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GALMAN vs. SB [1986]

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Atty. Arturo A. ROMERO, complainant, vs. Hon. Judge Gabriel O. VALLE,
JR., respondent [1987]
⇒ Romero charged Valle w/grave misconduct & oppression. Valle was the
presiding judge of the RTC Laoag City, Branch XII while Romero was one
of the 2 counsels for plaintiff in the case Iglesia Filipina Independiente vs.
Rafael Albano, et. Al. which was being tried in Valle’s sala.
⇒ Findings of Intermediate Appellate Court Associate Justice Abdulwahid
Bidin who was tasked to investigate the case: Case arose from a dispute
between Romero & Valle as to the proper marking of Iglesia Filipina’s
inventory book. Counsel insisted that it should be marked as Exh F
whereas judge claimed that it should be Exh G since an Exh F was already
marked during the previous trial where counsel was absent. Counsel
continued insisting in a loud voice which annoyed the judge. Judge
admonished counsel not to bring his passion to the court & that he should
respect the court. Valle then banged his gavel, left the rostrum & went to his
chamber.
o Romero’s version: Before leaving the rostrum, Valle told Romero “You
step out. We finish the matter outside.” Prior to this, judge was already
uttering embarrassing remarks w/c hurt him. While he made further
explanations calmly, judge banged his gavel w/o declaring a recess. He
unceremoniously removed his coat and then uttered said remark.
Romero then saw the judge outside waiting for him to come out. Judge
held a gun w/his right hand. Romero couldn’t move since he was
unarmed & shocked. He asked the court stenographer to put it on
record that the judge was holding a gun. Subsequently, Valle was
pacified & he returned to the court. Romero asked Valle to inhibit
himself from trying the case but latter denied it & instead reset the
case.
o Valle’s version: What he said was “five minutes recess.” Defendant’s
counsel and Romero’s co-counsel & witness corroborated this. From
his chamber, he went to the stairs passing the corridor holding his coat
& a gun w/c was inside its holster. Upon reaching the stairs, he was
informed by his clerk that there are still cases in the calendar ready for
trial. Thus, he returned to his chamber & placed his gun inside his
table. When trial resumed, Romero asked Valle to inhibit himself from
the hearing. Judge informed counsel to put his request in writing & he
then reset the case to another date. Another judge now handles case.
⇒ Valle’s defense: denial. Accusations are exaggerated, sensationalized,
fabricated & inherently improbable & contrary to human experience & one-
sided. He had a permit to carry his licensed pistol outside his house since
he received threats from the NPA.
Issue: WON both counsel & judge are equally to blame for the incident –
YES.
Ratio:
1. Lugue vs. Kayanan: Both counsel & judge have the shared responsibility to
maintain the high esteem & high regard for courts. They should promote
confidence & respect in the administration of justice, even if this means
restraining their prides at time. This is a crucial factor in the administration
of justice.
2. Judge & counsel must respect each other mutually.
3. Counsel (Romero)
a. He should be respectful & gracious to the courts of justice and judicial
officials. Raising his voice was a sign of disrespect.
b. He’s an active law practitioner in Ilocos Norte, IBP Ilocos Norte-Laoag
City Chapter director, Chapter’s Legal Aid Committee chairman,
PHILCONSA local chapter president and Lions Club local chapter
president. As a community leader, he’s expected to set an example to
other lawyers. He should have humbly accepted his mistakes.
2. Judge Valle
a. exhibited shortness of temper & impatience.
b. Judges have contempt powers to endeavor counsel to appreciate his
duties to the court. He should have cited counsel in contempt instead
of indulging in tantrums.
c. Carrying the gun, although permitted, was not an innocent act. Judge
used it to instill fear in/intimidate counsel.
d. He violated the Canons of Judicial Ethics w/c requires him to avoid
appearance of impropriety both in his professional and personal lives.
Holding:
3. Valle guilty of misconduct
b. DISMISSED from the service
c. w/o forfeiture of retirement benefits
d. w/ prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the gov’t, its
agencies/instrumentalities
2. Romero asked to show cause why no disciplinary action
should be taken against him for conduct unbecoming of an
officer of the court.
ARBAN vs. BORJA [1989]
 Administrative Case in the SC. Grave misconduct
 Ponciano A. Arban, the then District Engineer for Camarines Sur, Ministry of
Public Works & Highways, filed the instant admin. for grave misconduct
against Judge Melecio B. Borja, Presiding Judge of Branch XX, RTC, 5th
Judicial Region of Naga City, alleging that:
o Respondent fired his gun in the balcony of the apartment he is lodging
in, from where he followed the Arban to Cindy's Restaurant in
downtown Naga City. There, without any justification whatever,
respondent pistol-whipped the Arban on the left side of his head,
sending him sprawling to the floor and rendering him momentarily
unconscious.
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o Respondent also threatened with his said gun Arban’s companions.
ASAP, Arban reported the said incidents to RTC Executive Judge Juan
B. Llaguno, who advised him to ask NBI’s held w/c advice was
followed.
o NBI investigated Arban & his witnesses & NBI later forwarded the case
to the City Fiscal of Naga, where it is now pending preliminary inquiry,
delayed now for 3 weeks due to repeated requests for postponement
by Borja. The incident received much coverage by the print &
broadcast media.
 We referred the case to Justice Bienvenido B. Ejercito of the IAC for
investigation, report and recommendation.
 In his Answer, Judge Borja denied the charge against him. Borja moved for
the resetting of the case w/c was granted. Later, Arban filed a Motion to
Withdraw the Petition, stating that the “filing of the petition was caused by a
misunderstanding by the petitioner of the motives of the respondent” & that
“after the public apology by the respondent, the petitioner believes that the
scandal caused on the public by the act of the respondent has been duly
appeased.”
 Thus, Justice Ejercito recommended the dismissal of the case. However,
the SC resolved to:
(a) transfer the case to Justice Nathanael de Pano of the IAC for further
investigation, report & recommendation, and
(b) require counsel for petitioner to appear before said Justice-
Investigator for hearing of this case, stating that his failure to do so
will subject said counsel to strict disciplinary measures.
 Accordingly, Justice de Pano conducted further hearings of the case. A new
hearing of this case was set & Borja, through counsel, moved for dismissal
of the case on the ground of lack of evidence. Upon Justice de Pano’s
prodding, Arban’s counsel, Atty. General averred that the complainant no
longer resides in Naga City since he had been transferred from Naga to
Cavite City, in consequence of w/c, counsel had been unable to confer w/
the complainant
 Hearing was transferred to enable Atty. General to contact & confer w/
Arban. At the new hearing, Atty. General revealed that he had conferred w/
the complainant, who did not wish to proceed further in the case since his
personal honor & good name had already been vindicated by Borja’s public
apology. Counsel informed that he had filed a written manifestation to this
effect
 The incident involving Judge Borja & Arban generated nationwide publicity.
Later, the SC sent a telegram to Judge Borja for the latter to come
immediately for a conference & explain the alleged pistol whipping of Engr.
Arban as reported in the newspapers. SC designated Acting Court
Administrator Arturo Buena to investigate the matter. Buena stated that a
prima facie case of the reported pistol whipping of Engr. Ponciano Arban by
Judge Borja has been established, although lacking in details.
 Thus, despite the withdrawal of the complainant, the SC undertook present
action, even before Engr. Arban filed the present petition considering our
responsibility to discipline erring members of the bench and bar and to
preserve the integrity of the judiciary.
WON Borja should be penalized for his pistol whipping Arban
 YES. Even a mere cursory reading of Judge Borja's "apology" in relation to
the "petition" or complaint clearly indicates that Judge Borja admits the
commission of the act charged.
 The respondent admits in his public apology that he inflicted physical
injuries on the left side of the face of Arban while they were at Cindy's
Restaurant in Naga City, a public place.
 SC did not entertain Borja’s explanation that Arban tried to hit the Borja with
a fist blow & that while parrying that blow, Judge Borja wildly swung w/ his
right hand & happened to hit the Arban’s face
 There is no doubt in the mind of the Court that the physical injuries inflicted
on Mr. Arban were caused by a pistol-whipping.
 Whatever the motive may have been, the violent action of the respondent in
a public place constitutes serious misconduct and the resultant outrage of
the community in Naga City is a blow to the image of the entire judiciary.
 Judge Borja violated Sec. 3, Cannon of Judicial Ethics: "A judge's official
conduct should be free from appearance of impropriety, & his personal
behavior not only upon the bench & in the performance of judicial duties,
but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach."
 De la Paz v. Inutan: "The judge is the visible representation of the law and,
more importantly, of justice…Thus, for the judge to return that regard, he
must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to
follow. He should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest infraction
of the law."
 While the Investigator-Justice recommended a 2-yr suspension, it is the
consensus of the SC that the serious nature of the offense & the best
interests of the judiciary warrant the penalty of dismissal. Moreover, SC
frowns upon prolonged suspension of judges or court personnel as a
penalty, even assuming that it is deserved
Holding: Borja found guilty of grave misconduct, hereby ordered DISMISSED
from the service, w/ forfeiture of retirement benefits & with prejudice to
reinstatement in any branch of the gov’t or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities. However, he shall be paid any back salaries or accrued leaves
which are due to him as of this date.
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RAMIREZ vs. MACANDOG [1986]

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ALFONSO vs. JUANSON [1993]
Facts:
• Involves a complaint filed against a doctor of medicine charging Judge
Juanson with immorality and violation of the Code of Judicial ethics.
• Dr. Alfonso married Sol on December 10, 1988. Their married life was a
happy one until the Mrs. Juanson informed Dr. Alfonso that their spouses
were having an affair. She added that she has in her possession love
letters written by Sol to prove her claim. Dr. Alfonso did not believe her and
Sol assured his of her love and concern for their family.
• Alfonso spouses went to the US and during their stay there Mrs. Juanson
informed Atty. Alfonso about the affair of his daughter in law. Atty. Alfonso
hired a private investigator. The private investigator found out that Sol had
met with Judge Juanson in a condominium unit in Mandaluyong and that
they stayed there for approximately three hours.
• Dr. Alfonso confronted Sol about the evidence that was gathered by his
father. At first she denied the affair but later in the evening she admitted
having an illicit affair with Judge Juanson. The Alfonso spouses decided to
live in separate house.
• In defense, Judge Juanson claims that he first knew Sol in 1987 when she
engaged his professional services in connection with the criminal cases
filed by her office. In June 1992 (while the Alfonso spouses were in the US)
he received an overseas call from Sol asking him for advice concerning her
problem with her employer. They met up after the return of Sol in the
Philippines to discuss her problem. He added that it was impossible for him
to have sexual intercourse with Sol because he has been suffering from two
debilitating diseases – diabetes mellitus and prostatitis (which have
seriously affected his sexual potency)
• Justive Jaguros investigated the matter and concluded that the immoral
conduct of the Atty. Juanson has ruined two families and that he cannot
escape the blame and sin of what he has cause. Justice Jaguros added
that he is a judge who symbolizes the law and the highest degree of
morality in the community. The citizens look up to him as the embodiment
of justice and decency, as he decides cases brought to his court. He can
do no less. She recommended his DISMISSAL from office.
WON Judge Juanson should be dismissed from the Judiciary? NO
• There is no doubt in our minds that a very special relationship existed
between the respondent and the complainant's wife. Evidenced by cards or
notes (love letters)
• It is clear that their affair began before Sol and Dr. Alfonso were married on
10 December 1988 and might have blossomed from the attorney-client
relationship between respondent and Sol. Her marriage did not diminish
Sol's love for even after she committed herself to marriage, she still
sneaked out her love notes.
• Judge Juanson is not charged with immorality or conduct committed before
he was appointed to the judiciary. The evidence presented were insufficient
to prove that he and Sol continued their extramarital affair. Sol’s admission
to her husband that she had carnal knowledge with the judge made no
reference to specific dates and the side of Dr. Alfonso exerted no further
effort to obtain clarifications as to the dates.
• It was not proven that Judge Juanson and Sol had sexual intercourse after
his appointment in the Judiciary. It cannot be safely presumed that he
committed any sexual indiscretion after he became a judge. He is not
charged for immorality committed before his appointment. Accordingly,
proof of prior immoral conduct cannot be a basis for his administrative
discipline in this case. Judge Juanson may have undergone moral
reformation after his appointment, or his appointment could have
completely transformed him upon the solemn realization that a public office
is a public trust and public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
• Judge Juanson became indiscreet; he succumbed to the sweet memories
of the past and he was unable to disappoint Sol who asked for his legal
advice on a matter which involved her employment. Such indiscretions
indubitably cast upon his conduct an appearance of impropriety. He thus
violated Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which mandates that “a
judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety,
and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance
of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach,"
and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that "a judge
should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities."
It has been said that a magistrate of the law must comport himself at all
times in such manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the
most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of
integrity and justice. The ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge
are essential to the preservation of the faith of the people in the judiciary.
• It is settled that immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but
includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption,
indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless
conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of
the community, and as an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and
public welfare.
Ruling: Fine of P2,000
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IN RE JUDGE ROJAS [1998]

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Emma J. CASTILLO, complainant vs. Judge Manuel M. CALANOG, JR.,
respondent [1991]
⇒ Castillo wrote a letter to the SC charging Calanog w/immorality & conduct
unbecoming of a public official. She claims that she met the judge during
the pendency of the case for her deceased common-law husband’s
intestate estate. He was then temporarily holding office in QC RTC Branch
94 where the case was assigned. Judge was referred to her by an
acquaintance who claimed that he can help in the early termination of the
case. Upon meeting the judge, she was asked to see him in his law office.
When they met, he invited her to eat in a restaurant & even asked her to
ride w/him in his car. However, he took him to a motel where he made
sexual advances on her. But he didn’t succeed. The judge, a married man,
instead offered to be her sub-husband (whatever that means!), promised to
give her a Bliss condo unit and to provide financial support to her 2
daughters and send them to an exclusive school for girls. She was
convinced due to confusion caused by her husband’s untimely death &
Calanog’s persistence. She then moved in to the condo w/her daughters
and she subsequently gave birth to his son named Jerome Christopher
Calanog. However, after giving birth, judge refused to provide them
w/financial support & didn’t fulfill his promise to send her daughters to an
exclusive school. He likewise refused to pay the condo’s monthly
installment, thus they were informed by the National Housing Authority that
they will be evicted from said place. Calanog ignored her demands.
⇒ Calanog’s response: Castillo was no longer interested in pursuing the
complaint, thus case should be considered w/drawn or dismissed. He also
denied the allegations.
⇒ Castillo submitted an “Affidavit of Desistance” denying her allegations since
she has now come to her senses, is repenting & wants to straighten
everything. She considers her complaint w/drawn.
⇒ Jose Javier, Calanog’s court interpreter for 10 yrs. testified that Castillo &
Calanog indeed have a relationship. He was asked to deliver Castillo’s
weekly allowance, pay her monthly electric & water bills, bring her to the
hospital when she gave birth to Jerome, etc. He testified that she did live in
the Bliss condo.
⇒ NBI Intelligence Service: Castillo was Calanog’s mistress & she lived in a
Bliss condo w/her 3 children. Calanog frequented the condo but when they
go out, they walk separately, pretending not to know each other. A barangay
census record listed Castillo’s name w/her 3 children as occupants of the
condo unit. Youngest child was Jerome Christopher who was seen
personally inside the condo. Jerome’s birth certificate from the NSO
specified Manuel Calanog as the father.
Issues & Ratio:
1. WON Castillo’s Affidavit of Desistance will affect the continuation of
the administrative case. – NO.
⇒ It has no persuasive value especially if was executed as an afterthought.
This is necessary to avoid making a mockery out of trials & placing the
investigation of truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witness.
⇒ Javier’s testimony & Castillo’s complaint provide sufficient ground for the
charges. Calanog had an intimate, immoral relationship w/Castillo.
2. WON Calanog is guilty of immorality. – YES.
⇒ Pertinent laws:
a. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon I, Rule 1.01: A judge should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity, probity & independence.
Commentary: As the individual who dispenses justice, public
perception of the judiciary logically depends on the judge’s attributes.
b. Rule 140: Immorality is under serious charges & punishable
w/dismissal from the service w/forfeiture of benefits (except accrued
leaves) & disqualification from reinstatement/appointment to any public
office including a GOCC.
c. Code of Judicial Ethics: judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety
WRT his professional & personal life. There’s no dichotomy of morality.
His official life can’t be detached or separated from his personal
existence.
⇒ His conduct was unbecoming of his position. He betrayed the people’s high
expectations & diminished the esteem in w/c they hold the judiciary in
general. The faith & confidence of the public in the administration of justice
can’t be maintained if the judge who dispenses it is not equipped w/moral
integrity & continues to commit an affront to public decency.
⇒ This is an administrative matter, thus, the sufficiency of facts to prove
concubinage is immaterial.
⇒ He lacked circumspection & delicadeza by failing to avoid situations that
make him suspect to committing immorality & worse, having that suspicion
confirmed.
⇒ Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge must freely & willingly
accept restrictions on conduct that might be burdensome for ordinary
citizens.
⇒ He committed grave injustice upon Castillo who sought his assistance in
expediting her husband’s intestate estate proceedings. He took advantage
of her helplessness & material deprivation. A more reprehensible
exploitation of women in this case since the offender took advantage of his
power & authority to commit injustice.
Holding: Guilty of immorality. Dismissed from service w/forfeiture of retirement
benefits & w/prejudice to reinstatement/appointment to gov’t office including
GOCCs.
Gutierrez, dissent as to the penalty:
1. The penalty is too harsh. Principles of fairness, equity & compassion should
apply.
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2. Fault cannot be solely attributed to Calanog. Evidence was mostly obtained
from Castillo & the “discreet” investigation by the NBI. The justice finds
Castillo as a woman w/ill-motive or cause to complain. She’s a liberated &
experienced woman, wise in the ways of the world, w/o qualms about
having illicit relations w/men. She filed a complaint when she sensed that
her financial expectations were not forthcoming & a life of relative ease &
comfort could not be assured. She was motivated by revenge & bad faith.
Calanog on the other hand, is only human & bound to yield to the cravings
of the flesh. Perhaps he realized that he had sinned & should sin no more.
Thus, he should be given a chance to change his ways. Castillo & Calanog
willingly entered into this kind of relationship & thus, they are both offenders
& victims.
3. His excellent record should be considered too. – public service, civic &
national affairs, dedication to the welfare of the members of the bench,
leadership traits, etc.
a. member, Judiciary Planning Development & Implementation Office
b. president, Philippine Judges Association
4. Former cases applied lighter penalties, considering the ff:
a. long years of dedicated & devoted service to the government
b. first offense & fault due to inexperience
c. wife/widow/children of respondent, in awarding full retirement benefits
5. Penalty should only be a fine of P40k w/most severe warning. For the sake
of Calanog’s bright future, fair name & honor of his family & the service he
can render to the judiciary & the nation, he should be allowed to redeem
himself.
TALENS vs. ARCEO [1996]
 Administrative Matter in the SC. Gross Misconduct.
 Atty. Jocelyn C. Talens-Dabon, Clerk of Court V of the San Fernando,
Pampanga, RTC filed a sworn-complaint charging Judge Hermin E. Arceo,
the Executive Judge thereat w/ gross misconduct (later amended to include
immorality)
 SC referred the case to Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos of the
CA for investigation, report, and recommendations, and at the same time,
placing Judge Arceo under preventive suspension for the duration of the
investigation
 After requests for postponement from both parties, hearings were held. In
due time, the Investigating Justice submitted her Report and
Recommendation with the following findings:
o 3 days after Talens-Dabon first reported at the Office of the Clerk of
Court, Atty. Elenita Quinsay, she was summoned by Arceo. It bothered
her that he looked at her from head to foot "as if he were undressing
her." Arceo told her that she was going to be detailed to his office as his
assistant, a situation which she did not welcome having heard of
Arceo’s reputation in the office as "bastos" & "maniakis" prompting her
to work for her transfer to Br. 45 under Judge Adelaida Ala-Medina.
o Talens-Dabon received Arceo’s E.O. requiring her to report to the office
of the Exec. Judge. She observed respondent to be rude and
disrespectful to her & the other court personnel. He talked in a loud
voice and shouted at them; used offensive words such as "walang
isip," "tanga"; told green jokes & stories; made harsh and negative
comments about court personnel in the presence of others.
o Whenever he had the opportunity he would make bodily contact
("chancing") with her & certain female employees. When complainant
introduced her fiance to him, Arceo asked her why she was playing
w/her forefinger, at the same time gesturing with his to signify sexual
intercourse.
o One time, Arceo kissed complainant, as well as Marilyn Leander, Ester
Galicia and other female employees. He also had a porn tape played at
his bidding, and brought and showed to the employees a picture which
when held in some way showed figures in coital position.
o Adding to complainant's apprehensions about Arceo’s sexual
predilection were the revelations of Marilyn Senapilo-Leander, a
stenographer of Branch 43 who testified that Arceo wrote her love
letters, kissed her, pointedly stared at her lower parts when she wore
tight pants and made body contacts ("chancing"). One time, Arceo
summoned her to his chamber and she found him clad only in briefs.
When she turned around to flee, respondent called after her saying
"why are you afraid. After all, this is for you." Leander confided to
Bernardo Taruc, the most senior employee there who advised her to
report the matter to Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo Suarez but
Leander expressed fear of retribution from respondent. When
Leander's wedding was set in late 1995, respondent taunted her by
saying "Ikay, ang dami ko pa namang balak sa 'yo, kinuha pa naman
kita ng bahay sa isang subdivision, tapos sinayang mo lang, tanga ka
kasi!"
o For the complainant’s part, one afternoon, Arceo summoned her & at
one point gave her a poem (a must read! ) and thereafter
approached her for kisses w/c turned into a dramatic struggle. Arceo
stopped and complainant angrily fled. After confiding to Taruc and to
Atty. Elenita Quinsay what happened, complainant went to the Hall of
Justice where Arceo was and verbally broached her request for
transfer. He acceded. Thus she brought her written request for transfer
for respondent's signature but he refused although he eventually
signed the memorandum transferring her later that morning.
o 2 days later, complainant, after consulting her family, reported the
matter to the police and filed with the Municipal TC of San Fernando,
Pampanga criminal cases for acts of lasciviousness, Violation of Anti-
Sexual Harrassment Law and this administrative case on the following
day.
o For his part, Arceo mostly denied complainant's allegations stating that
he was merely joking then and making his other acts seem lighter than
how complainant had narrated, even testifying that complainant herself
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asked him to make the poem. He believed she was merely retaliating
for 4 incidents that he either scolded or humiliated her.
 Based on the foregoing findings, the Investigating Justice made the
following conclusions:
(a) that there is sufficient evidence to create a moral certainty that Arceo
committed the acts complained of, especially the violent kissing
incident;
(b) that complainant & her witnesses are credible witnesses who have no
ulterior motive or bias to falsely testify against Arceo;
(c) that respondent's denials can not prevail over the weight and probative
value of the affirmative assertions of complainant & her witnesses,
(d) that respondent's poem has damned him, being documented proof of his
sexual intentions towards the complainant;
(e) that by filing her charges imputing to Arceo a crime against chastity & w/
her background as a lawyer & a court employee, complainant was well-
aware that her honor would itself be on trial;
(f) that it is unbelievable that complainant, a demure newly-married lady and
a religious person, would fabricate a story with such severe implications
on respondent's professional and personal life just to get even w/
respondent for an alleged simple scolding incident; and
(g) that by doing the acts complained of, Arceo has tempted the morals of
not only complainant but also the other court employees over whom he
exercised power & influence as Executive Judge.
 The Investigating Justice thereupon, recommended that Arceo be
dismissed from the service with prejudice to re-appointment in any other
government position and with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges
appertaining him, if any.
WON Arceo is guilty of gross misconduct and immorality
 YES. The Court held that the findings and recommendations of the
Investigating Justice are in truth adequately supported by the evidence and
are in accord with applicable legal principles. The Court agrees and adopts
such findings and recommendations.
 The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to
administer justice but also upon the perception and confidence of the
community that the people who run the system have done justice. Hence, in
order to create such confidence, the people who run the judiciary,
particularly judges and justices, must not only be proficient in both the
substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly, they
must possess the highest integrity, probity, and unquestionable moral
uprightness, both in their public and private lives. Only then can the people
be reassured that the wheels of justice in this country run with fairness and
equity, thus creating confidence in the judicial system.
 LEGAL BASES: Code of Judicial Conduct
o Canon I, Rule 1.01: A Judge should be the embodiment of
competence; integrity and independence.
o Canon II, Rule 2.00: A Judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities.
o Canon II, Rule 2.01: A Judge should so behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.
 Court has adhered and set forth the exacting standards of morality and
decency which every member of the judiciary must observe
 Dy Taban Hardware and Auto Supply Co. vs. Tapucar: Rationale why every
judge must possess moral integrity: The personal and official actuations of
every member of the judiciary must be beyond reproach and above
suspicion. The faith and confidence of the people in the administrations of
justice can not be maintained if a judge who dispenses it is not equipped
with the cardinal judicial virtue of moral integrity and if he obtusely
continues to commit affront to public decency. In fact, moral integrity is
more than a virtue; it is a necessary in the judiciary xxx Being the subject of
constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept
restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen. xxx A judge should personify integrity and exemplify honest public
service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of his
official duties and in private life should be above suspicion.
 Respondent has failed to measure up to these exacting standards. He has
behaved in a manner unbecoming of a judge and as model of moral
uprightness.
 His actuations, if condoned, would damage the integrity of the judiciary,
fomenting distrust in the system. Hence, his acts deserve no less than the
severest form of disciplinary sanction of dismissal from the service. His
actuations are aggravated by the fact that complainant is one of his
subordinates over whom he exercises control and supervision, he being the
executive judge.
 Respondent may indeed be a legally competent person but he has
demonstrated himself to be wanting of moral integrity. He has violated the
Code of Judicial Conduct which requires every judge to be the embodiment
of competence, integrity, and independence and to avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all activities as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
 SC Circular No. 13: Finally, all trial judges should endeavor to conduct
themselves strictly in accordance with the mandate of existing laws and the
Code of Judicial Ethics that they be exemplars in the communities and the
living personification of justice and the Rule of Law
Holding: Arceo is hereby DISMISSED from the service for gross misconduct &
immorality prejudicial to the best interests of the service, w/forfeiture of all
retirement benefits & w/ prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the gov’t,
including gov’t-owned & controlled corps.
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LIWANAG vs. LUSTRE [1999]

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JAVIER vs. DE GUZMAN [1990]
Facts:
• Disbarment proceedings on the ground of dishonorable conduct.
• December 7, 1987 – Efren Javier and his mother, Lolita, borrowed
P200,000 from Judge De Guzman with interest orally agreed upon at 10%.
They issued a UCPB check for P220,000. They didn’t have a checking
account and as such the drawer of the check was Donato (brother-in-law).
• De Guzman required them to sign a MOA which provides a 20% interest
per month, compounded monthly. It also stated that an appropriate charge
against BP 22 can also be filed against them.
• The check was subsequently dishonored and as such a suit for a “sum of
money and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment” was filed in the RTC of Makati. In this case, the Javiers were
ordered to pay a sum of P608,971.67 with 20% interest/penalty a month
compounded monthly beginning September 8, 1988 until fully paid and the
sum equal to 10% of the amounts due and recoverable as reimbursement
of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
• Judge De Guzman also filed 2 criminal complaints. (a) violation of BP 22
against Efren [acquitted] (b) Estafa againt the Javiers [dismissed]
• March 21, 1989 – filed an administrative charge against Pedro (father of
Efren)accusing him of having committed Estafa, dishonesty and conduct
unbecoming of a government official.
• Feeling harassed the Javiers filed an administrative charge against Judge
De Guzman
1. Usurious interest
2. Taking advantage of his position as RTC Judge of Makati
3. Resorting to filing a criminal complaint for violation of BP 22 against
Efren despite the knowledge that he was not the drawer.
4. Failed to reveal the true facts in the administrative charge against
Pedro.
WON Judge De Guzman is guilty of dishonorable conduct? YES
• First Charge
o Interest now legally chargeable depends upon the agreement of lender
and borrower. Interest charged on the loan was exorbitant. The
amount is being collected as a charge for the use of money and this
charge is blatantly out of proportion to the amount of money loaned.
• Second Charge
o He took advantage of his position as Makati RTC judge by filing the
collection case against the complainant in that Court. Instead of filing
the suit in QC where the Javier resides or in Manila where he resides
he took advantage of the waiver of venue stipulated in the MOA when
he chose to file the case in Makati.
o He has fallen short of what is expected of his as a Judge and officer of
the court among whose duties is to see to it that public confidence in
the honor, dignity, integrity and independence of the judiciary is not
eroded pursuant to Canon 3 and 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
• Third Charge
o Efren Javier was not the drawer of the check and it was his duty as a
Judge whose personal behavior should at all times, even in his
everyday life, be beyond reproach sp as to promote public confidence
in the dignity, honor, integrity, and independence of the judiciary, who
should endeavor to prevent the erosion of such confidence by
irresponsible or improper conduct – to disregard his personal animosity
towards the Javiers and to see to the forthright dismissal of the case.
He failed to complu with this duty when he instead saw to the
continuation of the prosecution of the case until it reached the RTC and
up to its termination thereat.
• Fourth Charge
o Naturally felt aggrieved by what had transpired and he undoubtedly
thought that it could be righted by filing the administrative case. No
malice or desire to harass.
• A judge’s official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety,
and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance
of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.
• The truism that a Judge’s official life cannot simply be detached or
separated from his personal existence and that upon a Judge’s attributes
depend the public perception of the Judiciary.
• Public confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper
conduct of Judges. A Judge must avoid all impropriety and the appearance
thereof. Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely
and willingly accept the restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen. A judge should personify judicial
integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a
judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be
above suspicion.
• A judge shall refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect
adversely on the court’s impartiality, interfere with the proper performance
of judicial activities, or increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely
to come before the Court. A judge should so manage investments and
other financial interests as to minimize the number of cases giving grounds
for disqualification.
Ruling: severely censured, with a stern warning that a repetition of the said acts
or similar acts in the future shall receive greater sanctions.
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TAHIL vs. EISMA [1975] Dismissed. But considering his admission, he is ADMONISHED to demonstrate
Hadjirul Tahil charged Municipal Judge of Parang, Sulu, Carlito Eisma of a greater degree of competence, intellectual courage and independence in the
dishonesty for failing to report to work contrary to his daily time record. discharge of his judicial duties to merit the confidence and support of the people.
Judge Felix B. Barbers instituted an “investigation, report and
recommendation”.
The findings were:
Eisma was regularly present except for certain days when he marked
himself absent, correspondingly his salary is deducted from. The alleged
falsification of his daily time and record had no credibility.
The charge was filed out of hatred, anger, and revenge. They were
friends but Tahil’s pleas weren’t granted. Then Barbers went into detail that the
Judges when they decide do not look at friends or foes. His actions must be
prescribed by law and whether he acted judiciously and not influenced.
Complainant became wrathful and wrath must be channeled properly or else
they lead to grave injustice.
Tahil once brought a bailbond for murder for his nephew Bakkal Ilahal
for Eisma to approve. But Eisma denied it because the bondsmen did not
appear in court. Barbers said that this was correct procedure and adds, that the
signature of the principal Ilahal was not on the bond. There was also no
verification if the taxes of the real properties offered as bond were paid. They
lack the procedural attaching of receipts or a certification of the municipal
treasurer.
Tahil also has a bone to pick when his motion to dismiss the illegal
possession of firearms filed for his nephew was denied. The denial was because
the evidence testified by Lt. Rodialo Gumtang was strong against the certified
true copies of documentary evidence given by Tahil. The documents’ validity and
originality were also in question, but is welcome to be presented in the trial. But
Barbers said that, this too was correct and Eisma acted legally.
But Eisma admitted to having granted bail to the accused, Ilahal for
murder upon the request of a congressman, even if he strongly believes on the
latter’s guilt. It is recommended that he be fined for a month’s salary and warned
against any repetition.

WON Eisma is liable for his admission to granting bail upon request of a
congressman. YES but he shouldn’t be fined in this case for lack of proper
charge and investigation.
The consti all persons before conviction are bailable except those charged with
capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. The court must determine the
weight of the evidence in a summary hearing pursuant to §7 Rule 114 of the
Rules.
When Eisma admitted to granting bail even if he thought the evidence was
strong, his act is reprehensible. But it is not clear on record if a summary
hearing was instituted. Nor was Eisma charged and investigated for this.
Therefore, the court lacks specific finding if Eisma committed Gadalej, and can’t
impose a fine against him.
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Armando CONTRERAS, complainant, vs. Judge Cesar M. SOLIS,
respondent [1996]
⇒ Background:
1. info was filed against Rufino Mamangon, a PNP member, for the
murder of Gener Contreras, complainant’s brother.
2. Case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, however, Mamangon was
not released from detention
3. Mamangon filed a petition for habeas corpus w/c was assigned to
Solis’ branch. Solis dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
4. Solis issued an order authorizing Mamangon’s release upon posting of
a P25k cash bond. Thus, Mamangon was released.
5. Solis canceled the cash bond & ordered Mamangon’s re-arrest.
⇒ Armando alleged that he met w/Solis who told him that Mamangon was
willing to pay P25k for his release and if he (Armando) can give him that
same amount, he would no longer release Mamangon. He assails Solis as
having gravely abused his discretion & authority in ordering Mamangon’s
release since in a habeas corpus petition, the judge can only determine
WON detention is legal. No authority either in ordering re-arrest.
⇒ Solis’ defense: No notice of order was typed since clerks were no longer
available. Thus, notice was made personally. Notice was done to afford
offended party opportunity to participate in the proceedings. Mention of
P20k pertained to how much will be spent by Contreras in litigation.
⇒ Findings of Deputy court Administrator, Zenaida Elepano: fine
recommended
1. Meeting w/Contreras was unnecessary.
2. No proof re attempted exploitation.
3. Invoked by Solis in deciding to dismiss the case for the first time: Rules
of Court, Rule 114, Sec. 3 and Rule 102, Sec. 14 - accused lawfully
committed before final conviction is entitled to bail upon payment of a
bond. If penalty’s death and the evidence of guilt is strong, bail may
not be allowed.
4. Provisions not applicable since petition for habeas corpus is a special
proceeding not covered by aforementioned proceedings & penalty for
murder during that time was only reclusion perpetua & not death.
5. Solis’ decisions were erroneous because:
a. Mamangon was not even applying for bail when he was released. .
b. No hearing was ordered to provide the prosecution an opportunity
to show that the evidence was strong so as to preclude bail.
c. Mamangon was not lawfully detained. He should have been
released outright w/o need for bail or bond.
d. He has no discretion to cancel the bail since none of the
requirements for canceling bail was present (surrender of accused,
proof of his death, acquittal/dismissal of case, grave misconduct).
Issues & Ratio:
1. WON Solis is guilty of extortion & dishonesty. – YES.
⇒ A reasonable mind would deduce that Solis’ act meant something more. In
mentioning the price, it seems as if he was insinuating that Contreras would
save on the expenses & be certain of result by spending same amount for
the judge.
⇒ Meeting & giving of advice: far from the behavior of members of the
judiciary, who should, at all times, avoid the slightest hint of anomaly &
corruption. A judge should avoid any suspicion of irregularity & he should
promote confidence in the judicial system. This is the price he has to pay for
joining the judiciary.
⇒ Pertinent statutes:
a. Code of Judicial Conduct (CJC), Canon I, Rule 1.01: judge should be
competent, w/integrity & independent.
b. Canon II, Rule 2.00: Avoid impropriety in all activities.
c. Rule 2.01: Promote public confidence in the integrity & impartiality of
the judiciary.
2. WON Solis is guilty of grave abuse of authority & grave misconduct &
incompetence. – NO.
⇒ Dismissal of petition for habeas corpus in the first instance was proper
since it would naturally undermine the functions of a co-equal branch of the
court where the case was still subject to appeal.
⇒ Application of Rule 102 Sec. 14 erroneous. Detention was no longer lawful.
It was illegal & untenable. He should have granted the petition for habeas
corpus and ordered release of Mamangon w/o requiring him to post bail.
⇒ He should have not ordered the re-arrest of Mamangon.
⇒ Erroneous application of the law can’t be the sole basis for disciplining him.
Disciplining a judge requires that he act unjustly contrary to law,
w/conscious & deliberate intent to do injustice, act fraudulently or corruptly,
or w/gross ignorance. He can’t be liable if application was done in good
faith. Presumption would that he issued those orders in good faith in the
absence of proof to the contrary.
⇒ Malicious intent was not proven. Unable to find a clear & definite connection
between an attempt at extortion & subsequent erroneous orders.
Holding: Solis guilty of committing acts of impropriety prejudicial to the integrity
of the Judiciary. Ordered to pay a fine of P2,000.00 w/warning that a repetition
of a similar conduct shall be dealt w/more severely.
LIM vs. SEQUIBAN [1991]
 Administrative Matter in the SC
 Arnulfo Lim, the clerk of Court of the MTC of Allen, Samar, & Pepito
Royandoyan, the process server of that court, charged their judge, Sixto
Seguiban (Judge), w/ coercion, oppression, injustice, harassment and gross
misconduct
 Lim claimed that Judge slapped him in public at the courtroom’s doorway
because Lim had given Royandoyan the latter’s paycheck for the 2nd
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quincena of Feb, 1986. Lim apparently forgot that Royandoyan’s temporary justifiable cause & in gross violation of his dignity as a person, Judge
appointment had expired in Jan. 1986 Seguiban is hereby dismissed from service w/o prejudice to payment of
 Royandoyan claimed that Judge forcibly & w/ vindictiveness took his benefits due him for the period of his service to the Gov’t. Temporary detail
paycheck for the 2nd quincena of Feb, 1986 as he & Danilo Dalucapas had of Judge Siervo is terminated & he is ordered to return to his regular station.
refused to sign an untruthful affidavit prepared by Judge to be used in a  With respect to the administrative charge of insubordination filed by Judge,
criminal case w/c Judge filed against his court stenographer, whom he had the 5 employees are admonished not to repeat the same under pain of
earlier jailed for contempt. Judge barred Royandoyan from entering the more severe penalty in the future.
office & court premises. Thereafter he forcibly took Royandoyan’s
paycheck. When Judge received the complaint, he advised Royandoyan &
Dalucapas to resign or transfer. The latter quit his job.
 As an aftermath of the quarrels of the Judge w/ his clerk of court, process
server and court stenographer, a petition signed by some 190 residents of
Allen and sent to the Chief Justice, asking for the ouster of Judge for being
harsh and rude to lawyers, insulting them in the presence of their clients,
branding his employees as thieves w/o justifiable cause, jailing a court
stenographer for a simple mistake, & for sadistic behavior toward everyone
in general
 Then court employees went on mass leaves of absence for various reasons
& excuses. All the court employees refused to work & picketed the court
premises demanding Judge’s resignation
 SC temporarily detailed Judge at the MTC in San Isidro while Judge Siervo
of that court was transferred to the MTC in Allen
 Judge filed a charge of insubordination against 5 court employees: Lim,
Crispulo Padida, Mita Sabordo, Libertad Suan, & Jaime Almasco. Latter
filed a countercharge of falsification against Judge
 The charges of Lim & Royandoyan were referred to Judge Cinco, Exec.
Judge of the RTC for investigation. Judge Cinco recommended the
dismissal of the charges “w/ the respondent being admonished to be more
restrained & prudent in his behavior”

WON Royandoyan and Lim’s charges should be entertained

 NO and YES. SC held that Royandoyan’s charge of vindictiveness against
Judge should be dismissed for lack of basis it having been established that
Royandoyan’s provisional appointment as process server had by Jan. 1986
expired, hence, he ceased to be employed in the Gov’t & was not entitled to
compensation thereafter
 Judge is guilty of oppression & gross misconduct in slapping his clerk of
court, Lim, in public & thereafter, harassing him to resign or transfer to
another office on account of this administrative charge w/c Lim filed against
him
 Judge’s notorious predisposition to use physical violence & intemperate
language against his subordinates reveals a marked lack of judicial
temperament & self-restraint, traits not only desirable, but indispensable, for
every judge to possess besides the basic equipment of learning in the law.
He has demonstrated his unfitness to be a judge as behavior such as he
has exhibited puts the judiciary in dispute
 Thus, for having acted in an oppressive, improper, & violent manner against
his clerk of court by slapping him on the face w/o sufficient provocation or
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SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN vs. ALBANO [1996]
FACTS:
 The SP issued Resolution 56, which calls for the immediate investigation
of Judge Efren Albano (MTC) for:
1. Controversial decisions
2. Habitual absences
3. Indiscretion
4. Inefficiency
5. Incompetence
 More specifically, Judge Albano is being accused of:
1. irregularities in the way he conducts preliminary investigation – he
dismissed 40 criminal cases after preliminary investigation without
transmitting the resolution and records to the provincial prosecutor
upon conclusion of the proceedings
2. archived 2 cases when police failed to arrest the suspects therein, in
violation of Section 5 of Rule 112 of the RoC
3. issued warrants of arrest without examining the complainant and his
witnesses in writing and under oath, in violation of Section 6(b) of
Rule 112 and Section 21, Article III of the Constitution
 Judge Cabebe, to whom the resolution was referred for investigation, report
and recommendation recommended the dismissal of the Judge Albano from
the service with forfeiture of benefits
 In his defense, Albano explained that:
1. The cases were dismissed at the preliminary examination stage
(to determine whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant of
arrest), never reached the preliminary investigation state, there
fore there was no need to transmit the records to the provincial
prosecutor
2. He cannot be held liable for improper disposition of cases under
preliminary investigation because the acts imputed against him
pertain to his judicial capacity that are not subject to
disciplinary power.
SC holding:
I. preliminary examination v. preliminary investigation: judge
demonstrated his gross ignorance of the proper procedure in
conducting preliminary investigation. Conduct of preliminary
investigation is an executive, not a judicial function, therefore
falls under the authority of the prosecutor.
 Preliminary examination – where judge determines whether there is
reasonable grounds to believe that the offense has been committed and
the accused is probably guilty, so that warrant of arrest may be issued
and accused held for trial = judicial function
 Preliminary investigation – where the complaint or information is read to
the accused after his arrest and he is informed of the substance of the
evidence against him, after which he is allowed to present evidence in his
evidence (if he so desires). Determines whether or not he should be held
for trial = executive function
 Presidential Decree 911 removed the preliminary examination state and
integrated it into the preliminary investigation proper (now, there is only
one stage)
 Section 5, Rule 112 specifies that the duty of the investigating judge
includes the transmission to the provincial or city fiscal of the resolution
and records of the case. Should the fiscal disagree with the findings,
fiscal’s ruling will prevail.
 The government was constrained to assign this function to the judges of
the MTC and MCTC because there are not enough fiscals and
prosecutors. When the judge performs a non-judicial function, he is
performing a ministerial duty (i.e. transmitting the resolution along with
the records of the case to the fiscal within 10 days) his findings are
subject to review by the fiscal, which, in turn, may be reviewed by
the Sec. of Justice.
 He has deprived the parties their statutory right of review that should be
conducted by the provincial prosecutor
II. Issuance of warrants for arrest: while the issuance of a warrant for
arrest is addressed to the sound discretion of the judge and will
not subject him to disciplinary action, provided there is no grave
abuse of discretion or malice, he is still expected to follow strictly
the procedure laid down in the rules regarding its issuance.
 He issued several warrants of arrest without examining the complainant and
his witnesses in writing and under oath, in violation of Section 6, Rule 112
of the RoC (examination in the form of searching questions and answers)
 He may have unnecessarily deprived the accused their liberty, however
momentary
Ruling: Constitution requires that all members of the judiciary must be of
proven competence, integrity, probity and independence. His constant violation
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of the constitutional requirement and stubborn adherence to improper

procedures (he’s been doing this since the start of his term as municipal judge)
makes him unfit to discharge functions of a judge
Dismissed from service with forfeiture of all leave credits and retirement
benefits and disqualification from reemployment in the national and local
governments, as well as in gov’t instrumentalities and GOCCs
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PILIPINAS BANK vs. TIRONA-LIWAG [1990]
Facts:
• Verified administrative complaint filed by Pilipinas Bank charging retired
associate justice Tirona-liwag with gross ignorance of the law, partiality,
serious misconduct and knowingly rendering unjust orders and decisions.
• September 28, 1983 – Rustica Tan filed with the RTC a complaint for
damages with injunction against petitioner Pilipinas Bank to stop an
extrajudicial foreclosure of a lot.
• October 21, 1983 – Pilipinas Bank (PB) filed a motion to dismiss but it was
denied by Judge Aguinaldo. Atty. Rodolfo, counsel of the defendant,
received a copy of the order.
• July 15, 1985 – plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendant in default for
failure to file an answer.
• July 31, 1985 – PB filed an opposition to declare the defendant in default
and a motion to admit answer. The answer was attached and copy was
furnished to Atty. Policarpio.
• October 14, 1985 – Judge Aguinaldo issued an order declaring the
defendant in default. Judge Aguinaldo noted that Atty. Vega, counsel of the
defendant, received a copy of the order denying the motion to dismiss.
• November 15, 1985 – Atty. Bernardino filed a notice of appearance as
counsel for the plaintiff in view of the withdrawal of Atty. Policarpio.
• March 6 1986 – plaintiffs’ counsel filed an urgent motion to submit additional
evidence  granted
• March 14, 1986 – presented evidence to establish total damage amounting
to P11,474,554
• August 13, 1986 filed an MFR for the order of October 14, 1985. They
alleged that they never received a copy of the motion, did not receive a
copy of the order, and that it was only via their investigative work that they
learned of the developments. Motion was signed by Atty. Gutierrez
• September 10, 1987 – Atty. Gutierrez filed an appearance.
• October 21, 1986 – Judge Aguinaldo issued an order setting aside the
default order and admitting the defendant’s answer.
• August 24, 1987 – Presiding judge is now Judge Tirona-Liwag. Issued an
order directing Atty. Vega who had reappeared as counsel for the defendant
to furnish the counsel for the plaintiffs a copy of the answer within five days.
Hearing of the case was set on October 7, 1987.
• November 9, 1987 – order that declared the defendant in default.
• December 9, 1987 – Atty Vega filed a "Manifestation with Motion for
Postponement" stating therein that he erroneously sent a copy of the
defendant's answer to Atty. Lumen Policarpio, the plaintiffs' former counsel
but "... is now attaching herewith xerox copy of his Answer to Atty.
Gutierrez, the present counsel actually handling the case for his
disposition." Atty. Vega also asked that the case be reset on January 19,
1988.
• Hearing was reset to March 16, 1988 but counsel of the defendant failed to
appear. Plaintiffs’ counsel manifested that he had not received a copy of
the answer. Judge Liwag directed the answer to be stricken off the record
and declare the defendant in default.
• MFR filed by defendant was denied.
• Judge Liwag rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. She also granted a
motion for execution. Issued a writ of execution to enforce the decision.
Decision was not enforced because of a restraining order issued by the CA.
Issue: WON Judge Liwag committed reversible error and as such should be
disciplined accordingly? NO
• PB asks the application of res ipsa loquitur. It states that the decision of the
judge speaks for themselves in the light of the surrounding circumstances.
• Default order – no partiality, serious misconduct, or rendering of unjust
order in its promulgation. The situation could have been better handled and
a more correct order issued with the same effect as a blanket grant of a
motion to declare defendant in default. No basis for imposing disciplinary
measures on this score alone.
• Judge Liwag's finding that her predecessor lifted the default order because
of a misrepresentation by the bank's counsel. The behaviour of the bank's
counsel in subsequent proceedings and the long delay in the resolution of
the case eventually led to the questioned judgment.
• Claim that damages awarded is excessive  It was error on the part of
Judge Liwag to award damages more than what was prayed for in the
complaint. As cited by the appellate court, Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules
of Court is very explicit in that a judgment against the party in default shall
not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for.
• Res ipsa loquitur cannot apply  In these res ipsa loquitur resolutions,
there was on the face of the assailed decisions, an inexplicable grave error
bereft of any redeeming feature, a patent railroading of a case to bring
about an unjust decision, or a manifestly deliberate intent to wreak an
injustice against a hapless party. The facts themselves, previously proven
or admitted, were of such a character as to give rise to a strong inference
that evil intent was present. Such intent, in short, was clearly deducible from
what was already of record. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine does not except
or dispense with the necessity of proving the facts on which the inference of
evil intent is based. It merely expresses the clearly sound and reasonable
conclusion that when such facts are admitted or are already shown by the
record, and no credible explanation that would negative the strong
inference of evil intent is forthcoming, no further healing to establish them to
support a judgment as to the culpability of a respondent is necessary.
• Facts negate any improper or evil motive and malice on the part of Judge
Liwag in issuing the orders as well as the decision.
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o that Judge Liwag never issued the orders in deliberate haste to railroad
the case in favor of the plaintiffs and to the prejudice of the defendant,
the complainant bank herein
o The orders were issued after deliberation and consideration of all
pleadings filed by the parties. The orders were not issued without
rhyme or reason. The orders clearly reveal all the antecedent facts as
regards the subject matter of the orders and the justifications for such
orders. Judge Liwag issued the questioned orders in apparent good
faith without any proof or showing of malice, corrupt motives or
improper consideration.
o Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper
consideration are sufficient defenses protecting a judicial officer
charged with ignorance of the law and promulgation of an unjust
decision from being held accountable for errors of judgment, on the
premise that no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in
the administration of justice can be infallible. The respondent Judge's
claim of belief in the legal soundness of his orders would have been
more plausible were it not for his perceptibly persistent refusal, despite
the opportunity afforded by several occasions, to hear the merits of the
defenses of complainant Solidbank and its co-defendants in their
motions to dismiss and answer, and the grossly excessive and
unconscionable amounts of damages he adjudged against said
defendants despite their preclusion from any participation in the trial
• Justice Liwag states that if what she considered her best efforts are found
wanting by the Supreme Court, then she tenders her sincerest apologies for
the lapses or errors she might have committed and assures us that they
were not done with malice or intent to cause injustice to anyone.
• Judge Liwag should have acted in a more professionally competent manner
to obviate the appearance or suspicion of misconduct in the issuance of
orders awarding huge sums of money against defaulting or recalcitrant
parties. If she were still on the bench, she would have been reprimanded
and warned to be more careful in the scrupulous observance of the rules.
Since she has retired, the above observations suffice.