The European Union is adapting to the Lisbon

Treaty
The priorities of the Spanish Presidency and the interests of Romania

Authors: Paul Ivan, Mihai Panaite, Ciprian Ciucu, Robert Uzună

Policy Memo no 6
January 2010 1
Contents

Introduction - 3

Institutional issues – The implementation of the Lisbon Treaty - 4

Strengthening EU’s foreign policy. Different approaches for different neighbors - 6

The new European economic strategy – are we learning the lessons of the previous

failure? – 8

Romania and the 2020 strategy - A new and needed scapegoat for reforms?– 8

A new financial supervision framework - 10

What is flexicurity and how it could work in Romania - 11

The priorities of the Spanish Presidency for the Energy Sector - 14

2
Introduction

After many hurdles, the Lisbon Treaty finally entered into force on 1 December 2009 and the
Spanish presidency will be the first EU presidency to function under the rules of the new treaty.
The Lisbon Treaty was supposed to reduce the engagement of the country that holds the six
months rotating presidency, but Spain has come up with an ambitious agenda that it coordinated
with Belgium and Hungary, the next two countries to assume the EU presidency.
The Spanish presidency has come up with four main priorities for the EU:
 The implementation of the Lisbon Treaty
 The coordination of economic policies for the recovery from the economic crisis; the launch
of the Europe 2020 strategy
 Strengthening EU’s foreign policy
 Improving the rights and freedoms of EU citizens
We will review the first three of these priorities adding comments on their importance for
Romania.

Herman van Rompuy, the President of the European Council, José Luis Rodríguez
Zapatero, the prime-minister of Spain and José Manuel Barroso, the President of the
European Commission at the inaugural meeting of the Spanish Presidency (© European
Union)

3
Institutional issues – The implementation of the Lisbon Treaty

The Treaty of Lisbon introduced two new powerful institutional figures, the president of the
European Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
(the so-called EU`s Foreign Affairs minister).
Herman van Rompuy, the newly appointed President of the European Council, will chair EU
summits and will represent the EU in international summits at the level of head of state or
government. However, the country holding the rotating presidency will continue to chair meetings
at ministerial level. It is not clear how this separation will work in practice but it is expected that
the Spanish presidency will create practical precedents for the future.
Thus, even though the powers of the rotating presidency to set the EU agenda are retained by the
Lisbon Treaty, European Council (heads of states or government) meetings will no longer be
presided by the head of the state that holds the presidency. Therefore José Luis Rodríguez
Zapatero will participate in these summits only as Spain’s prime minister.
The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, a post given to
Catherine Ashton, is the main coordinator of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The new
post merges the role of External Relations Commissioner (last held by Benita Ferrero-Waldner)
with that of the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, held in the last 10
years by Javier Solana. The High Representative is one of the
vice-presidents of the EU Commission and chairs the council there are now more commissioners
of Foreign Affairs ministers. This double subordination dealing with external issues
makes it a strange occurrence within the EU`s institutional
framework, which traditionally split the three main areas along clearly delineated lines: Member
States, represented in the Council, the independent bureaucracy of Commission and the people
represented by the Parliament. Ms. Ashton will function both as a member of the Commission and
as an agenda setter within the Council, and it is not yet clear what the practical effects of this will
be.
The reason behind the creation of this powerful new position was the need to simplify the
fragmented organization of EU’s foreign policy that was split both between the Council Secretariat
(Solana) and the Commission and inside the Commission among various commissioners and DGs
(External Relations, Enlargement, Trade, Development, Humanitarian Aid etc.). The Lisbon Treaty
solved the first problem, but the internal organization of the new Barosso Commission seems to
exacerbate the second one as there are now more commissioners dealing with external issues. In
the new Commission Humanitarian Aid was split from the Development portfolio and a new post
of Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response was created, with the Bulgarian
Kristalina Georgieva being nominated for it1. Another change is that concerning the Neighborhood
Policy. The High Representative will not manage EU’s Neighborhood Policy (the relation with the
southern and eastern neighbors), a portfolio previously held by the External Relations
Commissioner. In the new Barosso Commission, the Neighborhood Policy was merged with
1
The initial nomination was for this post was Rumiana Jeleva but she stepped aside after failing to convince the
development committee of the European Parliament.
4
Enlargement and will be managed by Štefan Füle, a former Czech minister for European affairs. For
the other external relations areas the ‘traditional’ portfolios are retained with Karel de Gucht
taking Trade and Andris Piebalgs Development. It is still unclear how the new extended group of
external relations commissioners will work, if they will subordinate, or not, to the High
Representative (the Commission thus ceding to the Council a large part of its informal influence).
By chairing EU or international summits the new top figures will take some of the traditional roles
held by the rotating presidencies. However, Spain vowed to give “maximum” visibility to the new
posts and stressed there will be no competition between the Spanish authorities and the new
figures. More, prime-minister Zapatero said that Spain
will work ‘in complete cooperation and loyalty’ with the
The High Representative will not
new posts created by the Lisbon Treaty. In order to
manage EU’s Neighborhood Policy
coordinate the rotating presidency of the EU with the (the relation with the southern and
permanent presidency of the European Council, the eastern neighbors)
Spanish presidency and the president of the European
Council have agreed to set up a working group staffed
with representatives from both sides.
These reassurances will be tested in the following months and especially so during the seven
summits between the EU and several international partners (US, Pakistan, Morocco, Mexico and
other Latin American countries) that the Spanish presidency plans to hold in Spain and not in
Brussels. Mr. van Rompuy is supposed to represent the EU in international summits but as a host of
the summits, the Spanish prime-minister will also want to play an important role.
As mentioned above, even if under the new rules the country holding the presidency lost some
powers, Mr. Zapatero’s government will continue to be responsible for chairing the ministerial
meetings in Brussels, i.e. those meetings between Member States where most decisions are taken.

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Strengthening EU’s foreign policy. Different approaches for different neighbors
One of the priorities of the Spanish Presidency is to increase the international stature of the
European Union and to make the bloc a “genuine global player” in a “new multi-polar order”. In
order to do this, the Spanish government will have to define more clearly the new instruments for
foreign policy introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. Spain will have to collaborate with the High
Representative in setting up the European External
Action Service (EEAS), the European diplomatic
corps. The service will have its own budget and the
Commission’s delegation abroad will become EU
embassies. The EEAS’s creation has already
provoked clashes between the three institutions
that are going to provide its staff: the General
Secretariat of the Council, the Commission and
member states that will second staff from their
national diplomatic services. The European
Parliament also entered the fray by demanding to
have hearings with some of the special envoys and
ambassadors appointed by the High Representative.
Probably this will remain an open issue, because
member states generally oppose giving such powers ©European Parliament-Pietro Naj-Oleari
to Parliament and Catherine Ashton opposed the Catherine Ashton
idea during her own hearings in the EP.
Unsurprisingly, the Spanish Presidency’s external priorities reflect Spain’s own traditional areas of
interest: Latin America and the Mediterranean. In addition to these, the Spanish added the
transatlantic relationship and the renewal of a strategic agreement with Russia.
Spain plans to organize an EU-Latin America/Caribbean Summit, as well as simultaneous sub-
regional EU-Central America, EU-Mercosur2, EU-Cariforum3 and EU-Chile Summits and wants to
build-up the strategic partnerships with Mexico and Brazil. Spain also plans to improve ties with
Cuba but this will not be easy due to the lack of reforms in the country itself and the existing
opposition in the EU for such a policy change4.
In what concerns the EU’s neighbors, Spain wants “a balanced development of both the Eastern
and the Mediterranean tracks of the European Neighborhood Policy (EnP)”.
Launched after EU’s 2004 expansion, the European Neighborhood Policy had as an objective to
avoid the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbors and to
strengthen the stability, security and prosperity of these states. However, the policy lumped

2
Mercosur is a regional trade agreement among Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil and Uruguay established by the 1991
Treaty of Asunción.
3
Cariforum is an economic pact between the Caribbean Community (Caricom - an organization of 15 Caribbean nations
and dependencies) and the Dominican Republic with the EU.
4
Regarding the Spanish plans towards Cuba the President of the European Parliament Jerzy Buzek declared in an
interview that "Nothing has changed in Cuba to justify a new position of the EU".
6
together both northern African and Middle Eastern countries 5 that can’t become EU members
under the current rules and those from Eastern Europe 6, some of whom have strong European
aspirations. The need to separate the countries that have membership hopes from those that
would not be admitted into the EU was slowly acknowledged, and a gradual separation is visible
between the ‘ENP East’ and the EuroMed countries. The separation of the two groups received
new impetus with the launch of the Union for the Mediterranean in 2008 and the Eastern
Partnership the following year. However, despite these projects, all EU neighbors continue to be
placed under the same ENP hat.
To better address the different relationships with these countries further distinction should be
made between the “European neighbors” in the East and the “neighbors of Europe” in the South
and the EU should have different policies for these two areas. The merging of the Neighborhood
and Enlargement portfolios under one Commissioner was a step in the right direction. What would
make even more sense now would be to split the Neighborhood portfolio, retain the Eastern
Partnership states with Enlargement and assign the relationship with the Mediterranean countries
to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. It is probably too late to change
the structure of this Commission but Romania should advocate this idea inside the EU in the
following years as it is interested in the enlargement of the EU in its vicinity.
The aforementioned merging of the Neighborhood and
Enlargement portfolios raised hopes in some Eastern further distinction should be made
European states such as Moldova and Georgia about their between the “European neighbors”
European perspective. Romania is especially interested in the in the East and the “neighbors of
Europe” in the South
European integration of Moldova, a country that recently
started negotiations on a new Association Agreement.
However, Moldova is not officially considered a ‘potential candidate country’. Romania will further
advocate for the enlargement of the category of ‘potential candidate countries’, currently
comprised of the Western Balkans states and Iceland, especially considering that the accession
process for some of these states (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina) and territories (Kosovo) will
probably take a very long time. The EU integration of European states such as Moldova should not
be held hostage by the problems encountered by other countries.
Russia is not officially part of the European Neighborhood Policy since it negotiated a special
relationship with the EU based on four “common spaces”: Economic issues & the environment,
Freedom, Security & Justice, External Security and Research & Education, including cultural
aspects. Spain plans to continue negotiating the new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement7
with Russia and to improve relations in areas such as energy cooperation, mobility simplification.
Spain plans even to initiate a Free Trade Agreement with Russia if its accession to the WTO is
finalized first but this will most probably not happen in the next six months. Spain also plans to
strengthen the transatlantic dialogue and will organize an EU-US summit to address issues such as
better economic cooperation, the financial crisis recovery, energy security, the fight against
terrorism and foreign policy hotspots such as Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

5
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Jordan and Syria.
6
Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.
7
The document that explains the framework for cooperation between the two sides.
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The new European economic strategy – are we learning the lessons of the previous
failure?
Perhaps the most important proposal to be put forward and negotiated during the Spanish
Presidency will be the new grand plan for a European model of economic growth and
development, the EU 2020 strategy. The new strategy will follow on the Lisbon Strategy (2000 -
2010), which tried to turn the EU into “the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based
economy in the world”.
The new strategy will have to build on its largely The new strategy will have to build
unsuccessful predecessor. Its specific targets helped on its largely unsuccessful
establish common objectives for all Member States and it predecessor
succeeded in raising awareness about the importance of
sharing best practices for achieving those goals. But the use of (the open method of) coordination
instead of binding commitments and sanctions for non-compliance, coupled with too many targets
set for the first half of the implementation period (2000-2005), and the occurrence of the
economic and financial crisis during the last part led to underachievement of the Strategy’s
objectives.
The new EU 2020 Strategy is high on the agenda of the newly re-appointed Commission President
Barroso8, EU Council President van Rompuy, and the Spanish rotating presidency. A proposal from
the Commission (based on a consultation launched in November 2009) will be discussed at the
informal European Council on the 11th of February and at the March Spring European Council. The
main question is whether the new strategy will include some form of binding commitment and
sanctions for the Member States or it will continue to be a non-binding coordination process.

Romania and the 2020 strategy - A new and needed scapegoat for reforms?
The past experience with the Lisbon Strategy and the
current economic crisis provide the policy-makers in
For Romania, a plan with binding
Brussels with the necessary arguments for a more
commitments and sanctions for non-
revolutionary approach for the EU 2020 plan. The Spanish compliance could prove helpful
Presidency seems to be in favor of such an idea, but
gathering everyone’s support would be difficult. For
Romania, a plan with binding commitments and sanctions for non-compliance could prove helpful.
The decision-makers in Bucharest could thus implement unpopular reform measures and to justify
them by indicating that they were required by Brussels. Although not exactly a normal mechanism
for the adoption of unpopular but necessary decisions, the use of an “external scapegoat” works in
Romania, as shown by the experience of reforms in the 1990s. And the EU is still more popular in
Bucharest than the traditional scapegoat - the IMF. The decision-makers in Bucharest could thus
implement unpopular reform measures and shift the blame to Brussels.

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J. M. Barroso - Political guidelines for the next Commission, Brussels, 2009
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In its January 2009 evaluation of the implementation of the National Reform Programme9, the
Commission made certain recommendations for Romania in order to achieve the Lisbon targets: to
strengthen the public administration, to tighten the fiscal policy and improve the macroeconomic
mix, to simplify certain administrative procedures, and to rethink the education and training
systems in order to meet the demand on the labor market. In terms of concrete objectives,
Romania falls behind its country specific targets. The latest employment rate is 60%10, compared to
the national target of 63% and the Lisbon target of 70%, while investment in R&D was 0.58% of
GDP in 2007, compared with a national target of 1.8% of GDP, and a Lisbon target of 3% of GDP 11.
During the Spanish Presidency the Commission is also expected to put forward its proposals for the
future of the EU budget. In this respect, a public consultation process took place in 2008, and the
Commission will have to accommodate in its proposal the views expressed with that occasion. The
input provided points to a series of challenges for the future of Europe: climate change, economic
competitiveness, security of energy supplies, inequality between countries and regions,
demographic trends. These challenges would need proper financing in order to be appropriately
tackled. Therefore the results of the consultation favor increasing spending in areas such as:
environment, R&D, competitiveness, energy. Cohesion spending seems to be given the same
support as in the past, while agriculture appears to be the favorite pick for spending reduction12.
On the revenues side, the participants in the consultation pointed to the need to get rid of the
complicated system of corrections (the British rebate being the most prominent), and to simplify or
eliminate altogether the VAT-based resource. The reduction/elimination of the British rebate is
linked to further reforming the agricultural spending. The VAT-based resource requires that the
VAT bases in all Member States are harmonized in order to eliminate situations where less
prosperous countries with higher consumption rates contribute more to this resource. The share of
the VAT-based resources in total EU budget revenues has also declined over the years to a little
more than 10% today. Therefore most analysts seem to agree that this resource should be
eliminated in order to simplify the system of own resources. In the absence of a new resource, the
funding would be covered by increasing the share of the GNI-based resource, which has the
advantage of being more transparent and directly linked to each Member State’s prosperity.
For Romania, the most important item of the EU budget is agriculture, since the biggest part of the
allocations for the country come from this budget heading. A radical reduction in the agricultural
spending is improbable, however, since the agricultural lobby in Europe is still strong and the
approval of the financial framework is subject to unanimity voting in the Council. CRPE will soon
launch a comprehensive analysis of the EU budget reform and its implications for Romania.

9
See http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/pdf/european-dimension-200812-annual-progress-report/annual_en.pdf
10
INSSE, Ocuparea şi şomajul în trimestrul III 2009.
11
Commission Annual Progress Report 2008, Statistical Annex; available online:
http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/pdf/european-dimension-200812-annual-progress-report/stats_en.pdf
12
Former budget commissioner Dalia Grybauskaitė’s presentation is available online:
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/reform/library/conference/intro_grybauskaite.pdf
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A new financial supervision framework
Another area of interest during the Spanish Presidency is the negotiations on the new financial
supervision framework in the EU. Following the report by the high-level group of experts chaired
by Jacques de Larosière, the European Commission presented a proposal for a new legislation
package on financial supervision at the end of 2009. The main elements of the proposal concern
the creation of a series of European bodies in charge with financial supervision:
 a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), which would monitor macroeconomic
developments in order to be able to detect any threats to financial stability in Europe. It
would also provide an early warning mechanism for systemic risks and make
recommendations for action in this respect;
 a European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS), consisting of national authorities and
three new entities: the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), and the European Securities and Markets
Authority (ESMA).
Given the legislative procedure applicable (co-decision) and the calendar of activities in the
institutions, the package could be adopted in the second part of 2010. This means that part of the
negotiations will be held during the Spanish Presidency. As Romania is not one of the big players in
this area, a good approach would be to play safe and act as a deal facilitator.

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What is flexicurity and how it could work in Romania
The creation of new jobs as a solution for fixing the economy after the crisis is one of the four big
priorities announced by the Spanish Minister of External Affairs Diego López Garrido. The Spanish
Presidency is aware of the fact that the labor market has been directly affected by the economic
crisis. But since the powers of the European Presidency are still unclear, as its role is rather one of
proposing discussion agendas, the proposed politics will only be as efficient as the ability of the
Spanish to succeed in convincing member states to act in one direction or another.
The solutions indicated in the 2010 program published by Spanish Presidency to create new jobs
are
 professional training (retraining, gaining new skills) and
 improving the employability of workers (a new concept, representing the means by which
individuals can face the changing conditions of the hiring process).
Adjusting the work force to new sources of economic growth and optimal employment is, in the
Spanish vision, a guarantee for the European social model and for the pension systems in Europe.
As with any planning document, the Spanish assert that they will see to just about everything:
equality on the labor market between women and men, worker skill adjustment to the needs of
the labor market, the improvement in education quality, seeking excellence in university and
professional training, a good balance between workplace flexibility and safety, etc. In brief, new
jobs will be created, for which new competencies will be needed. The transition between jobs will
be administered efficiently, as well as that between professional training and jobs. In this sense,
flexi-security ought to be developed to the maximum. Learning throughout life should be much
more accessible, and universities ought to be much more open to atypical students.
Since we find among the objectives of this report the aim of promoting in Romania new concepts
making inroads in Europe and which are used in official
documents ( as well as the Commission’s working Universities ought to be much more
document for consultation regarding the future strategy open to atypical students.
"EU 2020”), it makes sense to briefly explain here a term
we are likely to also find in the near future in the
dictionary.
Clearly, the concept is made up of the words flexibility and safety. Even though the Danes are
credited with introducing it in the specialty vocabulary and its successful usage on a wide scale, the
term was first promoted in the 1990’s by the Dutch. It spread throughout Europe after 2005.
In order to be used successful (following the Danish model), the concept requires three conditions:
a flexible labor market, generous short-term social schemes, and active labor market policies. It
stems from the premise that workplace safety is no longer important if the chances of finding a
new job increase and you are well protected socially during unemployment.

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Fig. 1 Hybrid models of social security

Low workplace safety Higher workplace safety

United Kindgdom Italy
Low Social Security
USA Romania

Higher Social Security Denmark Germany

In the European Union, this social security model is actively promoted by social-democrats. Since it
is found in the Union’s planning documents, it is expected that this will be promoted in other states
as well, even though it is recognized that in the Northern states where it is successful, the system is
the result of decades of evolution and active policies for the labor force.
Over the short term, Romania has minimal chances to break away from the traditional model of
social solidarity, because it seems to lack almost all ingredients:
1. We have a labor market with reduced flexibility. One of the best indicators for this point is,
in fact, is the percentage of the population that participates in continuing education and
training. Below 2% of Romanians are involved in such programs which would give them a
larger area of competence and make them more easily employed.
Fig. 2 Lifelong learning in the EU. Percentage of the population 25-64 participating in
education and training over the four weeks prior to the survey

Source: Eurostat 2008

2. Our social protection schemes are overused and are not sustainable over the long term.
Unemployment aid cannot offer enough social security for families with several children.
3. We also cannot talk over the short term about active policies for the labor market for two
reasons. The first is that Romanian governments have proven incapable to think and apply
such policies on a wide scale. The second is that active policies are costly, and the
Government seems much more concerned now, after the crisis, to collect rather that spend
public funds to insure passive social schemes.
More than anything else, in order to develop flexi-security, workers’ ability to adapt to the needs
of various employers and the attitude toward the inevitability of job change is very important. For
example, in Denmark, approximatively 30% of the active population changes jobs annually, while
20% faces unemployment. In exchange, about 13% of the population undertakes at the very least a

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continuing professional training course, while 11% benefits from active employment policies (they
receive assistance from the state to find a jobs).
Fig. 3: The Danish flexicurity model

Following a relatively stable period, with an unemployment rate below the European average,
Romanians bare beginning to relive the fear provoked by lack of job safety. If we were faring well
with this chapter until now (and for migration reasons – we exported massively labor force to Italy
and Spain), now we are approaching and even exceeding, according to employers’ estimates, the
European average of 9,5 (according to EUROSTAT). The official figure published by ANOFM for
December 2009 is 7,8.
It is likely that the Spanish Presidency of the Council of the European Union will face difficulties in
reaching its objectives, at least as long as it lacks instruments somewhat comparable to the
International Monetary Fund, which demands budget cuts and layoffs rather than measures
focused on growth.

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The priorities of the Spanish Presidency for the Energy Sector
As part of its plan, the Spanish Presidency foresaw three Energy Councils in 2010, the first informal
between January 15-16 in Seville, and the following on March 12 and May 31, respectively, in
Brussels.
The number one priority for the next six months is adopting the 2010-2014 Energy Action Plan
2010-2014, on the occasion of the spring European Council. This seeks a revision of the Union’s
energy strategy for the following five years, to include the compromises obtained during
negotiations for the "Energy and Climate Changes” Packet, as well as the agreement reached in
Copenhagen in December 2009.
The plan will include among others, sections on the theme of energy sustainability, of the fight
against climate changes and energy security as well as the
Strategic Technology Plan – SET Plan. Discussions along
the Spanish presidency has proposed
this plan constituted, in fact, the emphasis during the to give priority to improving the
Informal Energy Council which took place on January 15- security of energy supply by
16 in Seville, together with the Council of European diversifying energy sources and
Environmental Council. The Spanish energy minister developing interconnection
stated that the energy policy cannot be seen as anything infrastructure between states
but a sustainable one, hence the link with the EU policy
regarding the environment.
The development of an energy security policy represents a priority for the EU, and it will be
included in the Action Plan for Energy Security and Solidarity. The objective consists of limiting
vulnerability for member states, through such measures as the development and multiplication of
trans-European transport networks and of the energy interconnections within the Union, a greater
transparency of energy markets, as well as establishing alert and solidarity mechanisms to
administer crisis situations. In this sense, in fact, among the stated legislative priorities is that of
adopting the Regulation related to the measures meant to guarantee the security of natural gas
supply.
In order to avoid problems such as those that arose after the conflicts between Russia and the
Ukraine, the Spanish presidency has proposed to give priority to improving the security of energy
supply by diversifying energy sources and developing interconnection infrastructure between
states. One key element in this direction will be represented by the activity of the European
Commission, which is expected to present the New Security Instrument for the Energy
Infrastructures of the EU, following public consultation. Also, in January, the Commission will
present an evaluation of the status of the energy projects of the European Plan for Economic
Relaunch and a draft Directive related to the transparency of energy markets. In March of this year,
the Commission is expected to present a Report on the internal market of the energy sector.
Although not confirmed entirely, it is possible that other proposals exist from the Commission for a
directive on radioactive waste and a regulation regarding transport of radioactive material.
With regards to international reunions, the agenda of the Spanish Presidency includes organizing
the second meeting of the EU-U.S. Energy Council (in May), a high-level Conference on the

14
Mediterranean Solar Plan (Valencia), a seminar in the area of renewable energies (Oran, Algiers),
finalizing negotiations for the Euratom-Rusia Agreement and launching discussions on the
negotiation mandate for a new Euratom – Australia Agreement.
Another concern for the Spanish Presidency will be promoting renewable energy. Following the
adopting of the Directive on renewable energy, the Spanish
Presidency intends to support the preparation of national plans The SET Plan seeks to analyze
for member states, which must be presented before June 2010. the practice in the area of
In addition, Spain wants to pay special attention to improving generating energy with low
energy efficiency in the 2006 Energy Efficiency Action Plan. Its carbon dioxide emissions, in
revision is planned for the first semester of the current, so that areas such as solar energy,
thermo-solar and
it can be adapted for the “20-20-2013” decision in the Energy
photovoltaic, land and sea-
and Climate Changes Package.
based wind energy and
The Spanish Presidency plans to encourage the third set of electric vehicles. The
measures regarding the energy internal market and to promote introduction of this priority
should come as no surprise,
the achievement of priority projects for energy interconnection,
given that Spain is, within the
as already decided in the Trans-European Energy Network
Union, one of the "champion”
Guidelines. states in the area of
Not least, the Spanish Presidency plans on adopting the renewable energies.
conclusions related to the Strategic Technology Plan (SET Plan)
and encouraging development of industrial initiatives in the
area of solar energy, smart networks and carbon capture and
storage.
Keeping in mind that the development of an energy security policy is a priority for the EU and for
the current Spanish Presidency, Romania could position herself as a pooling point for the interests
of Central and Southern EU member states directly affected by energy security aspects, the
objective being regional stimulation with a view to ensuring a constant flux of energy towards a
European market that is increasingly dependent on external energy sources. Romania could play
the main role of promoter of this initiative emphasizing the position according to which ensuring
of a stable energy framework depends on common coordinated efforts, and not punctual
initiatives.
Romania could, in addition to creating a framework for the interests of EU member states, to
attract for this initiative players from outside EU borders (for example Turkey – a very important
state for the transit of hydrocarbons to Europe) and even private interests (companies whose
activity depends on the existence of a stable and predictable energy circuit).

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The “20-20-20” Plan refers to the following 3 targets which should be accomplished by 2020: 20% reduction in
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2020 compared with 1990 levels, increase in the use of renewable energy from
7% to 20% by 2020 and improved energy efficiency in order to save 20% of EU’s primary energy consumption
compared with an acceptable basis (different for every country).
15
This report is part of CRPE’s project Romania as an active actor in EU debates and is financed by
the Soros Foundation Romania under the Foreign Affairs Initiative program.
The contents of this report do not necessarily represent the official position of the Soros
Foundation.

The opinions expressed do not automatically represent the position of all affiliated experts or other
affiliated institutions and partner organizations.

Credit cover photo: MyfanwyX via Flickr

Copyright of this publication is held by the Romanian Center for European Policies (CRPE)

© CRPE January 2010

Romanian Center for European Policies (CRPE)

Căderea Bastiliei 16
Ap. 2, Bucharest-1
office@crpe.ro
Tel/fax: (+4) 021.310.35.58

For more details about CRPE please visit http://www.crpe.ro/eng

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