F.
Conditions of Work
e. Specific Rules
3. Waiting time
Arica v. NLRC
J. Paras
Facts:
Arica sued Standard Fruits Corp. (Stanfilo) to
compel the latter to pay for uncompensated
working time. He was referring to the
preliminary activities that he and his fellow
farm workers do between 5:30 and 6 in the
morning, which include:
• Answering a roll call and getting
their individual work assignments for
the day
• Fill in their Labororer’s Daily
Accomplishment Reports
• Get their tools and equipment from
the stockroom
• Travel to the field where they were
assigned
Issue: Whether the said time should be
compensated by the company
Decision: The Supreme Court upheld the
decision of the NLRC in favor of the fruit
corporation
Ratio:
1. The Supreme Court noted that the same
issue was raised against Stanfilo in the
NLRC case Associated Labor Union v.
Standard Fruit Corporation. The Minister
of Labor Blas Ople made the following
findings, which were concurred in by the
NLRC:
• The 30-minute assembly time “long
practiced and institutionalized by mutual
consent of the parties” under their CBA
cannot be considered waiting time
within the purview of Section 5 Rule 1,
Book III of the IRR of the Labor Code.
• The assembly time (1) did not “deprive
the workers to attend to other personal
pursuits” (2) did not take a long time
because the company did not need to
give them long briefings such as in the
case of new employees and (3) the
homes of the workers were right on the
assembly area, allowing them to return
to their chores and (4) they were not
required to attend the roll call.
2. “In short, they are not subject to the absolute
control of the company during this period,
otherwise, their failure to report in the
assembly time would justify the company to
impose disciplinary actions.” Moreover, the
facts demonstrate that the roll call was not
“primarily intended for the interests of the
workers but ultimately for the employees,
to indicate their availability or non-availability
for work…”
3. The said ruling in ALU is res judicata, which
bars this present case.
Dissenting Opinion
J. Sarmiento
1. The workers maintained that the current
circumstances surrounding their work
schedule are different from that, which were
established in the ALU case. The company, in
Justice Sarmiento’s view, failed to rebut this
claim.
2. “It is evident that the Ople decision was
predicated on absence of any insinuation of
obligatoriness in the course or after the
assembly activities on the part of the
employees.” However, things had since
changed as the employees “had since been
placed under a number of restrictions.”
4. On Call, Rule 1, section 5(b)
5. Inactive Work Due to work Interruptions,
Book III, Rule I Sec. 4 (d)
University of Pangasinan Faculty
Union v. University of Pangasinan
Facts and Issues
The faculty union is suing the university for,
among others, unpaid Emergency Cost of
Living Allowances (ECOLA) during the
semestral break of academic year 1981-1982.
The university denied that the teachers were
entitled to the allowances since the semestral
break was not an integral part of the school
year and no actual services were rendered by
them. The school applied the rule: “No work
no pay. No pay, no ECOLA.”
Some of the faculty also claimed that the
school owed them for their unpaid salaries for
September 21, 1981. The school had assigned
extra loads to these teachers and it happened
that they had scheduled loads on September
21, which was declared a holiday.
Decision
A. Re: ECOLA.
The Court ordered the university to pay the
ECOLA.
1. According to the presidential decrees (PD)
granting ECOLA, all employees shall be
paid in full the required monthly
allowance [i.e. ECOLA] regardless of their
regular working days if they incur no
absences during the month. If they incur
absences without pay, the amount
corresponding to the absences may be
deducted.”
2. Indeed, the teachers are not in school
during the semestral break but these
cannot be considered absences contemplated
under the said PDs:
• “These semestral breaks are in the nature
of work interruptions beyond the
employees’ control.” All the schools in
the country have these breaks and they
themselves set their duration. The
teachers, thus, are forced to take leave of
absences. The rule “No work no pay”
applies to a situation “where the
employees voluntarily absent
themselves”. The rule has no applicability
in this case. Thus, they must be paid with
their salary and allowances.
• Moreover, wage regulations state that “all
covered employees whether paid on a
monthly or daily basis shall be entitled to
their daily living allowance when they are
paid their basic pay”. Conversely, the rule
is “No pay no ECOLA.” In this case, the
teachers were paid their regular salaries
during the break. It follows that they are
entitled to their ECOLA.
• Finally, the Court took notice of the nature
of the teachers’ work saying that
“[a]lthough they may be considered by the
respondents to be on leave, the semestral
break could not be used effectively for
the teacher’s own purposes for the nature
of the teacher’s job imposes upon him
further duties which must be done during
the said period of time.” (e.g. checking
papers, preparations for the next semester).
It would be unfair to consider them to be
on leave without pay.
B. Re: Alleged unpaid extra teaching load
The Court upheld the finding (of fact) by the
NLRC that the salaries for September 21 were
paid. However in an obiter, the court discussed
the rule applicable, assuming, that the wages
were not paid:
This time the rule No Work No Pay applies.
1. “We are now concerned with extra, not
regular loads for which the petitioners are
paid regular salaries every month
regardless of the number of working days
or hours in such month.”
2. “Extra loads should be paid only when
actually performed by the employee.
Compensation is based, therefore, on
actual work done and on the number of
hours and days.” There was no work
done since the day was a holiday. The
teachers don’t have to be paid for that day.
6. Work after Normal Hours
7. Lectures Meetings, Training Programs
8. Travel Time
RADA v. NLRC
Facts
Rada was hired as a project employee
(specifically, as a driver) of Philnor
Consultants and Planners Inc., which was
supervising the extension of the N.
Expressway.
As driver, he would leave his home in
Marikina at 5:30 in the morning and pick up
some of Philnor’s employees at designated
points along EDSA and take them to the
project site, arriving there at 7 a.m. He would
drop off the same employees as he took the
route home from the project site. This was
from 4 pm to 6 pm. Thus, all in all he spent
around 3 hours per day for the said travel
time.
Rada, after his last contract ended in 1985,
filed a suit before the labor arbiter asking that
the he paid overtime pay for the said 3 hours
spent daily as travel time during the duration of
his contracts.
In its defense, the company said that Rada was not
working during the said hours. The company just
allowed him to take the car home for his and the
other employees’ convenience; otherwise they
will spend 4 hours traveling every morning and
will be late for work.
Decision:
The Supreme Court ordered that the company
to pay Rada for overtime.
Contrary to the position of the company, “said
transportation arrangement had been adopted not
so much for the convenience of the employees,
but primarily for the benefit of the employer,
herein private respondent.”
This fact is inevitably deducible from the
Memorandum of respondent company, wherein it
admitted that the transportation arrangement as a
practical solution to the employees tardiness
brought by the traffic situation along the route to
the project site.
Picking up and dropping off the other company
employees was a required task that Rada
generally performed. Note that when Rada, for
some reason or another, could not go to work,
another driver was supposed to take his place. “If
driving these employees to and from the project
site is not really part of the petitioner’s job, then
there would have been no need to find a
replacement driver to fetch these employees.”
Since the assigned task of fetching and delivering
employees is “indispensable and consequently
mandatory”, the time spent for the same should
be considered overtime work.
f. Overtime Work
1. Overtime Work in Ordinary Working Day,
Art. 87; Rule I. Sec. 8
2.Emergency or Compulsory Overtime Work,
Art 89
3. Undertime Work/Leave, Art. 88
4. Additional Compensation, Art. 87
5. No computation Formula Basic Contract
Manila Terminal Co. Inc. v. NLRC
Facts
The workers suing Manila Terminal Co. were
hired as watchmen to guard the goods that the
company handled as part of its arrastre
services. They were employed on two 12-hour
shifts. Those with day shifts were paid P3
while those with night shifts were paid P6.
Later the company, implemented the required
8-hour shifts. The watchmen wanted the
company to pay them overtime during the
time that they were under 12-hour shifts.
Manila Terminal argued that the wage for the
12-hour shift was already inclusive of the
overtime premium. Besides, the workers had
acquiesced to the arrangement for more than
18 months; thus, they were deemed to have
waived their right to it.
Decision
1. The court awarded overtime pay to the
workers.
“A contract of employment, which provides
for a weekly wage for a specified number of
hours, [supposedly] sufficient to cover both
the statutory minimum wage and overtime
compensation, if computed on the basis of
the statutory minimum and which makes
no provision for fixed hourly rate or that
the weekly wage includes overtime
compensation, does not meet the requirements
of the Act (referring to the 8-hour labor law).”
(A caveat: this is my view)
In other words, if the contract of employment
requires the employee to work for more than 8
hours a day at specified wage, the contract must
state the hourly rate and if the same is multiplied
by 8, the product should be less than the set daily
wage. The difference should be sufficient to cover
for overtime premium (130% of the hourly rate x
regular overtime hours). Otherwise, the wage set
will not be considered inclusive of the overtime
pay.
2. The Court also said that there can be no
waiver of the right of overtime.
The law mandates extra compensation for
overtime. Thus, it would be contrary to public
policy for any contract to expressly provide for its
non-payment. If such right cannot be expressly
waived, then the same cannot be impliedly
waived.
The principles of estoppel and laches cannot be
applied:
• It is contrary to public policy
• The law “principally obligates the
employer to observe it, so much as it
punished the employer for its violation
and leaves the employee or laborer free
and blameless”
• The employee is such a disadvantageous
position as to be naturally reluctant or
even apprehensive in asserting any claim
which may cause the employer to devise a
way for exercising his right to terminate
employment.
6. Proof of Work/ Employer Obligation
SSS v. CA (2000)
Ynares-Santiago
Ignacio Tana, husband of the complainant,
Margarita Tana, was allegedly an employee of
Ayalde for 12 years. During the said period,
SSS contributions were allegedly deducted
from his salaries. When he died, she found out
that his contributions were remitted to the
SSS. Thus, she could not claim burial and
pension benefits.
Margarita filed a case before the Social
Security Commission against Ayalde for the
payment of the premiums. SSS filed a
petition-in-intervention and also sought a
ruling against Ayalde. They presented the
testimonies of Tana’s fellow workers to show
that Tana was regularly employed in the
hacienda and performed various tasks for 10
months each year (2 months was used to
prepare the land for cultivation). In return, he
was paid every 15th day of the month and
signed a yellow pad (which served as the
payroll) receiving the same.
Ayalde argued that Ignacio was an
independent contractor hired at a “pakyaw”
basis to plow Ayalde’s hacienda. She also
pointed out that he did not actually work in the
hacienda for 12 years. To prove she presented
payrolls for 1974-1976 and from 1978-1979.
The Commission gave a judgment against
Ayalde but the CA reversed it on the ground
that there was no employee-employer
relationship between Ayalde and Tana.
Mandatory SSS coverage is premised on the
existence of such relationship. Absent that,
Tana was not entitled to be paid.
Issues
1. WON there was employee-employer
relationship
2. A related issue, is with regard to the proof
needed to ascertain its existence
Decision:
The Court reversed the CA decision
1. At the onset, there are 4 essential elements of
an employee-employer relationship:
• Selection and engagement of the employee
• Payment of wages
• Power of control
• Power of dismissal
2. Ayalde’s argument that one of the elements is
missing, i.e., that she had no control over
Tana, who was hired on a pakyaw basis and as
an independent contractor, is specious. First,
he was not hired on pakyaw basis. He was
hired not just to plow the fields for
intermittent periods but was tasked with other
work in the hacienda like cutting sugar cane,
weeding, hauling fertilizers etc. Second, there
was an overseer through whom Ayalde
exercised power to hire and dismiss
employees like Tana and check on their work.
“…[T]he power of control refers merely to
the existence of the power. It is not essential
for the employer to actually supervise the
performance of (sic) duties of the
employees; it is sufficient that the former
has a right to wield the same.
3. The Court also did not agree that the mere
absence of Tana’s name in the payroll
presented by Ayalda necessarily meant he was
not the latter’s employee. First, the payrolls
presented were only samplings and were even
unsigned by the purported laborers. Secondly,
there was competent testamentary evidence
that contradicted Ayalde’s claims. The
presentation of the payroll is not an absolute
requirement to establish the existence of
Tana’s employment and his entitlement to its
consequential rights. “No particular form of
 evidence is required to prove the
existence of an employee-employer
relationship. Any competent and
relevant evidence to prove the
relationship may be admitted. For, if
only documentary evidence would be
required to show that relationship, no
scheming employer would ever be
brought before the bar of justice, as no
employer would wish to come out with
any trace of the illegality he has
authored considering that it should take
much weightier proof to invalidate a
written instrument.”

g. Nightwork, Art. 86; Rule II, Sections. 1-6

1. Coverage and Exclusion

2. Additional Compensation