Maria Alicia LEUTERIO, petitioner vs.
COURT OF APPEALS & Heirs of Benitio acknowledging Alicia as his natural child because we believe that a public
Leuterio, respondents [May 23, 1991]
Facts:
Ana Maglanque used to be one of Pablo Leuterio’s domestic servants & later his
mistress. They eventually married on Feb. 25, 1950.
June 15, 1950: Pablo died in San Luis, Pampanga leaving behind a large estate
consisting of several parcels of land w/c were all left w/Ana who took
possession of & administered the estate.
Patrocinio Apostol, Pablo’s niece filed a petition w/CFI Pampanga for her
appointment as Ma. Alicia Leuterio’s guardian (then 16 yrs old) alleged to be
the legitimated daughter of Pablo
Benito Leuterio, Pablo’s bro (full blood) filed a petition in the same court
praying for his appointment as administrator. He alleged that Pablo died w/o a
will & he was survived by Benito & their other siblings as well as the
descendants of their siblings. He further claimed that Pablo died a widower &
alleged legitimated daughter was w/o basis in fact & law.
Ana & Alicia (represented by Patrocinio) opposed. After hearing, Ana was
appointed administratrix.
Alicia’s claims:
1. she’s the natural daughter of Ana & Pablo since she was conceived at the
time when her parents were not disqualified by any impediment to marry
each other.
2. she presented sufficient evidence to merit judicial declaration of
compulsory recognition of her status as Pablo’s natural child
3. she was legitimated by her parents’ marriage 9 yrs after her birth
Alicia amended her petition, further claiming that since her birth up to the time
of Pablo’s death, she enjoyed an uninterrupted possession of the status of a
natural child of Pablo & Ana. She presented “indubitable writings” wherein Pablo
allegedly expressly acknowledged her as his daughter.
Probate Court: dismissed petition for lack of basis & merit. Evidence presented
were incompetent, spurious & unpersuasive.
CA: affirmed probate court’s decision. Findings:
1. Alicia’s certificate of record of birth was spurious.
2. It did not give credence to the testimonies of witnesses Gervacio Bagtas &
Paula Punzalan (teachers in Alicia’s school) & Don Sotero Baluyut.
3. Rejected the claim that Alicia has been in possession of the status of
natural child before & after her parents’ marriage.
4. Birth & baptismal certificates and photos don’t bear Pablo’s signature
expressing his acknowledgment of Alicia.
5. Alicia was born, reared & raised in Pablo’s house. Pablo had no child
w/previous wife & it’s normal for him to look upon Alicia as if she were his
own daughter.
6. There’s an absolute lack of document/writing such as receipts of payment
of school fees in the name of Pablo, signatures in school cards, letter to
relatives/friends recognizing Alicia as his daughter despite lapse of 9 yrs fr
Alicia’s birth to his death.
ISSUE: WON Alicia is the legitimated daughter of Pablo & Ana.
HELD: NO. CA decision affirmed.
RATIO:
1. According to Alicia’s counsel, desired relief is: not voluntary acknowledgment in
the sense that the decedent didn’t execute a pub document expressly
document is one of the evidence of compulsory acknowledgment.
2. Voluntary: acknowledgment of a child by the father.
3. Compulsory: instituted by child against the father to compel dad to
acknowledge him as a natural child, tolerated by dad & justified by dad’s direct
acts, does not of itself constitute evidence of acknowledgment that he is so in
effect. Evidence to compel dad to acknowledge child. Should be w/in time
prescribed by old CC Art. 137.
4. Applicable laws:
a. Father of a natural child may recognize it in 2 different ways: by voluntary
recognition (CC Art. 131) or by an involuntary recognition enforced by
either a civ or crim’l action (CC Art. 135)
b. Voluntary recognition may be made: a) in the record of births, b) by will, c)
by any other pub instrument. (CC Art. 131)
c. Involuntary recognition may be made by: a)an incontrovertible paper
written by parent expressly recognizing his paternity, b) giving child status
of a natural child of father justified by direct act of the dad or his family,
[CC Art. 135] and c)a criminal action for rape, seduction or abduction [RPC
Art. 440, par. 2]
5. Recognition must be precise, express & solemn (Lim v. CA) whether voluntary
or compulsory (Baron v. Baron).
6. This being a case of involuntary/compulsory recognition, lower courts held that
petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence needed to prove dad’s
involuntary recognition of child.
7. CC Art. 283 provides that recognition may be compelled if child has in his favor
any evidence or proof that defendant is his father. CA ruled that it’s not
retroactive whereas petitioner contends that it is. It’s actually immaterial
considering that both the Probate Court & the CA rejected in its entirety
petitioner’s evidence as insufficient, unpersuasive & spurious.
UYGUANGCO v. CA
178 SCRA 684 (1989)
Facts:
Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975.
He left his wife and 4 legitimate children (petitioners) some properties which they
divided among themselves
Graciano Bacjao Uyguangco filed a complaint for partition against the petitioners,
alleging that as the illegitimate son of the deceased and Anastacia Bacjao, he
mustn’t be left out of the extrajudicial settlement of the estate.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the case on the groung that Graciano could not prove
his alleged filiation having none of the documents mentioned in Art. 278, CC—
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic
writing. Neither may he resort to Art. 285, CC which provides that the action for the
recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the
presumed parents, except in certain case. Because he as already an adult when his
alleged father died and his claim did not come under the exceptions, he could not
resort to Art. 285.
He however insists that he has right to show under Art. 283 that he is “in
continuous possession of the status of a child of his alleged father by the direct acts
of the latter or of his family.”
Issue: WON Graciano may adequately prove filiation
NO. Present petition granted & complaint for partition dismissed
The Civil Code provisions they invoke have been superseded, or at least modified
by the Family Code which is now controlling
Since illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children (Art 175), Graciano may establish
his filiation by the means given in Art. 172. Thus while he has no record of birth
appearing in the civil registrar or a final judgment or an admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned, he insists that he has nevertheless been “in an open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child,” which is admissible as
evidence of filiation under Art. 172.
As proof to this open and continuous possession—he claims that he lived with his
father from 1967 til 1973, received support from him, used the name Uyguangco
without objection, a special power of attorney executed in his favor by Apolinario’s
wife, and another one by Suplcio Uyguangco, shared in the profits of the copra
family business of the Uyguangco’s and was even given a share in his deceased
father’s estate as found in the addendum to the original extrajudicial settlement
concluded by the petitioners
However, since his father has already died, his action is now barred as Art. 172
specifically requires that when the action is based on other proofs of filiations such
as open and continuous possession, the action must be brought during the lifetime
of the alleged parent.
Rationale for the rule: It is a truism that unlike legitimate children who are
publicly recognized, illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy
and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. Who then can be
sure of their filiation but the parents themselves? But suppose the child claiming to
be the legitimate child of a certain person is not really the child of the latter? The
putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the child’s
filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead.
Graciano’s complaint is based on his contention that he is the illegitimate child of
Apolinario, whose estate is the subject of the partition sought. If this claim can no
longer be proved in an action for recognition, with more reason should it be
rejected in the said complaint, where the issue of Graciano’s filiation is being raised
only collaterally.
However, the Court expressed the hope that the parties will arrive at some kind of
rapprochement based on fraternal and moral ties that will allow Graciano an
equitable share in the disputed estate.
Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals
Petitioner: Bienvenido Rodriguez, putative father
Respondent: Court of Appeals and Clarito Agbulos, alleged natural child seeking
compulsory recognition by petitioner
Facts:
 On Oct. 15, 1986, CLARITO AGBULOS filed an ACTION FOR COMPULSORY
RECOGNITION AND SUPPORT against BIENVENIDO RODRIGUEZ
 Clarito presented his mother, Felicitas Agbulos Haber as his witness
 Felicitas was asked by counsel to reveal the identity of the plaintiff’s father
 Counsel for Rodriguez raised a timely objection, which the court sustained
 Clarito filed a petition in the SC for review questioning said order, which the SC
referred to the CA
 CA allowed the testimony of the mother of the natural child concerning the
identity of the putative father
 PETIONER’S CONTENTION: Rodriguez appealed this decision of the CA on the
grounds that such a revelation is prohibited by Article 280 of the Civil Code:
When the father or the mother makes the recognition
separately, he or she shall not reveal the name of the
person with whom he or she had the child; neither shall she
state any circumstance whereby the other party may be identified.
 RESPONDENTS’ CONTENTION: Clarito claims that his mother should be allowed
to testify as to the identity of his father based on:
1. Article 283(4) of the Civil Code: The father is obliged to recognize the
child as his natural child… (4) when the child has in his favor any
evidence or proof that the defendant is his father
2. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court: A witness can
testify only to those facts which he knows of his own knowledge,
that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as
otherwise provided in these rules
Issue: W/N the testimony of the mother of a natural child as to the identity of the
father is admissible in actions for compulsory recognition. YES.
PROHIBITION IN ARTICLE 280 AGAINST THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE
FATHER OR MOTHER OF A CHILD APPLY ONLY IN VOLUNTARY AND NOT IN
COMPULSORY RECOGNITION.
Ratio:
 Navarro v. Bacalla is not in point, because the testimony of the mother was
admitted because the defendant offered no objection to the mother’s testimony
and accepted the finding of the trial court that he was the father of the plaintiff.
In fact the Court said that:
We are not ruling whether the mere testimony of the mother, without
more, is sufficient to prove the paternity of the child. Neither are we
ruling on the scope of Article 280, New Civil Code, which enjoins the
mother in making a separate and voluntary recognition of a child from
revealing the name of the father, specifically, as to whether the
mother’s testimony identifying the father is admissible in an action
to compel recognition if and when a timely objection to such oral
evidence is interposed.
 Infante v. Figueras is not in point either because testimony was rendered
inadmissible under procedural laws existing at that time, which was the Law of
Bases
 However, SC still concluded that testimony is admissible on the following bases:
1. Relative position of the progenitor of Article 280, which is Article 132 of the
Spanish Civil Code, with the other provisions on acknowledgement of natural
children of the same Code.
Art. 129: A natural child may be acknowledged separately or jointly by the
mother and the father.
 Art. 130: In case acknowledgment is made by only one parent, it shall be
presumed that the child is a natural one if, at the time of the
conception, the parent acknowledging is legally competent to
contract marriage.
Art. 131: Acknowledgment of a natural child must be made in the record of
birth, in a will, or in some other public document.
Art. 132: When acknowledgment is made separately, name of the other parent
shall not be revealed by the parent acknowledging it…
 In the Civil Code, only one new provision separates Art 280 (equivalent of Art.
132) and the equivalent of Art. 131
 If the sequencing were maintained, it becomes clear that the prohibition
against the identification by the parent acknowledging of the identity of the
other parent refers to voluntary recognition provided for in Art 278
(equivalent of Art. 131).
2. Senator Arturo Tolentino is of the opinion that prohibition does not apply in an
action for compulsory recognition. “When a recognition has been made by one
parent, the name of the other parent may be revealed in an action by the
child to compel such other parent to recognize him also.”
3. Justice Eduardo Caguioa also believes that prohibition refers merely to the act
of recognition. “It does prevent inquiry into the identity of the other party in
case an action is brought in court to contest recognition on the ground
that the child is not really natural because the other parent had no
legal capacity to contract marriage.”
4. Traditionally, free inquiry into the paternity was allowed by French royal
decrees. However, it was forbidden by the French Revolutionary Government,
which was passed on to the French Civil Code and, subsequently, to the
Philippine Civil Code. Today, there is no similar prohibition in the present
Family Code, which exhibits the intention of the legislative authority to
uphold the Code Commission’s stand to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of the paternity of illegitimate children. This is also
exhibited by Art. 172 which allows filiation to be proven by “any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.”
Jose Aruego, Jr. et al., petitionrs v. CA and Antonia Aruego, respndnts.
Jose M. Aruego, a married man, had an ardent relationship with Luz M. Fabian from
1959. Out of this relationship, Antonia and Evelyn were born. On March 30, 1982 he
died.
Minor respondent Antonia & her alleged sister Evelyn filed a complaint for
Compulsory Recogntn & Enforce’t of Successnl Rights before Manila RTC on 7
Mar 1983. On the basis of their open and continuous possession of the status of
illegitimate children, they prayed to be:
declared illegitimate children of Aruego, Sr.
recognized and acknowledged as compulsory heirs of Aruego Sr. by the
defendants (son and five minor children of Gloria Torres)
Respondents stated that Aruego Sr. verbally recognized them among family friends,
allowed them to use his surname and shouldered their educational expenses, too.
He attended to their school problems and allowed them to visit him in his office
every now and then. RTC declared Antonia, the younger of the two sisters, as an
illegitimate daughter of Aruego, Sr. Defendants were ordered to recognize her,
deliver her share in estate of Aruego, Sr. (1/2 of portion of share of legitimate
children).
Petitioners filed MFR but it was filed out of time. CA also refused to grant them a
petition for prohibition or preliminary injunction.
Petitioners allege that since EO 209 or FC took effect on 3 Aug 1988, CA decided
the claim of illegitimacy in a way not in accord with law. They argue that A175
should be applied.
WON provisions of the FC should be applied to the case of compulsory
recognition and…
such application would prejudice or impair any vested right of
private respondent that FC should not be given retroactive effect.
NO. Giving FC retroactive effect and at the same time prejudicing or impairing
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the CC or other laws is prohibited by
Article 256 of the FC.
Tayag V CA – the fact of filing of the petition to claim inheritance on the basis of
open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child already vested
in the petitioner her right to file it and to have it proceed to final adjudication in
accordance with the law in force at the time. Such right can no longer be prejudiced
or impaired by the enactment of a new law. Such right was vested to her by the fact
that she filed her action under CC regime.
As such, A175 can’t be applied since it will adversely affect a right of the private res
and consequently, of the minor child she represents insofar as A175 states that
illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in an action brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent. SC held then that A285 which states that
such action may be brought before the expiration of the 4-years from attaining the
age of majority if father or mother died during inority of the child.
Jison v. CA
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of CA. 1998
FACTS:
At the age of 39 yrs old, Monina Jison brought a petition for recognition as an
illegitimate child of petitioner Francisco Jison. She presented 11 witnesses 1 plus
documentary evidence (i.e. birth cert, baptismal cert, school records, various notes
and letters2 written by Francisco’s relatives recognizing her as his child).
1
These included houseboys of the Jisons, accountants of their household/firm Nelly’s Garden and even the brother of Pansay, Lope Alomar,
who used to work for Francisco. He testified that Pansay, during her 1 st mo of pregnancy, confided in him that Francisco impregnated her. He
then confronted Francisco who reassured him that he would support Pansay and her daughter. Nonetheless, Lope resigned thereafter in his
disgust. Other testimonies manifested that Francisco would call Monina “hija” or would respond w/ a smile to her calling him daddy.
2
Such letters contained letters of introduction and recommendation letters made by relatives of Francisco and his wife introducing her as
“being reputedly the daughter of Francisco Jison.”
Her version of the story is that Francisco was then married to Lilia Lopez Jison when
the former impregnated her mother Esperanza “Pansay” Amolar, who was then
employed as nanny of the couple’s daughter, Lourdes. As a result, Monina was born
on Aug 6, 1946 in Dingle, Iloilo and since childhood, she had enjoyed the
continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of Francisco by his acts and
that of his family. She further alleged that her father, whom she calls Daddy, gave
her support and spent for her education (from prep school to her Master’s degree,
followed by her CPA training, and eventually, as a Central Bank examiner). At the
start of each semester, as she recalled, she would show to her father that she was
enrolled and her father would ask her to first canvass prices before giving her
money. Her transcript of records showed Francisco listed as her Parent/Guardian.
She further noted that it was her father who paid for the burial expenses for her
mother’s death. And it was through filiation w/ her father that she previously was
able to seek employment at Miller & Cruz in Bacolod City. She was able to name the
members of the Jison household as well as the staff in her father’s office. She also
claimed knowing the 3 children of Francisco and Lilia. The last time she saw her
father was when she sought his blessings to get married.
In sum, Monina’s evidence and testimonies showed that (a)she was close w/
Francisco’s relatives, (b)she received PhP15 as monthly allowance from her father
coursed through the accountants of his ofc, (c)her filiation was known in the Jison
office & household, (d)her allowance was not recorded in the books but in a
separate cash book because it had to be hidden from Mrs Jison and children, and
(e)that she even asked for a Christmas gift from her godfather, Don Vicente, father
of Mrs Jison.
Monina also declared that in Manila, she met with her father and told him she
resigned because she wanted to go to Spain to study and thus needed money in the
amount of PhP25K for her education. However, Francisco refused as she could not
speak Spanish and would not be able to find a job. Because of this, the two
quarreled but after which, Francisco hugged her, calmed her down and asked her to
return to Bacolod City where he would give her the money. Monina returned to
Bacolod by plane, using a Filipinas Orient Airways plane ticket w/c Francisco gave.
She called Mr. Cruz, then Atty Tirol as evidenced by PLDT long distance toll cards w/
annotations by the phone co at the back reading “charged and paid under the name
of Frank Jison.” However, she learned from Atty Tirol that before Mr Cruz would
turn over the money promised to her, she would first have to sign an affidavit
stating that she was not Francisco's daughter. She disputed that all she had agreed
to w/ her father was that he would pay for her fare to go abroad, and that since she
was a little girl, she knew about her illegitimacy. She started crying and begged
Atty Tirol to revise the affidavit. She then sent a letter to Francisco to his house in
Forbes Park by JRS courier service. She subsequently met w/ him and in their
discussion, he told her that the affidavit was for his wife, that in case she heard
about Monina going abroad, the affidavit would “keep her peace.”
Guided by the advice of Atty Divinagracia who accompanied her during the first time
she went to Atty Tirol’s office and who told her the affidavit would boomerang
against Francisco as it is contrary to law, she signed the document as she was
jobless and needed the money to support herself and finish her studies. Ultimately
though, Monina decided not to go abroad, opting to spend what she received
through a Bank of Asia check, w/c only amounted to PhP15K, for her CPA review,
board exam and graduate studies.
However, Francisco denied all her allegations. He declared that Pansay’s
employment ceased as of Oct 1944 (Monina was born in Aug ’46) and that while
under his employ, she slept w/ other female helpers on the 1st flr of his residence
while he, his wife and daughter would sleep on the 2nd flr. He also staunchly denied
having had sexual relations with her and negated any knowledge about Monina’s
birth. In the same vein, he denied having paid for her tuition fees and asserted that
he never knew that his staff paid for such. He likewise categorically denied that he
told anyone that Monina was his daughter. He fired certain people in his office for
their failure to report such anomaly. As regards the affidavit, it was done to stop
Monina from spreading rumors that she was his daughter, that Monina willingly
signed the document, w/o any revisions.
Judge Castañeda, Jr presided over trial up to Oct ’86. He heard all of the
testimonies of Monina’s witnesses and half of her own on direct examination.
Judge Devera, Jr heard the rest of Monina’s testimony and those of Francisco’s
witnesses. The TC, through Judge Devera, ruled in favor of Francisco. It noted that
for the years between Monina’s birth and her mother’s death, no action of any kind
was instituted against Francisco either by her or her mother. Neither had plaintiff
brought any action against him immediately upon her mother death in 1965
considering that she was then already 19 yrs old. It also found Monina’s pcs of
evidence as either one of 3 categories: hearsay evidence, incredulous evidence, or
self-serving evidence. It further noted that it was not improbable that Pansay could
have copulated w/ one of the several other domestic helpers who where also
residing at Nelly’s Garden at that time. It held that Monina was barred by estoppel
by deed because of the affidavit w/c she signed when she was already 25 yrs old, a
professional and under the able guidance of counsel.
Monina appealed to CA. CA reversed decision and ruled in her favor. Although it
rejected the docs/certs presented, it found that Monina established her filiation as
Francisco’s illegitimate daughter by overwhelming, and not merely, prepoderant
evidence. It put great weight on the testimony of Pansay’s brother, Lope who even
after 41 yrs since the confrontation w/ Francisco was able to recount the details. It
held that Francisco’s vague denial and statements of firing his staff was grossly
inadequate to overcome the probative weight of Monina's testimonial evidence.
ISSUE: WON CA’s ruling will be upheld given the conflicting findings of fact of TC
and CA
HELD: Yes. Under Art 175 FC, illegitimate filiation such as Monina’s, may be
established in the same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate
children. Moreover, Art 172 provides the various forms of evidence w/c may be
presented. Monina was able to present a “high standard of proof” w/c was
coherent, logical and natural as compared to Francisco’s evidence w/c was barren
and mostly denials.
As regards the issue that there was opportunity for Monina’s mother to have slept
w/ other men during the time she conceived Monina, Francisco had the burden of
proof w/c he failed to deliver. The issue of whether sexual intercourse actually
occurred inevitably redounds to the victim’s or mother’s word, as against the
accused or putative’s father’s protestations. Although Pansay unfortunately passed
away and therefore cannot testify, this does not mean that Monina could no longer
prove her filiation. Since it was established that Pansay was still employed under
Francisco at the time Monina was conceived, sexual contact between Pansay and
him was not at all impossible, esp in the light of the overwhelming evidence.
Francisco is Monina’s father and she was conceived at the time Pansay worked for
him. He recognized Monina as his child through his overt acts and conduct as was
found by CA and such recognition has been consistently shown and manifested
throughout the years publicly, spontaneously, continuously and in an uninterrupted
manner.
Moreover, if Monina were not his illegitimate daughter, it would have been
unnecessary for Francisco to have gone to such great lengths in order that Monina
denounce her filiation.
Monina filed her action well w/in the period granted her by a positive provision of
law. A denial of her action on ground of laches would clearly be inequitable and
unjust.
Petition denied. Challenged CA decision affirmed.
Ma. Theresa R. ALBERTO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Intestate
Estate of Juan M. Alberto and Yolanda R. Alberto, respondents
Petition for review of a CA decision [June 2, 1994]
Facts:
Sept. 18, 1953: Ma. Theresa Alberto was born out of wedlock to Aurora Reniva
w/Juan M. Alberto (governor of some place) as alleged father. Theresa used
Alberto as her last name in all school records & correspondences. Juan was
legally married to Yolanda Alberto.
Sept. 18, 1967 (her 14th bday. ): dad was shot & he died intestate.
Yolanda was appointed administratrix of Juan’s estate. After inventory & acctg,
proceedings were closed & terminated.
Sept. 15, 1978: Theresa filed an opposition & prayed for the reopening of the
proceedings, that she be declared to have acquired the status of a natural child
& thus entitled to share in estate of dad. Probate court was convinced that she
had been in continuous possession of status of natural child & thus, it
compelled Juan’s heirs to recognize her as a natural daughter & allow her to
participate in the estate proceedings. It likewise declared that she’s an heir of
Juan & is entitled to ½ of the share of each legitimate child.
Probate court relied on the following evidence:
1. Juan & Aurora were sweethearts prior to Juan’s marriage to Yolanda
2. Juan gave money to Aurora thru Fr. Arcilla, Juan’s first cousin
3. Juan gave Theresa money for her schooling
4. Juan made known to his friends & relatives that she was his daughter
5. He made known to personnel of International School where Theresa was
enrolled that she was his daughter
6. Juan’s younger sister, Mrs. Aurita Solidum, asked Theresa to be sent to her
house to meet her dad for the first time when Theresa was 9.
7. Fr. Arcilla brought Theresa to Juan’s bedside in the hospital when he was
shot & asked guards to give way to her as she was a member of the family.
8. Juan’s step mom, Saturnina Alberto, introduced Theresa to one of Juan’s
daughter (her half-sister). She was introduced as an elder sister.
9. Aurora testified that her giving birth to Theresa was due to an indiscretion
and that Mrs. Solidum did arrange mtg bet Theresa & Juan
10. Theresa testified that:
a. her dad gave her P500.00 on their first meeting along w/2 telephone
nos. where he could be reached.
b. She met him several times after the 1st mtg & he gave him money
during those times too
c. Dad visited her in IS twice. IS is very strict when it comes to visitors &
by allowing Juan to see Theresa, this shows that he was identified by
the school personnel as Theresa’s dad.
d. Dad promised to see her in school during her 14 th bday w/c didn’t
happen because he was gunned down.
e. Her uncles & aunts (bros & sis) of her dad regarded her as their niece
& she was introduced as Juan’s eldest daughter. The children of Juan’s
bros & sis likewise recognized her as their cousin.
11. Jose Tablizo testified that there was a strong physical resemblance bet Juan
& Theresa & they wrote similarly too. He further stated that it was known
among Juan’s friends (the Breeze Gang..heheh) that Theresa was Juan’s
daughter and that Juan proudly showed him Theresa’s report card w/high
grades.
12. Atty. Martiniano Vivo testified that Juan’s lawyer, Immigrations
Commissioner Edmundo Reyes discussed w/him Juan’s letter saying that he
was not denying that he was Theresa’s dad and due to his marital status &
since he was a public official, he wanted to avoid public scandal thus
support will be given quietly thru Fr. Arcilla.
CA reversed decision. It was not satisfied that Theresa was in continuous
possession of status of natural child of deceased. Bases:
1. Case wherein 2 nurses took care of kids at the expense of alleged dad, that
he kissed kids, called them sons, gave money for their necessities, they
called him dad & was publicly regarded as dad of the children but Court
held that they were insufficient basis for a declaration of paternity. CA finds
Theresa’s evidence weaker than this. Dad may have been convinced of his
paternity but they don’t show his intent to place kids in possession of
status of natural children.
2. Theresa’s letter to Jose Tablizo wherein she wrote of how proud she is of
her dad & how she only knew him as a big man & that his friends like
Tablizo who knew him well & she envied them for having that privilege.
(see p. 751). CA claims that the letter gave the impression that Juan
distanced himself from Theresa.
Yolanda denied that Juan ever recognized Theresa as his daughter. She
presented letters sent by Aurora to Juan & Fr. Arcilla as proof that Juan refused
to recognize Theresa. In one letter Aurora complained that Juan didn’t give a
damn to Theresa & she mentioned that the child was graduating from Prep
School. Letter likewise stated that she waited for the money for support & that
she was grateful for the P300 he sent.
Issue: WON Theresa can be considered as the natural child of Juan who has been
in continuous possession of such status based on the evidence presented.
Held: Yes. CA reversed. Probate Court affirmed.
Ratio:
1. Letters from Aurora: did not prove that Juan refused to recognize Theresa. It
only proved that Aurora was having a hard time raising child on her own & she
asked for Juan’s assistance. Letter proved that Juan did provide support for
 Theresa. Besides, all the letters presented were written before Juan met
Theresa.
2. Juan never stopped Theresa from using his last name.
3. Report card story: being discredited for hearsay but according to SC this is w/in
the exception of the hearsay rule (Sec. 38, Rule 130, ROC)3.
4. Relatives of Juan recognized Theresa too. Yolanda could have presented any of
these relatives to negate Theresa’s claims but she failed to do so.
5. She has been in continuous possession of status of natural child of alleged
father by direct acts of latter or his family & thus, dad is obliged to recognize
the child (CC Art. 283).
6. Re Theresa’s letter to Tablizo: what a poignant novel she can now author as she
seeks to establish her parental links w/her dad. There must be questions as to
why his dad didn’t marry her mom when there were no legal impediments at
the time of her conception. Note that under the different categories of
illegitimate children under the CC, the natural child occupies the highest
position since her parents were not disqualified to marry during her conception.
Child is often the fruit of first love & is entrenched firmly in her parents’ hearts.
Juan could’ve not resisted manifesting signs of concern & care in so far as his
1st born is concerned especially since child has much talent & great promise. It’s
expected that dad would proudly step forward to claim his paternity.
Discreetness is understandable considering the straight-laced mores of the
times & the social & political stature of Juan. But despite that, he openly visited
his daughter in school & met w/her in several occasions. Though letter may
imply lack of association, it’s understood because their relationship was far
from normal. There’s sufficient proof that Juan acted in such manner as to show
his intent to recognize Theresa as his own & not that he distanced himself from
her.
7. CC Art. 285: Action for recognition of natural children may be brought only
during the lifetime of presumed parents except (1) if dad/mom died during
child’s minority, in w/c case, child may file action before the expiration of 4 yrs
from attainment of his majority. Theresa falls w/in this exception since she was
only 14 when her dad died. So can file an action before she reaches 25 (4 years
after age of majority w/c was 21 then). So she had until Sept. 18, 1978 to file
the action. And she filed the present action on Sept. 15, 1978, 3 days before
the expiration of the 4-year period.
DAVID V. CA
250 SCRA 82 (1995)
Facts:
Daisie David had an intimate relationship with her boss Ramon Villar, who is
married and a father of 4 children, all grown-up. They first had a son, Christopher
J., who was eventually followed by 2 more girls, Christine and Cathy Mae
The relationship became known to Villar’s wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to
his house and introduced him to Villar's wife.
After this, Daisie’s were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were
eventually accepted by his legal family.
3
Sec. 38.Declaration against interest. - The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of
the declarant, if the fact is asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that
a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in
evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third persons. (32a)
Then Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then 6 years old, to go with his
family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give Cristopher
back and had enrolled him at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year.
Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J. which the RTC
granted, giving sutody to Daisie and ordering Villar to give temporary support of
P3K a month to the 3 kids and to pay the costs of suit
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, hence this petition
Issue: WON custody should be given to Daisie
Held: YES. CA ruling reversed, custody granted to Daisie and Villar ordered to give
temporary support in the amount of P3K, pending the fixing of the amount of
support in an appropriate action.
Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father
Villar, was married to another woman other than the his mother.
As such, pursuant to Art. 176, FC, he is under the parental authority of his mother,
who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. And
because she has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by Villar, Daisie is
entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Rule 102, Sec. 1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is
separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a
mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority,
but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child.
The fact that Villar has recognized the Christopher may be a ground for ordering
him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under
Art. 213, FC, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."
RTC ordered Villar to give temporary support after finding that he did not give any
support to his 3 children by Daisie, except the meager amount of P500 a week
which he eventually stopped giving
Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the
grant of support in this case is justified by the fact that private respondent has
expressed willingness to support the minor child. The order for payment of
allowance need not be conditioned on the grant to him of custody of the child.
People vs. Namayan
Appeal from a decision of the RTC of Dumaguete
Facts:
 Tortillano Namayan was convicted for the rape of Margie Pagaygay who was 21
years old at the time of the offense. She was moderately retarded with a
mental age comparable to that of a 3 to 7 year old child.
 July 30 1991 – Estelita Pagaygay (mother) noticed the bulging stomach of
Margie and she brought her daughter to the hospital. They found out that
Margie was four to five months pregnant.
 Margie claims that Namayan raped her on several occasions.
 March 1991 – she went to fetch water from the artesian well and Namayan
pulled her and threatened her with a hunting knife on her neck. Namayan had
intercourse with her. This incident was followed when she was taking a bath
and when she was asked by her mother to buy beer.
 Namayan denied all the allegations. His alibi was that he was in prison from
February 5, 1991 to April 12, 1991. Ruben Gadayan attested that he was
confined in the prison for that time but he also stated that he was not
responsible for guarding the detainees. It was also proven that some detainees
are allowed to go outside which would depend on the discretion of the guard.
 Prosecution presented Lilian Gomez who saw Namayan during the town fiesta
on March 19, 1991.
 RTC found Namayan guilty of Rape
Issues:
WON it was physically impossible for Namayan to be the father of the child. NO
 On July 30, 1991 Margie was found to be 4-5 months pregnant therefore sexual
intercourse might have happened during the period between March 15, 1991 to
April 15, 1991.
 It was proven that Namayan was seen outside the Municipal Jail during the
town fiesta (March 19, 1991). Namayan was detained in a minimum security
prison and it was also stated that some prisoners were able to go out
depending on the discretion of the guard. These facts disprove the claim of
Namayan that it could not have physically possible for him to commit the act.
 Also, even if he was released only on April 12, 1991 it would have still been
possible for him to impregnate Margie.
WON compulsory acknowledgement and support for the child is a proper remedy in
this case. YES
 No legal impediment
 The crime of rape committed by Namayan carries with it among others the
obligation to acknowledge the offspring if the character of its origin doe not
prevent it and to support the same.
Mossesgeld vs. Court of Appeals
Petitioner: Marissa A. Mossesgeld, child’s mother
Respondent: Court of Appeals and Civil Registrar General
Nature: Petition to compel the local civil registrar of Mandaluyong to register the
certificate of live birth of petitioner’s illegitimate child using the surname
of the presumed father.
Facts:
 Marissa Alfaro Mossesgeld, single, gave birth to a baby boy (it’s the third time
she delivered a baby!) on December 2, 1989
 The presumed father is Eleazar Siriban Calasan, a married lawyer
 The father signed the birth certificate of the child as the informant, indicating
that the child’s name is Jonathan Mossesgeld Calasan
 He also executed an affidavit admitting the paternity of the child
 The person in charge at the hospital refused to place the presumed father’s
surname as the child’s surname in the certificated of live birth
 Thus, petitioner himself submitted the certificate to the office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Mandaluyong for registration
 Again, the municipal treasurer, as officer in charge of the local civil registrar’s
office, rejected the registration on the basis of the Civil Registrar General’s
Circular No. 4, which provides that under Article 176 of the Family Code,
illegitimate children born on or after August 3, 1988 shall use the surname of
their mother
 Upon inquiring about the status of the status of the registration of his child,
Calasan was furnished with a copy of the letter of the Civil Registrar General
denying the registration of the certificate of live birth on the grounds that it is
contrary to law
 Calasan, thereafter, filed a petition for mandamus with the Pasig RTC to compel
the local civil registrar to register the certificate of live birth of his illegitimate
son using his surname
 His petition was denied
 He filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion to for leave to amend the
petition to substitute the child’s mother as the petitioner
 His motion to amen was granted, but motion for reconsideration was denied
 He elevated the petition to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the RTC’s
decision
Issue: W/N mandamus lies to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register the
certificate of live birth of an illegitimate child using the alleged father’s
surname where the latter admitted paternity.
Held: NO. Local Civil Registrar correctly refused. ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN MUST
USE THE SURNAME OF THEIR MOTHER, REGARDLESS OF W/N THEY
HAD BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED BY THEIR FATHERS IN THEIR RECORD OF
BIRTH.
Ratio:
 Article 176 of the Family Code effectively repealed Article 366 of the Civil Code,
which gives a natural child the right to use the surname of his/her father where
he/she has been acknowledged by both parents.
 Article 176 explicitly states that illegitimate children shall use the surname of
their mother, be under her parental authority, and be entitled to support in
conformity with the provisions of the Family Code.
 This is the rule regardless of W/N the father admits paternity
 Thus, the Local Civil Registrar correctly refused
 Correct Remedy: Putative father may legally adopt his own illegitimate child,
thereby legitimizing the child and entitling the child to the use of the father’s
surname
Republic v. Abadilla
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of CA. 1999
FACTS: Common-law sps Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino begot 2
children. In the Birth Certs of both kids, they were registered w/ the surname
“Abadilla” and the name of their father was entered as “Herson” Abadilla. Also, an
entry was made in the date and place of marriage of the sps: June 19, 1987 at
Dingras, Ilocos Norte.

Sps filed an Amended Petition for Correction/Cancellation of Entries to make the
necessary changes and omit/delete the wrong info as regards the marriage. TC
granted the petition and ordered the Civil Registrar to issue an Amended Birth Cert
w/ the necessary changes (i.e. “Herson” to “Gerson”, date & place of marriage left
blank).
However, Ofc of SolGen assails that TC committed a reversible error in granting the
petition but failing to order the change of the minors’ surname from “Abadilla” to
“Celestino.”
ISSUE: WON petition should be granted
HELD: Yes. As illegitimate children, Emerson and Rafael should bear the surname of
their mother, Luzviminda Celestino as per Art 176 FC, w/c was the governing law
during the birth of the minors. Judgment modified. Civil Registrar ordered to
change the entry in the Amended Birth Certs w/ respect to their surname.
Carolina Abad GONZALES, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Honoria
Empaynado, Cecila H. Abad, Marian H. Abad & Rosemarie S. Abad,
respondents
Petition for review on certiorari a CA decision [Oct. 30, 1998]
Facts:
April 18, 1972: petitioners Carolina Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad & Cesar de
Mesa Tioseco sought the settlement of intestate estate of their bro Ricardo de
Mesa Abad. They claimed to be the only heirs & that Ricardo died a bachelor
w/o any legit/illegit descendants/ascendants. They alleged that properties
under Ricardo’s name were actually their mom’s properties only administered
by Ricardo. Cesar was appointed administrator.
May 2, 1972: petitioners executed an extrajudicial settlement of their mom’s
estate including properties previously under Ricardo’s admin. Old titles were
cancelled & new ones were issued in the name of the petitioners.
Petitioners mortgaged real properties in favor of Mrs. Josefina Viola, their
counsel’s wife.
July 2, 1972: Honoria w/her 2 children Cecilia & Marian filed a motion to set
aside proceedings. They alleged that Honoria was the common-law wife of
Ricardo for 27 yrs before his death & that they had 2 children. Rosemarie Abad
was likewise presented, allegedly Ricardo’s child by another woman, Dolores
Saracho. They charged Carolina, et al of deliberately concealing existence of 3
children to deprive them of their rts to Ricardo’s estate. They prayed that
Cecilia be appointed administrator. Cesar was maintained as the administrator
but they were allowed to take part in the proceedings. They also filed an action
to annul extrajudicial partition of Ricardo’s properties.
Trial Court declared 3 as the acknowledged natural children of Ricardo & they
are the only surviving legal heirs of Ricardo entitled to succeed his entire estate
subj to Honoria’s rts, if any, as co-owner of prop that may have been acquired
thru her joint efforts w/Ricardo. Siblings of Ricardo excluded from taking part in
admin & settlement of estate. Honoria appointed administratrix. Extrajudicial
partition and new titles issued to the siblings were annulled. Mortgages were
also declared inexistent & void. All titles & certificates ordered transferred to
Honoria as administratrix.
Carolina et al filed appeal but denied because filed out of time. CA affirmed
dismissal of appeal. SC directed trial court to proceed w/the appeal. After
hearing, trial court elevated case to CA which denied motions for lack of merit.
Same declarations made as in the first trial court decision including denial of
appeal for being filed out of time.
Carolina et al. claim that Honoria’s first husband, Jose Libunao, was still alive
when Cecilia & Marian were born thus, they should be presumed as legit
children of Honoria & Jose, pursuant to CC Art. 2564. They claim that he died in
1971. Honoria admits that she was formerly married to Jose & that they had 3
children. However, she claims that Jose died in 1943. Carolina et al. presented
ff evidence to support their claim:
1. Mapua Institute of Technology enrollment forms of Honoria’s children by
first spouse submitted in 1956 & 1958. Declared father was Jose Libunao &
so petitioners claim that had Jose been dead at that time, the children
should’ve stated so.
2. Affidavits of Juan Quiambao & Alejandro Ramos were also presented
claiming that they know that Jose died in 1971 & that he was buried at the
Loyola Memorial Park.
4
Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress.
 3. Affidavit of Dr. Arena, Ricardo’s physician, who testified that he examined
Ricardo in 1935 & he was diagnosed to be infected w/gonorrhea & that he
became sterile because of this.
Issue: WON Cecilia & Marian are illegitimate children of Ricardo.
Held: Yes. Petition denied. CA affirmed w/modification.
Ratio:
1. Claim that Jose died in 1971 is not conclusive. Failure to indicate parent as
deceased is not proof enough that parent was still alive.
2. Quiambao & Ramos affidavits are not competent since they’re merely
secondary evidence.
3. Best evidence would have been Jose’s death certificate but they failed to
present such.
4. While Loyola Memorial Records show that a Jose Libunao was buried in 1971,
it’s a different person. Buried there is JOSE BAUTISTA LIBUNAO married to a
JOSEFA REYES, whereas the person we are talking about is JOSE SANTOS
LIBUNAO married to HONORIA EMPAYNADO. (hmmm…good researchers! Hehe!)
5. DR. Arenas’ affidavit was objected by respondents as privileged communication
under Sec. 24(c), Rule 130, ROC.5 Petitioners do not dispute that his affidavit
meets the firs four requisites of the rule on confidential communication bet.
physician & patient.6 They assert that the finding as to Ricardo’s “sterility”
doesn’t blacken his character. But they conveniently forget that the “sterility”
arose when he contracted gonorrhea w/c definitely blackens his reputation.
Sterility alone blackens a reputation of a patient, all the more if it’s w/the
attendant embarrassment of an STD. Thus, affidavit is inadmissible for tending
to blacken Ricardo’s reputation & this fact is not changed by his death. The
privilege of secrecy is not abolished/terminated because of death otherwise the
purpose of the law would be thwarted & the policy would be defeated (Westover
vs. Aetna Life Insurance).
6. Respondents have overwhelmingly proven that they are acknowledged natural
children of Ricardo. They presented his individual statements of income &
assets and his individual income tax returns where he declared Honoria as his
legit wife & the 3 as his legit dependent children. They likewise presented proof
that he insured his daughters & opened trust funds for them.
7. CC Art. 988 provides that in the absence of legit descendants/ascendants, the
illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Whereas
CC Art. 1003 provides that in the absence of illegit children or surviving spouse,
the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate. Applying these to the
case at hand, since there are no legit descendants/ascendants, Ricardo’s
illegitimate children are entitled to succeed to his entire estate. His siblings,
who can only succeed him in the absence of illegitimate children are precluded
from inheriting his estate.
8. Respondents have presented sufficient evidence to prove that properties in
dispute belong to Ricardo & not to his mom as his siblings claim. This seems
5
Sec. 24(c), Rule 130, ROC Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. – Persons disqualified to testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the following cases: ( c ) A person authorized to practice medicine…cannot in a civ case wo
consent of patient, be examined as to any advice/treatment given by him or any info w/c he may have acquired in attending such
patient in a professional capacity, w/c info was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, & w/c would blacken the
reputation of the patient.
6
Rule on confidential communications bet physician & patient requires that: a) action in w/c advice/treatment given or any info is
to be used in a civ case; b) relation of physician & patient existed bet person claiming privilege or his legal rep & physician; c)
advice/treatment given by him/any info was acquired by physician while professionally attending to patient; d) info was necessary
for performance of professional duty & e) disclosure of info would tend to blacken reputation of patient.
acceptable to his siblings since they contend that they are entitled to the estate
whether it is owned by Ricardo OR Lucila (mom).
9. Re denial of appeal for being filed out of time: SC held that this is erroneous
since they have previously ruled that it was not filed out of time. SC rulings are
binding upon & may not be reversed by a lower court.
REPUBLIC v. VICENCIO
300 SCRA 138 (1998)
Facts:
Cynthia Vicencio is the daughter of Pablo Castro Vicencio and Fe Esperanza de Vega
Leabres.
When Cynthia was a year old, Pablo Vicencio left their conjugal abode after a
marital spat & since then never reappeared nor sent support to his family.
Ernesto Yu came to the aid of Fe and her children
Fe was successful in her petitions for dissolution of their conjugal partnership, for
change of name (to drop the surname of her husband) and for the declaration of
Pablo as an absentee
Fe and Ernesto Yu eventually married
Cynthia now files present petition for change of surname, from Vicencio to Yu
Issue: WON Cynthia may be allowed to change her surname to that of her step-
father's surname.
Held: NO. decision of the CA reversed
Cynthia asserts that her case falls under one of the justifiable grounds cited in Rep.
v. Hernandez. She says that confusion has arisen as to her parentage because ever
since childhood, Ernesto Yu has acted as her father, assuming duties of rearing,
caring and supporting her.
SolGen however argues that there is no proper & reasonable cause to warrant
private respondent's change of surname. Such change might even cause confusion
and give rise to legal complications due to the fact that private respondent's step-
father has 2 children with her mother. In the event of her step-father's death, it is
possible that private respondent may even claim inheritance rights as a "legitimate"
daughter. In his memorandum, he opines that "Ernesto Yu has no intention of
making Cynthia as an heir because despite the suggestion made before the petition
for change of name was heard by the trial court that the change of family name to
Yu could very easily be achieved by adoption, he has not opted for such a remedy.”
Court sided with the SolGen’s contention, arguing that Cynthia is the legitimate
offspring of Fe and Pablo and a legitimate child generally bears the surname of his
or her father.
It must be stressed that a change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right,
addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which has the duty to consider
carefully the consequences of a change of name and to deny the same unless
weighty reasons are shown.
Confusion indeed might arise with regard to Cynthia’s parentage due to her
surname. But even, more confusion with grave legal consequences could arise if a
change were allowed.
Previous decisions allowing children to bear the surname of their respective step-
fathers even without the benefit of adoption were not similar to the present case.
Based on the precedents cites, the worry of the court is if a child born out of a
lawful wedlock be allowed to bear the surname of the second husband of the
mother, should the first husband die or be separated by a decree of divorce, there
may result a confusion as to his real paternity. In the long run the change may
redound to the prejudice of the child in the community. Legal restraints bind the
court to rule as such.
Further, there is no assurance the end result would not be even more detrimental
to her person, for instead of bringing a stop to questions, the very change of name,
if granted, could trigger much deeper inquiries regarding her parentage.
Gan vs. Reyes
 Bernadetted Pondevida could not send her lovechild with Agustus Gan to
school, she demanded support from Gan. He denies that he is the father of
Francheska.
 Gan claims that since it was stated in the birth certificate of the child that her
father was unknown then there is no cause of action. This contention of Gan
was denied by the trial court. Despite the denial of his petition he was not able
to file his answer
 January 19, 2000 – Pondevida moved that petitioner be declared in default,
which motion was granted. Hence, the court received the evidence of private
respondent ex parte.
 May 12, 2000 - After finding that the claim of filiation and support was
adequately proved, the trial court ordered Gan petitioner to recognize private
Francheska Joy S. Pondevida as his illegitimate child and support her with
P20,000.00 every month to be paid on or before the 15th of each month
starting 15 April 2000. Likewise petitioner was ordered to pay Francheska Joy
S. Pondevida the accumulated arrears of P20,000.00 per month from the day
she was born, P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and P25,000.00 for expenses of
litigation, plus P20,000.00 on or before the 15th of every month from 15 May
2000 as alimony pendente lite should he desire to pursue further remedies
against private respondent.
 Pondevida moved for execution of the judgment of support, which the trial
court granted by issuing a writ of execution, citing as reason therefor private
respondent's immediate need for schooling.
 Gan appealed the decision of the trial court
 June 9, 2000 – Gan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court
of Appeals imputing grave abuse of discretion to the trial court for ordering the
immediate execution of the judgment. He averred that the writ of execution
was issued despite the absence of a good reason for immediate enforcement.
He also insisted that as the judgment sought to be executed did not yet attain
finality there should be an exceptional reason to warrant its execution.
 Court of Appeals denied his appeal. Basis: Sec. 4, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure judgments for support are immediately executory and cannot be
stayed by an appeal.
Issues:
WON adultery of the child’s mother would be a valid defense to show that the child
is a fruit of adulterous relations. NO
 It was it was not even hinted that he was married to the mother of Francheska
Joy. Gan consents to submit to Dioxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Testing to resolve
the issue of paternity, which test he claims has a reputation for accuracy.
 The court stated that that no useful purpose would be served if we dwell on
petitioner's arguments concerning the validity of the judgment by default and
his insistence that he be subjected, together with private respondent
Bernadette C. Pondevida to DNA testing to settle the issue of paternity. The
futility of his arguments is very apparent. It is not for us at this instance to
review or revise the Decision rendered by the trial court for to do so would pre-
empt the decision which may be rendered by the Court of Appeals in the main
case for support.
WON the writ of execution is valid and should it be executory. YES
 It was not proven that the writ of execution was issued beyond the legitimate
bounds of judicial discretion
 Section 4, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court clearly states that, unless ordered by
the trial court, judgments in actions for support are immediately executory and
cannot be stayed by an appeal. Section 4, Rule 39 is an exception to the
general rule which provides that the taking of an appeal stays the execution of
the judgment and that advance executions will only be allowed if there are
urgent reasons therefore.
 The money and property adjudged for support and education should and must
be given presently and without delay because if it had to wait the final
judgment, the children may in the meantime have suffered because of lack of
food or have missed and lost years in school because of lack of funds. One
cannot delay the payment of such funds for support and education for the
reason that if paid long afterwards, however much the accumulated amount, its
payment cannot cure the evil and repair the damage caused. The children with
such belated payment for support and education cannot act as gluttons and eat
voraciously and unwisely, afterwards, to make up for the years of hunger and
starvation. Neither may they enrol in several classes and schools and take up
numerous subjects all at once to make up for the years they missed in school,
due to non-payment of the funds when needed.
Tonog vs. CA
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner vs. Gladys Labrador, respondent
Petition for review on certiorari of RTC Cebu decision [Mar. 25, 1999]
Facts:
• 1986: Maria Rosario Canon, sister of respondent, had a common-law
relationship w/Degoberto Erasmo & during such cohabitation, Rosario begot 2
illegitimate children, one of w/c is Sarah Zita B. Erasmo born Apr. 27, 1988.
• During registration of Sarah’s birth, Rosario told Local Civ Registrar that she
was not legally married to child’s father. However, Loc Civ Registrar erroneously
entered name of Sarah in her birth record as SARAH ZITA C. ERASMO instead
of SARAH ZITA CANON. Name of mom was likewise erroneously written by
Gladys as Rosemarie instead of Maria Rosario.
• Pursuant to FC Art. 176 (illegitimate children shall use surname & shall be
under parental authority of mom), Galdys filed a petition for correction of
entried in the record of birth of Sarah, her niece. Rosario was then residing in
the US. Local Civ Registrar was impleaded in the case in his official capacity.
Hearing was set on Oct. 29, 1997, publication was likewise ordered in
newspaper of gen circulation in Cebu once a week for 3 consecutive weeks.
• Oct. 29, 1997: evidence presented w/RTC. Gladys testified allegations in
petition. She explained that she erroneously entered her sister’s name as
Rosemarie because she was more familiarly known as such. She further averred
 that Rosemarie & Maria Rosario are the same and that Rosario was abroad
living w/foreigner husband. She also presented Maria Rosario’s birth cert &
certification fr Office of Civ Registrar that it had no record of marriage bet
Rosario & Degoberto.
• RTC: granted petition. Ordered correction from Sarah Zita Canon Erasmo to
Sarah Zita Cano & name of mom fr Rosemarie Canon to Maria Rosario Canon.
Issue: WON summary proceedings under Rule 108 of Rules of Court may be
used to change entry in a birth certificate regarding the filiation of a child.
– NO
Ratio:
1. Respondent invokes applicability of summary proceedings under Rule 108 of
Rules of Court & Art. 412 of CC.
2. Petitioner: contests such claiming that these provisions can only be used to
correct/change CLERICAL/INNOCUOUS ERRORS. It CANNOT be used to modify,
alter or increase substantive rts such as those involving legitimacy or
illegitimacy of child. Result will not only involve substantial correction in child’s
record of birth but also in child’s rts w/c can’t be affected in summary action.
3. Leonor vs. CA: respondent Leonor filed petition for cancellation of registration
of marriage to petitioner for alleged nullity of legal vows due to non-observance
of legal requirements for valid marriage. Court ruled that invoked rule can only
correct/cancel typographical/clerical errors & not mat’l/substantial ones like
validity/nullity of marriage. Clerical-visible to the eyes or obvious to
understanding such as errors made by clerk or transcriber or a mistake in
copying or writing. Innocuous-harmless such as correction of name that’s
clearly misspelled or of misstatement of occupation of parent. If correction in
civ registry will change civ status of petitioners & children from legit to illegit,
same can only be granted in an ADVERSARIAL PROCEEDING and summary
procedure under Rule 108 & CC Art 412 are NOT applicable. THUS,
CORRECTION OF ENTRY CHANGING SARAH’S STATUS FR LEGIT TO ILLEGIT
CAN’T BE GRANTED IN SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS.
4. Republic v. Valencia: corrections re nationality/citizenship are substantial & can
only be done in adversarial proceedings. Adversarial means having opposing
parties, contested as distinguished fr ex parte application, wherein party
seeking relief has given legal warning to other party & afforded latter
opportunity to contest it. Excludes adoption proceeding. THUS, PETITION FOR
SUBSTANTIAL CORRECTION SHOULD INCLUDE AS RESPONDENTS THE CIV
REGISTRAR AND ALL OTHER PERSONS WHO HAVE/CLAIM TO HAVE ANY
INTEREST THAT WOULD BE AFFECTED. FULL HEARING & NOT SUMMARY
PROCEEDINGS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED.
5. Changes sought in case at bar are substantial.
a. Filiation will be changed fr legit to illegit.
b. Name of mom will be changed.
6. Sarah & her purported parents should be parties to proceedings since it would
affect her legitimacy, successional & other rts. Change may even embarrass her
due to social stigma that illegitimacy may bring. Rts of parents over her will
also be affected. Might affect creditors too. No sufficient legal explanation was
given why aunt who had no appointment as guardian of minor, was party to
petition.
7. Even if hearing was set, notice of hearing was published & hearing was actually
conducted during w/c parties testified, proceedings still fall short of
requirements needed for substantial alterations. All other indispensable parties
should have been made respondents. (Labayo Rowe v. Republic) Rules can’t
diminish, modify or increase substantive rts.
8. Even if proceedings were indeed adversarial, evidence presented by respondent
were insufficient to prove/fully substantiate her claim that Sarah was
illegitimate. She only presented certification fr civil registry re lack of record on
marriage bet Rosario & Degoberto along w/her testimony. She failed to prove
her allegation. Yes, FC Art. 176 is applicable but proper recourse for such is an
adversarial contest.
9. Note that Rule 108 contemplates a special proceeding & not an ordinary civ
action. It merely corrects clerical errors & does not grant/deny substantial rts.
Otherwise it would be tantamount to denial of due process to 3 rd parties &
whole world.
Held: Petition granted. RTC decision annulled & set aside.
De Los Santos vs. Luciano
Petitioner: Estate of the deceased Luciana de los Santos, wife of deceased Antonio
Escobar
Respondent: Maria Luciano, niece of Antonio Escobar
Nature: Appeal taken by Maria Luciano from the decision of the CFI of Manila,
which declared her not to be entitled to participate in the estate of
deceased Antonio Escobar
Facts:
 Tomasa Escobar was born to Leon Escobar and Josefa Esguerra before they
were married
 After her parents got married, they begot two more children: Antonio and
Fortunato Escobar
 All the while, Tomasa lived with the spouses and their two legitimate children
 All the children called the spouses “Tatay” and “Nanay”
 The other children called Tomasa “Manang,” which is an appellation given to
elder sisters
 Tomasa grew up and lived under the care of the spouses until she married
 The spouses supported her, treated and presented her as their daughter, and
was publicly known as such
 Tomasa married and had a daughter, Maria Luciano
 When she was widowed, she took her daughter with her and lived in the house
that Leon Escobar built for them
 Leon visited them almost everyday
 He sent his sons Antonio and Fortunato to keep them company at night
 When Tomasa died, Leon took Maria into his home until she married and was
taken by her husband to the province
 Leon Escobar died
 Fortunato became ill
 Antonio wrote to Maria to return to Manila to nurse Fortunato, even sending
money for passage
 When Fortunato died, Antonio took Maria into his home, where she lived until
Antonio’s death

 Maria claims that she is entitled to inherit from the estate of Antonio by virtue
of her being the legitimate daughter of Tomasa, who is a legitimated sister of
Antonio
Issues:
I. W/N Tomasa Escobar was a natural daughter of the spouses Leon and Josefa
Escobar, legitimated by the subsequent marriage of the spouses. YES.
II. W/N Maria, as legitimate daughter of Tomasa Escobar is entitled to inherit from
the intestate estate of the legitimate son of her mother’s parents. YES.
Ratio:
I. Tomasa was a legitimated daughter of Leon and Josefa Esguerra.
 Tomasa was born on December 29, 1836
 At that time, the effective legislation was Law I, Title XIII, Partidas IV,
which states that:
1. The children that a man has by a woman whom he keeps as a
concubine will be legitimate if her marries her afterwards
2. marriage has such force that, as soon as the father and mother
marries, the children become, for that reason, legitimate
3. same rule applies where a man has a child by his female slave
4. marriage has such extraordinary power that, as soon as this is
done, the mother becomes free, and the children legitimate, for
this reason
 Also, the well-established doctrine in the Philippines and Spain (interpreting
Law 11 of Toro) is that:
“A child is considered natural when, at the time of its
conception or birth, its parents could have married
without dispensation, and when the father has
expressly or tacitly acknowledged it.”
 Proof of status as natural child:
1. The fact that before and after their marriage the spouses
kept Tomasa with them and their legitimate children
2. The fact that they supported her, took care of her and
treated an presented her to society as their daughter
3. The fact that they built a house for her and her daughter
4. And the fact that her parents had the freedom to marry
without dispensation at the time of her conception or
birth
II. Maria, as legitimate child of a legitimated sister of legitimate brother
Antonio, is entitled to inherit from the intestate estate of her uncle.
 Legislation in force when Antonio died was the Civil Code
 Article 953 provides that: should children of brothers or sisters
exist, the surviving spouse shall, concurrently with said children,
be entitled to receive the part of the inheritance in usufruct
assigned him or her under Article 837, that is. ½ of the estate in
usufruct
 When Antonio died, Maria Luciano was entitled to full ownership of
½ of his estate and the naked ownership of the other half, the
usufruct of which belonged to the surviving spouse
 By the death of the spouse Luciana de los Santos, the
usufructuary right of said widow was extinguished
 Therefore, the naked ownership and the usufruct of the other half
was consolidated in Maria Luciano
 The lower court’s rejection of Maria’s claim is based on Article 943,
which provides that “natural or legitimated child has no right to
succeed ab intestate the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother”
 The prohibition should apply only to those legitimated by royal
concession and not to those legitimated by subsequent marriage
 This is because the Code, under Article 122, considers children
legitimated by subsequent marriage as having the same rights as
legitimate children; while, under Article 127, children legitimated
by royal concession are only granted the rights conferred to
acknowledged natural children
 Thus, it is clear that the intention of the legislator is to make the
prohibition in Article 943 apply only to those “legitimated” by royal
concession
Decision (Summary):
1. continuous possession of the status of a natural child constitutes tacit
recognition of paternity (Law 11 of Toro)
2. a child that enjoys continuous possession of the status of a natural
child is considered legitimated by the subsequent marriage of the
parents (Law 1, Title XIII, Partidas IV)
3. that the legitimate daughter of a legitimated sister is entitled to inherit
from her mother’s legitimate brother
4. that “legitimated” in Article 943 refers to those legitimated by royal
concession and not to those legitimated by subsequent marriage
In the matter of the estate of Samuel Bischoff Werthmuller. Ana M.
RAMIREZ, executrix & appellant, vs. Otto GMUR, as guardian of minors
Esther Renate, Carmen Maria & Leontina Elizabeth all surnamed Mory,
claimant & appellant [Aug. 5, 1918]
Appeal from CFI Iloilo judgment
*good luck sa magrerecite. Practice pronouncing the names. Hehe. 
Facts:
Samuel Bischoff Werthmuller, a Switzerland native, resided in the PI. He
married Doña Ana M. Ramirez. They had no children.
Samuel died in Iloilo on June 29, 1913. He left a valuable estate w/c he
disposed by will. Will was probated Aug. 1913. His widow, Ana, was appointed
executrix & letters testamentary were issued to her. All properties were given to
the widow except Swiss properties w/c were given to his bros & sis. Samuel, in
making the will, ignored the possible claims of 2 sets of children born to his
natural daughter, Leona Castro.
Info re Leona
 1. born in Bacolod on April 11, 1875 to mom Felisa Castro & unknown dad.
Margin of original baptismal entry had an annotation w/c provides that
Samuel recognized Leona in a public document & such was authenticated
by signature of Fr. Ferrero (nakakagutom naman yung name ni Fr. ). Fr.
Ferrero attested to this fact.
2. Leona was taken into Samuel’s family & she was brought up as a mem of
the family. Samuel tacitly recognized & treated Leona as his daughter.
3. 1895: Leona married Frederick von Kauffman, British born in HK who lived
in Iloilo. They had 3 children.
4. April 1899: Frederick brought Leona to Switzerland to recuperate where
she was placed in a sanatorium (hospital. Illness not specified.) Frederick
went back to the Phil while Leona was left in Switzerland.
5. Leona informed H that she wanted to remain free & did not want to resume
common life w/him. So in 1904, Frederick went to Paris to obtain divorce
under French laws. Divorce was decreed on Jan. 5, 1905 in favor of H & W
was in default. Leona was then staying in Paris but no evidence that she
was permanently domiciled there.
6. Leona became attracted to Dr. Ernest Emil Mory, physician in Swiss
sanatorium. He was previously married to but now divorced from Helena
Wolpman. Ernest & Leona had a daughter named Leontina Elizabeth born
on July 21, 1900. They got married in London on May 5, 1905. Two more
daughters were born after the marriage (Carmen Maria & Esther).
7. Leona died Oct. 6, 1910.
Around Feb. 20, 1914: Otto Gmur appeared as guardian of 3 Mory claimants.
Ana insists that WRT Mory claimants, Samuel did not recognize Leona. She
further claims that Leontina, the eldest of the Mory children should be
considered as the legit child of the 1st marriage since she was born while the
marriage was still subsisting. SC finds last argument untenable. Current
contention is that she was legitimated by Ernest & Leona’s subsequent
marriage. With regards to the 2 younger Mory children, it’s argued that they’re
legitimate being born after the marriage of their parents w/c is claimed to be
valid.
Dec. 29, 1915: CFI concluded that Leona was Samuel’s recognized natural
daughter & if she were alive, she’d be his forced heir entitled to 1/3 of his
estate. Leontina Elizabeth was declared a legit daughter whereas Carmen &
Esther are illegitimate. Leontina entitled to 1/3 of the estate and remaining 2/3
to Ana. Both Gmur & Ana appealed.
Frederick appeared as guardian of his own children in the proceedings. Petition
was granted on March 24, 1916. He then filed a petition on April 1, 1916
setting forth rts of his children to share in the estate. On April 26, 1916, Gmur
complained that matter has been decided already on Dec. 29, 1915, Ana denied
Frederick’s allegations. Frederick insists that the decree of divorce was invalid &
that all 3 Mory children are offspring of adulterous relations & that his children,
being the legitimate offspring, are alone entitled to participate in the
proceedings.
CFI decided on Nov. 14, 1916 that Leona was the acknowledged natural
daughter of Samuel & that the 3 kids from her 1 st marriage were legitimate and
were entitled to share in Samuel’s estate. Decision excluded Mory claimants.
Gmur appealed.
Both appeals were consolidated.
Issues & Ratio:
1. WON Leona is a recognized natural daughter of Samuel. – YES.
Proved that prior to her first marriage, she was in an uninterrupted enjoyment
of de facto status of natural child & treated as such by Samuel.
Document presented by Fr. Ferrero admissible since he’s the custodian of
church records. Original document not needed since they have shown that
diligent search was made to find it, to no avail. Thus, secondary evidence
presented by the priest is sufficient.
Applicable provision: Law 11 of Toro w/c became Law 1, title 5, book 10 of the
Novisima Recopilacion w/c provides that recognition could be established by
proof of acts on part of the parent unequivocally recognizing the status of his
child. This is different from CC Art. 131 provision w/c provides that
acknowledgment must be made in the record of birth, by will or in other public
instrument. Regardless of what provision is applied, it’s sufficiently shown that
Leona was recognized.
Ana’s contention that only kids born of persons free to marry may possess
status of recognized natural child. There being no evidence to show Felisa
Castro’s status at the time Leona was born, she will be presumed single or
widow. Court can’t entertain contrary presumption that Felisa’s guilty of
adultery.
As a recognized natural daughter, had she survived her dad, she would have
been his forced heir (CC Art. 807 (3) & 939) & entitled to 1/3 of the inheritance
(CC Art. 842).
2. WON the Mory children are entitled to inherit. – NO.
Frederick’s children are legitimate & entitled to inherit, thus no need to discuss.
WRT Leontina (eldest) of Mory kids: first marriage was still subsisting when she
was born thus she’s an offspring of an adulterous intercourse w/c is not capable
of legitimation (CC Art. 119).
Divorce is invalid & can’t be recognized in RP courts. French tribunal has no
jurisdiction to entertain an action for dissolution of marriage contracted in the
Phil by persons domiciled here esp since such marriage is indissoluble under
Phil laws. Although the spouses (first marriage) have traveled to different
places, all those stays were limited & thus we can’t say that they have
established their domicile elsewhere. It has been established that court of a
country in w/c neither spouse is domiciled & w/c one/both spouses may resort
merely for the purpose of obtaining divorce has no jurisdiction to determine
their matrimonial status & a divorce granted by such court is not entitled to
recognition anywhere. Going to one place for the sole purpose of obtaining
divorce w/o intention to remain in that place is not sufficient to confer
jurisdiction on courts of that state esp if cause of divorce is not recognized by
the laws of the state of that person’s own domicile. During the time they
obtained divorce decree, the Phil law provided that a valid marriage can only be
dissolved by death of one of the parties. The law invoked in obtaining the
divorce allowed divorce where wife has been guilty of adultery/husband guilty
of concubinage. Evidently, this should not be upheld since it is repugnant to the
moral sensibilities of our people & it’s contrary to law.
The divorce being invalid, the claims of the Mory children should then be
rejected. The rt to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated & acknowledged
natural children, excluding kids of adulterous relations. “Descendants” under CC
Art. 941 can’t include illegitimates born of adulterous relations.
3. WON the probate of a will affects the rights of forced heirs who don’t
appear to contest the probate. – NO.
 Rts of forced heirs to their legitime are not divested by decree admitting a will
to probate, regardless of fact that no provision has been made for them in the
will. Decree of probate is conclusive only as regards due execution of will.
Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 753: forced heirs can’t be prejudiced by failure of
testator to provide for them in his will. And even if testator intended to leave
everything to his wife, will is intrinsically invalid if it would cut off the rights of
his forced heirs.
4. WON an order for the distribution of an estate is conclusive & final as
against persons who are not before the court. – NO.
Proceedings involving Gmur & Ana did not involve Frederick’s children. Court
was unaware of their existence. They were not notified nor were they
represented in the proceedings. But not that their rt to participate was vested
immediately upon Samuel’s death to the extent to w/c their mom would have
been entitled to participate had she survived Samuel. The decision under these
proceedings was not published nor were persons entitled to participate
personally informed.
Code of Civ Procedure Sec. 753: after payment of debts & expenses of
administration, court shall distribute residue of estate among persons entitled
to receive it whether by terms of will or by operation of law.
Law does not provide for notice by publication or otherwise of application for
order of distribution to person’s estate. A purely ex parte proceeding w/o notice
by personal service/publication by w/c court undertakes to distribute property
of deceased persons can be conclusive upon minor heirs who are not
represented.
Code of Civ Procedure Sec. 41: 10 yrs actual adverse possession by
“occupancy, grant, descent or otherwise” shall vest title in the possessor. This
indicates that decree of distribution under w/c one may be placed in possession
by descent is not conclusive. Action of revindication may be brought by heir
against persons put in possession by decree at any time w/in period allowed by
gen statute of limitations (Layre vs. Pasco).
Application of Frederick’s children was presented in proper time & judgment in
their favor is correct. Mory claimants are barred from participating.

Held: CFI decision admitting Leontina to participate in the estate is reversed.

Frederick’s children admitted to share equally in 1/3 of estate. In other respects,
Nov. 14, 1916 decision affirmed.