PEOPLE vs.

BURGOS
US vs. DE LOS REYES & ESGUERRA
 STONEHILL VS. DIOKNO (from consti)
PARTIES:
Petitioners: Harry Stonehill, Robert Brooks, John Brooks, Karl Beck
Respondents-Prosecutors: Hon. Jose Diokno (Sec of Justice), Jose Lukban
(Acting Director, NBI), Special Prosecutors Cenzon, Plana, Villareal,
and Asst. Fiscal Maneses Reyes
Respondents-Judges: Judges Roan, Cansino, Clauag, Mencias, Jimenez
FACTS:Upon application of respondents-prosecutors, several judges
issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners
and/or the corporations of which they were officers to search the
persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses
and/or residences, and to seize documents and papers “showing all
business transactions” of petitioners as the subject of the offense in
violating “Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
Code, and the RPC.”
Petitioners alleged that the search warrants are null & void as
contravening the Constitution and Rules of Court (ROC) because:
1. they do not describe w/ particularity the documents, books, and
things to be seized
2. cash money not mentioned in the warrants were actually seized
3. they were issued to fish evidence against the petitioners in
deportation cases filed against them
4. searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner
5. the things seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the
warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with the law
Respondents-prosecutors alleged:
1. the search warrants are valid & issued in accordance with the law
2. the defects, if any were cured by petitioners’ consent
3. the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein
petitioners regardless of the alleged illegality of the searches
and seizures
The SC issued writ of prelim injunction prayed for. However, it was
partially lifted insofar as the papers, documents, and things seized
from the offices of the corporations are concerned; but, the injunction
was maintained as regards those seized in the residences of petitioners
herein.
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized may be split into 2
groups: 1) those found and seized in the offices of the corporations,
and 2) those seized in the residences of petitioners.
ON FIRST GROUP
Petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the
warrants and seizures made for the simple reason that said corporations
have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of petitioners. The legality of a seizure can be contested
only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein
may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the
documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of
the corporations, since the right to object to the admission of said
papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the
seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers
in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.
(Thus, the issues pertain to the second group…)
ISSUES:
1. WON the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures
are valid. NO
2. if invalid, WON said documents, papers, and things may be used in
evidence against petitioners. NO
RATIO:
Art III, Sec 1, par 3:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon a probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
ISSUE #1
Constitution requires: 1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the judge in the manners set forth; and 2)
the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these has been complied with in the contested warrants. They
were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical
persons named had committed a “violation of CB Laws, Tariff and Custom
Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and RPC.” In other words, no specific
offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments with
respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the
existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction
of competent proof that the party against who it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a
given provision of our criminal laws.
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out
completely one of the most fundamental Const’l rights, for it would
place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace
officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the
quoted provision – to outlaw the so-called general warrants.
The grave violation of the Consti made in the application for the
search warrants was compounded by the description made of the effects
to be searched for and seized. The warrants authorized the search for
and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of
petitioners, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or
illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the
petitioners and the corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly
contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights – that the
things to be seized be particularly described – as well as tending to
defeat its major objective, the elimination of general warrants.
ISSUE #2
The ruling in Moncado v. People’s court relied upon by respondents –
that illegally seized documents, papers and things are admissible in
evidence must be abandoned. This ruling is in line with American
common law rule that the criminal should not be allowed to go free just
“because the constable has blundered” upon the theory that the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures seized.
is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully Jose Burgos, Jr. used and marked Documents lawfully belonged to
obtained (i.e. action for damages against searching officer). as evidence some of the seized Burgos and he can do whatever he
documents and as such he is wants.
Most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and estopped from challenging the
eventually adopted the exclusionary rule (exclusion of illegally validity of the search warrant.
obtained evidence), realizing that this is the only practical means of
enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Sub-issues:

Mapp vs. Ohio: All evidence obtained by searches and seizures in Issue Ruling
violation of the Constitution, is, by that same authority, Alleged failure of the judge to Moot and Academic. Petitioners
inadmissible. conduct an examination under conceded that there was an
oath of the applicant and his examination.
The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the spirit of the witness
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Two search warrants pinpointed Typographical error. Two search
If the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to only one place where the warrants were applied for and
establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the petitioner was allegedly keeping issued because the purpose and
party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the articles intent were to search two
the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the distinct premises. Executing
fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent officer may look to the affidavit
evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is in the official court file to
probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the resolve an ambiguity on the
warrant. The only possible explanation for its issuance is the warrant as to the place to be
necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of the crime. But then, searched.
this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to Warrants were directed against Sule 12 sec. 2 provides personal
establish a probable cause. Burgos alone. Articles property that can be seized
belonging to co-petitioners were a. property subject of the
BURGOS VS. CHIEF OF STAFF also seized. offense
b. property stolen of
Facts: embezzled and other
⇒ Assails the validity of 2 search warrants issued under No. 19, Road proceeds or fruits of the
3, project 6 and 784 nits C&D, RMS building(office of Metropolitan offense
Mail and We Forum) were searched, office and printing machines, c. property used or intended
equipments, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used to be used as means of
in printing, publication and distribution of newspapers as well as committing an offense
numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature Does not require that the
alleged to be in the possession and control of Jose Burgos, Jr. property should be owned by the
(publisher and editor of the We Forum) person against whom the search
⇒ Petitioners are praying for the return of the articles seized to warrant is directed.
enjoin the use of the articles against Jose Burgos Jr. Real properties were seized. Davao Sawmill vs. Castillo:
⇒ Solgen manifested that they will not used the articles as evidence Article 415 (5) of the CC machinery which is movable by
until the final resolution of the legality and seizure of the provides that: machinery, nature become immobilized when
articles. receptacles, instruments or place by the owner of the
⇒ Note: the case was filed after more than 6 months after the search implements intended by the owner tenement, property or plant but
and seizure. of the tenement for an industry not so when placed by a tenant,
or works which may be carried on usufructuary or any person having
Contentions of the respondents and answers of the court: in a building or on a piece of only a temporary right, unless
land and which tends directly to such person acted as agents of
Respondents Supreme Court meet the needs of the said the owner. Petitioners here do
Should be barred by laches. Petitioners tried to obtain back industry or works are considered not claim that they are the owner
Laches is the failure or the articles seized by writing to immovable property. of the land.
negligence for an unreasonable the president (Marcos). The
and unexplained length of time extrajudicial efforts exerted by Issue: WON there was sufficient basis for the finding of probable cause
to do that which, by exercising the petitioners quite evidently upon which a warrant may validly be issued? NO
due diligence, could or should negate the presumption that they
have been done earlier. abandoned their right to the ⇒ Probable cause – facts and circumstance which would lead a
possession of the property reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
 offense are in the place sought to be searched. When a search
warrant is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in
connection with the publication of subversive materials the
application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a
specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive
material he has published or is intending to publish.
⇒ Mere generalization will not suffice
⇒ Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the
complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance
of a search warrant may be justified. The oath required must refer
to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the
petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to
convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the
affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence
of probable cause.
⇒ Search warrants that were issued were in the nature or general
warrants. Stanford vs. State of Texas: search warrants which
authorized the search for books, records, pamphlets, cards,
receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recording and other written
instruments concerning the Communist Parties of Texas and its
operations was declared void for being too general.
⇒ Premises was padlocked and sealed which resulted to discontinuance
of publication. Such closure is in the nature of previous
restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press
guaranteed under the fundamental law and constitutes a virtual
denial of the freedom to express themselves in print.
PEOPLE vs. BAES
 EVANGELISTA vs. HON. BAES
This involves five administrative complaints. What is relevant to us is
the first charges in the second (Basuan v. Baes) & third complaints
(Masa v. Baes) regarding knowingly rendering an unjust judgment (Art.
204, RPC)
Basuan v. Baes: First charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment
 One of the plaintiffs in a CAR Case, Ferardo Baeuan, failed to
appear at pre-trial, his co-plaintiff, Paciano Basuan, appeared.
 For failure of Ferardo to appear, Judge Baes ordered dismissal of
entire case, thus affecting also Paciano.
Held: Baes not guilty of RPC A204
 SC held that although order is indeed erroneous, but the motivation
for its issuance excludes malice or a deliberate attempt on the
part of the respondent to cause injustice.
 The rule is that a judicial officer, when required to exercise his
judgment or discretion, is not liable criminally for any error he
commits provided he acts in good faith, and that he may be held
liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment only if it is
shown beyond cavil that the judgment is unjust as being contrary to
law or as not supported by the evidence, and the same was rendered
with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.
 There being good faith on the part of the respondent judge in the
issuance of the questioned order, the charge should be dismissed.
Masa v. Baes: First charge of knowingly, or by reason of inexcusable
negligence or ignorance, rendering unjust orders.
 In a CAR Case, Judge De Guzman authorized landholder Jose Tan Kapoe
to eject his tenant Silvestre Masa. Upon Masa’s motion to
reconsider, Judge Macalino, then the presiding judge, ordered the
clerk of court to furnish a copy of the motion to Tan Kapoe's
counsel. No opposition was interposed so Judge Macalino
reconsidered & thereafter denied the petition for ejectment of Masa
and adjudging a leasehold system of tenancy between Tan Kapoe and
Masa. After 3.5 years, Judge Macalino, on petition of Masa,
rendered a supplemental decision fixing the rental on the holding.
 Tan Kapoe filed MFR of the supplemental decision AND denial of the
petition for ejectment. Judge Baes granted Tan Kapoe's MFR, on
grounf that Judge De Guzman's prior decision had become final &
executory allegedly since the MFR granted by Judge Macalino was
fatally defective for lack of proof of service.
Held: Baes not guilty of Art. 204
 Judge Baes' justification for his orders was rejected in Masa vs.
Baes. But while Judge Baes acted in abuse of discretion in issuing
the orders complained of, it doesn’t necessarily follow that he
acted in bad faith or that his abuse of discretion signifies
ignorance of the law in his part. Abuse of discretion by a trial
court does not necessarily mean ulterior motive, arbitrary conduct
or willful disregard of a litigant's rights.
Holding: Judge Baes not guilty of the charge of knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff & appellant, vs. EDUARDO ABESAMIS,
defendant and appellee [1953]
o April 1, 1950: an information was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of
Isabela against Abesamis for the crime of Direct Bribery. Abesamis,
the Justice of Peace of Echague & Angadanan, Isabela, was accused
of demanding & receiving P1,100.00 from Marciana Sauri for the
dismissal of the Robbery in Band w/Rape case against Emiliano
Castillo (Sauri’s son) pending in his court.
o Lower court dismissed the case on the grounds that the facts in the
information do not sufficiently charge the crime of Direct Bribery.
Issue: WON Abesamis is guilty of Direct Bribery. – NO.
Ratio:
1. RPC Art. 210, Direct Bribery punishes:
a. a public officer who agrees to perform an act constituting a
crime in connection w/the performance of his official duties,
in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present
received by such officer, personally or through the mediation
of another.
b. a public officer who accepts a gift in consideration of the
execution of an act w/c does not constitute a crime. It
provides different penalties for executed and non-executed
acts.
2. Crime charged doesn’t fall under #1a because dismissal of a case
does not necessarily constitute a criminal act. It may have been
a proper action.
3. It may fall under #1b, but the information failed to allege
whether the act was executed or not. Thus, the information is
defective in that aspect.
4. But the information may be sustained as a sufficient indictment
for Indirect Bribery under RPC Art. 2111. The allegations of fact
rather than the denomination of the offense determine the crime
charged, thus information should not have been dismissed.
Holding: Lower Court order REVOKED. Case REMANDED to the court of
origin for further proceedings.
1
Art. 211. Indirect bribery. — The penalties of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods, and public censure shall be imposed upon any public
officer who shall accept gifts offered to him by reason of his office. (As
amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 872, June 10, 1985).
FORMILLEZA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
PEOPLE vs. RODIS, ET AL.
 AGULLO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
⇒ Elvira Agullo was convicted for malversation of public funds. The
information against her provided that she wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, convert and misappropriate for her own personal
use and benefit the public funds she had in her possession in the
amount of Twenty Six Thousand Four Hundred Four Pesos and 26/100
(P26,404.26), belonging to the government of the Republic of the
Philippines, to the damage and prejudice of the latter
⇒ Agullo pleaded not guilty. She admits the amount that was lost but
she advances the defense of a fortuitous event. On the day that
she was carrying the amount, she suffered from a stroke and was
then brought to the hospital by a Metro Tacloban aide. Agullo
maintains that the money could have lost or stolen.
⇒ Aside from establishing that there was a cash shortage the
prosecution did not present any other evidence that Agullo used the
money for her personal benefit.
⇒ The Sandiganbayan undoubtedly disregarded or overlooked certain
evidence of substance which, to a large extent, bear considerable
weight in the adjudication of petitioner’s guilt or the affirmation
of her constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven
otherwise.
⇒ Upon thorough scrutiny of the evidence adduced by both prosecution
and defense, we hold that petitioner Agullo has satisfactorily
overcome and rebutted by competent proof, the prima facie evidence
of conversion so as to exonerate her from the charge of
malversation. To this end, petitioner presented evidence that
satisfactorily prove that not a single centavo of the missing funds
was used for her own personal benefit or gain.

Issue: WON Agullo can be convicted for malversation of public funds?

NO

⇒ Evidence presented against petitioner in this case do not fulfill

the test of moral certainty and may not be deemed sufficient to
support a conviction. Records reveal that evidence for the
prosecution consisted solely of the Report of Cash Examination,
dated 14 July 1986, which was presented by the prosecution to prove
the cash shortage in the amount of P26,404.26, on petitioner
Agullo’s accountability as Disbursing Officer of the then MPWH.
Likewise, the prosecution presented the Letter of Demand[27] dated
14 July 1986 signed by Auditing Examiner III Ignacio Gerez.
⇒ The prosecution opted not to present a single witness to buttress
its bid for conviction and relied merely on the prima facie
evidence of conversion or presumption of malversation under Article
217, paragraph (4) of the Revised Penal Code:

ART. 217. Malversation of public funds or property—Presumption of

malversation—
X X X “The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming
any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon
demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie
evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal
uses.”

⇒ Court has consistently ruled that the presumption of conversion in

Article 217, paragraph (4) of the Revised Penal Code is — by its
very nature — rebuttable. The presumption under the law is not
conclusive but disputable by satisfactory evidence to the effect
that the accused did not utilize the public funds or property for
his personal use, gain or benefit.
⇒ If the accused is able to present adequate evidence that can
nullify any likelihood that he had put the funds or property to
personal use, then that presumption would be at an end and the
prima facie case is effectively negated. The absence of funds is
not due to the personal use by the accused, the presumption is
completely destroyed; in fact, the presumption is never deemed to
have existed at all.
SAYSON vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
PELIGRINO vs. PEOPLE
 Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan [2001]
 April 4, 2001: Ombudsman filed 8 informations against Estrada w/the
SB for the following violations:
1. violation of Anti-Plunder Law
2. violation of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act
3. violation of the Code of Conduct & Ethical Standards for Public
Officers & Employees
4. perjury
5. illegal use of alias
 April 11, 2001: Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion to remand the case
to the Ombudsman for lack of preliminary investigation,
reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses and for an opportunity
to prove lack of probable cause
 April 25, 2001: SB found probable cause to issue Estrada’s warrant
of arrest. MFR filed by Estrada, denied.
 June 14, 2001: Estrada moved to quash information on his alleged
violation of the anti-plunder law (RA 7080 as amended by RA 7659)
due its unconstitutionality based on the following grounds:
1. vagueness
2. it dispenses w/the reasonable doubt standard in criminal
prosecutions
3. it abolishes the element of mens rea (criminal intent) in
crimes already punishable under the RPC
He alleges that these are violations of his fundamental rights to
due process & to be informed of the nature & cause of the
accusation against him. In particular, he assails the validity of
Sections 1 par. D, 2 and 4 of the statute. Plunder is defined in
the statute as the act of any public officer by himself or in
connivance w/members of his family, relatives
(affinity/consanguinity), business associates, subordinates, or
other persons of amassing/accumulating/acquiring ill-gotten wealth
thru a combination or series of overt/criminal acts in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least P50M. It shall not be
necessary to prove each & every criminal act, it being sufficient
to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt criminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme/conspiracy. (see
pages 428-429 for complete text of provisions)
Issues & Ratio:
1. WON the Anti-Plunder Law is vague. – NO
 The burden of proof here lies with the petitioner however, he has
failed to discharge his burden & overcome the presumption of
constitutionality of the statute.
 The standards here are ascertainable and the parameters are well
defined. Thus, accused will be able to determine the nature of his
violation.
 Sec. 2 of the law enumerates the elements of the violation: a)
public officer offender; b) combination/series of given criminal
acts; c) aggregate amount of at least P50M.
 The amended info in this case is detailed enough as it clearly
provides that Estrada, then president of the Philippines, amassed
ill-gotten wealth amounting to P4,907,804,173.17 (P4B+).
 Corpus Juris Secundum: A law is not unconstitutional merely because
the general terms were not defined.
 Mustang v. Lumber: Words in a statute must be interpreted in their
natural, plain & ordinary acception, thus: (definitions based on
the deliberations of the bicameral Committee on Justice w/c drafted
the Anti-Plunder Law).
a. combination: two acts under different categories
b. series: two or more acts under one category
c. pattern: at least a combination or a series
 A statute is vague only when one has to guess its meaning.
Overbreadth argument is only applicable in free speech cases since
they involve the “chilling effect” on protected speech.
2. WON the Anti-Plunder Law eliminates the need to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt by requiring that only a patter is needed to
convict an accused. – NO
 Estrada assails Sec. 4 of the statute w/c provides that it shall
not be necessary to prove each & every criminal act as long as a
pattern is established beyond reasonable doubt.
 However, Estrada has to bear in mind that the accused in whatever
case still enjoys the presumption of innocence.
 The prosecution still needs to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt
but not in all instances. Proving a pattern of at least 2 offenses
amounting to at least P50M would be sufficient proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt to convict the accused. This pattern can be
inferred from the series or combination of offenses.
 Besides, even if Sec. 4 is found unconstitutional, the validity of
the entire statute will not be affected by virtue of the
separability clause (if one part is invalid, the rest of the
provisions will not be affected).
3. WON the statute is malum in se. – YES
 It is malum in se thus requiring proof of criminal intent.
 Sec. 2 of the statute applies mitigating & extenuating
circumstances found in the RPC. This clearly proves that criminal
intent is needed for a conviction of plunder since one’s intent
determines his degree of responsibility (WON mitigating or
extenuating circumstances should be appreciated, etc.)
 RA 7659 as cited in People vs. Echegaray declared plunder as a
heinous offense implying that it is malum in se. Crimes mala in se
are characterized by punishment of acts w/c are inherently
immoral/wrong & it doesn’t matter that such acts are punished in
special laws (w/c would have generally characterized them as mala
prohibita).
Holding: Anti-Plunder Law is constitutional. Petition dismissed.
Some notes from Sir Te’s discussion:
 Combination: 2 acts under different categories done together/at the
same time
 Series: 2 or more acts (doesn’t matter if they’re the same act)
under one category done one after the other
 Sec. 4 is unconstitutional because:
1. it removes the need to prove each & every criminal act
2. it removes the presumption of innocence unless otherwise proven
by reasonable doubt
3. it makes it easier to convict an accused since there’s no need
to prove all criminal acts
4. it abolishes the requirement of proving guilt beyond reasonable
doubt
 SC: plunder, being inherently wrong even if a special law punishes
it, is malum in se thus criminal intent must be proven. SC had to
say this to save Sec. 4 w/c is unconstitutional.
 SC made it more difficult for the State to prove plunder since the
prosecution now has to prove criminal intent. Note that criminal
intent is not presumed. It has to be proven except in murder. 