CODICILS

• Art. 825. A codicil is supplement

or addition to a will, made after
the execution of a will and
annexed to be taken as a part
thereof, by which disposition
made in the original will is
explained, added to, or altered. 
CODICIL
• Is a supplement or addition to a
will, made after the execution of a
will and annexed to be taken as a
part thereof, by which any
disposition made in the original will
is explained, added to or altered.
CAN THE CODICIL
EXIST ON ITS
OWN?
Codicil is part of the will, so it cannot exist by
itself.
IF THE ORIGINAL WILL IS
A NOTARIAL WILL,
SHOULD THE CODICIL BE
ALSO IN THE FORM OF A
NOTARIAL CODICIL?
 WHICH SHOULD
PREVAIL –
DISPOSITIONS IN THE
WILL OR
DISPOSITIONS IN
CODICIL v. NEW WILL
When you execute a codicil after you execute a will, If after to executed a first will, you then execute
the codicil is taken as part of the will another will, the new will exists independently of the
first will and is without reference to the first will
CODICIL v. NEW WILL
The codicil EXPLAINS, ADDS TO, SUPPLEMENTS Has no regard to the previous will; does not explain,
and ALTERS the provisions in the original will add to or supplement the original will
 CODICIL v. NEW WILL
The codicil may revoke only a part of the original will
Because a codicil is taken as a part of the original will,
then the original will and the codicil are taken as one
When you execute a new will, the entire previous will is
revoked
When you execute a new will, they are separate. The one
revokes the other.
• Art. 826. In order that a
codicil may be effective, it
shall be executed as in the
case of a will.
• NOTARIAL CODICIL – will
follow the rules required by law
for a notarial will
• HOLOGRAPHIC WILL –
follows the rules of holographic
will
WHAT WOULD HAPPEN
IF THE CODICIL DOES
NOT FOLLOW THE
REQUIREMENTS OF
THE LAW?
• The codicil is void because it does
not comply with the requirements of
the law. The invalidity of the codicil
will not however affect the validity
of the will.
• The will is valid notwithstanding the
codicil’s invalidity.
INCORPORATIO
N BY
REFERENCE
Art. 827. If a will, executed as required by this Code,
incorporates into itself by reference any document or paper,
such document or paper shall not be considered a part of the
will unless the following requisites are present:
(1) The document or paper referred to in the will must be in
existence at the time of the execution of the will;
(2) The will must clearly describe and identify the same, stating
among other things the number of pages thereof;
(3) It must be identified by clear and satisfactory proof as the
document or paper referred to therein; and
(4) It must be signed by the testator and the witnesses on each
and every page, except in case of voluminous books of account
or inventories.
Incorporation by Reference
• If a will, executed as required by the Civil
Code, incorporates into itself by reference
any document or paper, such document or
paper shall not be considered a part of the
will unless the requisites set forth in Art.
827 are satisfied.
• GR: In probate of wills, only
documents or papers which are
executed in the form of wills can
be allowed probate.
• Exc: Art. 827- even if the paper or
document is not in the form of a
will, it can be probated along with
the will.
 ST
1 REQUISITE: The document or paper
referred to in the will must be in existence at the
time of the execution of the will
• Said document/paper must be ALREADY
IN EXISTENCE AT THE TIME OF THE
EXECUTION of the will
• An inventory which is not yet prepared is
not a valid incorporation by reference and
will not affect the will’s validity
 nd
2 REQUISITE: The will must clearly describe
and identify the same, stating among other
things the number of pages thereof
• State the number of pages of the document
to be incorporated (even if voluminous)
• General description of the document
(appearance, location)
 rd
3 REQUISITE: It must be identified by clear
and satisfactory proof as the document or paper
referred to therein
• Happens during the probate of the will
• Proof that the document presented is the
same document referred to in the will
• Extrinsic evidence
 th
4 REQUISITE: It must be signed by the testator
and the witnesses on each and every page, except in
case of voluminous books of account or inventories

• GR: Must be signed on each and every

page by testator and witnesses
• Exc: Voluminous – at least a sufficient
number of pages are signed
 Requirements to be stated in the will
• The fact that you are referring
to the document or paper
• Clear description and
identification of the document
• Number of pages of such
document
 Requirements to appear on the face of the
document to be incorporated:
• Signature of the testator and
witness
• Exc: voluminous
Proved by extrinsic evidence

• Existence of the document at the time of

the execution of the will
• That the document is the one being referred
to in the will
TAKE NOTE:

• If holographic will, the

incorporation by reference of a
document has to be entirely
written, dated and signed by the
testator
IS IT REQUIRED THAT
THE THIS
INCORPORATION BY
REFERENCE BE
MENTIONED IN THE
Unson v. Abella
• In view of the fact that the inventory is
referred to in the will as an integral part of
it, we find that the foregoing attestation
clause is in compliance with section 1 of
Act No. 2645, which requires this
solemnity for the validity of a will, and
makes unnecessary any other attestation
clause at the end of the inventory.
REVOCATION OF
WILLS AND
TESTAMENTARY
DISPOSITIONS
• Art. 828. A will may be
revoked by the testator at
any time before his death.
Any waiver or restriction
of this right is void.
 RIGHT TO REVOKE
• A will may be revoked by the testator at any time
before his death
• Any waiver or restriction of this right is VOID.
• However, the recognition of an illegitimate child
does not lose its legal effect, even though the will
wherein it was made should be revoked. (Art.
834)
FALSE CAUSE FOR
REVOCATION
• Art. 833. A revocation of a
will based on a false cause
or an illegal cause is null
and void. 
• If the testator revoked his will based on a
cause stated therein, but the facts
constituting the cause for revocation turn
out to be false, the revocation cannot
take effect and the will remains
operative.
• There must be a showing that there was a
mistaken belief that the cause exists.
Art. 830. No will shall be revoked except in the following cases:
(1) By implication of law; or
(2) By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided
in case of wills; or
(3) By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with
the intention of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some
other person in his presence, and by his express direction. If
burned, torn, cancelled, or obliterated by some other person,
without the express direction of the testator, the will may still
be established, and the estate distributed in accordance
therewith, if its contents, and due execution, and the fact of its
unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or obliteration are
established according to the Rules of Court.
 Manner of Revocation
• By implication of law
• By some will, codicil or other writing
executed as provided in case of wills
• By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating
the will with the intention of revoking it, by
the testator himself, or by some other person
in his presence and by his express direction
 By implication of law
• Preterition of compulsory heirs in the direct line – Art.
854
• Judicial demand of a credit given in legacy – Art. 957
• Loss, alienation or transformation of the thing bequeathed
or devised – Art. 957
• Commission by an heir, devisee or legatee of an act of
unworthiness – Art. 1031, 1032
• Decree of legal separation revokes the provisions in the
innocent spouse’s will in favor of the offending spouse –
Art. 63, par. 4, FC
By will, codicil or other writing
• In order that a former will may be revoked
by a subsequent will, the latter should be
valid and executed with the formalities
required for the making of wills and
probated, so that the revocatory clause
thereof may produce the effect of revoking
the previous will.
Samson v. Naval
st
• February 13, 1915 – 1 will
probated but denied
nd
• October 31, 1914 – 2 will
probated by the nieces and
legatees of the deceased Simeona F.
Naval
• The petition for allowance was opposed by
Monica Naval, Rosa Naval, and Cristina Naval
on the ground that the will, the allowance of
which is asked, could not be allowed, because of
the existence of another will of subsequent date,
executed during her lifetime by the same
Simeona F. Naval, and because said will has been
revoked by another executed subsequently by her
during her lifetime, and further, because sail will
has not been executed with the formalities
required by existing laws. 
• From the evidence it appears, as we have already stated, that the trial
court declared that the first document presented by the executor of the
deceased, Simeona F. Naval, as a will executed by her on February 13,
1915, and which was the subject-matter of case No. 13386 of said
court, could not be allowed, on the ground that it was not executed
with the requisites and formalities prescribed by law. Article 739 of
the Civil Code provides that a former will is by operation of law
revoked by another valid subsequent will, if the testator does not state
in the later will his desire that the former should subsist wholly or
partly. In harmony with this provision of substantive law, we find
section 623 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that no
will shall be revoked, except by implication of law, otherwise than by
some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of
wills.
Therefore, according to the legal provisions, in order
that the will of February 13, 1915, that is, the first
document presented as the will of the deceased
Simeona F. Naval, could have the effect of revoking
that which was presented afterwards by the
petitioners as executed by the same deceased on
October 31, 1914, that is, on a date previous to the
execution of the first, it was necessary and
indispensable that the later will, that is, that first
presented for allowance, should be perfect or valid,
that it, executed as provided by lay in case of wills.
Subsequent wills may revoke the
previous ones, either :
• EXPRESSLY
• IMPLIEDLY , in which case the
subsequent wills annul only such
dispositions in the prior wills as are
inconsistent with or contrary to those
contained in the later wills
• Art. 831. Subsequent wills
which do not revoke the
previous ones in an express
manner, annul only such
dispositions in the prior wills as
are inconsistent with or
contrary to those contained in
the latter wills.
Art. 832. A revocation made in a
subsequent will shall take effect,
even if the new will should become
inoperative by reason of the
incapacity of the heirs, devisees or
legatees designated therein, or by
their renunciation. 
Revocation by subsequent will
• Testator expressly revokes a prior will but
the new will cannot be given effect even if
its validity has been established due to the
incapacity of the heirs, devisees or legatees
or because of their repudiation of their
inheritance
Doctrine of Dependent Relative
Revocation
• If the testator provides that the revocation
of the earlier will is conditioned on the
effectivity of the testamentary dispositions
of his subsequent will – the revocation will
not take effect if the new will becomes
inoperative
 Testate Estate of Molo, GR No. L-2538,
September 21, 1951
• Mariano Molo y Legaspi died on January 24, 1941, in the
municipality of Pasay, province of Rizal, without leaving any forced
heir either in the descending or ascending line. He was survived,
however, by his wife, the herein petitioner Juana Juan Vda. de Molo,
and by his nieces and nephew, the oppositors-appellants, Luz,
Gliceria and Cornelio, all surnamed Molo, who were the legitimate
children of Candido Molo y Legaspi, deceased brother of the testator.
Mariano Molo y Legaspi left two wills, one executed on August 17,
1918, (Exhibit A) and another executed on June 20, 1939, (Exhibit I).
The latter will contains a clause which expressly revokes the will
executed in 1918. 
• 1939 will – first probated; denied
because not executed in accordance
with law
• 1918 will – subsequently probated
but was opposed by the Oppositors
• Oppositors: The 1918 will was
already revoked by 1939 will
• It is true that our law on the matter (sec. 623, Code of
Civil Procedure) provides that a will may be revoked
"by some will, codicil, or other writing executed as
provided in case of wills" ; but it cannot be said that
the 1939 will should be regarded, not as a will within
the meaning of said word, but as "other writing
executed as provided in the case of wills", simply
because it was denied probate. And even if it be
regarded as any other writing within the meaning of
said clause, there is authority for holding that unless
said writing is admitted to probate, it cannot have the
effect of revocation.
• But counsel for oppositors contend that, regardless of
said revocatory clause, said will of 1918 cannot still be
given effect because of the presumption that it was
deliberately revoked by the testator himself. The
oppositors contend that the testator, after executing the
1939 will, and with full knowledge of the revocatory
clause contained in said will, himself deliberately
destroyed the original of the 1918 will, and that for this
reason the will submitted by petitioner for probate in
these proceedings is only a duplicate of said original.
If it can be inferred that the testator deliberately destroyed the 1918 will
because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause of the 1939 will, and
it is true that he gave a duplicate copy thereof to his wife, the herein
petitioner, the most logical step for the testator to take is to recall said
duplicate copy in order that it may likewise be destroyed. But this was
not done as shown by the fact that said duplicate copy remained in the
possession of petitioner. It is possible that because of the long lapse of
twenty-one (21) years since the first will was executed, the original of
the will had been misplaced or lost, and forgetting that there was a copy,
the testator deemed it wise to execute another will containing exactly the
same testamentary dispositions. Whatever may be the conclusion we
may draw from this chain of circumstances, the stubborn fact is that
there is no direct evidence of voluntary or deliberate destruction of the
first will by the testator. This matter cannot be left to mere inference or
conjecture.
• Granting for the sake of argument that the earlier will was
voluntarily destroyed by the testator after the execution of the
second will, which revoked the first, could there be any doubt,
under this theory, that said earlier will was destroyed by the
testator in the honest belief that it was no longer necessary
because he had expressly revoked it in his will of 1939? In
other words, can we not say that the destruction of the earlier
will was but the necessary consequence of the testator’s belief
that the revocatory clause contained in the subsequent will was
valid and the latter would be given effect? If such is the case,
then it is our opinion that the earlier will can still be admitted to
probate under the principle of "dependent relative revocation." 
• "This doctrine is known as that of dependent
relative revocation, and is usually applied where
the testator cancels or destroys a will or executes
an instrument intended to revoke a will with a
present intention to make a new testamentary
disposition as a substitute for the old, and the new
disposition is not made or, if made, fails of effect
for some reason. The doctrine is not limited to the
existence of some other document, however, and
has been applied where a will was destroyed as a
consequence of a mistake of law 
• "The rule is established that where the act of
destruction is connected with the making of
another will so as fairly to raise the inference that
the testator meant the revocation of the old to
depend upon the efficacy of the new disposition
intended to be substituted, the revocation will be
conditional and dependent upon the efficacy of the
new disposition; and if, for any reason, the new
will intended to be made as a substitute is
inoperative, the revocation fails and the original
will remains in full force." 
• "This is the doctrine of dependent relative
revocation. The failure of the new testamentary
disposition, upon whose validity the revocation
depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a
suspensive condition, and hence prevents the
revocation of the original will. But a mere intent to
make at some time a will in place of that destroyed
will not render the destruction conditional. It must
appear that the revocation is dependent upon the
valid execution of a new will."
• We hold, therefore, that even in the supposition that the
destruction of the original will by the testator could be
presumed from the failure of the petitioner to produce it in
court, such destruction cannot have the effect of defeating
the prior will of 1918 because of the fact that it is founded
on the mistaken belief that the will of 1939 has been validly
executed and would be given due effect. The theory on
which this principle is predicated is that the testator did not
intend to die intestate. And this intention is clearly manifest
when he executed two wills on two different occasions and
instituted his wife as his universal heir. There can therefore
be no mistake as to his intention of dying testate. 
 Doctrine:
• A subsequent will containing a clause revoking
a previous will, having been disallowed for the
reason that it was not executed in conformity
with the provisions of section 618 of the Code
of Civil Procedure as to the making of wills,
cannot produce the effect of annuling the
previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory
clause is void 
Even in the supposition that the destruction of the original
will by the testator could be presumed from the failure of the
petitioner to produce it in court, such destruction cannot
have the effect of defeating the prior will where it is founded
on the mistaken belief that the later will has been validly
executed and would be given due effect. The earlier will can
still be admitted to probate under the principle of "dependent
relative revocation." The theory on which this principle is
predicated is that the testator did not intend to die intestate.
And this intention is clearly manifest where he executed two
wills on two different occasions and instituted his wife as his
universal heir.
By burning, tearing, cancelling,
obliterating
• Testator must be capacitated at the time of
revocation
• Animo revocandi + physical act of destruction
• Act must be any of the overt acts mentioned under
Art. 830
PHYSICAL ACT OF
DESTRUCTION
BURNING

• It is not required that the whole instrument

is completely burned. Even if only a
portion of the document is burned, then it
is considered to be an act of revocation.
What is important is that the testator burns
the will.
TEARING
• Either torn or cut
• Again, like the act of burning, even if slight
cut or tear only, that is sufficient to be
considered as an act of revocation
• The greater the cut, the greater is the
presumption that there is animu revocandi
on the part of the testator
CANCELING

• When you place a mark or line

across the writings
OBLITERATING

• When you blot out, erase

How about crumpling?

• Divided
The act must be a completed act.

• GR: Even if the destruction is not

complete, there is an act of revocation
• EXC: When the testator starts the
destruction of his will but changed his
mind; Voluntary desistance on his part
ANIMUS REVOCANDI
• Even if there are overt acts, but there is no
intent to revoke, then there is no
revocation.
• Accidental tearing
• What if there is an intent to revoke, but no
overt act?
• e.g. Testator, with all the intention to
revoke, placed the will above the stove, but
without the testator's knowledge, another
person took the will, preventing it from
being burned.
Revocation must be done

• by the testator himself

• by some other persons in his
presence and under his express
direction
• Need not render the will illegible,
sufficient that the act manifests an
intent to revoke the will
• Will can still be established even
if destroyed by some other person
if without the express direction of
the testator
WHAT TO PROVE (UNAUTHORIZED
DESTRUCTION) IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH
THE WILL?
• Contents of the will
• Due execution of the will
• Fact of its unauthorized destruction,
cancellation or obliteration
 THE FOREGOING MATTERS MAY BE
PROVED BY:
• SECONDARY EVIDENCES – copy of the original or
testimony of witnesses
• A holographic will, if destroyed, may not be probated,
unless a photocopy survives
• If it has been shown that the testator had ready access to
the will and it can no longer be found after his death, it
may be presumed that he cancelled or destroyed it.
ANIMO REVOCANDI +
PHYSICAL ACT OF
DESTRUCTION
 Testate Estate of Adriana Maloto, GR
No. 76464
• On October 20, 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as
heirs her niece and nephews, the petitioners Aldina
Maloto-Casiano and Constancio, Maloto, and the
private respondents Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto.
Believing that the deceased did not leave behind a last
will and testament, these four heirs commenced on
November 4, 1963 an intestate proceeding for the
settlement of their aunt's estate. 
• However, while the case was still in progress, or to
be exact on February 1, 1964, the parties — Aldina,
Constancio, Panfilo, and Felino — executed an
agreement of extrajudicial settlement of Adriana's
estate. The agreement provided for the division of
the estate into four equal parts among the parties.
The Malotos then presented the extrajudicial
settlement agreement to the trial court for approval
which the court did on March 21, 1964. That should
have signalled the end of the controversy, but,
unfortunately, it had not.
• Three years later, or sometime in March 1967,
Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former associate of
Adriana's counsel, the late Atty. Eliseo Hervas,
discovered a document entitled "KATAPUSAN
NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento)," dated
January 3,1940, and purporting to be the last will
and testament of Adriana. Atty. Palma claimed to
have found the testament, the original copy, while
he was going through some materials inside the
cabinet drawer formerly used by Atty. Hervas.
• Incidentally, while Panfilo and Felino are still
named as heirs in the said will, Aldina and
Constancio are bequeathed much bigger and more
valuable shares in the estate of Adriana than what
they received by virtue of the agreement of
extrajudicial settlement they had earlier signed.
The will likewise gives devises and legacies to
other parties, among them being the petitioners
Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of
Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor.
• Significantly, the appellate court while finding as
inconclusive the matter on whether or not the
document or papers allegedly burned by the
househelp of Adriana, Guadalupe Maloto Vda. de
Coral, upon instructions of the testatrix, was indeed
the will, contradicted itself and found that the will
had been revoked. The respondent court stated that
the presence of animus revocandi in the destruction
of the will had, nevertheless, been sufficiently
proven
• It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a
will, like burning in this case, does not per se
constitute an effective revocation, unless the
destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on
the part of the testator. It is not imperative that the
physical destruction be done by the testator
himself. It may be performed by another person
but under the express direction and in
the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes
without saying that the document destroyed must
be the will itself.
• In this case, while animus revocandi or the
intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a
state of mind, yet that requisite alone would not
suffice. "Animus revocandi is only one of the
necessary elements for the effective revocation of
a last will and testament. The intention to revoke
must be accompanied by the overt physical act of
burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the
will carried out by the testator or by another
person in his presence and under his express
direction.
• There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with
these requirements. For one, the document or papers
burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not
satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less the
will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not
proven to have been done under the express direction of
Adriana. And then, the burning was not in her presence.
Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in
stating that they were the only ones present at the place
where the stove (presumably in the kitchen) was located
in which the papers proffered as a will were burned.
• Nowhere in the records before us does it appear that
the two witnesses, Guadalupe Vda. de Corral and
Eladio Itchon, both illiterates, were unequivocably
positive that the document burned was indeed
Adriana's will. Guadalupe, we think, believed that the
papers she destroyed was the will only because,
according to her, Adriana told her so. Eladio, on the
other hand, obtained his information that the burned
document was the will because Guadalupe told him so,
thus, his testimony on this point is double hearsay.
 Gago v. Mamuyac, 49 Phil 902
• The purpose of this action was to obtain the probation of a last will and
testament of Miguel Mamuyac, who died on the 2d day of January, 1922, in
the municipality of Agoo of the Province of La Union. It appears from the
record that on or about the 27th day of July, 1918, the said Miguel
Mamuyac executed a last will and testament (Exhibit A). In the month of
January, 1922, the said Francisco Gago presented a petition in the Court of
First Instance of the Province of La Union for the probation of that will.
The probation of the same was opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio
Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac (civil cause No. 1144,
Province of La Union). After hearing all of the parties the petition for the
probation of said will was denied by the Honorable C. M. Villareal on the
2d day of November, 1923, upon the ground that the deceased had on the
16th day of April, 1919, executed a new will and testament.
• To said petition Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio
Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina
Mamuyac presented their oppositions, alleging
(a) that the said will is a copy of the second will
and testament executed by the said Miguel
Mamuyac; (b) that the same had been cancelled
and revoked during the lifetime of Miguel
Mamuyac and (c) that the said will was not the
last will and testament of the deceased Miguel
Mamuyac.
• With reference to the said cancellation, it may be
stated that there is positive proof, not denied, which
was accepted by the lower court, that will in question
had been cancelled in 1920. The law does not require
any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a
will to be preserved. It therefore becomes difficult at
times to prove the revocation or cancellation of wills.
The fact that such cancellation or revocation has taken
place must either remain unproved of be inferred from
evidence showing that after due search the original
will cannot be found.
• Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in
the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is,
in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was
cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is
shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot
be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will
has been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge
or authority of the testator. The force of the presumption of
cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying greatly,
being weak or strong according to the circumstances, is never
conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the will was not
destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it.
• In view of the fat that the original will of 1919 could
not be found after the death of the testator Miguel
Mamuyac and in view of the positive proof that the
same had been cancelled, we are forced to the
conclusion that the conclusions of the lower court are
in accordance with the weight of the evidence. In a
proceeding to probate a will the burden of proofs is
upon the proponent clearly to establish not only its
execution but its existence. Having proved its
execution by the proponents, the burden is on the
contestant to show that it has been revoked. 
• Art. 833. A revocation of a will
based on a false cause or an
illegal cause is null and void.
• Revocation of the will based on a
false or illegal cause
• Art. 834. The recognition of an
illegitimate child does not lose its
legal effect, even though the will
wherein it was made should be
revoked.