G.R. No. 172642. June 13, 2012.

*
ESTATE OF NELSON R. DULAY, represented by his wife MERRIDY JANE P. DULAY, petitioner, vs.
ABOITIZ JEBSEN MARITIME, INC. and GENERAL CHARTERERS, INC., respondents.

Labor Law; Arbitration; It is settled that when the parties have validly agreed on a procedure for
resolving grievances and to submit a dispute to voluntary arbitration then that procedure should be
strictly observed.—In any case, the Court agrees with petitioner’s contention that the CBA is the law or
contract between the parties. Article 13.1 of the CBA entered into by and between respondent GCI and
AMOSUP, the union to which petitioner belongs, provides as follows: The Company and the Union agree
that in case of dispute or conflict in the interpretation or application of any of the provisions of this
Agreement, or enforcement of Company policies, the same shall be settled through negotiation,
conciliation or voluntary arbitration. The Company and the Union further agree that they will use their
best endeavor to ensure that any dispute will be discussed, resolved and settled amicably by the parties
hereof within ninety (90) days from the date of filing of the dispute or conflict and in case of failure to
settle thereof any of the parties retain their freedom to take appropriate action. (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing, it is clear that the parties, in the first place, really intended to bring to conciliation
or voluntary arbitration any dispute or conflict in the interpretation or application of the provisions of
their CBA. It is settled that when the parties have validly agreed on a procedure for resolving grievances
and to submit a dispute to voluntary arbitration then that procedure should be strictly observed.

Same; Same; Collective Bargaining Agreements; It is only in the absence of a collective bargaining
agreement that parties may opt to submit the dispute to either the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) or to voluntary arbitration.—It is only in the absence of a collective bargaining
agreement that parties may opt to submit the dispute to either the NLRC or to voluntary arbitration. It is
elementary that rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they
are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect. Such rules and
regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are just as binding as if they have been written in the
statute itself. In the instant case, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from this rule.

Same; Same; Conciliation; Constitutional Law; Under the third paragraph, Section 3, Article XIII, of the
Constitution, “[t]he State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and
employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and
shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.”—No less than the Philippine
Constitution provides, under the third paragraph, Section 3, Article XIII, thereof that “[t]he State shall
promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use
of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance
therewith to foster industrial peace.”

FACTS:
Nelson R. Dulay was employed by General Charterers Inc. (GCI), a subsidiary of co-petitioner Aboitiz Jebs
en Maritime Inc. 25 days after the completion of his employment contract, Nelson died due to acute ren
al failure secondary to septicemia. At the time of his death, Nelson was a bona fide member of the Assoc
iated Marine Officers and Seaman’s Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP), GCI’s collective bargaining agen
t. Nelson’s widow, Merridy Jane, thereafter claimed for death benefits through the grievance procedure 
of the CBA between AMOSUP and GCI. However, the grievance procedure was “declared deadlocked” as 
petitioners refused to grant the benefits sought by the widow. The wife then filed a complaint with the 
NLRC Sub-Regional Arbitration against GCI for death and medical benefits and damages. Nelson’s brothe
r, only received P20,000.00 from respondents pursuant to the CBA. Merridy Jane contended that she is e
ntitled to the aggregate sum of $90,000.00 instead.
The CA ruled that while the suit filed by Merridy Jane is a money claim, the same basically involves the in
terpretation and application of the provisions in the subject CBA. As such, jurisdiction belongs to the vol
untary arbitrator and not the labor arbiter.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not claim for death benefits of an overseas employee should be with the Labor Arbiter consi
dering that such granting involves interpretation and application of the provisions in the CBA.
 
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court held that it is true that R.A. 8042 is a special law governing overseas Filipino wor
kers. However, a careful reading of this special law would readily show that there is no specific provision 
thereunder which provides for jurisdiction over disputes or unresolved grievances regarding the interpre
tation or implementation of a CBA. Section 10 of R.A. 8042, which is cited by petitioner, simply speaks, i
n general, of “claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contrac
t involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and ot
her forms of damages.” On the other hand, Articles 217(c) and 261 of the Labor Code are very specific in 
stating that voluntary arbitrators have jurisdiction over cases arising from the interpretation or impleme
ntation of collective bargaining agreements. Stated differently, the instant case involves a situation wher
e the special statute (R.A. 8042) refers to a subject in general, which the general statute (Labor Code) tre
ats in particular.

Furthermore, Article 13.1 of the CBA provides that in case of dispute or conflict in the interpretation or a
pplication of any of the provisions of this Agreement, or enforcement of Company policies, the same sha
ll be settled through negotiation, conciliation or voluntary arbitration. Therefore, it is clear that the parti
es, in the first place, really intended to bring to conciliation or voluntary arbitration any dispute or confli
ct in the interpretation or application of the provisions of their CBA. It is settled that when the parties ha
ve validly agreed on a procedure for resolving grievances and to submit a dispute to voluntary arbitratio
n then that procedure should be strictly observed.

Law applicable:

1987 Constitution Article 13

SECTION 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized,
and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations,
and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be
entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate
in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.

The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the
preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their
mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.

The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to
its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on
investments, and to expansion and growth.
Labor Code
Art. 218. Powers of the Commission. The Commission shall have the power and authority:
* To promulgate rules and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of cases before it and its
regional branches, as well as those pertaining to its internal functions and such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Code; (As amended by Section 10, Republic Act No.
6715, March 21, 1989)

G.R. No. 179146. July 23, 2013.*

HOLY CHILD CATHOLIC SCHOOL, petitioner, vs. HON. PATRICIA STO. TOMAS, in her official capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, and PINAG-ISANG TINIG AT LAKAS NG
ANAKPAWIS–HOLY CHILD CATHOLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION (HCCS-TELU-
PIGLAS), respondents.

FACTS:
A petition for certification election was filed by private respondent Pinag-Isang Tinig at Lakas ng Anakpa
wis – Holy Child Catholic School Teachers and Employees Labor Union (HCCSTELUPIGLAS). Holy Child Par
ochial School raised that members of private respondent do not belong to the same class; it is not only a 
mixture of managerial, supervisory, and rank-and-file employees – 
as three (3) are viceprincipals, one (1) is a department head/supervisor, and eleven (11) are coordinator
s – but also a combination of teaching and non-teaching personnel – as twenty-seven (27) are non-
teaching personnel. It insisted that, for not being in accord with Article 24510 of the Labor Code, private 
respondent is an illegitimate labor organization lacking in personality to file a petition for certification el
ection The Med-Arbiter denied the same.
 
ISSUE:
 Whether or not a petition for certification election is dismissible on the ground that the labor organizati
on’s membership allegedly consists of supervisory and rank-and-file employees.
 
RULING:
No. Before, when the 1989 Rules was still in application, mingling will prevent an otherwise legitimate a
nd duly registered labor organization from exercising its right to file a petition for certification election. B
ut then, the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules was further amended by Department Order No. 9, series of 
1997 (1997 Amended Omnibus Rules). Specifically, the requirement under Sec. 2(c) of the 1989 Amende
d Omnibus Rules – that the petition for certification election indicate that the bargaining unit of rank-
and-file employees has not been mingled with supervisory employees – was removed.

Petitioner argued that, in view of the improper mixture of teaching and non-teaching personnel in privat
e respondent due to the absence of mutuality of interest among its members, the petition for certificati
on election should have been dismissed on the ground that private respondent is not qualified to file suc
h petition for its failure to qualify as a legitimate labor organization, the basic qualification of which is th
e representation of an appropriate bargaining unit. The Supreme Court disagreed and said that the conc
epts of a union and of a legitimate labor organization are different from, but related to, the concept of a 
bargaining unit.

In case of alleged inclusion of disqualified employees in a union, the proper procedure for an employer li
ke petitioner is to directly file a petition for cancellation of the union’s certificate of registration due to 
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Article 239 of the L
abor Code, as amended. To reiterate, private respondent, having been validly issued a certificate of regis
tration, should be considered as having acquired juridical personality which may not be attacked collater
ally.

Laws applicable:
Art. 255. Exclusive bargaining representation and workers’ participation in policy and decision-making.
The labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate
collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the
purpose of collective bargaining. However, an individual employee or group of employees shall have the
right at any time to present grievances to their employer.

Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, workers shall have the right, subject to such rules
and regulations as the Secretary of Labor and Employment may promulgate, to participate in policy and
decision-making processes of the establishment where they are employed insofar as said processes will
directly affect their rights, benefits and welfare. For this purpose, workers and employers may form
labor-management councils: Provided, That the representatives of the workers in such labor-
management councils shall be elected by at least the majority of all employees in said establishment. (As
amended by Section 22, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)

Art. 256. Representation issue in organized establishments. In organized establishments, when a verified
petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent is filed before the
Department of Labor and Employment within the sixty-day period before the expiration of the collective
bargaining agreement, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically order an election by secret ballot when the
verified petition is supported by the written consent of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of all the
employees in the bargaining unit to ascertain the will of the employees in the appropriate bargaining
unit. To have a valid election, at least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit must have cast their
votes. The labor union receiving the majority of the valid votes cast shall be certified as the exclusive
bargaining agent of all the workers in the unit. When an election which provides for three or more
choices results in no choice receiving a majority of the valid votes cast, a run-off election shall be
conducted between the labor unions receiving the two highest number of votes: Provided, that the total
number of votes for all contending unions is at least fifty percent (50%) of the number of votes cast.
At the expiration of the freedom period, the employer shall continue to recognize the majority status of
the incumbent bargaining agent where no petition for certification election is filed. (As amended by
Section 23, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)

G.R. No. 209555. July 31, 2017.*

 UNITED POLYRESINS, INC., ERNESTO UY SOON, JR., and/or JULITO UY SOON, petitioners, vs.
MARCELINO PINUELA, respondent.

Labor Law; Unfair Labor Practice; It is an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to “cause or
attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee, including discrimination against an
employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or to terminate an
employee on any ground other than the usual terms and conditions under which membership or
continuation of membership is made available to other members.”—This could be an opportune time
for the union to consider amending its Constitution in order to provide for specific rules on the discipline
of its members, not just its officers. After all, it is given the right under the Labor Code, “to prescribe its
own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership.” But it may not insist on expelling
respondent from PORFA and assist in his dismissal from UPI without just cause, since it is an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization to “cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee, including discrimination against an employee with respect to whom membership in such
organization has been denied or to terminate an employee on any ground other than the usual terms
and conditions under which membership or continuation of membership is made available to other
members.”

FACTS:
United Polyresins, Inc. (UPI) is a registered domestic corporation while Ernesto Uy Soon, Jr. and Julito Uy
Soon are its corporate officers. Marcelino Pinuela was employed by UPI in 1987. He was a member of
the labor union, Polyresins Rank and File Association (PORFA), and was elected President thereof. Under
the existing CBA between UPI and PORFA, it was provided that UPI shall grant to PORFA PHP 300,000 as
the union’s capital for establishing a cooperative to meet the needs of its members. The CBA also
contained a union security clause which provided that employees who cease to be PORFA members in
good standing by reason of his resignation or expulsion shall not be retained in the employ of UPI.

During Pinuela’s term as PORFA President, it appeared that UPI automatically deducted from the
respective salaries of PORFA members amounts representing union membership dues and loan
payments. These amounts, which totalled ₱2,402,533.43, were then regularly turned over by UPI to
PORFA in the form of fifty eight (58) crossed checks. Several days before the PHP 300,000 loan became
due, the union officers and UPI met to discuss the proposed new CBA. However, UPI told Pinuela that it
will not discuss the proposed CBA until the loan is paid. Pinuela told UPI that the union did not have the
finances. Because of the recurring threat of failed CBA negotiations and salary deductions as a means of
recovering the amount of the loan, the union members began to demand the holding of a special
election of union officers. A special election was held, and a new union President and set of officers
were elected. When the new union officers conducted an investigation and found that the union had no
more funds as they were utilized in the prosecution of cases during Pinuela’s incumbency. Pinuela also
failed to make a formal turnover of documents to the new President.

The officers held that these violations constituted an infringement if the union’s Constitution which
prohibit the misappropriation of union funds and property and give ground for the impeachment and
recall of union officers. Thus, PORFA wrote a letter communicating Pinuela’s expulsion from the union.
Eventually, UPI issued a letter of termination to Pinuela.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Pinuela was illegally dismissed

HELD:
Yes. The union and UPI claimed that the dismissal was based on the union security clause. Pinuela’s
expulsion from the union was based on the union’s constitution. However, these provisions provides for
the impeachment and recall of union officers, not expulsion from union membership. Any officer found
guilty of violating these provisions shall simply be removed, impeached or recalled, from office, but not
expelled or stripped of union membership. It was therefore error on the part of PORFA and UPI to
terminate Pinuela’s employment based on Article XV, Section 1, paragraphs (e) and (f) of the union's
Constitution. Such a ground does not constitute just cause for termination.

In addition, the union may not insist on expelling Pinuela from PORFA and assist in his dismissal from UPI
without just cause, since it is an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to "cause or attempt to
cause an employer to discriminate against an employee, including discrimination against an employee
with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or to terminate an employee
on any ground other than the usual terms and conditions under which membership or continuation of
membership is made available to other members."

Notes:
WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS CASE?
 
RESPONDENT PINUELA, FORMER UNION PRESIDENT, WAS EXPELLED FROM PETITIONER LABOR UNION.
ON GROUND OF EXPULSION HE WAS DISMISSED. THE ISSUE WAS WHETHER HIS DISMISSAL WAS VALID.
THE COURT OF APPEALS RULED THAT HIS DISMISSAL WAS NOT VALID BECAUSE HIS EXPULSION FROM
THE UNION WAS NOT VALID. THE GROUND RELIED UPON FOR EXPULSION WAS CAUSE FOR
IMPEACHMENT OF UNION OFFICERS AND NOT FOR EXPULSION. THE SUPREME COURT AFFIRMED CA
DECISION.
 
RESPONDENT WAS EXPELLED BECAUSE HE FAILED TO ACCOUNT CERTAIN UNION FUND. WAS HIS
EXPULSION VALID?
 
NO. BECAUSE HIS FAILURE TO ACCOUNT FOR CERTAIN FUNDS WAS NOT ONE OF THE GROUNDS FOR
EXPELLING A MEMBER. THESE GROUNDS PER THE CONSTITUTION  OF THE UNION ARE:
1.  SUBVERSIVE OR PERSONS WHO PROFESS SUBVERSIVE IDEAS.
 
2. PERSONS WHO HAVE BEEN CONVICTED OF CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE.
 
3.  PERSONS WHO ARE NOT EMPLOYEES OF THE COMPANY.39
 
“A review of the PORF A Constitution itself reveals that the only provision authorizing removal from the
union is found in Article X, Section 6, that is, on the ground of failure to pay union dues, special
assessments, fines, and other mandatory charges. 38 On the other hand, grounds for disqualification
from membership may be found in Article IV, which states that:
 
Section 3. The following are not eligible neither [sic] for membership nor to election or appointment to
any position in the union:
 
 1. Subversive or persons who profess subversive ideas.
 
 2. Persons who have been convicted of crime involving moral turpitude.
 
 3. Persons who are not employees of the company.39”
 
BUT A CASE OF ESTAFA WAS ALREADY FILED AGAINST RESPONDENT. IS THIS NOT A GROUND FOR
EXPULSION?
 
NO. BECAUSE RESPONDENT IS NOT YET CONVICTED.
 
SPECIFICALLY, THE RESPONDENT FAILED TO RETURN THE P300,000.00 GIVEN BY THE COMPANY TO THE
UNION. CAN THIS NOT BE A JUST GROUND FOR THE DISMISSAL?
 
 NO. IN FACT THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE COMPANY TO THE UNION IS ILLEGAL.
 
“The matter of respondent’s alleged failure to return petitioners’ 1!300,000.00 which was lent to PORFA
is immaterial as well. It may not be used as a ground to terminate respondent’s employment; under the
Labor Code, such a contribution by petitioners to PORF A is illegal and constitutes unfair labor practice.
 
ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. -It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the
following unfair labor practice:
 
xx xx
 
(d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of any labor
organization, including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizers or supporters;42
(Emphasis supplied)”