consti part 12: protected interests in liberty
A. Non- impairment of Obligations
of Contracts
Art III sec 10. No law impairing the obligation
of contracts shall be passed.
Civil Code Art 1306 The contracting parties
may establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy.
PADILLA ARTICLE: A CIVIL LAW
Article 1306 (Civil Code)- The contracting parties may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they deem convenient, provided they are
not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order,
or public policy.
The article was taken from Article 1255 of the Spanish
Civil Code. The old provision stipulated that an
agreement between contracting parties was the law
between them, and such an agreement must be complied
with in good faith. Under the old article, limitations to
the freedom of contract included those against law,
morals or public order. Article 1306 adds those contrary
to good customs and public policy to these limitations.
The freedom to contract is protected under the
constitutional clause that “ no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law.”
The author explains that Liberty includes the freedom to
contract. He illustrates this through the case of People
vs. Pomar, where the Court held that “The right to enter
into lawful contracts constitutes one of the liberties of
the people of the state… A citizen cannot be compelled to
give employment to another citizen, nor can any one be
compelled to be employed against his will. Liberty
includes not only the right to labor, but to refuse to
labor, and consequently, the right to refuse to make
such contracts… To enter into legal contacts freely and
without restraint, is one of the liberties guaranteed to
the people of the state.” Also, freedom of contract is both
a constitutional and statutory right. Parties to a contract
are free to stipulate terms and conditions. However,
freedom of contract is not absolute, and is subject to
several limitations.
The limitations to the freedom of contract are those
against:
a) Law (The parties cannot stipulate against the
law, because the law is supreme and is always
deemed to be an integral part of every contract.
It may be possible to compromise a liability
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coming from a civil case, but this is not possible
with a liability arising from a criminal case.)
b) Morals
c) Good Customs
d) Public Order
e) Public Policy
Valid Stipulations include those onerous stipulations in
leonine contracts, stipulations in bond that surety’s
liability is solidary and primary, stipulations limiting
liability on bond, etc.
HOME BUILDERS & LOAN ASSOC. vs. BLAISDELL
01/08/34
Hughes, C.J.
FACTS:
Minnesota passed a moratorium law providing that in a
time of emergency, parties may seek judicial relief with
respect tp the foreclosure of mortgages & execution sales
of real estate, in that sales may be postponed and
periods may be extended. The statute leaves it to the
court's discretion as to the length of time that it will give
an applicant "as it will deem just & equitable." The Act is
to remain in effect "only during the continuance of the
emergency and in no event beyond May 1, 1935." No
extension of the period for redemption and no
postponement of sale is to be allowed which would have
the effect of extending the period of redemption beyond
that date.The section also provides that the time for
redemption from foreclosure sales theretofore made,
which otherwise would expire less than thirty days after
the approval of the Act shall be extended to a date thirty
days after its approval, and application may be made to
the court within that time for a further extension as
provided in the section. By another provision of the Act,
no action, prior to May 1, 1935, may be maintained for a
deficiency judgment until the period of redemption as
allowed by existing law or as extended under the
provisions of the Act has expired. Prior to the expiration
of the extended period of redemption, the court may
revise or alter the terms of the extension as changed
circumstances may require. Blaisdell, under the statute,
applied for an order extending the period of redemption
from a foreclosure sale. Their petition stated that they
owned a lot in Minneapolis which they had mortgaged to
appellant; that the mortgage contained a valid power of
sale by advertisement and that, by reason of their
default, the mortgage had been foreclosed and sold to
appellant on May 2, 1932, for $3,700.98; that appellant
was the holder of the sheriff's certificate of sale; that,
because of the economic depression appellees had been
unable to obtain a new loan or to redeem, and that,
unless the period of redemption were extended, the
property would be irretrievably lost, and that the
reasonable value of the property greatly exceeded the
amount due on the mortgage, including all liens, costs
and expenses. Though initially denied by the district
court, upon appeal the extension was granted by the
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consti part 12: protected interests in liberty
state supreme court, The state court upheld the statute
as an emergency measure. Although conceding that the
obligations of the mortgage contract were impaired, the
court decided that what it thus described as an
impairment was, notwithstanding the contract clause of
the Federal Constitution, within the police power of the
State as that power was called into exercise by the
public economic emergency which the legislature had
found to exist.
PETITIONERS:
the moratorium law is contrary to the contract clause
(Art 1, S 10) and the due process and equal protection
clauses (14th Amd).
ISSUE-HELD:
WON the moratorium law is constitutional-YES
RATIO:
At the outset the court made it very clear that except for
the time factor, no other aspect of the mortgage relation
was altered. The indebtness remains; in fact, the
mortgagor still has the right to the rentals for the time
when the period is suspended.
The court then discussed the historical backgorund of
the contracts clause vis-a-vis the concept of emergency
powers. Emergency does not create power. Emergency
does not increase granted power or remove or diminish
the restrictions imposed upon power granted or
reserved. The Constitution was adopted in a period of
grave emergency. Its grants of power to the Federal
Government and its limitations of the power of the States
were determined in the light of emergency, and they are
not altered by emergency. While emergency does not
create power, emergency may furnish the occasion for
the exercise of power.
Although an emergency may not call into life a power
which has never lived, nevertheless emergency may
afford a reason for the exertion of a living power already
enjoyed. In Wilson v. New, the constitutional question
presented in the light of an emergency is whether the
power possessed embraces the particular exercise of it in
response to particular conditions. In other words, there
must be a compelling state interest coupled with a
narrowly-tailored means to achieve it.
The "non-impairment of contracts" clause came to life
because at the time the Constitution was being drafted,
the drafters were mindful of the fact that there have
been an ignoble array of legislative schemes for the
defeat of creditors and the invasion of contractual
obligations. Legislative interferences had been so
numerous and extreme that the confidence essential to
prosperous trade had been undermined and the utter
destruction of credit was threatened.But as J. Johnson
wrote in Ogden v Saunders, to give such a sweeping
protection to the sanctity of contracts could not have
been the intent of the Constitution, given the fact that
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law has over a hundred examples wherein a contract
may be vioded.Societies exercise a positive control as
well over the inception, construction and fulfillment of
contracts as over the form and measure of the remedy to
enforce them.
Therefore there is a need to determine: what is a
contract? What are the obligations of contracts? What
constitutes impairment of these obligations? What
residuum of power is there still in the States in relation
to the operation of contracts, to protect the vital interests
of the community? The obligation of a contract is "the
law which binds the parties to perform their agreement."
Sturges v. Crowninshield. The laws which subsist at the
time and place of the making of a contract, and where it
is to be performed, enter into and form a part of it, as if
they were expressly referred to or incorporated in its
terms. This principle embraces alike those which affect
its validity, construction, discharge and enforcement.
Nothing can be more material to the obligation than the
means of enforcement. The ideas of validity and remedy
are inseparable, and both are parts of the obligation,
which is guaranteed by the Constitution against
invasion.Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy. But there is a
distinction betwwen an obligation & a remedy as pointed
out in Sturges: The distinction between the obligation of
a contract and the remedy given by the legislature to
enforce that obligation has been taken at the bar, and
exists in the nature of things. Without impairing the
obligation of the contract, the remedy may certainly be
modified as the wisdom of the nation shall direct. It is
competent for the States to change the form of the
remedy, or to modify it otherwise, as they may see fit,
provided no substantial right secured by the contract is
thereby impaired. No attempt has been made to fix
definitely the line between alterations of the remedy,
which are to be deemed legitimate, and those which,
under the form of modifying the remedy, impair
substantial rights. Every case must be determined upon
its own circumstances.
The general doctrine of this court on this subject may be
thus stated: in modes of proceeding and forms to enforce
the contract, the legislature has the control, and may
enlarge, limit, or alter them, provided it does not deny a
remedy or so embarrass it with conditions or restrictions
as seriously to impair the value of the right. Not only are
existing laws read into contracts in order to fix
obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of
essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into
contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The policy of
protecting contracts against impairment presupposes
the maintenance of a government by virtue of which
contractual relations are worthwhile — a government
which retains adequate authority to secure the peace
and good order of society. Into all contracts, whether
made between States and individuals, or between
individuals only, there enter conditions which arise not
out of the literal terms of the contract itself; they are
superinduced by the preexisting and higher authority of
the laws of nature, of nations or of the community to
which the parties belong; they are always presumed, and
must be presumed, to be known and recognized by all,
are binding upon all, and need never, therefore, be
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consti part 12: protected interests in liberty
carried into express stipulation, for this could add
nothing to their force. Every contract is made in
subordination to them, and must yield to their control,
as conditions inherent and paramount, wherever a
necessity for their execution shall occur. Thus, the
economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of
its continuing and dominant protective power
notwithstanding interference with contracts. The
interdiction of statutes impairing the obligation of
contracts does not prevent the State from exercising
such powers as are vested in it for the promotion of the
common weal, or are necessary for the general good of
the public, though contracts previously entered into
between individuals may thereby be affected. Sa
madaling sabi, police power measure ang nasabing
batas.
Taking all of this into account, the court concludes:
1)that there was an "emergency" in Minnesota that
warranted the enactment of the moratorium law; 2)the
statute addressed a legitimate need, the protection of a
basic interest of society (here the protection of the
economic system and the justness of giving debtors time;
3)the conditions are not unreasonable; 4)the legislation
is temporary in operation.
Petition dismissed, judgment of Minn SC affirmed.
RUTTER vs. ESTEBAN
Bautista Angelo, j.:
FACTS:
August 20, 1941 Rutter sold to Esteban 2 parcels of land
situated in the city of Manila for P9,600. P4,800 paid
outright, P2,400 on or before August 7, 1942, and
P2,400 on or before August 27, 1943, with interest at
the rate of 7%.
To secure the payment of the balance of P4,800, a 1st
mortgage over the parcels of land has been constituted
in favor of the plaintiff. New title was issued in favor of
Placido J.Esteban with a mortgage duly annotated on
the back thereof.
Esteban failed to pay. On Aug 2, 1949, Rutter instituted
this action in the CFI to recover the balance, interest,
and the attorney's fees. The complaint also contains a
prayer for sale of the properties mortgaged.
Esteban admitted the averments of the complaint, but
set up a defense the moratorium clause embodied in RA
342. He claims that this is a prewar obligation
contracted on Aug 20, 1941; that he is a war sufferer,
having filed his claim with the Philippine War Damage
Commission [PWDC] for the losses he had suffered as a
consequence of the last war; and that under sec 2 of RA
342, payment of his obligation cannot be enforced until
after the lapse of 8 years from the settlement of his claim
by the PWDC, and this period has not yet expired.
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ISSUE:
WON RA 342, approved by Congress on July 26, 1948, if
declared applicable to the present case is
unconstitutional being violative of the constitutional
provision forbidding the impairment of the obligation of
contracts  YES, unreasonable period (see sub-issue).
RATIO:
RA 342
o Sec 2: all debts and other monetary obligations
contracted before December 8, 1941 shall not due
and demandable for a period of 8 years from and
after settlement of the war damage claim of the
debtor by the PWDC;
o sec 3: should the provision of section 2 be declared
void and unenforceable, then as regards the
obligation affected thereby, the provisions of EO 25
dated November 18, 1944, as amended by EO 32,
dated March 10, 1945, shall continue to be in force
and effect
Moratorium (def’n) - is postponement of fulfillment of
obligations decreed by the state through the medium of
the courts or the legislature. Its essence is the
application of the sovereign power"
The test of the constitutionality of the moratorium
statute: It is required that the period of a suspension of
the remedy be definite and reasonable.
Impairs the obligation of contracts?
Yes, but it is justified as a valid exercise of police power.
Chief Justice Hughes says:
Not only are existing laws read into contracts in
order to fix obligations as between the parties, but
the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign
power is also read into contracts. The policy of
protecting contracts against impairment
presupposes the maintenance of a government to
secure the peace and good order of society. State
power must be consistent with the fair intent of the
constitutional limitation of that power. The
constitutional prohibition should not be construed
as to prevent limited and temporary interpositions
with respect to the enforcement of contracts if made
necessary by great public calamity.
Blaisdell case has its limitations:
o impairment should only refer to the remedy and not
to a substantive right. The State may postpone the
enforcement of the obligation but cannot destroy it
by making the remedy futile.
o propriety of the remedy. The rule requires that the
alteration or change that the new legislation desires
to write into an existing contract must not be
burdened with restrictions and conditions that
would make the remedy hardly pursuing
Blaisdell summary: Police power may only be invoked
and justified by an emergency, temporary in nature, and
can only be exercised upon reasonable conditions in
order that it may not infringe the constitutional
provision against impairment of contracts
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consti part 12: protected interests in liberty
SUB-ISSUE:
WON the period of 8 years which RA 342 grants to
debtors is unreasonable under the present
circumstances.  YES
RATIO:
The purpose of the law is to afford to prewar debtors an
opportunity to rehabilitate themselves by giving them a
reasonable time within which to pay their prewar.
Case at bar: These obligations had been pending since
1945 as a result of the issuance of EOs 25 and 32 and at
present their enforcement is still inhibited because of the
enactment of RA 342 and would continue to be
unenforceable during the 8-year period granted to
prewar debtors to afford them an opportunity to
rehabilitate themselves, which in plain language means
that the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least
12 years before they could effect a liquidation of their
investment dating as far back as 1941. This period
seems unreasonable, if not oppressive. And the
injustice is more patent when, under the law, the debtor
is not even required to pay interest during the operation
of the relief.
Reconstruction and rehabilitation has swept the country
since liberation. it can now be safely stated that the
financial condition of our country and the people have
returned to normal. This is so not only as far as
observation and knowledge are capable to take note but
also because of the official pronouncements made by the
Chief Executive.
ORTIGAS vs. FEATI
J. Santos (1979)
FACTS:
• March 4, 1952 – Ortigas & Co., a partnership
involved in real estate particularly the Highway Hills
Subd. along EDSA in Mandaluyong, entered into a
contract of sale on installments over 2 parcels of
land with Augusto and Natividad Angeles who later
transferred their rights and interests to a certain
Emma Chavez
• Under the agreement, it was stipulated among
others that:
xxx this shall be used exclusively for residential
purposes xxx
• Eventually, defendant Feati Bank and Trust
company acquired the lots and started the
construction of a building on the said lot devoted to
banking purposes
• Ortigas then filed for a writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain & enjoin the defendant from
continuing with the construction of the commercial
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bank in violation of the restrictions set in the
contract of sale that was imposed by the plaintiff as
part oif its general building scheme designed for the
beautification and development of the Highway Hills
Subd
• Defendant maintains that the area in question has
been declared as a commercial and industrial zone
by the Zoning Regualtion of RESOLUTION no. 27 on
Feb 4, 1980 of the Municipal Councilk of
Mandaluyong, Rizal
• Trial Court ruled in favor of defendant bank Feati
holding that the restrictions set by plaintiff Ortigas
were subordinate to Municipal Resolution 27
because of the municipal’s valid exercise of police
power. It stressed that the private interest should
“bow down to general interest & welfare.”
• Plaintiff appealed till it finally reached the SC
ISSUES:
1. WON Resolution No. 27 is a valid exercise of police
power
2. WON the said Resolution can nullify or supersede the
contractual obligations assumed by defendants
HELD & RATIO:
1. Yes. Although the validity of the resolution was
never questioned in the past proceedings, its validity
was at least impliedly admitted from the facts. Sec 3
of RA 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) empowers a
Municipal Council “to adopt zoning and subdivision
ordinances or regulations for the municipality. It
gives more power to local governments in promoting
the economic conditions, social welfare and material
progress of the community. The only exceptions are
existing vested rights arising out of a contract
between "a province, city or municipality on one
hand and a third party on the other," in which case
the original terms and provisions of the contract
should govern. The exceptions, clearly, do not apply
in the case.
2. Yes, the resolution as an exercise of police power by
the municipality can supersede contractual
obligations assumed by the defendants. While non-
impairment of contracts is constitutionally
guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to
be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police
power.
Police power is the most essential, insistent &
illimitable of powers, the greatest & most illimitable
of powers. It is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety and general welfare of the people. Its
exercise may be judicially inquired into and
corrected only if it is capricious, 'whimsical, unjust
or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due
process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guarantee.
Philippine Long Distance Company vs. City of
Davao . police power "is elastic and must be
responsive to various social conditions; it is not,
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consti part 12: protected interests in liberty
confined within narrow circumscriptions of
precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow
the legal progress of a democratic way of life."
Dobbins v. Los Angeles - 'the right to exercise the
police power is a continuing one, and a business
lawful today may in the future, because of changed
situation, the growth of population or other causes,
become a menace to the public health and welfare,
and be required to yield to the public good.
Vda. de Genuino vs. The Court of Agrarian
Relations - "We do not see why public welfare when
clashing with the individual right to property should
not be made to prevail through the state's exercise of
its police power.
The state, in order to promote the general welfare,
may interfere with personal liberty, with property,
and with business and occupations. Persons may be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in
order to secure the general comfort health and
prosperity of the state and to this fundamental aim
of our Government, the rights of the individual are
subordinated.
Philippine American Life Ins. Co. v. Auditor
General - the laws and reservation of essential
attributes of sovereign power are read into contracts
agreed upon by the parties. Thus not only are
existing laws read into contracts in order to fix
obligations as between the parties, but the
reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power
is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal
order. The policy of protecting contracts against
impairments presupposes the maintenance of a
government by virtue of which contractual relations
are worthwhile – a government which retains
adequate authority to secure the peace and good
order of society.
Dolan vs. Brown - "A grantor may lawfully insert in
his deed conditions or restrictions which are not
against public policy and do not materially impair
the beneficial enjoyment of the estate.
Resolution No. 27, in declaring that the western part of
EDSA is an industrial and commercial zone, was
obviously passed by the Municipal Council of
Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to
safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good
order and general welfare of the people in the locality.
Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions
prevailing in the area. Industrial and commercial
complexes have flourished about the place. EDSA, a
main traffic artery which runs through several cities and
municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an
endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise
and pollution are hardly conducive to the health,
safety or welfare of the residents in its route. Having
been expressly granted the power to adopt zoning and
subdivision ordinances or regulations, the municipality
of Mandaluyong, through its Municipal council, was
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reasonably justified under the circumstances, in passing
the subject resolution.
JUAREZ vs. CA
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
Lot 502 (hereafter known as The Lot) was leased in early
1900s to Serviliano Ocampo who built a house therein
and lived there w/ his parents and sister Angela. When
he died in March 1956, Angela took over the lease and
stayed there with her children (including Virginia). In
1976, she moved to Virginia’s house and leased the lot to
Roberto Capuchino. Meantime, Aranetas sold it to
Susanna Realty. Inc. which sold it in 1985 to Cetus Dev’t
Corp. After acquiring it, Cetus filed a complaint for
ejectment against petitioner on the ground that she
violated BP877 by subleasing The Lot w/o its consent.
Respondents:
CA ruled that BP 877 (effective on June 12, 1985) was
applicable because the orig’l contract of lease didn’t
specify a fixed term and payment of the rental was made
on a monthly basis. Contract was deemed terminated
from month to month. Hence, when it was renewed in
July 1985, it became subject to BP 877, which had come
into effect on June 12, 1985.
Petitioner:
BP 877 should not be given retroactive application
because it would violate the impairment clause and the
prohibition against ex post facto laws. Relying on Art.
16501, she also claims that sublease was not prohibited
when it was concluded in 1976 and since it was valid at
that time, it should continue to be valid even now. Also,
she says her mom is the proper party defendant since
her mom was the one who inherited the leasehold right
from Servillano, the original lessee.
ISSUE:
WON the ejectment of lessee Virginia Suarez be allowed?
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner can no longer retain the leased lot since
she is making a profitable business of subleasing it w/o
the written consent of the landlord.
RATIO
According to Art.16872, if the period for lease has not
been fixed, it is understood to be from month to month if
1
When in the contract of lease of thing there is no express prohibition, the lessee may
subject the thing leased, in whole or in part, without prejudice to his responsibility for
the performance of the contract toward the lessor.
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consti part 12: protected interests in liberty

the rent agreed is from month to month. As the original Cetus. She has taken over the leasehold right for
contract of lease didn’t prescribe a fixed period and the all intents and purposes.
rentals were paid monthly, the same should be
considered renewable from month to month. When the
sublease was renewed by Capuchino in July 1985, it
became invalid under BP877, w/c already became
effective. The law then, operated prospectively upon the CALEON vs. AGUS DEVELOPMENT
new or renewed contract of sublease, w/c to be valid
needed the written consent of the lessor. Moreover,
BP877 provides that “all residential units (The Lot comes FACTS:
under this) the total monthly rental of w/c doesn’t
exceed P480.00 as of the effectivity of this Act shall be • Private respondent Agus Development is the
covered.” private owner of lot 39 block 28 situated in
Lealtad Sampaloc when it leased the property to
Impairment clause (IC)3 is now no longer inviolate. More Rita Calleon for a monthly rental of Php 180.00.
and more, interests of the public have become involved Petitioner constructed on the lot leased a 4-door
in what are supposed to be still private agreements, apartment building.
which have as a result been removed from the protection • Without the consent of the owner of the lot, the
of the IC. As long as the contract affects public welfare petitioner sub-leased two of the 4-door
one way or another so as to require the interference opf apartment building for a monthly rental of Php
the State, then must the police power be asserted and 350.00 each.
prevail, over the IC.
• After learning of the sublease private respondent
filed a complaint for ejectment, citing as ground
PVB Employees Union v. PVB – Contract is protected
thereof the provisions of Batas Pambansa blg.
by guaranty only if it doesn’t affect public interest.
25, section 5, which is the unauthorized
subleasing of part of the leased premises to third
Housing is one of the most serious social problems of the
persons without securing the consent of the
country. The regulation of rentals has long been the
lessor within the required 60 day period from
concern of the gov’t to prevent the lessor from imposing
the promulgation of the new law.
arbitrary conditions on the lessee while at the same time
• After the trial the court rendered its decision
deterring the lessee from abusing the statutory benefits
accorded to him. Purpose of BP877 is to protect both ordering petitioner and all persons claiming
landlord and tenant from their mutual impositions that possession over her to vacte the premises
can only cause detriment to society as a whole. alluded to the complaint and to remove whatever
improvement she introduced to the property.
Here, rental on The Lot is only P69.70/mo. while the • Rita moved for procedural appeals and of course
petitioner charges Capuchino a monthly rental of P400. the decision of the trial court was affirmed hence
While it is true that P400 covers the lot and building, the its elevation to the supreme court.
point is that she isn’t paying the lessor enough for the
use of the lot in light of the total rental she is charging ISSUE:
Capuchino for the use of building and lot. She has 1. W/o the lease of an apartment includes a
taken undue advantage of the rental laws by holding on sublease of the lot on which it is
to the leased premises although they no longer need constructed? YES
them for their own residence or administering them to 2. W/o B.P 25 is contrary to the promotion of
the prejudice of the landlord. social justice policy of the new constitution?
NO
- BP877 is not an ex post facto law. It’s not penal
in nature. Virginia is not being prosecuted under HELD:
the said penal provisions as well.
- Angela is 92 yrs. Old and is now under the care 1. The issue has already been laid to rest in the case of
of Virginia. Thus, it is Virginia who is proper Duellome vs. Gotico where this court ruled that the lease
party defendant. She has been receiving the rent of a building naturally leases the lot therein, and the
from Capuchino and paying rent on the lot to rentals of the building includes those of the lot.

2. The objective of B.P 25 is to remedy the plight of the

2
If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, lessees, but such objective is not subject to the
if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to exploitation of lessees for whose benefit the law was
week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily. However,
even though a monthly rent is paid, and no period for the lease has been set, the courts
enacted. Thus the prohibition provided for in the law
may fix a longer term for the lease after the lessee has occupied the premises for over against the sublease of the premises without the consent
one year. If the rent is weekly, the courts may likewise determine a longer period after of the owner.
the lessee has been in possession for over six months. In case of daily rent, the courts
may also fix a longer period after the lessee has stayed in the place for over one
month. It must be remembered that the social
3
Impairment of obligation – any enactment of legislative character is said to “impair” justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of
the obligation of a contract w/c attempts to tgake from a party a right to w/c he is
entitled by its terms, or w/c deproves him of the means of enforcing such a right.
the property owner, who under our constitution and
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consti part 12: protected interests in liberty
laws are also entitled to protection. The social
justice consecrated in our constitution was not
intended to take away the rights from a person to
give them to another who is not entitled thereto.
B. Involuntary Servitude
Sec18. (2) No involuntary servitude in any
form shall exist except as a punishment for a
crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted.
RUBI vs. PROVINCIAL BOARD
[‘If all are to be equal before the law, all must be
approximately equal in intelligence.’ – main opinion by
Justice Malcolm]
[‘They (Manguianes) are citizens of the Philippine
Islands. Legally they are Filipinos. They are entitled to all
the rights and privileges of any other citizen of this
country.’ – dissenting opinion of Justice Moir]
Malcolm, J.:
FACTS:
Under Section 2145, Revised Administrative Code,
with prior approval of the Department Head, the
governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when he deems it
necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct non-
Christian inhabitants to make permanent settlements on
unoccupied public land – to be selected by the provincial
governor and approved by the provincial board.
In February 1, 1917, the Provincial Board of Mindoro
adopted Resolution No. 25 which was presented by
Provincial Governor of Mindoro Juan Morente Jr. The
resolution presents that since several attempts and
schemes of the past for the advancement of the ‘non-
Christian’ people of Mindoro have failed, it is ‘deemed
necessary’ to oblige the Manguianes to live in one place
in order to make a permanent settlement. The reasons
for the resolution are:
[1] failure of former attempts for the advancement of the
non-Christian people of Mindoro
[2] the only successful method is to oblige them to live in
a permanent settlement
[3] protection of the Manguianes
[2] protection of public forests
[3] introduce civilized customs
Governor Morente Jr. chose the sitio of Tigbao on Lake
Naujan, containing 800 hectares of public land for
approximately 15,000 Manguianes. The resolution was
approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
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Executive Order No. 2 was then issued by the governor
directing all the Mangyans in Naujan, Pola, Dulangan
and Calapan [Rubi’s place] to take their habitation in the
site not later than December 31, 1917. Section
2759¸Revised Administrative Code provides for an
imprisonment not exceeding 60 days for those who
refuse to obey the order.
Rubi and his companions did not fix their dwelling
within the reservation and they were punished with
imprisonment. On the other hand, Doroteo Dabalos was
detained by the sheriff of Mindoro because he escaped
from the reservation.
Rubi and the rest of the Manguianes sued out a writ of
habeas corpus alleging that they are deprived of their
liberty. They are also questioning the validity of Section
2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917.
Exposition of the Court (Baka magtanong si Dean)
II. History [Court wants to say that the ‘reservation
approach’ is not new and in fact ‘accepted’ in the
past. In short, Court is saying that they deserve it.]
A. Before acquisition of the Philippines by the
United States
During the Spanish period, the ‘Indios” were already
‘reduced’ [‘reducciones’] into ‘poblaciones’ [communities].
The purpose is to instruct them in the Catholic faith so
that the Indios will forget the ‘blunders’ of their ancient
rights and ceremonies – eventually allowing them to live
in a ‘civilized manner’. The crown offered tax exemptions
for those who obeyed.
Pueblos and reducciones were provided with basic
facilities for survival. Lands previously owned by the
Indios were not confiscated. Each town contained
around 80 Indios supervised by an Indio mayor.
Later, the Governor General issued a decree in 1881,
saying that it is the ‘duty to conscience and humanity for
all governments to civilize those backward races’.
Provincial authorities should help the priests in their
mission to civilize. To attain their mission, the Spaniards
adopted the policy of ‘bringing under the bell’
[establish homes of Indios within the reach of the sound
of the bell]. Incentives in terms of tax and labor
reductions were offered.
B. After the Acquisition of the Philipines by the
United States
President MacKinley’s Instructions was ratified by the
Philippine Bill and the Act of Congress of 1902. In
essence, these laws provide that the reservation
approach was the same course used by US Congress in
dealing with ‘tribes of North American Indians’. The
approach was deemed a wise and firm regulation to
‘prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized
customs’.
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consti part 12: protected interests in liberty
Jones Law was later passed empowering the Philippine
Legislature. The law established the Bureau of non-
Christian Tribes that recognized the dividing line
between the territory occupied by Christians and that of
non-Christians. The distinction is latter recognized by
special laws.
C.D. Terminology and Meaning
‘Non-Christian tribes’ was common term used. Religious
signification of the term was removed. The whole intent
of the term is to denote the civilization or lack of
civilization of the inhabitants. It relates to degree of
civilization rather than religious denomination.
In United States v. Tubban, the term was used for an
‘uncivilized tribe, of a low order of intelligence,
uncultured and uneducated’. It was held that mere
baptism in the Christian faith will not changed one’s
degree of civilization.
E. Manguianes
They are placed in the ‘third class’ in the ‘four-stage’
classification approaching civilization used by the
Philippine census. In local dialect, “Manguianes’ means
‘ancient’, ‘savage’ etc.
III. Comparative – The American Indians [Court is
saying that the ‘reservation approach’ was used also
for the American Indians – which was perfectly ok.]
The treatment for the Manguianes is no different form
the methods used by the US Government in dealing with
the Indian tribes. Their relationship is one ‘in a state of
pupilage’ – between a guardian and a ward. Congress
had plenary authority in this guardianship.
The Indians were not treated as having a state or nation.
They are treated as a ‘separate people’. Thus, the US
Government is there to protect the Indians form the
people of the State that harbor ill-feelings against them.
These laws were deemed political in nature not subject
to the jurisdiction of the Courts.
In United States v. Crook, a group of Indians led by
Standing Bear who fled from their reservation to avoid
disease and starvation were issued habeas corpus after
they were detained.
Using this case, Rubi was then declared as a citizen of
the Philippines, a ‘person’ within the Habeas Corpus Act.
ISSUES:
1. WON there was Section 2145 involved an
undue delegation of legislative power to the
provincial board of Mindoro.
- NO. Judge Ranney declared that “the true
distinction therefore is between the [1] delegation of
power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and [2] conferring an
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
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exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be
made.’ Section 2145 was issued under the second mode
of delegation.
- Section 2145 falls under the exception to the
general rule sanctioned by immemorial practice: The
central legislative body is permitted to delegate legislative
powers to local authorities. The Philippine Legislature
conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro.
- The reason is that provincial officers are better
fitted to select sites for reservations.
2. WON there was religions discrimination
against ‘non-Christian tribes’ under Section 2145.
- NO. It is clear that the Legislature meant that ‘non-
Christian tribes’ refers to ‘natives’ of ‘low grade of
civilization’ and does not discriminate on account of
religious differences.
3. WON the protection afforded by President
MacKinley’s Instructions, the Philippine Bill and the
Jones Law providing that no person ‘shall be
deprived of life, liberty and property without due
process of law’ extends to members of non-Christian
tribes.
- NO. Civil liberty can be said to mean that measure
of freedom which may be enjoyed ‘in a civilized
community.’ It is a legal and refined idea, the offspring of
high civilization. Considering the that the Manguianes
do not have a civilized conception of liberty, they cannot
claim the they were deprived of it. Furthermore, Section
2145 is applicable to all of a class. The classification
based on degree of civilization is not arbitrary.
- Due process means that:
[1] there is a law prescribed in harmony with the general
powers of the legislature
[2] that law is reasonable in its application
[3] it is enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure
[4] it is applicable to all the citizens of the state or to all
of a class
- Liberty as understood in democracies, is not
license; it is liberty regulated by law. It is not
unrestricted license. It is only freedom from restraint. It
is not an absolute right. However, it is not limited to
freedom from physical restraint.
- Chief elements of the civil liberty are right to
contract, right to chose one’s employment, right to labor
and right of locomotion.
4. WON bringing the Manguianes into the
reservation amounts to slavery and involuntary
servitude.
- NO. Slavery and involuntary servitude denote a
condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to
another. In the reservation, the Manguianes are working
for no other but for themselves.
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consti part 12: protected interests in liberty
- If the Manguianes are not in the reservation, there
are vulnerable subjects to involuntary servitude of
civilized communities who may take advantage of their
ignorance. They are being protection from involuntary
servitude and abuse. They are, through Bureau of non-
Christian Tribes, slowly ‘fused’ with the civilized world –
‘bringing them under the bells’.
5. WON Section 2145 is a valid exercise of police
power.
- YES. Without attempting to define police power, it
is the power co-extensive with self-protection. It is the
inherent and plenary power to prohibit all things hurtful
to the welfare of society. Thus, the law protects the
forests from the illegal caingins [slash and burn
agriculture in forested areas]. They are restrained for
their own good and the general good of the
Philippines.
- The ‘whole tendency’ therefore of the Court is
toward ‘non-interference’ on the political ideas of the
legislature.
- In fact, the Manguianes ‘liked the plan’. There were
‘encouraging reactions’ from the children who attended
the schools. They were ‘eager’ to be receiving benefits of
civilization in the reservations.
HOLDING:
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code is valid. Their
confinement in the reservation does not amount to
slavery and involuntary servitude. Habeas corpus cannot
issue.
Carson, J. concurring:
- I agree that ‘non-Christian tribes’ denote a ‘low grade of
civilization’. The test for civilizations has been:
[1] mode of life
[2] degree of advancement in civilization
[3] connection or lack of connection with some civilized
community
- Degree of civilization can only increase by withdrawal
of permanent allegiance or adherence to non-Christian
tribes.
Johnson, J., dissenting:
- They were deprived of their liberty without a hearing.
All persons in the Philippines are entitled to a hearing, at
least, before they are deprived of their liberty.
Moir., with Araullo and Street, dissenting:
- The case of the Indian nations in the US cannot apply
to this case because the Indian nations were considered
a separate nations where the US dealt with them using
treaties. Also, the reservations given to them were very
large – about thousand of square miles.
- In this case, the Manguianes are not a separate state.
There are not treaties. They are Filipinos, legally
speaking. They are entitled to all the rights and
privileges of any other citizen of this country.
- The caingin argument will not lie because the fires
never spread to the tropical undergrowth. These
burnings are isolated – these are not great abuses
meriting their ‘incarceration’.
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- The Manguianes have never been a burden to the
State. They have not committed any crimes. In fact, they
were described as ‘peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-
nomadic’. When there are in reservations, there are
more vulnerable to involuntary servitude. The needs
for survival in an enclosed community like food and
clothing would be tempting incentives for the
Manguianes, who do not have the means to produce
these things, to trade their freedom to involuntary
servitude.
- The majority claim that Section 2145 is substantially
the same as Act, No. 547 of the Philippine
Commission. However, the constitutionality of this
earlier Act was not passed upon by the Court.
- If the rationale of the Court is applied, then
decapitation en masse will result. It will be an open air
jail for all natives – even those who have proven their
progress measured against standards of the civilized
world like the Ifugaos and Tinguianes.
- Like the case of Standing Bear in the US, I think that
the Court should rule that the Manguianes were
deprived of their right to life, liberty and pursuit of
happiness.
KAISAHAN vs. GOTAMCO
(1948)
ponente: Hilado J
FACTS:
Kaisahan staged a strike which paralyzed Gotamco. The
two parties were brought to the Court of Industrial
Relations. A compromise was made: kaisahan returns to
work if Gotamco raises wages by P2 w/o meal plus the
right to bring back little pieces of firewood front gotamco,
until the final determination of the case. Court issued
the compromise in their return to work order together
with injunction 'company is enjoined not to lay-off,
suspend or dismiss any laborer affiliated with the
petitioning union, nor suspend the operation of the
temporary agreement, and the labor union is enjoined
not to stage a walk-out or strike during the pendency of
the hearing.'
Afterwards gotamco filed another case w/ CIR because
Kaisahan resumed the strike. Kaisahan filed a counter-
petition saying that gotamco violated the terms first by
certain discriminations, by not hearing grievances, by
employing four new chinese laborers w/o authority of
the court and in violation of sec 19 of Commonwealth
Act 103 and by firing a certain Naximino Millan.
CIR held that there was a violation of the court order by
kaisahan, that there was no clear proof that gotamco
employed 4 new chinese laborers and that Millan was a
troublemaker and his petition for reinstatement was
denied.
Petitioner now contends that court order and sec 19 CA
103 is unconstitutional because it amounts to
involuntary servitude.
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consti part 12: protected interests in liberty
ISSUE:
WON sec 19 CA 103 creates involuntary servitude
HELD:
It can't be involuntary servitude if a person voluntarily
contracts employment and impliedly voluntarily puts
himself under the province of sec 19 CA 103.
RATIONALE:
CIR: This section is presumed to be constitutional.
Several laws promulgated which apparently infringe the
human rights of individuals were "subjected to
regulation by the State basically in the exercise of its
paramount police power". The provisions of Act No. 103
were inspired by the constitutional injunction making it
the concern of the State to promote social justice to
insure the well being and economic security of all the
people. ...
Section 19 complements the power of the Court to settle
industrial disputes and renders effective such powers
which are conferred upon it by the different provisions of
the Court's organic law, more particularly, sections 1
and 4, and "other plenary powers conferred upon the
Court to enable it to settle all questions matters,
controversies or disputes arising between, and/or
affecting employers and employees", "to prevent non-
pacific methods in the determination of industrial or
agricultural disputes"
Manila Trading and Supply Company vs. Philippine
Labor Union: the ultimate effect of petitioner's theory is
to concede to the Court of Industrial Relations the power
to decide a case under section 19 but deny it, the power
to execute its decision thereon. The absurdity of this
proposition, is too evident to require argument. In the
second place considering that the jurisdiction of the
Court of Industrial Relations under section 19 is merely
incidental to the same jurisdiction it has previously
acquired under section 4 of the law, if follows that the
power to execute its orders under section 19 is also
the same power that it possesses under section 4.
Sec 19 CA 103 does not offend against the constitutional
inhibition prescribing involuntary servitude. Whenever
an employee enters into a contract of employment, under
the said law he also voluntarily accepts those comditions
prescribed in sec 19, among which is the "implied
condition that when any dispute between the employer
or landlord and the employee, tenant or laborer has been
submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations for
settlement or arbitration, pursuant to the provisions of
this Act, and pending award or decision by it, the
employee, tenant or laborer shall not strike or walk out
of his employment when so joined by the court after
hearing and when public interest so requires, and if he
has already done so, that he shall forthwith return to it,
upon order of the court, which shall be issued only after
Hearing when public interest so requires or when the
dispute can not, in its opinion, be promptly decided or
settled ...". The employee has a free choice between
entering into a contract of employment or not. Such an
implied condition, negates the possibility of involuntary
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servitude ensuing. The court is satisfied that there were
formal hearings before the order was issued. As to public
interest requiring that the court return the striking
laborers, the economic and social rehabilitation of the
country urgently demands reconstruction work from the
late war that the government is striving to accelerate as
much as is humanly possible.
The court construes the provision to mean that the very
impossibility of prompt decision or settlement of the
dispute confers upon the court the power to issue the
order for the reason that the public has an interest in
preventing undue stoppage or paralyzation of the wheels
of industry. And, as well stated by the court's resolution
of July 11, 1947, this impossibility of prompt decision or
settlement was a fact which was borne out by the entire
record of the case and did not need express statement in
the order.
Finally, this Court is not authorized to review the
findings of fact made by the Court of Industrial Relations
DISPOSITION:
Affirm CIR decision. Kaisahan in contempt of court with
costs.
C. Imprisonment for Non-
Payment of Debt
Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for
debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
LOZANO vs. MARTINEZ
December 18, 1986
Yap, J:
FACTS:
• The constitutionality of B.P. 22 or the Bouncing
Checks Law, which was approved on April 3, 1979,
is the sole issue presented by the petitions for
decision.
o An essential element of the offense under BP 22 is
knowledge on the part of the drawer of the check of
the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the
bank to cover the check upon its presentment. It
creates a prima facie presumption of such
knowledge when the check is dishonored by the
bank if presented within 90 days from the date on
the check.
• BP 22 is aimed at stopping or curbing the practice of
issuing worthless, i.e. checks that end up being
rejected or dishonored for payment.
• Before the enactment of said statute, issueing
worthless checks was punished under the provisions
on estafa in the RPC but because of the reliance by
the Court on the concept underlying the felony of
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consti part 12: protected interests in liberty
estafa through false pretenses or deceit (i.e. the
deceit or false pretense must be prior to or
simultaneous with the commission of the
fraud),checks as payments for pre-existing debts
were not covered.
o Statistics have shown that a greater bulk of
dishonored checks consisted of those issued in
payment of pre-existing debts.
o BP 22 addressed the problem frontally and directly
making the act of issuing a worthless check
malum prohibitum.
Constitutional Challenges to B.P. 22:
1. offends the constitutional provision forbidding
imprisonment for debt;
2. impairs freedom of contract;
3. contravenes equal protection clause
4. unduly delegates legislative and executive
powers
5. enactment is flawed since Interim Batasan
violated consti provision prohibiting
amendments on third reading.
RATIO:
Most serious of these challenges is that the statute runs
counter to the inhibition in the Bill of Rights saying, “No
person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a
poll tax.”
• Petitioners claim that the statute is nothing more
than a veiled device to coerce payment of a debt
under the threat of penal sanction.
• Prohibition in the Bill of Rights was intended to
prevent commitment of debtors to prison for
liabilities arising from actions ex contractu and was
never meant to include damages arising in actions
•
ex delicto.
In answering whether BP 22 violates the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for
debt, it is necessary to examine what the statute
prohibits and punishes as an offense.
• The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is
the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation
which the law punishes. The law is not intended to
coerce a debtor to pay his debt but is to prohibit
under pain penal sanction the making of
worthless checks and putting them into
circulation because of the deleterious effects it
has on the public interest.
o An act may not be considered by society as
inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but
because of the harm that inflicts on the
community, it can be outlawed and criminally
punished as malum prohibitum in the exercise of
the state’s police power.
o The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a
thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels
of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society
and the public interest.
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• It is not for the judiciary to question the wisdom
behind the statute. It is sufficient that there exists a
nexus between means and ends.
HELD:
We find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of
police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for
debt.
Regarding violation of freedom to contract: freedom
to contract which is protected is freedom to enter into
lawful contracts. Besides, checks are commercial
instruments and cannot be categorized as mere
contracts.
Regarding violation of equal protection: contended
that is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of
the check and should also be punished since without his
indispensable participation there is not crime.
Unacceptable since it is tantamount to saying that
swindled should be punished alongside the swindler.
Regarding undue delegation: What cannot be
delegated is the power to make laws which is the power
to define the offense sough to be punished and to
prescribe the penalty, it does not cover the contention
that the offense is not completed by the sole act of the
drawer but depends on the will of the payee in
presenting the check to the bank for payment.
Regarding violation of prohibition against
amendments in 3rd reading: text approved by the body
is the text approved on second reading.
D. Right Against Self
Incrimination
U.S vs. NAVARRO
FACTS:
The defendants, Baldomero Navarro, Marcelo de Leon,
and Fidel Feliciano (alias Bulag) are charged with the
crime of illegal detention. The said defendants, together
with other persons unknown armed with revolvers and
daggers, went one night about the middle of November,
1902, to the house of one Felix Punsalan, situated in
Matang-tubig, barrio of Malinta, town of Polo, Province of
Bulacan, and by force and violence took the said Felix
Punsalan, without, up to the date of this information,
having given any information as to his whereabouts or
having proven that they set him at liberty.
The defendants on being arraigned pleaded not guilty.
The court below rendered judgment condemning each
one of the defendants, Baldomero Navarro, Marcelo de
Leon, and Feliciano Felix (alias Bulag), to life
imprisonment and payment of the costs of prosecution.
Against this judgment the defendants appealed.
Article 481 of the Penal Code provides that a private
person who shall lock up or detain another, or in any
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consti part 12: protected interests in liberty
way deprive him of his liberty shall be punished with the
penalty of prision mayor.
The second paragraph of article 483 provides that one
who illegally detains another and fails to give
information concerning his whereabouts, or does not
prove that he set him at liberty, shall be punished with
cadena temporal in its maximum degree to life
imprisonment.
ISSUE:
WON article 143 has the effect of forcing a defendant to
become a witness in his own behalf or to take a much
severer punishment ?
HELD:
Yes. Judgment reversed. Defendants are found guilty of
the crime defined and punished in by article 482 of the
Penal Code, with AC of nocturnity with legal accessory
penalties and payment of costs.
RATIO:
-This provisions of the law has the effect of forcing a
defendant to become a witness in his own behalf or to
take a much severer punishment. The burden is put
upon him of giving evidence if he desires to lessen the
penalty, or, in other words, of criminating himself, for
the very statement of the whereabouts of the victim or
the proof that the defendant set him at liberty amounts
to a confession that the defendant unlawfully detained
the person.
And so in order to arrive at a true interpretation of
article 483 it is necessary to examine that system of
procedure.
In Escriche's Dictionary of Legislation and
Jurisprudence:
criminal prosecution is divided into two principal
parts or sections which are, first, the summary,
and second, the penalty stages. The principal
purpose of the summary trial is to inquire
whether a criminal act has been committed and
to determine by whom the act has been
committed — that is to say, the object is to get
together all the date possible for the purpose of
proving that an act falling within the sanction of
the penal law has been committed by such and
such persons. In the plenary stage the purpose
is a contradictory discussion of the question of
the guilt or innocence of the defendant, and the
rendition of a judgment of conviction or
acquittal. It may well be that although it appears
in the summary stage of the proceeding that the
act has been performed by the accused, still in
the plenary stage it may be shown that the act
was not really criminal or that there was a
lawful excuse for its commission.
The record of the summary proceeding should
contain evidence of the commission of a
punishable act, all possible data tending to point
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out the delinquent, a record of all proceedings
connected with his arrest and imprisonment, the
answers of the accused to the interrogatories put
to him as to any other witness to obtain from him
a statement of all he knows concerning the crime
and those guilty of it.
Now let us apply the rules of law above indicated to the
case in question, supposing that the crime had been
committed prior to the passage of the Philippine bill or
General Orders, No. 58. The judicial authorities having
reason to believe that someone has been illegally
detained or kidnapped proceed to make a secret
investigation of the case, arrest the suspected culprit,
and demand of him that he give any information he may
have concerning the act under investigation and to state
whatever may have been his own participation therein.
The evidence shows that someone has been taken away
from home and has not been heard of again, and the
facts point to the prisoner as the presumptive criminal.
He is told to state what he knows of the matter. If he
does so, and proves that the person detained was
liberated by him, or that such person is living in such
and such a place, then the prosecuting attorney will
know that he must draw a charge under the first or
following sections of article 481, according to whether
the facts elicited by the preliminary or summary
investigation show only a detention in general, or for the
specific periods of time indicated in the latter part of the
section. But if the prisoner fails to prove the
whereabouts of the person whom he is accused of
making away with, or that he liberated him, then the
prosecuting attorney has a case falling within the last
paragraph of article 483.
It follows, therefore, from an examination of the old law
that no prosecution under this article would have ever
been possible without a concomitant provision of the
procedural law which made it the duty of the accused to
testify and permitted the prosecution to draw an
unfavorable deduction from his refusal to do so. The
crime defined by article 483 was composed of three
elements:
(a) The illegal detention of a person by the
accused.
(b) Lack of evidence up to the time of the
summary investigation that this person had
recovered his liberty.
(c) A failure on the part of the accused in the
course of the summary proceeding to prove that
he had liberated the person detained, or to give
information at that time of his whereabouts, or a
refusal to give any evidence at all which left him
in the same position as would an unsuccessful
attempt to prove the facts above mentioned, and
which were necessary to overcome the prima
facie case made out by the proof of the first two
elements
Now every one of these ingredients of the offense must
exists before an information can be filed for a
prosecution under this article. The real trial was the
plenary and was very similar to out regular trial after
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consti part 12: protected interests in liberty
arraignment. But the summary, with its secret and
inquisitorial methods, was vastly different from our
preliminary investigation. If the right had been taken
away to question the accused and compel him to testify,
then element (c) above indicated, would have always
been lacking. And that right has been taken from the
prosecution by both General Orders, No. 58, and by the
guaranty embodied in the Philippine bill. That being the
case the crime defined in article 483 can not now be
committed, because the possibility of adding to the
element (a) arising from the act of the accused the other
two elements equally essential to the offense has been
forever swept away by the extension to these Islands of
the constitutional barrier against an inquisitorial
investigation of crime.
- this case the prosecuting attorney charges the
accused with kidnapping some person and with
not having given any information of the
whereabouts of that person, of having proved
that he — the accused — has set him at liberty.
To make out a case the Government must show
that the prisoner has been guilty of every act or
omission necessary to constitute the crime of
which he is charged, and it will not be disputed
that the exercise of an absolute right can not
form part of a crime. In this case the
Government has proved that the defendant was
guilty of a breach of his duty to respect the
rights of others by showing that he, with others,
carried a certain individual away from his house
against his will, the accused not being vested
with authority to restrain his fellow-citizens of
liberty. It is impossible for the Government to
prove the other elements of the crime, because
the acts necessary to constitute them must be
anterior in point of time to the trial, and must
constitute some breach of duty under an
existing law. It has been demonstrated that the
omission which, under the former law
constituted the two remaining elements, is no
longer penalized but is nothing more than the
exercise of one of the most essential rights
pertaining to an accused person.
- The provision that no one is bound to criminate himself
is older than the Government of the United States. At an
early day it became a part of the common law of
England.
- It was established on the grounds of public policy and
humanity — of policy, because if the party were required
to testify, it would place the witness under the strongest
temptation to commit the crime of perjury, and of
humanity, because it would prevent the extorting of
confessions by duress.
- It had its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial
methods of interrogating the accused person, which had
long obtained in the continental system. (Jones's Law of
Evidence, sec. 887; Black's Constitutional Law, 575.)
Precisely the same of law applies to the case at bar. If
the defendant does not do certain things, if he does not
consti 2 all stars
make certain statements or proofs, he is severely
punished.
It may be said that the defendant is only required to
speak on one point in the case, that the prosecution
must prove the illegal detention, and that the burden of
showing the whereabouts only is put upon the
defendant.
- it be urged that the defendant is not compelled to
testify, that he remain mute, the answer is that, the
illegal detention only being proved by the prosecution, if
he does not make certain proof, if he remains mute, then
not only the presumption but the fact of guilt follows as
a consequence of his silence, and such a conclusion is
not permitted under American law.
- It is the duty of the prosecution, in order to convict one
of a crime, to produce evidence showing guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt; and the accused can not be called
upon either by express words or acts to assist in the
production of such evidence; nor should his silence be
taken as proof against him. He has a right to rely on the
presumption of innocence until the prosecution proves
him guilty of every element of the crime with which he is
charged.
-In the language of Mr. Justice Bradley, in the Boyd
case, "any compulsory discovery by extorting the party's
oath . . . to convict him of a crime . . . is contrary to the
principles of free government; it is abhorrent to the
instincts of an Englishman; it is abhorrent to the
instincts of an American. It may suit the purposes to
despotic power but it can not abide the pure atmosphere
of political liberty and personal freedom."
VILLAFLOR vs. SUMMERS
J. Malcolm
FACTS:
Petitioner Emeteria Villaflor here was charged with
adultery. She was then asked to submit to a physical
examination to determine if she was pregnant or not.
She refused to obey and challenged the order on the
ground of being in violation of the constitutional
provision relating to self incrimination.
ISSUE:
WON the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be
examined violates the Bill of Rights and the Code of
Criminal Procedure.
HELD:
No it does not. Writ of habeas corpus being prayed for is
denied.
RATIO:
13
consti part 12: protected interests in liberty
The court here acknowledged that there are a number of
authorities that deal with the subject, though many are
conflicting.
Cited was the case of People v. McCoy, a case dealing in
infanticide, where the court deemed it a violation of the
Constitution to compel the defendant to submit her body
to examination, being a violation of the right against self-
incrimination.
In State v. Height, J. McClain recommended that the
general rule should be that “a defendant can be
compelled to disclose only those parts of the body which
are not usually covered”.
The court in this case, however, looks to more
progressive decisions.
Cited was the decision of J. Holmes in Holt v. US, where
he said “based upon what he termed "an extravagant
extension of the Fifth Amendment," said: "The
prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be
a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communications
from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when
it may be material."
The Philippine SC also seemed to limit the protection,
stating that the limitation was to be "simply a
prohibition against legal process to extract from the
defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of
his guilt.
While the court agrees with the latter two
interpretations, it does not attempt to draw any dividing
line, as this would be too difficult to determine. This
case, however, is seen as one of the most extreme cases
which could be imagined.
Quote: “For the nonce we would prefer to forget them
entirely, and here in the Philippines, being in the
agreeable state of breaking new ground, would rather
desire our decision to rest on a strong foundation of
reason and justice than on a weak one blind adherence
to tradition and precedent.”
Going into the history of the law, it is seen that it was
made as a deterrent to “odious inquisitorial methods of
interrogating an accused person by which to extort
unwilling confessions with the ever-present temptation
to commit the crime of perjury.”
DUE PROCESS
Under the due process of law, every person has a natural
and inherent right to the possession and control of his
own body. However, superior to the complete immunity
of a person to be let alone is the inherent which the
public has in the orderly administration of justice.
Between a sacrifice of the ascertainment of truth to
personal considerations, between a disregard of the
public welfare for refined notions of delicacy, law and
consti 2 all stars
justice cannot hesitate.
ELEMENTS/PURPOSE OF CRIMINAL TRIAL (in case
he wants to discuss this)
The object of having criminal laws is to purge the
community of persons who violate the laws to the great
prejudice of their fellow men. Criminal procedure, the
rules of evidence, and constitutional provisions, are then
provided, not to protect the guilty but to protect the
innocent. No evidence of physical facts can for any
substantial reason be held to be detrimental to the
accused except in so far as the truth is to be avoided in
order to acquit a guilty person.
PEOPLE vs. VALLEJO
(2002, per curiam)
PERTINENT PROVISIONS:
Section 12 of Art. III of the Constitution provides in
pertinent parts:
"(1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
"(2) No torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation or any other means which vitiate
the free will shall be used against him. Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or
other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
"(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him."
There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced
confessions treated in this constitutional provision: (1)
coerced confessions, the product of third degree methods
such as torture, force, violence, threat, and intimidation,
which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of Section 12, and
(2) uncounselled statements, given without the benefit of
Miranda warnings, which are the subject of paragraph 1
of the same section.
FACTS:
1. Accused Vallejo was charged with the crime of
rape with homicide for the rape-slaying of a 9
year-old girl. The RTC convicted him and
sentenced him with the penalty of death.
2. Vallejo questions the validity of the oral and
written confessions presented as evidence
against him. He alleges that the oral confessions
were inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay,
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consti part 12: protected interests in liberty
while the extrajudicial confessions were obtained
through force and intimidation.
3. According to him, the police forced him to admit
that he had raped and killed the girl and that he
admitted having committed the crime to stop
them from beating him up. He also claimed the
police even burned his penis with a lighted
cigarette and pricked it with a needle.
4. He further claims that, although he admitted to
Mayor Abutan and Atty. Leyva the commission
of the crime, this was because the police had
maltreated him. He did not tell the mayor or
Atty. Leyva that he had been tortured because
the policemen were around and he was afraid of
them. Mayor Abutan and Atty. Leyva were not
also present when he gave his confession to the
police and signed the same. He claims that
although the extrajudicial confession was in his
own handwriting, he merely copied the contents
thereof from a pattern given to him by the police.
ISSUE:
WoN the extrajudicial confessions of the
accused are admissible as evidence as these were
allegedly obtained through force and intimidation
and without the aid of a lawyer.
HELD:
YES, these are admissible. The accused failed
to support his contention that these were obtained
through fraud and intimidation and that he was not
assisted by proper counsel.
RATIO:
• Vallejo cannot now claim that he was not apprised
of the consequences of the statements he was to
make as well as the written confessions he was to
execute. Neither can he question the qualifications
of Atty. Lupo Leyva who acted as his counsel
during the investigation.
• To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not
challenge all the questions being propounded to
his client. The presence of a lawyer is not
intended to stop an accused from saying
anything which might incriminate him but,
rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to
preclude the slightest coercion as would lead
the accused to admit something false. Indeed,
counsel should not prevent an accused from freely
and voluntarily telling the truth.
• Atty. Leyva testified that he "sort of discouraged"
the former from making statements as anything he
said could be used against him. But, as accused-
appellant was willing to be investigated, Atty.
Leyva said he advised him to tell the truth
consti 2 all stars
• Vallejo admitted that he was first asked whether
he wanted the services of Atty. Leyva before the
latter acted as his defense counsel. And counsel
who is provided by the investigators is deemed
engaged by the accused where the latter never
raised any objection against the former's
appointment during the course of the
investigation but, on the contrary, thereafter
subscribed to the veracity of his statement
before the swearing officer.
• In previous cases decided by the SC, the accused
made extrajudicial confessions to the municipal
mayor freely and voluntarily. In all of them, the
extrajudicial confessions were held admissible in
evidence, being the spontaneous, free, and
voluntary admissions of the guilt of the accused.
We note further that the testimony of Mayor
Abutan was never objected to by the defense. In
this case, the mayor's questions to accused-
appellant were not in the nature of an
interrogation, but rather an act of benevolence by
a leader seeking to help one of his constituents.
• The bare assertions of maltreatment by the police
authorities in extracting confessions from the
accused are not sufficient. The standing rule is
that "where the defendants did not present
evidence of compulsion, or duress nor violence
on their person; where they failed to complain
to the officer who administered their oaths;
where they did not institute any criminal or
administrative action against their alleged
intimidators for maltreatment; where there
appeared to be no marks of violence on their
bodies; and where they did not have
themselves examined by a reputable physician
to buttress their claim," all these will be
considered as indicating voluntariness.
• Accused testified that he was made to stay in the
municipal hall from 10:00 o'clock in the morning
until 11:00 o'clock that night of July 10, 1999,
during which time he was boxed, tortured, and hit
with a piece of wood by policemen to make him
admit to the crime. However, accused was
physically examined by Dr. Antonio Vertido at
about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day.
While the results show that accused-appellant did
sustain injuries, the same are incompatible with
his claim of torture.
OBITER: At all events, even if accused-appellant was
truthful and his assailed confessions are
inadmissible, the circumstantial evidence, as already
shown, is sufficient to establish his guilt beyond all
reasonable doubt. The prosecution witnesses
presented a mosaic of circumstances showing
accused-appellant's guilt. Their testimonies rule out
15
consti part 12: protected interests in liberty
the possibility that the crime was the handiwork of
some other evil mind. These witnesses have not been
shown to have been motivated by ill will against
accused-appellant.
BELTRAN vs. SAMSON
Ponente: J. Romualdez (1929)
FACTS:
The petitioner complains that Judge Samson ordered
him to appear before the provincial fiscal to take
dictation in his own handwriting from the latter. The
order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the
purpose of comparing the petitioner's handwriting and
determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain
documents supposed to be falsified. The respondents
contend that the petitioner is not entitled to the remedy
applied for, inasmuch as the order prayed for by the
provincial fiscal and later granted by the court below,
and against which the instance action was brought, is
based on the provisions of section 1687 of the
Administrative Code and on the doctrine laid down in
case law
The fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative
Code, and the proper judge, upon motion of the fiscal,
may compel witnesses to be present at the investigation
of any crime of misdemeanor. But this power must be
exercised without prejudice to the constitutional rights
of persons cited to appear. The petitioner, in refusing to
perform what the fiscal demanded, seeks refuge in the
constitutional provision contained in the Jones Law and
incorporated in General Orders, No. 58.
The said provision is found in paragraph 3, section 3 of
the Jones Law which (in Spanish) reads: "Ni se le
obligara a declarar en contra suya en ningun proceso
criminal" and has been incorporated in our Criminal
Procedure (General Orders, No. 58) in section 15 (No. 4)
and section 56. As to the extent of this privilege, it
should be noted first of all, that the English text of the
Jones Law, which is the original one, reads as follows:
"Nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself." As to its scope, this privilege is
not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to all
giving or furnishing of evidence.
ISSUE/HELD:
W/O Not writing from the fiscal's dictation by the
petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's
handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain
documents supposed to be falsified, violates the
petitioner’s right against self-incrimination. YES
RATIO:
Whenever a defendant, at the trial of his case, testifying
in his own behalf, denies that a certain writing or
consti 2 all stars
signature is in his own hand, he may on cross-
examination but compelled to write in open court in
order that the jury may be able to compare his
handwriting with the one in question. It was so held in
the case of Bradford vs. People and Sprouse vs. Com.
However, in the case of Sprouse vs. Com., the defendant
voluntarily offered to write, to furnish a specimen of his
handwriting. We cite this case particularly because the
court there gave prominence to the defendant's right to
decline to write, and to the fact that he voluntarily wrote.
In this case, we are not concerned with a defendant, for
it does not appear that any information was filed against
the petitioner for the supposed falsification, and still less
is it a question of a defendant on trial testifying and
under cross-examination. This is only an investigation
prior to the information and with a view to filing it.
Writing is something more than moving the body, or the
hand, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical
and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that
the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine
or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent
fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we
believe the present case is similar to that of producing
documents of chattels in one's possession. For the
purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a
similarity between one who is compelled to produce a
document, and one who is compelled to furnish a
specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the
witness is required to furnish evidence against himself.
And we say that the present case is more serious than
that of compelling the production of documents or
chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write
and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence
which does not exist, and which may identify him as the
falsifier.
It cannot be contended in the present case that if
permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's
handwriting is not granted, the crime would go
unpunished.
Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a
municipal treasurer, according to Exhibit A, it should
not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtain genuine
specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is
impossible to obtain a specimen or specimens without
resorting to the means complained of herein, that is not
reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed
by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases
criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice,
but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the
raison d'etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege
exists for the protection of innocent persons.
With respect to the judgments rendered by this court
and cited on behalf of the respondents, it should be
remembered that in the case of People vs. Badilla (48
Phil., 718), it does not appear that the defendants and
other witnesses were questioned by the fiscal against
their will, and if they did not refuse to answer, they must
be understood to have waived their constitutional
privilege, as they could certainly do.
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consti part 12: protected interests in liberty
"The privilege not to give self-incriminating evidence,
while absolute when claimed, may be waived by any one
entitled to invoke it."
CABAL vs. KAPUNAN
FACTS:
Col. Maristela filed w/ Sec of Natl Defense a complaint
charging Manuel Cabal, then AFP Chief of Staff, with
“graft and corrupt practices, unexplained wealth,
conduct unbecoming…dictatorial tendencies, giving false
statements as to financial life, etc.” A month later, the
President created a committee (3 former justices, 2
generals) to investigate the administrative charge and
submit a report asap. Upon request of Maristela, Cabal
was asked to take the witness stand and be sworn to as
witness for Maristela. Cabal objected, invoking his right
against self-incriminatn.
Committee insisted he take the witness stand subject to
his right to refuse to answer incriminatory questions.
Cabal still refused. Committee referred matter to City
Fiscal of Manila who filed with the CFI a charge on Cabal
of contempt under section 580 of RAC. Respondent
judge Kapunan ordered petitioner to show cause.
Instead petitioner tried to have charges against him
quashed.
Note that an accused in a criminal case may refuse to
answer incriminatory ?s and take the witness stand.
Thus, the issue is:
ISSUE:
WON the proceedings before the committee is civil or
criminal, determining won Cabal may invoke right
against self-incrimination
HELD
Yes. Although technically a civil proceeding, as a
consequence of forfeiture being in the nature of a
penalty, proceedings for forfeiture of property are
deemed criminal in substance and effect. Hence,
exemption of Cabal in criminal case from obligation to be
witnesses against himself is proper.
RATIO:
The purpose of the charge is to apply RA 1379 Anti-Graft
Law, which authorizes the forfeiture of the State of
property of a public officer or employee which is out of
proportion of his salary and other lawful income. Such
forfeiture is of the nature of a penalty as it is a
divestiture of property w/o compensation, imposed by
way of punishment by the lawmaking power to insure a
prescribed course of conduct. It restrains the
commission of an offense, the effect of which is to
transfer the title to the specific thing from owner to the
sovereign power.
consti 2 all stars
Moreover, where the position of the witness is is virtually
that of an accused on trial, as in the case at bar, he may
invoke the right against self-incrimination in support of
a blanket refusal to answer any and all questions.
BENGZON vs. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE
(20 November 1991)
Ponente: J. Padilla
FACTS:
On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Presidential Commission on Good
Governance (PCGG), filed a complaint with
Sandiganbayan against the petitioners of this case.
PCGG allege, among others, that: defendants (petitioners
therein) Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez and Juliette
Gomez Romualdez, alleged “cronies” of former President
Marcos and First Lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos,
engaged in schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich
themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. Among
these stratagems are (1) obtained control of some
bigbusiness enterprises such as MERALCO, Pilipinas
Shell, and PCI Bank, (2) manipulated the formation of
Erectors Holding Inc, to appear viable and borrow more
capital, reaching a total of more that P2 billion, (3)
collaborated with lawyers (petitioners therein) of the
Bengzon Law Offices in concealing funds and properties,
in maneuvering the purported sale of interests in certain
corporations, in misusing the Meralco Pension Fund
worth P25 million, and in cleverly hiding behind the veil
of corporate entity.
On 13 September 1988, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile
delivered a speech before the Senate on the alleged take-
over of SolOil Incorporated by Ricardo Lopa (who died
during the pendency of this case) and called upon the
senate to look into possible violation of the Anti Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act or RA 3019. The Senate
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or Blue
Ribbon Committee (SBRC) started its investigation
through a hearing on 23 May 1989, but Lopa and
Bengzon declined to testify. The SBRC rejected petitioner
Bengzon’s plea and voted to pursue its investigation.
Petitioner claims that the SBRC, in requiring their
attendance and testimony, acted in excess of its
jurisdiction and legislative purpose. Hence this petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON the court has jurisdiction over this case. YES.
2. WON the SBRC’s inquiry has a valid legislative
purpose. NO.
3. WON the sale or disposition of the Romualdez
corporations is a purely private transaction which is
beyond the power of the SBRC to inquire into. YES.
4. WON the inquiry violates the petitioners’ right to due
process. NO.
RATIO:
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consti part 12: protected interests in liberty
1. As the court held in Angara vs. Electoral Commission,
the Constitution provided for an elaborate system of
checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the departments of the government, and it is
the judiciary that was vested of the powers to determine
the scope, nature and extent of such powers.
2 and 3. Sec 21, Art VI of the Consti provides:
“The Senate… may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.”
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct
inquries in aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or
unlimited. With regard to the rights that shall be
respected, it should be considered to refer to the Bill of
Rights, particularly the right to due process and the
right not to be compelled to testify against one’s self.
The speech of Sen. Enrile contained no suggestion on
contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the
Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA
3019. The purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by
respondent SBRC was to find out WON the relatives of
President Aquino, particularly Ricardo Lopa, had
violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the
36/39 corporations of Kokoy Romualdez to the Lopa
Group. There appears no intended legislation
involved.
The inquiry also is not conducted pursuant to Senate
Resolution No. 2124 (SR 212), as the committee alleges.
The inquiry under SR 212 is to look into the charges
against PCGG filed by stockholders of Oriental
Petroleum in connection with the implementation of
Section 26 Article XVIII of the Constitution. Mr. Lopa
and the petitioners are not connected with the
government and did their acts as private citizens; hence,
such a case of alleged graft and corruption is within the
jurisdiction, not of the SBRC, but of the courts. In fact,
the Sandiganbayan already took jurisdiction of this issue
before the SBRC did. The inquiry of the respondent
committee into the same justiciable controversy already
before the Sandiganbayan would be an encroachment of
into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction.
4. One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Consti to an
individual is the right against self-incrimination. This
right construed as the right to remain completely silent
may be availed of by the accused in a criminal case; but
it may be invoked by other witnesses only as questions
are asked of them (Chavez v CA). This extends also to
respondents in administrative investigation but only if
they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding. This
is not so in this case. BUT since the court already held
that the inquiry is not in aid of legislation, the
petitioners therein cannot be compelled to testify.
4
Senate Resolution wherein the activities of PCGG be investigated on
the ground, among others, that the Sandiganbayan has ordered the
PCGG to answered charges filed by three stockholders of Oriental
Petroleum that it has adopted a “get-rich quick” scheme.
consti 2 all stars
Held: Petition is GRANTED. The SBRC is enjoined from
compelling the petitioners and intervenor to testify before
it and produce evidence at the said inquiry.
GALMAN vs. PAMARAN
Cuevas, J. 08/30/85
FACTS:
After the death of Ninoy, Marcos issued PD 1886,
creating the Agrava Fact-Finding Board to investigate on
the tragedy. The statute gave the board broad powers,
among them :
Sec. 4 The Board may hold any person in direct
or indirect contempt, and impose appropriate
penalties.
A person guilty...including...refusal to be sworn
or to answeras a witness or to subscribe to an
affidavit or disposition when lawfully
required to do so may be summarily adjudged
in direct contempt by the Board.
Sec. 5 No person shall be excused from
attending and testifying...on the ground that his
testimony or evidence required of him may to
incriminate him...but his testimony or any
evidence produced by him shall not be used
against him in connection with any transaction,
matter or thing concerning which he is
compelled, after having invoked his privilege
against self-incrimination, to testify or produce
evidence, except that such individual son
testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution
and punishment fro perjury committed in so
testifying...
Sec 12. The findings...shall be made public.
Should it warrant the prosecution of any person,
the Board may initiate the filing of the proper
complaint with the appropriate gov't agency.
Among those who were called in by the Board were
private respondents Gen. Fabian Ver and Maj. Gen.
Prospero Olivas. Eventually two reports came out of the
Agrava Board and both were presented to Marcos; the
majority report by board chair Justice Agrava and the
minority report authored by 4 others. They were turned
over to the Tanodbayan, who filed two informations for
murder (for the death of Ninoy, another for Rolando
Galman, the other dead person on the tarmac who was
supposedly a Communist hitman) with the
Sandiganbayan against private respondents herein
charged as accesories, with several principals & 1
accomplice.
In the course of the trial, the prosecuting Tanodbayan
marked and offered as part of their evidence the
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consti part 12: protected interests in liberty
individual testimonies of the private respondents before
the Agrava board, to which the respondents objected.
The Sandiganbayan resolved to admit all the evidences
offered by the prosecution except the testimonies in view
of he immunity given by PD 1886.
Petitioners: (Saturnina & Reynaldo Galman,
Tanodbayan)
1. said testimonies are admissible because the
respondents failed to invoke before the Agrava Board the
immunity granted by PD1886
2. non-invocation of privilege constitutes a valid waiver.
3. right against self-incrimination functions only
criminal cases
Repondents (Sandiganbayan, Ver, Olivas et.al)
1. evidences cannot be used against them as mandated
by Sec 5 PD1886
2. without the immunity provided for in the 2nd clause
of Sec 5, the legal compulsion imposed by the 1st clause
of the same Sec would be unconstitutional for being
violative of the right against self incrimination.
ISSUE/HELD:
w/n the testimonies of the respondents before the Board
are admissible as evidence - NO
RATIO:
Though designated as a fact-finding commission, the
Agrava board was for all intents and purposes an entity
charged with the determination of the person/s
criminally responsible so that they may be brought
before the bar of justice. In the course of the
investigation it is but natural that those who are
suspected of the commission of the crime are to be called
in. And when suspects are summoned & called to testify,
they are not merely "sheding light' on the incident, they
are in fact undergoing investigation (the crim law
definition, which in this case can be analogized to a
prelim investigation). Therefore, they are supposed to be
read their rights (remain silent, etc) and are supposed to
afford themselves the full protection of the law, which
includes the right against self incrimination.
In this case, because of PD 1886 compelling respondents
to testify on pain of contempt, that option has effectively
been eliminated. However, the rights of the accused,
being constitutional rights, cannot be set aside. Their act
of continuing to testify before the board cannot be
accepted as a valid waiver of the right to remain silent,
because in the first place they had no option to do so.
The contempt power of the Board acted as a form of
compulsion. Lefkowitz v NJ. The right against self-
incrimination is not limited to criminal cases, for it is not
the character of the suit involved but the nature of te
proceedings that controls. Cabal v Kapunan.
The Court continues to rule that the private respondents
were not merely denied of the afore-mentioned rights but
more broadly the right to due process. While it is true
that Sec 5 of PD 1886 provides some sort of immunity,
analyzed closely, it will be shown that it is a form of "use
immunity" (prohibiting the use of the witness' compelled
testimony & its fruits in any manner in connection with
the criminal prosecution of the witness) but it grants
consti 2 all stars
merely immunity from use of any statement given before
the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by reason
or on the basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or
producing evidence do not render the witness immuned
from prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of the
right against self-incrimination. This the Court said is
contrary to due process, as they were not appraised of
their rights and also because such a
"confession/testimony" is inadmissible under the
exclusionary rule in Sec20, Art 4 of the Consti.
In order to save PD 1886 from unconstitutionality, the
Court held that in view of the potent sanction found in
Sec4 of the said law on the refusal, the compelled
testimonies are deemed immunized by Sec 5 of the same.
Petition dismissed.
Makasiar, C.J. concurring: There can be no implied
waiver of the right against self incrimination. Also,
because of the nature of the proceedings, the invitations
to testify handed out by the Agrava board are effectively
subpoenas, hence it takes the nature of a criminal
proceeding. the respondents were under the impression
it was not, thus they were not fully appraised of their
rights.
(Escolin, Dela Fuente, Alampay hold essentially a similar
view)
Concepcion, concurring: testimony cannot be used in
any subsequent proceeding.
(Plana holds a similar view)
Teehankee, dissent: It is wrong to exclude totally and
absolutely inadmissible the testimonies of teh private
respondents. The right against self-incrimination in
proceedings other than criminal is considered an option
of refusal to answer, not a prohibition of inquiry. Thus, it
must be invoked at the proper time (according to him,
the proper time was during the testimony to the board);
a person summoned to testify cannot decline to appear,
nor can he decline to appear as a witness, and no claim
of privilege can be made until a question calling for a
criminating answer is asked. Gonzales v Sec of Labor.
Nor were the respondents in a criminal trial, they were
ordinary witnesses. An ordinary witness before the
Board could not invoke the right to silence and refuse to
take the witness stand. Their right & privilege (which is
not self-executory/automatic ipso jure) was, while
testifying, whether voluntary or by subpoena, to invoke
the privilege and refuse to answer as and when a
question calling for an incriminating answer is
propounded. Failure to invoke this personal privilege
automatically results in loss ipso facto.
E. Unlawful Search & Seizure
STONEHILL vs. DIOKNO
PARTIES:
Petitioners: Harry Stonehill, Robert Brooks, John
Brooks, Karl Beck
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consti part 12: protected interests in liberty
Respondents-Prosecutors: Hon. Jose Diokno (Sec of
Justice), Jose Lukban (Acting Director, NBI), Special
Prosecutors Cenzon, Plana, Villareal, and Asst. Fiscal
Maneses Reyes
Respondents-Judges: Judges Roan, Cansino, Clauag,
Mencias, Jimenez
FACTS:
Upon application of respondents-prosecutors, several
judges issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants
against petitioners and/or the corporations of which
they were officers to search the persons above-named
and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences, and to seize documents and papers “showing
all business transactions” of petitioners as the subject of
the offense in violating “Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and the RPC.”
Petitioners alleged that the search warrants are null &
void as contravening the Constitution and Rules of Court
(ROC) because:
1. they do not describe w/ particularity the
documents, books, and things to be seized
2. cash money not mentioned in the warrants were
actually seized
3. they were issued to fish evidence against the
petitioners in deportation cases filed against
them
4. searches and seizures were made in an illegal
manner
5. the things seized were not delivered to the courts
that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in
accordance with the law
Respondents-prosecutors alleged:
1. the search warrants are valid & issued in
accordance with the law
2. the defects, if any were cured by petitioners’
consent
3. the effects seized are admissible in evidence
against herein petitioners regardless of the
alleged illegality of the searches and seizures
The SC issued writ of prelim injunction prayed for.
However, it was partially lifted insofar as the papers,
documents, and things seized from the offices of the
corporations are concerned; but, the injunction was
maintained as regards those seized in the residences of
petitioners herein.
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized may be
split into 2 groups: 1) those found and seized in the
offices of the corporations, and 2) those seized in the
residences of petitioners.
ON FIRST GROUP
Petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality
of the warrants and seizures made for the simple reason
that said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality
of petitioners. The legality of a seizure can be contested
only by the party whose rights have been impaired
thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search
consti 2 all stars
and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of
by third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may
not validly object to the use in evidence against them of
the documents, papers and things seized from the offices
and premises of the corporations, since the right to
object to the admission of said papers in evidence
belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the
seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the
corporate officers in proceedings against them in their
individual capacity.
(Thus, the issues pertain to the second group…)
ISSUES:
1. WON the search warrants in question, and the
searches and seizures are valid. NO
2. if invalid, WON said documents, papers, and
things may be used in evidence against
petitioners. NO
RATIO:
Art III, Sec 1, par 3:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon a probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
ISSUE #1
Constitution requires: 1) that no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in
the manners set forth; and 2) the warrant shall
particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these has been complied with in the contested
warrants. They were issued upon applications stating
that the natural and juridical persons named had
committed a “violation of CB Laws, Tariff and Custom
Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and RPC.” In other words,
no specific offense had been alleged in said applications.
The averments with respect to the offense committed
were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for
the judges who issued the warrants to have found the
existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes
the introduction of competent proof that the party
against who it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision
of our criminal laws.
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would
be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental
Const’l rights, for it would place the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or
passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil
sought to be remedied by the quoted provision – to
outlaw the so-called general warrants.
The grave violation of the Consti made in the application
for the search warrants was compounded by the
description made of the effects to be searched for and
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consti part 12: protected interests in liberty

seized. The warrants authorized the search for and

seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions
of petitioners, regardless of whether the transactions
were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure
of all records of the petitioners and the corporations,
whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the
explicit command of our Bill of Rights – that the things
to be seized be particularly described – as well as tending
to defeat its major objective, the elimination of general
warrants.

ISSUE #2
The ruling in Moncado v. People’s court relied upon by
respondents – that illegally seized documents, papers
and things are admissible in evidence must be
abandoned. This ruling is in line with American
common law rule that the criminal should not be allowed
to go free just “because the constable has blundered”
upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected
by means other than the exclusion of evidence
unlawfully obtained (i.e. action for damages against
searching officer).

Most common law jurisdictions have already given up

this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary
rule (exclusion of illegally obtained evidence), realizing
that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures.

Mapp vs. Ohio: All evidence obtained by searches and

seizures in violation of the Constitution, is, by that same
authority, inadmissible.

The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the spirit of the

constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures. If the applicant for a search warrant has
competent evidence to establish probable cause of the
commission of a given crime by the party against whom
the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the
applicant should not comply with the requirements of
the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no
such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the
Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence,
no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only
possible explanation for its issuance is the necessity of
fishing evidence of the commission of the crime. But
then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence
of evidence to establish a probable cause.

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