BAGUIO MARKET VENDORS MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE (BAMARVEMPCO)

v.CABATO-CORTES
G.R. No. 165922

Facts:
Petitioner Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO)
is a credit cooperative organized under Republic Act No. 6938 (RA 6938), or the
Cooperative Code of the Philippines. Article 62(6) of RA 6938 exempts cooperatives
from the payment of all court and sheriff's fees payable to the Philippine Government for
and in connection with all actions brought under this Code, or where such action is
brought by the Cooperative Development Authority before the court, to enforce the
payment of obligations contracted in favor of the cooperative.

In 2004, petitioner, as mortgagee, filed with the Clerk of Court of the RTC of
Baguio City a petition to extrajudicially foreclose a mortgage under Act 3135, as
amended. Under Section 7(c) of Rule 141, as amended, petitions for extrajudicial
foreclosure are subject to legal fees based on the value of the mortgagees claim.
Invoking Article 62 (6) of RA 6938, petitioner sought exemption from payment of the
fees.

However, Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes, Executive Judge of the trial court,

denied the request for exemption, citing Section 22 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, exempting from the Rules coverage only the Republic of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and certain suits of local government units.

Issue:
Whether BAMARVEMPCO’S application for extrajudicial foreclosure is exempt
from legal fees under Article 62(6) of RA 6938.

Held:
No. Article 62(6) of RA 6938 is no authority for petitioner to claim exemption from
the payment of legal fees in this proceeding because first, the fees imposable on
petitioner do not pertain to an action brought under RA 6938 but to a petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage under Act 3135. Second, petitioner is not the
Cooperative Development Authority which can claim exemption only in actions to
enforce payments of obligations on behalf of cooperatives.

This Court was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights. the Court described its exclusive power to
promulgate rules on pleading, practice and procedure as one of the safeguards of this
Courts institutional independence: “The payment of legal fees is a vital component of
the rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it
cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards
of this Courts institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is now the Courts exclusive domain”.
Fabian vs. Desierto G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998
Facts:
Petitioner Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and President of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation which was engaged in the construction
business. Private respondent Nestor Agustin was the District Engineer of the First Metro
Manila Engineering District. PROMAT participated in the bidding for government
construction projects, and private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official
position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some
time, in the course of which, private respondent gifted PROMAT with public works
contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office. When
petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and resisted
her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and
threats. Petitioner filed an administrative complaint against private respondent.
Ombudsman found private respondent guilty of misconduct and meted out the
penalty of suspension without pay for 1 year. After private respondent moved for
reconsideration, the Ombudsman discovered that the private respondent’s new counsel
had been his classmate and close associate, hence, he inhibited himself. The case was
transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman who exonerated private respondent from
the administrative charges. Petitioner appealed to the SC by certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 27 of RA 6770 which provides for appeals in
administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the SC in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is valid
Held:
The revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the SC via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Under the
present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but
only from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Sec. 1 thereof.
Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to
be brought to the CA on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and
conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a
uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It
consequently violates the proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI of the Constitution against a
law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the SC.
Barroso vs. Omelio
G.R. No. 194767
October 14, 2015

Facts:
This case is about the complaint for sum of money, damages and attorney’s fees
against Dennis Li wherein the herein petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City, Branch 16. Dennis Li failed to pay the sums of money as provided for under
said Judgment on Compromise Agreement. Herein petitioner then filed a Motion for
Execution and RTC-Br. 16 issued a Writ of Execution solely against Dennis Li. When
said Writ of Execution against Dennis Li was returned by the Sheriff unsatisfied,
petitioner then filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment upon the Counterbond.
However, instead of appearing before RTC-Br. 16, Travellers filed a separate case for
Declaration of Nullity, Prohibition, Injunction with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary
Injunction & Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), and Damages, which was raffled to
RTC-Br. 14. Said petition prayed for the following reliefs: (a) the issuance of a TRO
enjoining Sheriff Anggot and herein petitioner from implementing and enforcing the Writ
of Execution dated April 28, 2009, and after hearing, the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction; (b) judgment be rendered declaring the counterbond and its
supporting documents to be null and void; ordering Sheriff Anggot and herein petitioner
to desist from further implementing the Writ of Execution dated April 28, 2009; and (c)
ordering Sheriff Anggot and herein petitioner to pay Travellers actual and moral
damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.

Hence, this case petition was filed alleging that respondent judge committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and gross
ignorance of the law by (1) acting on respondent Travellers' petition despite the lack of
jurisdiction of RTC-Br. 14; (2) issuing the writ of preliminary injunction without requiring
Travellers to put up an injunction bond; and (3) assuming jurisdiction over the action for
prohibition and injunction against the executive sheriff of a co-equal court.

Issue:
Did the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction and gross ignorance of the law?

Ruling:
Yes because under the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular
orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in the administration
of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another
court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the
injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court
that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction
over Its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and
over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial
officers acting in connection with this judgment.

Applying the foregoing ruling, it is quite clear that, in this case, the issuance of the
subject writ of preliminary injunction was improper and, thus, correctible
by certiorari. Herein respondent judge does not have jurisdiction to hinder the
enforcement of an order of a co-equal court. He must be aware that said co-equal court
had the exclusive jurisdiction or authority to correct its own issuances if ever there was,
indeed, a mistake. There is no question, therefore, that subject writ of preliminary
injunction is null and void.
Sarmiento v. Zaratan
GR 167471, February 5, 2007
Facts:
On 2 September 2002, petitioner Gliceria Sarmiento filed an ejectment case against
respondent Emerita Zaratan, in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 36. On 31 March 2003, the MeTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.
Respondent filed her notice of appeal. Thereafter, the case was raffled to the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 223 Sarmiento vs. Zaratan. In the Notice of Appealed Case,5 the
RTC directed respondent to submit her memorandum in accordance with the provisions
of Section 7(b) of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court and petitioner to file a reply
memorandum within 15 days from receipt. Respondent’s counsel having received the
notice on 19 May 2003, he had until 3 June 2003 within which to file the requisite
memorandum. But on 3 June 2003, he filed a Motion for Extension of Time of five days
due to his failure to finish the draft of the said Memorandum. He cited as reasons for the
delay of filing his illness for one week, lack of staff to do the work due to storm and flood
compounded by the grounding of the computers because the wirings got wet. But the
motion remained unacted. On 9 June 2003, respondent filed her Memorandum and it
was dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or not the Motion for Extension of Time by the respondent is valid.
Ruling:
Yes. It has been held that a “motion for extension of time x x x is not a litigated motion
where notice to the adverse party is necessary to afford the latter an opportunity to
resist the application, but an ex parte motion made to the court in behalf of one or the
other of the parties to the action, in the absence and usually without the knowledge of
the other party or parties.” As a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party
has a right to resist the relief sought by the motion and principles of natural justice
demand that his rights be not affected without an opportunity to be heard. It has been
said that “ex parte motions are frequently permissible in procedural matters, and also in
situations and under circumstances of emergency; and an exception to a rule requiring
notice is sometimes made where notice or the resulting delay might tend to defeat the
objective of the motion.”
Estipona vs. Hon. Lobrigo
G.R. No. 226679 August 15, 2017

Facts:
On March 21, 2016, Salvador Estipona was apprehended for possessing 0.084
grams of shabu. He was then charged for violating Sec. 11, Article II of RA No. 9165
(Possession of Dangerous Drugs).  On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a “Motion to Allow
the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement”, praying to withdraw his not
guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other
Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being
a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his
possession. He argued that Sec. 23 of RA 9165 prohibiting plea-bargaining violates the
intent of the law to rehabilitate an accused of a drug offense, the rule-making power of
the Supreme Court and the principle of separation of powers.
Respondent Judge Lobrigo issued an Order denying the motion.

Issue:
Is Section 23 of RA 9165, which prohibits plea bargaining in drug cases,
unconstitutional as it encroached upon the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate
rules of procedure?

Ruling:
Yes. The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is the
Courts’ exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative
departments. The Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure. The separation of powers among the
three co-equal branches of the government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps
the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole
province of the Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact
laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules
promulgated by the Court. The Court deem it proper to declare as invalid the prohibition
against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose. Section 23 of
Republic Act No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making
authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Pp vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 167304 August 25, 2009

Facts:
Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu. On January 14, 1994, she was able to get hold of a
cash advance in the amount of P71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher in order to
defray seminar expenses which she headed. After almost two years since she obtained
the said cash advance, no liquidation was made. Despite the demand of the City Auditor
to settle her unliquidated cash advance, she failed to liquidate the same.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) then filed an Information with the
Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445,
otherwise known as The Auditing Code of the Philippines.
The Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dismissed the case against Amante for lack
of jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether or not a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary Grade
26 who was charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls within
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

Ruling:
The present case falls under Section 4(b) where other offenses and felonies
committed by public officials or employees in relation to their office are involved. Under
the said provision, no exception is contained.
By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law, respondent
Amante, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the alleged
commission of an offense in relation to her office, falls within the original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.
The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to
those that are committed in relation to the public official or employee's office. The Court
had ruled that as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected
with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the
performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no
personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused not have committed it had he
not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted for an offense
committed in relation to his office.
A close reading of the Information filed against respondent Amante for violation
of The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said offense was committed in
relation to her office, making her fall under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended.
The case is then remanded to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.
Sanchez vs. Demetriou
G.R. Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993

Facts:
Petitioner Antonio Sanchez, who was then the Mayor of Calauan, Laguna, and
six other persons were charged with the crime of rape with homicide for the alleged
rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez. The Panel of State
Prosecutors of the Department of Justice conducted a preliminary investigation on
August 9, 1993. Petitioner Sanchez was not present but was represented by his
counsel, Atty. Marciano Brion, Jr.
PNP Commander Rex Piad issued an "invitation" to the petitioner requesting him
to appear for investigation at Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang, Laguna. It was served on
Sanchez and he was taken immediately to the said camp. At a confrontation that same
day, Sanchez was positively identified implicating him as a principal in the rape-slay of
Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. The petitioner was then placed on "arrest status"
and taken to the Department of Justice in Manila. The respondent prosecutors
immediately conducted an inquest upon his arrival, with Atty. Salvador Panelo as his
counsel.
After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez. He was forthwith
taken to the CIS Detention Center, Camp Crame, where he remains confined. On
August 26, 1993, Judge Eustaquio P. Sto. Domingo issued a warrant for the arrest of all
the accused, including the petitioner, in connection with the said crime. The Court
thereupon ordered the transfer of the venue of the seven cases to Pasig, Metro Manila,
where they were raffled to respondent Judge Harriet Demetriou.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations filed against him because: 1)
he was denied the right to present evidence at the preliminary investigation; 2) only the
Ombudsman had the competence to conduct the investigation; 3) his warrantless arrest
is illegal and the court has therefore not acquired jurisdiction over him, 4) he is being
charged with seven homicides arising from the death of only two persons; 5) the
informations are discriminatory because they do not include Teofilo Alqueza and
Edgardo Lavadia; and 6) as a public officer, he can be tried for the offense only by the
Sandiganbayan.
The respondent judge denied the motion.

Issue:
Whether or not the arrest of Mayor Sanchez was valid
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case

Ruling:
The petitioner was taken to Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna, by virtue of
a letter-invitation issued by PNP Commander Rex Piad requesting him to appear at the
said camp for investigation. The invitation came from a high-ranking military official and
the investigation of Sanchez was to be made at a military camp. Although in the guise of
a request, it was obviously a command or an order of arrest that the petitioner could
hardly be expected to defy. In fact, apparently cowed by the "invitation," he went without
protest with the officers who had come to fetch him. It may not be amiss to observe that
under R.A. No. 7438, the requisites of a "custodial investigation" are applicable even to
a person not formally arrested but merely "invited" for questioning.
The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal.
Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on August 26, 1993 against him
and the other accused in connection with the rape-slay cases. It was belated, to be
sure, but it was nonetheless legal.
The subsequent issuance of a valid warrant of arrest cured the defect of the
unlawful arrest.
The crime of rape with homicide with which the petitioner stands charged
obviously does not fall under paragraph (1), which deals with graft and corruption cases.
Neither is it covered by paragraph (2) because it is not an offense committed in relation
to the office of the petitioner. There is no direct relation between the commission of the
crime of rape with homicide and the petitioner's office as municipal mayor because
public office is not an essential element of the crime charged. The offense can stand
independently of the office. It follows that the said crime, being an ordinary offense, is
triable by the regular courts and not the Sandiganbayan.
De Lima vs. Guerrero
G.R. No. 229781 October 10, 2017

Facts:
The Senate and the House of Representatives conducted several inquiries on
the proliferation of dangerous drugs syndicated at the New Bilibid Prison (NBP), inviting
inmates who executed affidavits in support of their testimonies. These legislative
inquiries led to the filing of complaints with the Department of Justice against Senator
Leila de Lima. Four cases were consolidated and the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors was
directed to conduct the requisite preliminary investigation.
On January 13, 2017, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Prohibition and Certiorari assailing the jurisdiction of the DOJ Panel over the complaints
against her. Accordingly, on February 17, 2017, three Informations were filed against
petitioner De Lima and several co-accused before the RTC of Muntinlupa City. One of
the Informations was docketed as Criminal Case No. 17-165 and raffled off to Branch
204, presided by respondent judge. The Information charged petitioner for violation of
Section 5 in relation to Section (jj), Section 26(b), and Section 28 of RA 9165 otherwise
known as “Comprehensive Dangerous Act of 2002” for allegedly committing illegal drug
trading in New Bilibid Prison.
On February 20, 2017, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash, mainly raising the
following: the RTC lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged against petitioner; the
DOJ Panel lacks authority to file the Information; the Information charges more than one
offense; the allegations and the recitals of facts do not allege the corpus delicti of the
charge; the Information is based on testimonies of witnesses who are not qualified to be
discharged as state witnesses; and the testimonies of these witnesses are hearsay.
On February 23, 2017, respondent judge issued the presently assailed Order
finding probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against De Lima and her
co-accused.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the petitioner violated the doctrine on hierarchy of courts
2. Whether the RTC or the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the violation of
RA No. 9165
3. Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in finding
probable cause to issue the Warrant of Arrest against petitioner

Ruling:
First Issue:
Petitioner disregarded the hierarchy of courts. The strictness of the policy is
designed to shield the Court from having to deal with causes that are also well within
the competence of the lower courts, and thus leave time for the Court to deal with the
more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it.
Contrary to her position, the matter presented before the Court is not of first
impression. Petitioner is not the first public official accused of violating RA 9165 nor is
she the first defendant to question the finding of probable cause for her arrest. In fact,
stripped of all political complexions, the controversy involves run-of-the mill matters that
could have been resolved with ease by the lower court had it been given a chance to do
so in the first place.
Second Issue:
The Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case. It is basic that jurisdiction
over the subject matter in a criminal case is given only by law in the manner and form
prescribed by law. It is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. The pertinent special law governing drug-related cases is
RA 9165, which updated the rules provided in RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. A plain reading of RA 9165, as of RA 6425, will reveal
that jurisdiction over drug-related cases is exclusively vested with the Regional Trial
Court and no other. The designation of the RTC as the court with the exclusive
jurisdiction over drug-related cases is apparent in the provisions of the law where it was
expressly mentioned and recognized as the only court with the authority to hear drug-
related cases.
To reiterate for emphasis, Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660, is
the general law on jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over crimes and offenses
committed by high-ranking public officers in relation to their office; Section 90 of RA
9165 is the special law excluding from the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction violations of RA
9165 committed by such public officers. In the latter case, jurisdiction is vested upon the
RTCs designated by the Supreme Court as drugs court, regardless of whether the
violation of RA 9165 was committed in relation to the public officials' office.

Third Issue:
Respondent judge did not abuse her discretion in finding probable cause to order
the petitioner's arrest. Personal determination of the existence of probable cause by the
judge is required before a warrant of arrest may issue. What the Constitution
underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine
and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on
the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no
probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause. Notably, for purposes of determining the propriety of the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is tasked to merely determine the probability,
not the certainty, of the guilt of the accused. She is given wide latitude of discretion in
the determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. A finding of
probable cause to order the accused's arrest does not require an inquiry into whether
there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that
the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
Again, per the February 23, 2017 Order, respondent judge evaluated all the
evidence presented during the preliminary investigation and on the basis thereof found
probable cause to issue the warrant of arrest against the petitioner. The Court is not
surprised given that the only evidence available on record are those provided by the
complainants and the petitioner, in fact, did not present any counter-affidavit or
evidence to controvert this. Thus, there is nothing to disprove the following preliminary
findings of the DOJ prosecutors relative to the allegations in the Information.
Miranda vs. Tuliao
G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006

Facts:
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon, Isabela, which
were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of
private respondent Virgilio Tuliao. Two informations for murder were filed against 5
police officers and SPO2 Rodel Maderal in RTC of Santiago City. The venue was later
transferred to RTC Manila wherein all of the accused where convicted and sentenced to
two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at
that time, being at large. Upon review, the SC acquitted the accused therein on the
ground of reasonable doubt.
In September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn
confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3
Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons
responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao. Respondent Tuliao filed
a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners. Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo
Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary
investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest. In the
hearing of the urgent motion, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and
issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court did
not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the
court.

Issue:
Whether or not an accused can seek judicial relief if he does not submit his
person to the jurisdiction of the court

Ruling:
An accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the
jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired
either through compulsory process, such as warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary
appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court. It is only when
the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke
the processes of the court. Thus, an accused must first be placed in the custody of the
law before the court may validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs. The Court ruled
that petitioners Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since they
were not yet arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty at the time they filed their
"Urgent Motion to complete preliminary investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall and/or
quash warrants of arrest."
Paderanga v. CA
People of the Philippines v. Guting
G.R. No. 205412 09 September 2015

Facts:
PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi were standing in front of the Camiling Police Station when
suddenly the appellant approached them and told them that he stabbed his father.
When PO1 Macusi asked who killed his father, appellant answered, “Sinaksak ko po
yong tatay ko! Napatay ko na po!" PO1 Torre then got the knife from appellant and gave
it to PO1 Macusi for proper disposition. The Policemen then went to the Guting’s
residence to verify the reported crime and when they arrived, they saw the victim’s
lifeless body. When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty. The RTC then convicted
appellant of Parricide. The CA affirmed the conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not appellant’s oral confession to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi,
without the assistance of counsel, is inadmissible in evidence.
Ruling:
No. Accused-appellant in the instant case, on his own volition, approached
unsuspecting police officers standing in front of the police station with a knife in his hand
and readily confessed to stabbing his father to death. Accused-appellant was arrested
and subjected to custodial investigation by the police officers only after his confession.
Hence, herein accused-appellant's confession, even if done without the assistance of a
lawyer, is not in violation of his constitutional right under Section 12, paragraph 1, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution. Accused-appellant was not under custodial investigation
when he admitted, without assistance of counsel, to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi that he
stabbed his father to death. Accused-appellant's verbal confession was so
spontaneously and voluntarily given and was not elicited through questioning by the
police authorities. It may be true that PO1 Macusi asked accused-appellant who killed
his father, but PO1 Macusi only did so in response to accused-appellant's initial
declaration that his father was already dead. At that point, PO1 Macusi still had no idea
who actually committed the crime and did not consider accused-appellant as the
suspect in his father's killing.
People v. Pepino
People v. Francisco Galit
People v. Domingo R. Muleta

Facts:
Domingo Muleta allegedly raped her niece, Charito Delgado and was found to be
naked in Malolos, Bulacan tied in a post. She bore five stab wounds which caused her
instantaneous death. The accused was then brought for custodial investigation and was
assisted by Atty. Deborah Daquis which at the same instance, he admitted having raped
the victim.
In the defense of the appellant, he claimed that he had been brought for
investigation wherein he was also tortured, boxed, kicked and brought to a secluded
place. He also claimed that he was forced to sign a document he was not able to read
and because he can no longer bear the torture. In addition, he was not assisted by
counsel.
Issues:
1. Whether or not his extra-judicial confession is admissible in evidence.
2. Whether or not his constitutional rights during custodial investigation were
properly understood by the accused.
3. Whether or not there is a valid waiver of rights.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that extrajudicial confession must conform to the
constitutional requirements otherwise it is invalid or inadmissible in evidence. Such
constitutional right include the right to remain silent, to have an independent and
competent counsel preferably of his own choice, to be provided with counsel if they are
unable to secure one, to be assisted by such counsel during the investigation, to have
such counsel present when they decide to waive these rights and of fact that anything
they say can and will be used against them in court. In the case at bar, such right was
violated as the accused was not assisted by counsel at that time.
It was found that the heading of the sworn statement refers to the same date.
The purported sworn statement of the appellant was prepared prior to the arrival of his
counsel. The sworn statement was executed and completed on the same day. Atty.
Daquis arrived only the following day which only shows that the accused’s extrajudicial
confession was not assisted by counsel, and hence, inadmissible.
There was also no valid waiver of rights. There was failure to show that Muleta
had understood his rights, his waiver of those rights, and the implications of his waiver.
Moreover, Atty. Daquiz made no effort to determine whether the accused was treated
well, or if he understood his rights which are indications that his constitutional rights
have not been complied with.
People v. Vicente Lugnasin

Facts:
Vicente Lugnasin together with one Devincio Guerrero was convicted of the
crime of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. Nicassius Cordero
narrated in court how he was abducted and kept for four days. The accused also
negotiated for ransom but failed to receive the same. Afterwards they released Cordero.
Cordero positively identified Lugnasin and Guerrero as the perpetrators in this case in
an out of court identification.
The defense contends that such identification of Cordero was marked with
suggestiveness and that their warrantless arrest was illegal. Moreover, their rights under
RA 7438 were also violated.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the out-of-court identification of Cordero was marked with
suggestiveness.
2. Whether or not the contention that their warrantless arrest as illegal is deemed
waived because it was not raised before his arraignment.
3. Whether or not there was violation of their constitutional rights under RA 7438
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Cordero positively identified both the accused as
two of his kidnappers. He saw them before he was blindfolded and it was not marked
with suggestiveness because it was not supported by solid evidence. Cordero’s
description of the incident was detailed of how he was abducted. Further, an out-of-
court identification does not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of independent in-
court identification and that, even assuming that an out-of-court identification was
tainted with irregularity, the subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may
have attended it.
With regard to the warrantless arrest of the appellants, they raised no objection
to the irregularity of their arrest before the arraignment. They have actively participated
in the trial of the case. It is deemed that they have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
trial court, hence curing any defect in his arrest. The appellants are estopped from
assailing any irregularity of their arrest or to move for the quashal of the information
against him on such ground before arraignment. They are deemed to have waived their
right to question their arrest.
There was also no violation of their constitutional rights under RA 7438. Neither
one of them executed an extrajudicial confession or admission. The records also show
that their co-accused Cielito Buluran opted to remain silent during the custodial
investigation.
People v. Idel Amminudin

Facts:
Idel Amminudin was allegedly arrested for illegally transporting marijuana.Police
officers received a tip from an informant. While alighting from the M/V Wilcon, the
informer pointed at him. Police officers approached him and inspected his bag wherein
they found what looked like marijuana. Amminudin was brought to the headquarters and
subject to investigation.
In his defense, Amminudin disclaimed the marijuana. He claimed that he was
arrested and immediately handcuffed and his bag was seized without a search warrant.
At the headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the
marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the arrest was valid.
2. Whether or not a search warrant is needed to obtain.
Ruling:
In the case at bar, the accused was not caught in flagrante delicto nor was a
crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless
arrest. No overt act was done as he was only descending form the gangplank of the
M/V Wilcon 9. It is also apparent that the police officers were given enough time to
secure such warrants to validly effect the arrest of the appellant. Amminudin’s
information was known, the vehicle was identified and his adate of arrival was certain.
However, there were no warrants of arrest and search were issued in the present case.
Thus, the Court ruled that the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence
obtained is inadmissible.
Rodel Luz v. People
Facts:
Rodel Luz was seen by PO2 Emmanuel L. Alateza driving a motorcycle without a
helmet. The latter prompted to flag down the accused for violating a municipal
ordinance requiring all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet while driving a motor vehicle.
PO2 Alteza invited the accused to the sub-station as it was at a proximate distance. He
noticed the accused was uneasy prompting him to oblige the same to slowly put out the
contents of the pockets of his jacket. The contents included four plastic sachets, two
were empty and the other two contained suspected shabu.
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure because there was
no lawful arrest. He was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of a
city ordinance. Moreover he also did not consent to the search conducted by him.
Issue:
Whether or not the arrest was valid.
Ruling:
The Court found that there was no valid arrest of the petitioner. Arrest is the
taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be
arrested or by the person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the
arrest. Under RA 4136 or The Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general
procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the
confiscation of the driver’s license of the latter.
Petitioner Luz was not given a citation ticket in the present case, and could not
be said to have been “under arrest’ as there can never be an arrest for a traffic violation.
Moreover, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search is illegal. The object
seized was not in plain view rather it was concealed inside a metal container inside
Luz’s pocket. There was also no consented search because it was not voluntary.
Petitioner was asked to put out the contents of his pockets. Neither has it qualified
under “stop and frisk” rule because petitioner was not at all suspicious when he was
flagged down for a traffic violation. Hence, the seized drugs are inadmissible in
evidence.
JOEY M. PESTILOS, et al. v. MORENO GENEROSO
GR No. 182601, Nov 10, 2014
Facts:
On February 20, 2005, at around 3:15 in the morning, an altercation ensued between
the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso at Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit,
Quezon City where the petitioners and Atty. Generoso reside.

Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 to report the incident. Acting
on this report, Desk Officer SPOI Primitivo Monsalve (SPO1 Monsalve) dispatched
SP02 Javier to go to the scene of the crime and to render assistance. SP02 Javier,
together with augmentation personnel from the Airforce, A2C Alano Sayson and Airman
Ruel Galvez, arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged
altercation and they saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.

Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted
the police officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for
investigation.

The petitioners went with the police officers to Batasan Hills Police Station. At the
inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the petitioners
stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the
attack.
On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation on the ground that they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that
no valid warrantless arrest took place since the police officers had no personal
knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime.

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY ARRESTED WITHOUT A
WARRANT.

Held:

In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon the

courts to consider if the police officers have complied with the requirements set under
Section S (b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically, the
requirement of immediacy; the police officer's personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the determination of probable cause that the
person sought to be arrested committed the crime.
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they
have personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the
scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable
to conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These circumstances
qualify as the police officers' personal observation, which are within their personal
knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.
People of the Philippines vs Gerente

GR no. 95847-48, March 10, 1993

Facts:
The Valenzuela Police Station received a report about a mauling incident. Upon
learning at the hospital that the victim died on arrival and being informed of the cause of
death, the policemen proceeded to the crime scene where they found a piece of wood
with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana. After being told by
the eyewitness the identity of one of the three assailants, the policemen went to
appellant’s house where they introduced themselves, and apprehended him and
confiscated dried marijuana leaves.

Issue:
Whether or not the search of appellant’s person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves
in his possession were valid.

Held:
YES. The policemen arrested appellant only some three hours after he and his
companions had killed the victim. They saw the victim dead in the hospital and when
they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death.
The eyewitness reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor,
the appellant, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had
personal knowledge of the violent death of the victim and of facts indicating
that appellant and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest him without a
warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would
have fled the law as his two companions did. The search conducted on appellant’s
person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest.
Judge Martonino R. Marcos v. Judge Perla V. Cabrera-Faller
 A.M. No. RTJ-16-2472
 
Facts:

The controversy stemmed from the death of complainant's grandson, Marc Andrei Marcos
(Marc Andrei), during the initiation rites of Lex Leonum Fratemitas (Lex Leonum) held
on July 29, 2012at the Veluz Farm, Dasmariñas City, Cavite. Finding probable cause to sustain the
prosecution of the accused in the said case, Judge Cabrera-Faller issued an order directing the
issuance of a warrant of arrest and, at the same time, the archiving of the entire record of the case until
the arrest of the accused. However, ten days later, Judge Cabrera-Faller issued another order
directing the recall of the warrants of arrest of the three accused which she claimed were issued
inadvertently. And on August 15, 2013, the said judge issues the Omnibus Order quashing, lifting
and setting aside the warrants for their arrest and ultimately dismissing the case against all of them for
lack of probable cause.

The order of dismissal prompted complainant to file this administrative case against Judge Cabrera-
Faller.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the warrants of arrest were validly recalled by Judge Cabrera-Faller.

HELD:

In the judicial determination of probable cause, no less than the Constitution mandates
a judge to personally determine the existence of probable cause before issuing a
warrant of arrest. This has been embodied in Section 2, Article III of the Philippine
Constitution and Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Clearly, Judge
Cabrera-Faller was mandated to personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause and,
on the basis thereof, to issue a warrant of arrest. Though she was not required to
personally examine the complainant or his witnesses, she was obliged to personally
evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor before
ordering the issuance of a warrant of arrest. In the June 13, 2013 Order, Judge
Cabrera-Faller recalled the warrants of arrest against three of the accused. She,
however, failed to explain why she issued the warrants inadvertently. She merely wrote
that the warrants of arrest were “inadvertently issued” without any explanation why there
was such inadvertence in the issuance. The Court cannot accept this.
It could only mean that she failed to comply with her constitutional mandate to
personally determine the existence of probable cause before ordering the issuance of
the warrants of arrest. As the presiding judge, it was her task, upon the filing of the
Information, to first and foremost determine the existence or nonexistence of probable
cause for the arrest of the accused. If she did find the evidence submitted by the
prosecutor to be insufficient, she could order the dismissal of the case, or direct the
investigating prosecutor either to submit more evidence or to submit the entire records
of the preliminary investigation, or she could even call the complainant and the witness
to answer the courts probing questions to enable her to discharge her duty.
JUDGE ABELITA III v. DORIA

GR.no. 170672

Facts:

 Judge Abelita III filed a complaint for Damages against P/Supt. Doria and SPO3
Ramirez. Petitioner alleged that while he and his family are on their way home, these
two officers requested them to proceed to the Provincial PNP Headquarters at Camp
Boni Serrano, Masbate, Masbate. He was forcibly taken and was searched without
warrant. A shotgun was found in his possession and he was arrested. Petitioner was
charged with illegal possession of firearms and frustrated murder. The trial court found
that petitioner was at the scene of the shooting incident in Barangay Nursery. The trial
court ruled that the police officers who conducted the search were of the belief, based
on reasonable grounds, that petitioner was involved in the incident and that the firearm
used in the commission of the offense was in his possession. The trial court ruled that
petitioner’s warrantless arrest and the warrantless seizure of the firearms were valid and
legal, thus, rejecting petitioner’s claim for frame up.

Issue:

Whether or not the warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure were illegal
under Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Ruling:

 No. For the warrantless arrest under this Rule to be valid, two requisites must concur:
(1) the offender has just committed an offense; and (2) the arresting peace officer or
private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does
not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense
with their own eyes. In this case, P/Supt. Doria received a report about the alleged
shooting incident. SPO3 Ramirez investigated the report and learned from witnesses
that petitioner was involved in the incident. They were able to track down petitioner, but
when invited to the police headquarters to shed light on the incident, petitioner initially
agreed then sped up his vehicle, prompting the police authorities to give chase.

Petitioner’s act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report which they
investigated, is enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police
authorities as to the existence of probable cause. The seizure of the firearms was
justified under the plain view doctrine. Since a shooting incident just took place and it
was reported that petitioner was involved in the incident, it was apparent to the police
officers that the firearms may be evidence of a crime, hence they were justified in
seizing the firearms.
 Comerciante v. PP
GR No. 205926 July 22, 2015

Facts:
Agent Radan of the NARCOTICS group and P03 Calag were aboard a
motorcycle, patrolling the area wile on their way to visit a friend at Mandaluyong City.
They spotted at a distance of about 10 meters, Comerciante and Dasilla – standing and
showing “improper and unpleasant movements,” with one of them handing plastic
sachets to the other. Thinking that the sachets may contain shabu, they immediately
stopped and approached the two men. P03 Calag introduced himself as a police officer,
arrested Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated two plastic sachets which confirmed
as shabu

Dasilla filed a demurer to evidence, which was granted by the RTC, thus his
acquittal. However, due to Comerciante’s failure to file his own demurer to evidence, the
RTC considered his right to do so waived and ordered him to present his evidence.

Comerciante contends that P03 Calag did not effect a valid warrantless arrest on
him. On the other hand, the Office f the Solicitor General maintains that Comerciante’s
wrrantless arrest was validly made pursuant to the “stop and frisk” rule, especially
considering that he was caught in falgrante delicto in possession of illegal drugs

Issue:
1. Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest
2. Whether or not the the “stop and frisk” search was valid

Held:
1. No. There is no other overt act could be properly attributed to Comerciante as
to rouse suspicion in the mind of P03 Calag that the former had just
committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Verily, the acts
of standing around with a companion and handing over something to latter
cannot in any way be considered criminal acts

2. No. Stop and frisk searches is where the law enforcers are given the legal
arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, they should have
the ability to discern – based on facts that they themselves observe – whether
an individual is acting in a suspicious manner.
In this case, Comerciante’s acts of standing around with a companion and
handing over something to the latter do not constitute criminal acts. These
circumstances are not enough to create a reasonable inference of criminal
activity which would constitute a “genuine reason” for P03 Calag to conduct a
“stop and frisk” search on the former.
 PP v. Tuazon
GR No. 175783 September 3, 2007

Facts:
The Antipolo City Police Stattion received through telephone, a confidential
information that a Gemini car bearing plate number PFC 411 would deliver an
unspecified amount of shabu in Marville Subdivision, Antipolo City. When the team
arrived, they saw the said Gemini car and immediately flagged it down. It was then that
PO1 Padlan saw a gun tucked on Tuazon’s waist and the latter said that it did not
belong to him nor could he produce any pertinent document relating to said firearm. As
soon as Tuazon stepped down from the car, PO3 Bueno saw five plastic sachets on the
drivers seat, the contents of which Tuazon allegedly admitted to be shabu

Tuazon filed a supplementary pleading in which he questioned the validity of his

arrest and the admissibility of the evidence presented against him. He contends that at
the time of his warrantless arrest, he was merely driving within Marville Subdivision. He
had not committed, was not committing, and was not about to commit any crime which
could have justified his apprehension. He also alleged that the absent of search
warrant, the shabu seized from him should be excluded from evidence.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid warrantless search and the evidence presented
was admissible

Held:
Yes. The police had probable cause to effect the warrantless search of the
Gemini car driven by Tuazon. The information provided by the informer turned out to be
correct as, indeed, the Gemini car was spotted in the place where it was said to be
bringing shabu. When they stopped they stopped the car, they saw a gun tucked in
Tuazon’s waist wherein he did not have any document to support his possession of
said firearm which all the more strengthened the police suspicion.

After he was told to step out of the car, they found on the driver’s seat plastic
sachets containing powdery substance. These circumstances. Taken together, are
sufficient to establish probable cause for the warrantless search of the Gemini car and
the eventual admission into evidence of the plastic packets against appellant
 PP v. Cogaed
GR No. 200334 July 30, 2014

Facts:
Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan) received a text message
from an unidentified civilian informer that one Marvin Buya would be transporting
marijuana from Barangay Lun-Oy, San Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of San
Gabriel, La Union. PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order “to intercept the suspect.
A passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatac’s checkpoint.
SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags. Cogaen
and Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since they were transporting the
bags as a favor for their barriomate named Marvin. After this exchange, Cogaed opened
the blue bag revealing three bricks of what looked like marijuana which were found
indeed as marijuana.

According to Cogaed’s testimony during the trial, he was at Balbalayan, La

Union, “waiting for a jeepney to take him to the Poblacion of San Gabriel so he could
buy pesticide. He boarded a jeepney and recognized Dayao and upon arrival, Dayao
allegedly asked to help Cogaed in carrying his things, which included a travelling bag
and a sack. This was when SPO1 Taracatac approached them. When they were at the
police station, Cogaed said that “SPO1 Taracatac hit him on the head. The bags were
also opened, but Cogaed never new what was inside. It was only later when Cogaed
learned that it was marijuana when he and Dayao were charged with illegal possession
of dangerous drugs.

However, the case was dismissed against Dayao. Because he was only 14 years
old at that time and was exempt from criminal liability.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid warrantless search and seizure

Held:
No. The search involved in this case was initially a “stop and frisk” search but it
did not comply with all the requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.
The balance lies in the concept of “suspiciousness”present in the situation where the
police officer finds himself or herself in. In this case, Cogaed was simply a passenger
carrying a bag and traveling aboard a jeepney. There was nothing suspicious,
moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag.

Normally, “stop and frisk” searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to
confer with a judge to determine probable cause. In this case, there was not a single
suspicious circumstances and there was no approximation for the probable cause
requirement fro warrantless arrest. The person searched was not even the person
mentioned by the informants. The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the
person searched was Victor Coaged

Lastly, the facts of this case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful
arrest. None of the instances enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court
were present when the arrest was made. There were no overt acts within plain view of
the police officers that suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time.
Therefore, the evidence obtained was also inadmissible because it was obtained there
was no valid warrantless search and seizure.
Ogayon v People
G.R. No. 188794
Facts:
Pursuant to the enforcement of Search Warrant No. AEK 29-2003, drug
paraphernalia and plastic sachets containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or
“shabu” were found in the possession of Ogayon. Two Informations were filed against
him for violations of RA 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002).
Relying on the presumption of regularity, the RTC rejected Ogayon’s frame-up
defense. The RTC rendered a joint judgment convicting Ogayon of the two criminal
charges against him.
Ogayon appealed to the CA. This time, he questioned the validity of the search
warrant, claiming it was improperly issued. He argued that the search warrant was
defective for lack of transcript showing that the issuing judge conducted an examination
of the applicant for search warrant and his witnesses.
Although the CA found no evidence in the records showing compliance with this
requirement, it nevertheless upheld the search warrant’s validity due to Ogayon’s failure
to make a timely objection against the warrant during the trial.
Issue:
W/N Ogayon had waived his right to question the legality of the search warrant. – YES.
Granting that Ogayon had already waived his right to question the legality of the search
warrant, the search conducted was still highly irregular, thereby rendering the seized
articles as inadmissible in evidence. – YES.
Ruling:
Under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant is central to the right, and its existence largely depends on the
finding of the judge conducting the examination.
Ogayon’s appeal of his conviction essentially rests on his claim that the search
warrant was defective because "there was no transcript of stenographic notes of the
proceedings in which the issuing judge had allegedly propounded the required
searching questions and answers in order to determine the existence of probable
cause." We find that the failure to attach to the records the depositions of the
complainant and his witnesses and/or the transcript of the judge’s examination, though
contrary to the Rules, does not by itself nullify the warrant. The requirement to attach is
merely a procedural rule and not a component of the right. Rules of procedure or
statutory requirements, however salutary they may be, cannot provide new
constitutional requirements.
Instead, what the Constitution requires is for the judge to conduct an "examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce," after
which he determines the existence of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant.
Generally, a judge’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant is accorded great deference by a reviewing court, so long as there was
substantial basis for that determination. "Substantial basis means that the questions of
the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed,
and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place
sought to be searched."
Apart from the statement in the search warrant itself, we find nothing in the
records of this case indicating that the issuing judge personally and thoroughly
examined the applicant and his witnesses. The absence of depositions and transcripts
of the examination was already admitted; the application for the search warrant and the
affidavits, although acknowledged by Ogayon himself, could not be found in the records.
The testimonies given during Ogayon’s trial made no reference to the application for the
search warrant. SPO4 Caritos testified that he was among those who conducted the
surveillance before the application for a search warrant was made. However, he was
not the one who applied for the warrant; in fact, he testified that he did not know who
applied for it.
The records, therefore, bear no evidence from which we can infer that the
requisite examination was made, and from which the factual basis for probable cause to
issue the search warrant was derived.
The nullity of the search warrant prevents the Court from considering Ogayon’s
belated objections thereto.
The CA declared that Ogayon had waived the protection of his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures due to his failure to make a timely objection
against the search warrant’s validity before the trial court. It based its ruling on the
procedural rule that any objections to the legality of the search warrant should be made
during the trial of the case.
The Court finds the CA’s casual treatment of a fundamental right distressing. It
prioritized compliance with a procedural rule over compliance with the safeguards for a
constitutional right. Procedural rules can neither diminish nor modify substantial rights;
their non-compliance should therefore not serve to validate a warrant that was issued in
disregard of the constitutional requirements. As mentioned, the existence of probable
cause determined after examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses
is central to the guarantee of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. The ends of justice
are better served if the supremacy of the constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures is preserved over technical rules of procedure.
Moreover, the courts should indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights; we should not presume acquiescence in the
loss of fundamental rights.
With the inadmissibility of the drugs seized from Ogayon' s home, there is no
more evidence to support his conviction.
People v Doria, Gaddao
Facts:
Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao were charged with violation of Section 4, in
relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. They were caught during a
buy-bust operation with the help of the civilian informats. Doria was caught wherein the
PO3 Manlangit disguised as a buyer of marijuana. Thereafter, Manlangit and his
companion asked Doria where the money was, Doria then pointed at the house of
Violeta Gaddao. Upon arrival, Manlangit found Gaddao and noticed a carton box under
the dining table. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of
what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
Contention of the accused-appellants: Doria was directed to point out the house
of one “totoy” the husband of Gaddao. Upon arrival, the Manlangit seized Violeta and
found a box containing Marijauna in the house. Gaddao had no knowledge of the illegal
drug.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City convicted the
accused-appellants. The trial court found the existence of an "organized/syndicated
crime group" and sentenced both accused-appellants to death and pay a fine of P500,
000.00 each.

Issue:

Whether the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is unlawful

Whether the lower court erred in upholding the validity of the warrantless search
leading to the seizure of the marijuana allegedly found inside the house of
accused-appellant (Gaddao)

Held:

For the first issue, no. warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful.
Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:

"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
 (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a
warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense." Appellant Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. When an
accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the
police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.

For the second issue, yes. The lower court erred in upholding the warrantless
search and seizure of the accused-appellant’s house.

In the case of Gaddao, she was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged
identification made by her co-accused. In fact, she was going about her daily chores
when the policemen pounced on her. Furthermore, Appellant Doria did not point to
appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom
he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs. Appellant Doria
may have left the money in her house, with or without her knowledge, with or without
any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Doria's word, the Narcom agents had no
reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. If there is no
showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had, in his own right,
knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal
offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.

Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was illegal, it follows

that the search of her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills
and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest. It cannot also be
attested that the marijuana was found under the plain view doctrine and thus admissible
because the requisites were not met.

In the case, the marijuana cannot be admitted as an evidence because PO3

Manlangit did not know exactly what the box contained that he had to ask appellant
Gaddao about its contents.  The marijuana was not in plain view and its seizure without
the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution.  It was fruit
of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded and never considered by the trial
court.

Hence, Violeta Gaddao is acquitted

ESPANO VS CA

RODOLFO ESPANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 120431 April 1, 1998

Facts:

            Pat. Pagilagan together with other police officers went to Zamora and Pandacan
Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in the area. They saw petitioner
selling something to another person. After the alleged buyer left, they approached
petitioner, identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded two
plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if he had more marijuana, he
replied that there was more in his house. The policemen went to his residence where
they found ten more cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner was brought to the
police headquarters where he was charged of possession of prohibited drugs.

Issue:

            Whether or not the pieces of evidence were inadmissible

Ruling:

            The Supreme Court held that Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:

“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense . . . “

            Petitioner’s arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He was caught in
flagrante as a result of a buy bust operation conducted by police officers on the basis of
information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area. The police
officer saw petitioner handling over something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left,
they searched him and discovered two cellophane of marijuana. His arrest was,
therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bag of marijuana seized were admissible in
evidence, being fruits of the crime.
Abenes vs. CA
G.R. No. 156320
February 14, 2007

Facts:
This is a case against Rodolfo Abenes of the offense of illegal possession of high
powered firearms and its ammunitions. Wherein three days prior to the May 11, 1998
national and local elections, the Philippine National Police of Pagadian City establish
and man a checkpoint for the purpose of enforcing the Gun Ban which was then being
implemented.

At the same day, a red Tamaraw FX trying to pass though the check point was
stopped by the team and directed to park at the side of the road and because the car’s
windows were tinted, the police officer knocked and requested the occupants to step
down for a routine inspection. At this juncture, the police officer noticed that a holstered
frearm was tucked at the right wasit of Abenes. The firearm was readily visible to the
policemen; it was not covered by the shirt worn by Abenes. The latter was then asked
by the police officer whether he ahd a license and authority to carry the firearm, and
whether his possession was exempted from the Gun Ban being enforced by the
COMELC. Acccused answered in the affirmative. The policemen then demanded for the
pertinent documents to be shown to support his claim but could not show any. Hence,
the police officer confiscated the said firearm and the accused was brought to the PNP
Headquarters. A certification was then disclosed that the accused is not registered nor a
licensed firearm holder.

On the other hand, the accused tried to alleged tat the firearm did not belng to
and was not recovered from him; that the firearm was recovered by the policemen from
the floor of the vehicle inside a clutch bag which was allegedly left by an unidentified
person who hitched a ride somewhere along the national highway of Tawagan Norte
Zamboanga Del Sur and alighted near the Mabuhay Bazaar in Pagadian City.

Issue:
Was the petitioner’s constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure violated?

Ruling:
No because in this case the firearm was seized from the petitioner when in plain
view, the policemen was it tucked into the accused’s wasit uncovered by his shirt.

Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who
has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence. The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites
concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification
for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the
discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent
to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwise subject to seizure. All the foregoing requirement are present in this case.
However, the Court must underscore that the prosecution failed to satisfactorily prove
the negative allegation in the Information that the petitioner possessed no license or
permit to bear the subject firearm. Therefore, the Court acquitted the accused form the
charged of illegal possession
Manalili vs. CA
G.R. No. 113447
October 9, 1997

Facts:
This is a case against the petitioner, Alain Manalili, who was charged with
violation of Sec. 8, Art. II of RA 6425. That the policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of
Kalookan City Police Station were conducting surveillance in front of Kalookan City
Cemetery. This is made because of the information that drug addict were roaming the
area.

Upon reaching the Kalookan City cemetery, the policemen alighted from their
vehicle. They chanced upon a male person in front of the cemetery who appeared high
on drugs. The male person was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a
swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid the policemen, the latter
approached him and introduced themselves as police officers. The policemen then
asked the male person if he could see what is in his hands which showed his wallet and
allowed the police officer to examine the same. He found suspected crushed marijuana
residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents. The accused then was
brought to the police headquarters for further investigation

However, the accused had a different side of the story wherein he alleged that he
was aboard a tricycle when the police officer order the tricycle driver to stop because
the latter and the accused were under influence of marijuana. The police officer then
bodily searched the two but nothing was found on the person of the accused and the
driver. The policemen allowed the tricycle driver to go while they brought the accused to
the police headquarters at Kalookan City where they said they would again search the
accused. It was futher testified that the accused was made to take off his pants at the
police headquarters but no marijuana was found on the body off the accused.

Issue:
Were the marijuana leaves found in the possession of the accused admissible as
evidence, contending that they were products of an illegal search?

Ruling:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that the search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-
frisk. As a general rule, search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured
judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to
challenge. Exemption to this are: (1) search incidental to lawful arrest; (2) searhing of
moving vehicles; (3) seizure in plain view; (4) customs search; and (5) waiver by the
accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure.
 In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during
their surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the
Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police information was a popular hangout
of drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the
Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who
were high. The policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop petitioner to
investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such investigation, they found
marijuana in petitioner’s possession.

Furthermore, the Court concur with the Solicitor Generals contention that
petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained when
he failed to raise this issue or to object thereto during the trial. A valid waiver of a right,
more particularly of the constitutional right against unreasonable search, requires the
concurrence of the following requirements: (1) the right to be waived existed; (2) the
person waiving it had knowledge, actual or constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she had
an actual intention to relinquish the right. Otherwise, the Courts will indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental safeguards and will not deduce
acquiescence from the failure to exercise this elementary right. In the present case,
however, petitioner is deemed to have waived such right for his failure to raise its
violation before the trial court. In petitions under Rule 45, as distinguished from an
ordinary appeal of criminal cases where the whole case is opened for review, the
appeal is generally limited to the errors assigned by petitioner. Issues not raised below
cannot be pleaded for the first time on appeal. Therefore, the accused was held guilty of
the crime charged.
People vs. Libnao
G.R. No. 136860
January 20, 2003

Facts:
This is a case filed against the accused, Agpanga Libnao and Rosita Nunga, for
the violation of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425 wherein the Philippine National Police in
Tarlac receive a tip from the intelligence operatives and began conducting surveillance
operation on suspected drug dealers in the area.

The next day the police officer flagged down a passing tricycle. It had two female
pasengers seated inside, who later identified as the accused. In front of them was a
black bag. Suspicious of the black ag and the two uneasy behavior when asked about
its ownership and content, the officers invited them to Kabayan Center in the same
barangay. As soon as the barangay captain arrived, the bag was opened in the
presence of the appellant, her co-accused and personnel of the center. Found inside it
were eight bricks of leaves sealed in plastic bags and covered with newspaper. The
leaves were suspected to be marijuana.

During the trial, the trial court found bothe accused guilty of the offense charged.

Issue:
Did the police officer who arrested both accused violated the right or the latter
against illegal and unwarranted arrest and search?

Ruling:
No because the requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the
carrying out of a search and seizure is not absolute. There are certain familiar
exceptions to the rule, one of which relates to search of moving vehicles. Warrantless
search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability
of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out
of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such
cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is
limited to visual inspection. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive
search, such would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers made it upon
probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to
the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains as item, article or object
which by law is subject to seizure and destruction.

The warrantless search in the case at bench is not bereft of a probable

cause. The Tarlac Police Intelligence Division had been conducting surveillance
operation for three months in the area. The surveillance yielded the information that
once a month, appellant and her co-accused Rosita Nunga transport drugs in big
bulks. At 10:00 pm of October 19, 1996, the police received a tip that the two will be
transporting drugs that night riding a tricycle. Surely, the two were intercepted three
hours later, riding a tricycle and carrying a suspicious-looking black bag, which possibly
contained the drugs in bulk. When they were asked who owned it and what its content
was, both became uneasy. Under these circumstances, the warrantless search and
seizure of appellant’s bag was not illegal.

It is also clear that at the time she was apprehended, she was committing a
criminal offense. She was making a delivery or transporting prohibited drugs in violation
of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425. Under the Rules of Court, one of the instances
a police officer is permitted to carry out a warrantless arrest is when the person to be
arrested is caught committing a crime in flagrante delicto. Thus, it is valid.
Malacat v. CA
GR No. 123595 December 12, 1997
Facts:
On or about August 27, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly keep, possess and/or acquire a hand
grenade, without first securing the necessary license and/or permit therefor from the
proper authorities.
Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated
National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, testified that on 27 August 1990,
at about 6:30 p.m., in response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, he was on
foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon
Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They
chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three
to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the
Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with their eyes moving very
fast.
Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both
groups for about thirty minutes. The police officers then approached one group of men,
who then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with
and apprehended petitioner. Upon searching petitioner, Yu found a fragmentation
grenade tucked inside petitioners front waist line. Yu’s companion, police officer Rogelio
Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. 
The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to a
stop and frisk, where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being
preceded by an arrest and whose object is either to maintain the status
quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information. Probable
cause was not required as it was not certain that a crime had been committed, however,
the situation called for an investigation, hence to require probable cause would have
been premature.
Issue:
Whether or not the search and seizure of the police officers to the petitioner lawful.
Ruling:
No. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the
validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority
of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a
search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a
search can be made the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid
arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within
which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any
money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of
the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee
with the means of escaping or committing violence.
In this case, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest
preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the
arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime
had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed.
Vergara v. People
GR 170180, November 23, 2007
Facts:
On or about the 17th day of March 2003 accused Arsenio Vergara Valdez have in his
possession, control and custody dried marijuana leaves wrapped in a cellophane and
newspaper page, weighing more or less twenty-five (25) grams, without first securing
the necessary permit, license or prescription from the proper government agency. The
prosecution presented three (3) barangay tanods of San Benito Norte, Aringay, La
Union namely, Rogelio Bautista (Bautista), Nestor Aratas (Aratas) and Eduardo Ordoo
(Ordoo), who arrested petitioner.
Bautista testified that at around 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. of 17 March 2003, he was conducting
the routine patrol along the National Highway in Barangay San Benito Norte, Aringay,
La Union together with Aratas and Ordoo when they noticed petitioner, lugging a bag,
alight from a mini-bus. The tanods observed that petitioner, who appeared suspicious to
them, seemed to be looking for something. They thus approached him but the latter
purportedly attempted to run away. They chased him, put him under arrest and
thereafter brought him to the house of Barangay Captain Orencio Mercado (Mercado)
where he, as averred by Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to open his bag. Petitioner’s
bag allegedly contained a pair of denim pants, eighteen pieces of eggplant and dried
marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper and cellophane. It was then that petitioner was
taken to the police station for further investigation.
Aratas and Ordoo corroborated Bautistas testimony on most material points. On cross-
examination, however, Aratas admitted that he himself brought out the contents of
petitioner’s bag before petitioner was taken to the house of Mercado. Nonetheless, he
claimed that at Mercados house, it was petitioner himself who brought out the contents
of his bag upon orders from Mercado. For his part, Ordoo testified that it was he who
was ordered by Mercado to open petitioner’s bag and that it was then that they saw the
purported contents thereof.
Issue:
Whether or not the search on the bag of Valdez valid?
Ruling:
No. A stop-and-frisk situation, following Terry v. Ohio, must precede a warrantless
arrest, be limited to the person’s outer clothing, and should be grounded upon a
genuine reason, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.
The supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they appeared dubious, cannot be
viewed as sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity enough to validate his
warrantless arrest. If at all, the search most permissible for the tanod to conduct under
the prevailing backdrop of the case was a stop-and-frisk to allay any suspicion they
have been harboring based on petitioner’s behavior. However, a stop-and-frisk
situation, following Terry v. Ohio, must precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to the
person’s outer clothing, and should be grounded upon a genuine reason, in light of the
police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the
person detained has weapons concealed about him. Valdez vs. People, 538 SCRA 611,
G.R. No. 170180 November 23, 2007
Sanchez v. People
GR 204589, November 19, 2014
Facts:
On or about the 19th day of March 2003, in the Municipality of Imus, Province of Cavite,
the accused have in his possession, control and custody, 0.1017 gram of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as “shabu,” a dangerous drug, in
violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. He pleaded not guilty of the offense
charged.
In the version of the prosecution, Around 2:50 p.m. of March 19, 2003, acting on the
information that Jacinta Marciano, a.k.a. “Intang,” was selling drugs to tricycle drivers.
SPO1 Elmer Amposta, together with CSU Edmundo Hernandez, CSU Jose Tagle, Jr.,
and CSU Samuel Monzon, was dispatched to Barangay Alapan 1-B, Imus, Cavite to
conduct an operation. While at the place, the group waited for a tricycle going to, and
coming from, the house of Jacinta. After a few minutes, they spotted a tricycle carrying
Rizaldy Sanchez coming out of the house. The group chased the tricycle. After catching
up with it, they requested Rizaldy to alight. It was then that they noticed Rizaldy holding
a match box and asked Rizaldy if he could examine such. SPO1 Amposta found a small
transparent plastic sachet which contained a white crystalline substance. Suspecting
that the substance was a regulated drug, the group accosted Rizaldy and the tricycle
driver. The group brought the two to the police station.
In the version of the defense, on the date and time in question, he, together with a
certain Darwin Reyes, were on their way home from Brgy. Alapan, Imus, Cavite, where
they transported a passenger, when their way was blocked by four (4) armed men riding
an owner-type jeepney. Without a word, the four men frisked him and Darwin. He
protested and asked what offense they committed. The arresting officers told him that
they had just bought drugs from Alapan. He reasoned out that he merely transported a
passenger there but the policemen still accosted him and he was brought to the Imus
Police Station where he was further investigated.
Issue:
Whether or not the in flagrante delicto was valid hence search warrant is no longer
necessary.
Ruling:
No. For warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 (in flagrante delicto arrest)
to operate, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer. On the other hand, paragraph (b) of Section 5 (arrest effected in hot
pursuit) requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense has in fact
just been committed and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be apprehended has committed it.
Elucidating on what constitutes “stop-and-frisk” operation and how it is to be carried out,
the Court in People v. Chua, wrote: A stop and frisk was defined as the act of a police
officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or
contraband. The police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial
inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious
conduct, in order to check the latter’s outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons.
The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the
police officer’s experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the
person to be held has weapons (or contraband) concealed about him. It should
therefore be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this
principle to apply.