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When a Corporation receives Rs. 7 Crores of loan from a bank, it has got itself a full-fledged banker. But,
when the same corporation receives a loan amounting to Rs. 70 Crores, it not just gets a full-fledged banker,
but also something similar to a partner.
Abstract
This paper attempts to study the lender’s liability in corporate borrowings through the case study of
Kingfisher Airlines and that how the negligence on the part of the banks led to such a fiasco of corporate
borrwing setup. The paper shows the concept of liability in case of corporate borrwings is not just limited to
the borrower, rather it is also applicable on the lender. Also, there are ways in which the lender’s liability can
be avoided and better transparency and public accountability can be ensured.
Introduction
The Kingfisher Loan fiasco has been in highlights everywhere from the time it came out in the media. The
case is a result of the flaws of the system which majorly cosists of flaws made by the banks while making
approvals for such loans. In the middle of all the sentiments and anger, the most important aspect which is
connected to the heart of the problem is less traversed. The aspect is of ‘lender’s liability’.1 Lender’s liability
is an American Concept and means the liability of the lender in case of some breach of contract, fiduciary
relationship, or alleged wrongful behaviour. the concept of lender’s liability cover not just due diligence on
the part of lender while granting loans, but also make a lendor liable in case they fail to take appropriate and
timely measures to stop the debt from becoming bad-debt.2
Corporate Borrowings
An adequate amount of capital is needed for the smooth and successful functioning of any business. There
can be two ways to get the capital for your business. First, through the internal sources by way of issuing the
equity share capital. While the second can be done through external sources such as commercial borrowings,
issue of debentures, fixed deposits, loans from banks, etc. Borrowing is the term used when the capital is
raised through some external sources.
There can various types of borrowings that a company can opt for:
1
Daniel R. Fischel, “The Economics of Lender Liability”, Vol. 99, Yale L.J., 1 31-154 (1989).
2
Rowan McR. Russell, “Impact of Recent Corporate Collapses on Negotiating and Drafting Syndicated Loans”, Vol. 27, No. 2,
Am. Bar Assoc., 397-427 (1993).
1. Long term borrowings
This kind of borrowing is preferred where the funds are to be borrowed for a longer period of time.
The time period for which the funds can be borrowed under such kind of borrowing is 5 years or
more.
3. Medium-term borrowings
Funds borrowed for a period of 2-5 years.
4. Secured borrowings
In this kind of borrowing, the lender has access over the assets of the company and thus an obligation
to the debt is deemed as security.
5. Unsecured borrowings
In this kind of borrowing, debt contains a financial obligation.
6. Syndicated borrowings
This kind of borrowing is generally used when the borrower needs a large amount of fund and such
fund is generally raised through a group of lenders.
7. Bilateral borrowings
Wherein the company borrows from a particular kind of financial institution it is termed as bilateral
borrowing. Only a single kind of contract is there between the parties to the borrowing.
8. Private borrowing
Under this kind of borrowing the loan is taken from a bank or some financial institution.
9. Public borrowing
It consists of the financial institutions that can be freely traded on a public exchange.
Lender’s Liability
Lender’s liability in originality is an American Doctrine, which in its traditional sense was understood as a
loan made by the lender in a bad faith with an intent to fraud or misrepresent. The liability of a lender is
generally an output of his conduct and not an activity. Generally, lender’s liability arises in cases of breach
of some central or state statutory obligations or in case of breach of some judicial pronouncement. Thus, the
lender is found to be liable in cases where he exercises control over the affairs of the borrower beyond his
limits, i.e, excessive control or engages in some fraudulent conduct against the borrower or the creditors of
the borrower, or engages in some conduct that is been prohibited by some Central or State laws.
2. Fiduciary Relationships
In a fiduciary relationship, one person owes a special duty towards the other because of his position
and the fiduciary is bound to look after the interests of the other person and take special care of him.
Before, the borrowers were able to establish that the lender is bound by some fiduciary duties
towards and thus should be liable in case of breach of such duties. However, later on, the lenders
limited the contention of the borrowers with respect to the fiduciary relationship between the lender
and the borrower.
3
RBI Notification DBOD. Leg. No.BC. 104 /09.07.007/2002-03, May 5, 2003.
4
2003(9)SCALE185
5
http://www.markables.net/files/Beyond_all_comparables_Kingfisher_brand_valuation.pdf.
purposes of the debt restructuring process, Kingfisher Airlines presented the brand Kingfisher to the banks as
collateral. However, the important question is were the banks right on their side to depend merely upon the
valuation of the brand and accept it as collateral which was based on the overrated revenue estimates?
Should have banks dug deeper than into the grounds of such valuation which was way higher than the
industry’s average before making loan approvals? If No, then does not it creates the lender’s liability on the
part of the banks? Just like the Kingfisher bird, the money too flew away.
Furthermore, In India, Suitcase banking is a common practice which is highlighted in the cases of Syndicate
Bank and Bhushan Steel Case. Thus, shortcomings on the part of the banks, especially in public sector banks
in evaluating the creditworthiness of the borrowers cannot be ignored. There is no event in India till date
where the banks are being made accountable for the happenings of such events.
There’s a theory of good money-about to go bad-saved by good money-finally goes bad. To put it simply, in
situations where a loan is about to turn bad, more loan is put into the same borrower or in some sister
company of the borrower in order to pay off the previous loan so that the banks are not required to put the
previous loans as NPAs. Ultimately what happens is that these loans turn out to be bad causing more loss
and trouble to the banks.6 This vicious cycle is termed as ever-greening of loans.
There is no surprise to it that in the case of a daring businessman like Mallya, banks took a back seat till the
things became chaotic and went out of their control. Laconically, the concept of lender’s liability should
cover not just due diligence on the part of banks while granting loans, but should also make banks liable in
case they fail to take appropriate and timely measures to stop the situations like these to happen. 7
6
Reserve Bank of India v. Jayantilal N Mistry, AIR 1 SC 2016
7
ttp://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-12-14/news/45191294_1_gross-npas-state-run-
h
banks-psu-banks.
8
AIR 1 SC 2016
To conclude, if such instances of crony lending at the cost of macro-economic losses are to be avoided then
certain measures are to be taken to held such lender’s liable for their bad decisions and utter negligence. RBI
has a tendency to save the banks from public embarrassment and thus allows them to maintain secrecy. To
make a shift to solve the existing problems, it’s important for both the banks and the RBI to leave aside their
Ostrich approach by ignoring the core issue and pretending as if everything is absolutely fine. The approach
has to be preventive rather than curative in nature until and unless we have a proper credit rating system.
Furthermore, the banking secrecy laws need to be changed keeping in mind the current situation. There is
always a collision happening every now and then between the RTI and the secrecy provisions regulating
banks. These secrecy laws are generally used generally to guard the defaulters rather than using it to
safeguard actual confidentiality.9
9
Banerjee, Sudipto, 'Wilful Defaulter': Name and Shame Strategy V/S Procedural Safeguards. COMPANY LAW JOURNAL,
Vol. 1, 2015(January), pp. 1-13.