Pontifical University of the Holy Cross

Department of Philosophy

Student: Evan Simpkins

Proposed Title: The Road to Wisdom: the Commentary on the Metaphysics, the Birth of the
Science, and the Proof of an Immaterial Being

Director: Rev. Dr. Stephen L. Brock

I. Summary of Investigation: Objectives, Methods, and Contents

This dissertation will look at the way, according to Thomas, in which our minds assimilate

the science of metaphysics, and, specifically, whether it is necessary to have proof of the existence

of an immaterial being to begin metaphysics. Before Thomas, Plato attempted to explain how we

enter into the highest science in the famous allegory of the cave.1 Only slowly and step by step are

our minds prepared to peer into dialectic, the science of the highest and immaterial things, he says.

Beginning with sensation we move to opinion, and from opinion we arrive at science of lesser

things. From science of lesser things, we arrive at the science of the highest things, only after many

years of study and at a mature age. Aristotle2, with the necessary adjustments, makes the same

claim. All of our knowledge begins in sensation, and we guess at the truth, by means of dialectic,

before grasping it. Children can mouth the words of metaphysics but they do not understand what

they are saying.3 Mathematics comes first, then Physics and Ethics, when a good age has been

reached. Metaphysics comes last. He summarizes this process in the first pages of the

Metaphysics: starting with sensation, the mind first asks about easy things and only at the end

arrives at the more difficult scientific questions.4 Thomas gives the same order on numerous

occasions, both in commentaries and more direct contexts, where he is giving his own judgment on

1
Republic VII
2
see In VI Eth. lect. 7
3
Ethics 6
4
Meta. 1.2
the matter.5 But, is the proof for the existence of an immaterial being necessary for the passage

from physics to metaphysics?

The necessity of the proof of an immaterial being

There are many texts6 where Thomas seems to say that the proof for the existence of an

immaterial being is necessary for beginning the science of metaphysics. Many, though not all, of

these are in the Commentary on the Metaphysics. The suggestion is that if there is no knowledge of

an immaterial being, there can be no science of being which extends beyond mere material being.

Physics, while remaining formally the same, becomes the ultimate science, simply because there is

no higher science.7

One may realize, like the pre-Socratics, that considering being in itself might constitute a

science and know that would entail a treatment of the first principles of all being, but until

something beyond matter and bodily form are known to exist, that treatment will always be a

physical and not an immaterial, metaphysical one. The pre-Socratics, believing that all there was in

the universe was material, attempted to treat the first principles.8 Physics remained the science of

mobile, mutable things, even though the treatment of first principles was given to it, both the

principles of being and of science. The most universal understanding of the first principles of

science, like the law of non-contradiction, was contracted to material things. Finally, if there were

no proof for the existence of an immaterial being, there would be no science beyond that of material

being.

The proof of the existence of an immaterial being is not necessary for beginning metaphysics

5
See Cont. Gent. I, caput. 12, n. 6, which says that there would be no science beyond natural
philosophy if there were no proof of an immaterial being: “Tum ex ipso scientiarum ordine.
Nam, si non sit aliqua scibilis substantia supra substantiam sensibilem, non erit aliqua scientia
supra naturalem, ut dicitur in IV metaph..” also, In Librum de Causis, lect. 1 and In Boeth. De
Trin. q. 5, a. 1, ad. 9.
6
In IV Meta. lect. 17, 13 (c. 748); In VI Meta. lect. 1, 17 (c. 1170); In XI Meta. lect. 7, 21 (c.
2267)
7
In III Meta. lect. 6, n. 398 “[T]he philosophy of nature would be first philosophy if there were
no other substances prior to mobile corporeal substances, as is stated below in Book VI (see
n.1170).”
8
In IV Meta. lect. 5, n. 593 “[T]hey believed that they alone established the truth about the
whole of nature and therefore about being, and thus about first principles, which must be
considered along with being.” They considered all of nature and therefore, mistakely, thought
they were treating being.
 On the other hand, Thomas also says that what are first known to us are the principles of

metaphysics.9 Thomas is insistent that ens or being is what first falls into the mind, our first thought.

And, the subject of metaphysics is universal being or ens commune, so it would seem that we have a

grasp of metaphysics very early on. It belongs to metaphysics to consider those principles which

are the first things that we know.

Moreover, even if the subject of the science is not the being which is first known by us, we

should still be able to begin to think metaphysically simply by considering being by itself, apart

from the matter in which it is first present to us. This, in fact seems to be the process in Aristotle’s

Metaphysics. In Book 4, Aristotle concludes that the subject of the science of metaphysics is being

because it is about the first causes, which cause all things and being is what is common to all things.

All sciences attempt to demonstrate the properties of a subject genus in light of its causes.10 There is

no talk yet of a proof for the existence of immaterial beings, the consideration of which, the first

causes, is the goal and not the beginning or subject of the science. God and the separate substances

are not the subject of the science as such. Being as being is considered before the existence of an

immaterial being is established by metaphysics. In Book 6, Aristotle goes a step farther, however,

and distinguishes the sciences by how they are related to matter. This is an essential division

because things are intelligible, and therefore objects of science, precisely insofar as they are

immaterial, or abstracted from matter. So, Aristotle says, if there is no immaterial being, and hence

something which is abstracted from matter in a different way than natural things, there is no science

beyond natural science. For a first grasp of the subject of the science, though, it is sufficient to

consider things from the perspective of being.

The precise determination of the subject of the science

9
Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, 1.5, n. 7. “[Q]uarundam propositionum termini sunt
tales, quod sunt in notitia omnium, sicut ens, et unum, et alia quae sunt entis, in quantum ens:
nam ens est prima conceptio intellectus. Unde oportet quod tales propositiones non solum in
se, sed etiam quoad omnes, quasi per se notae habeantur. Sicut quod, non contingit idem esse
et non esse; et quod, totum sit maius sua parte: et similia. Unde et huiusmodi principia omnes
scientiae accipiunt a metaphysica, cuius est considerare ens simpliciter et ea, quae sunt entis.”
10
CM, proem.
 However, whether one is convinced by the texts that suggest the proof of the existence of an

immaterial being is necessary to begin metaphysics or those that point to an earlier grasp of the

subject of the science, there are many points in Thomas’s thought with which any position must

harmonize. Obviously, of tantamount importance in determining when metaphysics is learned is

the nature of metaphysics itself, what its subject is. Thomas tells us the subject-genus11 of

metaphysics is ens commune, the cause of the subject genus is God, and its properties are the first

principles of science (CM proem). But, depending on how one defines ens commune, different

effects result. Ens commune could be ens as first known. It could be a conception of being which

includes the explicit negation of, or precision from, matter, either on the basis of a proof that such is

really the case, or without a proof. Then, it could be a more sophisticated notion of being, the ratio

entis, i.e. a resolution of ens into esse and its relation to essence, and thus presuppose knowledge of

the real distinction between essence and esse.12 Depending on the interpretation of ens commune,

the beginning of metaphysics will occur, respectively, later and later in the order of learning.

How is the subject of metaphysics grasped: by simple apprehension or by a judgment?

Abstraction is the process by which we grasp a subject genus or any universal nature

whatever. There is, Thomas says, a mode of abstraction proper to each of the sciences. Abstraction

of a whole is proper to physics; abstraction of a form is proper to mathematics; and separation or

metaphysical abstraction (ST 1.85) is proper to metaphysics. Since things in matter are not

intelligible in act, they must be abstracted or taken out of matter if they are to be understood.

Physics abstracts from particular sensible matter. Mathematics abstracts from particular sensible

matter, universal sensible matter and particular imaginable matter. Metaphysics abstracts from

particular and universal sensible matter, and particular and universal imaginable matter, i.e., all

matter. These modes of abstraction make different modes of definition possible. And, these kinds

of definitions are the middle terms of scientific syllogisms, which constitute the sciences

themselves.13 If the subject of metaphysics is reached through metaphysical abstraction or

11
Subject-genus here is taken analogically, in keeping with the analogical unity of being.
12
See Tavuzzi
13
CP 1.1
separation, it would seem that it could not be being as it is first known to us because separation is a

judgment and judgment presupposes simple apprehension. It is not the first act of the mind. If it is

reached through separation, it will either be based on a proof or be self evident. The former will

follow the method of Metaphysics 4, the latter Metaphysics 6.

There are different ways of interpreting Thomas’s texts on the way in which the subject of

metaphysics is grasped. Some suggest that it is arrived at through separation, a negative judgment,

i.e. metaphysical abstraction. Thus, Thomas distinguishes between mathematical, physical, and

metaphysical abstraction, which arrives at being.14 However, other texts suggest that the subject of

metaphysics is arrived at, prior to any separation, through simple apprehension. Being is what first

falls into the mind. This position is opposed in Scholastic tradition by Cajetan and John of St.

Thomas,15 who were arguing against the Scotistic position that what we first know is immaterial

being. Of those who interpret the texts of Thomas to say that the subject of metaphysics is arrived

at through separation, some (Owens, Wippel, and Maritain, for example) believe that the texts

suggest a self evident judgment, without need of proof. The mind considers being in itself, apart

from whether it is material. This is sufficient to establish a separate subject genus.

How the subject is grasped by the mind: a resolution

Another way in which Thomas approaches the problem of the subject of metaphysics is

through the name metaphysics itself.16 Although there are different interpretations of the historical
14
“Quaedam vero sunt quae possunt anstrahi eitam a materia intelligibile communi, sicut ens,
unum, potentia et actus . . .” (ST 1.85.1ad2)
15
“the first object of its act of understanding, for this object is something extrinsic, namely, the
nature of a material thing. And therefore that which is first known by the human intellect is an
object of this kind . . .” I.87.3.c. “The first object of our intellect, in this state of life, is not
every being and everything true, but being and true, as considered in material things, as we
have said, from which it acquires knowledge of all other things” Ad.1. “the proper object of the
human intellect, which is united to a body, is a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter,
and through such natures of visible things it rises even to some knowledge of things invisible”
I.84.7.c.
16
CM proem.: “Metaphysica, inquantum considerat ens et ea quae consequuntur ipsum. Haec
enim transphysica inveniuntur in via resolutionis, sicut magis communia post minus
communia.” CBT 5.1.c.3: “Quaedam vero speculabilia sunt, quae non dependent a materia
secundum esse, quia sine materia esse possunt, sive numquam sint in materia, sicut Deus et
Angelus, sive in quibusdam sint in materia et in quibusdam non, ut substantia, qualitas, ens,
potentia, actus, unum et multa et huiusmodi. De quibus omnibus est theologia, id est scientia
divina, quia praecipuum in ea cognitorum est Deus, quae alio nomine dicitur metaphysica, id
est transphysicam, quia post physicam discenda occurrit nobis, quibus ex sensibilibus oportet
in insensibilia devenire.” CBT 6.1.c.22: “Maxime autem universalia sunt, quae sunt communia
omnibus entibus. Et ideo terminus resolutionis in hac via ultimus est consideratio entis et
origin of the word, for Thomas it has great significance in suggesting the nature of the science and

its place in the order of learning. In these explanations of the name are some of Thomas’s most

interesting statements about how we arrive at the subject of metaphysics. In this context, it is

referred to as the term of a process of resolution.17 There is much debate about the nature of this

metaphysical resolution. For example, is the subject of metaphysics grasped for the first time

through resolution or is it only that other things are reduced to it by resolution? If one holds that it

is only other things which are reduced to it, since Thomas holds that the order in resolution explains

why metaphysics is learned after the other sciences, they have to explain how it is that we attain

metaphysics before we learn it.

A Resolution

A possible resolution of the differing intpretations of Thomas seems to lie in the distinction

between strictly scientific knowledge and the more vague knowledge with which we begin.

Thomas says in the commentary on Physics 1.1 that the sciences are distinguished by their modes of

defining. The proper instrument of science is a scientific syllogism with a definition as its middle

term, and metaphysics is distinguished from mathematics and physics because it defines without

matter what exists without matter. Since our first notion of being comes before our notion of matter

and our notion of matter comes before our notion of the immaterial, the grasp of being which we

first have, and which is presupposed to every other concept, is not metaphysical in the same sense

in which the final speculative science grasps being metaphysically. Moreover, a first vague, or

potential, grasp of being as immaterial must be distinguished from the dialectical consideration of

being as immaterial which comes before scientific proofs and the explicit denomination of being as
eorum quae sunt entis in quantum huiusmodi. Haec autem sunt, de quibus scientia divina
considerat, ut supra dictum est, scilicet substantiae separatae et communia omnibus entibus.
Unde patet quod sua consideratio est maxime intellectualis. Et exinde etiam est quod ipsa
largitur principia omnibus aliis scientiis, in quantum intellectualis consideratio est principium
rationalis, propter quod dicitur prima philosophia; et nihilominus ipsa addiscitur post physicam
et ceteras scientias, in quantum consideratio intellectualis est terminus rationalis, propter quod
dicitur metaphysica quasi trans physicam, quia post physicam resolvendo occurrit.” The name
first philosophy refers to the science’s dominion over first principles, judging them and
defending them from objections. Metaphysics refers to the order of learning, the order in
which even the judgment of principles must take place.
17
“It is learned after physics and the other sciences, because intellectual thinking is the
terminus of rational thinking. For this reason it is called metaphysics, as if to say beyond
physics, for in the process of analysis (resolvendo) it comes after physics.” CBT 6.1.c.22
immaterial which takes places after the existence of actually immaterial beings has been proven.

These latter two have more of the character of the abstraction which Thomas calls separation and

which he says distinguishes metaphysics from the other speculative sciences, which have their own

proper abstractions.

A Research Objective

This dissertation will attempt to clarify how Thomas viewed the relation of the proof of the

existence of an immaterial being to the beginning of metaphysics. It will consider the beginning of

the science of metaphysics in relation to the precise determination of its subject-genus, the proper

modes of abstraction in the sciences, and scientific resolution, suggesting a way of reconciling the

divergent opinions of scholars. Moreover, it will attempt to analyze the thought of an important

figure in the current debate. The late, influential Thomist, Charles De Koninck, attempted to

explain abstraction from matter in a series of articles in the Laval Theologique et Philosophique.

The second article18 ends with the statement: “Evidence to show that we might at least consider

such a[n immaterial] quality would depend upon a demonstration that there is a third mode of

defining, which means proving such a quality is in reality in the way that man is in reality. It would

be evidence leading not merely to what might be considered in separation, but to what is separate in

reality” (63). The existence of an immaterial being is presupposed to any science treating being as

immaterial. DeKoninck never finished the series of articles. We hope in this dissertation both to

explain why he said this and what ramifications this statement would have had if he had been able

to finish the articles.

The answers to these questions are of no small import, as the current debate among

American Thomists attests.19 Ralph McInerny and Fr. Benedict Ashley, O.P., have recently

published books on the question. Monsignor Wippel's and Dr. Knassas' books defend opposing

positions. But it goes beyond any in-house debates of provincial Thomism, it is a universal concern

18
 He died before writing the third article, which seems likely to have treated metaphysical abstraction and the 
grasping of the subject of metaphysics.
19
 The main question in the debate is whether it is necessary to study natural philosophy before one is able to do 
metaphysics. 
to learn about the world, and knowing the order in which to do that is necessary for doing it well. A

small error in the beginning is enormous in the end. An understanding of the order of learning is a

key to wisdom itself. It also opens the door to a dialogue with modern and postmodern

philosophers as they attempt to understand the world we live in. It goes beyond the terminology of

any one school and is of concern to philosophy itself. This thesis intends to shed light on how it is

that wisdom is learned.

II. Outline of Table of Contents

Abbreviations, etc.

Proemium

A. The question of the necessity of a proof of the existence of an immaterial being for the

beginning of metaphysics: its importance and difficulty and the order of this treatment

B. Plato’s Allegory of the Cave and Aristotle’s Metaphysics: the order of learning in Plato

and Aristotle

I. Setting Up the Debate: Aporia

A. Against the necessity of a proof

i. Ens (commune?) as the first thing that falls into the mind

ii. Self evident first principles belong to metaphysics

iii. Thomas’s proof of the possibility of immaterial beings from the nature of

form itself: form as such is immaterial

iv. The negative judgment of separatio is proper to metaphysics

v. The method of Metaphysics 4 does not presuppose a proof

B. Suggesting the need for a proof

i. Texts from CM suggesting the necessity of a proof of immaterial being for

the science of metaphysics

ii. The natural object of the mind and the value of a demonstrated judgment of

immateriality
 iii. Dialectical versus scientific considerations of immateriality

iv. Dekoninck and “Abstraction from Matter”

II. Retracing the Path We Take in Coming to Know Metaphysical Reality:

The Thomistic Principles of the Order of Learning

A. Exterior sensation: proper, common and indirect sense objects: not all sensibles

are equal

B. The difficulty of separating what is not separate in sensation: the efficacy of

multiple senses

C. Interior Sensation: Common Sense, Vis Cogitativa, Memory and Experience

D. The phantasm: proper matter of abstraction

III. The Natural Object of the Human Intellect

A. Thomas: quiddity of a material thing

B. Scotus

C. Cajetan and John of St. Thomas: ens concretum quiditati sensibili

D. The general effects of sensation on our understood knowledge. Our first ideas:

from the more known to the more knowable (Physics 1.1)

E. The order of analogical naming reveals the order in our understanding: we name

things as we know them; Commentary on the Metaphysics 5 and 9, from sensible

impositions to immaterial ones

IV. The Order of Learning the Sciences

A. The division of the sciences

B. Definition of science and subject-genus from Posterior Analytics (CP 1.1)

C. Sciences divided essentially by their abstraction from matter 1. abstractio totius 2.

abstractio formae 3. separatio or metaphysical abstraction

D. Mathematics, Physics, Ethics, and then Metaphysics

E. The subject of metaphysics: Averrroes, Avicenna, Albert, and Thomas

 F. Analogical unity of being as the basis of the unity of the science of metaphysics

G. The order(s) of resolutio and the name metaphysics: Thomas’s explanation why

metaphysics comes last 1. resolution of intrinsic causes. 2. extrinsic causes

H. Metaphysics dependence on Physics and Physics dependence on Metaphysics: not

a vicious circle

The Conclusion. Possible resolution of the two differing interpretations of Thomas and the

respective texts: the different senses of science                           

III.Bibliography

Plato:

Republic

Meno

Aristotle:

Metaphysics (esp., books 2 and 6)

Physics (esp. proemium, divisions of the sciences)

On the Soul (esp., 1.2)

Categories

Posterior Analytics (esp., 2.19)

Nicomachean Ethics (esp., book 6)

Thomas:

In Meta.

In Phys.

In De Anima

In Post. An.

In De Trinitate 5 and 6

De Ente et Essentia

Summa (esp. I.87)

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Metaphysics” in Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association,14,

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Los Angeles, 1975.

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DeKoninck, C. “Abstraction from Matter: Notes on St. Thomas's Prologue to the Physics,”

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399-441.

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Trinitate, Rome, 1974.

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1957, pp. 247-263.

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Garrigou-Lagrange, R., “De intellegentia naturali et de primo obiecto ab ipsa cognito”, Acta

Pontificiae Academiae Romanae S. Thomae, 1940.

Gilson, E., Being and Some Philosophers. Pontifical Medieval Institute: Toronto, 1952.

Jordan, J.D., Ordering Wisdom: The Hierarchy of Philosophical Discourses in Aquinas.

University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, 1986.

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Debate on the State of Metaphysics, (American University Studies Series V,

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_____. Being and Some Twentieth Century Thomists, Fordham University Press: New York,

2003.

Kondoleon, Theodore, J., “The Start of Metaphysics,” The Thomist 58 (1994): 121-130.

Krapiec, A. M., “Analysis formationis conceptus entis existentialiter considerati,” Divus

Thomas (Piac.) 59 (1956), pp. 320-50.

Maritain, J., A Preface to Metaphysics. Books for Libraries: New York 1979.

_____. A Preface to Metaphysics: Existence and the Existent. Trans. Lewis Galantiere and

Gerald B. Phelan, Pantheon Books: New York, 1948.

Mauer, A.A., “Form and Essence in the Philosophy of St. Thomas.” Mediaeval Studies, 13,

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_____. On Being and Essence. Trans. Armand Mauer. Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval

Studies: Toronto, 1968.

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Philosophique. 1956; 12, 120-124.

_____. “ 'Esse ut actus intensivus' in the Writings of Cornelio Fabro,” Proceeding and

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IV. Languages consulted in bibliography:

Latin, Greek, English, and Italian

V. Language in which the thesis will be written

English