City of Los Angeles, et. al. v.

Young, Justice
Doctrine: As the province of a writ of certiorari is to review a recordof an inferior
court, board or tribunal, and to determine from the record whether such court,
board, or tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction, evidence which contradicts the
record is never permitted.
When an attorney’s name appears as signed to an acceptance of notice filed in a
justice of the peace court, such attorney, on certiorari to review the record of said
justice, cannot impeach the record by showing that he did not sign such
acceptance.
Nature: Appeal from judgment of superior court annulling a judgment rendered in a
Justice’s court
Date: Sept. 15, 1897
Ponente: Henshaw, J.
Facts:
• Mecombs instituted a suit against the city of LA and C. Compton in the
justice’s court in LA.
• The defendants appeared in said action represented by their atty. WE Dunn
and interposed a demurrer to the complaint.
• The justice of the peace heard and overruled the demurrer granting the
defendants 2 days time to answer.
• Defendants failed to answer and judgment by default was entered for the
plaintiff.
• The statutory period of 30 dats during which an appeal could be taken to the
supreme court passed and afterwards the defendants in that action obtained
a writ of review from the supreme court of the county.
• The superior court annulled the judgment of the justice’s court
• Hence, the present appeal.
Issues/Held:
(1) Whether the Jones’ ruling is applicable in the present case? NO
(2) Was Dunn’s parol testimony that he did not know who signed his name in the
notice and that he received no notice of hearing admissible (contradicting the
record of the justice)? NO
Ratio:
(1)
The defendants (petitioner/appellant) contend that they nor their attorney
have been served with the notice of the time set for trial and sevice of such notice
upon them is an imperative prerequisite to the jurisdiction of the justice of the
peace to try the case under section 850 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (They based
it on the ruling of the case of Jones v. Justice’s Court where there was no proof of
service of the notice of hearing and the return did not show that the justice had
given any notice or refer to the service of any notice)
However the case at bar differs in essential particulars from that of Jones v.
Justice’s Court. Differences : First, a transcript of docket entries showed that on
May 22nd notice was issued and on May 25th notice was returned and filed. Second,
the papers and files in the case, among which is a written notice of the date set for
the hearing of demurrer addressed to WE Dunn notifying that the demurrer has
been set for hearing on May 25, 1896 at 1:30 pm and bearing an indorsment by the
constable who served it (H.H. Yonken) : “Received copy of the within notice -----.
1896. W. E. Dunn. Attorney for defendant. Served H.H.Y.” (served on May 23 by
leaving a copy thereof with a man in the office of W.E. Dunn).
Whereafter Atty. Dun introduced parol testimony swearing that he did not
know who signed his name to the notice and that he never received notice of the
time set for hearing to the demurrer.
The essential difference between this case and the Jones case is that in that
case the court limiting its inquiry to the return, found that there had been no
service f the notice of trial, in this case the court considering the parol testimony of
the aat. Dunn impeaching and contradicting the record of the justice (wrongfully)
reached the same conclusion.

(2) The parol testimony of Dunn was inadmissible and should have not been
admitted. Upon certiorari, if it becomes necessary for the court of review to be put
in possession of the facts upon which the court below acted and that court should
require the lower court to certify such facts in its return to the writ and this
statement of facts would then be a part of the record. Under this principle, the
evidence of Yonken may be admitted not as contradicting the record of justice by at
supplemental thereto.

But it may be set our as a universal rule that as the province of a writ of
certiorari is to review a recordof an inferior court, board or tribunal, and to
determine from the record whether such court, board, or tribunal has exceeded its
jurisdiction, evidence which contradicts the record is never permitted.
Thus, when an attorney’s name (Atty. Dunn’s) appears as signed to an
acceptance of notice filed in a justice of the peace court, such attorney, on certiorari
to review the record of said justice, cannot impeach the record by showing that he
did not sign such acceptance.