DISMEMBERMENT OF PAKISTAN

AN OVER-VIEW
DR. SARFARAZ HUSSAIN MIRZA
NAZARIA-I-PAKISTAN TRUST
Aiwan-i-Karkunan-i-Tahrik-i-Pakistan, Madar-i-Millat Park, 100-Shahrah-i-Quaid-i
-Azam, Lahore. Ph.: 9201213-14 Fax: 9202930 Email: trust@nazariapak.info Web: na
zariapak.info
All rights reserved
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DEDICATION
With all my sea-deep affection, I earnestly dedicate this humble work to the mil
lions of Pakistani Youth who are perhaps still unaware about the realities of th
e disintegration of their beloved motherland.
Message from the Chairman
Nazaria-i-Pakistan Trust is a national academic-cum-research institution for pro
moting and projecting the ideology of Pakistan as enunciated by Quaid-i-Azam Muh
ammad Ali Jinnah and Allama Muhammad Iqbal. To fulfill this role, the Trust's pr
ogrammes aim at highlighting objectives for which Pakistan was established, reca
lling sacrifices rendered for achieving it, and creating awareness among people,
particularly young generations, about its ideological basis and its glorious Is
lamic cultural heritage. The Trust feels that its efforts can bear fruit if it s
ucceeds in equipping the youth with authentic knowledge about the inspirational
teachings and achievements of our Founding Fathers, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Ji
nnah and Allama Muhammad Iqbal. With this aim in view, the Trust carries out mul
tifaceted activities, one of which is production of literature which not only di
sseminates knowledge about the great Pakistan Movement but also fills our hearts
with feelings of pride on our successful struggle for independence, makes us co
nscious of our vast national and human wealth, and unfolds our capabilities to f
ace the future with confidence. It must be admitted that although, after sufferi
ng huge losses of life and property, we
ultimately succeeded in achieving Pakistan under the epoch-making leadership of
Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, we could not make it an ideal Islamic State as
visualized by Quaid-i-Azam and Allama Iqbal. After the death of the Father of t
he Nation, his unfaithful successors deviated from his path and turned Pakistan
into a playfield of civil and military dictators. The Quaid-i-Azam delivered us
from the slavery of Britishers and Hindus but we have now fallen into the trap o
f another type of slavery. To free ourselves from its clutches and all other typ
es of overlordships, we must seek guidance from the nationbuilding thoughts and
actions of Quaid-i-Azam and Allama Iqbal who aspired to make Pakistan a truly mo
dern Islamic welfare democratic state. As pointed out before, our main focus is
on younger generations who were in the forefront in the struggle for Pakistan an
d who can even today play a similar role in building up Pakistan into a modern d
emocratic and welfare Islamic State. The students' favourite slogan during Pakis
tan Movement was Pakistan ka matlab kiya: La Ilaha Illallah. Through this slogan
the Muslim youth saw a dream of regaining our past glory and establishing our o
wn free Muslim State in our homelands. The Quaid-i-Azam was fully conscious of t
he mighty role which students played in the past and
could play in the future. Addressing a deputation of students on 31 October 1947
he observed: “Pakistan is proud of its youth, particularly the students who have
always been in the forefront in the hour of trial and need. You are the nation-b
uilders of tomorrow and you must fully equip yourself with discipline, education
, and training for the arduous task lying ahead of you. You should realize the m
agnitude of your responsibility and be ready to bear it.” The truth is that we hav
e long neglected the youth and our educational system does not inspire them to g
ive their best in the building up of Pakistan economically, socially, politicall
y and even educationally. Inspiration comes through ideological education, which
in our case involves a study of twonation theory derived from Islamic Ideology
which motivated the great Pakistan Movement and on which is raised the edifice o
f our nationhood. It is this ideological education which the Trust seeks to impa
rt to the Pakistani youth through its publications, including the present one. I
hope, this literature will acquaint the Pakistani youth about the separation of
East Pakistan and inspire them to rise above provincial, linguistic and sectari
an rivalries and make them apostles of national unity and territorial integrity.
Majid Nizami
CONTENTS
Preface 9 Prelude 13 Language Controversy 17 Promulgation of First Martial Law i
n 1958 21 Mujib's Controversial Points 22 Second Martial Law and General Electio
ns 24 Beginning towards an End 27 India's Role in the Dismemberment of Pakistan
37 The ugly Role of Foreign Press 44 BBC Reporting 52 Analysis 63 Conclusion 65
Appendices: o The text of Six-Point Formula 67 o Mr. Bhutto storms out of Securi
ty Council 71 o Operative Clauses of the Polish Resolution 75 O President Yahya
breaks the News 77 O Comments of the Pakistani Press 79 v References 101 v v v v
v v v v v v v v v
9
PREFACE
It was in early eighties when I first attempted to work on East Pakistan Crisis
under the guidance of Prof. Dr. Rafique Ahmad. With his blessings, I was able to
produce a book on the ‘Role of Foreign Press’ in the dismemberment of Pakistan. The
present monograph is a supplement of my earlier work with a few changes and add
ition of four Appendices i.e., (i) Text of Six Point Agenda Formula of Sheikh Mu
jiburrahman, (ii) Operative Clauses of historic Polish Resolution (iii) Presiden
t Yahya’s speech of 16th December, 1971 and (iv) Extracts from The Times, London D
ecember 16, 1971 dealing with the speech of Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in the Unite
d Nations Security Council when he said: “Mr. President!” “I am leaving your Security
Council. I find it disgraceful to my person and to my country to remain here a m
oment longer. Impose any decision, have a treaty worse than Versailles, Legalize
aggression, Legalize occupation... I will not be a party to it. We will fight…my
country harkens for me.” As a humble student of history, I have tried to put facts
before the readers with utmost care and responsibility. My view point is that t
he Pakistani nation specially the generation born after the good old days of
10
the ‘United Pakistan’ should be properly acquainted with the realities of the sevent
ies. It is a fact that at that time, the whole nation was kept completely ignora
nt of what was being written and told by the foreign media especially at a time
when Pakistan was struggling to steer out of turbulence. Hence the whole narrati
ve and reporting of the foreign press was biased and totally one sided. The Indi
an press media played havoc following the policy of disinformation and misinform
ation. As we know, India could never reconcile herself to the fact of partition,
therefore, one could see the Indian’s inner desire to undo Pakistan in its damagi
ng press propaganda against it. It may be recalled that during the East Pakistan
Crisis, the Indian Foreign Minister had categorically declared: “We may have to t
ake action on our own if a satisfactory political solution to the Bangla Desh cr
isis is not found out”. (The Times, London, June 26, 1971). (Late) Indira Gandhi’s,
inflammatory statement needs special mention when she said. “… the enemy shall be cr
ushed…And now victory will be complete when the Bangla Desh Government establishes
itself in Dhaka and stabilizes….” (The Times, London, December 11, 1971). What does
this depict? One may appreciate to believe that Bharat has not recognized Pakis
tan even today. History is the witness to the fact that she is the arch enemy of
Pakistan and shall remain so for all times to come. It is a fact that Bharat is
mainly responsible for
11
disintegrating Pakistan. Beware, she is on the look for another misadventure. Pa
kistani nation should learn a lesson from its past because any nation which does
not learn from its past may not have any future to plan. I would call this mono
graph a ‘sorrowful vent’ of a wretched heart remembering a part of its country that
was treacherously separated by the enemy when it was still in its ‘twenties.’ Acknow
ledgements I must acknowledge that I was able to complete this task because of f
oster care of the respected Chairman Janab Majid Nizami, who has been very kind
and considerate to me throughout my job at the Nazaria-iPakistan Trust. Prof. Dr
. Rafique Ahmad, Vice-Chairman needs special mention since he, as usual, gave me
tremendous moral encouragement and provided academic guidance in the completion
of this booklet. Above all, Mr. Rafaqat Riaz, Additional Secretary deserves my
special thanks for taking personal interest in making this project as a regular
assignment and publishing it in a booklet form. I shall be failing in my duty if
I don’t mention the name of Mr. Shahid Rasheed, Secretary who gave me free hand t
o complete my task.
12
I am thankful to Mr. Naeem Ahmad, an experienced script editor, for bringing thi
s script in order. While doing so, he gave me very useful suggestions. I should
thank Mr. Shahid Gulzar for the entire typing work which he undertook with care
and responsibility. As usual, Mr. Muhammad Shahzad showed keenness in finalizing
this booklet. In the end, I must acknowledge that I am aware of the flaws in th
e work for which I alone stand responsible. An effort will be made to remove dis
crepancies if any, in the next edition.
Lahore: 3rd June, 2009
Sarfaraz Hussain Mirza
13
PRELUDE
In March 1940, the Muslims of the South Asian Sub-continent voiced for the creat
ion of a separate homeland in their majority areas. With this aim before them, t
hey, under the able and dynamic leadership of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinn
ah (1876-1948), after decades of relentless struggle, ultimately achieved their
goal on August 14, 1947 and their Quaid was sworn in as the first Governor Gener
al of the largest Muslim country in the world. This biggest state of Muslims com
prised of two wings set apart by 1000 miles from each other. The eastern and wes
tern zones of Pakistan worked under one system for good 24 years but were disjoi
nted in December 1971 owing to a number of reasons – major cause being the hostili
ty of Pakistan’s immediate neighbour – Bharat with whom she had parted ways in 1947.
Bharat could not reconcile herself, with the partition right from 1947 which sh
e dubbed as “cutting of the baby into two”. During the movement for Pakistan, the Hi
ndu leaders called it vivisection of ‘mother India’ and once the region was divided,
they could not accept the fact of Pakistan. They, however, did so with mental r
eservation and since then remained active in making persistent efforts to undo P
akistan. The top brass of the Indian National Congress failed to conceal their i
nner hatred against Pakistan and, on different occasions, gave
14
the impression of creating forced “Akhand Bharat”. In their bid for re-unification o
f British India, they spared no effort to undermine Pakistan by different means –
either through their utterances or by means of physical interventions. The Congr
ess Committee’s resolution of June 14, 1947 expressing their hatred against the di
vision of India; Sardar Vallabhbhai’s (1875-1950) statement regarding re-unificati
on; Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru’s (18891964) verdict on re-union, Maulana Abul Kalam A
zad’s (1888-1958) remarks of “short lived partition”; M.K. Gandhi’s (1869-1948) oppositi
on to the creation of Pakistan; Acharya Kriplani’s “claim of a United India”, are clea
r testimony to the fact that Bharat could not digest the birth of Pakistan. Whil
e ‘the Muslims were satisfied psychologically over what they had achieved, the Hin
dus seemed determined to regain what they [thought they] had lost’. And to achieve
this end, Bharat lost no opportunity, whenever made available to her. She sudde
nly stopped the flow of canal waters to Pakistan’s parched lands; pushed millions
of refugees into Pakistan at the time of partition; seized Junagarh and Kashmir
states on different pretexts. She struck against Pakistan thrice – first in 1948,
secondly in 1965 and lastly in 1971, when she was able to have fulfilled her evi
l design of disintegrating Pakistan. It may be recalled that the Bengali Muslims
played a very vital role in the creation of Pakistan; as no other Muslim provin
ce had so overwhelmingly supported the idea of Pakistan as had the province of B
engal. Tracing the history of the Muslim national struggle one finds that
15
the political party that gave Pakistan to the Indian Muslims, the All-India Musl
im League, was established in Bengal in 1906. The historic Pakistan Resolution o
f March 1940, demanding a separate Muslim State, was moved by a stalwart Bengali
Muslim leader, A.K. Fazlul Haque (1873-1962). In the general elections of 1945-
46, the role of Bengali Muslims proved to be decisive in the creation of Pakista
n. It was a Bengali Muslim League leader in the person of Syed Hussain Shaheed S
uharawardy (18931963) who moved the historic resolution demanding a single state
of Pakistan on the occasion of Muslim League Legislatures Convention held in Ap
ril 1946 at Delhi, under the presidentship of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah.
It may be noted that while the Bengali Muslims voted for Pakistan, the Hindu Ben
galis never voted or supported the Pakistan Movement – and, it was this pressure g
roup of Hindu element that worked behind the scenes for reunion with their co-re
ligionists in Hindu Bharat. One feels difficult to find out any historical insta
nce of Bengali Muslim’s disinterest in the creation of a single state Pakistan. It
is also difficult to see how Pakistan should have become a reality without the
determined support of the eastern wing’s electorate. Then, what provoked them to e
xpress their discontent soon after the creation of Pakistan till the crisis of 1
971? Seen in the light of facts, there is little doubt to believe that Hindu
16
machinations against a sovereign nation sowed the seeds of the East Pakistan cri
sis, through which the country and the nation passed between 1948–71. The Hindu sc
hool teachers and University professors played a significant role in carrying ou
t propaganda against Pakistan among the students. Prior to partition, a province
that served as hinterland for the Hindu industrialists and an area that was kep
t in a state of backwardness during the British regime and, the Bengali Muslim,
who by experience of history since the annulment of the partition of Bengal in 1
911, had thrown its weight in the Muslim League independence movement for better
economic living and openings, now miserably fell victim to the nefarious underh
and activities of the Hindu population within East Pakistan and with their corel
igionists across the border. Due to hostile Hindu propaganda, serious misunderst
andings cropped up to strain the relations between West and East Pakistan. These
misunderstandings gave an opportunity to the hostile elements within Pakistan t
o exploit the situation to engineer the March 1971 ‘uprising’ in East Pakistan. Othe
r factors, such as distance between the two wings, lack of contact between the m
asses of both the wings, the emotions that arose because of language issue, mish
andling of delicate issues by some unimaginative policy makers and a ‘false’ sense o
f neglect and exploitation of Bengalis by West Pakistanis, gave a
17
chance to the fifth columnist and the outside interests to intervene.
Language Controversy
The most crucial hour of misunderstanding between the two wings that sowed perma
nent seeds of mistrust between them came when controversy began in February 1948
with regard to a demand for making Bengali Language an official language.1 This
, however, was opposed and a serious controversy started at the national level t
hat led to the significant political blunders. This was the first occasion when
the East Pakistan leadership involved students into anti-centre agitations and i
nadvertently, invited the nefarious interest of the communist elements to step i
n. The resentment bred by the language issue was transformed into a political mo
vement with the passage of time. However, the tension subsided with the timely i
ntervention of the father of the nation Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah during
his visit to Dhaka on March 17, 1948 but about four years after his death, it em
erged again in February 1952, when the Central Government attempted to introduce
Arabic script for the Bengali language. Khawaja Nazimuddin (1884-1964) the Prim
e Minister of Pakistan, declared Urdu as the national language. The Provincial A
ssembly of East Pakistan in return passed resolution demanding Bengali to be one
of the national languages. Soon after, demonstrations started and on February 2
1, two Bengali students died of police firing and a Shaheed Minar was
18
erected in their memory. At length, in 1954, the Constituent Assembly approved B
engali as one of the two state languages. With this move, provincialism, which h
ad raised its head as early as 1950, now heightened political polarization in Pa
kistan. In the general elections of 1954 held in East Pakistan, the Muslim Leagu
e was badly defeated. A United Front comprising of four parties, including the A
wami League preached regionalism in the electioneering campaign presenting 21-po
int programme which voiced for regional autonomy. Soon after the crushing defeat
of the Muslim League in East Pakistan, a new chapter of violence, armed attacks
, rioting and plundering was opened, resulting in a large number of casualties.
The then Chief Minister, A.K Fazlul Haque, on this occasion remarked, ‘that the tr
ue solution of the problems of East Pakistan was independence.”2 In these hectic d
ays of political unrest, Haque ministry (United Front’s Government) was dismissed
and Governor’s rule was imposed in East Pakistan by Governor General Ghulam Mohamm
ad (1895-1956). Major General Iskander Mirza (1899-1969) was appointed Governor
of the Province. This step redoubled the hatred of Bengalis against West Pakista
n and as such the former turned against the Central Government. In was then in 1
955 that Chaudhary Mohammad Ali (1905-1980) became the Prime Minister after Moha
mmad Ali Bogra (1909-1963). His appointment as
19
Premier was seen with bitterness by the Bengalis on the pretext that both – the nu
mber one and number two positions – that of the Governor General and the Prime Min
ister – were ‘usurped’ by the West Pakistanis against the established tradition of all
ocating one key position to either wing. While the East – West relations were gett
ing strained, the Indian interest began to increase in Pakistan’s politics – and, fr
om 1956, the Indians stealthily began to intervene in Pakistani politics. Chaudh
ary Mohammad Ali entered into an agreement with the East Pakistan leaders. Accor
ding to the agreement, matters such as unification of West Pakistan, parity betw
een East and West Pakistan and the question of regional autonomy were solved whi
ch ultimately paved the way for the passing of the Constitution in 1956. After t
he failure of the Ministry of Abu Hussain Sarkar (1895-1969) during the premiers
hip of Chaudhary Mohammad Ali, Ataur Rehman (b-1907) of the Awami League was app
ointed Chief Minister in 1956 by the new Prime Minister, Hussain Shaheed Suharaw
ardy, who ‘was commissioned to form the Ministry at the Centre in September 1956’. W
ith his great political skill, Suharawardy solved some of the controversial issu
es including that of the electorates yet the discontent of the Bengalis did not
subside and, in April 1957, the East Pakistan Legislative Assembly adopted a res
olution with regard to regional autonomy. In this particular move, politicians l
ike Maulana Abdul Hameed Khan Bhashani (1880 – 1976) took the initiative.
20
The political problem of regional autonomy kept on troubling and, in October 195
7, Suharawardy, who had so amicably handled the situation, resigned ‘for fear of d
ismissal’. Thereafter Ismail Ibrahim Chundrigar (18971960) succeeded Suharawardy i
n 1957. The year 1958 saw rapid changes in the ministries one after another, in
East Paksitan. On March 31, 1958 the new Governor of the Province, A.K. Fazlul H
aque, dismissed Ataur Rehman’s ministry and installed Sarkar’s ministry. Immediately
afterwards, the Central Cabinet dismissed Fazlul Haque and, as a result, Sarkar
was ousted within twelve hours leaving the office vacant for Ataur Rehman to co
me back to power. On June 18, 1958 the Awami League was defeated in the House be
cause the National Awami Party of Bhashani, which had been playing a changing ro
le of now opposing and then supporting different ministries one after another, n
ow withdrew its support of the Awami League. On June 20, Abu Hussain Sarkar form
ed the Government but it was short-lived as National Awami Party had once again
withdrawn its support and had sided with the Awami League. This resulted into ch
ange of ministry once again and on June 23, Sarkar was defeated in the House. Be
cause of unstable and increasingly confused situation, President’s Rule was impose
d in the Province on June 24,1958. In August 1958, Awami League was reinstalled
and this time the Assembly once again could not function properly. The overall p
olitical situation by then was awfully painful in both the wings. If there was t
urmoil in
21
the east, the west too was not free of tension as the Muslim League and the Repu
blican Party, formed in 1956, were at loggerheads against each other in West Pak
istan Legislative Assembly.
Promulgation of First Martial Law in 1958
In these circumstances, when the nation was completely disillusioned with the po
litical leadership, the first Martial Law was imposed on October 28, 1958 by the
Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, General Mohammad Ayub Khan (1907-1974)
. He unnecessarily charge sheeted the politicians and wrongly held them responsi
ble for inviting such an uncalled for step. Ayub Khan’s Martial Law was seen by th
e Bengalis as a conspiracy hatched by West Pakistanis who, according to them, di
d not allow the parliamentary system to work successfully in the country. ‘Ayub Kh
an ruled both the wings with a strong hand and made relentless efforts to curb p
rovincialism.’ Apparently he formulated a policy of better understanding between t
he people of both wings, laid stress on Islam as a unifying force, increased the
ratio of installation of industry, encouraged inter-wing marriages and revised
quota of East Pakistanis in Civil Services; but despite his persistent efforts h
e failed to satisfy the Bengalis and all his attempts for reconciliation were fr
ustrated owing to one reason or the other. His selfstyled system of Basic Democr
acy could not achieve desired results. Ayub Khan introduced Presidential form of
government and gave a Constitution to the nation in
22
1962 which was bitterly resented by the East Pakistanis, resulting into wide spr
ead unrest in that region which convulsed the whole Province for a year. It was
on this occasion that Hussain Shaheed Suharawardy was arrested. Resentment of th
e people gave an opportunity to many intruders of the enemy camp, including the
foreign powers to walk in and, thereafter, passive voices for separation began t
o be heard here and there. The years 1964-65 witnessed increasing political chao
s in the country. In 1965, Pakistan faced aggression by India and during these f
ateful days, the East Pakistanis began to think themselves unprotected and Sheik
h Mujibur Rehman (1922-1975) the leader of the Awami League, came to the forefro
nt with his controversial demand of ‘self-determination’.
Mujib’s Controversial Points
It was during this ugly period that the foreign press had started taking interes
t in the political crisis of Pakistan. The seeds of the future foreign press sab
otage were sown in 1965, which continued to prick Pakistan from time to time and
ultimately fired its last bullet during 1971 crisis in East Pakistan. India, wh
ich had begun intervening in Pakistani politics after 1956, now encouraged Mujib’s
uncalled for activities who had exposed himself with his much controversial Six
-points3. Because of his campaign of hatred against the western zone and, also,
his intentions of secession, Mujib was arrested in April 1966, but released afte
r a few days and
23
was re-arrested in May 1966—an act that triggered off demonstrations by the Awami
League workers. In January 1968, Mujib became the centre of attention when his n
ame was announced in Agartala4 Conspiracy, thereby making him a ‘martyr’ while he wa
s in jail. The case, however, was withdrawn due to political pressure and, East
Pakistan’s hatred against West Pakistan became intense which paved the way for the
Bengalis to openly speak about ‘independence’. By the end of 1968, Ayub’s power was f
orcefully challenged by the people and a storm of frustration rose against him l
eading to severe agitations against the Centre. Ayub Khan tried to save the situ
ation by calling a Round Table Conference (RTC) of political leaders on February
26, and March 10, 1969. Prior to that, Mujib was released under political press
ure to participate in the Conference. His attitude during the deliberations of t
he Conference was negative as he totally refused to soften his stand on Six-poin
ts. ‘Since Ayub Khan believed these points to be a gate-way towards confederation,
therefore, he declined to accept them’. On the other hand, while the Conference w
as in progress, both Bhashani from East Pakistan and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1928-1
979) from West Pakistan, who had refused to attend the Conference earlier, stage
d agitations in the streets. Thus the RTC failed because of serious differences
of opinion amongst political leaders and non-cooperation of Bhutto and Bhashani.
The effort of a peaceful political solution therefore ended in fiasco.
24
Seeing all avenues closed for the transfer of power to civilian government, Ayub
Khan resigned on March 25, 1969, abrogated the Constitution and handed over the
government to General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan (1917-1980), who imposed second
Martial Law in the country. While addressing the nation, Ayub Khan referred to t
he efforts being made for dividing the country and said that in such circumstanc
es, “I cannot preside over the destruction of my country”.5 However, the fact remain
s that the first seed of destruction was sown on the promulgation of Ayub’s Martia
l Law.
Second Martial Law and General Elections
With the beginning of the second Martial Law regime, the people became more disg
runtled. The disgusted Bengalis, who had already resented the Martial Law of 195
8, immediately reacted to the second one too. They felt that it was another step
to curb them economically and, they began drifting towards the Awami League. It
appears that at the advent of Yahya’s Martial Law, the nation had been divided in
to opposing factions— one believing their salvation lying with the Awami League un
der Mujib and the other faction thought Bhutto to be their saviour but unfortuna
tely both of them miserably failed to save the unity of Pakistan. After assuming
power, Yahya Khan declared that he would hand over the government to the electe
d representatives of the people and to achieve this end, he announced general el
ections and did some spade work
25
prior to that event. In his broadcast of November 28, 1969 he dissolved the One
Unit and adopted the principle of one man-one vote instead of parity—a principle t
hat had popular support in the past among the warring political groups, even the
East Pakistan leadership. Dissolution of One Unit and the abolition of parity s
ystem was perhaps, the first step towards bifurcation of Pakistan. The events th
at followed in the coming years in the political history of Pakistan changed the
entire fabric of the Pakistan’s body politic. In order to hold general elections
in December, the government lifted the ban on political activities on January 1,
1970. On March 30, Yahya Khan promulgated the Legal Framework Order (LFO) which
laid certain principles for the coming elections i.e., the type of the future g
overnment; preservation of Islamic ideology; framing of the Constitution in a sp
ecific period and the powers of the President of Pakistan to amend or reject the
Constitution passed by the National Assembly. Elections to the National Assembl
y were to be held on October 5, 1970 but in September, East Pakistan was afflict
ed by heavy floods followed by cyclone disaster in mid-November 1970. As million
s of East Pakistanis had been severely affected by this natural calamity, the Go
vernment as well as the majority of political parties of both the wings agreed f
or the postponement of the elections, which were now postponed from October 5 to
December 1970 accordingly.
26
During the electioneering campaign, Mujib availed of every opportunity of exploi
tation and left no stone unturned to spread hatred against West Pakistan amongst
the Bangalis. He exploited the flood situation and fully benefited from the cyc
lone disaster by playing up the passions of the Bengalis and blaming the Governm
ent for apathy and neglect. While he was cunningly carving a line of separation
with his notorious slogan of Six-points, the political situation in West Pakista
n was also not encouraging. No political party could seriously challenge the vei
led secessionist intentions of Mujib’s Six-points. Neither wing’s political parties
other than the Awami League tried to bring effective and representative candidat
es in the field in East and West Pakistan constituencies. Even the Pakistan Peop
les Party of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto did not nominate any one over there. The result
was that the election campaign gave an impression of regionalism rather than na
tionalism. The East Pakistan leadership particularly Mujib, became aggressive an
d gave an impression of clear cut hatred against West Pakistan and its leadershi
p. Of course, it was a confusing as well as a discouraging situation from the na
tional point of view. After the elections, the two largest parties that emerged
victorious were the Awami League from East Pakistan and the Pakistan Peoples Par
ty from the West Pakistan. They secured 160 seats and 81 seats respectively out
of 300 total National Assembly seats6 (excluding reserved seats for women to be
indirectly elected). These
27
results show that the elections were fought on the basis of regionalism and not
on the national level--though popularly known to be the most fair elections ever
held in the history of Pakistan. In other words, this ‘fairness’ did not suit the n
eeds of the geo-political requirements of the country. The way in which the elec
tioneering campaign was launched by the political parties and, the display of a
lack of foresight by the people in general and the leaders in particular, moved
the country towards a confederation.
Beginning towards an End
After the elections, the situation became alarming. The future of the country de
pended on two largest groups which had emerged victorious. The eyes of the world
were set on the political situation of Pakistan. Democracy awaited the decision
of the hour. The nation was anxious to see her fortunes in the democratic frame
work that was supposed to be built up after the elections. But what happened aft
er the elections was a sad story of ugly events that took place one after the ot
her. A serious controversy in inflammatory words began between the leaders of th
e major victorious parties in whose hands lay the destiny of the country. The go
vernment in power lacked imagination who could not fully guage the seriousness o
f the disastrous consequences of the grave situation. The ship of the nation was
tottering on the turbulent sea and hardly any leader had the capability of a re
al statesman who could face the nasty waves.
28
The party leader having the lion’s share became arrogant and too difficult a man t
o be handled either by the government or the second majority party or any other
political quarter. Mujib wanted nothing but ‘separation’. His attitude then was “take
it or leave it.”7 As such, a cold tug of war for snatching power began between the
two majority parties. What should have happened after the elections was that th
e session of the National Assembly should have been convened according to schedu
le, but all efforts towards this direction were frustrated due to wrong interpre
tations and untimely utterances of the contending political parties regarding th
e future course of action and framing of the constitution. This battle of words
helped to intensify the existing hatred and misunderstandings and the little tha
t was left beneath the surface ascended up with its ugly and horrible posture. T
he extremist groups while reaping the harvest, cried for ‘independence’ which furthe
r widened the gulf between the two wings. The nefarious activities of the extrem
ists radical students added fuel to Mujib’s secessionist intentions. On January 3,
1971 Mujib and his partymen including MNAs, in a public meeting clearly indicat
ed their designs of ‘separation’. On this occasion, Mujib, in his address, said that
‘the blood of the martyrs would not be allowed to go in vain. We will frame the c
onstitution as we are the representatives of the majority. Those who want to pla
ce an obstacle in its way will be eliminated”8.While Mujib spoke, the map of Bangl
adesh was displayed on the table carrying the words “Jai Bangla”.9
29
To coop the situation, a series of parleys began between the political leaders a
nd Mujib. The President of Pakistan also met with Mujib, and talks between Bhutt
o and Mujib also took place but nothing concrete came out of these meetings. Dur
ing the course of these meetings, Mujib showed least interest in the all-Pakista
n role which the nation expected him to play. Alarmed by Mujib’s activities, Gener
al Yahya Khan went to Dhaka and held 3-hour talks with the former on January 12,
1971. These talks failed to produce any positive result. On January 27, 1971 Bh
utto flew to Dhaka with his constitutional formula which was rejected by Mujib a
s it did not protect his future scheme of creating a separate Bangali state. Acc
ording to Bhutto, he had accepted all the Six-points minus half a point, but neg
otiations between the two could not continue and, at the end of the parleys, bot
h of them criticized each other for the failure of talks. Meanwhile, on January
30, 1971 an Indian plane was hijacked as a result of treachery to Lahore by two
so-called Kashmiri ‘freedom fighters’. The hijackers were given asylum. The Indian g
overnment held Pakistan responsible for this incident and suspended flights of a
ll Pakistani aircrafts over Indian territory, which cut off the link between Eas
t and West Pakistan. Such an act was necessarily part of the treachery referred
to above. Bhutto, who was busy in talks with Mujib, returned to the capital bare
handed and met President Yahya on
30
February 11, 1971 to acquaint the President about his discussion with Mujib. The
situation as it appeared was that: “Apart from the uncompromising attitude of the
political leaders, the self-assumed role of the army as the custodian of the co
untry, the role of foreign agencies, the pressure of the extremists and the refu
sal of the West Pakistan leadership to recognize the new political realities of
the situation played a vital role in widening gulf between East and West Pakista
n”.10 On February 13, 1971 General Yahya Khan announced that the National Assembly
would meet in Dhaka on March 3. On February 15, 1971 Bhutto declared that his p
arty MNAs would not attend the session in the given situation. The same day Muji
b’s MNAs and MPAs reaffirmed their faith in Six-points programme. Realising the gr
avity of the situation and, for fear of any possible catastrophe, the West Pakis
tan leadership and political circles did not appreciate Bhutto’s verdict and expre
ssed serious apprehensions. They said that if the step was actually taken then ‘it
would lead to a point of no return’. On February 19, Bhutto again met the Preside
nt to discuss the ‘tense and serious situation’. On February 20, 1971 an amendment w
as made in the ‘Legal Framework Order’ (LFO) which made a provision for elected memb
ers to resign even before the meetings of the assemblies. On February 22, 1971 P
resident Yahya Khan held a high level meeting with the Governors and Martial Law
31
Administrator of East Pakistan. According to Dr. Safdar Mahmood, as communicated
to him by a ‘knowledgeable source’, “it was in this meeting that the plan for militar
y action was approved in case Mujib refused to modify his Six-Points”.11 On Februa
ry 22, 1971 Bhutto reiterated his earlier threat of launching a movement through
out West Pakistan if the session of the National Assembly was convened as schedu
led. It was on this day that he unequivocally declared ‘to liquidate any member of
his party who dared to attend the session’. “In case it was the intention of someon
e to create different independent states in Pakistan, let it be said so clearly” a
dded he12. Thus the foundation for separating of ways was laid on February 28, 1
971 and, the later events, proved decisive as history witnessed thereafter. Bhut
to’s sensational slogan of “Idhar Ham Udhar Tum” struck the last nail resulting into f
inal parting of ways. On March 1, the session was declared to have been postpone
d by the Government with no fresh date announced. While the postponement of the
Session was welcomed by West Pakistan majority parties, the East Pakistanis term
ed it as a challenge – and began talking of ‘independence’. As a result, Mujib called
for a total strike on March 2, as a mark of protest against the postponement of
the session. What followed thereafter was horrible which completely paralysed th
e entire administration of the Province.
32
“Mobs took to the streets and indulged in arson, murder, rape and loot…workers walke
d out of factories, business houses closed down and Government servants began ab
senting themselves from offices. Those who failed to cooperate voluntarily were
made to comply through strongarm tactics reminiscent of nazi storm troopers. So
great was the reign of terror that all normal life came to a standstill. Instead
of the legally constituted Government running the administration, the Awami Lea
gue headquarters issued edicts stopping the payment of taxes or transferring pay
ments from the central head to the provincial account, and depositing Government
revenues in private banks rather than Government treasury”.13
Even the Army troops were not spared and were attacked by trained guerillas. It
was in these days of bloodbath that General Yahya Khan proposed a Round Table Co
nference to be convened on March 10, 1971 to subside the crisis, but Mujib and o
thers refused to attend. On March 4, Mujib launched the civil disobedience movem
ent which spread like wild fire from one end of the Province to another, resulti
ng into a wave of fascist hysteria. Every type of inhuman atrocity was committed
33
and hundreds of innocent people done to death. Houses were set on fire. Arson, l
oot and plundering became the rule of the day. National flag was desecrated and
the portrait of the Father of the Nation was trampled under foot.14 On March 6,
Yahya Khan, in his broadcast, announced that the National Assembly would meet on
March 25, 1971. In response to this, Mujib placed certain demands as pre-condit
ions for attending the Session. He pressed for withdrawal of Martial Law before
convening the session and, transfer power to the elected representatives of the
people forthwith, through a Presidential Proclamation. He, in fact, had added an
other four demands to his Six-points. These demands were seen as a prelude to ‘ind
ependence’. It became evident when Mujib announced his plan to run a parallel gove
rnment on March 7. It was on this day that ‘Bangladesh’ flag flew on the top of his
house.15 This act clearly signalized porting to the ways. While unspeakable brut
alities continued to be committed on non-Bangalis, the President of Pakistan, as
a last resort, though too late, tried to convince Mujib not to declare ‘independe
nce’. He flew to Dhaka on March 15, 1971. He negotiated with the later for ten day
s to hammer out a compromise, preserve the democratic process and facilitate tra
nsfer of power. “During the negotiations”, said an official report, “Sheikh Mujibur Re
hman initially escalated his mandate for provincial autonomy into a
34
demand of confederation. This meant that after the issue of the proposed proclam
ation, extinguishing Martial Law and transferring power, the five provinces of P
akistan would be cut adrift and national sovereignty would be virtually extinct”.1
6 The report further said that “Sheikh Mujibur Rehman demanded that the National A
ssembly must ab initio sit in two committees: one composed of members from East
Pakistan, the other from West Pakistan. Later he developed this into a demand fo
r two constitutional conventions drawing up separate constitutions”.17 On March 22
, both Mujib and Tajuddin Ahmad, the General Secretary of the Awami League, had
an unscheduled meeting with General Yahya Khan in which they categorically deman
ded the transfer of power to East and West Pakistan. This was categorically a cl
ear signal for the break up of Pakistan. Historically March 22, would be conside
red as the decisive day for the dismemberment of Pakistan in her history. It may
be referred here that earlier on March 14, Bhutto too had made a similar damagi
ng statement of demanding transfer of power to majority parties in East and West
Pakistan. It was in response to this statement that seven political parties sev
erely condemned Bhutto’s ‘malicious plans’ and had declared to start a movement for th
e transfer of power. On March 23, Dr. Kamal Hussain, a prominent Awami League le
ader, met President Yahya’s aides and handed over Awami League’s draft constitution,
which
35
proposed the procedure for framing two constitutions.18 Tajuddin Ahmad demanded
for a proclamation to be made within 48 hours in the light of their draft consti
tution. The same day the West Pakistani leaders who were trying to soften Mujib
reported to General Yahya their failure to dissuade the arrogant Sheikh from sec
ession.19 Shortly before that, Mujib took salute of a March past from a squad of
armed volunteers. March 23 was observed as a ‘Resistance Day’ in East Pakistan unde
r his directive. The flag of ‘Bangladesh’ was unfurled on his residence. While unfur
ling the flag, Mujib said that “the struggle is for emancipation and for freedom”.20
On March 24, the Awami League aides met President Yahya’s aides and Tajuddin Ahma
d, while talking to the press reporters said that so far as they were concerned
there was no further need for negotiations.21 The conspiracy originally uncovere
d by Agartala Case was now fully under way. The fact is that “Volunteers were unde
r training in every district in the garb of ‘Sangram Parishads’. Arms and ammunition
s from India had been smuggled in and stocked at strategic points all over the p
rovince…how well-planned and well-organised the Awami League move was can be gathe
red from the mortar fire which came from Jagannath Hall on the night of 25th-26t
h March and the appearance within 3 hours of innumerable barricades all over the
city of Dhaka on the night of the 25th March”.22
36
While political negotiations were in progress, the Awami League was busy prepari
ng to get her demand of ‘separation’ fulfilled by force. They instigated students, a
rmed soldiers of regular forces, and made the educational institutions the centr
es of subversive activities. When failed to win over by persuation, the Awami Le
ague sought to line up through Nazi-style tactics. A reign of terror was unleash
ed and unmentionable atrocities committed. On March 25, Mujib, in the presence o
f a huge mob at Dhaka persuaded them to prepare themselves for “supreme sacrifice” a
nd the following day, on March 26, a full-scale revolt was witnessed throughout
East Pakistan. Mujib called on his people to continue the struggle “until the last
enemy soldier has vanished”.23 It was against this background that Mujib was arre
sted for his rebellious activities and Army action was ordered in East Pakistan.
The small hours of March 26, 1971 had been set as the zero hour for an armed up
rising, and for the formal launching of the “independent Republic of Bangladesh”. Aw
ami League’s bid for secession was now under way. Barely a few hours before the Aw
ami League’s zero hour for action, the Armed Forces of Pakistan came in the field
around midnight of March 25-26, 1971. On the eve of Army action, Yahya and Bhutt
o, who had gone there for negotiations, flew back to West Pakistan on March 25 a
nd 26 respectively. Yahya Khan in his broadcast of March 26, outlawed the Awami
League, banned political activity throughout Pakistan and described Mujib and hi
s party as enemies of Pakistan.
37
Commenting on the Army action, Bhutto remarked, “Thank God Pakistan has been saved”,
but the subsequent events later on proved that the military action, in fact, ma
rked the end of the united Pakistan. What a pity! India’s Role in dismemberment of
Pakistan India, who had been reluctant to accept the creation of Pakistan since
1947 could never reconcile to the partition of the sub-continent. She remained
on the lookout to undo the existence of Pakistan. On the eve of the March crisis
in East Pakistan, India played havoc. She was directly involved in the armed re
bellion by the secessionist elements in East Pakistan in March-April 1971. As di
scussed before, the Indian intervention in the political affairs of Pakistan had
started earlier in 1956. It continued to enhance with the passage of time and,
on various occasions, India deliberately interfered in Pakistani politics, espec
ially after Mujib’s victory in the 1970 elections. Her attitude became threatening
. Her press and election media missed no opportunity of portraying Mujib as a he
ro and martyr. The hijacking of the Indian plane was a pre-planned conspiracy ag
ainst Pakistan. Prior to this, in 1965-66, the Indian High Commission at Dhaka h
ad indulged in East Pakistan politics. The All India Radio began a malicious cam
paign against Pakistan, thereby inciting the Bangali sentiments. Indian propagan
da literature was being smuggled into Pakistan territory and freely distributed
to project Mujibur Rehman. At the time of Mujib’s arrest in May-June, 1966, Indian
38
infiltrators had crossed over the borders to Pakistan to help the Awami League w
orkers in demonstrations against the Central Government. In 1967, according to a
concrete evidence, it was found out that India was involved in Agartala Conspir
acy. A number of witnesses confirmed that Sheikh Mujibur Rehman had been one of
the actors of this drama since 1964 in collusion with India.24 One of the witnes
ses stated that India had categorically agreed to provide arms and ammunitions t
o the secessionists at the time of revolt against Pakistan and, on the eve of su
ccessful rebellion, India would block the air and sea routes which join East and
West Pakistan with each other.25 Again in 1968-69, a large number of miscreants
were sent by the Indian Government to East Pakistan, who were to play a mischie
vious role during agitations in association with local Hindu population. These m
iscreants raised slogans such as “Jai Hind, Akhand Bharat and Bande Matram even in
Dhaka city”.26 During the Round Table Conference of political leaders with Ayub K
han in February-March 1969, Ayub Khan had disclosed that “thirty thousand Indian m
iscreants equipped with arms and ammunition had entered East Pakistan and were l
ooting and killing people”.27 It may be recalled that after Mujib’s victory in 1970
elections, India adopted a threatening posture and amassed her Army along the bo
rders of East Pakistan on the pretext of holding fair elections in Bangal. India
n Radio and press gave all out support to Mujib and incited East Pakistanis agai
nst the Government of Pakistan.
39
Thousands of Indians entered East Pakistan and posed a threat to law and order.
The Indian arms and ammunition was freely distributed by her agents during and a
fter the elections. After the pre-planned hijacking of the Indian plane to Lahor
e, the Indians made their bid to inflict financial loss on Pakistan and to provi
de an opportunity to the Awami League to make its military preparations for a fi
nal round with the Pakistan Army. At the time of Awami League’s call for strike on
March 2, 1971 thousands of Indian agents and huge quantity of arms poured into
East Pakistan. During the first fortnight of March 1971, inhuman barbarities wer
e witnessed in most of the East Pakistan districts in which the Indian miscreant
s with the help of Hindu population of East Pakistan surpassed all the past even
ts of brutalities ever committed in the history of the sub-continent. Thousands
of persons were surrounded and killed in cold blood. Women were paraded naked in
the streets and mothers were made to drink the blood of their own children. Wom
en and children locked up in thousands were burnt alive and inmates were roasted
to death. The streets of Dhaka were littered with corpses.28 Mujib’s Mukti Bahini
, a brain child of India was established in July 1970, which was duely trained i
n Indian territory by the Indian Army, whose endless atrocities committed on non
-Bangali population of East Pakistan can hardly be discussed in words. At the ti
me of ‘Bangladesh Ceremony’ observed on March 23, 1971 the Indian officials particip
ated in the notorious function.
40
“Concrete evidence is available to prove that during 19701971, infiltration of arm
ed personnel and transportation of ammunition from India into East Pakistan cont
inued on a hectic speed under the supervision of the Border Security Force. The
Mukti Bahini was expanded, strengthened, and trained militarily”.29 On the day Muj
ib was arrested for revolting against the Government, Indian reaction to the eve
nt was not only quick but sharp as well. On March 27, India expressed sympathy i
n Lok Sabha with the refugees from East Pakistan. While the fact is that by that
time no East Pakistani had ever crossed the borders to take refuge in the India
n territory. Also indisputable as a fact was the speech of the then Prime Minist
er of India, (late) Mrs. Indira Gandhi on March 29, when she moved a resolution
in the Indian Parliament offering unanimous support to what was described as the
“freedom struggle”.30 On March 31, the Indian Parliament expressed its “deep anguish
and grave concern at the developments in East Pakistan.31 “The tempers of the Cong
ress Parliamentary party members were so high that some demanded recognition of
Bangladesh by the Government of India, and others declaration of war against Pak
istan”.32 Again on March 30, the State Assemblies of Bihar and Assam unanimously a
dopted resolutions urging the Indian Government to recognize the provisional gov
ernment of the “Republic of Bangladesh” and the same sentiments were expressed by
41
the Chief Ministers of Tamil Nadu and Madhya Pradesh. On the same day, both hous
es of the Indian Parliament assured the secessionists in East Pakistan of their “w
holehearted support.” “Situated as India is” said the Indian Prime Minister so cunning
ly while moving the resolution, “and bound as the people of the sub-continent are
by centuries-old ties of history, culture and tradition, parliament cannot remai
n indifferent to happenings so close to the Indian border”.33 On April 4, Mrs. Ind
ira Gandhi speaking at the session of the All-India Congress Committee asserted
that it was neither “proper nor possible” for India to keep quite”.34 However, on Apri
l 24, the Deputy Chief Minister of West Bangal declared, “we in West Bangal recogn
ize Bangladesh although the Central Government has not done so yet.”35 From the ab
ove facts the salient point emerges about India’s role in the East Pakistan crisis
that India, officially and unofficially, openly and secretly, physically or voc
ally, showing complete disregard to international law of non-intervention in any
other country, blatantly interfered in Pakistan’s internal crisis. It may be note
d that on the eve of Mujib’s proclamation of illegal ‘independence’, the Indian radio
and other media of publicity began a vehement campaign propagating the false ‘caus
e’ of Mujib and the Awami League. In other words, India found the situation quite
compatible towards fulfilling her unholy design to undo Pakistan - the moment fo
r which she had been waiting
42
since 1947. Chaos in East Pakistan offered her a golden opportunity to disintegr
ate Pakistan. In the words of Subrahmanyum, Director of the Indian Institute for
Defence Studies, “what India must realize is the fact that the breakup of Pakista
n is in our interest and we have an opportunity the like of which will never com
e again.”36 In such an environment while the Indian media and their leadership inc
luding the Premier were busy carving a ‘line’ in the map of Pakistan, the internatio
nal press, influenced and ‘bribed’ by Indian secret agencies added more fury to the
already tense situation. Seconding the Indian exaggerated propaganda, they gave
false accounts of events, thus turning the events in favour of India and damagin
g the image of Pakistan at international level. Death toll in thousands was exag
gerated and the stories of refugee problem surpassed any type of falsehood. The
refugee problem was only used as a pretext for invading Pakistan. India wanted t
o aggravate the situation by shrieking for refugee settlement to grab more aid f
or relief. If refugees were a problem to India then why did not she allow them t
o return to their homeland after the general amnesty had been declared and, the
things, seemed to be settling down? The fact, however, as interpreted by Mohamma
d Ayoob and K. Subrahmanyum was:“The Government of India, presumably after due del
iberations, decided not to close the borders, but to allow the refugees to
43
come in. In a sense the commitment of the Government of India to the liberation
of Bangla Desh was implicit in this decision. If this had not been done, it woul
d have been difficult to have sustained the flame of resistance in Bangla Desh f
or nine long months, and to keep up the morale of the people of Bangla Desh.”37 Wh
en uncertainty and confusion were at their peak, Indira Gandhi hurriedly toured
several countries during which she advocated the false ‘cause’ of India. Her tone wa
s threatening with regard to the situation in East Pakistan. Her attitude reflec
ted her ‘determination to have a final round with Pakistan’. She played with one bal
l in hand, leaving the rest in the air thus isolating and depriving Pakistan of
any possible assistance from any quarter, and decided to beat the trumpet of del
iberate aggression against her. It may also be noted that by then India had ente
red into a Joint Defence Pact with Russia. Eventually, the skirmishes with the I
ndian Army in the guise of Mukti Bahini, which had started as early as March, no
w took shape of a full-fledged war when India sent her Army in East Pakistan on
November 22, 1971. The war spread and on December 3, 1971 it took West Pakistan
in its fold. When war flames had risen too high, the matter was taken to the Sec
urity Council where various resolutions were moved for a cease-fire, but one way
or
44
the other, either India or her ally Russia, rejected or vetoed on one pretext or
the other. The resolution moved by Poland on December 15, 1971 to cease all mil
itary action as a first step towards cease-fire met the same fate. Z.A. Bhutto,
who was representing Pakistan in the Security Council, made a lengthy speech on
this occasion saying: “I find it disgraceful to my person and my country to remain
here…Legalize aggression, legalize occupation I will not be a part to it. We will
fight. We will go back and fight”. Then he ripped up the Council agenda and stalk
ed out of the chamber…”38 While this was going on in the Security Council, Dhaka fel
l to the Indian Army on December 16, 1971. The long cherished goal of India was
thus achieved.
The ugly Role of Foreign Press
It would not be wrong to implicate the western press as ‘one of the founding fathe
rs of Bangladesh’. “At the indignation of Bharat its correspondents did not stop at
malicious and tendentious reporting. They spent hours and days among University
students discoursing on the economic viability of the proposed state of ‘Banglades
h’ and canvassing the possibility of an open revolt against the Central government
when they arrived in East Pakistan for the ostensible purpose of reporting on t
he situation resulting from tidal floods in November 1970. But none of this tale
nted team visited Lahore to witness the massive relief effort organized for floo
d-victims”.39 The news of floods, sufferings of the displaced people and
45
the news of internal strife between the two brotherly wings, practically came fr
om the foreign press – probably ‘interested foreign press’ who sabotaged the whole aff
air in conformity with the policy line given to them by their ‘friends’– the Indians.
It is believed that there are three permanent elements in the foreign press: one
that believes in objective writing, the second which is regarded as a forceful
element, works in line with the policies of the secret services agencies of any
of the foreign country which purposely provides information in conformity with h
er designs, and the third perhaps the biggest of all, is that element which is t
actfully bribed for any ‘adventure’. It appears that India made best use of the last
two who deliberately created confusion during the East Pakistan crisis and will
ingly engaged themselves in concocting stories to malign Pakistan. The foreign m
edia particularly the British News media, gave one-sided accounts of the events
in East Pakistan quoting “a line from here and a line from there to suit there own
interest”.40 It published unfounded and distorted reports showing open sympathy w
ith the Indian supported ‘Bangladesh’ rebellion. Their editorials, articles and news
comments and reports carried biased stories damaging the Pakistani image. Takin
g notice of it, the national press gave critical comments. Deploring their attit
ude the Pakistan Observer of Dhaka in its editorial of April 27, 1971 said “…the Bri
tish press, minus a small
46
section, has been following the same line of anti-Pakistan propaganda depending
wholly and blindly on unverified stories told by Indian propagandatists”.41 Callin
g these news as “gross exaggeration” Mrs. Jill Knight an MP of the British Parliamen
t, who happened to visit Pakistan in June 1971, remarked, “papers in Britain are s
till reporting atrocities, and shocking evidence of violence, but there is none
of this going on now”.42 “The ire and wrath of the foreign correspondents was mirror
ed in their exaggerated accounts of the Army Action”.43 The statement of General T
ikka Khan, Chief Martial Law Administrator in East Pakistan, as quoted in ‘Pakista
n Divided’, portrays a vivid picture of the ‘ruthless’ reporting of the foreign press
media. He remarked, “to this day the world still believes we started everything. T
his is a complete distortion of history…Mujib wanted a showdown. During the strugg
le that followed, the Bangalis exaggerated their casualties by a thousand percen
t or more. Mujib says there were 200,000 rapes. A Roman Catholic Organization, w
hich the press has chosen not to quote, comes up with a figure of 4,000. We have
been the victims of a propaganda machine”.44 Such an act of journalistic dishones
ty was done under the Indian-inspired falsehood tactics. Dailies like Times, Gua
rdian and Telegraph carried virulent antiPakistan propaganda campaign throughout
the crisis in East Pakistan especially after the ‘expulsion’ of about half a dozen
foreign correspondents from Dhaka by the military authorities for their safety p
urpose. These
47
correspondents took this step too seriously and, in return, deliberately present
ed distorted events in a manner prejudicial to Pakistan’s interests. Exaggerated f
igures of refugees were given, imaginary stories of large scale fighting were pu
blished. ‘The illegal and revolutionary demand of a pressure group, miscreants and
anti-state elements was presented in such a way that it looked like a demand of
the entire population of East Pakistan. Funny stories as ludicrous and maliciou
s as anything were advertently circulated to slander Pakistan.’ One such story tha
t appeared in the foreign press was that “a large number of girl students had been
killed in the Roqayya Hall on the night of 25th March while the fact of the mat
ter is that the military did not enter the premises of the Hall at all, to which
the provost of the Hall herself bears testimony”.45 While commenting on the role
of the British Press, the Pakistan Observer, in its issue of September 4, 1971 w
rote: “if one goes by what is being published in the British press, one would almo
st believe that Bangladesh exists while in fact there is none…It is notable here t
hat while the British press has approved the role of the British troops in north
Ireland in quelling rebellion and lawlessness, the same press is denouncing Pak
istan for using troops to curb lawlessness and anarchy to save the lives of inno
cent citizens and restore law and order
48
in East Pakistan…This is a policy of double standard”.46 One finds contradiction in
the publications of such a press. It would be interesting to note that many Brit
ish papers wrote about the ‘reign of lawlessness that the Awami League had let loo
se in East Pakistan in the month of March; called Shaikh Mujibur Rehman a demago
gue and rabblerouser and emphasized the need to restore order in the Province. B
ut later on when the Pakistan Army intervened to restore the order, safeguard th
e integrity of Pakistan and tackle the disruptionists, the same papers began to
sing a different tune. They began to lionize the Awami League and called the law
breakers and secessionists “freedom fighters”.47 It is increasingly ‘astonishing and
a pity that while brazenfacedly distorting truths and misrepresenting facts eman
ating from India, they blacked out the news and versions from Pakistani sources’.
It may be recalled that ‘Even when Hilter’s Germany was at the peak of its power, th
e master propagandist, Goebbels, observed certain principles to deceive the worl
d but the irresponsible manner in which the western press, maliciously propagate
d against echoing on Pakistan, the Indian broadcasting media and the press, can
hardly be narrated in adequate words. It is a wonderhow the western press and ne
ws media became a tool in the hands of Indian expansionists and war mongers. It
is quite evident that saboteurs and miscreants played a nasty
49
game of rumour mongering to create boundless confusion and chaos with the sole o
bjective of destroying the confidence of the people and, thereby, enabling the a
ntistate elements and infiltrators to make capital out of the weaknesses of thos
e who fell a prey to the sordid stories that were invented during the crisis. Wh
atever was happening in East Pakistan was the internal problem of Pakistan and o
nly the Pakistanis were to decide the best way out for themselves and no foreign
power had a right to impose a solution. The fact is that the baseless and unfou
nded propaganda was carried out by Indian agents in the foreign press. According
to an editorial of the Pakistan Observer of April 27, 1971, this version has be
en beautifully picturized when the paper wrote: “for all we know, the British publ
icity media have no correspondents of their own in East Pakistan and are apparen
tly guided by second hand reports from hostile sources in India. They seem almos
t to be functioning as relaying stations of the All India Radio and other Indian
publicity agencies so that if you have heard one you have heard all”.48 To please
the Indians, the British press and her broadcasting services reported false sto
ries often committing ridiculous blunders. On many issues they widely differed a
mong themselves. For example, “the number of refugees from East Pakistan was estim
ated between 10,000 by the British press in June 1971 while the BBC told that th
e number was 20,000 and the Indian Television was saying their number was 600,00
0. Similarly, the estimates of deaths on the first day of Army
50
action was reported to be 6,000 and the press declared the number as 10,000”.49 As
referred to earlier, the Times, the Guardian and The Sunday Telegraph took the
lead in presenting most virulent anti-Pakistan propaganda through their news col
umns and also editorially. They frequently used the name of ‘Bangladesh’ without any
inverted commas as a matter of principle. Through their writings, these papers
gave the impression that long before its actual existence, the ‘country’ had come in
to being and her government functioning in Calcutta. The Guardian’s reporting abou
t Pakistani affairs was remarkable for its lack of objectivity, while using load
ed phrases like “Punjabi occupation regime”, “liberation forces of the Bangladesh”, “Banga
l’s struggle” and “self-determination for Bangladesh”. Commenting on the role of The Gua
rdian, an analyst wrote in the Pakistan Times of Lahore in its issue of June 18,
1971 that: The “Guardian” does not report events; it tells the Bangalis living in B
ritain how to carry on the war, how to use guerrilla tactics and defeat the hate
d Pakistan Government and of course the BBC is always there to line the cue and
broadcast a summary of the British press for the benefit of the poor East Pakist
anis, who know nothing of modern techniques of war”.50 The performance of the Indi
an propagandists in distorting facts about happenings in East Pakistan and the f
utile attempts to justify her illegal and immoral intervention in Pakistan’s inter
nal affairs was understandable, but what was not so understandable was
51
the role played by the British publicity media with minor exceptions. It is a pi
ty that the British press minus a small section had been following the same line
of anti-Pakistan propaganda, depending wholly and blindly on unverified stories
told by Indian propagandists. One is compelled to appreciate the propaganda mac
hinery of the Indian propagandists who successfully directed rumourmongering cam
paign on an international scale thereby convincing the world media to see things
in Pakistan through Indian eyes only. It may be recalled that the Western press
had remained mute when India illegally occupied Kashmir in 1948, forcibly held
Goa, Monabao, Hyderabad and, thereafter, attacked Pakistan thrice in 1948, 1965,
1971. Why did the Western Press remain cold during periodical pogroms of Muslim
s in India since partition of the South Asian region? Why, after all, Pakistan r
emained their attractive target throughout? The attitude of the American news me
dia was also no better. Their attitude remained unfriendly and unsympathetic on
a number of occasions. Pakistan expressed her concern over unauthenticated and t
endentious reports, mostly derived from Indian sources. Deploring the publicatio
n of one-sided news and views about happenings in East Pakistan, the Pakistani A
mbassador “pointed out that those newspapers had refused to publish the news refut
ing reports of the killing of ten professors of Dhaka University…51” The tendency in
America to publish and believe unconfirmed reports, so long as they were damagi
ng to Pakistan, also became
52
apparent, from the statement issued by the International Committee of University
of Emeritus in New York, describing the “massacre of scholars at Dhaka”. “The truth a
bout the “massacre” was revealed when the professors listed as dead were authoritati
vely reported to be alive”.52 The western press gave horrible stories of refugee s
ufferings as depicted by India. They published tearful accounts of the suffering
s of refugees and of starvation. Although there had been human suffering during
a few months in East Pakistan but the question is that how did this take place a
nd who caused it? Wasn’t it India who first created unrest in East Pakistan, execu
ted acts of rebellion and sabotage and then opened her borders, encouraging some
what unhappy and innocent people of East Pakistan to cross over and take refuge
in camps set up under a pre-planned programme. By raising hue and cry, India kil
led two birds with one stone – damaging the integrity of Pakistan and getting maxi
mum foreign economic aid from the world in the name of refugee sufferings and sh
ortage of food grains. BBC reporting while analyzing the attitude of the British
press and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) propaganda on the East Pak
istan crisis, Dr. K.K. Aziz, has given considerable account on the subject in hi
s work titled ‘Britain and Pakistan.’ He writes: “…British politicians, historians, writ
ers, journalists and authors of letters to newspapers had not missed any opportu
nity
53
between 1947-1971 of expressing their intense dislike for Pakistan. But it was o
nly when the crisis in East Pakistan came in March 1971 that they discovered a G
od-sent occasion to vent their spleen to their heart’s content. All the pent-up em
otions, historical memories and bitter frustration suddenly found release. The l
ong-awaited moment had come and with a concerted and gleeful determination they
assailed everything Pakistani from the very creation of the country to its minor
difficulties.”53 Side by side with the British press, it’s radio played the same ro
le. It appears that the BBC mostly depended on the distorted reporting of the pr
ess. Its programmes were later reproduced in its magazine namely ‘Listener’. One, Mi
chael Clayton of the BBC who was expelled from Dhaka along with a few other fore
ign correspondents on March 26, 1971 in his talk on Radio in early April called
Sheikh Mujibur Rehman ‘a moderate politician’ and described the army’s action of resto
ring law and order as applying ‘the solution of burning and killing’ to the independ
ence aspirations of East Pakistan’s people”.54 David Sells in his talks on radio “call
ed upon the Bangalis of East Pakistan to organize themselves politically so as t
o be able to offer “effective military opposition to the domination of West Pakist
an”.55 By the end of July in a talk, John Grigg said:
54
“The partition of India in 1947 was an unmitigated tragedy, the principle cause of
which was that a man of perverse genius – Mohammad Ali Jinnah – was determined at a
ll costs to create a separate Muslim state. In spite of the Indian National Cong
ress’s genuine commitment to secularism, Jinnah aggravated and exploited the Musli
ms fear that in a Hindu-majority state they would be persecuted, or would at any
rate exist only as second-class citizens. On the basis of that doctrine Pakista
n was established, the unity of India shattered, and in the process two historic
Indian communities – Bangal and Punjab – were divided. Pakistan was from the first
day a geographical nonsense…Since 1947 the concept of Muslim solidarity, which was
the one positive element in the case for Pakistan, has been exposed as a disast
rous myth, while the negative argument that Muslims would find life intolerable
in India has proved equally illusory…The demand for an independent Bangladesh is a
fair enough comment on the record – and the very idea – of Pakistan. But is it fair
to India’s record, or to the idea of a united India which was sacrificed (want on
ly by Jinnah, sadly by Nehru) when the British withdrew? Gandhi could never give
his
55
blessing to what he called the “vivisection” of India. To him, the events of 1947 we
re heart-breaking – the negation of all that he had worked for more than thirty ye
ars. But surely his vision of a united India, in which different religious group
s could live together in peace was the right and the true vision, and is this no
t the moment to recapture it?... No doubt it would be extremely difficult to reo
pen the question which was settled, on the wrong lines, in 1947. Sovereign state
s, however misbegotten, have a terrible bound to resist any attempt to liquidate
them. All the same…the people of India and Pakistan are essentially one people, w
hose artificial division has been a calamity for themselves and for the world. T
hat calamity should, if possible, be ended…The proper demands to make are that She
ikh Mujibur Rehman should be released, that the elected representatives of the P
akistani people should be allowed to meet, and that military rule should give wa
y to constitutional government…it is possible that a liberated Pakistan would grad
ually, through its component parts (Bangalis, Baluchis, Pathans etc. as well as
the dominant Punjabis) return to the idea of a united, confederal India. Such a
development would
56
bring comfort and hope to the masses whose lives have been blighted by the effec
ts of Partition”.56 The above sentiments are being expressed even today by Indians
and a group of seudo-intellectuals who are playing role of fifth columnists in
Pakistan since its dismemberment in 1971. Now have a look on another inflammator
y analysis against the creation of Pakistan. In the late October, John Grigg sai
d in his talk that: “Bangal was partitioned in 1947 and East Pakistan brought into
being ‘on two assumptions which have turned out to be completely false. The Musli
m solidarity proclaimed by Jinnah has been disproved by West Pakistan’s exploitati
on of the eastern region over more than twenty years, and by Yahya Khan’s recent a
trocities; while the alleged impossibility of a fair deal for Muslims under Hind
u majority rule has been disproved by the experience of India’s 60 million Muslims
since Independence. So why not revert to the idea of a united India? Since the
two-nation theory has failed, why not go back to one nation instead of creating
a third nation and so, perhaps, starting an endless process of Balkanistan”.57
57
While talking about the plight of the refugees in the same radio programme, John
Grigg said that: “One thing is absolutely clear. The refugees will go home only i
f and when the Punjabi Army is withdrawn from East Bangal. Moreover, to be sure
that they return in safety they will need to know that Sheikh Mujib has been rel
eased and that the country is effectively under his control…The outside world has
shown too little appreciation of India’s gigantic act of charity towards nine mill
ion citizens of another nation driven by methods of barbarism on to her soil…The p
artition of Bangal is against nature. The original cause of it – religious prejudi
ce – is now palpably a waning force, and the vested economic interests which parti
tion has created are unlikely to be much of a breakwater against the force of Ba
ngali nationalism. Meanwhile…unless they go home very soon, there will be war”.58 In
early November 1971, another speaker namely Donald Milner, not only made a fore
cast of an Indian attack on Pakistan but also advocated it during his talk on th
e radio, saying: “Steadily, it seems, the false logic of events in forcing India a
nd Pakistan into war…The end of the monsoons means that heavy
58
artillery can be moved up to the East Pakistan frontier…Meanwhile, the continued p
ressure of the Bangali refugees is impelling the Indians to action. As war fever
mounts, at least in the north of India, a quick campaign looks more and more at
tractive. In theory, it would create one independent state of Bangladesh, behold
en to India for its very existence, to which the refugees could all return in co
nfidence. And with Pakistan weakened irreparably by the loss of half of her popu
lation and resources, India would be free to divert her own vast defence budget
towards crying social and economic needs. Mrs. Gandhi’s cabinet is ‘still divided ro
ughly 50-50 between hawks and doves, and there seems little doubt that the decis
ion is hers”.59 In early December Donald Milner in his talk said: “Even the most opt
imistic observer must now admit that little short of a miracle can save India an
d Pakistan from war’. India ‘had no need to foment anti-Punjabi fervour in East Paki
stan’. The refugees are ‘a very real goad to India to take action. Overtly she has b
ehaved in the circumstances with commendable moderation, insisting until very re
cently that the whole crisis was an
59
internal affair for Pakistan to solve (even if India knew she couldn’t!)’. “For the In
dians, it may be now or never: a unique opportunity (while world sympathy lasts)
not only to get rid of the refugees, but at the same time finally to shatter th
e unity of Pakistan”.60 By the end of December 1971, a report of Peter Flinn sent
from Rawalpindi was read out on radio which alleged that: “The youth of Pakistan’ ha
d already written off Muslim unity as a practical failure before the fighting an
d the armed services are almost relieved to see the East go”.61 Like the BBC, the
British press did no less harm to Pakistan by false reporting during the March c
risis. Its leading papers gave “full-scale” coverage to the so-called ‘Bangali Liberat
ion Movement’ with full devotion. The Times took the lead in the whole affair: “It d
id not make a secret of its utter dislike for Pakistan. In the dispatches it cho
se to print, in the headlines it gave to the news, in the placing of the reports
, in the location and choice of the letters to the editor, in the gossip of its “T
imes Diary” – man, in its leading articles and editorials, in the choice and size of
photographs published – in the entire handling of the crisis it struck such a
60
partisan and one-sided attitude that there is no good in analyzing its point of
view”.62 The correspondent who frequently wrote about East Pakistan crisis for the
Times was Peter Hazellhurst, whose accuracy of reports was widely challenged in
the Pakistani press. His dispatches in particular, seriously damaged the reputa
tion of Pakistan. As quoted in “Pakistan and Britain”, Nirad C. Chaudhuri, an Indian
Hindu Bengali and a famous writer in his article titled “Indian Government and Br
itish Correspondents” published in Hindustan Standard of Calcutta on June 6, 1971,
wrote in his concluding remarks that: “Some very strange and significant points a
re to be noted in connection with these reports: First, a foreign correspondent
is playing up the idea of an inevitable and general war between India and Pakist
an as imminent. Secondly, he is allowed to observe and report details of troop m
ovements, deployment, armaments, and defensive works, and even to identify units
of the army. Thirdly he predicts the results. Let me assert this categorically:
that no country in the world if it means business will ever allow anyone, not t
o speak of foreign correspondents, to observe and report military dispositions i
n this manner. Even the idea of a war is not allowed to be
61
played up. The suspension is unavoidable that The Time’s correspondent is doing al
l this with the tacit consent if not at the instance of the Government of India.
On any other supposition it is incomprehensible… But the really important questio
n to put is, why Mr. Peter Hazellhurst is being given opportunities to collect i
nformation to write as he is doing? I can only say that knowingly or unknowingly
he is playing the part of a publicity agent for Government of India in order to
serve certain ends of our foreign policy. The Government of India has found tha
t no amount of threats on its part will make the Pakistani Government change its
policy in East Bangal, and also that all its diplomatic notes will not make for
eign governments put any kind of pressure in order to compel the Pakistani Gover
nment to come to terms with the Muslims of East Bangal. Yet the Government of In
dia feels that it is presenting the bogey of war between India and Pakistan, wit
h all its possibilities of involvement of the Great Powers and a world war, to f
righten these Powers into forcing Pakistan to make concessions to the
62
Muslims of East Bengal. Of course, this is a very naive manoeuvre. But there is
hardly any other option open to the Government of India, with the exception of a
ctual war which certainly will not be risked. Mr. Hazellhurst’s dispatches, with a
ll their unreliability as reporting and mischievousness as propaganda, fall with
in the framework of such a policy. Whether it is due to Mr. Hazellhurst’s personal
commitment to India or to promptings from the Government of India, I cannot say
. But whatever the inspiration, the writing itself is highly irresponsible”.63 The
other correspondent namely Anthony Mascarenhas, published for years his reports
in the New York Times and The Time magazine. Later, in February 1971, he associ
ated himself with The Sunday Times. He was once an assistant editor of the Morni
ng News of Karachi where his role became controversial on account of some financ
ial embezzlement and, he left Pakistan some how or the other without clearance.
Having associated with The Sunday Times, he could not really commit himself to o
bjective reporting and published utterly baseless and false stories about the cr
isis, particularly when he wrote articles such as “Genocide” published in the The Su
nday Times on June 13, 1971 – reporting the killing of East Pakistan University te
achers, intellectuals and artists by the Pakistan Army, who – not
63
only one but all of them were later found to be alive and had appeared on the te
levision to testify the blatant untruth of Anthony Mascarenhas. Despite the fact
that the report had been found totally absurd, yet the paper, a little after th
at event, while advocating the accuracy of this report said that “…in any event, we
have the fullest confidence in the integrity of our reporter”. So this is one of t
he example of the press that claimed to be free of any outer pressure; objective
in writing and positive in thinking.
Analysis
It is apparent that casual forecasts, futuristic propositions, carefree reportin
g, and one-sided stories published in the Foreign Press particularly British, we
re taken as a reality by the world media. Some ‘influenced’ Pakistanis including the
unaware Bangalis, remained ignorant of the factual position. The public at larg
e, not aware of the events and its consequences fell a victim to this propaganda
of the British press. The material thus published was based on day-today report
age of the crisis but one feels bewildered to find that a large portion reflecte
d ‘advocacy’ of India in which the word ‘Bangladesh’ in place of East Pakistan was frequ
ently used since March 1971. The plight of the refugees was described in an emot
ional manner thereby using it as a pretext for fulfilling the future designs of
India to disintegrate Pakistan. Discussions on military
64
strategy of countries; support to the Mukti Bahini guerrillas and, objections ra
ised in favour of India regarding posting of the U.N. members to the refugee cam
ps, remained attractive topics for the British correspondents throughout the cri
sis. They strongly advocated the ‘cause’ of India for borrowing maximum economic aid
on the pretext of refugee sufferings. The Pakistan Army remained their favourit
e target. The foreign correspondents did not even spare the irregulars such as c
ivilian Razakars by calling them “fanatic rightists” and “zealous Muslims”. The matters
such as shortage of foodgrain and distribution of rations amongst the refugees w
as discussed under the influence of the Indian press. Any statement or analysis
from outside, favouring Pakistan, appear to be immediately sabotaged and every e
ffort made to nullify the facts. An example of the statement of Mrs. Jill Knight
, an MP of the British parliament, and, its subsequent nullification the next da
y by the British press, is sufficient to prove this verdict. The foreign corresp
ondents passed sarcastic remarks against Muslims, specially the West Pakistanis.
These correspondents seem to be worried about American and Chinese support to P
akistan in the event of war and talked of the probable Russian involvement as a
consequence. They appear to be satisfied over guerrilla’s activities but seem to b
e annoyed with the Razakars helping the administration for maintenance of law an
d order. It is not possible to offer a detailed analysis of all that was partial
ly reported in the Foreign Press, however,
65
an effort has been made by quoting a few references which clearly depict that th
e foreign press is association with the Indian media played a havoc with the sov
ereignty of Pakistan.
Conclusion
It may be concluded that it was not a ‘genocide’ as termed by the Foreign Press but,
a well-fought civil war. Throughout the campaign, India had been deliberately m
isinterpreting the East Pakistan case. It was, in fact, ‘war’ between two clauses of
the UN Charter i.e., (i) responsibility to safeguard human rights and, (ii) non
intervention in the internal affairs of a member country of the United Nations.
It may be noted that throughout the crisis, India had been debating the question
of selfdetermination, a right which, the East Pakistanis had categorically used
in the general elections of 1945-46, when they had opted to join Pakistan. The
fact is that India never accepted the existence of Pakistan since its birth. The
British and other Foreign Press propaganda helped cherish the Indian dream of d
isintegrating Pakistan. As quoted in “Britain and Pakistan, A study of British Att
itude towards East Pakistan Crisis in 1971”, “British propaganda against Pakistan in
1971 was far better organized, more effective and enjoyed greater official enco
uragement than that against Nigeria during the Biafra war…The responsibility for t
he admittedly one-sided presentation of the situation in the British Press and B
ritish Television falls largely on
66
President Yahya Khan for the expulsion of the Foreign Correspondents…The public op
inion then of this country was considerably and inevitably misinformed”. It is all
eged that Pakistan was bifurcated because of fallacies committed by military jun
ta in power. While some believe that Pakistan was dismembered by Indian hostilit
y. Still others are of the view that it was the result of the hostile attitude o
f the political elite of both the wings, whose thirst for power had pushed them
to the extreme ends. But an in depth study of the Foreign Press would reveal tha
t besides other various factors especially Indian Military intervention which wa
s responsible for the break-up of Pakistan, it was decidedly by the hostile Indo
British Press media that sealed the fate of a united Pakistan. Had it not played
havoc during the fateful days of the East Pakistan crisis, one could possibly d
ream of an amicable solution to the problem.
67
APPENDIX I
THE TEXT OF THE SIX-POINT FORMULA AS ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED AND SUBSEQUENTLY AMEND
ED IN THE AWAMI LEAGUE’S MANIFESTO Point No. 1 Original: The Constitution should p
rovide for a Federation of Pakistan in its true sense on the basis of the Lahore
Resolution, and Parliamentary form of Government with supremacy of Legislature
directly elected on the basis of universal adult franchise. Amended: The charact
er of the government shall be federal and parliamentary, in which the election t
o the federal legislature and to the legislatures of the federating units shall
be direct and on the basis of universal adult franchise. The representation in t
he federal legislature shall be on the basis of population. Point No. 2 Original
: Federal government shall deal with only two subjects, viz. Defence and Foreign
Affairs, and all other residuary subjects shall vest in the federating states.
Amended: The federal government shall be responsible only for defence and foreig
n affairs and, subject to the conditions provided in Point No. 3 below, currency
.
68
Point No. 3 Original: (A) Two separate but freely convertible currencies for two
wings may be introduced, or (B) One currency for the whole country may be maint
ained. In this case effective constitutional provisions are to be made to stop f
light of capital from East to West Pakistan. Separate Banking Reserve is to be m
ade and separate fiscal and monetary policy to be adopted for East Pakistan. Ame
nded: There shall be two separate currencies mutually or freely convertible in e
ach wing for each region, or in the alternative a single currency, subject to th
e establishment of a federal reserves system in which there will be regional fed
eral reserve banks which shall devise measures to prevent the transfer of resour
ces and flight of capital from one region to another. Point No. 4 Original: The
power of taxation and revenue collection shall vest in the federating units and
that the Federal Centre will have no such power. The Federation will have a shar
e in the state taxes for meeting their required expenditure. The Consolidated Fe
deral Fund shall come out of a levy of certain percentage of all state taxes. Am
ended: Fiscal policy shall be the responsibility of the federating units. The fe
deral government shall be provided with requisite revenue resources for meeting
the
69
requirements of defence and foreign affairs, which revenue resources would be au
tomatically appropriable by the federal government in the manner provided and on
the basis of the ratio to be determined by the procedure laid down in the Const
itution. Such constitutional provisions would ensure that the federal government’s
revenue requirements are met consistently with the objective of ensuring contro
l over the fiscal policy by the governments of the federating units. Point No. 5
Original: (1) There shall be two separate accounts for foreign exchange earning
s of the two wings. (2) Earnings of East Pakistan shall be under the control of
East Pakistan Government and that of West Pakistan under the control of West Pak
istan Government. (3) Foreign exchange requirement of the Federal Government sha
ll be met by the two wings either equally or in a ratio to be fixed. (4) Indigen
ous products shall move free of duty between two wings. (5) The Constitution sha
ll empower the unit Governments to establish trade and commercial relations with
, set up trade missions in and enter into agreements with, foreign countries. Am
ended: Constitutional provisions shall be made to enable separate accounts to be
maintained of the foreign exchange earnings of each of the federating units, un
der
70
the control of the respective governments of the federating units. The foreign e
xchange requirements of the federal government shall be met by the governments o
f the federating units on the basis of a ratio to be determined in accordance wi
th the procedure laid down in the Constitution. The Regional Governments shall h
ave power under the Constitution to negotiate foreign trade and aid within the f
ramework of the foreign policy of the country, which shall be the responsibility
of the federal government. Point No. 6 Original: The setting up of a militia or
a paramilitary force for East Pakistan. Amended: The governments of the federat
ing units shall be empowered to maintain a militia or para-military force in ord
er to contribute effectively towards national security.
71
APPENDIX II
MR. BHUTTO STORMS OUT OF SECURITY COUNCIL ACCUSING BIG POWERS
Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, stormed out of the Un
ited Nations Security Council today shouting: “I will not be party to the ignomini
ous occupation of part of my country. You can take your Security Council. I am g
oing.” Weeping openly, he said: “I find it disgraceful to my person and my country t
o remain here….Legalize aggression, legalize occupation, I will not be a party to
it. We will fight. We will go back and fight.” Then he ripped up the Council agend
a and stalked out of the chamber, with the rest of his delegation following hard
behind. From: Micheat Leapman New York, December 15 THE TIMES, December 16, 197
1 The theatrical gesture came at the end of a tearful speech in which Mr. Bhutto
urged members not to pass a resolution recognizing the fact of India’s occupation
of East Pakistan. He had called for the meeting late this morning as consultati
ons continued among Council
72
members on British and French proposals for a resolution recognizing this realit
y. His excitable speech included attacks on the Soviet Union, Britain and France
for failing to support Pakistan’s position. He said: “We are told about the realiti
es but the realities keep changing.” Gesturing towards Mr. Jacob Malik of the Sovi
et Union Mr. Bhutto said: “The reality was that Nazi forces were at the gates of M
oscow. You were saluted for resisting this reality.” Principles were more importan
t than realities, he went on. “The principle is that Pakistan is an independent so
vereign state…that is the basic reality.” The great powers were pandering to India w
hich was intoxicated with military success. This was his moment of anguish. He a
ddressed himself directly to “the super-powers, the super-duper powers, the razzli
ng-dazzling powers” that had “imposed their super-will for the moment”. The Security C
ouncil, by recognizing India’s occupation of East Pakistan, would write a new page
in international relations. “Do not permit this shameful barbaric aggression to h
old sway”, he pleaded. “You want us to lick the dirt. We are not going to lick the d
irt.” Referring to the British and French initiative Mr. Bhutto went on: “Gallic log
ic and Anglo-Saxon experience, or whatever it is, have cost us dearly.” It was
73
not acceptable for Britain and France or for anybody to take a neutral attitude.
“You have to take a position on these matters. You have to be on the side of just
ice or the side of injustice, on the side of the aggressor or the side of the ag
gressed.” Afterwards, the British spokesman commented: “There will be widespread sym
pathy for the personal despair voiced by Mr. Bhutto in the Council today. It is
a pity that he felt it necessary to denigrate the efforts of Britain and France
to restore peace to the subcontinent.” Earlier the British spokesman had outlined
the proposals on which Britain and France are trying to get agreement in the Cou
ncil. They are: 1. A cease-fire in the West and in the East. 2. A preservation o
f lives and observance of the Geneva Convention. 3. A comprehensive political se
ttlement which takes account of the realities of the situation. 4. A reference t
o the (United Nations) Secretary General’s offer of good offices. 5. The need for
relief and rehabilitation. 6. A call for a report on the implementation of the r
esolution. The spokesman added that during the intensive discussions last night
and today no delegation had rejected the proposals but, so far, some were uncomm
itted to them.
74
New York, Dec. 15. – Outside the Council chamber, Mr. Bhutto said: “I hate this body
. I don’t want to see their faces again. I’d rather go back to a destroyed Pakistan.”
Then, followed by the seven grim-faced members of his delegation, he strode down
the carpeted main hall past milling groups of surprised diplomats, and was driv
en off in a misty rain. His parting words to the Council had been: “Mr. President,
I am not a rat. I’ve never ratted in my life. I have faced assassination attempts
, I’ve faced imprisonment. …Today I am not ratting, but I am leaving your Security C
ouncil. “I find it disgraceful to my person and to my country to remain here a mom
ent longer…Impose any decision, have a treaty worse than Versailles, legalize aggr
ession, legalize occupation…I will not be a party to it. We will fight…my country ha
rkens for me”. On his march through to the corridor, Mr. Bhutto told reporters tha
t Pakistan was not breaking its relations with the Council or the United Nations
. Although he had been caustic about the British and French during his speech. H
e said afterwards that his delegation was working with the British and French on
their resolutions. – (New York Times News Service.)
75
APPENDIX III
Operative Clauses of the Polish Resolution
It may be recalled that four resolutions were tabled in the meeting of the UN Se
curity Council held on 15 December, 1971. Of these, the operative clauses of the
polish draft resolution, S/10453 Rev 1, are appended below as examined in “The Se
paration of East Pakistan” authored by Hasan Zaheer (Karachi, 1994). The clauses a
re:i) “The immediate release of Mujibur Rahman (this was deleted in the revised ve
rsion) and transfer of power to the elected representatives in East Pakistan; ii
) An initial cease-fire in all areas of Pakistan for a period of 72 hours immedi
ately after the beginning of the process of power transfer; iii) Regrouping of P
akistani armed forces in East Pakistan to pre-set locations for evacuation from
there; iv) All West Pakistani civilian personnel and other persons willing to re
turn to West Pakistan, and East Pakistani Civilian personnel and other persons i
n West Pakistan willing to return to East Pakistan to be given an opportunity to
do so under the supervision of the United Nations;
76
v) The cease-fire to become permanent soon after the withdrawal of Pakistani tro
ops and their concentration for that purpose had started during the period of 72
hours; vi) Withdrawal of Indian armed forces from East Pakistan to start soon a
fter the evacuation of nationals from both the Wings and the Pakistan armed forc
es from East Pakistan had started; vii) The withdrawal of Indian troops to actua
lly start in consultation with the newly-established authority in East Pakistan.”
77
APPENDIX IV
PRESIDENT YAHYA BREAKS THE NEWS THE TIMES, December 17, 1971
“President Yahya Khan today admitted to his people that the army in East Pakistan
had been overwhelmed, but he said that a temporary setback in one theatre of war
did not mean the end of the struggle.” “Nowhere in his 15-minute broadcast to the n
ation did he concede that East Pakistan had been lost, nor did he specifically c
ommit himself to continuing with the war in the west. He called, however, on the
international community to “move quickly and firmly to extinguish the flames of w
ar in the entire region.” “The President said that “the heroic fight put up by our arm
ed forces in East Pakistan against overwhelming odds will go down in history as
an epic of indomitable courage reminiscent of the highest traditions of the sold
iers of Islam. Though vastly outnumbered and cut off from supplies and reinforce
ments by land, sea and air due to the enemy blockade, “these ghazis of Islam held
out for months against a perfidious and ruthless enemy, massively equipped and b
acked by a super power.” “The President told the nation that though a battle might b
e lost, final victory would be theirs. To the people
78
of East Pakistan he said: “This is not the end. We shall fight for our country rel
entlessly.” “He also made no mention of cease-fire possibilities, though he said Pak
istan was ready to honour any decision of the United Nations that led to an hono
urable solution consistent with the national interest.” “He ended his speech by call
ing on the people to carry on the struggle with discipline and determination. “Thi
s is a war which has to be fought in the fields, factories and homes as much as
the battlefield”, he said. “The collapse of East comes a little over three weeks aft
er Indian troops first crossed the border in strength. For the Pakistanis it is
a humiliating blow. The outcome of the war to date is that half of the country a
nd an army of more than sixty thousand men have been lost and no compensating ga
ins have been made in the west. “President Yahya’s vague promise to continue with th
e struggle is partly an attempt to damp down popular agitation, it also leaves h
im the option of pursuing the war in the west if all attempts at a cease-fire fa
il.”
79
Appendix V
In the following pages one would find that the Pakistani Press had so perfectly
penpictured the factual position about the biased and negative approach of the I
ndian and British Press. In the following editorial comments the truth has been
rightly unveiled by the Pakistani Press. (Editor)
COMMENTS OF THE PAKISTANI PRESS
(English & Urdu) DELINQUENT PROPAGANDISTS THE PAKISTAN OBSERVER EDITORIAL “Joseph
Goebbels, Hitler’s propaganda minister, worked on principles of self-justification
of power and including “The big lie” by varied repetition. We do not subscribe to t
he view that propaganda agencies of all governments look upon Goebbels as their
idol and ideal. But it is blatantly evident that the Indian propagandists do. In
fact, they are so adept at this “big lie” technique that they have succeeded in pus
hing Goebbels to the second place in their own game. The shameless way in which
the
80
Indian publicity media – the press and radio – are indulging in spreading falsehoods
about Pakistan should leave no doubt about their super-skill in this regard. Tr
uth always happens to be the first casualty of motivated publicity and propagand
a. In this sense the performance of the Indian propagandists in distorting facts
about happenings in East Pakistan and in the futile attempt to justify India’s il
legal and immoral interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs is understandable. W
hat is not so understandable is the role being played by the British publicity m
edia with minor exceptions. For instance, although the news of the setting up of
an inquiry commission to go into the circumstances and cause of the hijacking o
f the Indian plane of January 30, was reported in the overseas bulletin of the B
ritish broadcasting corporation’s radio and T.V., the Commission’s finding that it w
as wholly planned and executed by the Indian intelligence agencies has been comp
letely blacked out. It is a pity that the British press minus a small section ha
s been following the same line of anti-Pakistani propaganda depending wholly and
blindly on unverified stories told by Indian propagandists. It is amazing how t
he British press had drifted from the ethical mooring in its campaign against Pa
kistan. Unless it has done away with the indispensable principle of objectivity,
it would be impossible for it to be almost completely taken in by Indian propag
anda machinery. For all we know, the British publicity media have no corresponde
nts of their own in East Pakistan and are apparently guided by second
81
hand reports from hostile source in India. They seem almost to be functioning as
relaying stations of the All India Radio and other Indian publicity agencies so
that if you have heard one you have heard all. Even a whisper emanating from th
e air seems to raise a faithful echo there. We take no pleasure in finding ourse
lves compelled to write in this vein which we do in sorrow rather than in anger.
It is far from us to, as they say, take them for a ride, which, unfortunately,
they are obviously doing in open defiance of their journalistic traditions of tr
eating facts as sacred and printing them only after they have passed through the
sacrament of confirmation. Otherwise it may be called a free press, but never a
responsible one. This is not an inspiring record of performance of the press of
a country which continues to be the model of parliamentary democracy. It is, of
course, not unknown to any student of history that the British Press, at least
a substantial section of it, tended to magnify events in any country which freed
itself from the British Colonial subjugation and got out of its orbit of influe
nce. For this every reason a BBC correspondent was, not quite long ago, expelled
even from India. This time, of course, Pakistan has to be maligned and harmed b
ecause it serves their economic interests more to please India, the bigger count
ry, where the scope and prospects of trade and profitable investments are much w
ider and better. When eventually truth will come out and the real story will be
told, much of the credibility of their reports and comments will be lost and the
ir
82
versions of events in other countries will also be taken with a large grain of s
alt. Incidentally we recall the story told of a high official in the Roosevelt A
dministration, who was known for his very cautious attitude in the matter of acc
epting a reported fact without proper verification. One day when someone pointed
to a flock of sheep and said that their wool had been sheared, he said, “on this
side it looks so, anyway”, we do not expect the British press to exercise that muc
h caution, but it will be appreciated and it will be closed to reality if it doe
s not see things in Pakistan only through Indian eyes.”
PAKISAN ATTITUDE OF UK’S INFORMATION MEDIA
Anti-Pakistan news being readily spread Dawn, April 24, 1971
London, April 23
“How partisan and dishonest have organs of British information media become vis-à-vi
s Pakistan is amply demonstrated by the virtual blackout imposed on the verdict
of the inquiry commission headed by Mr. Justice Noorul Arefin, that the Indian i
ntelligence service and enemies of Pakistan were behind hijacking of an Indian a
irliner to Lahore which was used by India as a pretext to ban Pakistani over fli
ghts. The British Broadcasting
83
Corporation broadcast the news of the report about the inquiry commissions in it
s overseas news bulletins but the BBC practically blacked out news in its domest
ic radio and television news bulletins. British public has been conditioned to p
rolonged poisonous propaganda emanating from over worked rumour factories in Ind
ia and the situation has now been reached when any antiPakistan news is readily
believed. The Liberal British newspapers, “The Guardian” which published letters on
March 31, supporting “Bengal’s struggle” and “Self-determination” for “Bangladesh” has so f
not published the statement by Col. (Rtd.) Inayat Hassan that he never signed on
e of these letters which included his name. “The Guardian” and the British newspaper
s have also not printed news that Col. Hassan (Rtd.) resigned from Chairmanship
of the socalled campaign for “self rule in Bangladesh”. Oft-repeated, protestations
by the British information media and those by the British Officials and diplomat
s on its behalf that it is independent and dedicated to principles of free expre
ssion and fairplay appear pretty hollow in view ever since the cyclone in East P
akistan last November.
Cricket Tour
A campaign against England tour by Pakistan Cricket Team starting on Saturday ha
s been mounted by anti-Pakistan elements in this country which include
84
Indians, “Bangladesh” extremists, black power supporters and now also some left wing
labor MPs known for their pro-Indian sympathies. This campaign forms part of th
e world-wide psychological warfare being waged by the enemies of Pakistan follow
ing the total collapse of the Indian supported “Bangladesh” rebellion. Other weapons
in the armoury of these enemies of Pakistan are rumours designed to disrupt Pak
istan’s foreign trade (principally raw jute and jute goods exports) and to create
misgivings about the value of Pakistan rupee.”
BRITISH NEWS MEDIA AND PAKISTAN
By: “OBSERVER” THE PAKISTAN TIMES, JUNE 18, 1971 “Pakistan political crisis has clearl
y demonstrated that by and large the British press, television and radio are eit
her unsympathetic or outright hostile to Pakistan. One did expect complete impar
tiality or objectivity from the news media, because the subject was sensitive an
d emotive. But, of course, it would be sheer folly to expect any sympathy from t
he British press (or Government) for the following reasons: • Britain has larger i
nvestments in India than in Pakistan.
85
• India is a bigger country and therefore a bigger potential paradise for the fort
une-hunters of British board rooms. • India has a much stronger and more successfu
l propaganda and public relations machinery than Pakistan. Its large crowd of fo
reign correspondents, writers, artists, dancers, singers, sadhus, jogis, juggler
s, and their hirelings, infesting every nook and corner of Britain constantly ke
ep India in the forefront. In view of these and many other reasons, knowledgeabl
e persons had no illusions that in case of choice between India and Pakistan, Br
itain will always choose the former. However the high ideals and the almost prov
erbial ‘objectivity’ of the British Journalists and particularly BBC were held up as
models before us. These models now lie broken before us. To analyse the recent
attitude of British mass media towards Pakistan one should see things with the h
indsight of recent history. It is common knowledge that the British press has be
en painting Pakistanis living in this country in lurid colours for several years
. Any coloured thief, vagabond, smuggler or smuggled one, is always reported to
be Pakistani. Facts are hardly checked and it is taken for granted that a colour
ed wrong-doer must be a Pakistani.
86
The most virulent anti-Pakistan propaganda was carried on by the “Guardian”—both edito
rially and through its news columns. Although it is common that the nomenclature
s of Pakistan army and East Pakistan have been changed into West Pakistan army a
nd East Bengal by British press, the “Guardian” always writes Bangladesh (not within
inverted commas) as the name of the imaginary country whose cabinet is in the I
ndian Government hostel in Calcutta and which exists in the news rooms of AIR an
d PTI. However, during the last few days for some reasons it has ceased to be fa
shionable to quote the Bangladesh radio, which is not heard even in Calcutta. Th
e “Guardian’s” reporting about Pakistani affairs is remarkable for its lack of objecti
vity (e.g. using loaded phrases like “Punjabi occupation regime”—April 16) but also re
ads like an “order of the day” for the “liberation forces of the Bangladesh”. The “Guardia
n” does not report events; it tells the Bengalis living in Britain how to carry on
the war, how is to use guerrilla tactics and defeat the hated Pakistan Governme
nt. Of course the BBC is always there to link the cue and broadcast a summary of
the British press for the benefit of the poor East Pakistanis, who know nothing
of modern techniques of war. Dailies like “Times”, “Guardian” and “Telegraph”, gave Indian
inspired stories, some BBC broadcasts give
87
false reports and often commits ridiculous blunders, in its intense desire to pl
ease the Indian. But united against Pakistan, the British media widely differ am
ong themselves on many issues. For example the number of refugees from East Paki
stan has been estimated at between 100,000. One was amused to hear that on the s
ame day BBC was talking of 20,000 refugees and ITV was saying their number 600,0
00. Similarly, the estimates of details on the first day were 6,000 than the hea
dlines next day declared 10,000. The British press had been doing its best to cr
eate bad blood between the two wings, highlighting and augmenting parochial feel
ings. The British press had played a similar role in Biafra. The “Times” corresponde
nt callously wrote on April 19 about the Bengalis “—some see them (Bengalis) as a ra
ce of feckless poetasters, spouters of perfervid political oratory, who tend to
melt away at the first sound of gun-fire.” The ITV did no good turn to the East Pa
kistanis when it showed a film in which an Indian instructor was teaching the Be
ngalis the art of the warfare. He mercilessly slapped a Bengali who was unable t
o handle the gun properly. Pakistan’s Government, press and radio would do well to
face these hard facts, and review their policies accordingly.
88
PAKISTAN AND THE BRITISH PRESS
By: a correspondent THE PAKISTAN OBSERVER
September 4, 1971
“The western press, particularly the British has been carrying on for the past sev
eral months a virulent anti-Pakistan propaganda campaign. They have printed all
kinds of lies and rumors and presented them as news to their readers. From the w
ay events in Pakistan have been presented in the British press, it appears that
their reports have been mostly based on hearsay gossips and rumours. Instances a
re galore where figures have been blown out of all proportions, facts have been
distorted and events deliberately presented in a manner prejudicial to Pakistan’s
interests. Exaggerated figures of refugees have been given, imaginary stories of
large scale fighting have been printed. The demand of a small band of miscreant
s and anti-state elements have been presented as that of the people of East Paki
stan. One story circulated in the foreign press was that a large number of girls
students had been killed in the Roqayya Hall on the night of 25th March while t
he fact of the matter is that the military did not enter the premises of the Hal
l at all, to which the provost of the Hall herself bears testimony. Such other l
udicrous and malicious stories have been deliberately circulated to slander Paki
stan. If one goes by what is being published in the British press, one would alm
ost believe that
89
‘Bangladesh’ exists while in fact there is none. The socalled ‘Bangladesh’ is a figurant
of the fevered imagination of the British correspondents and a few Indian agent
s. Britain is herself burdened with the problem of north Ireland. It is notable
here that while the British press has approved the role of the British troops in
north Ireland in quelling rebellion and lawlessness the same press is denouncin
g Pakistan for using troops to curb lawlessness and anarchy to save the lives of
innocent citizens and restore law and order in East Pakistan. What is lawlessne
ss for Pakistan? This is a policy of double standard.
Truthful Stories
Even so some honest and fair minded British journalists have spoken the truth an
d exposed the hypocrisy of their press. Many British reporters had the courage t
o swim against the current and wrote about the real state of affairs in East Pak
istan which totally negates the bulk of reporting on Pakistan in the British pap
ers. The truthful stories about Pakistan have exposed the antiPakistan stance ta
ken by a large section of British papers. It is remarkable that many British pap
ers wrote about the reign of lawlessness that the Awami League had let loose in
East Pakistan in the month of March, called Sheikh Mujib a demagogue and rabbler
ouser and emphasized the need to restore order in the province quickly. But late
r on after the Pakistan army intervened to restore order, safeguard the integrit
y of Pakistan and tackle the
90
disruptionists, the same papers began to sing a different song. They began to li
onize the Awami League and called the law breakers and secessionists the freedom
fighters. One of the British papers which has been persistently spreading malic
ious propaganda against Pakistan in recent times is the “Guardian”.”
PAKISTAN AND THE WESTERN PRESS
By: Mohammad Aminur Rashid THE PAKISTAN OBSERVER
October 18, 1971
“Even when Hitler’s Germany was at the peak of its power, the master propagandist Go
ebbels observed certain rules to deceive the world. His blatant lies and exagger
ated accounts of victories of Hitler’s Germany did however, contain an iota of tru
th in them. But from the irresponsible manner in which certain western papers an
d broadcasting institutions such as BBC i.e. “Bania” Broadcasting Corporation and Al
l India Radio have been spreading lies about the events in Pakistan it seems the
se are bent on establishing new records of telling lies. It is the duty of press
men, reporters, news media, Radio, T.V., and other broadcasting institutions to
enlighten the public as to the exact nature of events that take place anywhere i
n the world. ‘Bias’ and slant in any form should be avoided. It is a pity that the w
estern press, journalists and other
91
news media have been brazenfacedly distorting truths, misrepresenting facts and
spreading lies about Pakistan. They have published misleading stories emanating
from India while blacking out the news from Pakistani sources.
Expansionist Policy
The baseless propaganda and filth that is pouring out of all India Radio needs t
o be treated with contempt. All India Radio is called a public corporation but t
he way it is behaving it seems that it is worse than a privately owned radio sta
tion. Even privately owned Radio stations and news media in many parts of the wo
rld maintain much better and higher standards of reporting and would certainly f
eel ashmed of belonging to a fraternity to which All India Radio belongs. India
is undoubtedly a country which does not have much regard for peace and world opi
nion. Inspite of being a member of the U.N., she has frequently defied its resol
utions. Her expansionist foreign policy makes us shudder to think what would hav
e been the fate of the world had India been as powerful as say the U.S.A. Confro
nted with India even Hitler would have set up in utter consternation. She is a n
ation without scruples, character or principles of any kind and her activities h
ave proved this beyond any shadow of doubt. It is a wonder how the western press
and news media have become a tool in the hands of Indian expansionists and war
mongers. It is admitted on all hands that Pakistan is a sovereign state and has
shown to the world that she is capable of running her affairs with the highest i
deals of
92
democracy and goodwill that has brought her lasting respect of the big and small
alike. She has exhibited her tolerance, foresightedness and powers of impartial
discretion much to the astonishment of the entire world. What happened in East
Pakistan is our own concern. But India is blatantly interfering in our internal
affairs. For a country like India, whose own internal affairs are nothing but cr
ude high-handedness of a country that does not know what to do with its time. Th
e world at large should know that events in East Pakistan are a purely internal
matter and Pakistan is quite capable of putting her house in order in course of
time. Indian attempts to force Pakistan to act in accordance with her dictates i
s simply unbearable, to say the least. Pakistan’s political life unlike that of ma
ny countries of the world has been one of peace and tranquility. Not only the wo
rld press but also the bitterest enemies of Pakistan have had to admit that Paki
stan has made gigantic progress in all spheres of life and the present situation
is but a passing phase that will soon be over. In contemporary political histor
y and during the last twenty years the world has seen so many political changes,
upheavals and the like, even within some of the so-called most advanced countri
es that changes in the political arena are more or less a matter of routine thes
e days.
Our Conviction
The action that was taken in East Pakistan was necessitated by the exigencies of
the situation. Whatever
93
may be said by our enemies we stand firmly to the conviction that the changes we
re necessitated by the rebellion of the now defunct Awami League. Pakistan was c
reated as a single entity, though separated by geography. The fact that Pakistan
has continued to progress for the last 23 years has made it quite clear that Pa
kistan has come to stay. It is obvious that anyone or any political party that a
ttempts to dismember the country is a traitor and enemy of the people. The big p
owers of the world should take note of the fact that the action taken by Preside
nt Yahya Khan to save the solidarity and integrity of Pakistan will go down in h
istory as one of the greatest decision that any president has had to take. The d
ecision had to be taken to save the very foundations of Pakistan from being dest
royed by a selfish, shortsighted and rebellious political party whose greed and
thirst for power had reached the point of insanity. It should further be noted t
hat had President Yahya intended to cling on to power, he would never have held
the elections in the first place. The elections were the first free and fair ele
ctions ever held on the basis of adult franchise in Pakistan and that is enough
proof of the fact that President Yahya is capable of delivering the goods. If af
ter this magnanimous show of good will and complete sincerity, the now defunct A
wami League chose to dismember the country and destroy Pakistan altogether then,
all right thinking people of the world and even those with the slightest common
sense, will agree that President Yayha had no choice but to take steps to stop s
uch an act of treason. The present
94
state of affairs in East Pakistan in view of the communication difficulties crea
ted by saboteurs and miscreants is not fully known to the public at large and mi
screants are playing a nasty game of rumour mongering to create more trouble. Th
ese rumours are coined and circulated with the sole objective of destroying the
confidence of the people and thereby enabling the antistate elements and infiltr
ators to make capital out of the weakness of those who fall prey to the sordid s
tories that are invented. In view of this, one can well imagine the dangerous co
nsequences of rumour-mongering. What All India Radio and the foreign press are d
oing is rumourmongering on an international scale.
Truth
The ‘Bania’ Broadcasting Corporation, All India Radio and sections of the press shou
ld note that they cannot mislead the world for long. Truth is bound to come out
sooner or later. The people of Pakistan are determined to live in a free and uni
ted Pakistan. What is happening in East Pakistan is our own internal affair and
we Pakistanis ourselves will decide what is best for us. No foreign power has a
right to impose a solution on us. The facts of the matter cannot be changed by t
he ridiculous, illogical, unfounded and baseless propaganda being carried by Ind
ian agents in the foreign press and radio.
95
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References
Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan Divided, Lahore, 1984, p.8. Pakistan Divided, op.cit. p
. 19. 3 The Six-point formula was originally authored in 1966 which was reevalua
ted in 1970. It carried all regional demands which were articulated from time to
time since 1947. It proposed a weak Centre; two currencies for the two Province
s; Provincial governments to negotiate foreign trade and aid; communication to b
e placed under the Provincial governments control; to maintain a military and pa
ra-military force. It was a veiled scheme of secession which carried inherent co
ntradictions and was impracticable. (However Z.A. Bhutto, had agreed to all poin
ts minus half point relating to foreign trade and aid). For text of the Formula,
please see Appendix 1. 4 Agartala – a place in the state of Taripura where in Jul
y 1967 a conspiracy was hatched to secede by violence. Its secret leaked out and
Sheikh Mujibur-Rehman and 34 others, involved in conspiracy, were arrested unde
r the Public Safety Ordinance. Later, the withdrawal of the case led to Armed Re
volt of March 1971 by the Awami League. 5 The Pakistan Times, Lahore, March 26,
1969. 6 There were 56,508,000 people on the electoral register. Of these 25,300,
000 were in West Pakistan and the remainder in East Pakistan. The actual turn-ou
t for polling was 56% in East Pakistan; 70% in Punjab; 60% in Sindh; 48% NWFP an
d 40% in Baluchistan. The party position was – All Pakistan Muslim League (Qayyum
Group) 9; Pakistan Muslim League (Council) 7; Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (Hazarvi G
roup) 7; National Awami Party (Wali Group) 7; Pakistan Muslim League (Convention
) 2; Jamaat-eIslami, 4; Pakistan Democratic Party, 1; Markazi Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-
Islam, (Thanvi Group) 7; and Independents, 14. 7 The Present Crisis in East Paki
stan, A Statement by an official spokesman of the Government of Pakistan, May 5,
1971. p.5. 8 Pakistan Divided, op.cit., p. 9. 9 Ibid. 10 Pakistan Divided, op.c
it., p. 105. 11 Ibid., p. 111. 12 The daily Dawn, Karachi, March 1, 1971. 13 The
Present Crisis in East Pakistan, op.cit., p. 6. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid., p.
7. 17 Ibid. 18 White Paper, (Urdu), Mashraqui Pakistan Kay Haliya Buhran per Huk
umat-e-Pakistan Ka Jaree Karda Qartas Abeez, August 5, 1971, p. 9. 19 Ibid.
2 1
102
Ibid., p. 10. Ibid. 22 The Present Crisis in East Pakistan, op.cit., p. 7. 23 Pa
kistan Divided, op.cit., p. 133. 24 White Paper, (Urdu), op.cit., p. 12. 25 Ibid
., pp. 12-13. 26 Pakistan Divided, op.cit., p. 52. 27 Ibid., p. 53. 28 Ibid., pp
. 121-122. 29 Pakistan Divided, op.cit., p. 135. 30 “Mujib Fighting India’s War”, Indi
a’s Role in East Pakistan Crisis, (East Pakistan Documentation Series) Speech at t
he All India Congress Committee, New Delhi, 4 April 1971. p. 9. 31 Pakistan Divi
ded, op.cit., p. 140. 32 Ibid., 33 Mujib Fighting India’s War, op.cit., p. 10. 34
Mujib Fighting India’s War, op.cit., p. 10. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid., p. 19. 37 Mohammad
Ayoob and K. Subrahmanyum, The Liberation War, New Delhi, (Reprint March 1972) p
. 156. 38 The Times London, December 16, 1971. 39 Dr. Abdul Hamid. “Origins of the
East Pakistan Problem – A Historical View”, Journal of the Research Society of Paki
stan. University of the Punjab. (Lahore) Vol. VII., No. 3, July 1970. p. 30. 40
The daily Dawn, Karachi, June 19, 1971. 41 Mehrunnisa Ali. The East Pakistan Cri
sis: International Crisis, published in Pakistan Horizon, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, Kara
chi. (Second Quarter, 1971), p. 52. 42 Ibid. 43 Pakistan Divided, op.cit., p. 14
3. 44 Ibid. 45 The Pakistan Observer, Dacca, September 4, 1971. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid
. 48 Ibid. April 27, 1971. 49 The Pakistan Times, Lahore. June 18, 1971. 50 Ibid
. 51 The East Pakistan Crisis: International Crisis, op.cit., p. 45. 52 Ibid. 53
Aziz. K.K., Britain and Pakistan, A Study of British Attitude Towards the East
Pakistan Crisis of 1971, Islamabad, 1974, p. 143.
21 20
103
Ibid. p. 144. (Reproduced from Listener April 8, 1971, p. 437). Ibid., p. 146. (
Reproduced from Listener, May 6, 1971, p. 607. 56 Britain and Pakistan, A Study
of British Attitude Towards East Pakistan Crisis of 1971, op.cit., pp. 147-148.
(Reproduced from Listener, July 29, 1971, pp. 134-135. 57 Ibid., op.cit., pp. 14
8-149. (Reproduced from Listener, October 28, 1971, pp-562-563). 58 Britain and
Pakistan, A Study of British Attitude towards East Pakistan Crisis of 1971, op.c
it., pp. 148-149. (Reproduced from Listener, October 28, 1971, pp. 562-563.
55 54
Ibid., p. 150. (Reproduced from Listener, November 11, 1971, p.641). Ibid., p. 1
50-151. (Reproduced from Listener, December 9, 1971, p.785). 61 Britain and Paki
stan, A Study of British Attitude Towards East Pakistan Crisis of 1971, op.cit.,
pp. 151. (Reproduced from Listener, December 30, 1971, pp. 892. 62 Ibid., p. 17
0. (Reproduced from Listener, December 30, 1971, p.892). 63 Britain and Pakistan
, A Study of British Attitude Towards East Pakistan Crisis of 1971, op.cit., pp.
170-171.
60
59