA12 0DJ
T +44 (0) 1985 848764

M 94381 8764
DII Army DLW-Warfare-TD-Pub-C1
© Crown Copyright AC 71648

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CONTENTS

ARMY FIELD MANUAL VOLUME 1 PART 2

Handling Instructions: For MOD Use Only

Army Code 71648

ARMY FIELD MANUAL

This publication supersedes

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS & CONDITIONS OF RELEASE

As directed by Director Land Warfare.

Telephone +44(0)1985 848764.

Amendment Number Date Amended Initials

fight in a the future – some of which is reflected in Chapter 1.

Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION TO THE BATTLEGROUP

Part 5 Roles and Task of Joint Effects 1-26

Non-UK Forces 1-29

Annex C Mechanized Infantry 1-C-1

Annex E Light Infantry 1-E-1

Annex I Considerations for the use of Attack Helicopters 1-I-1

Chapter 2 COMMAND OF BATTLEGROUP OPERATIONS

Part 1 Command 2-1

Chapter 3 ORCHESTRATING OPERATIONS

Part 1 Operational and Tactical Frameworks 3-1

Chapter 4 OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Part 1 Principles 4-1

Battlegroup Raid 4-38

Annex C Advance to Contact 4-C-1

Annex E Link Up 4-E-1

Chapter 5 DEFENSIVE ACTIONS

Part 1 Considerations and Principles 5-1

Mobile Defence 5-12

Part 3 Conduct of the Defensive Battle 5-14

Annex E Battle Drill – Rearward Passage of Lines 5-E-1

Chapter 6 SUSTAINING BATTLEGROUP OPERATIONS

Chapter 7 HOT STABILISATION

Information Activity 7-6

Strike Operations 7-12

Part 4 Support to the Delivery of Essential Services 7-17

INTRODUCTION TO THE BATTLEGROUP

1. Chapter 1 will establish an understanding of the battlegroup, its role in the

a. Be able to regroup easily by day and night.

the unit leadership is of the highest order. In particular:

a. The fundamentals of the Manoeuvrist Approach to Operations and Mission

b. Offensive action should be undertaken whenever the opportunity arises, in

c. The battlegroup must be capable of achieving and sustaining a high tempo of

operations. This stems from effective training, strong leadership, understanding of

PART 1 - CONFLICT AND THE BATTLEGROUP

THE NATURE OF CONFLICT

d. Human Stress. Despite technological advances, human stress will always be a

presents amongst opposing, often less disciplined, forces.

THE CHARACTER OF CONFLICT

8. FCOC Considerations. FCOC asserts that the battlespace in which battlegroups

a. Congested. Future interventions are likely to be conducted in densely

populated urban or littoral3. areas, in which many of the population will be

b. Cluttered. A cluttered environment will hinder our ability to distinguish

c. Contested. Freedom of manoeuvre will be contested in all environments by

d. Connected. The densely populated centres of activity in which future

e. Constrained. Operations are likely to be constrained by Western legal and

a. Open Terrain. Open terrain is likely to be sparsely populated, for example

unrestricted manoeuvre space. Engagements by direct fire weapons will be at or

offer excellent opportunities for reconnaissance and target acquisition. Conversely

b. Close Terrain. Close terrain may be densely populated in urban areas, or

sparsely populated in dense vegetation such as jungle. It is characterised by

detail will be difficult.

c. Regular Forces. Regular forces will be organised and equipped to secure