Rethinking 'Moral Panic' for Multi-Mediated Social Worlds

Author(s): Angela McRobbie and Sarah L. Thornton

Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Dec., 1995), pp. 559-574
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political Science
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Angela McRobbieand SarahL. Thornton

Rethinking'moralpanic'for multi-mediated
socialworlds

ABSTRACT

It is now over twentyyears since the well-establishedsociologyof

deviance along with the emergent sociology of mass media pro-
duced the concept of 'moralpanic'.The variousstudies of youth
culture, drugtakersand the media reaction to these and other
phenomenaproducedsomeof the mostimportantworkin post-war
Britishsociology.This articleargues that it is now time that every
stage in the process of constructinga moral panic, as well as the
socialrelationswhichsupportit, should be revised.lt suggeststhat
more attention should be paid to the consequencesof the great
expansionof the mediaand to the manymore participantsinvolved
in publicdebate (including,for example, commercialpromotions
departmentsand pressuregroups).We argue that 'folk devils'are
less marginalizedthan they once were; they not only find them-
selves vociferouslyand articulatelysupported in the same mass
mediathatcastigatesthem, but their interestsare also defended by
their own niche and micro-media.Finally,the articlesuggeststhat
whatweremorestablepointsof socialcontrolhaveundergonesome
degree of shift, if not transformation.

'Moralpanic'is now a term regularlyused byjournaliststo describea

processwhich politicians,commercialpromotersand media habitu-
ally attemptto incite. It has become a standardinterviewquestionto
put to ConservativeMPs:are they not whippingup a moralpanicas a
foil to deflect attentionawayfrom more pressingeconomicissues?It
has become a routine means of making youth-orientatedcultural
productsmore alluring;acid house musicwasmarketedas 'one of the
mostcontroversialsoundsof 1988'set to outrage'thosewho decrythe
glamorizationof drug culture'.l Moreover,as moral panicsseem to
guarantee the kind of emotional involvement that keeps up the
interestof, notjust tabloid,but broadsheetnewspaperreaders,as well
as the ratings of news and true crime television, even the media
S Volumeno. 46 I.ssueno.4
PfflJ I)ecembo 1995 1eSvSN0007-1315 )londonSchoolof2:conomcs 1995
560 AngelaMcRobbieaml SarahL. Thornton

themselvesare willingto take some of the blame.Sue Cameron,dis-

cussing 'newjuvenile crime'on BBC2'sNewsnight, asks, 'Is it not the
mediaitselfwhichhas helped to createthis phenomenon?'
Moralpanics,once the unintendedoutcomeofjournalisticpractice,
seem to havebecomea goal. Ratherthanperiodsto whichsocietiesare
subject'everynow and then' (Cohen 1972/80:9), moral panics have
become the wayin whichdailyeventsare broughtto the attentionof
the public.They area standardresponse,a familiar,sometimesweary,
even ridiculousrhetoricratherthan an exceptionalemergencyinter-
vention.Used by politiciansto orchestrateconsent,by businessto pro-
mote salesin certainniche markets,and by mediato makehome and
social affairs newsworthy,moral panics are constructedon a daily
basis.
Given their high rate of turnoverand the increasingtendency to
labelall kindsof mediaeventas 'moralpanic',we thinkit is timeto take
stockof the revisions,then considerthe strengthsand weaknessesof
this key concept. Although both the originalmodel of moral panics
and the reformulationswhichintroducednotionsof ideologyand he-
gemonywereexemplaryinterventionsin theirtime,we arguethatit is
impossibleto relyon the old modelswiththeirstagesandcycles,univo-
cal media, monolithicsocietalor hegemonicreactions.The prolifer-
ation and fragmentationof mass, niche and micro-mediaand the
multiplicityof voices,whichcompeteand contestthe meaningof the
issues subjectto 'moralpanic',suggest that both the originaland re-
vised modelsare outdatedin so far as they could not possiblytakeac-
count of the labyrinthineweb of determiningrelationswhich now
exist between social groups and the media, 'reality'and represen-
tation.

THE ORIGINAL I HEORYOF MORALPANICS

Althoughthe argumentthatmediacoveragecan havean activerole in

creatingdeviantbehaviourowesitsexistenceto symbolicinteractionist
theoriesof 'labelling'(cf. Becker 1963;Wilkins1964),it wasthe pion-
eering studies of Jock Young (1971) on the socialmeaningof drug-
taking and Stanley Cohen (1972/1980) on the media-inspiredcon-
frontationsbetween mods and rockers,and their edited collections
(Cohen 1971; Cohen and Young 1973) which developed and effec-
tivelylaunchedthe conceptof 'moralpanic'.Not onlydid theirstudies
explorehowagentsof socialcontrollikethe policeplayeda rolein 'am-
plifying'deviance,buttheydevelopeda vocabularyfor understanding
the powerfulpartplayedby the media.This meantgoing beyondthe
sociologicalaccountswhichlooked at patternsof ownershipand con-
trol as signs of complicitybetweenmediaand government.Attention
Rethinking panic'for multi-medzated
'moral soctalworlds 561
wasnow being paid to the ideologicalrole of the mediaand the active
constructionof certainkindsof meaning.
In addition, this work explored how deviant behaviourwas inter-
active rather than absolutist. It was more often the outcome of
complexchainsof socialinteractionthanthe productof young people
witha predisposition,individuallyor environmentally,towardscrime
or rule-breakingbehaviour.Finallythis approachchallenged moral
guardians by suggesting that their overreaction was counterpro-
ductive.The mediacoverageof devianceactedas a kind of handbook
of possibilities to be picked over by new recruits. Worse still,
segregatingyoung people awayfrom the communitycreateda greater
riskof long-termsocialdisordersince'a societycan controleffectively
only those who perceive themselves to be members of it' (Young
1971:39). Overreaction,therefore, contributedto further polariz-
ation,though this might havebeen the desiredeffect, as StuartHallet
al. ( 1979)laterargued.
Cohen'sFolk Devils and Moral Panics is rightfullya classicof media
sociology,embracinga greaterdegree of complexitythan the many
summariesof the workindicate.He acknowledgesthatsocialcontrolis
uneven and much less mechanistic than the model of deviancy
amplificationsuggests. Indeed one group of respondents (drawn
from the non-mod, non-rocker public) criticizes the media for
over-reportingthe clashes,whileothersdescribehowtheycamedown
to the beachto havea lookat the 'fun'.Cohen hasa sophisticatedgrasp
of how these events fed into popularfolklore ('Whereare the mods
and rockers today?'was a question he was repeatedly asked while
carryingout his fieldwork)and when the panic had finally run its
course and de-amplificationhad set in, the charactersin this drama
settled into history as recognizable social types belonging to a
particularperiod, sometimesreferredto, even by the agentsof social
control,witha hint of nostalgia.

HOOLIGANS, HISTORY, AND HEGEMONY

Engagingdirectlywith the law and other rhetoricof Thatcherismin

the late 1970sand into the 1980s, Geoff Pearson'sHooligans:A Hzstory
Fears( 1983)focuseson the waymoralpanicsoften entail
of Respectable
looking backto a 'golden age' where socialstabilityand strong moral
disciplineactedas a deterrentto delinquencyand disorder.However,
twentyyearspreviously,the same processcould be seen in operation:
the 'kids' were seen as unruly and undisciplined, unlike their
counterpartsof the previousdecade. The same anxietiesappearwith
startlingregularity;these involvethe immoralityof young people, the
absence of parental control, the problem of too much free time
leading to crime, and the threat which deviant behaviour ,oosesto
 AngelaMcRobbte andSarahL. Thornton
562
national identityand labourdiscipline.
1940s, there were scares Pearsonshowshow,during
the 1930s, there were a about 'coshboys'and Blitzkidsand how,the
string of moral panics in
leisure time and the
decline of the Britishwayabout the misuse of
popularityof Hollywood of
backthrough the cinema.Pursuingthischainlife through the
nineteenthcentury,Pearson of investigation
of the complaints argues that the nature
and the
normativeand consensual social response to them provides a
lenceof socialchange and language for understandingthe turbu-
studyis to casta critical discontinuity.The value
inviolent crimes shadowoveranyclaimsabout of this historical
carriedout by young the dramatic
moralpanics in society act people. Instead,it shows rise
as how
draws on a complexlanguage a form of ideologicalcohesion which
The studies of Cohen, of nostalgia.
acting on behalf of the Young and Pearsonshow
dominantsocialorder. Theymoral panics as
orchestrating consent by actively are a means of
opinion and socialconsciousnessinterveningin the space of public
andrhetorical language through the use of highly
which emotive
'something be done about it'. Thehas the effect of requiring that
ficationis preciselythat where argumentabout deviancy
ampli-
and legislativeaction, such strategiesare indeed followedby
social
strong they also reassurethe publicthatthere
governmentand is
Itis only withtheoriesstrongleadership.
of ideologythatthe idea
panicsas defining and of the
integrated distortingsocial issues gives media'smoral
and connective way to a more
meaning understanding of the construction
across the whole range of media forms and of
Policing
t)zeCnsis ( 1979)by institutions.
StuartHall
ContemporaryCulturalStudies and hiscolleaguesat the Centre
for
ham
marksa turning point in (CCCS),Universityof
this respect.They Birming-
Marxist
and a more theoretical introduceda more
more
palatableto British vocabularyto the terrain,which
sociologists was
semiologicalanalysisof the massthan much of the structuralist
and
because
it drew on the media which followed it,
second, empirical
becauseof its concern for model of the moral panic first,
and,
Policing the Crzsiscan be historyand politicalculture.As a
result,
and culturalstudies. seen as bridging the gap between
sociology
Policing
theCrisuintroduced
the way in which the Gramscianconceptof hegemonyto
analyse
alleged moral panics around
criminalityof young mugging and
conditions
of consentwhichwere Afro-Caribbeanmalescreatedthe the
social
more focused towardslawnecessaryfor the constructionof a
society
liberalism
and 'permissiveness'of and order and less inclinedto
ofmoral
the panic the 1960s.This the
shows it not to be an particularanalysis
strategy,partof the practice isolatedphenomenonbut a
connective
the
sphere of influence which of hegemonywhich
moral Gramsci enlarges
panic then becomes an labelled 'civil society'.The
envoy for dominant
ideology. In the
Rethinking
'moral
panic'for multi-medzated
soczalworlcls 563

languageof commonsense, it operatesas an advancewarningsystem,

and as such it progresses from local issues to matters of national
importance,from the site of tensionand pettyanxietiesto full-blown
socialand politicalcrisis.The authorsare alert to the complexityof
historical and social breakdown which, they claim, can then be
managedonlythroughthe escalationof the controland coercion.This
begs manyquestionsin relationto the scaleof socialcontrol,but what
is particularlyimportantis the recognitionthat ideologyis a suffusive
socialprocess,and that it is not a simplequestionof the distortionof
truth, but rather that ideology is a force which works continuously
throughthe mobilizationof'common sense'.
Despitethe pivotalpositionPolicingtheCrisisoccupiesin the history
of the concept of moral panic, the panoramicsweep of its Gramsci-
influencedargumentacrossthe entire landscapeof post-warBritain
makes it more a work of classic neo-Marxistscholarship than a
sociologyof deviance.Criticalresponsehasthus been dividedbetween
those sociologistswho take issue with the study's empiricalclaims,
suggestingas Waddingtondoes that
the evidence cited in support of the view that the situationwith
regard to crime in general and 'muggings'in particularwas not
gettingdramaticallyworse,and in some respectsshowsan improve-
ment, does not in fact support this contention. (Waddington
1986:257)
and writerslike PaulGilroywho drawfrom the studya vocabularyfor
developing further an analysis of race and ethnicity, relocating
PolicingtheCrisiswithina more distinctlyCulturalStudiesperspective.
(Gilroy 1987) More recently Schlesingerand Tumber (1994) have
returned to the sociologyof crime reportingand both responded to
Hallet al. (1981)and re-visitedmoralpanictheoryas a whole.
As its title suggests,SimonWatney'sPolicingDesire(1987) looksnot
at crimebut at so-calleddeviantsexual practice,takingthe debatesof
Policing the Crisis further by providing a foundation for a better
understandingof how controversialsocialand sexual issues become
inscribedwithcertainkindsof meaningacrossa wide varietyof media
forms.Watneyrightlypointsout that the gradualand stagedcreation
of a 'folkdevil'as describedby moralpanictheoristsappliesto neither
gay men and lesbiansnor people who are HIV positive.Insteadthere
is a whole world of 'monstrous'representations.Since sexualityis
subjectedto regulation and control through a multiplicityof insti-
tutionseach withtheirown distinctivediscursivepracticesand textual
strategies,moral panics are not, as some have suggested, the key to
understandingfearsand anxietiesaboutAIDS. As Watneyputs it
the theoryof moralpanicsis unableto conceptualisethe massmedia
as an industryintrinsicallyinvolvedwith excess, with the voracious
appetite and capacityfor substitutions,displacements,repetitions
564 AngelaMcRobbie
andSarahL. Thornton
and signifyingabsences.Moralpanictheoryis alwaysobligedin the
final instance to refer and contrast 'representation'to the arbi-
tration of 'the real',and is hence unable to develop a full theory
concerning the operationsof ideology within all representational
systems.Moralpanicsseem to appearand disappear,as if represen-
tation were not the site of permanent struggle of the meaning of
signs. (Watney1987:4 1)
Classicmoral panic theoristswould ignore the daily endorsement
(not to say enjoyment)of heterosexualityas an ideologicalnorm and
the consequencesthis has for those who are excluded. Policiesand
practiceswhichare concernedwith'policingdesire'do not, according
to Watney,emanate from one or two centralizedagenciesof social
control.They areendemicin mediaand society,andin thiscontextthe
moral panic is best seen as a local intensificationor 'the site of the
current front line' rather than a sudden, unpleasantand unantici-
pated development (Watney 1987:42). Watney suggests that our
understanding of moral panics might be fruitfully informed by
psychologicalmodels which seek to understand the ambivalence,
excessiveinterestand even fascinationdisplayedby moralguardians
for the objectsof theirdistaste.
Through consideringthe meaningswhichhave developedaround
AIDS and homosexuality,Watney replaces the vocabularyof the
moralpanicwith thatof representation,discourseand the 'other'.In
so doing, he is ableto bring to his workconceptsdrawnfrom fieldsof
psychoanalysis,film studiesand culturalstudiesto producea deeper
accountof processesof exclusionand regulationthanthatavailablein
the traditionalsociologyof socialcontrol.

CONTESTING 'SOCIETY' AND 'HEGEMONY'

Britishsocietyand media,youth cultureand 'deviance'havechanged

considerablysince the 1960s, and these historicaltransformations
bring to light some of the theoreticaland methodologicallimits of
these various studies. In original moral panic theory, 'society'and
'societal reactions' were monolithic and, as others have already
argued, ultimatelyfunctionalist.Similarly,Hall et al., Pearson and
Watney perhaps over-state hegemony and overlook the counter-
discoursesfrom whichthey drawand to whichtheycontribute.In the
1990s,when socialdifferentiationand audiencesegmentationare the
orderof the day,we need takeaccountof a pluralityof reactions,each
with their different constituencies,effectivitiesand modes of dis-
course.
Given the kinds of moral panic to which they attend, it is
problematicthat Cohen's'society',Pearson'sdescriptionof collective
memoryand Hallet al. 's 'hegemony'excludeyouth.Ethnographiesof
Rethinking
'moral
panic'formulti-medzated
soctalworlds 565

contemporaryyouth culture (cf. Thornton 1995) find that youth are

inclinednotto lamenta safe and stablepastbutto have overwhelming
nostalgiafor the dayswhen youthculturewasgenuinelytransgressive.
The 1990s youth culture is steeped in the legacy of previous'moral
panics'; fighting mods and rockers, drug-taking hippies, foul-
mouthedpunksand gender-bendingNew Romanticsare partof their
celebratedfolklore.Whetheryollth culturesespouse overt politicsor
not, they are often set on being culturally'radical'.Moralpanic can
therefore be seen as a culminationand fulfillmentof youth cultural
agendas in so far as negative news coverage baptizestransgression.
Whatbetterway to turn difference into defiance, lifestyleinto social
upheaval,leisureinto revolt?
Disapprovingmass media coverage legitimizesand authenticates
youth culturesto the degree that it is hard to imaginea Britishyouth
'movement'without itt For, in turning youth into news, mass media
both frame subsultures as major events and disseminate them; a
tabloidfront page zsfrequentlya self-fulfillingprophecy.Sociologists
might rightlysee this in terms of 'deviancyamplification',but youth
have their own discourseswhich see the process as one in which a
'scene'is transformedinto a 'movement'.Here youth havea point,for
what gets amplified is not only a 'deviant'activity,but the records,
haircutsand dance styleswhichweresaidto accompanythe activities.
Knowledgeof this youth-cultureethos is such that its exploitation
has become a routine marketing strategy of the publishing and
recording industries. For example, the 'moral panic' about 'Acid
House'in 1988, 1989 and 1990 beganwitha predictionon the backof
the albumthat launchedthe musicgenre. The sleeve notes described
the new sound as 'drug induced', 'sky high' and 'ecstatic'and
concluded with a prediction of moral panic: 'The sound of acid
tracking will undoubtedly become one of the most controversial
sounds of 1988, provokinga split between those who adhere to its
undergroundcreed and those who decry the glamorizationof drug
culture.'In retrospect,this seems prescient,but the statementis best
understood as hopeful. Moralpanics are one of the few marketing
strategiesopen to relativelyanonymousinstrumentaldancemusic.To
quote one music monthly,they amount to a 'pricelessPR campaign'
(Q,January1989)2.
Following London Records' sleeve notes, the youth-orientated
music and style press repeatedlypredictedthat a moral panic about
Acid Hollse was 'inevitable'.3Innuendo, then full-blown exposes
about Ecstacyuse in Britishclubs, appeared in the music press for
monthsbefore the storywas pickedup by the tabloids.By the end of
August, many magazines were wondering why the tabloids were
ignoring the issue, while others, confident of eventual moral panic,
imagined possible headlines like 'London Gripped by Ecstacy!'or
'Drug Crazed New Hippies in Street Riot' (TimeOut 17-24 August
566 Angela andSarahL. Thornton
McRobbie

1988).In September1988,duringthe 'sillyseason',the tabloidsfinally

tookthe bait and subjected the culture to the full front-page
treatment. The government,Labouroppositionandthe police were
only
keento ignore the topic for as long as they possiblycould,
belatedlymakingstatements,arrestsand recommending legislation.
This moral panic was incited by a couple of culture industries(e.g.
recording and magazinepublishing)wellversedin the 'hip'ideologies
ofyouth subsultures.
In additionto the difficultywe havein excludingratherlargesocial
groupsand industrialactivitiesfrom accountsof 'society'or 'consen- the
sus',so we can'tignore the manyvoiceswhich now contributeto
debateduring moral panics. In the 1990s, interest groups, pressure
groups, lobbiesand campaigningexpertsare mobilizedto intervenein
moralpanics.Forexample,the spokeswomanof the NationalCouncil
on an
forOne ParentFamilies,Sue Slipman,playeda leading role, in
almostweekly basis over a period of three or six months,
diminishingthe demonizationby the Tories of young single mothers
forhavingchildrenwithoutbeing married. in
One of the main aims of pressuregroups is timelyintervention media
relevantmoral panics- to be able to respond instantly to the
demonizationof the group they represent, and to provide infor- The
mationand analysisdesigned to counter this representation.
effectivenessof these groups and in particular their skills at working
or
withthe mediaand providinghighlyprofessional'soundbites'more
lesson cue make them an invaluable resource to media machinery
They
workingto tight schedulesand withincreasinglysmallbudgets.
allowthe mediato be seen to be doing theirduty by providing 'balance'
can
in their reporting.At the same time, they show how 'folkdevils'
anddo 'fightback'.
This phenomenonof becomingan expert, havingbeen a deviant,
hasa long historyin the fieldof seriouscrime,drugabuseandjuvenile
up to
delinquency.However,the proliferationof groupsrecentlyset they
campaignon behalf or with folk devils and the skillwith which
engage withmediais an extremelyimportantdevelopmentin political on law
culture. When Labourand Conservativestake the same line for the
and order, arguing for 'effectivepunishment'and the need
to give voice to
tnoralregenerationof society,manymediaare inclined
other, sometimesdissenting,groups. In the absence of an immediate
and articulate response from Labour, such groups occasionally A new
function as a virtualform of oppositionto the government.media,
politicalsociology,takinginto account the prominence of the
the
might fruitfully explore the precise sphere of influence and
effectivenessof these organizations.
This marksa seriesof developmentswhichhaveoccurredperhaps the
in response to the impact of moral panic theory itself,4 i.e.must
sociologistas expert.At leastsome of the agentsof socialcontrol
 'moralpanic'for
Rethinking soczalworlds
multi-mediated 567

have been listeningwhen figureslikeJock Young and Geoff Pearson

were invited to add their voices to these debates, because in recent
incidentswhere there have been fears that disorderor olltbreaksof
riotingmightspreadto otherareasor to othercities,the playingdown
of the scaleof such incidentshas been a recurrentfeatureand a point
of recommendationby the policein relationto the media.
Althoughmoral panicsare anti-intellectual,often characterizedby
a certain religious fervour, and historicallymost effectivelyused by
the right, only a predominantlyright-wingnational press arguably
stops them from being amenable to the current left. Of course,
governmentis alwaysadvantaged,due to higher numberof authori-
tativenews sourcesand to institutionalizedagenda-setting.But, there
is alwaysthe possibilityof backfire.Forexample,whenJohn Majorat-
temptedto buildupon the moralpanicaround'singlemothers'(if not
initiated,then certainlyfueled by governmentspokespeoplebecause
it helped legitimizewelfare cutbacks)with his 'Backto Basics'cam-
paign, the media, followed by Labour,deflected the empty rhetoric
backonto the Tory party,turningthe campaignintoan ad-hocinvesti-
gationinto the personalmoralityand sexualpracticesof Tory MPs.
The delicatebalanceof relationswhichthe moralpanicsociologists
saw existing between media, agents of socialcontrol, folk devils and
moral guardians, has given way to a much more complicatedand
fragmented set of connections.Each of the categoriesdescribedby
moral panics theorists has undergone a process of fissure in the
intervening years. New liaisons have been developed and new
initiativespursued. In particular,two groups seem to be makingever
more vocaland 'effective'intervention:pressuregroupshave,among
other things, stronglycontestedthe vocalityof the traditionalmoral
guardians; and commercialinterests have planted the seeds, and
courted discourses,of moral panic in seeking to gain the favourable
attentionof youthfulconsumers.
This leads us to query the usefulnessof the term 'moralpanic'- a
metaphor which depicts a complex society as a single person who
experiences sudden fear about its virtue. The term's anthropo-
morphismand totalizationarguablymystifymorethantheyreveal.Its
conception of moralsoverlooksthe youthful ethics of abandonand
the moral imperativesof pressuregroups and vocal experts. In the
l990s, we need to acknowledgethe perspectivesand articulationsof
different sectorsof society.New sociologiesof socialregulationneed
to shift attentionawayfrom the conventionalpoints in the circuitof
amplificationand controland look insteadto these other spaces.
MORAL PANICS FOR EVERY MEDIUM

Not only need the attitudesand activitiesof different social groups

and organizationsbe taken into accountand not subsumedunder a
568 Angela anzlSarahL. Thornton
McRobbie

consensual 'society',but also the disparateperspectivesof different

a
mass,niche and micro-medianeed to be explored. Britain saw
remarkable 73 per cent increasein consumermagazine titles during
the1980s - the resultof moredetailedmarketresearch,tightertarget
marketing and new technologieslike computermailingand desk-top
publishing (Marketing13 August 1993).Crucially,the successof many
ofthese magazineshas been in the discoveryand effectiverepresen-
tationof nichesof opinionand identity.
As seen above, moral panic is a favouritetopic of the youth press.
Whenthe mass media of tabloids and TV become active inwere the
'inevitable'moralpanicabout'AcidHouse',the subsultural press
ready.They trackedthe tabloidseverymove, re-printedwhole front
pages,analysedtheir copy and decried the mzsrepresentation of Acid
House.Some 30 magazinesnow targetand speak up for youth.
Another area of developmentis the gay and lesbianpresswho are
representedby several national and regional, weekly and monthly
papers,magazines and free sheets, some of which have become a
sub-dividedby age, like the long-establishedGayNews which takes
differenteditorialline from the younger, less politicalBoyz. Of course,
of
thesedevelopmentsare verymuchdependenton the development
recognition of the presence and
a'pinkeconomy'and the commercial
persistenceof high levelsof gay discretionaryincome.
Despitetheir proliferationand diversification,however,the media
areobviouslynot a positivereflectionof the diversityof Britain'ssocial in
interests.This is partlybecause there are large groups of people
which the media are not economically, and, therefore, editorially
interested- crucially,the D and E 'socialgrades'whicharecategorized
by the National ReadershipSurveyas the unskilledworkingclass and
'thoseat the lowestlevelsof subsistence',in otherwords,the long-term of
employedand poorlypensioned.Buteven here,thereareglimmers the
hope. The Big Issue is now perceived as the newspaper voice of
of
homeless.Othergroupsand agenciesproducea never-endingflow in a
newsletters and press releases many of which are written
and
house-stylecustomizedto the needs of thejournalistson nationalas a
local media. So-calledfolk devils now produce their own media
counterto whatthey perceiveas the biasedmediaof the mainstream.
Moreover,these niche and micro-mediacan even attemptto incite
theirown moralpanics.Take, for example,two rivalpoliticalgroups,
the SocialistWorkersParty (SWP)and the British National Party to
(BNP)- both of whichhave their own tabloidpapers,whichspeakthe
their membersand attemptto reach out beyond. In the wake of
electionof a BNP councillorin Tower Hamletsin autumn 1993, the of
fascistBNP paperwrotehystericallyaboutthe lostneighbourhoods League
the whiteworkingclassand vilified members of the Anti-Nazi
the
(ANL,a branchof the SWP)as 'ANAL'scum.The SWPpaper,onand
other hand, recounted how fascism was sweeping the country
Rethinking
'moralpanic'formulti-mediated
socialworlds 569

full-outNazismwasjust aroundthe corner,due to the actionsof their

chief 'folkdevil',not the BNP hooligan,but the police- those'traitors'
to the workingclasswho gavethe BNP the protectionof the state.Both
attemptedto fuel violent politicalaction with their respectivemoral
panic discourses- arguably with a measure of success. This case
suggeststhatmoralpanics,of thislocalizedvariety,are not necessarily
hegemonic.
But one needn'tturn to specialistmagazinesand newspapersto find
the pluralityand divergencesof opinionthatcharacterizetoday's(and
probablyyesterday's)'moral panics'.Even the nationaldailies have
dependablydifferent stances.The paper whose tone and agenda is
closest to 1960/1970s-stylemoral panic is probablythe DailyMail.
Duringthe Thatcheryears,the DailyMailpractisedand perfectedthe
characteristicsof hegemony,in a waywhichwasin uncannyharmony
withThatcherism.It wasa dailyprocessof reachingout to winconsent
through endlessly defining and redefining social questions and
representing itself as the moral voice of the newly self-identified
middleclassas wellas the old lower-middleclass.The factthattheMail
is the only nationaldailywithmore femalethan malereaders- if only
51 per cent female- undoubtedlyinformsits respectablegirl'sbrand
of moralindignity.Hence, hysteriaaboutsingleand teenage mothers
is perfectmaterialfor a DailyMailmoralpanic.
Tabloids like the Sun prefer to espouse an altogether different
brandof moraloutrage.Witha toplesssixteenyearold on page 3 and
a hedonistic pro-sex editorial line, their moralism need be finely
tuned. But that doesn't stop them from being the most preachyand
prescriptiveof Britain'sdailypapers,with page after page of the 'Sun
says . . .' However, the Sun'sfavouritemoral panics are of the 'sex,
drugs and rock'n'roll'variety- storiesabout other people havingfar
toomuchfun, if only becausethe paper is set on maintaininga young
(andnot graying)readership.Moreover,these kindsof storyhavethe
advantageof allowingtheir readersto have their cake and eat it too;
they can vicariouslyenjoy and/or secretlyadmire the transgression
one moment, then be shocked and offended the next. When con-
sideringthe waymoralpanicsworkwithindifferent publications,one
need keep in mind that Sun readerstake their paper a good deal less
seriously than Mail readers take theirs. As Mark Pursehouse dis-
covered in interviewingSun readers, one of the key pleasures in
readingthe Sunis the processof estimatingwhatpartof a storyis true,
whatpartsexaggeratedor totallyinvented.(cf. Pursehouse1991)
In the last few years, the broadsheetshave not only made use of
more visual and colour material, they also seen to have adopted
tabloid-styleheadlines to accompanytheir tabloidsupplements.For
example, the covers of the GuardianG2 section frequently sport
exaggerated,sensationalheadlines. 'BLOODON THE STREETS':
They're PackingPistolsin Manchester'announcesa story about the
570 AngelaMcRobbiearuSSarahL Thornton

increasinguse of firearmsby youngdrugdealerson mountainbikesin

Manchester'sMoss Side (Guardzan9 August 1993). Given the more
measuredcopy which follows, the Guurdzanwould seem to be using
this'shockhorror'languageto lightenup the story- the capitalletters
signifying an ironic borrowing of tabloid style. But, as the Sun's
languageis understoodby manyof its readersas tongue-in-cheek,the
Guardzan'sirony gives it an alibi,but not absolution.Moreover,these
mixtures of outrage and amusement point to the 'entertainment
value' of moral panics- something mentioned but not really inte-
grated into previous models. (cf. Curran and Sparks 1991 for a
critiqueof the sastigmaticperspective'of accountsof politicsand the
presswhichoverlookentertainment.)
In consideringtheDailyMail, the Sun and the Guardzan,we'vefound
that each paper has its own styleof in-housemoralism.As the British
pressbecomesmorecompetitive,one strategyfor maintaininghealthy
circulationfiguresis for a newspaperto castitself in the role of moral
guardian,ever alert to new possibilitiesfor concernand indignation.
It would seem that professionaljournalisticstyle,carefullyattunedto
the popularityof 'humaninterest'stories,drawson a moralisticvoice
which, for the purposes of variety, it is willing to undercut with
occasionalirony,jokes, etc.
Althoughthe multiplicityof contemporarymoralpanicsis perhaps
best demonstratedin relationto printmedia,the sametendenciescan
be found in radio and television. Even with only four terrestrial
channels,newdefinitionsof youthprogramminghaveopeneda space
for counter-discourses.Television producer Janet Street-Porter,
drawing on the cut-up graphic style of punk and indicatinga new
commitment on the part of broadcastersto take youth seriously,
pioneered'YouthTV' in the mid-eightiesthroughher Def II serieson
BBC2.In keepingwiththiscommitmentseveralof theseprogrammes
were explicitlyaimed at countering youthful folk devils and moral
panics,particularlyaround drugs. Thus an informativeand rational
BBC2Reportageprogrammeon the use of Ecstasyin raveculturecan
be set againstthe much more traditionalsensationaland fearfulCook
Report(ITV) on the samesubject( 1992).

MEDIATEDSOCIAL WORLDS

In additionto unpacking'society',on the one hand, and the 'media',

on the other, the third considerationin updating models of 'moral
panic'need be that the media is no longer somethingseparablefrom
society. Social reality is experienced through language, communi-
cation and imagery. Social meanings and social differences are
inextricablytied up with representation.Thus when sociologistscall
for an accountwhichtellshow life actuallyis, and whichdealswiththe
Rethinking
'moralpanic'for
multi-mediated
socialworlds 571

realissuesratherthanthe spectacularand exaggeratedones, the point

is that these accountsof realityare alreadyrepresentationsand setsof
meanings about what they perceive the 'real' issues to be. These
versionsof 'reality'wouldalsobe impregnatedwiththe markof media
imageryratherthan somehowpure and untouchedby the all-perva-
sive tracesof contemporarycommunications.
The media have long been seen to be embedded in the fabricof
society.Whatmay be constitutivelynew is the degree to whichmedia
have become something with which the social is continuouslybeing
defined. For example, characterizationslike 'Mirrorreader'or 'Times
reader' often give us as good an indication of social class as the
mentionof a particularoccupation.Socialage and generation(rather
thanbiologicalage) are playedout in the relationbetweenRadiosOne
and Two or Capital 1tMand Capital Gold. Subtle differences of
gender identityare negotiatedwhen, say,a working-classwomansays
she dislikesall soapoperas,preferringinsteadnews,sportand nature
programmes.Similarly,at the riskof being cliche,for a man to admit
his devotion to the films of Joan Crawfordand Judy Garlandis, in
some contexts,tantamountto 'comingout'.
At another level, the hard and fast divide between media pro-
fessionalsand media 'punters'seems to have broken down to some
extent. The ownership of home video-cameras,the new space for
broadcastinghome video materialon nationaltelevision(in serieslike
VideoDiartes),the existence of 'right to reply' programmes, the
possession of degrees in media studies all point in this direction.
Audiencescan be creditedwith possessinga greaterdegree of 'media
literacy' than they did in the past. Also important here is the
introductionof a distinctivelyamateurish(ratherthan professional)
style of presentation,developed by Channel Four'sTheTubein the
early 1980s and best reflected in the 'fluffed' mannerismof its two
presenters,Jools Holland and Paula Yates. Finally, the increasing
relianceon the audienceas a resourcefor successfultelevision,either
as visualizedparticipantsor audibleinternalaudiences,seemsto givea
positiveplace to the audience in the processof programmeproduc-
tion.
The strengthof the old modelsof moralpanicwasthattheymarked
the connection between 'the media'and 'socialcontrol'.But, nowa-
days, most political strategiesare media strategies.The contest to
determine news agendas is the first and last battle of the political
campaign.Moreover,the kinds of social issues and politicaldebates
whichwere once includedon the agendasof moralpanictheoristsas
sitesof socialanxiety,and even crisis,could now be redefinedas part
of an endlessdebateaboutwho 'we'are and what'our'nationalculture
is. These are profoundly'homeaffairs'.The dailyintensityand drama
of theirappearanceand the manyvoicesnowheardin the background
but in the foreground,punctuatingand producingreality,pointmore
572 AngelaMcRobbte
aruS
SarahL. Thornton

to the reality of dealing with social difference than to the unity of

currentaffairs(cf. Hall,Connelland Curtis1981).

CONCLUSIONS

Whathasbeen arguedhere is thatthe modelof moralpanicis urgently

in need of updatingpreciselybecauseof its success.Whilethe theory
beganits life in radicalsociology,the strengthof the argumentquickly
found its way into those very areas with which it was originally
concerned,influencingsocialpolicyand attitudesto deviancegener-
ally.As a result,the police,as agentsof socialcontrolnow showsome
awarenessof the dangersof overreaction,while sectorsof the media
regularlyremind viewersof the dangersof moralpanicand thus of
alienatingsections of the communityby falsely attributingto them
some of the characteristics of the so-calledfolk devils.
Crucially,the theory has, over the years, drawn attention to the
importanceof empoweringfolkdevilsso thattheyor theirrepresenta-
tivescan challengethe cycleof sanctionsand socialcontrol.Pressure
groups, lobbies,self-helpand interestgroups have sprungup across
the country and effectively positioned themselvesas authoritative
sourcesof commentand criticism.They now contributeto the shape
of publicdebate,playinga majorrole in contestingwhatthey perceive
as dangerousstereotypesand popularmisconceptions.
The theoryhas also influencedbusinesspractice,albeitthroughan
undoubtedlymorecircuitousroute.Cultureindustrypromotionsand
marketing people now understand how, for certain products like
records, magazines,movies and computer games, nothing could be
betterfor salesthana bit of controversy- the threatof censorship,the
suggestionof sexual scandalor subversiveactivity.The promotional
logic is twofold: first, the culturalgood will receive a lot of free, if
negative,publicitybecauseitsassociationswithmoralpanichavemade
it newsworthy;second, rather than alienatingeveryone, it will be
attractive to a contingent of consumers who see themselves as
alternative,avant-garde,radical,rebelliousor simplyyoung. In the
old models of moral panic, the audience played a minor role and
remainedrelativelyuntheorized.Withfew exceptions,they were the
spaceof consensus,the spaceof mediamanipulation,the spaceof an
easily convinced public. A new model need embrace the complex
realmof reception- readers,viewers,listenersand the varioussocial
groups categorizedunder the heading of public opinion cannot be
readoff the representationof socialissues.
The moralpanicswe havebeen discussinghere are less monolithic
than those the classicmodel implied.Recentmoralpanicsdo remain
overwhelminglyconcerned with moral values, societal regularities
and drawingof lines betweenthe permissibleand the less acceptable.
However, hard and fast boundariesbetween 'normal'and 'deviant'
Rethinking
'moralpanic'formulti-mediated
socialworkls 573

wouldseem to be less common- if only becausemoralpanicsare now

continuallycontested. Few sociologistswould dispute the expansion
over the last decade of what used to be called,quite simply,the mass
media. The diversificationof forms of media and the sophisticated
restructuringof variouscategoriesof audience requirethat, while a
consensual social morality might still be a political objective, the
chances of it being delivered directly through the channels of the
mediaare much less certain.
(Dateaccepted:October1994) AngelaMcRobbie,
Departmentof SocialScience
LoughboroughUniversity
of Technology
and
SarahL. Thornton
Departmentof MediaStuxlies
Universityof Sussex

NOTES

1. Sleeve notes of The Ho?vseSound of Cohen, S.1972/1980 FolkDeviEsand Moral

ChicagoVolumeIII: AcidTracksreleasedin
January1988by LondonRecords(a label
of PolygramInternational).
2. This may not, in fact, be new.
Perhaps the first publicity campaign
intentionallyto court moraloutragewas
conducted by Andrew Loog Oldman
who, back in the 1960s, promoted the
Rolling Stones as dirty, irascible,rebel-
liousand threatening.(cf. Norman1993)
3. Cf. 'New Acid Daze', New Musical
Express(6 February1988); 'Acid Daze',
RecordMirror(20 February1988);'Acid
Daze',MelodyMaker(27 February1988);
Darren Reynolds 'Acid House', Soul
Underground(April 1988).The repetition
of the phrase 'Acid Daze' suggests the
storieswerePRled.
4. Cohen'sFolkDevilsand MoralPanics
and Young'sTheDrugtakershavebeen on
the syllabi of many A-level sociology
courses anct unlverslty courses In so-
. * . .
Panics: The Creationof the Mods and the
Rockers,Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Cohen, S. and Young, J. (eds) 1973 The
Manufactureof the News: Deviance,Social
Problernsand the Mass Media, London:
Constable.
Curran, J. 1978 'The Press as an Agency
of Social Control: An historical perspec-
tive' in G. Boyce et al. (eds) Newspaper
Histoty,London: Constable.
Curran,J. and Sparks, C. l 991 'Pressand
Popular Culture', Media, Culture and
Society13: 215-37.
Gilroy, P. 1987 ThereAin'tNo Blackin the
UnionJack:TheCulturalPoliticsof Raceand
Nation, London: Hutchison.
Hall, S. et al. 1979 Policing the Crisis:
Mugging, the State and Law and Order,
London: MacMillan.
Hall, S., Connell, I. and Curti, L. 1981
'The "unity"of current affairs television'

in Tony Bennett et al. (eds) Popular

ciology, social policy, social work, and Televisionand Film, London: BFI.
morerecentlymediastudies. Pearson, G. 1983 Hooligans:A Histotyof
RespectableFears,London: MacMillan.
BIBLIOGRAPHY Pursehouse, M. 1991 'Looking at the
Sun: Into the Nineties with a Tabloid and
Becker,H. 1963TheOutsiders,NewYork: its Readers', CulturalStudiesfrom Birming-
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