Personality and Individual Differences 43 (2007) 1406–1415

www.elsevier.com/locate/paid

Paranormal belief and reasoning

Neil Dagnall *, Andrew Parker, Gary Munley
Faculty of Health, Social Care and Education, Division of Psychology and Social Change, Manchester
Metropolitan University, Elizabeth Gaskell Campus, Hathersage Road, Manchester M13 0JA, United Kingdom

Received 19 July 2006; received in revised form 1 February 2007; accepted 12 April 2007
Available online 11 June 2007

Abstract

This paper examined whether belief in the paranormal is linked to a general weakness in probabilistic
reasoning, or whether belief in the paranormal is directly linked to the perception of randomness (misrep-
resentation of chance). Previous research investigating probabilistic reasoning errors and belief in the para-
normal has assessed errors only on a limited number of types of probabilistic reasoning problem. This study
used a range of probabilistic reasoning tasks (perception of randomness, use of base rate information, the
conjunction fallacy, and the derivation of expected value). Participants were given the four types of prob-
abilistic reasoning problem and were asked to complete the paranormal belief scale (PBS) (Tobacyk, 1988;
Tobacyk & Milford, 1983). The results indicate that only perception of randomness predicted paranormal
belief. In addition to this median splits revealed that high and low believers in the paranormal differed only
on the ability to correctly answer perception of randomness problems. These results suggest that paranor-
mal belief is not associated with a general weakness in probabilistic reasoning but arises from a specific def-
icit associated with perception of randomness (misrepresentation of chance).
Ó 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Probabilistic reasoning; Perception of randomness; Misrepresentation of chance; Paranormal belief scale

*
Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 1612472560; mobile: +44 7722189953; fax: +44 1612476364.
E-mail address: N.Dagnall@mmu.ac.uk (N. Dagnall).

0191-8869/$ - see front matter Ó 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.paid.2007.04.017
 N. Dagnall et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 43 (2007) 1406–1415 1407

1. Introduction

Paranormal beliefs1 are commonly held within modern society (Diaz-Vilela & Alvarez-Gonz-
alez, 2004; Gallup & Newport, 1991; Musella, 2005; Newport & Strausberg, 2001). This is illus-
trated by frequent reports of psychic experiences (e.g., precognition and telepathy) (Blackmore &
Troscianko, 1985; Jones, Russell, & Nickell, 1977; Zusne & Jones, 1982). Why people report para-
normal experiences is unclear. Blackmore (1997) forwards three possible explanations: personal
experience (Blackmore, 1984; Palmer, 1979), selective bias, and probability misjudgement (Black-
more & Troscianko, 1985; Matthews & Blackmore, 1995; Sutherland, 1992).
Personal experience is the notion that believers in the paranormal have experienced genuine
paranormal phenomena. Currently, there is only limited and strongly contested empirical evi-
dence to support the existence of ‘‘true’’ paranormal phenomena (Bressan, 2002). Some critics
have questioned that such evidence exists (Bressan, 2002; Stanovich, 2004), and others have
pointed out that paranormal phenomena are incompatible with current theories of physics
(Musch & Ehrenberg, 2002). Hence prevailing theories of paranormal belief favour more mun-
dane and conventional explanations, such as selective bias; misperception and misinterpretation
(Houran & Lange, 1996; Lange & Houran, 1997).
There is much support for the role of selective bias in producing and maintaining paranormal
belief. For instance, Lange, Houran, Harte, and Havens (1996) found that reports of apparitions
were guided by belief in the paranormal and demand characteristics. Indeed, the perception of
paranormal experiences has been found to stimulate further paranormal experiences even when
none exist (Houran & Lange, 1996; Lange & Houran, 1997). Eastham (1988) noted that once per-
cipients observed an alleged paranormal phenomenon they searched for further paranormal phe-
nomena. This may be why strength of paranormal belief has been found to positively correlate
with the number of subjective paranormal experiences encountered (Blackmore, 1997; Glicksohn,
1990; Musch & Ehrenberg, 2002). Overall, these findings suggest that people who believe in the
paranormal may selectively search for evidence that confirms their beliefs’.
Probability misjudgement theory predicts that believers in the paranormal will make more er-
rors in probabilistic reasoning than non-believers (Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985; Brugger,
Landis, & Regard, 1990). Blackmore and Troscianko (1985) found that believers in the paranor-
mal performed worse than non-believers across a range of probability judgments tasks; generation
of random number strings, distinguishing between random and patterned strings, responsiveness
to sample size, and on a variant of the birthday paradox (Musch & Ehrenberg, 2002). In addition
to this Brugger et al. (1990) found believers show significantly higher repetition avoidance than
non-believers in the production of random numbers and that they rate the likelihood of dice roll
sequences containing repetitions to be lower than sequences without repetitions. These results sug-
gest that non-believers are more likely to accept that repetitive events happen by chance (Brugger
et al., 1990). In all of the above studies believers underestimated or underrepresented the num-
ber of repetitions of items. These observations lead researchers to speculate that believers

1
No universally agreed upon definition of paranormal belief has yet been proposed. Studies typically define
paranormal belief in terms of the measurement instrument used. The measure of paranormal used within the current
study is the paranormal belief scale (Tobacyk, 1988; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983).
1408 N. Dagnall et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 43 (2007) 1406–1415

underestimate the probability of chance occurrences and as such ascribe paranormal causation to
naturally occurring coincidences (Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985; Brugger et al., 1990).
Despite evidence to support the probability misjudgement theory other studies have produced
contradictory evidence (Blackmore, 1997; Matthews & Blackmore, 1995). Musch and Ehrenberg
(2002) suggest that inconsistent research findings in this area may arise because previous studies
have used limited, unreliable measures of probabilistic reasoning skills. Musch and Ehrenberg
(2002) also question the validity of previous research, suggesting that the link between probabi-
listic reasoning and paranormal belief could be underpinned by general cognitive ability (as mea-
sured by the last school grade completed).2 To test this notion Musch and Ehrenberg (2002) gave
participants a battery of six tests (dice sequences, dice throws, random number generation, two
variants of the Birthday Paradox: Blackmore & Troscianko (1985), and a sample size problem)
and found a negative correlation between probabilistic reasoning skills and belief in the
paranormal.
The negative correlation, however, was found to disappear once cognitive ability, as indexed by
secondary school completion grade (the German Abiturnote), was controlled for. On the basis of
this Musch and Ehrenberg (2002)3 concluded that probability misjudgement is not a decisive var-
iable in determining the extent of paranormal belief. Similarly, Bressan (2002) found an interac-
tion between level of education, probabilistic reasoning and belief in the paranormal; errors in
probabilistic reasoning were greater in believers than non-believers in a sample drawn from the
general population, but not for a sample of university students.
Previous research investigating probabilistic reasoning errors and belief in the paranormal has
assessed errors only on a limited number of types of probabilistic reasoning problem. The prob-
lems used typically involve judgements of randomness or appreciation of the impact of sample size
on distribution of cases to categories (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky’s, 1972: maternity ward prob-
lem). Thus the theory that paranormal belief is underpinned by faulty probabilistic reasoning
has been tested in only a partial way. The aim of this research is to determine whether belief in
the paranormal is linked to a general weakness in probabilistic reasoning, or whether belief in
the paranormal is linked to specific probabilistic reasoning errors.
It has been hypothesised that the probabilistic errors of true interest are those that pertain to the
internal representation of chance (e.g., perception of randomness) (Bressan, 2002). Particularly, it
has been proposed that misrepresentation of chance events (coincidence) may be the mechanism
underpinning the development and maintenance of paranormal beliefs; percipients attribute
chance events to paranormal causes (Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985). If the misrepresentation
hypothesis is correct then believers in the paranormal should show more errors on problems that
relate directly to the perception of randomness or chance occurrence than non-believers. Probabi-
listic reasoning problems that are not concerned with the perception of randomness should not be
subject to error in a way that differentiates between believers and non-believers in the paranormal.
Alternatively, if belief in the paranormal is a function of general cognitive ability then it is likely

2
Musch and Ehrenberg (2002) used secondary school completion grade (the German Abiturnote) as a measure of
cognitive ability. It consisted of a weighted grade average for the last two years of secondary education in at least ten or
more subjects.
3
Musch and Ehrenberg (2002) concluded that differences in general cognitive ability rather than specific probabilistic
reasoning skills provided the basis for paranormal belief.
 N. Dagnall et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 43 (2007) 1406–1415 1409

that higher rates of error will be found for believers on all types of probabilistic reasoning problem
rather than those that relate specifically to the perception of randomness.
In order to test this notion the research reported here tests performance on four types of prob-
abilistic reasoning problem to determine whether performance varies differentially on these as a
function of belief in the paranormal. The types of problem used relate to: perception of random-
ness, use of base rate information, the conjunction fallacy, and the derivation of expected value.
Problems related to the perception of randomness required participants to make judgements
about the likelihood of obtaining outcome sequences, e.g., from tosses of a coin, containing dif-
ferent number of repetitions of the same outcome, e.g., 1, 3 or 6 heads in a row, and also to predict
the likelihood of obtaining a particular outcome on a coin toss given outcome sequences contain-
ing different numbers of repetitions of the same outcome. In all cases the likelihood of the out-
come sequences obtained was equal and the likelihood of the particular outcome on the coin
toss was 0.5 irrespective of the number of repetitions of a particular outcome immediately preced-
ing it.
Use of base rate information problems require participants to evaluate the likelihood of an out-
come using both evidence in relation to the outcome and base rate evidence relating to the occur-
rence of that outcome. Evidence suggests that a common error in probabilistic reasoning is to
ignore or under represent base rate information when evaluating the likelihood of potential out-
comes (e.g., Eddy, 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972).
Conjunction fallacy questions in all cases presented participants with a number of alternatives
and asked participants to select the alternative with the highest likelihood of being true (e.g., The
Linda problem – Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). In all questions one of the alternatives was a single
event, whilst the other alternatives required this event and another event to be true. It should be
apparent that the likelihood of a single event must be greater than the likelihood of that event and
another event co-occurring.
Expected value problems presented participants with a choice to buy 1 of 2 lottery tickets with
different odds and payouts, or the opportunity to decline to purchase the ticket and thus retain the
cost of the ticket. In all cases participants could simply determine the expected value of the gam-
bles (by multiplying the odds by the payout) and compare these to the value obtained from retain-
ing the cost of the ticket and thus select the best option from the three choices available.
It is hypothesised that if belief in the paranormal is a function of faulty probabilistic reasoning,
particularly in relation to the perception of randomness then performance on the first group of
problems should vary as a function of paranormal belief. If on the other hand belief in the para-
normal is a function of a more widespread weakness in cognitive ability then performance on all
four classes of problem should discriminate believers and non-believers.

2. Method

2.1. Participants

Ninety six participants took part in the study, 22 males and 74 females. The mean age was 20.39
years, SD = 4.85, range 18–47. Participants were first year full and part-time undergraduate stu-
dents enrolled on a Psychology programme.
1410 N. Dagnall et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 43 (2007) 1406–1415

2.2. Materials and procedure

Participants were provided with a booklet and were guided through the completion of each
stage of the study. First participants were asked to indicate demographic information about them-
selves; age and gender.
Participants were next asked to complete 17 reasoning problems. There were four types of prob-
lems: perception of randomness: five questions; base rate: four questions; conjunction fallacy four
questions; and probability questions: four questions. Perception of randomness problems required
participants to make judgements about the likelihood of obtaining strings (e.g., ‘‘Imagine a coin
was tossed six times. Which pattern of results do you think is most likely?’’ ‘‘(a) HHHHHH, (b)
HHHTTT, (c) HTHHTT, (d) All equally likely’’). Base rate problems required participants to
evaluate the likelihood of an outcome using both evidence in relation to the outcome and base
rate evidence (e.g., ‘‘You go to a party where there are 100 men, 70 of the men are Psychologists
and 30 are Engineers. Before being introduced to each man you are given a short personality descrip-
tion of him – What is the probability that Dick is an Engineer?’’ (a) 70%, (b) 30%, (c) 50%). Con-
junction fallacy problems presented participants with a number of alternatives and asked
participants to select the alternative with the highest likelihood of being true (e.g., ‘‘Two football
teams (Team A and Team B) are playing in a local derby. What is the most likely outcome of the
game?’’ (a) Team A score first, (b) Team A score first and win, (c) Team A score first and lose, (d)
Team A score first and the game is drawn.). Expected value problems presented participants with a
choice to buy 1 of 2 lottery tickets with different odds and payouts or the opportunity to retain the
stake (see Appendix A for examples of each problem type). The order of the questions was ran-
domly determined prior to the construction of the question booklet. The order of the questions
was randomly determined prior to the construction of the question booklet. This order remained
the same for all participants.
Finally, participants completed the revised paranormal belief scale (PBS) (Tobacyk, 1988). The
PBS has been demonstrated to possess adequate validity (Dudley, 2000; Tobacyk, 1995a, 1995b;
Tobacyk & Milford, 1983). The PBS is a 26-item self-report questionnaire. Participants are pre-
sented with statements such as: ‘‘there is a devil’’, and ‘‘Witches do exist’’. Participants’ responses
can range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

3. Results

The paranormal belief scale (PBS) demonstrated excellent internal reliability (a = 0.92) (George
& Malley, 2003). A significant negative correlation was found between paranormal belief and the
mean number of correct responses, r = 0.242, df = 94, p = 0.018. This was further analyzed using
multiple regression. The four item types (perception of randomness, use of base rate information,
the conjunction fallacy, and the derivation of expected value) were entered as predictors of para-
normal belief. Using the enter method, a significant model emerged (F4,91 = 4.36, p = 0.003.
R2 = 0.401, adjusted R2 = 0.124). Scores on perception of randomness were found to predict para-
normal belief (b = .316, p = 0.002). Performance on base rate, conjunctive fallacy and expected
value problems were not found to be significant predictors of paranormal belief (Table 1). Corre-
lations between question variables and paranormal belief are displayed in Table 2.
 N. Dagnall et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 43 (2007) 1406–1415 1411

Table 1
Standard multiple regression of question variables on paranormal belief scale (PBS) scores
Predictor variables B b p
Perception of randomness 8.981 0.316 0.002**
Expected value 3.615 0.124 0.208
Base rate 3.175 0.143 0.149
Conjunctive fallacy 3.812 0.153 0.122
Unstandardised regression coefficients (B), standardised regression coefficients (b).

Table 2
Correlations between question variables and paranormal belief scale (PBS)
1 2 3 4 5
*
1. Paranormal belief .32 .19 .16 .09
2. Perception of randomness .32* .13 .09 .16
3. Expected value .19 .13 .12 .02
4. Base rate .16 .09 .12 .16
5. Conjunctive fallacy .09 .16 .02 .16
*
Significant at P = 0.001 (one tailed).

Table 3
Descriptive statistics for high and low paranormal belief across problem types
Paranormal belief
Low paranormal belief (n = 48) High paranormal belief (n = 48)
Perception of randomness 3.35 (0.84) 2.92 (0.87)
Base rate 1.94 (1.12) 1.65 (1.12)
Conjunction fallacy 1.46 (1.05) 1.60 (0.96)
Expected value 0.73 (0.87) 0.44 (0.82)
Number (N) of participants. Standard deviation (in parenthesis) for each individual measures.

A median split was performed on paranormal belief to produce low and high paranormal belief
groups. Low and high paranormal belief group performance was then compared on each of the
problem types.
Participants low in paranormal belief solved a higher number of perception of random-
ness problems than those high in paranormal belief, t(94) = 2.501, p = 0.014, d = 0.51. No differ-
ences were found between low and high paranormal groups for: base rate, t(94) = 1.276, p > 0.05;
conjunctive fallacy, t(94) = 0.709, p > 0.05; and expected value, t(94) = 1.689, p > 0.05
(Table 3).4

4
Performance on expected value problems was low in both conditions suggesting that participants struggled to
comprehend these problems.
1412 N. Dagnall et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 43 (2007) 1406–1415

4. Discussion

This paper examined whether belief in the paranormal was linked to a general weakness in
probabilistic reasoning, or whether belief in the paranormal was directly linked to perception
of randomness (misrepresentation of chance). Of the four types of probabilistic reasoning prob-
lems completed in this study (perception of randomness, use of base rate information, the con-
junction fallacy, and the derivation of expected value) only perception of randomness was
found to predict paranormal belief. In addition to this when participants high and low in para-
normal belief were compared across problem types, performance was found only to differ on per-
ception of randomness; participants low in paranormal belief scored higher than those high in
paranormal belief. Performance on use of base rate information, the conjunction fallacy, and
the derivation of expected value was found to be similar for both high and low paranormal belief
groups. These findings suggest that perception of randomness (misrepresentation of chance) and
not weaknesses in general probabilistic reasoning are responsible for paranormal belief. This no-
tion is consistent with much previous research.
Particularly, Blackmore and Troscianko (1985) argued that flawed probability judgements
may underpin paranormal belief (Sutherland, 1992). The rationale is that coincidences are more
likely than human intuition suggests (Diaconis & Mosteller, 1989; Musch & Ehrenberg, 2002).
Consequently, if, individuals lack an appreciation of randomness (Blagrove, French, & Jones,
2006) they will be more likely to ascribe paranormal meaning to random events (Blackmore &
Troscianko, 1985; Brugger et al., 1990). This study finds evidence in support of this probability
misjudgement model of paranormal belief; the findings suggest that a specific reasoning deficit
associated with perception of randomness may be important in the development and mainte-
nance of paranormal belief. The fact that previous studies have used a range of different prob-
abilistic reasoning tasks may explain the inconsistent findings reported (Musch & Ehrenberg,
2002).
Interestingly, in this study differences were observed in undergraduate students. This finding is
dissimilar to that of Bressan (2002), who found an interaction between level of education, prob-
abilistic reasoning and belief in the paranormal; errors in probabilistic reasoning were greater in
believers than non-believers in a sample drawn from the general population, but not for a sample
of university students. The students in this study would be expected to be homogenous in terms of
educational achievement and experience. It is therefore likely that the difference between this and
the Bressan study arose from either the sample selected, or the types of problem used. Bressan
(2002) had a much more diverse student group; Psychology, Letters, Engineering, Biology, and
Philosophy. In addition to this Bressan (2002) used a variety of problems (e.g., comprehension
of sampling issues, sensitivity to sample size, generation of random strings) rather than the specific
problems used in this study.
Future studies need to consider more fully the type of problems employed to assess probabilis-
tic reasoning. Particularly, the notion that paranormal belief arises from general cognitive deficits
in reasoning requires qualification and further examination. This study suggests that paranormal
belief may arise from a specific weakness in reasoning; perception of randomness, which is inde-
pendent of general probabilistic reasoning abilities. Future studies need to examine this further,
possibly by exploring the relationship between individual facets of probabilistic reasoning and
general cognitive ability.
 N. Dagnall et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 43 (2007) 1406–1415 1413

Appendix A. Example questions

(1) Perception of randomness

(a) Imagine a coin was tossed six times. Which pattern of results do you think is most likely?
(a) HHHHHH
(b) HHHTTT
(c) HTHHTT
(d) All are equally as likely
(b) If an unbiased coin was tossed six times and each showed a head. What do you estimate
the probability to be of a tail being shown on the next toss?
(a) 100%
(b) 75%
(c) 50%
(d) 25%
(2) Base rate
You go to a party where there are 100 men, 70 of the men are Psychologists and 30 are Engi-
neers. Before being introduced to each man you are given a short personality description of
him. The personality descriptions for two men are as follows:
(a) Dick is a 30 year old man. He is married with no children. He is a man of high ability and
motivation who promises to do well in his field. He is well liked by his colleagues.What is
the probability that Dick is an Engineer?
(a) 100%
(b) 70%
(c) 50%
(d) 30%
(b) Jack is a 45 year old man. He is married with 4 children. He is generally conservative,
careful and ambitious. He shows no interest in politics and social issues and spends most
of his free time on his hobbies which include; carpentry, sailing and mathematical puz-
zles. What is the probability that Jack is an Engineer?
(a) 100%
(b) 70%
(c) 50%
(d) 30%
(3) Conjunction fallacy
Two football teams (Team A and Team B) are playing in a local derby. Which outcome is
most likely?
(a) Team A score first
(b) Team A score first and win
(c) Team A score first and lose, or
(d) Team A score first and the game is drawn
(4) Expected value
You have £10 to spend on one of the following alternatives:
(a) A lottery ticket that gives you a 10/1 chance of winning £90
1414 N. Dagnall et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 43 (2007) 1406–1415

(b) A lottery ticket that gives you a 10,000/1 chance of winning £1,000,000
(c) Keep the £10

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