10 Azerbaijan: search for identity and

new partners
SHIREEN HUNTER

Introduction
One of the most significant _ albeit
M ikh a i I Go.b" ch.u, s .C-for*
"*",
rural particularism, drive .
p"r i.i., :il:t:;l'r:.
;:ilTf :::.: J:
foi poliri."l indepe'denci, and the rise of a
variety.of popular movemenrs ,l,.oughooi
In rhe Baltic republics, Georgiai u-J rhe USSR.
er-.nia, from rhe beginning
popular movements. have had ,i.^,
n"tl.,arrrt focus, poriticaty and cul-
turally' They arso have had a^ clear r.rr.
which is toward Europe and the.$7esr.
or ,1.i. .*i.-"ilii.nrnrio.,,
In rhe Muslim republics, by conrrast, the
enhanced ethnic and cultural
particularism and self-asserrion has l"d
ro-.o'furio.,
the elite regarding their nation.t r.li-iJ.nriry
exrernal ties' Indeed, these repubrics
and ".no'g'riJp.opt. ".,a
rhe dile*iJn of rheir
are ,o.n t.r*..; ;;;;;ilres
tural and polirical arrractlon. of cur-
Grearer freedom of cultural expression,
prus the diminution in Russia,s
political and culturar threar, h""; ;;;;
ord ethnic, culrural, and rerri_
rorial rivalries and confricrs. They havei.J
ro reinrerpretarion, and often
disrortion,- of geographic and hir;;i;J;"cts ^
purpose of forging a new sense of and evenrs with rhe clear
narional identity. The resurt has been
increased risk of intra_ and.inr.._..pulii.
ilostility
The loosening of bonds u.t*..n tt.-..iuutr." and conflic.1
in Moscow, and rhe complere airrJrri", of "r,a in..."rr"r aurhoriry
broughr the question of htw aiii.r."i'r.publics rhe Soviet Union, have
immediate neighbors and ro ,h. b;;;;.; would rerate ro rheir
fore' The larter is of grear imporrance
ll,.rn"rio.,"l community to rhe
to the neighboring stares and to rhe
ex-tra-regional powers,, l1.lud,ine rhe grear
powers. No clear patterns of
rnrera*ion birween the Musrim ..pu.-bri.,
emerged' Nevertheless, rhe'enrire
dour.r Rri" ""a.ii.i. ;ilil;";ave yer
regional and inrernational competition has become the focus of
for infl,r.n...
It is clear, however, thar-the Muslim ..pJii.r'
world, in particurar with their relations wirh the ourside
expand. It is also clea1.1h1r ".isib;;;';. "rh.;i;i;;j"'""r"r,,.r, *,,
"urrt"rr.*ouia U. keenly interesred in rhe
evolution of these republics' .*r..niir.t",iJ.,
they wourd try to affecr
".,a
225
 Azerbaiian: sed,'t lt t,,

rheir ci;;ra.irers. In particular, wirh growing inter;r, r,,,,, r

repi:irircs and Muslirn srares, the dynamics of Midcllc I , , ;

affecr rhe outside rs' views of evenrs in rhese republics, .rr,,l

their approach toward rhem. The great powers, noraLrly, rl,, r

would be keenly interested in rhe patterrr of relations wlr,, t,

between these republics and their neighbors, especially ,,, ,, i

regions as Transcaucasia. This interesr is natural becaus,.rl,, i

these relations would affecr regional policics, including, r{ 1,,,,,,.1

of power far beyond rhe region's immediate viciniry. 1.,,,
United Srates and Western counrries would want to see lrrrl.
as a Western NATO ally enhanced in this region and in (.< rrr, ,l
that of Iran contained.
How rhese new interactions would affect these republics nr, !!. , ,

opments and the shape of regional polirics in Cencral and \,,r,,r,

are still hard to predict. Whar is clear is thar rheir impar:r r,, i ,r

{p
would be significant.
The impact would be most dramaric if these republics w(.r( ,,
independence and have no mediating center, and somewhat l. ., , ,,,,,
if they were to rentain within the Commonwealrh - even il ,, , , r

with Russia and other Slavic republics. This would be so 1,,,,,,

within a loose confederal strucrure the central authoriry in M,,,,,,,
have some inf'luence over issues of foreign relations. In this , ,

likelihood, Moscow's prioriries and irs policy uis-d-uis rhe rrr r1.t,l
states would have consideratrle influence in derermining the.1,.,,, ,

their relarions and nor merely the larrer's own proclivities.z The ( ,,,,,..
wealrh of Independent Srares, if ir can achieve a unified milir.rri r.,
could reduce the risk of intra- and inrer-republic conflicr. But rl,, .,.,
union's dissolution a'd the proliferarion of armies has ,,,,,, .. ,
the risk of such conflicts, as well a conflict 'ational
between rhese reDrrr,l,, ,, ,

their neighbors- This is so because new states often use foreign..,,,,,,,,

foster their national uniry.
Paradoxically, the chance for regional cooperarion could also ,,,, ,,
as the newly irrdependent and ecr-rnomically weak republics seek t. r,1,r,
the Russians with new economic partners.
The Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan provides an excellenr c2rsr. tr.,,.,
which to observe rhe evolution of these diverse and often conrra.r, r,,,
forces and their inreracrion as rhey shape rhis country's self-image,,,,,r ,,.
perceptions of its surroundings and.irs own place in ir.
Azerbaijan's hisroric legacy, its mixed ethno-cultural makeup, irs s,, r ,,
Map l0.l The Caucasus
ian divisions, and the multipliciry of irs minorities make the task of ti, ,, I

oping a new national identiry and charting a new course for the co..r,l
outside the context of the soviet Union a challenging, and porenrially (r, ,

tablilizing, process.
The same characreristics offer opportunities for the republic ro f,,,1,,
 ZZE Sbrreen Hunter
Azerbaijan: search for identity 229
new and sarisfying ties wirh its two big neighbors, Iran and Turkey, but
The narionarists of Azerbaif an's popurar Front (ApF)
they also entail risk of conflicr, especially wirh lran. and orhers rried to
convey such an image to international observers.
A more problematic issue for the republic would be rhe furure of irs They called for rhe reuni_
relations with neighb.ring Armenia, with whom it has been locked in a
of the so-cated "No*hern" .r,d ..sourh.r;1';;;;;,ans.
'carion the separarion of the two regions
artributed The1,
long and bloody conflicr. Indeed, the dynamics of Azerbaijan's relations ," nirro.r. consprracy
with Armenia could also affect rhe course of its relations with Iran and " oi,i. Treaty
Russia and Iran in 1808 under the ,"..n,
3.j,X::.Ir"ris,t of
Turkey.
Azerbaijan's developments would have implicarions beyond its borders.
In addition ro w^alting reuni'carion, Sovier Azerbaijani
official and non-official.-.h-ave-a very L*r.nr,u" narionalists -
An excessively pan-Turk-isr cultural policy and irredentisr philosophy con6nes of whar thev cail "sourhern Azirbaiian.,'
norion of the ter.torial
would increase rhe risk of regional conflict involving lran and Turkey, in
territory of so-called S3uth...r Azerbaijan Ic;;;il^rl ,n"-, ,h.
addirion to Azerbaijan. However, an approach whi& drew on all aspects exrends as far as centrar Iran.
some urtra rationarists go even fr.rh.,
c>f Azerbaijan's rich and mulri-faceted iultural heritage could become a
janism, and arg;ue in favor of a pr.,-rurkirt tr,"" ir* il"-;;;;; Azerbai_
catalysr for new thinking on regional ries and imperus ro broader uis-r)-uis lran. They
say char Soviet Azerb-aijan's goar shourd
regional cooperation involving lran, Turkey, and ^n p.ih"p, even
orher be "pp.or.h
to unire all of lran,s Turkic_
Transcaucasian republics. speaking population.s
Azerbaijan's experience would also have implications for other Muslim
The inaccuracy of the norion of two Azerbaijans
imperial conspiracies is beyond divided as a resurt of .

republics. In short, developmenrs in Sovier Asia would have ramiGcations do,rfi fo.
'Russo-Ira.ri"r .ui..r-. ;i imparrial
for a vast region strerching from the Black sea ro the persian Gulf. Thus, hisrorian' The history of "ny *^., "ny
and the character of the
trearies signed trerween the two srares and
while sovier republics' ries wirh the new commonwealrh, and even Russia ,1. r".i i[u,;" i;;; of rurk_
alone will remain of key importance, other regional ties may very manchai (1828) is known in lran ih. ..Shameful,,
well shows rhar there was no deal struck ",
(Nangin) reary
become more significanr. Therefore, rarher rhan merely chronicling recenr
jan's expense. R.ather, the separation
b.r*..n Iran and Russia ar Azerbai-
events' political changes, and similar issues, it is more imporrant ro analyre of rhe currenr rerrltory of sovier Azer_
baiian from Iran *'s a. creai .o.r..qu..,.. of
the process of nation-building in sovier Asian republics in its historical and Russia's imperial expansion.
This is not ro s,ggesr rhat these lands or rarher,
or at least some of rhem _ may nor have wanted rh.i, li."i f.,rd"l lo.dr,
-
cultural conrexr, and in light of current dynamics of regional and inter-
national politics. Ir is also imporrant ro analyze rhe scope and characrer of independence from lran,
alrhough most crf rhem fought on lran's ,id.
ties which are devel.ping between these republics, their neighbors, and during rh.';;;;.r"rt rs merery
to point to the of the theory of Russo_"perri;, ;;rp;;".y.
other stares. is equally important ro see how rhese republic!' neighbors -r'91'9,,rheAzerbaiian
_It
view their developments and their impact on their own securiry and In November^ollowness ielegarion ar the paris pi"." .onr.r-
ence presented to the Iranian.de.legation *"which
I n rerests, was not admirted to rhe
Perhaps even more imporrant is a crirical rook at many of the currenrlv
accepted definirions of ethniciry, rerritories, borders, erc. and how they
I:f ",::J';:n::;'[".':ilJ'.:[.,T:;'I;:if [:;iH::T[".ffi l*ili
have evolved as they apply ro soviet Asia. The history of rhis region was relarions'7 However' realizing that Iran was not capabre of protecring
againsr rhe Russians, in Article d of the proposed them
frozen somerime in the mid nineteenth cenrury. Then the commurists rried rreary the Azerbaijanis
to write a new history and ethnography for it. whar is currentry happenrng said that thev needed rhe same.kinq h.ro ri.,at rhe B.i;iri";;;.-"ruppor.d
is. the resumprion of hisrory, but with all rhe baggage
ro give Iran in the contexr of the 1919 "-f Anglo_persian
of Soviet hisro.ogr"- have made Iran a virtua.l British p.or..ro."i..
,.."ry, *t,iJi, *ould
phy. How this resumption of history would is what would deter- nr.rU"i;^" *is wi''.,g
""i"ta
mine the furure of rhese regions and rheir neighbors. to accepr condirions that the lranians rebeiled Th.rr,
r.rni".,
parliament de6ed Britain and refused to ."tify
,h. "g"irri-I".'rr,l
;;;r;.'
consequently, nothing came out of these
Where is Azerbaijan? Iran-Azerbaijan conracrs.
These poinrs are noted here in order ro
appeal of pan-Turkism.ro the Azerbaij"rri,
b;i;"." the rhesis of rhe universar
In January 7990 a number of soviet Azerbai janis tore down borde r posrs
gravitarion of
,, rhe time, and the-o.o_,n.r,
inevirabre
on the soviet-Iranian frontier, The impression was rhen created rhar the Azerbaija" Turkey. Moreover, .u*
world was witnessing something akin to the crumbling of rhe Berlin wail, of Azerbaijan's :":"..d movemenr
pan-Turkic
lpur5s had before dabbled in other
which heralded the reunification of the rwo Germanies.3 ideologies and had triej an lran-orienteJ rr."..gy.
For instance, Mohammad Amin Rasul_Za?eh,
the president of rhe
 ffi*.'
230 Shireen Hunter

Musawat parry, was first a sociarisr Azerbaijan: search identtty 23l

and for
"Himmat" parry' He spenr many y."* a member of the sociarisr-oriented cial organization in_sovier Azerbaijan
in Tehran i" Iran and prbrirr";;
-i."n,,). called
Iran and was a member of rhe r.ftirt g.re..ill" Brrlik (,,L)niry,,). He is frorrr
cailed newspaper
expelled from rran.fbr |ran_e-Now i.:u.* i; ;;r';;; afrer being *r""0 ii-' ,]""'i"ir.o Fedaytn.
his lefrisr id.u, thur ne wenr ro Turkey e-Khalgh, which is scill engaged i" .fi"l
an ardenr pan-Turkisr.8 The facr and became esrtne activities against rhe
is thar t, reglme in Tehran.t2 currcttt
a rtra cri on, r ra n a n
d Tu rkey, ;.,
than mere erhnic o. .ulru."l. ^;.
.;;d'ii: j:,;: :j
?;1,,Lil"".r;l:.,'ijj Ir is no secrer rhar rhe sovier Union
consisrenrry fotowed a duar
considerarions of which policy toward Iran,.namely, gooa ..r"rions trach
parrner could be more herpfur "rn"iiy,'pr"cticar
h^s deier-ined rhe poliricar orientatron infiltration through.lefti* i"rJ.r. Hi*or,.",y,at state revel and crandestirrc
Azerbaijani intellecruals und politi."i of ,t.l"ri.r-il.ri"i;"n con,-
:::::,'',il?"i':i PI;v;; i-p"'i""'"'"i', T*i,ing a'r|
Thus' the facts behind th. c.."rio'".ri",rrr.
philosophy are somewhat differeni
oi.n. .o.**192o republic and irs ,'*jffii5:i '"
arion and currentrv acrs. as a.h.isroric
fr"-'rr,. myth rhat su.rtunds its cre_ The Azerbaijan communist parry
remained
foint of ..f.;..";;;lizerbaijani aided by the prese.nce of. sovier ;;;;;: .influential after 19g9, firsr
narionalists and rheir vision of the fut.rre- ,1.1, narionatisr
repubric of Azerbaijan *o, n.r, creaced
garb' changes in rhe. leadership rr"".'..'r"r*d
wirhin rhe communist-parry
"ur'"irffi#:
from facrionar comperrtirrr
in r9lg, rheir choice no.-L.."ur. of the eliminarion of irs
^r Ylr:.rhe-
or name was not by the Iranian Azerbaijanis, influence' Thus, benearh the..* "rratrJ-..
"vercomed eve. those who or-ri.-oii'-rnar.r, ou,l
.*t...,"r irru.,-u.,y
had their own grievances against rhe cenrrar governmenr in arrirudes roward inte-rnar
example, according to, Ahrnad Kasravi, Tehran. For "r,d ,rrri ortt,ool and poricy
in Azerbaijan even afrer the d.p"r,ui.
Iranian Azerbaiian under rhe r.J;;;;i;'";
the anci_cenrer movemenr rn rhe oTpresident"rr..t
Muralibov.
Mohammad Hussein Khiabani Moreover' popurar
toyed wirh rhe idea of changing,t. -orr.rn..,r, in ioui., Azerbaiian-Jil not deuer,r1,
distan ("The Land of Liber,i"lit"
null'orrl. 1.".i".'pi"""t... to Aza- exacrry rhe wav rhey did i1 01he1
..puuir.. cerrainry che so-cated Azer-
r"r-ro be .onfused
wirh or subsumed baijan Popular Fronr, particularry thor.
.1.*.r,cs who are alrowed ro l;c
r[is also "r p.;;.;;; by some
di,pur., the norion acrive, is not fury.represenrarive of
;1!;:,*::y;T",f,,.., republic' Additionalry, rhe-re. it *id.rp..ad
the range of popurar views in the
R,.,1'. ;:T:::Jl : J:?," li' ;,::.+r;?: suspicion ihar there has
i l.f I ::*".J; ;
pou g or
rin a deal berween eremenrs of th. "
co*mu'r-,lr,.rtrutishment and certain becrr
p n-
was spurious " as the soviet Union visrs o[ the popurar Front. Thus, acri_
and rhe
Iranian leftists used the notion o[ ,l*y say does no, n...rrurily reprc-
one Azerbaijan being separaced
arri'cia,y in order ro promore separatisr senr rhe views of all Azerbaijani, -r-r"i
rendencies in the Iranian Azerbaijan. o. .u*ihe majoriry.
Theiesc exampre of rhis policy were In facr, despire the prominence rhat
the efforrs of rhe popular Fronr acquired in
the sovier Union ir rs+] ,"1er up an
auronomous govern- and 1990, making ir seem roday to
u. u.ry powerfur, it is very dif'curt
l9g9
ment in rhe Iranian Azerbaijan rhrough derermine whar it exaccly is beyond r<l
rhe manipurario,' u .oii".,io., of individuais who
Soviet rroops in rhat reglon. "iir,.-j*sence of together in November.1988, many
of *io_ t,"".,t;;;;;;.r.d
came
Ir was also after rhe sovierization of
rhe region are indeed some porirical parties in
e"..i"iyr.,, such as the sociar ri.r.
stalinisr period rhar 6rst ,t. *o.i, '*".irr..." and,..sourhern,,
in parricurar, in rhe
crars and rhe yeni Musa.rat, uu,
"p"r,.Demo-
jan became common in Soviet and Azerbai_
a"__.rro.r. I have described "o.*lr-,irra.,,t. ApF umbrella.ra
Party of Azerbaijan and rhe co--orri*'nl.ry Moreover, rhe Democratrc
ro promore rhe rhesis of the oppression Soviet Azerbaijan began il: hl:.?.,*] q1.r..e-yq
determine the dynamics of Azerbaijani
,r,.i *jrii"
.*,.u,
"1i",
rerarions wirh rran. The persist- i
"r Azerbaijanis
of sourhern ence of the Soviet Azerbaijani
r."a..rrrip i.r th. ui.* oi-ri#r.r".,
they called "chauvinist persians,"r, by what Iranian Azerbaiian as.one rand and thc i
t., rnte. years, long before the sovier
reform movement and rhe rise of ^rJ;;;'p;;pre divided bv imperiar machi- r
the Soviet Socialist Republic
of the rwo Azerbaijans. "r
ar..u"ii",i
groups, communisr readers
""r;;r;;; ralked abour of
rhe reunificarion tili:ir":,i..:J,::i:,1'ff nEiiH:J
jj:l"n[tr*#:T;:,.r:1ll
.For .*o-pt., ,i.'head of rhe Azerbaijan KGB,
Gaidar Aliev, who larer became ;;;;;,
and will emphasize the hisroricaiJiii;.*I.,
t.;;;;;"rh.'il ---'/ | F .
well as rhe Iranian dimension .r ri.
" *ourdofb.rhe
rhat he hoped rhar the two,Azerbailans
polirburo, said rn
19g3
may even.begin to promore a pan-Iranist .rillli 'll I
*gi""'s backgroun,
"", ,o'i'l.il-
, E:.n Azerbaiian
roday many of rhe ;;;,ii*T,Jr,r.r,-..
"ri;; claims roward pan-Turkic rhemes promored by rhe
or pan-Isramic ,t.ri,fi I
Iranian -orr'.*i.._J l...d..,rirr rhe in Turkey. ...r"i-tlllllt II
soui.r Rre.baijanis
zLr udrJallls ano
una certatn circlcs
emanare from rhose wrthin ,h. S;;;;;
national movemenr rhat are Iranian-origin ir.rU"i;u' But.depending on conditions within
i.rtirtr. ror insrance, a promi- lran, in particular the abilitv of
nenr exponent of this view is Rasul cenrral governmenr ro meer th....ono*i., thc I
siam"ek, one of the leaders of an
unoffi_
of irs people, rhe above thesis courd gai"
lo.i"t, rrJ*ri"*i;;;.1:,i,:il I
o"orir.,r, in rrrc lra.i.r, Ar.:l:i,...'
rDalrxn, I
I
 232 Shireen Hunter
In that case, separatisr movements could develop in lran seeking unifi-
cation with Soviet Azerbaiian. This type of movement, if supported by the
Soviet Azerbaijan, could lead to armed conflict wich Iran.
It is clearly logical for rhe Sovier Azerbaijanis ro wanr ro promore the
rhesis of geographic, historic, and ethnic unity of the region and the notion
of Russo-Iranian conspiracy. The unificarion of rhe two regions would
enhance the economic and political position of the new unit by expanding
its size and increasing its resources. In the more immediate future, Soviet
Azerbaijanis make no secret thar they want to use the lranian Azerbaiian
expatriate community in order to Promote their position in Europe and in
rhe United States, and to attract their capital. However, so far 'they have
not been very successful. In the future, roo, if Iran's economic and political
situarion improves and the process of privatization and the opening of the
economy continues, and the regime conrinues to woo the exiles back home,
most Azerbaijani investors are likely to go back home to lran rather than
ffy operating in a society that in the last seventy years has lost much of its
mercantile and entrepreneurial skills and is likely to be politically unstable
for some time.
However, there is an even more immediate and pressing reason for this
historic revisionism. The Soviet Azerbaiianis, by focusing on foreign
enemies, are trying to foster a separate national idenrity for themselves.
This is clearly admined in conversations with Azerbaiiani intellectuals
'Whatever the
once rheir thesis is challenged with valid historic arguments.
motives behind this policy, rhe achievemenr of this goal will not be easy
and its political costs could be very high. Although not clearly spoken, it is
clear thar in talking about unification the Soviet Azerbaijanis see them-
selves as the leader and the senior partner in a united Azerbaijan, although
in order to attract the lranians, they proclaim that Tabriz would be the
capital of the new state. There is a thinly disguised - and hardly iustified -
sense of superiority among Soviet Azerbaijanis, or ar leasr rhe Baku inrel-
lectuals, uis-i-uis the lranian Azerbaijanis. This artitude, however, shows
lack of understanding of the Iranian Azerbaiianis' characteristics. It is
doubtful that the Iranian Azerbaiianis in Tabriz would want to replace
Tehran's authority with that of Baku, even if the nominal capital was
Tabriz. Even within Iranian Azerbaiian, local differences are significant'
These differences are even more pronounced with Soviet Azerbaijan
beyond the immediate border villages. The long period of Russification
and recent trends toward what could be called "Turkeyization," as
opposed to mere Turkification, have made even the two dialects vastly
different.
Moreover, while some Iranian Azerbaijanis may want greater autonomy
and even independence from Tehran, it is unlikely that, with few excep-
tions, they would like to be subsumed in some sort of confederation under
the Russians or to become a cultural satrapy of Turkey. In this regard, too'
Azerbaiian: search for identity 233
the Iranian Azerbaijanis' proud and independent nature and the rarher
disdainful attitude of the Russians, and even cerrain Turkish intelligentsia,
toward them as rough and unrefined would acr as significanr barriers.
Beyond the st:cular, a-religious intellectuals, religious af6niry wirh orher
Iranians would conrinue ro affect rhe masses'attitude, such schemes could
only succeed in two cases: (1) a collapse of cenrral aurhoriry in lran; (2)
profound regional and inrernational changes leading to a total redrawing
of regional nraps. The latrer development, however, almost inevitably
would also mean the disintegrarion of Turkey, as well as Iraq and perhaps
others.
It is in the recognirion of these facs thar in rhe last year, officially rhe
current goveflrmenr of the republic and even the APF have roned down
rheir nationalist rhetoric. There is no more ralk of immediate reuni6cation.
There is not even talk of serring a rimetable for reunificarion, Rarher, the
rhesis now promoted is rhat of "one people living wirhin rwo states." This
diminution in the narionalist and irredenrisr rheroric is parrly due to rhe
fact that popular reacrion in the Iranian Azerbaijan ro calls of unification
were subdued" True, some Iranian Azerbaijani inrellecruals. both in Iran
and abroad, are receprive to such ideas.15 Many of rhem, howeverr are
motivated by their opposirion to rhe currenr Islamic regime rarher rhan
separatist feelings. Consequenrly, as one member of rhe Academy of
Sciences of Azerbaijan SSR rold me, many Soviet Azerbaijanis began ro say
rhar before making unificarion a principal goal they should 6rst find our if
the Iranian Azerbaijanis wanr ro unite with rhem.
There has also been a grearer realizarion on the part of soviet Azerbai-
jani leadership of differences berween the cwo people. Indeid, an official of
the so-called vatan Jamiyati (The Homeland Association), an organizarion
predating perestroika, wirh rhe goal of atrracting Iranian Azerbaiianis rold
me that rhe two people 6rst need to become reacquainted wirh one another
before talking about uni6cation.
Another reason has been rhe realization by Sovier Azerbaijanis rhat uni6-
carion may not necessarily mean rhe separation of rhe Iranian Azerbailan and
its joining with rhe Sovier republic. Rarher, rhere may be the risk rhat ar least
some Soviet Azerbaijanis, parricularly those speaking Iranian dialecrs, may
want to join Iran. In fact, a soviet academician admirted to me thar in places
like Lankaran, and heavily Shi'a border areas, mosr people would like ro loin
Iran. Moscow's influence, which is concerned about its own relations with
Iran, also contribured to rhe lowering of nationalist rheroric. Moreover, as
long as there was a chance to keep most of the Union togerher, it seemed that
Moscow woulcl try its best to keep Azerbaijan within the Union, even if other
Transcaucasian republics such as Armenia and Georgia became indepen-
dent.16 But a unired and thus expanded Azerbaijan may be less easily per-
suaded to remain within the new Commonwealth.
In the meantime, however, Moscow cannot openly repudiate rhis rhesis.
 234 Shireen Hunter
Moreover, it l'nay hope that it would be able ro keep an expanded Azerbai-
jan in its orbit. However, after the acceleration of the process of the Soviet
Union's disintegration following the failed right-wing coup of August
1991, this point has been made moot. With Azerbaijan becoming com-
pletely independent rhe campaign for reunification with the Iranian Azer-
baiian could begin in earnest again. Whatever transpires in the future, ir is
clear that the issue of historic confines of Azerbaijan will acquire more
than academic interest.
Ethnic and cultural legacy and composition
Azerbaijan's ethnic, sectarian, and linguistic composition and the char-
acter of its cultural legacy also contribute to its problems of defining a new
national identity, and determining the nature of irs relarions with irs
neighbors.
Azerbaijani nationalists are proud of their ancient history and ofren
refer to rhat. Meanwhile, most of them insist on the pure "Turkicness" of
Azerbaijan, both ethnically and culturally, throughout its history. It is
important to make a distinction between the Soviet Azerbaiian and the
Iranian Azerbaijan. From ancient times, after the massive introduction of
Iranian people into the region, and until the introduction of Arab and
Turkic elements in later centuries, the Iranian Azerbaiian has been eth-
nically solidly Iranian. In ancient rimes, however, Albania or Eran or what
is now Soviet Azerbaijan had had a more mixed population, including
some of the Iranian family of Indo-Europeans.lT Another difference is that
the area that is now Soviet Azerbaiian historically has been more vulner-
able to migratory pressures, including those by Turkic tribes. Most his-
torians agree that the gradual Turkification of Azerbaiian began in the
tenth or eleventh century. Prior to that, for nearly 3,000 years, in addi-
tion to indigenous inhabitants, particularly in Soviet Azerbaijan (the
people of the Caucasus), the dominant ethnic group in the region was the
Iranian branch of Indo-European tribes.
The rise of rival Safavid and Otroman empires in Iran and what is riow
Turkey in the fifteenth and sixteenth cenruries accelerated the Turkifi-
cation trend. While the Safavids were lranian, their court was heavily
influenced by Turkic elements. Thus, while disputed, the theory that many
Azerbaijanis are linguistically Turki6ed Iranian people has merit. Cer-
tainly their physical characteristics are more similar to lranian people than
to other Turkic people such as the Turkmen, Uzbek, Kyrgyz, etc. Thus, the
current thesis of Soviet Azerbaijani nationalists rhar Azerbaiian has always
been one hundred percent Turkic is not valid. It is, of course, to be noted
here that extrem€ pan-Turkists in Turkey, and in Soviet Azerbaijan,
believe that such ancient people as the Sumerians, Chaldeans, Iranian Par-
rhians, and even Kurds and Medes, were Turk. And they date the existence
Azerbaiian: searcb for identity 2.1 5
of Tr:rl :.: 1.,_,301. in Central Asia, Asia Minor, and elsewhere ro 5,000 yc,rrr
befcie ri-ri '1.'irrh of chrisr.r8 Hcw,ever, even som€ of the sovier Azerbaij,rrrl
narionair'tis in privare adnrit ro these hisroric inconsistencies and recogrrre
the more mixed ethnic and culrural background of rheir counrry, incluclrng
the existence of a strong Iranian element.
The reason for emphasizing Turkic puriry, ir was explained ro me by l
soviet Azerbaijani political scientisr, is political expediency. The narirrr-
alisrs believe rhat rhis arrirude is iusrified in order ro forge a srrong Turkie
national identity. orher issues, including conflict with Armenia. are alsrr
manipulated for the same purpose.le Moreover, being fuily aware of rhe
srrength of Sovier Azerbaijan's ties wirh Iran, rhis atritude is parrlv ainrc,l
ar preempring and preventing porenrial atrracrion toward lran. ofGcials.,l
rhe curre.t governmenr of Soviet Azerbaijan, which is srill dominared lrv
the old Communisc esrablishmenr, albeir in a narionalisr garb, sancrion rlrrr
' policy. Until rhe developments following the failed coup of August 199 l,
and in view of the close link between rhe Azerbaijani leadershif wirh tlrr
center' so, ir appeared, did Moscow. similarly, such views also srrrr
'wesrern proclivities which wanr Turkey ro emerge
as the scrongest inllrr
ence in Azerbaijan.
Therefore, views which challenge rhis ultra-Turkic narionalisr theory .l
history are nor openly aired. Bur there are some indications that such views
exist. According to rhe chairman of the political science departmenr of rlrc
Academy of sciences of Azerbaijan, only 3 percenr of people in Azerbaijrrrr
hold the view rhat rhe ethnic and hisroric origins of Azerbaiian is conncc.
red rvirh that of other Iranian peoples,zo There is some reason to believe
thar rhere may be a much larger number of people who support rhis view.
For insrance, according to the same academician, there is a widesprearl
campaign of insulc and discredir in sovier Azerbaiian aimed ar rhe Iraniarr
Azerbailani historian-scholar Ahmad Kasravi, a prominenr proponent ol
rhe Iranian origins of Azerbaijan's history and culture. The main chargc
against Kasravi is rhar he was an Iranian narionalist and a pan-lranist. This
creates the suspicion thar Kasravi's views may be more popular rhan
admitted openly. otherwise, such a campaign seems fruitless m.o,r
spirited. "rd
whar is imporranr for the furure of Azerbaijan is how irs peopre will
choose ro de6ne themselves irrespecrive of historical facts or rhe precisc
erhnic n.rix of the popularion. If these people see rhemselves as pure Turks
or predominantly Turk or Turkified, then rhat is what rhey wili be. If rhcy
develop a differenr vision of rhemselves, then rhar view would mold their
self-identity. Neverrheless, manipularion of these facrs by various groups
inside rhe counrry, in rhe region, and even by outside powers would havc
an impacr on rhe evolurion of the soviet Azerbaiianis' self-image. For
example, an official policy of Turkeyization through more exrensive cul-
tural contacts wirh Turkey, reform of language, and rhe propagation o1
 236 Shireen Hunter
cglrural pan-Turkism through the mass media, would deeply affect the
self-perception of the nexr generation. A different policy would have a
different i-p".t. Irrespective of the ultimate outcome of this search for
narional identiry, the exaggeration of one aspect of the regional and
popular culture could in the process become highly divisive'
^ links with Iran and emphasized rhe differenes between rhem, hoping
These issues are also nored here because of their implications for the
future character of the republic's relations with irs neighbors. For example,
overemphasis on Turkic purity would certainly complicate efforts to create
closer ties with the Iranian Azerbailan.
A culturally pan-Turkic policy on the part of Soviet Azerbaijan is
likely to be jarring ro most Iranian Azerbaijanis. This would be par-
ricularly the case if Soviet Azerbaiian were to become a cultural satrapy
of Turkey. There is already a trend in this direction, ar least in Baku.
The efforts to rid Azerbaiian's Turkic dialect of Persian words and the
introducrion of modern Turkish idioms and, in general, a vasr increase in
Turkey's cultural influence from music ro writing there will make com-
munication between the two Azerbaiians more difficult. This is so
because the modern Turkish and the Azerbaijani Turkic dialect are not
mutually understandable, particularly to non-educated people, or at least
not easily.
Pasr efforrs on the part of separatist movements in the Iranian Azerbai-
jan, mosr notably thar of the Democratic Party of Azerbaiian sponsored by
the Soviet Union in the 1940s to impress a Turkic character on the region
by, among other things, instiruring instructions in rhe Turkick dialect, did
not succeed.
Admittedly part of this failure was due to the anti-religious and socialist
characrer of the movement which offended the masses' religious sensibili-
ties. But a large part of the Azerbaiiani intelligenrsia - including some
leftists - were also against the anti-lranian dimension of the Party's ideol-
ogy.2r Therefore, barring widespread disaffection of the lranian Azerbai-
ianis from the rest of rhe country, which is not very likely alchough not
incoqceivable, rhe current emphasis on the part of Soviet Azerbailani
narionalists and leadership on ultra-Turkic nationalism coupled with pan-
Turkic rendencies is likely to deepen the barriers berween the two Azerbai-
jans rather than bring them closer together.
Moreover, these attitudes would make rhe development of a distinct
..Azerbaijani" identiry wirh both irs Turkic and lranian dimensions more
difficulr. The failure to develop such an identity, in turn, could alienate
orher ethnic groups within Soviet Azerbaiian since the population of this
republic is not solidly Turkic. There are, for example' Iranian-origin
people with special Iranian dialecrs called "Tati" and "Taleshi," as well as
Kurds and Dagestanis. In the Iranian Azerbaiian, a large parr of rhe
'Western Azerbaiian is inhabited by non-Turkic, Indo-EuroPean' Iranian-
origin Kurds and hence, ethnically and linguistically part of Kurdistan.
Azerbaijan: searcb for identity 237
These ethnic diversities further illusrrate rhe unrealism of the norion of
"Northern and southern" Azerbaijans forcibly separared that now musr be
reunited"
The Communist regime was responsible for a sysremaric reinterpre-
tation of the region's hisrory and culture.22 Ir downplayed Azerbaijan's
eventually ro incorporare rhe Iranian Azerbaijan into the Soviet srare. This
policy also 6r neatly into rhe overall Soviet srraregy of developing separare
rerrirorial an<l culcural entities out of irs Asian possessions, as well as its
effort ro fragment neighboring Iran, since ir believed this would make its
Sovietization easier.
Today Azerbaijan is bedevilled by this legacy.lndeed, many of rhe same
mechods of historical revisionism are used by the currenr leadership and
nationalist leaders. But rheir unwillingness ro come ro rerms wirh the reali-
ties of rheir pasr and to recognize rheir cultural duality is likely to compli-
cate rheir problems of defining rheir cultural and polirical identiry and
developing positive ties with their neighbors. The Azerbaijanis cerrainly
have the option of repudiaring rhe lranian dimension of their origin and
culture. But rhey cannot both lay claim to an ancienr and vast culrure and
deny its historic characterisrics.
Religion: factor for unity or division
Historically, religious proclivities of the local population have played
importanr roles in derermining the political direcrions of the regions now
incorporated in the Iranian and Soviet Azerbaijans. The principal line of
religious divide in the region is that between rhe sunni and rhe Shi'a
Muslims. The Iranian Azerbaijan is solidly Shi'a, with the exceprion of
many of its Kurdish inhabitants who are sunnis. The Sovier Azerbaiian
also has a srrong shi'a majority. Estimates as ro the percentage of Shi'as
versus Sunnis vary somewhere between 75 to 85 percent in favor of rhe
Shi'as.
Historically, religion has been a principal factor in rhis region's identi-
6cation with Iran. In what is now the soviet Azerbaijan, pro-ortoman
tendencies in rhe past and pro-Turkish tendencies now have been srrongesr
dlrlong the Sunni population or those withour srrong religious beliefs. By
the same token, pro-lranian tendencies have always been strongest arnong
the Shi'as. However, to assume, as some'Western scholars have done, rhat
religion was rhe only reason for rhe Azerbaijanis' idenrification wirh lran is
incorrect. Iran's relations, for example, wirh sourhern Iraq, which is also
overwhelmingly Shi'a bur mosrly Arab or Arabized, illustrate rhat religious
affiniry is not enough ro bind different people rogerher. similarly, rhe Shi'as
of Turkey - known as the Alawis - do nor identify wirh lran despire relig-
iou.s affinity. Rarher, it has been the combinarion of religious bonds and
 ;iir rfr
1

238 Sbireen Hunter ri

'1

-:,,zerbaijan: searcb for identity Z3v

other affinities thar has been rhe reason for Azerbaijan's closeness with l

Iran. anc ff:,i:,j/ rl'roseu€s are reopening. ,\zerbaijani

authoriries want ro li..'
conrr'c'i over the direcrion of rhis *,-:,,emenr
During rhe evenrs of winter 1989*1990 rhar sarv an or-rtpoiiring of and influenc. ir, For.xou,1'1u,
nationalist and' auronomisr senrimenrs, Sovier aurhoriries, including they ir'lend ro rransrare the Koran i,rro ir".i
-.t rurkic diarect and prob:rhry
control religious instruction, Therr: is a fe4r
Mikhail corbachev himself, blamed disturbances on "Muslim fanatrcs." rhar interesr 'rerigi,,rrr
in
He accused lran of igniring the 6res of fundamenralisr fervor and warned it d#t instruction would direct
_Azerbaijan Muslims roward Iran becausc ,f
to stay our of rhe republic's affairs. The reaction of Azerbaijani nationalisrs ;w
shi'ism, particularly now that n"ry'srti'" ."les of Iraq t,"u. u""nEsrroyerl,
ro these accusarions was negarive and ringed wirh a.nger. They, in rurn, Turkey, here too, r..T:.ro_be raking l;;l
by sending Turkish religi.ur
accused the soviets of wanting to !urn western oprnion againsr the Azer, ,,#
"ffi "
insrrucrors to the repu.blic. Even thelaudis
fu'din! egffiirr,'ir,r,r,,r.
baijanis in their conflicr wirh Armenia by accusing rhem of fundamental- rors in Azerbaijan' The Iranians are not "re
totaily absent from the scerre
eirher'27 How rhe rerigious element *ourJ
ism. since then, borh rhe Soviet Azerbailani aurhorities and rhe Narional ffi Azerbaijan's national.identity and i.r
pray.in ,r,"
f.o..rr-oimorclirrg
Fronr leaders have srrenuously rried ro downplay religious dimensions of fotii."t orienration is not cle,rr,
the republic's popular movements.23 whar is clear is thar religion would
artitude of many Azerbaijnrrrr
cerrainly there is no valid evidence which would support rhe accu- ro their surroundings and especiaily "ff..;;;
io-irJi, ,*o neighbors with whrrrrr
ffi they have so many affiniries.-Ho*.u.r,
sarions made by the sovier aurhoriries rhat rhe Azerbaiian national move- ".tr{
ail perhaps not the most imporrant one, in
ii *ould be only one factor, rrrrrl
nrent was a religious fundamentalist movemenr. However, rhe playirrg- SE
ril;il
chis process,
down of rhe Islamic elemenr by both governmenral aurhoricies and iw
Narional Front personaliries also seems exaggerared. As long as rhere are ifj Modernization and requirements of developmenr
1o _trulv democratic polirics in sovier Azerbaiian, ir would be exrremely i'}i
{'l As in mosr Mr"rsrim,lands, rhe quesr for
difficulr ro ascertain the stre.grh of different tende.cies in the republic. modernization and deveropnrcrrr
has been a significanr force in *rr"t ir
Indeed, Azerbaijan's political scene since the srationing of Soviet rroops in Azerbaijan independent over rrrc
the republic in Jan'ary 1990 has been characterized by a compromise
I
""* ...,ru.y, rhose
last century and a half. In the ninete.rrri
,.:li welcomed Russian rure felr rhat by Azerbaijanis trr*r
between segmenrs of the old Communist esrablishmenr and elemenrs of the Russia it,"y *o,,r,l
National Fronr' This became quire clear during the ocrober 1990 parlia- ii have a berter chance of deveropinj r"rro.iori.,g-wirh
rSl
same considerarions were paitlv- responsible-oJ..n economy and society. -I'lre
mentary elecrions. Many political parries and rendencies existed clandes- tt{l
octoman tendencies among certain Azerbaijan
f". ;h; ;;;;' of pr'
rinely but were not allowed to operate freely. tfl intetectuars. As Irarr'r
Islamically oriented groups, including pro-Iranian groups bur also pro- ri;l economic and polirical decrine accelerared
in
the perceprion of orroman Turkey as rhe the niner..rrth l.rrtury ",r,1
Turkish Islamists such as rhe followers of rhe yeni Musavat partesi also .i
I
most advanced of the tw'
Muslim srares grew' coupred wirh che i".,
exist, but mostly in clandesrine form.2a An opinion poil taken in Baku in iii Turkey hr;;;;; ioortror,r in
,tl Europe' the number of.soviet.Azerbaijanis"r
early l99o showed thar only 3,8 percent of Baku's popularion favored the reanin! ro*"rir,i.t.y rtr,,
grew. Afrer rhe Bolshevik revolurion,
esrablishment of an Islamic republic and only 1g.9 percenr favored full
preferred to remain wirhin the new sour.t
rio, rhor. S&i.i a*.U"lr:"ri, *f,,
inregration into the Islamic world. However, 76.7 percent favored estab-
Iran, did so because rhey viewed tt. nurrirn,
,rrr., rather than join Turkey ,r
lishing conditions and instirutions which would satisfy the religious feel- as rhe more advanced.
ings of Muslims and 97.0 percenr welcomed the opportuniry ro learn more The issue of development and modernization
has arso been a cenrrll
issue in sovier Azerbaijan, and in rt,"
about Islamic culture.25 of the soviet Ar.rurri.,,,,
The point ro be srressed here, however, is thar Baku - like many other "rri,,ra.
toward their ries wirh Moscow, their ,,eighbors,
and the outside worrrr,
The A'erbaijani governmenr and inreiliglntsra
capitals - is not typical of rhe resr of rhe counrry. This is parrly due ro the want to move cioser r,
those who could besr h-elp rhem deuerop
fact that in the last 150 years rhere has been a large influx of foreign ethnic ,"h.i, ..o.,o*ic and technorogrt.rl
base. Thus, until the failed coup,
and religious elements into Baku. Moreover, secularization is always rhe Sovier economy was ,r
stronger in urban centers. Indeed, it is believed that religious feelings are
shambles'.many did not see much ^!;f9;;
betler arternarives ro conrinur.rl
economic links to Moscow. Even after
very strong oucside of Baku and especially in the villages.26 Therefore, it is the coup, and despite showirrg
greater reluctance to sign any new economic
conceivable rhat a republic-wide poll would have shown a more balanced union treaty, Azerbaijan tlrrl
not burn irs economic bridges to Moscow-
breakdown berween Islamic and other orientations among the popularion. The greater
Turkev among many soviei Azerbaijani rn,.rr..r"J, "*r".iiorr-ro*.,.t
what is clear is that there is growing inrerest in religion in therepublic
their perceprion thar Turkey h"r
;;;rr";;, du. n,
-"i. gr.", ,rria., in economic dever''

24A Shireen Hunter
ment, not merely because of their pan-Turkism or ethnic af6nity. By con-
trast, Irarl's political and economic problems over the last ten years make ic
not a very attractive partner for development. Another consideration is
access to Europe and to the West in general. This considerarion also favors
Turkey since it is viewed as a conduit to the'West.
Moreover, the Azerbaijanis want to develop a positive image which
could help them in their conflict with the Armenians. The Western coun-
tries, especially the United States, have made no secret of the fact that they
would like to see Turkey emerge as the dominant influence in Soviet Asia
from the Caucasus to Central Asia.28 They feel thar as a secular pro-
'Western state, the Turkish presence would enhance Western influence.
Some'Western countries feel this may compensate Turkey for not being
invited to join Europe.
However, the inconclusive result of the Turkish parliamentary elections
of November 7991., growing problems of the Turkish economy, rhe
increasing threat of Kurdish separatism, and divisions within the Turkish
poliry on how to deal with this problem cloud Turkey's future. Should
Turkey's economic and political problems worsen, it would affect its
leadership aspirarions in Azerbaijan and in Central Asia.
.What
is clear is that imperatives of economic development and modern-
iz.ation would have a very important impacr on rhe orientation of Soviet
Az-erbaijanis. These considerations may even prove more significant rhan
rhat of ethnic, linguistic, religious, and other bonds in deciding the nature
,,f their regional links.
Ilalancing the two neighbors
As we have observed, rhe nationalist rhetoric and the general culrure
rrt'rrcl in Soviet Azerbaijan is distinctly pan-Turkic and pro-Turkish. The
rrrrrjority of Azerbaiian intellectuals and National Front leaders make no
..r't ret that they see Kemalist Turkey and Mustapha Kemal as the model to
l','t'rnulated. Some of them have even talked about the possibility of creat-
rrr1,.:r confederation with Turkey which larer could extend to the Central
,\,,r:rn Republics. This view was, for instance, expressed by a number of
,'\l'l:rnembers including Ebulfez Aliev in an interview published in the
I rrr kish daily Miliyel on July L6, 7990. However, pro-Turkish tendencies
,,r ,irrongest in Baku and within the intelligentsia. There is some evidence
rlr.rr in border areas wirh lran and among the more religiously-oriented
,
",,r1 1-ropulation,
pro-lranian senriments are stronger.
lrr the last two years a number of agreements on economic and commer-
, r.rl tooperation have been signed between Turkey and the Azerbaijan
'."|t lrr addition, direct air links between Istanbul and Baku have been
, .,,1'lished. There has recently been.talk of building a bridge over River
\r r'. rn order to facilitate communication with Turkev.2n Telecommuni-
Azerbaijan: searcb for identity
241,
carion linkage has also _expanded. yer, while Turkey is emergrng as rhe
favored partner, ties wirh Iran are nor ignored.
Indeed, similar economic and .omme.cial agreemenrs have been signed
wirh lran.,, In addition to wanring ro maximize rheir economic gains, the
authorities do not wanr to antagonize Iran. Thus rhere is a desir. ro ar leasr
keep a semblance of balance between the rwo neighbors. Moreover, the
aurhoriries realize rhat .antagonizing lran would i"-p.. rheir plans of
intensifying contacts with rhe Iranian Azerbaijan
thu, reduce the
".,d
chances of a future unification of the two regions. Moreover, given Azer_
baijan's problem with neighboring Armenia and .u.n porrib'ie rensions
with Georgia, ir cannor ajford ro engender Iranian hosrility as well.
The question of balancing ties is nor limited only ro..ono*,i. polirical
areas and exrt:nds even ro cultural issues. For example, during rhe"nd
debate over
changing rhe,:urrent cyrillic alphaber into eirher rhe Arabic o"r iuti, ,.ripr, in
addirion ro the inrrinsic merits of the two, rhe impacron relarions with Iran
and rurkey vras also considered. concern was expressed that in the case of
choosing Arabic scripr, Iran's culrural influence mighr become overwhelm_
ing, and in tht: case of Larin, rhat of Turkey. The deblre was finally settled in
favor of Latin, hence.favoring Turkey. But in making rheir choice, the Azer-
baijanis had zrlso had their furure ries with the WesIin mind-
Nevertheless, in late 1991 rhere were signs of grearer willingness on
rhe
part of Sovier Azerbaijanis to allow a more visitle lranian .Jlr,r.rlp..r_
'. ence.Parricularly significanr has been rhe agreemenr berween the two
counrries rhat allows Iran ro set up g.ou.,J sarellire sration in Bakrr,s
Radio and relevision company which"would enable sovier Azerbu,l"r,i, ro
receive Iranian television. They have also agreed to joinrly produce pro-
grams in both Persian and in Azerbaijani dialect, including^a 90_minure
weekly program. If these progra.ms are implemenred, rhey *Juld go a long
way to restore the current imbalance in Turkey's f^uo..Ji
In addition to trying to balance rheir two big neighbors and cultural kin,
the Azerbaijanis are rrying to expand their direcr ties wirh o(her counrries
as parr of rheir drive. ro enhance their independent national identiry ana
inrernarional personality. Thus diplomatic relarions were esrablished with
Egypt, a trend likely to extend to other Muslirn counrries. B.,t Azerbaijrn
has even reached agreements with Israel on economic and technical
cooperarion. 'rhis is ,a posirive developmenr. The more indepeJ..,r ,h"
republic becornes in these matters, the better it is to h"u. .orrrt.rctiu. ."1"_
tions wirh many stares in the region, thereby mitigating the fear of becom_
ing dominated by one or rhe ocher.
Views from Ankara and Tehran
As could bc expecred, evenrs in Sovier Asia have been keenly followed
by both Iran and rurkey. The amirude and approach of each .o.',.rrr" ,o
 1.42 ,Shrre.q Flunter

rt"-'nrs in thar area have been determined 4zerbaiian,: search ieentity

both by their hisroric tres and by for Z4.l
rileir currenI d,orraestic condirions
and aspiratior,r, *"ii""r^ti" ayr,"*l.u
of internarional politics. ",
The evenrs af r9g9_r990 in sovier
Azerbaijan faced both T,urkey and
Iran wirh their 6rst serious policy
rest uis-d-uis rh. s"iil rut"rrri-r,
movements' Turkey's immediate response popurar
ro disr.urban.., irr'ar."u.rju'
was exrremelv cautious and weil
in accord,wirh ;; [;;irr'p.,n.ipt.,
Turkish foreign policy. Fore*an'pt., of
in soviet Azerbaijan-f1esldent. t'"o"i'ii? about Turkey,s view of evenrs
"rt.d of Turkev
concerned sorely wirh irs own internal said Turkev was
probrems Azerbaijan
crisis was an internar affair of rh.
soui.t union.""d;'h;;.
He further added thar
Turkey did nor nurture aspirations of
a Turkish empire thar wourd
pass the Turkic repubrics tr encom_ 4r_'Lrrs E\-
rn" soui.iunion. Rarher, Turkey wourct grve prir
tinue to folrow Araturk's poricy of wourd con_
non--.nrurrgil.;l i""r".1,* disputes :: orhers
as 1-..."nt-"dating de*;;l.T; the newly
truropean counrries, as
such as Lusrria
and the principle of "peace rn tir.
Ho-ll"r,d; pi."f" ;; ,h" v';;?o.,, Given
Gi fr.r rha
ven the facr ""ira ri;;;J.;,
tirr-.r"i.nrari^^
r orien on -^_-,-
;;;::,
,-
e considering Turkey.
;;;^;;;;::ffi':?:ff1;I;.*r*
More imporranrry, ozal srressea ri. Jrrr.r.nces in it were rhe underpinii:g:
janis and rhe Turks. He said
,1,. er.ri"iir'r,i, ,r" Shi;"
between the Azerbai-
changes inevirably ,"rr.lf:l: :f
fr;k;{;;l;arisr foreign policy, rhc ra
baijani dialect is crose to Turkish ,h;i;;. ;tho.rgf, er"._
";; arso .o'rir,,,.i
separare. ozar ";li;;ry. Ir- is in recogniiion of tl
ni*ia."i.ozar
the ulrimate sin from ,t p..rf..ri"J
Azerbaijan by saying thar- "i p.""_rurkisrs
" the'Azerbailanis,
commirted
in Turkey and in 3ijl,,li,*ri*":ji::"1: *l
:':_j:t.. have been saying rt ", r.-lli#;;: Y:l rrs
...t';,:":l1,1?lr:,
.h. rurkish
ro rhe
,:oparr
rurkjsh f,,,]
f,r
concern of Iran.r2 Ozal's speech ...rr.d being shi'as, were more a il e"ia. i,,l;;#oJi.i,:ne
rvr LIE'rr
and that Tu
POIlcy''J
, Thus, rebuff bv lu.
ripples in snku. olat', .i,"r
f"ri,-;;;;i,;ff.T'rh:;::l il*:,:",il: .",f,::r:{i:::r,fi ' j:ilT"'.1::,J$::Tfi
leader oI the socialist parry, said
was causing rifts between- Turkey's
Ozal,s ,.f.r..r.. ." ,ir.T,]."i_!ni."
citizens of different denominations.
,ptl,
liffi
and rh e'v'es re rn e rs ; ;; ;; #; :''',1_'f ;,il]x ::$:i:*:H:I:::::
:[::i:*: lffi
suleiman Demirer; rhe reader ovpl"Jprime minis.., oiiu.t.y, said
thar Ozal's srirem"nr, ignored "r th" ,.J", principles .t:JL1i?**l*;\:ffi
"Turkic"
"Tu " ar.
rkre i.l,-..;-^r-.
';:,',fl :.ii:'g.,":-"r"J",1r..,i,,
Lr.l.:.i' Les berween "Turkish"
n;;, rr
Turkish republic was foinded. gut.ni-E..uir, upon which rhe
leader of the osp, accused
nlrea, nrri- fl,
i c
prorector' and spokesman.
a i i
#" ;.l:n, "r..XT:., ; T: 'h:
ozal of irresponsibilitv in pushing rlr. for,arr ru.t i. p"e,opre.rr Turkey arso scer
soui.r i".ri"liirir;;;;j
There were also demonst."riois ;; rran.i3
;;k"r" and Isranbui d.--.anaing u :il::i y ::i::",::., :, ::,^ :l ln,l* ;j;;. ;.1.,.,. popu a,ion s a s D ro,,,,

il:p riffA sisn

,?x nx *i:* : j:* r:'jti,
r

more acrive Turkish rore in Azerbaijan.

since then, r".r.llrr'p"rr.y ,o*".d r:t'.1i,H:i';
Azerbaijan, and in general uis_d_uis Azerbaijan.
become more acri visl
-,,rn ring., of
type' To begin wirh, ozar senr his wif.
Sovie
;-i,fi :?,
n""rt,
:li":;." ::1*:;
ser.,ra ro Azerbaijan to reassure the
o
ru rk sh influence
lt1kt'h. i. a**"ii".
n n uen ce in
i
^
i-,-l'^'.,
i F;i.+;
J:,:l: policv of impl*R
*.r'ri."r1i.t"1:ltt_: T"X;J':l*il1fl
Azerbaiiani leaders that Turkey *"t n*
i.aifferenr ro their siruarion. And :j"i:i#';:;1,',il'ff :l*J,*[iT:yj:.:!:f"':.T':i:i",','':-'l
wirh Iran was anotherfacron
following rhar, conracrs botrr
"r "rnti"i'lnd
Turkey and Sovier Azerbaijan in.r."*J unofficiar levels berween ;# r._il;.i;,iii?To.trtron iurf..r,.f ,,t
Presi&nt_ Turgur Ozal
dramaticalry, incruding a visir by
: *':,*::|1! J'".
::::il :;,1' ::?: ?: : :: red, ;, ;. ;
"f br'i. ":
in the spring i ra v o
This changed Turkish attitude rln**i
I grud,r"r fJ,?lill.l,'l;:*taiio.nremai;;;*ild;i:-"'il:1.?l'S,,Y:fi".
"
in Turkey's foreign policy o.i..rtrtior, ,.frecring bur fundamenrar shifr
ments in Turkey and internarionar c-hanges,
borh do-.rii. i.r,.top_
especiaily
rural rore
rurar role in Soviet
Soviet A,erbaiian
",:lr]:l:1r-o.^1sie,nifi31r
for Turkey and for these republr*
*i;:iJ
economic, politicat, ,rrrd J
Mllillililiii,il,Tii,.ill,i
war' A discussion of changes in Turkish-foreign poticy
rhe end of rhe cord iriirr',1,i, go"r shourd be purstrerl
u.y.Jri e
ir
X,"lnllli.l?#j li::*_t{ .ii,
onty lertain .,,*,r"r^p;i,,i. p.,rin*i ,o ,* scope "r. " "a.*.L.," n di visions in thcse r
n teres ts ;J';;""'#;Lil
*,iT:;:fJ rI::' ,,.,ay ;:'f,7 [:i:il' iH: "
i
:?:1i:.'::::
The 6rsr poinr is thar in the last few years Evenrs in Soviec Azcrbaijan
Turkey has been going
-presented Iran
acure ser of dilemmas. Burdened'by with a differenr anrl
i""i* with the aren,
" "rsocrarion
 244 Shireen Hunter
would have a more difficult time managing the Azerbaiiani issue. When che
Azerbaif an crisis erupted in January 1990, Iran was in a delicate posirion in
terms of its domesric politics and in its international relarions.
Domestically, the factional power struggle and positioning for the post-
Khomeini period was at irs peak as the Ayatollah Khomeini's health
waned. The war with Iraq had ended in a ceasefire, leaving chunks of
Iranian territory under Iraqi occupation. And the country was
economically devastated, militarily weak, and in the grips of an intense
political debate about the misrakes of its revolutionary decade.
lnternationally, the controversy over the Ayatollah Khomeini's edict in
1989 that the Indian-born British author Salman Rushdie should be killed
on charges of apostasy against Islam in his book Satanic Verses, had
created the worst crisis in lran's relations with the West since the time of
the American hostage crisis. The effects of this crisis were still affecting
Iran-'West relations tn 1991.
The only positive elemenr in Iran's foreign relations at the time was the
improvement of relations with the Soviet Union, which had culminated in
the rhen-speaker of the lranian Parliament Ayatollah Al-Akber Hashcrni
Rafsaniani's trip to Moscow in June 1989.
Thus the eruption of the Azerbaiian crisis presented Iran wirh a difficult
dilemma: if it were to take a high profile in defense of the Azerbaijanis it
would risk scuttling all recent improvemenrs in ries with the Sovier Union;
and if it responded too coolly, it would jeopardize future ties with the Azer-
baiianis.
In addition, understandably, Iran was concerned about rhe ramifi-
cations of events in the Soviet Azerbaijan for its own securiry and terri-
torial integriry. Iran was also concerned abour possible Soviet milirary
action against itself. The ofEcial attitude of the lranian government was
cautious and based on the principle of respect for every country's indepen-
dence and territorial integrity and support for the legitimate aspirations of
Azerbaiiani Muslims.3e
Unofficially, however, opinion on how to respond was divided, with
some segments ddvocating a more activist policy in support of Azerbaijani
Muslims.ao However, the lranian government did nor succumb to these
pressures and continued irs low-key policy. This attitude of rhe lranian
government was manipulared by the ultra pan-Turkists in Sovier Azerbai-
jan and projected as the modern-day version of historic Russo-lranian
collusion to thwart Azerbaiian's aspirations for unity and independence.
After the relative stabilization of the situation in Azerbailan, the Iranian
government tried to expand and consolidate relations wirh the republic.
Apart from economic agreements between the two countries, the lranian
government and unofficial bodies were using cultural and religious affini-
ties to cement ties and to prevent a Turkish monopoly of the republic's
cultural scene. Cultural societies in Iran and in Baku have been set up,
Azerbaijan: searcb for identity 245
entitled "Nezami Associarions" after rhe great Persian-Azerbaijani poer
''Nezanri Gandiavi. A conference commemorating Nezami's 850th a.nivcr-
sary was held in Tabriz, the capital of rhe lranian province of Easrern
Azerbaijan in June 1991, artended by experts on Persian literarure from the
region and the world. Religious leaders from Iran also visited the republic
and there are Soviet Azerbaijani srudenrs in rhe theological schools in
Ghom. Howe'ver, the Iranians are still cautious in completely opening up
the borders.
lfhat is cle'ar is that Iran will be keenly interested in the evolution of
events in the r,:public and their implicarions for its securicy. Iran, ar least at
this point, does not have any irredentist aspiration toward rhe region and is
more concernr:d abour the Sovier Azerbaiian's irredentist claims toward irs
own territory, Irs principal objecrive is ro have a presence there and to
prevent the enrergence of ulrra pan-Turkic tendencies which could expand
to Iran and its Turkic minorities.
However, g;rowing Turkish activism has raised concerns in lran. The
Iranian press lras been saying rhat by failing to take a more activist arritude
toward Azerbaijan, rhe governmenr is allowing Turkey ro implant its
power rhere arid ro turn it into a NATO base which could be used against
Iran.4l Thus, in the immediate future, Iran may try to raise its profile there.
In December 1991, the Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati visited
Baku and reached new agreements with Az_erbaijan. He denied the charges
made in an lzuestia arricle that Iran was againsr Azerbaijani indepen-
dence.42
Let us briefly consider the issue of Armenia and how it would play in
Turkish-Azerbaijani relations. The Armenian leaders, largely because of
pressure by the'Wesr, are seeking to improve ries wirh Turkey.as Bur, as ar
the popular level, anri-Turkish sentiments are strong. Too close Turkish-
Azerbaijani relarions would affect Armenia's efforrs ro improve ties with
Turkey. Iran, by conrrasr, has been a safe haven for Armenians fleeing
Ottoman repression since the nineteenth century.44 Iran, therefore, can
play the Armenian card in its comperition with Turk'ey. In fact, the Arme-
nians, although circugnspecr in their rapprochemenr with lran, have been
keen on creating airlinks with lran, as well as a land bridge over rhe Aras
River.a5
Also Russia's interest and stake in Azerbaijan would acr as a balance
againsr Turkish or Iranian dominarion of rhe republic's economic and cul-
tural life. A cooperative relationship with both Turkey and Iran would besr
serve Turkey's inrerests economically, culrurally, and politically, and
would enhance its independence in these domains.
A promising note in rhis regard is the request of Soviet Azerbaijan ro
ioin the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) which groups lran,
Turkey, and Pakistan. It may lead to expansion of this organizarion and
eventually perhaps include other Soviet Muslim republics.a6
 245 Sbiyeen Hunter
A.zerbaijan: search ideitity 2l
Azerbaiiani-Armenian relations: is reconciliation for
possible?
Irr rernrs of f'urdame'tar issr:es of national o. i ;':,ili i.: * : Jffi r,[T: j:,-":ff ::ff:5
evolurion of rhe nature of Azerbaiian's
ide'tity anci cultLrre, the
rerations with irs two Musrim f i+i:he ibu'e'u';;;;;;
;

!rhis ;ff ::j,,:; : I I

neighbors, Turkey and lran, ..,or. imporrant than any other rerarions l:H ,:'1i;;J:,1t earrier decision and
*ou. ,,,,
j

that the republic may develop"r.with orher counrnes.

But in terms of immediat. prorp..t, for
Azerbaijan's securiry, poriticar
g ro un
rhe Armenians
liii iLll :i,ilT.:
;1
", of
s, r,
":
.Karab"kh;;;i;;"in
a,.
b.rr.,
::;ff
a: *,,i,:.ffi lf:i:i
ff |
stabiliry' and economic growth and prosperity, However' Azerbaijani p'o,.r,, " dil;;;nomic:rry I
"-nlltli .on...n
rerations with Armenra are for Turkey', pr.f...,,.. ,,,
the mosr significanr. The narure of ar.rblil"n,s have common borders *i,t
relarions with Armenia * a
change of hearr' But the
nr..ulti"""*... o,i,.. i*po.r]'n,-r1.,o., i,, ,t,,, ,!
small, land-locked, and isorated christian
considerable impacr on che characrer
communrry - would arso have a
decision ro give rhe area
il;-il;; i"1 yn9r. signi'cant in the srvrer
I
of its relario.,, *irt ,t. iVlur, N"r.i.i.""n, -irh il r*i" e.il.ni"n I
Thus' a repear of rhe kiring of Armenians in "r
and which is physicalty ,.p",;;;;'i;oi-,
would adversely affecr_'wesrerriopinion
Baku inlaniary t990 ir..u",;^; ;; ;;;il, -,n,rr,,r,
t..,it.,, y,
ir, *rrr-*".rr',1' t.tp ar..-
baijan economically. Continued :".f';.; "na
or even worse, ourright war, ;:j::':J?:.I;,j $: 'o,"' "i ",'iu,o,,o-o,,, repubric. rhis change ,,r I/
would prohibit foreign invesrors from
d im m in g i *
Jrffiil:::.:
i ro r pr..r, 7o r ra p i d ;.; ;;;;
wirh Armenia would also undermine " :nt;:,i :;. rl:: I
A:"*.xr,:,
communar
trHi'{,,l. ;*1* :::'ff**i;:i Hfffi: I
Azerbaijr.,, ;;;;l;i,ij por,ri.,n b.t*..n ,r,.'ar..u"iianis
rensions.
uis-d-uis irs rwo Iarge neighbors. In rerms
evolutio', continued confricr with Arrnenia would
of Azerbaiian's a"o.n"rrl polirical bee,n,an endemic
o::ll:l r,' ,f.,;, *ri"" since theand rhe Armenians rr,rvp I
of .r,rr, I
chances, which are already slim, for tt.r.
tions in the near future.
i,.the. urJ"r-i".
""y
a.u.topment of democraric rnsfrrll- ffi, :r;Jil:,'J:,-{:1.":4 :
&i':.d : :., :T ;:, r
rvincil ,.r'*...a ur.,i. ;iG;
";;;;;;,
j*#i::r::il
:t; j
;
j j
The currenr Azerbaijani^readership, which
has strong authorirarran re'_
nT::1ff'lJ;it"J :t-'l:, "i'
iirri"e .,,, i
dencies, would use the conflict *irh n.m.nia tailure.to charge n'n-, i,l,f'llJio*1.tto"""ni teacher
and rhe exrernar rhreat ro tl.re
republic's rerriroriar integriry in order ro jusrify In the 1970s' Arnrenian activism
"ta",r'.--"ri?;;':.i I
undemocraric rure. More with strong nadonalisr ,rd...ur..,,,,,,
dangerous wourd be tharihe A.-.r,i"n-A#bairani in Armenia, i,,...n,.a. lr'.r" I
.."ni.i1"., ffi:
Karabagh could Iead
Pakistan
to rheir ou.r--irii".izarion, much as rhe
dispute over Kashmir led to tt,. *irit".irarion
of the Indian subcontinent. If this were ro
gofar beyond the rwo repubrics and wourd
fr"ro.no_
Indo-
and nuclearizarion
h"pp.n, rhe imprications would
H,,l.LlT?:T
ffi;il1,,.,i:lli..T?:,?i$*i#[,i:'l,Jfi rf"*i]rf:j:ii
1.,;"i;;;
j j'l
destabilize neighboring areas jl"J
as
" .l;Tl' :,: i;.T:n: :!?, y:T: trr;"i l.,H11# lh ;::;;:i:::,,J;l I
"ui'd * o a r, I I ;;;:#fi -1I
-i
u'-"l
na ti on a I ism
Nagorno-Karabagh and the roots of the 'H'JJ:,g,.: lilll,' " " i
I
Armenian-Azerbaijani dispute Increased Armenian nationalism, coupled
The focus of the recent Azerbaijani-Armenian by glasnosr' resurted in rurn in with the opporruniries offcrc,r I
dispure has been confricr_ rn o,rrpouring of Azerbaijani narionarisrrr
ing territorial craims in regard to the mounrarnous
region of Nagorno-
Indeed, it has been ,.cy!d ,r,",
i"rJ,irinll']qr_.nir. nationalism, .r;r;;;i I
Karabagh, a small autonomous area, parr
of Azerbaijan, bur wirh -..g,on,, lized in rhe claim to Karabagh,
ilii;;rercame official J
whelmingly Armenian popuration.-D.rpii. an over- apathy in Azerbaijan ooori," I
a reducrion in ,r,.
Amenian popularion, the Armenianr h"u. a 70 alist groups's' Through^1nd r.a ,"" ,r-'l'J.J.tJo-..,, of popurar"r,a
and nari.,,, I
percenf in rlss, p.o,"lrJ,"al;i""r,racions, urr6,sr;L.-"1.,.',ll
"r"i".i, rhis
Armenia, I
Bur other factors beyond. rerritoriar grievances
have conrributed to
:J;:il1Tft?-T1"i; gaining ,r,.
"rr "i-.i'", ",in.",i,; TiJ;l il
mutual animosity- The ge'resis of the Karlbagh
dispure J"* ,o'ir,. .".r, . A particularly importanr watershed in rhe worsening of Azerbaiiarrr
period of the esrabrishmenr.of conrror by I
the Tsar's possessions in the T."nr."u."rur,
process of carving rerritorial srates out
th* new Bolshevik regime over
ond ,1," U"gin"iii of rh.
f,'.f i',il fi:ffi ',,Ti,ilxff#*l.":.'#*;:**:nff:t*'ji, il
ruarv 28-29' r9gg, bv rhe Azerblij""r
of ther.r. y"rii. These .i",r..r"I*)-i"":j:,i

il

248 Shireen Hunter
sive property damage and large numbers of dead and wounded, with esti-
-ut.i urtyi.tg according to Soviet or dissident sources'
Similar *... ,.rrd. by Armenians on Azerbaiiani communities
"ti".ks
and villages. Rising rension between Azerbaiianis and Armenians also
resulred in large migration of peoples from each republic. These r.efugees,
especially the Arerb"ilani refugees in Baku, became a maior contributor
to
nationalist
the worsening relations betwien the two peoples' increased
passions, 6n"lly leading to the large-scale massacre of Armenians in Baku
in the winter of 199o, ,h" introduction of Soviet military forces to Baku
"id
in January.
3in.. ,h^, time, while there has not been anything resembling what hap-
pened in Baku, Azerbaiiani-Armenian clashes have continued and all
.ffo.r. at reconciliation, including those engineered by Boris Yeltsin, Presi-
dent of the Russian Federation, and Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of
Kazakhstan on September 21, 1991, failed to resolve the problem. The
crash of a helicopter on a peace mission in November 1991 carrying
officials from Azertaiian, Kazakhsran, the KGB, the Defense Ministry, and
the Russian Republic's parliamenr, was blamed by Azerbaiian on the Arm-
enians.S1 The outlook for a quick resolurion of this problem is not
promising. Rather, with the Sovier Union's disintegration and the rush by
toth Ar.r,enia and Azerbaiian to form national armies, the risk of outright
war between the two republics has increased'
The principal culprit: religion, ethnicity, or the legacy of Soviet
imperialism and mismanagement?
while rhe dispure over the territory of Nagorno-Karabagh is the
immediate and most tangible cause of Armenian-Azerbaiiani conflict,
other factors have also conqributed to this problem' During the crisis of
January 1990 and the massacre of Armenians in Baku, many
wesrern
Lbr.ru"rr, especially journalisrs, referred to religious and ethnic differences
berween the^Azerbailanis and the Armenians as the underlying causes of
conflict between the two PeoPles.
No doubt these factors are important, but nevertheless, undue emphasis
on rhem, especially religion, should be avoided. In fact, the case of the
Armenian communities in neighboring Iran, including the Iranian Azerbai-
jan, proves that religious differences have never been an insurmountable
obstacle to peaceful and even friendly coexistence'
since rhe safavid times in lran, Armenian communities have lived in
safety in that country. Admittedly, non-Muslims do not enioy equal rights
wirh Muslims in Islamic societies run by Islamic law. But they enioy pro-
rection and freedom to Practise their faith. In secularized Muslim societies,
they enjoy equal sratus with other citizens. This was increasingly the case
in lran under the secularizing influence of the Pahlavis"
Azerbaijan: search for identity 249
The situation worsened after the Islamic revolution as Islamic law and
morality was enforced with greater rigor. But there was no gross violation
of the Armenian cornmtrnity's rights, at least not more than those of other
Iranians whc, did not fit the Islamic mold promoted by rhe new
government,
In shorr, rhe main problem has never been religion but rhe lack of
democracy. 1'hus, religious abuses thar the Armenian community in
NKAO suffen:d, such as the destrucrion of churches, especially during the
oeriod rhar Gaider Aliev was the KGB boss of Azerbaijan, were the con-
i.q.r.n." of anti-religious dimensions of Communism and not the anti-
Christianism <>f Islam.52
The erhnic factor is more important, given the identification of Azerbai-
janis as "Turks," and in view of the unhappy experience of the Armenian
communiry in Otroman Turkey even before the tragic events of 1915,
which is imprinted on their collective consciousness as wilful genocide.
But again, rhis facror should not be exaggerated, Certainly rhe linguisri-
cally Turkified Iranian Azerbaijanis have lived peacefully with the Arme-
nians. Even in Kemalist Turkey inter-communal relations have improved.
Nevertheless, the Armenians' historic memory of suffering at the hands of
rhe "Turks" colors their present attitudes. Thus every Azerbaijani-
Armenian conflict acquires dimensions which go beyond what is justified
by the specific incident as they merge with rhis collective consciousness of
Armenian suffering.
Erhnic anirnosity steadily increased following the introduction of
Russian power and the relative favoring of the Armenians as fellow Chris-
tiarrs. Thus even in earlier times, envy and disparity in social and economtc
conditions have been more important than mere ethnic differences.s-r
Repressive policies adopred by Communist regimes only exacerbated
rhese rensions. These policies, plus the manipulation of inier-ethnic conflict
both by the local Communist leadership and central power in Moscow rn
rhe battle between reformers and hard-liners' as well as the center's vacilla-
rion and confusion during the early part of the crisis in 1988 and Gorba-
inept efforts to keep a crumbling union together, have
chev's desper^te
^nd
been principal culprits in exacerbating Azerbaijani-Armenian animosity.5a
Indeed, some observers have gone so far as to accuse the communist
esrablishment in Azerbaijan of complicity with hard-liners in Moscow in
provoking the worst of Azerbaiiani-Armenian clashes, namely those in
Sumgait in 1988 and in Baku in 1989*1990. These riots were supposed ro
show the dangers of perestroika and glasnost, and thus discourage the
in Moscow from pursuing them. In January
central government 1990,
arracks against the Armenians were allegedly provoked in order to pave the
way for the introduction of the Russian army to Baku in order to crush the
Azerbaijani independence movemenr, This move at the time was viewed as
pro-Armenian by rhe Azerbaijanis. They maintained that undue influence
 250 Sbireen Hu.nter
Azerbaijan: searcb for identity Z.5 l
of rhe Armenians within the Moscow establishmenr was
the reason for rhis interpenetrated Asian possessions of the Tsar herve
move. lr is very dif6cult ro ascerrain rhe veraciry cif conrributed t,,
rhese.r,r.g.r. Buc rhere heighrened sense of erhnic and cu"rttrrar p:rrticur:rrism.
seems to be enough circumstanrial evidence ro This increased scr
support the rhesis that some
degree of. manipularion by locar and cenrral authorities was of separareness has sown rhe seeds of furure conflicrs.
involved, both in the Sumgaic and Baku evenrs. indeed In cenrral Asia, fo.r_ example, because of the communisrs,
building srraregies, suddenly rhe mixed Turko-Iraniun-rrtumic'.urtur. narr.
Certainly the attitude.of rhe_centrar governmenr roward
rhe issue of rhe region has become divided into Tajik, Uzbek,
Nasor19:K-ara bagh, and the. confl icti ng .r"i-, of
Azerba,irjan A.-.r,i" wirh hisroric falsi'cation practised by ih.'r,ew sysrem,
;;; n;;;..iog",l,
since i.987 largely depended on the rwo repubricr'
pori,ion, "nd
on the issue policy has been ethnic and cultuiar conflicr and unrearistic
the legacy of tl
of independence or remaining wirhin the union. Tirr,
1990 Armenia seemed to be moving toward indep.nde.,c"
*h.r, Ly A,.,g,..rr claims by these new entiries toward rheir neighbors. irrederrtr
*nir" Azerbai_ The u.r, .*"*pr.
jan indicated thar ir was wiiling ro remain in rhe u"i";;-';h. central rhis is the fabrication of rhe notion of Norrhern
and Sourher'
government began ro shift toward a more pro-Azerbail".,i In addition ro this process of state- and nation-building, nr"ruoi1,,,,
during the Azerbaijani-Armenian clashes *hi.h rook
poriiro.,. Thus *t
ruared erhnic and religious parricurarism rarhe*rrr.-r"ii..i.gi.r, o...,
pr"..'i.'rrr"y rssr, inrernationalism, Sovier policies, s.uch as playrng soci,rrr
soviet rroops and Azerbaijani forces cooperated one erhnic group ag.rrr
the Armenian forced displacement of ethnic groupr, such
miliria. "g"ir,r, 11o1h.er' as rhe rransfer of slri
The immediate cause for rhese crashes was sovier efforrs Meshketian Turks ro predomi'a.,trf sun'i uzbekisran.
ro disarm Arm- borders without adequare concern abour ethni. Drawing r
enian militia which the-repubrican governmenr rr"a p.o-ir.Jr;;; una ti.,g;irr-J-f".r.r*
but had persian-speaking Tajiks
not been able to comprete. But the Armenians accused
the cenrrar govern- :":! ."t.leaving the of samarkand and Bukrr,*
menr-of using this prerext to punish Armenia for having in Uzbekisran - also conrribured to und .,.lru.ui .ir"rry'"ii"r,,,,,,
new Union Treary, and thus sided with Azerbaiian.ss
i"ir.d;; sign rhe siry' In the case of NKAO, the fare"rhni.
o[ rhe region was nor decided o'rrr
orhers relared rhis ro basis of its ethnic composirion nor on the principre
-the
intra-leadership .or,fli., in Azerbaijan becween
determination.
of narionar scrf
Mutalibov and Hasan Hasanov, the Azerbail"ni .q"i*-r"*'lf p.i*.
Minisrer. The Karabagh issue has been manipurarei
o As long as the central governmenr pursued a total
by uoriou, facrions
policy of repressir,ll
and groups in Azerbaiian in efforts to gain power rhese feelings were kept benearh rhe surtace. But
and influence.r6 as soon as the lid w,r,
Bur perhaps more rhan any factor orhei rhan lifted under glasnost, ro Gorbachev' s urter surprise these
p"riri."i."pi.rrion pouring our.
feelings cilllG
economrc stagnarion, rhe inherenr inconsistencies
of the notio'n-ol .,ro.i"l_
"nd
ist inrernationalism" and irs contradicrion with th.
.,.tion-i.rrtdi.,g poti_ . Economic sragnation, environmentar damage, and other socioecon,rrrrr
shorrcomings of rhe sovier sysrem furrher exacerbated
cies of sovier leadership which began under Starin t,"r. .".,riuured ethno-culturar irrri
currenr difficulties nor only in-Azerbaijan, but to mositv' In fact, rhe Azerbaijani-Armenian conflicr
i"1rn.;;;;;r*;;;; rion to irs obvious territorial dimensions, has been
L;;;;;;i, in
"; affected
"fr"
soviet empire. The essence of sociarisr inrernarionalism
was that crass by all ",t,r,
thcre
Interesrs and lovalries rather rhan erhnic and facrors. probably under a.rruly open
rerigiou; ;;;;i";sms and
allegiances would consriture principar u""at rrninf;il;;:'sociarist
-rl;i.rl;;;i;;;;;lu,y
petng system the Karabagh Armenians' desire f". pru,
society' But a socialisr society cannor be created
oi.rnigi.,t- t,lot o.,ty th.
Armenia would have becomi much ress inrense, if "ni6;;;Lr, *,rrr
not tora[y-"ii*innt",t.
old socioeconomic and poriticar strucrures have ro Moreover, if inter-repubric curturar and other ;"";;;;;'.lop..^,i.,,,
u"" air-u",red, but had been kept at a high rever, rhe Armenians would
peoqle.must be cured of iheir religior* u'i narionarist nor have f"rt ,.pu."t",.
and ethno-cenr.c from rheir kin and rhus wourd nor have seen any need
procfivtrles. for rerriroriar rerrrrl
This goal 6carion.57
... .was supposed to be achieved by what the soviets called In rhe more recenr pasr, the same lack of understanding
"inrernarionalist education." Even as lare as r9g7_'9gg, of the forces rrf
Gorbachev ethnicity by the soviet.leadership, especiaily Gorbachev,
blamed rhe
_ourpouring of nationarist senrimenrs and ethnic viorence misha.ndling of the Armenian-Azerbaiyani conflicr.
.In,.rL,rr.a ,,, ,r,u
-" -consr.rl
throughout th-e empire on the governmenr's laxness in tnde.d,
inrernarionalist edu_ complaint in rhe Soviet Union and abioad was
cation' The fact, however, is rhar erhnicity and religion rhat Gorbachev had rrrr
stronger forces of group identificarion than class.
rr"u. prou"n undersranding of the nationariries probrem nor
any rear interest in ir, rr'r
Moreover, in a paradoxical way, the soviet poriry of any clear plans to deal with it.s8
carving our separ-
ate terrirorial and culrurar entities of ethnicary, .utiu."rty, It seems rhat the Soviet readership was srunned ro 6nd our rhar
rlre
sovier Union was nothing but a coioniar empire,
"ni..ilgiourty and rhar as soon cr
 r!ffii,',,,, Azerbaiian: search for identity 253
,ffit.',i.i
252 Sbireen Hunter
,
and then the dismissal of
would exPress rheir anti- and his replacement by Abdul Rakhman Vezirov,
opportunity was offered. the non-Russrln l::r'le
rl:l
of Ayaz Mutalibov' Moreover' following
feelings' Vazirov and the comrng to Power
colonial sentlments ln an tlpsurge oI narionelist
.i
int?ru.rtion in Baku, the Azerbaijanis, including the
Moscow,s military Gorba-
and resenrmenr toward
Thus,Gorbachev's,r"ttmt"t-thatbyexpressingnationalistfeeiingsand
were stabbing at the heart of i{ i.rl.*r,lp, de,veloped a srrong dislike ofo-freasons, over
their desire fo. ind.ptndtnlt, tht Armenians .ilt .iJ, p.rr"n, although for a variety ties with Moscow' including concern
of rhis lack of awareness' ln addition' as
;;;r;;iL; *^, th.^ait"ttgou"'n-tnt's
"'ult efforts to hold the union together # ["r^b"gh, thc:y maintained reasonable Lggl' the Azerbai-
noted before, ,t,. ..tt""i of .!s Thus, wher.r the coup attempt took place in August
without at the same ti-.."o-pt"tely.reverting ro rhe repre.ssive methods
policy ffi iani leadershilr was pl.ased' It'deed, Azerbaijan's president Ayaz Mutali-
of milirary Power' led to a of his satiifacrion ar Gorba-
the past, despite ".t;;i;i indeed on rhe entire
ffi fi;,';;;; ii,. it-"'** visiting Iran, expressed
inconsistency o" the NKAO issue' as
u"itt"'iot ""t # chev's dismissal.fe l-t. i*tt denitd that he had done so' But these denials
".,a
problem. W forces' On September 5' Moscow Radio broad-
---in"
nationality r .---.:-- anlmoslty
^-. alJ no, satisfy' opposition
..rui, *", the exacerbation of rhe conflict and growing ffi caStareportthatMutalibovhadsurvivedanassassinationattemptand
toward the Russians and the was denied by Azer-
by both the Armenta";-;;J rhe Azerbaijanis ,W
blamed tire A:zerbaif an Popular Front for ir. But this
central government in Moscow' rela- .fd baijani sources.5o
What the i*fii* for the future of Armenian-Azerbaiiani ,1w Indeed, Ayaz Mutalibov managed to consolidate his
power and be
"Uou"
is thar the ."..""ir.".", or r^r^u"t h is untenable. lt is very unlikely
in the election on September 8 in which he ran unop-
tions Azerbaiiani elected as prer;ident
under
that an overwhelmingly Armenian area could remainthe current situation i$,1
;;;. il! ",.,fy other candidare, a Social Democrat once af6liated wirh
jurisdiction' no*.u.iJh;;; ;tt no easy alternatives to his candidacy at the lasr minute'
Armenia' nor a repatri-
1$l
ipp, Zurau.ht Ali Zade, withdrew
'--er.ru"ii"n
either. For instance, n"i't't' the return of NKAO to -,'l
moved quickly to declare irs independence as ir became
clear
was no more and rhat the so-called
ationoftheArmeniatp"p"f"'i"t'areplausiblealternatives'Theso-called
envisaged keeping the area by';;;i;-tigz rh^, rhe Soviet Ur.rion
;'co*_o.*ealth of lndependent stares" did not have much chance of
Baku plan mediated Uy!lf rrit and Nazarbayev
as part of Azerbaiia,,'Ut" "L'o holding
free elections and granting NKAO the Soviet Union inrensified the po*'er
;i;;;;g it. "l-he disintegiation of
complete self-rule. S,'t,-'o far rhese !lat'' h"t"
not been implemented' leadership. Ir also led to the flaring up of
Moscow or other Asian ,ii"ggr""*i,i,in th" er".6aijani
Indeed, it seems in..*'i"gly unlikely that either
the conflict wirh Armenia over Nagorno-Karabagh.
ln fact, the problem of
rhis problem. Thus, some kind
Republics could find " p"i."rrr solution to .- mediation and inter- iJ;;t; K^rabagh and rhe Azerbaiiani power struggle became inextric-
of internation"t - ir,.l,.tiitg ptth"p' United Nations ably linked rogether.
they were left
vention appear necessary'
and after a period of conscious of the facr rhat with the end of the soviet Union
However, once the ilfaO t1ispute is .settled' to themselves to settle the Karabagh issue' the two sides took measures
and Armenia cannot live In
healing, there ls.,o ui"Utt-'""'on *'hy Azerbaiian i.J to fierce fighting in the winrer and spring of 1992' January'
To achieve this goal' however' in addition to 'Jni.i an acr
in peace, if not in ,",;l;;it' A,ler'aiian decided uring Karabagh under irs direct iurisdiction,
should be taken not to exacerbate 'o uf the fighting the
resolving th. fr.uU"gft ptoUttrn, care
pan-Turkic which contributed ,o ,h. fr"ri.rg of conflict. During
the Armeniarrr' r".tiigr'of being encircled. An
irredentist,
exacerbl': Arme- nr.rt-"ii""i, suffered serious ,.u-..r.t and a large number of Azerbaiianis
fit .t of iould do iust thar' Kholali and Agdarn
were killed by the Armenian forces, particularly in the
the part A?erbaijan 'ftlight'.the
alone' Viewed in this
il""j
""f i".fl"LJ"f .".ittfement and being
influence in Azerbaiian villages. These reverses convinced the Azerbaijan Popular Front and the
pJl.y "f ou".rly p.omoting Turkey- as ihe main leadership to ofpJn.rlr, of President Ayaz Mutalibov.to force him out office'old com-
of In view
could backfir", .u..,--*i.h"r"."nt efforrs of the Armenian divisions within the
ol in. r.rg_enred narure of the ApF and the
of Azerbaiian's
improve ties with TurkeY' munist esiablishment after Mutalibov's removal, the future
leadership became very clouded. Elections were scheduled for Jtne 1992
i, surprised many rhar they were held. vhile various faffions pro-
Post.Augustlgglcoupdevelopmentsandoutlookforthecharacterof "ij
Azerbaii ani government ...a.awithdevelopingtheirseparatemiliria'adevelopmentwhichdidnot
,"g", *.ff for Azerba]ian's stabiliry, elections provided citizen particrpa-
ThecommuntstestablishmentinAzerbaijanwasnevercomfortable to the presidency' APF
tion through , .,o.,-uiol.tt outlet' The man elected
with perestroika and glasnost' However'. they manipulated^these'issues' i."a., RbJ Fez llcibey, promised to regain Nagorno-Karabagh for Azer-
and even more so ,fr. fi"r"U"gh problem, in
their internal in-fighting' This
baiian'
led to the dismissal of Kamran Bagirov
"nd -".,ip.tl"tiot'i'st
in-hghring
 --------
254 Shireen Hunrer

The .Azerbaijani readership crisis made resolurion search for idtntity

problenr r'or-e dif6curr-by making ir exrremery of rhre Karabagh 2S5
t".d ro. are exacerl,. ,,ed by rF,e
leader to be flexible. In facr, o.,. oith..h"rgu, "ny"Azerbaiiani
againsrpresident fii!,. i;,;;
1:l;:O"rr,oo presence of tw,,i"narge"
neigh-
was rhat he u'ras roo flexible on this rnarrer.
1992, various mediation efforts by lran,
Muralib.v
A^s a_resurt, throughout sp.ng t;*'i.ilil*?{rE:i::"[iT'i:i:,r.#ilil*tru*";m::1,
the GSCE, and the United Nations
ro solve_rhis pnoolem did nor yield any resulrs.
. Another consequence of the heighrened Karabagh il';ri";'J.-'i..#r!'Jr1]:iT.":y:li'il*#'#i[.H+*lhf*
o:ttbaijan were to go
leadership probrems was --or. intervenrionisc
jan's crisis and Azerbai_
zarion. ciu.n ,n.l1lll^tl roo far in self-Turkeyi.
rurkrsh policy
uis-d-uis Azerbaijan, partry in view" of
ApF's pro-Tu.kish p"n-ru.tirt distincrA;;;"""'"1'.:iii:l:'r"+il:i;-'"?*iJ;?,:iti::*11,H;i;
tendencies, whereas Mutaribov was ftlore
even-handed i""nJ .L'rra ro rera_ ' 'Bi;l:"fi:::'_Tn::Um.:*
tions wirh Azerbaijan's rwo big neighbors.
Turkish leaders;;:;'", Turgur
ozal and Mesut Yilonaz op"nly Jdrrocut.d a more
Tu_rkish policy on the issue of Nagorno_Karabagh.
active and inrrusive for srabirirv and e1o13mi. i:l l. coultvr
er"*iil-r, i'.r...tnrio.,,
ruture prospe*,
with Armenia. wirh'ut
In sum' as was noted earrier_in ihis .rr"y, ,n.?"pid
disintegration
union broughr ro rhe fore Azerbarran's many conrradictronsof rhe :illi:i::ffi l:l;"ir:l:;:;;i*1.-;:l$;;;bi"nmayc,,,
Tri:r
divisions' consequently, on the eve of irs independenc.,-;;;;;r.public,s
[uture seemed very uncerrain.
and
o"ver-m n,
iIi ra ri za ri o

Civen where it is locared,

"
r, a a.t-" y ;
; ;:;::?j :;:::#TT1ilil
Azerbaiian w
"na
ini..n",rr"i'o",,,,.s. oursiders *,,i,,11:.jtTe_be
drawn in
Conclusions ""'""
Soviet Azerbaijan i,:.p.".ple are going rhrough-a process thar
#i:l'lJ: drflti,jtjti*::+,;;;-_:,'
jan's furure would be
of rhe new narions ofl"d
rhe Third^worrd"experienced during rhe
many "ffecred-L;;h*';;ooens
Independenr srates. r","r
.i,*ii,",i""
":
ro rhe Commor
I970s knorvn as rhe process o[ narion-buirding. 1960s and ii'in. Russian presence w,
In doing so, rhey are rrying
ro rediscover rheir o11r. In chis exercise, rh.y
are U.,.i..,.a Uy cie So,riet
of h istoric faisi fi ca rion, r"r."a-i"ri.,izarion, a nd ii,',':'.""".1i*"::,fi:i?:?:::r."*,i:,:=q.;d;;;;:
legacy
what rhey discover about rheir own history and R ussi fi carion.
curtural roors is ofren
of rs fra
i g m en ta t i o n
. o r a r., i
"
Iran whicir
r, i, gt'fi :,.ffi....T fl .:l,:ilT
"'
i j
incomparible wirh rheir currenr and future
vision of th.-r.ru.r. Thur, ff::-*:iT:n}1if" "I^o1,...,uinry wourd increas
some of rhe Azerbaijani inte'ectuars
are engaging in historic revisionism
of

|
their own and are reinterpreting hisrory inirder to 6r their
history- is a pracrice rhar ail nacionr .ng"g.
presenr goars.
'Historic revisionism, romanticism, and even mythification of one,s
#,.i'".ji#
#:l'::**i :' f.*",' ffi l*: * ri:lt frif #ft
in ro varying degrees. Bur in the

flt', I
case of soviet Azerbaijan, if pushed tlo"fur,
it couid J..rL ,.rio.rs prob_
lems for them in their external ties.
This search for identiry and efforts ar narion-buirding
rrufu i', in.:; rH i r1j*r,h;il,T:.}ili#Fil
fisIr would
are happening in also allow-A.*.bi,i;';;i:;
a highly conrrolled atmoiphere within o n"r.o*
these issues and the range of.parricipants
erire. popurar debate on
are rimited. Thus, wharever irs I
rerarionships *i;-;;, neighbors
respecrive in,.,.,rr. nder
;+j,:;
,",* more consrructive
r-.f
iftii:ii.'!fr.;*-;, I
#;;;X.ff :::1,ffff; :*, il;;,1 I
an< ,;
ourcome' it may not be very lasting. In rhis process,
Azerbaijan is feering
:::,i#:j:r
new and expanded r"'-' ,.,i'.ut,,,,;i
the impact of several of irs Jhnic, ting,rlrti., .uf
"rp..ti r,rr"l ,.tigiou, "?'r.eionar economi. I
composirion. The people are divided as difFerenr ;r;r;;;.;',i."na
I

one facror (religion) or anorher (language) ro, o,rrr of .l

ar times, vasrry differenr
degrees.
Moreover, there are extremisr rendencies within
f:*:
complicate problems
"f n"rion_Uuil,ting
tragmentation along sectarian and other lines. ".,d
different groups which
increase the risk of
Azerbaijan,s p.obl._, of
,i
'rl

.J
*-t1*t+**l;nit*p*t*'*ffi|
#
 260 Shireen Hunter
caucasus," Souiet Nationalities Suruey, united states Department of srare,
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, no. 15, August 22' 1988' p. 10'
52 See Ronald Suny, "The Revenge of the Past: socialism and Ethnic conflict in
Transcaucasia ," Neut Left Reuiew, no. 184, November/December 1990' See
also Saroyan, "The Karabakh Syndrome."
53 On Gorbachev's vacillarion, see Mark saroyan, "Trouble in the Transcauca-
sus," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 45, no. 2, March 1989' p'
.54 On the pro-Azerbaiian tilr, see "Armenians and Azerbailanis clash in Two
Soviet Villages," Christian Science Monitor, May 7, 1991' p. 5.
5J On Mutalibov-Hasanof rivalry, see ibid.
55 On the Armenians' cultural grievance, see Saroyan "The Karabakh
Syndrome."
57 On Gorbachev's lack of understanding of nationality problems, see Ludmilla
Alexeyeva "Unrest in the Soviet Union," Wasbington Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 1,
Winter 1990, pp. 63-77. Also, Quentin Pecl, "Dagger at Heart of Perestroika,"
Financial Times, January 18, 1.99O, p. 17 .
58 See Elizabeth Fuller, "The Azerbailani Presidential Election: A one Horse
Race," Report on the LSSR,vol. 3, no, 37, September 13, 1991, p' 14-
11 Armenia: the nation awakens
NORA DUDWICK
18'
In a speech ro rhe Armenian parliament in ocrober, 1990, Levon Ter-
Perrosian observed thar the "Armenian people finally woke up from irs
delightful slumber" ro realize rhe realiries of its situation.l In his commenr,
Ter-Petrosian,, now president of Armenia, was using one of the most
popular tropes of nationalism.2 Ninereenrh-cenrury nationalist discourse
de6ned dr:velopmenr of vernaculars and the exploration of folklore
-the
which formed the first phase of European nationarism as rhe...redis-
covering' of something deep-down always known."3 Metaphors of
awakening, rediscovery, and regeneration, all of which appear wirh fre-
quency in Arnrenian public discourse, are apr for conceptu alizing national
sentiment in Armenia, for which, despite an unbroken presencc of nearly
3,000 years on rhe Armenian plateau in Asia Minor, ..hisrory has been a
broken trail."4
The formation of the Armenian People
It has yet to be ascertained whether Armenians originated in wesrern
Asia Minor or wherher rhey were among the narive inhabitanrs of rhe hieh-
lands of easrern Anarolia. Nor is it known where rhe term "Armenia,""or
the indigenous rerm, "Hayastan" originates,s although Greek and persian
sources refer ro "Armina" and "Armenians', as early as 500 B.C.6 The
Armenian tribes were 6rsr recognized around 500 B.c., with the collapse of
the wealthy kingdom of urartu, centered in van (in present-day Turley).7
'lwhether
Uramu was pri.marily Armenian, wirh a small ruling elite from a
different ethnic stock, is today a conrentious issue for Armenian hisrorians
eager to prove that Armenians were indigenous to easrern Anatolia.
Articles on Armenia's relation to the kingdom of Urarru periodically
appear in the local press.s Polirically, early Armenia was made up of
feuding dynastic principaliries, a partern which conrinued throughoui rh.
medieval period, making Armenia a prey to larger neighboring empires. At
the same time, this pattern probably ensured the survival of a^ distinct
ethnic identity since part of Armenian territory continually maintained
some autonomy and thereby resisted assimilationist pressures.e
The adoprion of chrisrianity as the state religion ar the beginning of rhe
261
 262 Nora Dudwick
Armenia: the nation at*,ak-es 16.l
fourth ce*tury', and the crearion of a phoneric, thirry'-six character alphabe
.r
soc.:, i."
a century lacer under Church sponsorship, played a major role in mai,rraiir,
and.egtons, beginr,,,rg wirh a purely culrural
phasi. ",s
r.r'h,,::r
and lirer.uv
ing a distinctive Armenian identity, for "in a real sense, Armenians did noa
to a militanr camnaign for the "national idea_"17
iecl
even fully becorne 'Arrneniar.rs' until rhey acquired their own distinctively
Armenian religion . ."lo In A.D. 4sl, at rhe Battle of Avarayr, st. Vardan The first awakening
Mamikonian and his 696 men died resisring rhe persian Empire's arrernpr a[e "prehisrory"' of Armenian narionalism can be
to impose Zoroastrianism on the Armenians. Today, Armenians commem- dated to rhe sixteerrrlr
cenrury, when an Armenian currural renaissance
orate this date as a reminder of their willingness ro martyr themselves for b.g"" l;-,h; diasp'rr,
The use of rhe printing press by Armenian commerciar
their christian faith. what is signiGcant, however, is that for the early ro a srream of publications in Armenian,^incruding entrepreneurs lctr
chronicler of this evenr, ir was nor just a religious conflicr. According to menian Bible (Amsrerdam, 1.666), and the 6rsr
ri.-Hrri'p.i"ted Ar-
Elishe, Vardan and his men foughr the persians to defend rheir craditional (Madras, iournal of Armenian affairr
customs and way of life, evidence thar a sense of distincriveness already
L7 94). Afi rhese pu blicarions disseminated E"."p;;;
learning amons Armenians.rs A. very signi6cant R.naissance
existed among Armenians some 1,500 years ago.ll After the sixth cenrury
culru.ral awakening was rhe ..dir.o.,..y"and
f";;;:;..;i-';
-"i Armeni*r
schism between rhe Armenian and Byzanrine churches, Armenia formed a repubric"ri"" Armenii,l
classical religious, riterary and hisroric"i ,.*,,
distinct cultural unit between rhe classical wesr and the persian east.l2 by rhe rra"r.r,ir".i* monks,
an Armenian Benedictine order founded in Venice
Split between the Persian and Roman (and larer, Byzantine) empires by the in the eighreenrh cen"
rurv're The Mekhirarists' efforts were aimed
end of rhe fifrh cenrury, Armenians conrinued to enioy relative auronomy
menian communities of the ortoman Empire,";;i;;;d.";;i, f.ii*"ro or_
despire rendering nominal fealry ro rheir imperial rulers.lr "u", ,rt./*.J.".li.rut ,,o, ,,,
transform cultural views into poridcar trends."2o
waves of invasions by Turkic tribes from cenrral Asia in rhe eleventh Hirro.i."i
cal Armenian heroes who had resisted foreign
cenrury, followed by the Mongol invasions of rhe rhirreenth and fourteenrh dominarion "Jmychologi_
were offered r,
Armenians primarily as sources of pride anJ spiriruar
centuries, stimulated Armenian migration to cities rhroughour Europe, u"tu.r.-ir,"
of the "narion," however, remained .urtrrr"i rarher i-t,"" 'p"iiri.al concept
Russia, and rhe Middle Easr. By rhe end of rhe Gfreenrh ..nr.,.y, ih. antr
wirhin rhe ottoman Empire, where the bulk of ,h;
ottoman Turks had esrablished themselves in consrantinople, and rvere A;;;l"lloput"tion
srill formed an impoverished, semi-lirerare, often Turkish-speaking
extending rheir power inro Anarolia. The orroman Empire iuled religious mass,
rhe "nation" as a self-consc^ious enriry consisted
minorities through rheir religious leaders; rhus, the patriarch of rhe Arme-
clerical and wealthy classes,2t
pri-"rily ;;,h. miilet,tt
nian Aposrolic church became rhe functional head of rhe Armenian com-
Following the Mekhitarisrs modificarion of the
munity, or millet. The church became rhe single mosr imporranr insciru- ancient literary ran-
guage, grabar, Khatchatour Abovian popurarized
tion of Armenian life within the ottoman Empire,la and "from rhe fiftee'th
nacular with the pubricarion of his ,,tuer, wounds"
,"ai."ily ,,,oJifi.d u..-
to the late ninereenth cenrury, whoever led rhe church spoke for what nacular subsequently became the medium
of Armenia. This ver-
there was of the nation."15 ir,.ri.ringt ;utior,"tir,i.
A sixteenth-cencury rreaty with rhe persian Empire divided Armenia inro
literary revival in which appeals
-.r. -"d. "fto"r,Armenians in rhe
a western portion under ottoman hegemony and an eastern portion under ! empire ro "wake up ... . from your death_inviting ottoman
ig'or"n..,
state"tu;b";-of
I remember your pasr glory, mourn your present
Persian hegemony. The new boundary rransformed Armenia into a perpe- ,l of wrerchedness and
heed the example of orher enlightened n"tion,
tual rhearer of war, as military campaigns, pillage, deportations and iil . . .,,22
In rhe mid-nineteenth ..nt,rry,,, culrural pracrices,
famine during rhe following cenruries accelerared the depopulation of rhe as summed up by the
conception of "narion," graduaily displaced ."rigior,
Armenian hinterland, ultimately turning Armenians into a minoriry in
ethnic identity for a new Armenian middre,crass "r-r-h;!J"l"r,ro, or
their homeland.16 In contrast to rhe impoverishmenr of rhe Armenian writers, reachers, and smail.manufacturers, who
of doctors, Iawyers,
heartland, a prosperous commercial bourgeoisie developed in rhe urban
ov.er social and poriticar life in rhe miilet.23
chailer.i .rrl. control
diaspora. It was among these communities that a nationaiist consciousness this new riberal class achieved
a limited democratization of rhe miilet administration,
6rst developed. Now permanent "outsiders," Armenians turned rheir which turned its
arrenrion ro spreading.,rireracy and enlightenment
attention to rhe plight of the distanr but longed-for homeland. In rhese among the Armenran
popularion. Bur mosr liberals focused thJir efforts
wirhin
cities, they were also exposed ro the revolutionary and nationalist currents
for as one liberal editor wrote, "the patriarcr, i, rr,"r.,-ii.. tor,rr"n,r'opr.,
which began to sweep Europe in rhe eighreenrh and nineteenrh cenruries.
educared elemenrs of the narion are there. In ii"olrri* "ra
As in Europe, nationalism among Armenians developed unevcnry among one word, the great strengrh
of the narion is there."za
 264 Nora Dudwick Armenia: tbe nation awakes 265

The growth of cultural nationalism in the urban centers contrasted with Table 11,.1,. Distribution of tbe Armenian population, 19gg
the lack of narional consciousness in the rural hinterland, where rhe very
concept of "Armenia" had been lost for the mass of Armenians unril ir was Sovier Union 4,500,000 Latin America 100,000
rediscovered and reinvented by intellectuals in the nineteenth century.2s Armenia 3,100,000 Canada 50,000
Sentimenr in the countryside consisted of "the simple artachment to a land United States 750,000 Balkans
invested wirh historical and spiritual significance," and the goal of the Middle East 6c Libya, (Bulgaria, Greece, Romania) 50,000
peasantry was the creation of an environment which allowed them to pre- Egypt, Ethiopia 475,000 Australia 25,000
serve traditional norms.26 In contrast, the cultural awakening in the cities $Testern Europe 400,000 Far East 12,500
stimulated a new generation of educated provincial Armenians, such as the lran 140,000 Africa 5,000
self-taught clergyman from Van, Mkrtich Khrimian, who in his concern
for the welfare of the masses "began a shift in Armenian political thought source: adapterl from claire Mouradian, De staline i Gorbatcheu (1990), p. 169.
'where she has
from an abstract nationalism to a concrete populism . . ."27 By redefining Provided a range of fgures I have averaged them to produce a single
estimate for a given region.
patriorism as love of the fatherland, the nation was linked to particular
territory, a further step in the development of a political program.
Despite the millet reforms and the guarantees for Armenian security were executed or died on death marches across Turkey.3r Refugees poured
which the European powers forced the Ottoman Empire ro make after rhe inro Russian Armenia, where they consrirured ar leasr one fJumh^of the
Russo-Turkish war of 1877-t878, the economic and political situation in population by rhe beginning of the rwenries.32
the provinces steadily deteriorated. The war had devastated the Armenian Ir is impossible ro exaggerare rhe signiGcance of rhis event for conremDo-
countryside, and the Sultan's repression against the Armenians for their rary Armenian rhinking, borh in Armenia and in rhe diaspora. The seno-
perceived pro-Russian orientation and increased poliricization resulted in cide virrually eliminared Armenians from nine-re.tth, of rheir hisrJrical
the massacres of 1895-1895, which took 300,000 Armenian lives.28 homeland in easrern Anatolia, leaving them only rhe small, mangled rerri-
By the early nineteenrh century, the annexation of rhe Crimea and tory in the Russian caucasus. Throughout the Middle Easr, Europe, and
Eastern (Persian) Armenia by Russia introduced new security and pros- Norrh America, it created new or vastly enlarged diasporan commr-rniries
perity to the Russian Armenians.2e As in the Ottoman Empire, a new gener- where rhe memory of rhe genocide served as a virtual "ih^rr., of identitv."
ation of secular, nationalist intellectuals emerged by mid-cenrury. Their even among families who had nor direcrly experienced ir.13 Since then,
socialist and revolutionary ideology had a profound impact on the pro- Armenians have repearedly soughr an official acknowledgement of the
grams of the Armenian political parties. Although two of these parries, rhe genocide by Turkey, which in recenr years has poured a significant amounr
Hunchak parry (Geneva, 1.887), and the Dashnak party (Tbilisi, 1890) were of money inro a sophisticared denial.3a In rhe afterm"rh of rhe senocide.
founded outside Armenia proper, rheir efforts were directed primarily ar Armenians were willing ro see rhe Sovier Union as irs bulwark asainsr
the six eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire, where most Turkish traditional ene mies, or ar leasr, as the lesser of two evils. This percJption
Armenians lived. Their programs were radicalized by increased oppresslon parrly explainr; Armenians' acceptance of sovier aurhority, as well as rhe
and large-scale massacres in the Ottoman Empire and rhe example of rhe relative lack of anti-sovietism among many diasporan Armenians.
successful Balkan resistancd movements. Ultimately, the parties' dearth of wirh the collapse of central power which fonowed the october Revo-
' lution in 191.7 ,and the wirhdrawal of Russian rroops from
manpower and economic strength, rhe lack of acrive support from inrerne- the Transcauca-
cine confliccs, and a futile reliance on assistance from the European powers, sus, Armenia, ,\zerbai.;'an, and Georgia declared independence. In 191g, rhe
contributed to the failure of the nineteenth-centurv revolurionarv move- Armenian rel:ublic began its exisrence under rhe leadership of the Dashnak
ment to secure its aims.3o Pa*y, on ab.ut 4,500 square miles (1,2,000 square kirometers) of bleak rugged
rerrain, crammed with refugees, devoid of the bare essenrials of life, and sur-
rounded by hostile forces . . . it became the "Land of stalking Death," as
The 1915 genocide famine, contagion, and exposure swepr away nearly 200,000 peop"le during rhe
The Armenia liberation movemenr came ro an abrupt halr during World ensuing year.J5
'$?ar I, when the Ottoman Empire took rhe opportunity to rid iself of its
During rhe war wirh Turkey, harvests had decreased by 40 percenr, rhe
troublesome Armenian population. In the organized slaughter which land under culrivation by a third, and industrial producrion had almost
peaked between 1915 and 1917, between one and 1.5 million Armenians ceased. The Turkish invasion and occuparion of rgrg lefr 200 villaees and
 266 Nora Duduick
Armenia: the nation aw,akes
half the vineyards in rhe Ararar valrey in ruins.l5 By 1919,the 26-
repubric was
overwhelmed by alrnosr 300,000 refugees, resenrful
",
r.it,r..,
Armenian leadership; new refugeer po.,..d in dairy f;-;h;'Ni";h
lf the Easc F.,xple1in, the limits of nariona[,,ii:

sus and Azerbaiian.rT

cauca- {tv..o,,, rire relarionship bet,"ve.,n
r
sov,er ,.si,r,;"1.;," een te20 and t,)bi:
valerrr and shifring, depending i:n:tl;:*::"T"iT,,
Sovietization "" *i,",
are considering. Anitude, ."-nged
p"riod and *ii.f,
f.o-.,h.
-;;;;;;;,
r".f"f groups
among ri"..;.
sovierization of the repubric occurred "as a measure
of last resort by rhe .o--uiirrr, ,r,o, ,1,.y -... ini".iilJ,ra,",
especra
socrerv' 'rsr-generation
to rhe opporrunism of n.*,'to.oj
defeared, discouraged, and disintegrating Dashnak g"".;;;;;;
dent Armenia," which signed
li i na.o.n- ' rnerr supporr for the .ri;., ;r;r;1#"il"o.no.a "
,',,

itJ powers on Decembe r z, r9zo.r8 regime, ro rhe

disaffecrion,l"* i"rr,ffry, amo ,

"*"y
According to a British eyewitness, ';p.ople were amazed, incredulous, bur
for the mosr p.arr apatheric- Anyhow, tirey though, i, *"uiJi. :i?:,"I':',-i?i.# Ti} i:, fil';::'Jl,::p-" r' ",.,, " n a . n.',. n". o r, h o u,
i

better to The Arrnenian church rr*; ",,

have the Russians back and ro rose rheir'indepJnd."..;;;;; ;;:;;e the focus of dissidenr narionarisr
sacred
be mas- but.rather, played a cautlous
by the Turks."3e and accomn
The primary aim of the new sovier Armenian readership
agriculrural producrivity ro pre_war levels. By tlZ.e,
was ro resrore
so vi e r,,u,.l il il a r.."
J y I ;;;
rions' as weil as ics influence
" : i ?,l"jlr,
;;;;;.;;teiligenrsia,
;;; ;ll":,:x,,1, ".,*;before SovierizariolI
^iriruit,r."l pro_
ducrion had reached 71.5.percent of its prewai t.rr.t,'"ni-lo-f.r..n,
prewar sown land was again under cultivarion. By of
the end of thJ tw.nrres,
:l*:::: ;i: mi;;lJ'#3;:* *i;,"i': "-n'a'rionar
si1
a number o_f .irrigation projecrs had been completed and twenry preserving Arm..,ia's scholarly ltad.rrhip
electric ti,..rl3 "'i"'oi"'J
rtl-, Itoutgtng a n,

ti;*..ri,.*,r;d" r [":; * : jT# *J

srarions had been consrrucred.a, Indusrriar production prr...J.a statelessness. And for ..^^r-'r,l,l_',]"
"na
srowry s. a
9f.int rhis period and- unemploymenr remained l,igf, *.""Jout the h urch
c e . .
" " ".1" ;,:*
ll19'.::tlf rhe bulk of rhe population (82.1 percenri ,ritt ti"i,rg in rhe
cou n tryslcle.'l illool;,an.tttianiry,
history
""Jon,, "..
,"a nor easily comparrmenrA
TheArmenian peasanrry was collecrivized in rhe 1930s, Throughout rhe Sovier period,
despire a vigor- boundaries of permirred Armenrans continued to push
ous resisrance from 1930 ro 1934 red by cradition"r ar che
occasionally supported by rural Communisrs. The "ilf";;-i;"d"r, req ui remenr. of inr rrona "",i"."jir*"*l
most *t.rp.."a for_".,d r in fo.m, ;;.;'"lif ,',',' :Jill:,.,T::;:"i:U:
of resistance was rhe sraughter of rivesrock nationalism in rhe Sovier Union
of mur_ of "rhe narion" ;";'";i;;;"d.9Iy .n.;;;;g.iTi,rt," rro,.,,
"rd;h.-;;;;r;;;;;
berry trees in silk producing areas.42 Berween r92g and 1935, indusrry,s as rhe
share of total producrion incieased from 21.7 ro
62.r percenr.a3 After r950,
""tt-;";;;',r'*.,.r,
polirical issues was allowed, " rimir.d-.on-tirt"tion
i;;;"r'ri.r.,issues uf
however, investment in indusrry increased, especiaily idiom of culture. Defense -rn. i, ..r,o?iJi,l'_ were couched in rhc
in the energy and "f *h.rh.r of the Armenian lan.
chemical industries (later.ro become a rargef herirage' o'*'hi"o,,
capira income in Armenia rose 152 perienr"r.."t"g,."i o;;;.;;;; and per
b.r*.i :r|Z}-);J"DZg, as :ill';,::T:li ;f':l'l - was simurraneousry rrr
compared ro an arr-U-nion average it vg percenr.aa
By 1g75, onry 20
m. a n i o r. p.o,..,
* i3'i : :i.:# i# : :i :, : i;; l
r r
l,"i.* "*:,:.j
percent of the labor force in agricurtur.
-rt..rrri, their tirular republic,
"
however, r.,"". llu :
.*9.!.d
percent of rhe labor force in *ith :a
"na in serrrices. srrong sense of narional idenrity; "",]*ays been able to mainrain a
industry, ind a2 percent with acrerized by high rares of irr.._.-i"g.
,t.r..t.n-unities have rhus been
rwo-thirds of rhe population living in cities r.rd rt*ns, char-
errn.ur-iua .or"- fos of erhnicity.sz
pleted the rransirion from an ro an urban, i.,d,rrr.i"lir.l sociery..j "ii
"gr"ii".,doubr been
This transformarion has withour The institutional framework
a source of legirimation for
the regime. For many Armenians, after the genocide, of nationalism
menr took on a "parrioric and quasi-mysricar varue"
..ono-i. d.u.rop- Inirial ly' sovier authorities-encouraged
rhe Armenian people's resurre*ion, and thereby,
as the embodiment of with Armenians and ,h. d.u.lof.i;;;?;'il rhe,sraf6ng of rocar governme.r
system.# Indeed, some, middle-aged Armenians ", fo,,t. Armenian comm-unisr parry,
people were pleased at rhe growrh after World
in";uriinl"rio.,
yerevan ."..il th"t
iil.,j3ii;il?rtT'Jj,:l,o'"ie-J*."-."",","rwereArmeni"n,5;"rrhough
Iq", II;;i;; ["allir, f"oa
li
-
ro eat' and were optimisdc abour getring ahead rhrouih - ",,i "-,, s i, " ; "; ;; ; .'.^3-ltli: ii ff :il : :
":T [:::, f ,?::f,
r i
r,lrJ *J.r..- local Parry members :::: were Armeniun. fiur, up unril 193d, ..ambirious
 268 Nora Dudwick ' ,'''!

youths tlid nor have to cease being Armenian, they had to become Soviet 'l Table 11.2. National composition of Armenia,1979*1989
Armenians."55 '.
r979 989
During this time, Armenia acquired rhe structures oI national statehood ,i
1

n.I*ork of cultural institutions. Yerevan State University opened in ')l

(thousands)
"nd "
1.921.,s6 an Armenian affiliate of the Academy of Sciences was-
founded in .jdrl
i*
(thousands) % %
the historical and cultural patri- '$
fS3S, followed by museums displaying .ffi Armenians 2,725 89.7 3,076 93.7
mony: the Museum of Hisrory; Erebuni Museum, the Matanadaran, the i1tr
Azerbai janis L67 5-3 41. 7.4
..pori,o.y of Armenian manuscriprs; rhe Miasniakian Library, and several
4 Russians 70 L.J )l 1.5
nlur.,r*r. The Academy of Sciences became autonomous in 1943 and Kurds 51 1..7 65 1.8
"..
expanded, along with scientific facilities such as Biurakan observatory, ffi Others 30 1.0 5Q 1.5
-d
*hi.h took on a nationalist significance as a result of the international Total 3,037 100.0 3,283 100.0
reputation of its direcror, rhe asrronomer victor I-Iambartsumian.5T #fffi
ffi Source: from Mouradian, De Staline d Gorbatcheu (1990), p. 155.
The centralization of authority under Stalin in the thirties drastically
reduced rhe autonomy of Armenia's government and communist Party. ffi
The Great Purge began with the mysterious death in 1936 of the Armenian ffi 'What's in a name?
6rst secrerary, Aghasi Khaniian. None of the sixteen members of the fl
Bureau of the Armenian Party's Central Commirtee of 7936 still held their Language in Armenia has been a way of describing and arguing about
posrs in 1937,andof rhe eleven new members, only two were still in of6ce
:$J political issues, including Russian cultural hegemony and Moscow's poli-
ty March, 1940.sB In Armenia, the purges destroyed two generations of
rll
tical conrrol. Armenian enlightenment figures of rhe nineteenth century
intellectuals, and replaced the remaining old Communists and the second 'ii recognized the symbolic signi6cance of language; in the first Armenran
generation of communisr Parry leadership with "apparatchiks" rather :ill vernacular grammar, published in 1866, the impoverished, Turkified state
ih"n .euolutionaries, conrrolled by and dependent on the center.Se By L947, ,t,ii
of Armenian vernacular speech served as a metaphor to describe the
..Armenians weie required ro be more rhan Soviet Armenians; they had to ii]ffi "incursions and devastations" occurring under the Ottomans.6a Language
be Armenian Soviets."60 {i remains an ernotive issue for Armenians, who consider rhe Armenian lan-
Yet strong political and economic centralization cannot be equated guage, an archaic branch of Indo-European, and its unique alphabet, to be
i.$
with absolute central control, and national republics come to wield power
,il one of the factors responsible for rheir long survival as a distincr ethnic
ro rhe extent that they were responsible for implementing central direct- :ill entity, Even in Turkophone Armenian communities of the Ottoman
ives.6r The zig-zag policy toward nationalism in Armenia since the 1920s
,:l Empire, it was noc uncommon for Armenians to write Turkish using the
'aI
reflecrs the paradox that achievement of centrally-determined policies l,il Armenian alphabet.55
depended on the abilities of local leaders to mobilize local populations, ,i$i The new Sovier government encouraged rhe use of the Armenian lan-
,ii]
*hi.h ,h"y could best accomplish when perceived as responsive ro Iocal gr,rage in administration and education, using it as the "transmission belt"
iii
interesrs. The high degree of narivization in the post-sralin period (in
,
for disseminating Marxist-Leninist ideology and Soviet policies.56 Yet,
L964, Armenians made up 91.8 Percent of Party membership, but only 88
t;i"f.ji
Armenian had to withstand a number of assaults. In the thirties, an attempt
;l to Latinize the Armenian alphabet rallied intellectuals, who defeated this
percenr of the population),62 combined wirh the republic's ethnic homo- qU]

geneity, created a "palpable native cast" to the local bureaucracy's Per-

.i.sjl
measure as well as a later attempt to Cyrillicize it.57 A Terminological
ieprion regarding its own welfare and that of the republic.53 During the 'i$l Committee formed to "modernize" Armenian introduced Russian scienri-
itl 6c, political, and governmental terms into the lexicon, even when equiv-
'1960s, a movement toward greater economic decentralization allowed the t$ii
Armenian government to increase its independence from Moscow and alent Armenian terms already existed. By 1955, this policy was reversed,
solidify local support by making concessions ro local nationalism. and new terms were drawn from grabar (Classical Armenian) or even
Installed in 1,974 as First Secretary after an essentially local career, Demir- :$l
.:Sl
Western Armenian, once condemned as bourgeois.6s Rules were further
jian, like his predecessor, Anton Kochinian, was able to manipulate liberalized in the sixties, and political terms could once again be expressed
national feelings and strong traditional networks of mutual assistance to $t in Armenian.6e
solidify his personal position. ,*:i In the 193C)s, the hours of Russian-language instruction in rhe schools
itl
i*"1
.:iffl
:"lll
 Z7A Nora D.udwick
Armenia: tbe nation auakes Z7l
clrr.bed steadily, displacing Armenian,To and rhe number of Armenian
ihildren in R'ssian schools increased due ro parents, concern that tuil' :i'r exarnple, links the achieveme.t of rhe Armenians'age-old
their fc:' i n.:.:oendence and freedom to th. .ri" desires
'"lrilclren's cereer mobiliry wourc be blocked by in;rdequare masrery of bl,rh ;;;;'; ;;;n.itr*.ni". r,
l{'ssian' ln 1927,98'5 percent of pupirs in Armenia were arrending Dr",ring the twenries, well-known Armenran
writers,
Ar- arrisrs living ourside the repubric were invired composers, and
rrc.ian schools;71 by 1987, this decreased to 75 percenr.Tz Even members ro work in Armenia. The
of first decade of Soviet power saw a .ulr,rr"l
tlrc Armenian writers' Union enrolled their children in Russian ..n"irr"n.",
I-his rrerrd was deeply disrurbing to many Armenian culturar
schools.Tr
"would later be rooked hack_upon fondly as a period a period rhat
6gu..r, -ho and great creativity,"82 In the thirties, many of rerative freedom
irccrsed local party elites of alienation from rheir own culrure
an"J narional
charges of nationarism, and .n .n,ir.
writers were arresred on
rrrrcresrs.T4 The poet, Gevork Emin, asserted that the generation of Armenia,s most
republicls schoors
wc'rc graduating pupils who spoke neither Armenian nor ralented writers' incruding Axel Bakounrr.
Russian fluent_ the poet Eghishe charenrs,
ly'75 and an.ethnographer claimed rhar rhe fact rharo'or, perished in srarin's purg.i.r' During v'orrd?rd
tlrcrr entered rhe Russian-ranguage crassroom wirh no prior
e.-.oian chil- cessions were made to harness Ari-renian
$/". II:;;;;..,'ii-ir.a .on-
knowredge of nationaiist feerings to the war
I(rrssian impeded learning and even emotional deveropmenr.T6 efforr; a l94r rzuestia ediroriar pr"irJ ;;it,.
Delegares ro tarenrs or rn. eiri.r,ian peopre
rhe 1981 congress of the Armenian s?rirers' union warned thar . . . (and) their centuries old culture."8a
the Armenian folk lirerature was col-
irrcrcased volunrary use of Russian posed a serious threat lected and published, and perform.r,..,
to rhe vitality of
dancing organized'ss During rhe
of Armenian fork music and
rhc Armenian language and curture, and that an ever-growing ri. C^hurch arso ..began ro enjoy a
number of -".,
respire from Sovier persecution, if nor from
Prrpils.were enrolling at Russian schools since rhe adop*tion ofih. ,eq,rire_ Soviet control.,,86
rrrc:nr rhat dissertations musr be submitted in Russian.iT Afrer rhe war, rhe campaign againsr nationalism
'fhe,issue began anew as con_
of bilingualism had ofren been manipulaced by rhe Parry to temporarv Armenian wrirers were condemned
for ,.i;.;i;;;g;ll hisroricar
sccrrre local legirimacy. Demirchian, one past" and popurar nineteenth^century aurhors
of the longerr-r..uing firsr secre- such as Raffi banned for
t:rrics skilled ar exploiting locar sentiments and pubri. thei r "bourgeois na tionali.sm. "sT roil;*-g
decrared starin,s dearh, censored works
irr e speech rhar every. pupil mrrst "acquire a pe.fecr "n*i.ti".s, were republished and writers rehabiritated,
knowreJge of his some, such as charents and
rrrrrive language, its riches and peculiarities . ..ire Nevertheless jrn Bakounrs, posrhumously' Hisroricar rh.r.,.s
thc popr-rlar poer; silva Kaputikian, noted that the posirion of Armenian
Dg7,
in
quency in lirerature, and monographs
appeared with increasing fre-
were puiiirh.d on ,h"
I
thc republic was diminishing every year, even within srricrly
rocar insriru-
eval and early Sovier periods oi A.menian
hirro.y. "n.i..,r, -.ai-
ti()ns, ro the poinr where parents hesitaced to send rheir c'hildren The explorarion of diasp-oran rhemes, especiaily
to Ar_ the $Testern Armenian
nrcniarr schools"T9 expe.ence' signalled a shifr from "natio.,or
idenrificarion of the nation wirh a rp..ifi.
.or,r.io',,rrra* u"raa on the
rerritory,, ro one based on ..a
I
more inclusive conceprion of ethnic e*perience
Interpreting the past unferrered byporitic"r bor-
ders."88 This new consrruction of narionarity
Even sharper barrles over narionalism have been foughr in the
Iircrrt.re and hisroriography
arenas of
as Armenian writers and schorars worked to
cultural pracrices soughr ro. incorporare Armenian
inro a single Armenian narion. This trend is
on rhe basis of ethnic and
diasporan communities
exemplifi'eJ-[y iir"r"ru.. o"
I
('().srrucr a pasr which ratified and legitimized ggnocide. The 6rst^major work,
nati'nal claims and aspir- Kirakosyan,s Tbe First .wortd
war and the'\yestern Armenians, wa"s;ohn
the
.rri.ns' Afrer the creation of a Soviet Armenia, the intellectual and cultural publish.a i'
larc l97os and l9g0s by a spare ise5,-rolrow.d in rhe rt
"f Jrrai* under Kirakosyan,s
establishmenr undertook rhe rask of 6rmly establishing the
Armenian his- sorship.8r spon-
t.rical claim ro irs terrirory. A roponymic reform ..il"ced Tu.kish and
Ittrssian place-names wirh Armenian names, effeciivery erasing
from
1'.Pular memory rhe facr thar Musrims had formed a maiority of the crossing the boundary: dissident narionarism 1t
rcgion's population unril the last half of the nineteenth century.8' in Armenia
Expressions oF grief over the genocide, nostalgia for the rosr rer.rorres In rhe post-Sralin era, Armenia has been. characterized
inrerplav" berween officiar narionarism, tr'. hightf by a ..comprex
rrr 'JVesrern Armenia, and pride in Armenia's unique ;";;r;;J:;prersion
cr"rlrural heritage were
,rllowed a limited expression as long as the progressive hisrorical
l'sarisr Russia and the soviet Union in Armenian hisrory was
role of
"national pride, patriotic- sentimentr, ...t"i'
and the dissident nationarism of pubiic" p-*r,
giorlh."tio; p"rr,,,
of
oi'.t. ll
acknowl_ Jra ,rr"r.rior,"J politic"l
t:dged. An introduction ro a '1.946 collecrion of patrioric Armenian organizations.e' To the extenr that Armenian
litera- Turkey' rhey were not perceived as threats to demands were directed ar
soviet hegemony. on the
I
 272 Nora Duduick
contrary, Armenia remained "a 'loyal millet' within the Soviet Socialist
world."el
Nevertheless, in contrast to rhe intellectuals' protesrs, which were con-
fined to the realm of culture, radical dissent arose among a small group of
people born toward the end of the Sralin era into working class or lower
middle class families.e2 Many of these families had originated in Turkish
Armenia, and the national question was inexrricably bound up wirh their
personal fate. Human rights issues were often instrumenralized to serve rhe
"Armenian Cause" (Armenian irredenta) in a system where rhe only
authorized political space was the national, and where the heavy burden of
the Armenian past and the ongoing reality of the national question made it
dif6cult for young Armenians to think politically in universalisric rerms.es
For the most part, their activities received little attention or supporr among
the Armenian diaspora.
The 6rst known Armenian group wirh a narionalisr agenda, rhe Union
of Patriots, appeared in 1955 ar Yerevan State University.ea Ir was followed
in L963 by the Union of Armenian Youth, which conrinued for three
years.es The National Unification Party (NUP) formed in Yerevan in 7966,
called for an independent Armenia which would include \Tesrern Armenra,
Nakhijevane5 and Karabagh. The leaders were arresred in 1968, and the
nineteen-year-old Parouir Hairekyan took over leadership until his arresr
in 1969.e7
Despite the small numbers involved in radical proresr, it was during rhe
sixties that the first massive outbreak of national feeling occurred in
Yerevan. On April 24, t955, as public officials, represenrarives of the Ar-
menian Apostolic Church, and delegares from the diaspora garhered in the
Spendarian State Theater of Opera and Ballet ro commemorate rhe fifrieth
anniversary of the Armenian Genocide, an esrimared 100,000 people
gathered ourside, demanding the return of Armenian lands seized by the
Turks and asking for Soviet assisrance.es The demonsrration was broken
up by the militia, and many of rhe student-age parricipanrs spenr a few
days in jail, among them, future leaders of the Armenian national move-
ment (ANM).
It is evident that the narional issue had already become the focus of
considerable student acriviry. Vaskan Manoukian, one of rhe ANM
leaders, says that it was at this time that the idea of independence was born
among Armenian yourh.ee In March t967, for example, thirty-two studenrs
were expelled from the universiry for nationalist, anri-Soviet activiry.roo At
Yerevan State Universiry in the 1970s, a group of reform-minded Komso-
mol members attempted ro democrarize university policies by engineering
the election of popular candidares.lol
As a result of the 1965 demonsrrarions, the 6rst secrerary of the Arme-
nian Communist Party, Yakov Zohrabtan, a member of Khrushchev's
team, popular for his perceived honesry and symparhy for narional issues,
Armenia: the nation atuakes 273
was replaced. His successor, Kochinian, launched a criticism of Armenian
nationalism but authorized the 6rsr monument ro the Armenian Genocide.
an imposing strucrure which thereafrer allowed yearly commemorarions
r;
be channelecl roward a precise and instirutionalized space.ro2 In rhe follow-
ing years, addirional monumenrs were erected to heio.s of the Armenian
Iiberation str:uggle a1{
ihe bartle against rhe Turkish Army, in a similar
effort to assLlage and defuse narional feelings.ro:
ln 1,977, the Armenian Helsinki warch Group was founded ro monitor
compliance .,vith rhe Helsinki Accords and to work for Armenian mem-
bership in the united Nations; membership included a few of the NUp's
founders. An announcemenr made by the group in
June, 1377, d,escrrbed
civil rights violarions in Armenia and enumerated the ..anti-nationaliry
policies of the central and republic governments," the desrruction of
narional customs and language, the privileging of Russian over Armenian
schools, lingrrisric Russification, and finally, the ongoing violation of the
Karabagh Armenians' civil rights. By February,'197g, wiih its members
in
prison and awairing sentencing, the group had been crushed.loa The
ensuing investigations rried ro discredit the NUp and rhe Armenian
Hel-
sinki watch ()roup by linking them to an explosion which occurred in the
Moscow merro, Janua,ry 8, 1977. Three young workers, including a former
NUP member (rehabilirated in 1985), were rried secrerly in Moscow and
execured in 1979.los The early eighries saw conrinuing arresrs and rrials
for
the dissemination of samizdat urging indeper.rdenc. 6!.4r-"ni^.roe
The Karabagh movement
In February, 1988, in response to acrivism among the Armenrans in
Nagorno-Karabagh, the largest demonsrratrons since 1965 erupted in
Armenia. In Nagorno-Karabagh, a concerted movemenr d.u"loped'".ou'J
'rhe single goal of arraching rhe obrast to Armenia. In Armenia,
,h. p.or.r,.
of support rransformed into a movement wirh a broad agenda of demo-
cratic and cultural demands. The goal of independen.. u,u"r.-6.r, articulated
much later in rhe movemenr, and even then, wir.f ambivalence. In effecr,
while Armenians in Nagorno-Karabagh used Gorbachev's slogans of p.r-
estroika and glasnost to legitimize rheir struggle to join Arm.iia, rhose
in
Armenia used the Karabagh issue ro furrher their srruggle for peresrroika
and glasnost.loT
Historically, Nagorni Karabaghros was one of the few regions in Eastern
Armenia to preserve a certain degree of autonomy, rured "by rocal Arme-
nian princes who offered fealty to Muslim khans. Bur
while Armenian cultural and economic acrivity flourished in rhis region, it
also
became an imporrant site of Musrim inreilectuar and poriticar de"velopmerrt.
More than Baku, it was this mountainous area that ,..r,.d rhe focal poinr of
emerging Azerbaijani identity . . .tor ",
 274 Nora Duduick
Armenia: the nation awakes
P op u I a t i on of N a kh i i e u a n a nd 27S
[;if ,Y;; N a g o r no K
_
a ra b a gtt
" iins;:r'!i{:ti.rnaj and
vis;c'ir broadcasts from,currurar mareria.ls, iack of facirities for receiving telc-
Armenia, ,n. appropriation
t9t4 ".ra of Armeniarr his_
1926 1959 t970 t979 ::;',:lrt#l};11 ""n'"""''n"'its a' .i.;.r,;;;; r.om rh. pa.ry
urttyro),ffr€rlt' " ",ut,
many protesters
Nakhijeuan r"r"t*rr]' were forced ,o t*u. Nagorno-
Armenians 53,700 11,300 g,500 5,800 3,400
Elsewhere in Azerbaijan, wirhotir
even the nominal institutional
Azeris 81,300 93,600 l27,ooo tsgido 229,700
tures of oblasr_based cultural struc-
Nagorno-Karabagb monoethnic villaees, or found "urono_y, Armenians either lived in
*oi)r'rirendi inthe ciry with their Azer_
Armenians 170,000 tlT,ooo 11g,000 t?,l,7oo baijani neighborsl M.orr nor"bt;^
Azeris ;;;;"", rh.y be.am.;;;;;;" erhnically
e,ooo 8,600 r8,1oo zz,,i6o 123,100
37,200 i1T1'-lrrrian-speaking .ri.. *t i.r,l.g"r-d:d irserf, in rhe words of Arme_
ff :, J;Tffi :,';?fi :;;'* il;,., perso n,,
;;'
Source:from Mourad
; ;:*, ",,,*.
":,::';11il",:: :l'-^.T:""' :l:lis-c'
Pressures f;.;;;;;;';,: tj ci tv of Baku.
1e87' Promin.,,r A.m.ninn,
After annexation by Russia in the early
nineteenrh century, Nagorni
such as z".i u"i"il,i,'"ofj';:
;|:Til""
("mounrainous") Karabagh, along *iri2^ngrrur and mosr of present-day sergeiMikoyu.,lror,.orn.,"rr"rrurit;;;:f,'::!^lt.f
Azerbaijan, was incorpoiared in-ro a ffi:;r*:,i:T[X:
,}.j; J:::."jffi .idl:':', ;; ril'":;p
singre province. Despiie Nagorni -,.ga
Kara bagh's I a rger y A rmen i an pop
Iressed op,i*r-,"' rd g n
u t",i on,i'.'."".'r'r*rili"li'.o"a,
i n a
rail lines bound'it ever more tighrry ro Baku, " "a
problem'
day after rt-,. a.-ol-."-t^the-Karabagh oti"f..'ii, ,gsr, ,h.
o.,
and Armenian workers
"iin" ;';:::!r,
r' a' ..
;fii::i,::#, 3::,F*", u.,d Nofo.ni ra.,b"gi *;;['i;"ri-,. rh.iui,,g * "
occurred r! village
the Armenian i1 [,;{ 1?.::' }:',"# l l
rt?ilT 'cf,"ra"f.hlu, ilt'jj
lvhen Armenia and
Azerbaijan became independent repubrics and ro call for Nasorno-Ka.obighk "f oio.n_.n.it lo;r;.;'ii' areruui,un,
Zangezur, Nakhiieva.n, and Nago.ni
rc"r"L"gl, 6.."-;;i;l;;."r,
rn 191g,
or uirr.,
in borh Armenia N"g"r;;fi1.:i1;, signaruresa._."r".,freanwhil.,
".arhis
petirion supporting were gathered on a
contenrion between rhe Armenia-n, Azerbaijani, demand.il8 Th-ese,activjries
and otroman armies. After culminared on Feb_
Sovietization, Nakhijevan ruary 20, 1999, when, afrer.a
N";;;;ii"*U"g,,;;;;;;
""d iesisrance, i"., "f or.r- _..t oi'Jirit a.puri.l^ro,ri.",*"ror'o_
baijan, despite militanr Armenian
and in i923, most of Nagorni
Karabagh was organizedinto rhe Nrgor.,o-t<"rabagh ff:1k*
oblast sovier vored ;.,;;;;r"i", -.r,
N"go.r,o_Karabagh join Arm_
comprising an area of erio"",.o"s obrasr,
.7,70o
square ,iil"r,
i;ir'fi_.ri^ uy
a narrow corridor-lll As "r,d,.p;";;; basis
a resurt of the erirnic-territoriar 1988 and after
federal srructure, rocal currurar of rhe sovier
baijan -i"".iri., ,,r.h the Armenians in Azer_
found rhemserves treated as factualry non-indigenous,
", News of the even
from republic-based culrural d.;;;;;;;.1,,
Resistance never complerely died in
and excruded
l
a r a Februa I l,.-.",,j#
!"j* :;,i:"I; : T:;,:T;
tion of a new chemic"'i'pl.;;-,;;"irij.
j,j,ffi,l?
[r;-j ffi ::1
Stalin's dearh, the Karabagh n.-.r,i".r,
Nagorno-Karabagh, bur afrer
people garhered at the spendrri""-sr"r.'iiearer iil-i;;i;ing day,
sending hundreds
i.g.r, ro proresr more openly,
of letrer{ peritio's,
"*.";..
j:::::::l:l"n of supporr. During ,1,. .ou.r..of the of opera and Barer in a
complained abour the sysremaric economic "nJa".t.g"tion;;;"il;;*. They
underdeveropment and steady
oemonstrarors increased .*po.,..,iiuily week, che number of
when Moscow refused to consider
of culrural righrs in the oblasr. A peririon addressed border changes b."nd'.J ;i;;JJlrrlr."ro., as ..narionarisrs,,
:t":9i
in 1964 details the rrandfer,of local ..,,..Jri, to Khrushchev "exrremists. " The"nd and
srr]d.enrs,,,.u.h..r,- u.,I'lnr.ll..,u*t,
o bra r, ;,h.- ;;;i ;;; ; t ;;.;;;; ";i;;.,il: :;::::'J jl; demonstrarions in rhe 6rsc d"y, ;;;;: up
*.r. ,oo1, loirr.d by blue collar workers rhe
s
"' Three years
s.upplies'r13 l"tei,.an
; H: ffj' :1.. and agricultural workers r."*',t.
Armenian people refers to the "pp""l
," ,Le Soviet authorities and rhe one week ar the
.-oir*r,0.. The crowds dispersed after
"iundreds of requests to the cenrral of Zori
".lilg wirh Go.b";h;;Bai;;; Silva Kapurikian, who
Governmenr in Moscow and to ,t. gou.rr,;enr- returned from discussions "rq Arexander
the harassment, murder, and impril""*.n, of Azerbaijan,, regarding Moscow with guarded and yakovrev in
Karabagh'lla Addirionar protests
of Armenians in Nagorno_ "rru.."r,..,
No one who parricipared in ,r,i, "i "
?"r"*Ule ourcome.
"o*J ,t. unavailability of Armenian the almosc r.uni..nd.r,t"t
n.., i.ll or a.-o"rrorions wirr
forger
-ooj oi'rrfra"r?,r, even elation, that gripped

2J6 Nora Duduick
the men and women who stood for hours in the freezing February cold,
listening ro a succession of speakers from Armenia and Nagorno-
rcarabalh. The memory of these days larer took on an important mobiliz-
ing ,ole1s rhe proof and symbol of Armenians' ability to act in concert.r20
Tf,e massiv. J.monrt.ations also provided tangible evidence for the
impotence of the aurhorities, who were unable to provide responsive
but unwilling ro suppress rhe movement by brute force.
leadership
Leadership and strategY
In Nagorno-Karabagh, Party and government leaders played an active
role in a'rriculating rhi popularion's grievances and in organizing their
resisrance. In Armenia, an informal advisory role was played by prominent
intellectuals, many with personal or familial origins in Karabagh' Strategy
and ractics were formulated by whar came to be known as the "Karabagh
committee," an informally organized, fluid group of writers, teachers, and
scientists, mainly consisting of men in their thirties and forties, few with
Party affiliations.
*hil. d"*onsrrarions in Yerevan came to a remporary halt in March,
1988. a network of committees sPrang uP at industrial enterprises, insti-
tutes, university departments, and schools to disseminate accurate infor-
marion and to organize collecrive acrions if necessary. The Karabagh com-
I mittee achieved .no.mous credibility with the popularion during their
frequenr "informational" meetings which resumed a few months later' and
also received de facto recognition from local Party aurhorities, with whom
they held periodic negotiations.
in the immediate aftermath of rhe disastrous earthquake of December 7,
lggg,ru r as the Karabagh commitree was organizing relief efforrs, eleven
members were arrested and transferrgd to prisons in Moscow by the Ar-
menian aurhoriries, now headed by {irst secretary Suren Harutiunian,l22 in
I a ldst-ditch effort to retrieve their own crumbling legitimacy.la For the next
six monrhs, rhe most salient asPect of political life in Armenia was their
detention, which itself triggered further protests and political organization.
They were released wirhout charges six months later, in May, 1989,
I virtually sanctified in the eyes of most Armenians. Under their leadership,
the dozens of groups, parties, and political activists who had entered the
political scene since February, 1988, came together in autumn, 1989' to
I form the Armenian National Movement (ANM)'
In Armenia, the Armenian National Movement brought together three
groups with distincr, bur overlapping agendas: those interested in demo-
f.adc reforms in an all-Union context, those exclusively concerned with
I rhe Karabagh issue, and a broad, middle groupr interested in all political
and cultural issues affecting the "nation." The movement also mobilized a
vasr reservoir of discontent among a population fed up with official cant
I
Armenia: the nation awakes 277
and hypocrisy, pervasive corruption, severe environmental pollution, and
the declining srandard of living. Ordinary people in Armenia greered Gor-
bachev's call for reforms with enthusiasm, bur few changes were apparenr
by 1988, aside from an increased freedom to express criticism. Demirjian,
ensconced in a web of corruption, proved more orthodox than Moscow in
his resistanc<: to liberalization.l2a
Initially, 1\rmenians believed that if they produced sufficient documenr-
arion to back their historic claim to Nagorno-Karabagh,r25 the injustice of
its inclusion in Azerbaijan, and the discrimination suffered by the Kara-
bagh Armenians, then Moscow would resolve the problem in the spirir of
glasnosr and perestroika. Moscow's sreadfast refusal to consider border
changes, the failure of the Armenian authorities to support national
demands, sharp attacks from the central press, and silence from the local
press directed the movement's activities toward a parliamentary struggle.
By spring, 1990, ANM-sponsored candidares had been elected to the Ar-
menian parliament, and Levon Ter-Petrosian, one of the Karabagh Commir-
ree members, was elected president of the Parliament. This marked rhe end
of Communist Party power in Armenia.
Violence in Azerbaiian
During demonstrations in Yerevan, in February 1988, Armenian rioting
broke out in the depressed industrial city of Sumgait (not far from Baku),
home to 15,000 Armenians out of a total population of 250,000. Of the
rhirry-two people killed, twenty-six were Armenians, hundreds of Arme-
nians were injured, and many apartments were sacked and burnt.l25 This
shocking event provided additional impetus for political organization in
Armenia. In November 1988, new outbreaks of anti-Armenian violence
occurred in Azerbaijani cities and towns as local authorities offered little
prorection. This set off a two-way flood of refugees, as Armenians fled
from Azerbaijan, and Armenia's 160,000-strong rural Azeri population fled
to Azerbaijan. 'While acknowledged incidents of harassment and violence
occurred in Armenia, their extent remains a contentious issue.t27 A year
later, with a new outburst of violence in Baku, Azerbaijan's remaining
Armenian community (outside Nagorno-Karabagh) fled the republic and
Baku was occupied by Soviet troops.128
$Tithin Azerbaiian, the Karabagh question became the symbol of chal-
lenge to Azerbaijan's terrirorial integrity and sovereignty. Armenian acti-
vism triggered formation of an Azerbaif ani Popular Front, which put forth
a plarform calling for democratic reforms along with reassertion of conrrol
in Nagorno-Karabagh. Faced by lack of grass-roots support, and the rigid
refusal of the Communist Party to engage in even limired discussion, the
Front adopted an increasingly nationalistic, anti-Armenian programl2e In
1989, hoping to crush Armenian activism, it organized a rail blockade of
 278 Nora Dttdwick
Armenia: the nation auakes 279
Nagorno-Karabagh and Armenia. The blockade failed
to co.nrer Arme-
ni;rn demancis, but seriousry disrupted reconsrructi.n i' diasPoran Politicai
ravaged regro.s of
che earti.rcluake
and p.t Nagornr>-Krrabagrr and acl jaceiit
i?l;l;, jf '*ise' parties have esrablished rhemselves
in
.Arrnenia,
Armenian-populated disrricts in a virtual srare of siege. Tf,e The new power arignments have caused
blockade con_ tensions, however, as tradi-
tinued on-and-off rhrough 1990 and r991, wirh Armenians rional diasporan agendas come into .o.,Ri.,
occasionally wirh rhe req;;;;;,, of srare-
insriruring "counrerblockades" of Nakhiievan. building. Fricrion a;o:e, for .*"_p1., *nen
rhe governmenr decided ro
In Nagorno-Karabagh, Armenians conrinued work sroppages seek diplomatic and commerciar rerations
and pro_ Armenia's border with Turkey ...onlitJ
*itn
-iu.t Lf .'-ii;"' reality of
resrs. In January, 1989, ,\,roscow repraced the locar mosr locar Armenians ro chis
org"nl'oi'gou...,.n"n, srrategy' but some-secrions of the diaspora
with a "special Administrarion Committee" headed iy err.JJy accused the government of
vorsky;
although inirially welcomed by rhe Armenian population,
failed ro halr rensions in rhe oblasr. Moscow replaced ir
the Commirree
less rhan a year
[TilX,il: T.}1:, ::'3ff .: *"r'l- v-"
" " a roca r p" -i-" i'a i
",po,*
later with a military adminisrrarion which Armenians ,.I How Armenia defines her responsibiriries
accused of supporr- for the..narion,, wilr affect the
ing Azerbaijan's arrempr ro reassert control of the oblas.. role she plays in rhe Karabagh'.".fli;;:-i;
e, inr..-.tt ni. q nr*"ni", ,orn. p."or. viewed
violence conrinued, groups of volunteers from n.rn."ir -."-. rhe governmenr's cauriour
defend villages in Nagorno Karabagh,rro but rhe uiol.n..
,o rr.tp Ti "p!."J-i^n r"
Karabagh. t13 In facr, rhe popurarion', -o,rn, ro abandonirrg N"go..o-
series of arracks, ambushes, and the taking of hosrag.r-;; "r."irr.a
in Armenians are heroes ",,iiud"in i,their
.;;;;, "*u-i""ii".,'riri rc"r"u"rr,
sides. In" ..fronr,,,
as chey
;;;
April, 1991, specially-appoinred Azerbaijani miriria, Jia.a uy ioui., "i1"1L
but those who volunrariry tJave
villages ar the
ar-y compromise are criricized for
rroops' began violendy deporting Armenians froo, ih.i, riri;g;; "ar"."r.
berraying rhe common homeland-".tvtr.,f
Rr*.nians fear that iiAzerbaijan
pretexr of searching for armed Armenian milirants. under rhe succeeds in driving Armenians f.o- N"gorno-Karabagh,
a.*..,1"ir-.oncruded artack Zangezur' However, others priuut.'ry they wi, next
rhat sovier rroops were supporring the Azerbaijanis in,.;;n quesrion *hether iolding on
promise to sign the proposed u'ion treaty. rn 1ggr, severar
for their to Nagorno-Karabagh is worrh the'sacrifice of
negoriare rhe conflicr failed, and in rhe first nronths
arremprs ro has caused in Armenia. yer, che idears
lir,., ;il;l;;uption ir
"J core
of 1992, Nagorno- andvarues ar the of Armenian
Karabagh remained a site of vircuar war, wirh an escalaring i identity, such as martyrdorn i" rh. def.r,r.
;;;;. of casu- limits on
of nation
";
strategic options available ro rhe government.
;;i;, ;;ert subrle
alties reported weekly as Armenians recorded milirary ,ul..rr.r.-' I
I
reinforced.rhe
ar rhe pubric funerars in yerevan honoring This ideal is
l:,1
Nagorno-Karabagh, where..speakers compare the men kiiled in
,i rheir deaths to rhe mar-
Nation and state tyrdom of St. Vardan Mamikonian. ----t
t,j
By aurumn, 1991, Armenians had made up their minds I Since 1988, Armenian language and
on the question culrure. are experiencing a revival,
of independence' In th-eir seprember 2r, 1.99r referendu-, ,h.f
I
I to the poinr where som. Rirsri-un-speaking Armenians feer
voted in Dozens of new journals discomfort.
favor of wirhdrawing from tire sovier Union. when rhe ,,e*rpr.pa* t,"u. appeared in Armenian,
union .ottrpr.d, I
"nd
Ar.menian-language educarion and
however, Armenia joined the new commonwearth of
r.,d.p.r,d*r srates.
I
h", b..r, ,,'"a.'_r"l;;;;' i;;rmenian
The Armenian leadership must now creare a funcrionar'gou.;r,-.nr"t ,i children'.Aided by gifts from.the al^rp".",'ii. Armenian Apostolic Church
structure' a narional ideology abre ro mobirize people's
l
is expanding irs activiries:it h", ,.op.r,.J
e'f.gies for rhe
difficulr period ahead, and a itrategy for coping wirh rhe fur"bieh
I
and organized parish youth g_ro.,pr. "iu..h.r, o.aririJ n.i p.i"rrr,
RJ.onr*ucring rhe nation also
and the republic's acure economiclroble65.'ri
conflicr .',,'i .
involves erasing the signs of rhe-sovilt p.rioa,
.,] monumenrs of Russian and
Armenian leaders also speak abour the importance of crearing Armenian Communists have been ,._or,.d,
a feeling
.rl
:":;l
has replaced their names on streers and
,,.*
"nd "and r.n""i;;; reform
of "starehood" among rheir people. As a sovereign ,tut", Arrn-..,Ia 'rii squares, in cities, towns and
musr villages rhroughour the republic. tt i, i'i.rJrring
now rethink its relarion wirh the diaspora. ThJ Karabagh ,,,i
ro specurare as ro how rhe
Mo.n..r,.r,, I Armenia of rhe future will reshape irs pasr.
described itself as a pan-Armenian mouement with ..1.;;;.;-;, ,ii:l
Lorn toc"l Concepts of democracy, social
and diaspora Armenians. The new leadership has called lurrle, human righrs, ecology, and cul_
iirrp"r"
"p""irt. .ihe
for assisrance in bqilding a new state, bur ieels rhar *.rir."rif
iri
tural regeneration are rerms which ngu.. i"
core
,11
l:-u a pubric discourse where vi-
sions of Armenia's future vie f"r d".ri.,"ni..
(e.g., independent Armenia) will be assisting the
Armenia", rl," disper_
sl
4l ri,. poririon-..p*r""r.a uy
the president and his crose adviso.r ,"R*irir,;;;;;;i"*i';:#;:;"
sion."l32 Diasporan Armenians have been-invited ro parricipar."i in tt.
&f
.."_
economic and polirical restructuring; several now hord ,:, ception of her "civilizing mission." This
high jou.rn*".,, Armenia is 6rmly orr.ii.J ro,""ra
i

,rl Europe and principles of rhe E.,lighrenmenr.

i.{l
,rii,r i
Other groups propose a
.,ittl
-wsi

#
:';{fl
 280 Nora Duduick
national ideology constructed around the defense of Armenian society,
biologically conceived as an organism which must be protected from
degradarion by avoiding contact with alien influences.l3a This is an ideol-
ogy of cultural isolation and of the subordination of individual rights to
the welfare of an abstract whole.
Now that Armenians are constructing a state, the national ideology
which prevails will help de6ne the character of her external relations and
the political rights available to her own'citizenry. The prevailing ideology
will influence Armenia's abiliry to integrate the tens of thousands of
Russian speaking, "Turki6ed" ^Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan, and
the extent to which the culrural development of ethnic minorities will be
protected and encouraged. Uldmately, the guiding philosophy of the new
state will interact with the practical exigencies of political and economic
restructuring to determine rhe extent to which cultural variation and diver-
sity find encouragement in Armenian society.
Notes
I would like to thank rhe International Research & Exchanges Board for rheir
research support, and Aram Nigogosian and Asia Lerner for their crirical com-
ments on an earlier draft of this chapter.
1 The speech is translated and reprinted in Gerard J. Libaridian, ed., Armenia at
the Crossroads: Democracy and Nationhood in tbe Post-Souiet Era (Water,
town, MA: Blue Crane Books, 1991), p. 115.
2 Benedict Anderson, lmagined Communities: Reflections on tbe Origin and
Spread of Nationalisn, revised 2nd edn (New York; Verso, 1991), p. 1,95"
3 tbid., p. 196.
4 Ronald Suny, "Some Notes on rhe National Character, Religion, and Way of
Life of the Armenians," unpublished paper presented at the Lelio Basso Foun-
dation conference, Venice, October '1,8-20,7985, p. 3.
5 Christopher J. Valker, Armenia: Tbe Suruiual of a Nation, revised 2nd edn
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), p. 20. This is a good, overall intro-
duction to Armenian history, 1800-1900. This revised edition also includes a
brief discussion of the Karabagh movemenr.
5 Herodotus, Strabo, and Xenophon describe Armenia's wealth of flocks, natural
products, metals, precious stones, and the fame ofher soldiers. For a discussion
of classical references to Armenia, see Robert W. Thompson, "The Armenian
Image in Classical Texts," in Richard C, Hovannisian, ed., The Armenian
lmage in History and Literature (Malibu, CA: Undena Publications, 1981),
pp.9-25. See also David Marshall Lang, Tbe Armenians: A People in Exile,
(London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1988, new edn), pp.39-48.
7 The Urartian fortress, Erebuni, iusr outside Yerevan, gives the city its name.
8 The philologist, Raphael Ishkhanian, known in Yerevan for his efforts ro
increase the use of Armenian in the public domain and ourlaw Russian-
language schooling for Armenian children, has published a number of arricles
on this theme.
9 Ronald Suny, Armenia in tbe Twentietb Century (Chico, CA: Scholars Press,
1983), p. 4.
Armenia: tbe nation au.takes ZBI
10 Suny, "Nores," p. 5.
11 The dating of Elishe's hisrory of Vartan is conrroversial. soviet Armenra
scholars co.sider him a contemporary of Vardan, while Robert W. Thompson
places his acrcount toward the end of rhe sixth cenrury. see his commenrary in
Thompson (translator), Elishe. History of Vardan and tbe Armenran ,War
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 1-53.
12 cyril roumanoff, studies in cbristian Caucasian History (washington: Geor-
getown University Press, 1963).
13 Valker, Arntenia, p. 21.
Khayig Tol6lyan, "The Role of the Armenian Apostolic Church in the Dia-
spora," Armenian Reuiew, vol. 41, no. 1-151, Spring 1988, p. 56.
15 lbid., p. 57.
l6 According to Armenian Patriarchate 6gures of 1882, there were 2,660,O00 Arm-
enians in the Ottoman Empire, of whom 1,530,000 lived in the six easrern
vilayets. According to walker, these estimates are probably too high. Neverthe-
Iess, most sources agree rhat Armenians formed about a third of the population
of Eastern Anatolia by the end of the nineteenrh cenrury, although in many
regions they were rhe largest single minoriry. Walker, Artnenia, pp. 95-96.
17 Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990), p. 12.
18 Henry Jewel Sarkiss, "The Armenian Renaissance, 1500-1863," The
Journal of
Modern History, vol. 9, no. 4, December 7937, pp. 437438.
19 lbid., p. 441.
20 Gerard J. Libaridian, "Narion and Fatherland in Nineteenth Century Arme-
nian Political Thought," Armenian Reuieu, vol. 35, no. 3, Autumn 1983,
pp.71-90.
2r lbid., p.71.
22 Quoted from the liberal Armenian newspaper, Hayastan, published in Con-
stantinople, ibid., p. 76.
23 Until the emergence of a liberal middle class, the mi!Let was dominared by an
oligarchy of bankers, rich merchanrs, and governmenr of6cials known as the
amira class.
24 Lit>aridian, "Narion and Fatherland," p.78.
25 Suny, "Notes," p. 4.
26 Libaridian, "Nation and Fatherland," o.87.
27 lbid., p.79.
28 Walker, Armenia.
29 Ronald suny, "The Formation of the Armenian parrioric Intelligentsia in
Russia: The First Generations," Armenian Reuietu, vol. 35, .no. 3, Autumn
1,983, p.25.
30 This paragraph is based on Louise Nalbandian's The Armenian Reuolutionary
Mouement: Tbe Deuelopment of Armenian Political parties througb tbe Nine-
teenth Century (Berkeley: Universiry of Califorr-ria press, 1967), one of the de6-
nitive works on the Armenian revolutionary movement. See also Anaide Ter
Minassian, Nationalism and Socialism in the Armenian Reuolutionary Moue-
ment (Cambridge MA: -fhe Zoryan Instirute, 1984); this short monograph
covers the period 1885-1914.
31 Exact mortaliry figures are dif6cult to determine because of uncertainties in the
pre-l915 census figures for Armenians in rhe Ortoman Empire. For a rhoughrful