UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

BACKWARD DISTRICT OF ANYWHERE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

V. NO. RX-010YC

IVE B. PERSECUTED

MOTION TO DISMISS CHARGES

(Lack of Essential Element)

COMES NOW the Accused, by special appearance in challenge of

jurisdiction, pursuant Rule 12(b)(2), to state:

A. The charging instrument, an Information, presents five counts of failure

type of offenses punishable under §7203.

B. In order to comply with constitutional safeguards concerning due

process of law and the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the

accusation rules of procedure have been promulgated to regulate and

simplify as well as to “standardize” the process which is due.

C. FRCrP Rule 7 specifies the content of an Indictment, or an Information,

and portions relevant here are:

“The indictment or the information shall be a plain, concise and

definite written

statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.”

 “The indictment or information shall state for each count the
official or customary citation of the statute, rule, regulation or other provision
of law which the defendant Is alleged therein to have violated.”

D. The Information fails to state in each count the official citation to a

statute or code section which allegedly has been violated, as expressly

required by the Rule. Additionally, the Information fails to specify in a

written form in plain, concise and definite statement all of the essential facts

in substantial allegations so as to inform the defendant and the court exactly

of the nature of the offense intended to be charged.

1) At two places within each count the wording of, “to make an income tax

return” appears. And from that one can glean that the nature of the

complaint has something to do with income tax returns, that is, not a return

in regard to some other tax, such as a distiller’s tax. That the Information

specified INCOME TAX returns helped to narrow the field to that particular

species of return.

2) Because of the allegations about making an INCOME TAX return in each

count one can determine that the missing citation of the provision

supposedly violated must be located within Sub-Title A of the tax code. In

order to be sufficient within the context of this Information one can discern

that the nature of the text, if any there be, as relates to the or those missing

statute section(s) would impose a requirement or duty to make (and file?) a

return; an income tax return. The non-cited and missing statute section(s),
if any, would be the one or more section(s) that supposedly were

violated, not section 7203!

3) In addition to the omission of citation of statute section(s) supposedly

violated, there is no written statement of the essential facts concerning a

duty or requirement to make an income tax return. In lieu of any substantial

allegation(s) the Pleader substitutes the phrase, “he was required by law”,

which is merely a conclusion of law, if such law actually exists. And if there

is no portion of the income tax law which expressly and clearly imposes a

duty and requirement to make an INCOME TAX return then the above

quoted pleader’s conclusion is not a conclusion concerning something that a

statute supposedly says. Instead, the quoted phrase represents a blatant

fraud in pleading.

This Accused challenges, and this court should insist that the government

attorney(s) shall cite and produce copies of the section(s) of the income tax

statute which imposes a duty to make an income tax return.

4) A duty and requirement to make a return is an essential element to

constitute an offense under section 7203, and must be plainly, concisely and

definitely alleged in an Indictment or an Information as required by Rule 7(c)

FRCrP. And then, later, must be proved at trial. It is suggested that the only

means of evidencing such a proof is to produce copies of the statute

section(s) which impose the duty to make the particular type of tax return at

issue.
5) In the instance of this Information, the duty and requirement to make a

return is not alleged conformably with the Rule 7(c). Indeed, not at all

because a Pleader’s conclusion is not a substantial allegation of fact and

emphatically not of an essential fact. Such a conclusion should be treated as

not being an allegation at all.

6) The failure to allege an essential fact, as required by the Rule, yields a

defective and insufficient charge, one which, in this instance, is fatally

defective and cannot be resurrected.

THEREFORE: The effort at the charges in the Information, all five

counts, must be dismissed. Be it so ordered.

Dated this ______of April, 2009.

_______________________
;
IVE B. PERSECUTED, Accused

{Add Certificate of Service – directed to U.S. Attorney by way of U.S.

Mail. Get address from Clerk of court }

NOTE - - - [NOT to be appended to the above paper! This is info for you.
 “It is now a well established fact that Congress never enacted any
Statute(s) at Large creating a specific liability for taxes imposed by Subtitle
A of the Internal Revenue Code. By comparison, Congress has enacted
Statute(s) at Large creating specific liabilities for taxes imposed by Subtitles
B and C of the

Internal Revenue Code. On this key point, see 26 CFR 1.1-1(b) and
Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87,

4 L. Ed.2d 127, 80 S. Ct. 144 (1959), quoting in pertinent part:

But the section contains nothing to that effect, and, therefore, to

uphold this addition to the tax would be to hold that it may be imposed by
regulation, which, of course,the law does not permit. United States v.
Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351, 359; Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 446-
447; Manhattan Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134. [Bold emphasis
added]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

BACKWARD DISTRICT COURT OF ANYWHERE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

v. ) Case No. RX-

010YC

IVE B. PERSECUTED )

MOTION TO DISMISS INFORMATION

Comes now the Accused, by special appearance, in challenge of

jurisdiction, and without waiver of improper plaintiff, to state:
1.) It has long been recognized that the federal United States has not

been granted any common law authorities or jurisdictions. This was

emphatically confirmed in 1938 when the U.S. Supreme Court

overturned the Tyson doctrine in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 US 64.

2.) That the federal United States lacked any common law jurisdiction

was early-on recognized in U.S. v. Worrall, (1798) 2 US 384 Fed. Case.

2 Dall. 384, and also ruled in the U. S. Supreme court in U. S. v. Hudson

and Goodwin (1812) 7 Cranch 32.

3.) In U.S v. Cruikshank (1875) 93 US 542, the U.S. Supreme Court

explained, “The government of the United States is one of delegated

powers alone. Its authority is defined and limited by the

Constitution. All powers not granted to it by the instrument are

reserved to the States or the people. No rights can be acquired under

the constitution or laws of the United States, except such as the

government of the United States has the authority to grant or

secure. All that cannot be so granted or secured are left under the

protection of the States.” (Emphasis added) 92 US, at 551. Obviously

the U.S. Congress has not been granted or delegated any power to
adopt a common law and therefore cannot lawfully authorize a

criminal mode of procedure by way of a Information in the U.S. District

Courts.

4.) This Accused is aware of the ruling in DUKE v. UNITED STATES, 301

US 492 which was decided in May of 1937, almost one year prior the

Erie Railroad decision above cited and wherein the court ruled in these

words, “There is no federal general common law. Congress has no

power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state

whether they be local in their nature or ‘general,’ be they commercial

law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution

purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.” 304 US 78.

5.) From the above, this Accused contends that the Erie decision

necessarily overturned the Duke ruling and in effect postulates that

the statute of December, 1930 which led to the questions in Duke is

also unconstitutional.

6.) A re-view of history shows that the origin of a criminal procedure

by way of an Information was a device concockted in the infamous Star

Chamber by the excessively ambitious Empson and Dudley after the

 statute of 1495, 11 Henry VII, Chap. 3 (Offenses against Statutes) had

further extended the jurisdiction of the Star Chamber so as to include a

criminal jurisdiction.

When the Star Chamber as a court was abolished by statute in

1640, 16 Car. I, Chap. 10 (Star Chamber), the procedural device which

originated there was also abolished. But its use was revived in the

King’s Bench despite its unlawfulness. And it continues - - - -.

7.) Criminal procedure by way of an Information is of British origin and

has not and cannot be adopted by the Congress, despite that the

language of some statutes seem to suggest otherwise.

8.) The procedural method being pursued here in this alleged case is

that of an Information, a method which is absolutely unlawful.

ACCORDINGLY: This Information must be dismissed. Be it so ordered.

_________________
_____

Ive B. Persecuted, Accused

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

BACKWARD DISTRICT OF ANYWHERE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. No. RX-
010YC

IVE B. PERSECUTED

4th MOTION TO DISMISS

(No Charge)

COMES NOW the Accused, by special appearance in challenge of

jurisdiction, pursuant Rule 12(b) (2), to state,

This Accused contends:

1) The government attorney has used a typical “pattern” charge in

each count in the Information.

2) In each count all of the wordage up to the words, “he did willfully

fail ---“ is unnecessary to any charge intended, is only preliminary data

that goes to describe a WHO that may be charged with

 an offense made penal by section 7203. Such unnecessary data

may be struck and disregarded because it is not pertinent to the

charge.

3) The actual charge intended in each count begins with the words,

“he did willfully fail ---“, and thereafter the government attorney musty

allege all the essential elements to constitute the offense.

4) In the instance of an offense under §7203, which is a generic

penalty section, there are only five distinct acts of failure that have

been made penal, and they are:

(a) Failure to pay an estimated tax;

(b) Failure to pay a tax;

(c) Failure to make a return;

(d) Failure to keep records;

(e) Failure to supply information.

And a so-called “failure to file” (a return) is not within the

express provisions of the section.

5.) In this Information the only charge element which has been alleged

is failure to make a return.

Whether the allegedly not made return is an income tax return

is not a core element of a charge here.

6.) But, for all that the paragraph of each count does excessively say,

it nevertheless remains that an essential element has not been

alleged. Namely, the “charge” portion of §7203 requires that for each

count of the five failure acts, as specified above, there must be an

accompanying allegation asserting that they were not done at a time (or

times) as required by law (or

regulation).

7.) The failures of allegation in this Information is that the Accused has

not been charged in the charging portion of each count with having failed

to make a return at the time (or times) as required in an unspecified

statute, or regulation.

THEREFORE: No charge has been presented before this court and the case

or cases must be dismissed. Be it so ordered.

Dated this ___ April, 2009

___________________________

Ive B. Persecuted, Accused

 Add certificate of Service

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

BACKWARD DISTRICT OF ANYWHERE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

V. No. RX-010YC

IVE B. PERSECUTED

FIRST MOTION TO DISMISS

Improper Plaintiff

COMES NOW the Accused, by special

appearance in challenge of jurisdiction, to show the court a lack of

authority, as follows:

1) The Information names “UNITED STATES OF AMERICA” as

being the Plaintiff without explaining or more particularly
describing who or what that “UNITED STATES OF AMERICA” is.

2) The nature of the Information as presented seems to

deliberately utilize an implication to the end that the unaware will
assume that the “UNITED STATES OF AMERICA” is or refers to the
federal government; and the gullible won’t question the
subterfuge.

3) The facts are that as generally used the United States of

America is an abstraction which refers to the fifty states which
collectively comprise the union of States known by that name. The
United States of America has not been constituted by law as a
government in a sense of federal government; there is no
government entity by that name. That which is referred to sub-
nominee “United States of America” is not an entity competent to
sue, or be sued, and it cannot be a real party in interest.

4) Because there is no government entity by the name of

United States of America or UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, there is
no Plaintiff before the court which this court can recognize as an
entity competent to proceed.

THEREFORE: Because of the lack of a legally

cognizable plaintiff this Information must be dismissed. Be it so

ordered.

Dated _____ of April, 2009.

____________________

Ive B. Persecuted, Accused

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 The undersigned certifies that the above document was
served on all parties in the above cause by depositing one copy
each in the U.S. mail postage prepaid, in an envelope addressed
to _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ on
this _____ day of April 2009.

______________________

Ive B. Persecuted

NOTE - - - - GET, Read, and STUDY NORTON v. SHELBY COUNTY

(1886) 118 US 425

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

BACKWARD DISTRICT OF ANYWHERE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

V. NO. RX-010YC

IVE B. PERSECUTED

MOTION TO STRIKE

COMES NOW the Accused, by special appearance in challenge of

jurisdiction, pursuant Rule 12(b)(2) and Rule 7(d), to state:

A. The portions of Rule 7 FRCrP which are relevant to this motion are:
 (c) Nature and Contents.

The indictment or the information shall be a

plain, concise and
definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense
charged.

The indictment or information shall state for

each count the official or Customary citation of the statute,
rule, regulation or other provision of law which the defendant is alleged
therein to have violated.

(d) Surplusage. The court on motion of the defendant

may strike surplusage from the indictment or information.

B. Under the Rule the Pleader is required to state for each count the

official or customary citation of the statute, rule, regulation or other provision

of law which the defendant allegedly violated. Immediately below each

count in the Information it is expressly alleged in these words, “In violation of

Title 26, United States Code, Section 7203”. This statement is the only

citation to any statute or rule etc. in the Information, and this motion is

based on that fact.

Treating the content of section 7203 as being the only substantive

portion of a statute which was violated as expressly alleged, all wording or

language as used in the Information which is not contained within section

7203, or is not fairly inferable from the context thereof is herein contended
to be surplusage and should be struck and deleted from the Information, as

follows in specific detail:

1. The words, “During the calendar year”, and the year date as in

each count should be struck from each count because there is no equal

wordage or dates within section 7203.

2. The words, “had and received gross income in excess of”, and the

amount, (of 56,400.) as inserted into the Information should be struck

from each count because there is no equivalency of wordage or

relevancy of amounts in section 7203.

3. The words, “that by reason of such gross income he was required

by law”, as inserted into the Information should be struck from each

count because there is no equivalency of wordage in section 7203, and

further, because this entire phrase constitutes a pleader’s conclusion

about something which supposedly exists somewhere in some

unspecified law or statute, and at best this phrase expresses only what

the pleader might believe some law supposedly requires. It is not,

emphatically not a substantial allegation of fact as clearly required by

the pleading rule, Rule 7(c).

4. The words, ”following the close of the calendar year” and the date

as inserted into the Information should be struck from each count

because there is no equivalency of wordage, or relevancy of dates

within section 7203.

5. The words, ”and on or before April 15, 2003” and the date as

inserted into the Information should be struck from each count

because there is no equivalency of wordage, or relevancy of dates

contained within section 7203.

6. The words, “to make an income tax return”, include wordage which

is not contained within section 7203, and because those extra words,

specifically the words, “income tax”, are not contained within section

7203, the words “income tax” should be struck from each count in the

Information, An additional aspect applicable to this point of contention

is that the Pleader apparently has inferred and concluded that the

Accused is one upon which some undisclosed and/or unspecified

statute has imposed a duty of making a thing called a “return” in

regard to some tax concerning some undefined thing called

“income”. To the extent that the Pleader had inferred and/or merely

concluded that the Accused is one who is burdened with a statutorialy

imposed duty in regard to making “an income tax” return without

specifying the statute which imposes such a so-called duty, the Pleader

has failed to present a substantial allegation of fact as required by the

rule of pleading, Rule 7(c) and for that reason the words of, “an income
tax” where they appear at two places in each count in the Information

should be struck from each count in the Information.

7. The words, “to the District Director of the Internal Revenue

Service for the Internal Revenue District of Louisville, at Louisville,

Kentucky, in the Western District of Kentucky, or to the Director,

Internal Revenue Service Center, at Covington, Kentucky, or other

proper officer of the United States” as inserted into the Information

should be struck from each count because there is no equivalency of

wordage or relevancy for them in section 7203.

8. The words, “stating specifically the items of his gross income and

any deductions and credits to which he was entitled,” as inserted into

the Information should be struck from each count because there is no

equivalency of wordage or relevancy for them in section 7203.

9. The words, “that well-knowing and believing all of the

foregoing,” as inserted into the Information should be struck from

each count because there is no equivalency of wordage or relevancy

for them in section 7203.

10. The words, “to said District Director of the Internal Revenue

Service, to said Director of the Internal Revenue Service Center, or to

any other proper officer of the United States.” As inserted into the
 Information should be struck from each count because there is no

equivalency of wordage or relevancy for them in section 7203.

The final line under each count in the Information asserts that the

foregoing is “In violation of Title 26, United States Code, Section

7203”, which is simply not true!

THEREFORE: Because all of the wordage as detailed above is

surplusage and impertinent all of the above specified wordage should

be struck form each count in the Information. Be it so ordered.

Dated _______ April, 2009.

___
__________________________

IVE B. PERSECUTED, Accused

Add Certificate of Service

&nb
sp;

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

BACKWARD DISTRICT OF ANYWHERE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

V. NO. RX-010YC

IVE B. PERSECUTED

MOTION TO STRIKE

COMES NOW the Accused, by special appearance in challenge of

jurisdiction, pursuant Rule 12(b)(2) and Rule 7(d), to state:

A. The portions of Rule 7 FRCrP which are relevant to this motion are:

(c) Nature and Contents.

The indictment or the information shall be a

plain, concise and
definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense
charged.

The indictment or information shall state for

each count the official or Customary citation of the statute,
rule, regulation or other provision of law which the defendant is alleged
therein to have violated.

(d) Surplusage. The court on motion of the defendant

may strike surplusage from the indictment or information.

B. Under the Rule the Pleader is required to state for each count the

official or customary citation of the statute, rule, regulation or other provision

of law which the defendant allegedly violated. Immediately below each

count in the Information it is expressly alleged in these words, “In violation of

Title 26, United States Code, Section 7203”. This statement is the only
citation to any statute or rule etc. in the Information, and this motion is

based on that fact.

Treating the content of section 7203 as being the only substantive

portion of a statute which was violated as expressly alleged, all wording or

language as used in the Information which is not contained within section

7203, or is not fairly inferable from the context thereof is herein contended

to be surplusage and should be struck and deleted from the Information, as

follows in specific detail:

1. The words, “During the calendar year”, and the year date as in

each count should be struck from each count because there is no equal

wordage or dates within section 7203.

2. The words, “had and received gross income in excess of”, and the

amount, (of 56,400.) as inserted into the Information should be struck

from each count because there is no equivalency of wordage or

relevancy of amounts in section 7203.

3. The words, “that by reason of such gross income he was required

by law”, as inserted into the Information should be struck from each

count because there is no equivalency of wordage in section 7203, and

further, because this entire phrase constitutes a pleader’s conclusion

about something which supposedly exists somewhere in some

unspecified law or statute, and at best this phrase expresses only what
the pleader might believe some law supposedly requires. It is not,

emphatically not a substantial allegation of fact as clearly required by

the pleading rule, Rule 7(c).

4. The words, ”following the close of the calendar year” and the date

as inserted into the Information should be struck from each count

because there is no equivalency of wordage, or relevancy of dates

within section 7203.

5. The words, ”and on or before April 15, 2003” and the date as

inserted into the Information should be struck from each count

because there is no equivalency of wordage, or relevancy of dates

contained within section 7203.

6. The words, “to make an income tax return”, include wordage which

is not contained within section 7203, and because those extra words,

specifically the words, “income tax”, are not contained within section

7203, the words “income tax” should be struck from each count in the

Information, An additional aspect applicable to this point of contention

is that the Pleader apparently has inferred and concluded that the

Accused is one upon which some undisclosed and/or unspecified

statute has imposed a duty of making a thing called a “return” in

regard to some tax concerning some undefined thing called

“income”. To the extent that the Pleader had inferred and/or merely

concluded that the Accused is one who is burdened with a statutorialy

imposed duty in regard to making “an income tax” return without

specifying the statute which imposes such a so-called duty, the Pleader

has failed to present a substantial allegation of fact as required by the

rule of pleading, Rule 7(c) and for that reason the words of, “an income

tax” where they appear at two places in each count in the Information

should be struck from each count in the Information.

7. The words, “to the District Director of the Internal Revenue

Service for the Internal Revenue District of Louisville, at Louisville,

Kentucky, in the Western District of Kentucky, or to the Director,

Internal Revenue Service Center, at Covington, Kentucky, or other

proper officer of the United States” as inserted into the Information

should be struck from each count because there is no equivalency of

wordage or relevancy for them in section 7203.

8. The words, “stating specifically the items of his gross income and

any deductions and credits to which he was entitled,” as inserted into

the Information should be struck from each count because there is no

equivalency of wordage or relevancy for them in section 7203.

9. The words, “that well-knowing and believing all of the

foregoing,” as inserted into the Information should be struck from

each count because there is no equivalency of wordage or relevancy

for them in section 7203.

 10. The words, “to said District Director of the Internal Revenue

Service, to said Director of the Internal Revenue Service Center, or to

any other proper officer of the United States.” As inserted into the

Information should be struck from each count because there is no

equivalency of wordage or relevancy for them in section 7203.

The final line under each count in the Information asserts that the

foregoing is “In violation of Title 26, United States Code, Section

7203”, which is simply not true!

THEREFORE: Because all of the wordage as detailed above is

surplusage and impertinent all of the above specified wordage should

be struck form each count in the Information. Be it so ordered.

Dated _______ April, 2009.

___
__________________________

IVE B. PERSECUTED, Accused

Add Certificate of Service

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 BACKWARD DISTRICT COURT OF ANYWHERE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

v. ) Case No. RX-

010YC

IVE B. PERSECUTED )

MOTION TO DISMISS INFORMATION

Comes now the Accused, by special appearance, in challenge of

jurisdiction, and without

waiver of improper plaintiff, to state:

1.) It has long been recognized that the federal United States has not

been granted any common law authorities or jurisdictions. This was

emphatically confirmed in 1938 when the U.S. Supreme Court

overturned the Tyson doctrine in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 US 64.

2.) That the federal United States lacked any common law jurisdiction

was early-on recognized in U.S. v. Worrall, (1798) 2 US 384 Fed. Case.

2 Dall. 384, and also ruled in the U. S. Supreme court in U. S. v. Hudson

and Goodwin (1812) 7 Cranch 32.

3.) In U.S v. Cruikshank (1875) 93 US 542, the U.S. Supreme Court

explained,

“The government of the United States is one of delegated

powers alone. Its authority is defined and limited by the

Constitution. All powers not granted to it by the instrument are

reserved to the States or the people. No rights can be acquired under

the constitution or laws of the United States, except such as the

government of the United States has the authority to grant or

secure. All that cannot be so granted or secured are left under the

protection of the States.” (Emphasis added) 92 US, at 551.

Obviously the U.S. Congress has not been granted or delegated any

power to adopt a common law and therefore cannot lawfully authorize

a criminal mode of procedure by way of a Information in the U.S.

District Courts.

4.) This Accused is aware of the ruling in DUKE v. UNITED STATES, 301

US 492 which was decided in May of 1937, almost one year prior the

Erie Railroad decision above cited and wherein the court ruled in these

words, “There is no federal general common law. Congress has no

power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state

whether they be local in their nature or ‘general,’ be they commercial

law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution

purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.” 304 US 78.

5.) From the above, this Accused contends that the Erie decision

necessarily overturned the Duke ruling and in effect postulates that

the statute of December, 1930 which led to the questions in Duke is

also unconstitutional.

6.) A re-view of history shows that the origin of a criminal procedure

by way of an Information was a device concockted in the infamous Star

Chamber by the excessively ambitious Empson and Dudley after the

statute of 1495, 11 Henry VII, Chap. 3 (Offenses against Statutes) had

further extended the jurisdiction of the Star Chamber so as to include a

criminal jurisdiction.

When the Star Chamber as a court was abolished by statute in

1640, 16 Car. I, Chap. 10 (Star Chamber), the procedural device which

originated there was also abolished. But its use was revived in the

King’s Bench despite its unlawfulness. And it continues - - - -.

 7.) Criminal procedure by way of an Information is of British origin and

has not and cannot be adopted by the Congress, despite that the

language of some statutes seem to suggest otherwise.

8.) The procedural method being pursued here in this alleged case is

that of an Information, a method which is absolutely unlawful.

ACCORDINGLY: This Information must be dismissed. Be it so ordered.

_________________
_____

Ive B. Persecuted, Accused

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

BACKWARD DISTRICT OF ANYWHERE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

V. NO. RX-010YC

IVE B. PERSECUTED

MOTION for BILL of PARTICULARS

 COMES NOW the Accused, by special appearance only and

without waiver of challenges to jurisdiction, pursuant Rule 7(f)

FRCrP, to state:

1) This Accused comprehends that a Bill of Particulars

cannot “cure” a

defective or insufficient indictment or information,

nevertheless because

the Information here does not properly comply with Rule

7(c) FRCrP in

that the Information does not cite or otherwise specify the

particular

statute, or section thereof, allegedly violated, nor cite or

identify a

particular administrative regulation (if any) supposedly

violated, this

Accused is extremely handicapped and cannot understand

how or even if

an unspecified statute or regulation might have been

violated.

2) In particular, this Accused needs to know the following

specific things:

(a) What statute, or section thereof, imposes a duty or

requirement “to
 make an income tax return”?

(b) IF a duty or requirement “to make an income tax

return” was or has

been imposed by an administrative rule or regulation, this

Accused

needs a copy of the applicable rule or regulation.

(c) What statute, or section thereof, imposes a duty or

requirement “to

make an income tax return TO said District Director of the

Internal

Revenue Service”? (emphasis added to clarify this point)

(d) IF a duty or requirement “to make an income tax

return TO said District Director of the Internal Revenue
Service” was or has been imposed by an administrative rule
or regulation, this Accused needs a copy of the applicable
rule or regulation.

(e) What statute, or section thereof, imposes a duty or

requirement “to make an income tax return TO said Director
of the Internal Revenue Service Center” ? (emphasis added
for clarification)

(f) IF a duty or requirement “to make an income tax

return TO said Director of the Internal Revenue Service
Center” was or has been imposed by an administrative rule
or regulation, this Accused needs a copy of the applicable
rule or regulation.
 (g) What statute, or section thereof, imposes a duty or
requirement “to make an income tax return TO any other
proper officer of the UnitedStates.”? (emphasis added to
clarify this point).

(h) IF a duty or requirement “to make an income tax

return TO any other proper officer of the United States” was
or has been imposed by an administrative rule or regulation,
this Accused needs a copy of the applicable rule or
regulation.

(i) Please define the phrase “any other proper officer of

the United States” as used in the Information. Does this
phrase refer to a de jure officer of the United States as
appointed by the President of the U.S. pursuant Article II, §2
of the Constitution? Or does it refer to some other
claimed to be “officer of the United States”? Specify the
WHO that “other proper officer” is!

(j) Is the language of “fail to make an income tax return”

a cryptic euphemism used in lieu of a direct and positive
statement of “fail to file an income tax return”?

This Accused cannot understand a so-called “charge”

not made nor can a defense be effective.

THEREFORE: The government attorney(s) should be

required to reply and respond to all of the above. Be it so
ordered.

Dated ______ April

 _______________
_________

IVE B.
PERSECUTED, Accused

Add Certificate of Service

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

BACKWARD DISTRICT OF ANYWHERE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

V. NO. RX-010YC

IVE B. PERSECUTED

MOTION TO DISMISS CHARGES

(Lack of Essential Element)

COMES NOW the Accused, by special appearance in challenge of

jurisdiction, pursuant Rule 12(b)(2), to state:

A. The charging instrument, an Information, presents five counts of failure

type of offenses punishable under §7203.

B. In order to comply with constitutional safeguards concerning due

process of law and the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the

accusation rules of procedure have been promulgated to regulate and

simplify as well as to “standardize” the process which is due.

C. FRCrP Rule 7 specifies the content of an Indictment, or an Information,

and portions relevant here are:

“The indictment or the information shall be a plain, concise and

definite written

statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.”

“The indictment or information shall state for each count the

official or customary citation of the statute, rule, regulation or other provision
of law which the defendant is alleged therein to have violated.”

D. The Information fails to state in each count the official citation to a

statute or code section which allegedly has been violated, as expressly

required by the Rule. Additionally, the Information fails to specify in a

written form in plain, concise and definite statement all of the essential facts

in substantial allegations so as to inform the defendant and the court exactly

of the nature of the offense intended to be charged.

1) At two places within each count the wording of, “to make an income tax

return” appears. And from that one can glean that the nature of the

complaint has something to do with income tax returns, that is, not a return

in regard to some other tax, such as a distiller’s tax. That the Information

specified INCOME TAX returns helped to narrow the field to that particular

species of return.

2) Because of the allegations about making an INCOME TAX return in each

count one can determine that the missing citation of the provision

supposedly violated must be located within Sub-Title A of the tax code. In

order to be sufficient within the context of this Information one can discern

that the nature of the text, if any there be, as relates to the or those missing

statute section(s) would impose a requirement or duty to make (and file?) a

return; an income tax return. The non-cited and missing statute section(s),

if any, would be the one or more section(s) that supposedly were

violated, not section 7203!

3) In addition to the omission of citation of statute section(s) supposedly

violated, there is no written statement of the essential facts concerning a

duty or requirement to make an income tax return. In lieu of any substantial

allegation(s) the Pleader substitutes the phrase, “he was required by law”,

which is merely a conclusion of law, if such law actually exists. And if there

is no portion of the income tax law which expressly and clearly imposes a

duty and requirement to make an INCOME TAX return then the above

quoted pleader’s conclusion is not a conclusion concerning something that a

statute supposedly says. Instead, the quoted phrase represents a blatant

fraud in pleading.

This Accused challenges, and this court should insist that the government

attorney(s) shall cite and produce copies of the section(s) of the income tax

statute which imposes a duty to make an income tax return.

4) A duty and requirement to make a return is an essential element to

constitute an offense under section 7203, and must be plainly, concisely and

definitely alleged in an Indictment or an Information as required by Rule 7(c)

FRCrP. And then, later, must be proved at trial. It is suggested that the only

means of evidencing such a proof is to produce copies of the statute

section(s) which impose the duty to make the particular type of tax return at

issue.

5) In the instance of this Information, the duty and requirement to make a

return is not alleged conformably with the Rule 7(c). Indeed, not at all

because a Pleader’s conclusion is not a substantial allegation of fact and

emphatically not of an essential fact. Such a conclusion should be treated as

not being an allegation at all.

6) The failure to allege an essential fact, as required by the Rule, yields a

defective and insufficient charge, one which, in this instance, is fatally

defective and cannot be resurrected.

THEREFORE: The effort at the charges in the Information, all five

counts, must be dismissed. Be it so ordered.

Dated this ______of April, 2009.

_______________________
;
IVE B. PERSECUTED, Accused

{Add Certificate of Service – directed to U.S. Attorney by way of U.S.

Mail. Get address from Clerk of court }
NOTE - - - [NOT to be appended to the above paper! This is info for you.

“It is now a well established fact that Congress never enacted any
Statute(s) at Large creating a specific liability for taxes imposed by Subtitle
A of the Internal Revenue Code. By comparison, Congress has enacted
Statute(s) at Large creating specific liabilities for taxes imposed by Subtitles
B and C of the

Internal Revenue Code. On this key point, see 26 CFR 1.1-1(b) and
Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 4 L. Ed.2d 127, 80 S. Ct. 144 (1959),
quoting in pertinent part:

But the section contains nothing to that effect, and, therefore, to

uphold this addition to the tax would be to hold that it may be imposed by
regulation, which, of course,the law does not permit. United States v.
Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351, 359; Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 446-
447; Manhattan Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134. [Bold emphasis
added]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

BACKWARD DISTRICT OF ANYWHERE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. No. RX-010YC
IVE B. PERSECUTED

MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL

COMES NOW the Accused, after the government has

rested from its presentation, to remind the court of lack of

evidence(s) or proof(s) of the government’s claims as alleged, as

follows:

1) This Accused renews the previously filed “MOTION TO

DISMISS CHARGES”, especially at point 3 & 4, and herein contends

that the government has not adduced evidence such as to show and

prove that this Accused is a “person” who is “required under this

title” - - to make a return; an income tax return. This applies to all

counts.

2) Additionally, the Information asserts that this Accused failed “to

make an income tax return”. The Information does not allege in

any plain, concise and definite language that this Accused failed to

FILE any return document so made. Perhaps the lack of such an

allegation can be explained by the fact that a failure to FILE an

income tax return has not been made an offense within section

7203.
3) Beyond doubt the government has not adduced any

evidence so as to prove that this Accused has failed “to make a

return”; an income tax return. The mere fact that some supposedly

government official or employee did not receive a return is not a

proof of a failure “to make a return”; an income tax return. This

applies to all counts.

4) This Accused renews the previously filed “4th MOTION TO

DISMISS”, especially at points 6 & 7, and herein contends that the

government has not adduced evidence such as to show when such

a return must be made; not the when that such a “return”

supposedly must be “filed” because that has not been alleged, nor

has a “failure to supply information” been alleged. This applies to

all counts.

5) The Information directly and specifically states that the

Accused failed “to make an income tax return TO a District Director

of the Internal Revenue Service”, or, as in an alternative, “TO a

Director of an Internal Revenue Service Center”, or, as another

alternative, “TO any other proper officer of the United States”. The

first two alternatives of this allegation have been and are impossible
of performance and proof for the reason that the supposedly

existing offices and officers specified as “District Director” as well

as “Director” (of a service center) ceased to exist by the year 2000

because of an IRS Reorganization Plan as mandated by Title I of the

“Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998”,

P.L. 105 – 206, §1001, 112 Stat. 685, at 689.

6) In this case there is no proof that this Accused did not send

(file?) a copy of a “return” TO such non-existent

personnel.

Accordingly, upon a lack of proof as above indicated, this

court should rule an acquittal. Be it so ordered.

Dated _____________

__________________________
&n bsp; & lt;
/SPAN> __________________
_______

IVE B. PERSECUTED, Accused

 Cert of Service not needed.

Footnote --- This paper is to be “motioned-up” verbally at the close

of the government’s case, that is, immediately after the
government “rests”. Provide a copy of this paper to the judge and
to the government attorney right after you have motioned it up.

&nbs p;