Linguistic Framing Effects in Consumer Behavior:

How ―Happiness‖ Versus ―Satisfaction‖ Frames Influence Judgments

MATHEW S. ISAAC

BOBBY J. CALDER*

Under review at the Journal of Consumer Research.

Please do not cite without permission.

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* Mathew S. Isaac (m-isaac@kellogg.northwestern.edu) is a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow and

Bobby J. Calder (calder@northwestern.edu) is the Charles H. Kellstadt Professor of Marketing

and Psychology, Marketing Department, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern

University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208. The authors thank Aaron Brough, Miguel

Brendl, Alex Chernev, and Ed Malthouse for their helpful comments on the first author’s

dissertation, on which this article is based. The authors also gratefully acknowledge the staff at

Kohl Children’s Museum, 2100 Patriot Boulevard, Glenview, IL for their assistance with data

collection.
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ABSTRACT

Prior literature has documented a host of framing effects whereby judgments are sensitive to

subtle changes in words or syntax. The present research contributes to the framing literature by

identifying a novel ―happiness‖ versus ―satisfaction‖ framing effect. Although the words

happiness and satisfaction are often used interchangeably by academicians and practitioners

alike, particularly in the context of survey research, we show that reflecting on one’s happiness

versus one’s satisfaction with a product can differentially influence the extremity of subsequent

product-related judgments (e.g., likelihood to repurchase, likelihood to recommend).

Specifically, we demonstrate that happiness frames produce polarized judgments whereas

satisfaction frames result in more moderate judgments. We argue that this effect can be

explained by a disparity in the lexical markedness, or semantic implications, of the two words.

Our claim is that the word happiness is relatively marked and thus conveys more

presuppositional information than satisfaction, which is relatively unmarked. As a result,

happiness frames polarize judgments by eliciting either positive or negative cognitions, whereas

satisfaction frames moderate judgments by generating both positive and negative cognitions.

Across four experiments, we demonstrate a robust ―happiness‖ versus ―satisfaction‖ framing

effect and provide support for our theorizing that lexical markedness is the driver of this effect.
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In the area of survey research, it is well documented that ―minor changes in question

wording, question format, or question context can result in major changes in the obtained results‖

(Schwarz 1999). Likewise, parallel research in the area of judgment and decision-making has

documented numerous framing effects, where subtle changes in words or syntax greatly affect

subsequent judgments (McKenzie and Nelson 2003; McNeil et al. 1982; Peterson and Wilson

1992). In the latter literature, researchers have typically generated pairs of logically equivalent

statements and shown that they are evaluatively non-equivalent. For example, 75% lean ground

beef is consistently preferred over 25% fat ground beef, even though the two options actually

contain the same proportion of lean versus fat (Levin 1987; Levin and Gaeth 1988). However,

framing effects have also been shown in contexts where statements or labels are not strictly

equivalent but are semantically similar (Block and Keller 1995; Druckman 2001; Levin,

Schneider, and Gaeth 1998; Mayer and Tormala 2010; Rothman et al. 1999). For example, after

viewing a film depicting an automobile accident, participants estimated the speed of the collision

to be greater when asked how fast the cars were traveling when they ―smashed into‖ versus ―hit‖

one other (Loftus and Palmer 1974).

In this research, we document a novel framing effect that occurs when the semantically

similar labels of ―happiness‖ and ―satisfaction‖ are alternatively used to elicit product

evaluations. We show that considering one’s happiness versus one’s satisfaction with a product

can differentially influence the extremity of product-related judgments which follow, such as the

likelihood of repurchasing the product or recommending it to a friend. Specifically, we find that

happiness frames produce polarized judgments whereas satisfaction frames result in more

moderate judgments. Drawing on psycholinguistics, we argue that this effect can be explained
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by a disparity in the lexical markedness, or semantic implications, of the two words. Our claim

is that the word happiness is relatively marked and thus conveys more presuppositional

information than satisfaction, which is relatively unmarked. As a result, happiness frames

polarize judgments by eliciting either positive or negative cognitions, whereas satisfaction

frames moderate judgments by generating both positive and negative cognitions. Next, we

develop more fully a theoretical explanation of these predictions in terms of lexical markedness.

THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT

The words ―happiness‖ and ―satisfaction‖ are commonly utilized to elicit evaluative

judgments (e.g., ―how happy are you?‖, ―how satisfied are you?‖). However, the use of

happiness versus satisfaction has been largely dictated by convention (with happiness being more

prevalent in studies of well-being and satisfaction being more prevalent in consumption-related

contexts) or arbitrary, with the two words frequently interchanged. For instance, the terms ―life

satisfaction‖ and ―life happiness‖ were used indiscriminately in separate surveys that each

attempted to assess the mental health of Americans (Bradburn and Caplovitz 1965; Cantril 1965;

Gurin, Veroff, and Feld 1960). Similarly unsystematic substitution patterns of satisfaction and

happiness questions are evident in studies involving respondents’ evaluations of their lives, jobs,

interpersonal relationships, and products (e.g., Glenn and Weaver 1981; Oswald 1997; 1984;

Wheeler 1991). Even validated scales that profess to measure either happiness or satisfaction

often include items containing both words (Hills and Argyle 2002). When researchers have

directly compared responses to questions containing the word ―happiness‖ with questions
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containing the word ―satisfaction,‖ they have typically used a within-participant design which

unsurprisingly has produced high positive correlations (Campbell, Converse, and Rodgers 1976;

McKennell 1978; Schwarz and Clore 1983; Shiv and Huber 2000). Thus, although happiness

and satisfaction are obviously different words, it is unclear what the consequences might be of

using one word versus the other. We draw from research on lexical markedness to help explain

how happiness and satisfaction frames might influence subsequent product-related judgments.

Lexical Markedness

Lexical markedness is a psycholinguistic construct that posits differences in the implied

meaning of similar words based on their unique lexical properties (Greenberg 1966;

Huttenlocker and Higgins 1971). Markedness emerged from the observation that certain word

pairs (e.g., long-short, good-bad, lion-lioness) are asymmetric (Trubetzkoy 1933), with marked

words (e.g., lioness) conveying more precise presuppositional information (e.g., the subject’s

gender) than their unmarked counterparts (e.g., lion). Although scholars have debated the

precise ingredients that constitute markedness, the ―key word uniting all kinds of markedness…

is informativeness‖ (Chvany 1985).

Markedness was originally conceptualized in absolute terms, and words were classified

as either marked or unmarked. A central conclusion of this early work was that negatively

valenced words (e.g., unfriendly, bad) were marked whereas their positively valenced

counterparts (e.g., friendly, good) were unmarked (Klima 1964). A broader perspective on

markedness suggests that the concept may be applied to two positively valenced words that are

highly similar (e.g., happiness-satisfaction). We hypothesize that happiness is relatively marked

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and satisfaction is relatively unmarked. Further, since markedness is generally recognized as a

multi-dimensional construct (Andersen 1989; Gvozdanovic 1989; Wurzel 1998), we show

empirically how three widely accepted criteria for determining markedness– syncretization,

specificity, and prototypicality– each support our overarching hypothesis.

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Insert table 1 about here

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Syncretization. Syncretization is a linguistic term that relates to word structure and refers

specifically to the morphological variation and complexity of words. The greater syncretization

of marked words results in a reduction in the number of distinct combinations or extensions that

a word or word stem may assume (i.e., less differentiation). In contrast, the lesser syncretization

of unmarked words allows them to ―combine freely and productively‖ (Ross 1987). For

example, negatively valenced word stems, which are considered to be marked, usually have

fewer grammatically appropriate variants (i.e., greater syncretization) than positively valenced

word stems. See table 1 for empirical evidence that happiness is more marked than satisfaction

based on the criterion of syncretization.

Specificity. Specificity relates to word content or semantic meaning. Marked words are

considered ―more special(ized), more precise, more constrained, and less general‖ than

unmarked words (Waugh and Lafford 2000). Since unmarked words convey less specific

meaning, they are more likely to be neutralized in certain contexts. As an example, a speaker

who asks ―how good is the food?‖ may simply be asking for an evaluation of the food; a positive
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response (e.g., ―good‖) or a negative response (e.g., ―bad‖) is equally valid. A speaker who asks

―how bad is the food?‖ is implying much more; ―he is pronouncing the food to be bad and is

asking about the extent of its badness‖ (Clark 1969). Thus, the word ―bad‖ conveys greater

specificity of meaning and is therefore marked, relative to the word ―good.‖ Even though they

are not polar opposites, we contend that happiness conveys more specific semantic meaning than

satisfaction and is therefore relatively marked. Empirical support for this claim is provided in

table 1.

Prototypicality. The final criterion for determining markedness is prototypicality, which

relates to both the naturalness and frequency of word usage. Unmarked words, within a given

context, are relatively prototypical whereas marked words are relatively abnormal (Battistella

1990). A word’s ―degree of normalcy, or degree of naturalness‖ is highly correlated with its

frequency of usage (Winter 1989). Within a product-oriented context, we contend that surveys

that inquire about ―product satisfaction‖ are more prevalent in the marketplace than ―product

happiness‖ surveys. See table 1 for evidence that happiness is more marked than satisfaction on

the basis of being less frequently observed within a product evaluation context.

In sum, our contention is that happiness is more marked than satisfaction on the basis of

greater syncretization, greater specificity, and lesser prototypicality. As noted earlier, the key

word uniting these determinants of markedness is ―informativeness.‖ To test this overall

conception of markedness, we asked 70 research participants about either their happiness or their

satisfaction with a product and then requested that they indicate how much information about the

product was communicated merely by the question wording. The mean informativeness rating

provided by participants in the happiness condition (M = 4.2) was significantly higher than the
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mean rating provided by participants in the satisfaction condition (M = 2.6); t(68) = 3.23, p < .01.

This offers further support for out claim that happiness frames are more marked than satisfaction

frames.

The Influence of Markedness on Judgments

Prior research has shown that respondents may provide different responses to questions

containing marked and unmarked words. For example, considering ―how frequently‖ versus

―how infrequently‖ the same event is likely to occur can lead to disparate estimates (Harris

1973). In a consumer-related context, researchers have also found evidence that could be

interpreted in terms of markedness, although the majority of this work has focused on logically

equivalent but oppositely valenced frames. For example, in a study by Peterson and Wilson

(1992), participants were asked whether they would pay $30 to try a mediocre restaurant.

Depending on condition, participants were told that there was a ―50% chance they would be

satisfied with the restaurant‖ or a ―50% chance they would be dissatisfied with the restaurant.‖

Consistent with other framing research that has found evidence of valence-consistent shifts (Sher

and McKenzie 2006), participants were much more willing to pay $30 to try the restaurant if

they were in the unmarked ―satisfied‖ frame rather than the marked ―dissatisfied‖ frame.

The research discussed thus far suggests that the effect of markedness on product-related

judgments may depend on the valence of the frame; for example, marked frames which are

negative (e.g., dissatisfaction) tend to produce relatively negative judgments. However,

researchers have also found that markedness may influence judgments based on the valence of
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the target (i.e., the object being judged). In one study (Adams-Webber and Benjafield 1973),

participants listed the names of personal acquaintances and then subsequently rated each

acquaintance on a series of dimensions, half which were unmarked (e.g., pleasant, old, active,

etc.) and half which were marked (e.g., unpleasant, young, passive, etc.). Importantly, the

markedness and the valence of these dimensions were orthogonal. That is, for certain word

pairs, marked dimensions (e.g., unpleasant) were more negative than their unmarked

counterparts (e.g., pleasant). For other pairs, marked dimensions (e.g., young) were more

positive than their unmarked counterparts (e.g., old). The authors found that judgments

involving marked words were particularly sensitive to the valence of the target. Irrespective of

frame valence, ratings of marked words were consistently more extreme than ratings of

unmarked words. For instance, positively valenced acquaintances were judged more favorably

on marked dimensions relative to their unmarked counterparts. This result suggests that marked

frames may polarize judgments in the direction of the target’s valence.

Building on this evidence, we theorize that marked versus unmarked frames may evoke

different types of information processing, which can be distinguished empirically by examining

the cognitions of individuals in the respective frames (Mussweiler and Strack 1999). Our

proposed theoretical framework, which is depicted in figure 1, predicts that unmarked frames

will evoke mixed-valence cognitions, whereas marked frames will evoke one-sided cognitions.

For marked frames (e.g., happiness), positive cognitions should result when the target’s valence

is positive, but negative cognitions should result when the target’s valence is negative.

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Insert figure 1 about here

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We test these predictions in the context of product evaluations by asking consumers to

reflect on their happiness or their satisfaction with various products. Although both words are

positive in valence, we suspect that happiness frames, which are marked, lead to greater

polarization of subsequent product-related judgments. On the other hand, satisfaction frames,

which are unmarked, are expected to produce more moderate judgments. Our specific

hypotheses follow.

H1: When products are positively valenced, consumers in happiness frames are likely

to judge them more favorably than consumers in satisfaction frames.

H2: When products are negatively valenced, consumers in happiness frames are likely

to judge them less favorably than consumers in satisfaction frames.

Our proposed framework suggests that different types of information processing mediate

the relationship between markedness and product-related judgments. If our reasoning is correct,

differences in information processing should be empirically distinguishable based on the

cognitions of individuals in these frames. We expect more one-sided thoughts for consumers

encountering marked frames, and more mixed-valence thoughts for consumers encountering

unmarked frames.

H3: When evaluating products, consumers in satisfaction frames are more likely to

generate both positive and the negative cognitions whereas consumers in

happiness frames are more likely to generate either positive or negative

cognitions.

When products are positively valenced, we predict that happiness frames will produce
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more favorable judgments as compared to satisfaction frames. Our prediction contrasts with an

alternate account, which would predict exactly the opposite pattern of judgments. This

alternative, which we refer to as the threshold hypothesis, is based on the belief that happiness is

merely a more positive word than satisfaction. If satisfaction has a lower positivity threshold

than happiness, consumers might be fully satisfied with a positively valenced product but not

completely happy with the same product. Reflecting on one’s satisfaction with such a product

may lead to generally positive cognitions and favorable product judgments. However,

considering happiness with a positive product could result in mixed-valence cognitions and

relatively less favorable judgments if consumers consider why they are not completely happy

with the product. Thus, the threshold hypothesis predicts that satisfaction frames may lead to

more favorable judgments than happiness frames. On the other hand, our proposed markedness

explanation predicts that happiness frames will generate more favorable judgments than

satisfaction frames by evoking cognitions that are predominantly positive (i.e., the same valence

as the target). We test these differing accounts in the first two experiments of this article, each

which examines judgments of positively valenced products.

EXPERIMENT 1

The main objective of experiment 1 was to provide evidence that happiness frames lead

to more favorable judgments of a positively valenced product than satisfaction frames and to

implicate processing type as a driver of this effect. Using a field setting, we examined the

impact of happiness versus satisfaction frames on the likelihood of renewing an annual

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membership at a children’s museum.

Method

Experiment 1 featured a between-participants design with two conditions (frame:

happiness vs. satisfaction). Participants were 100 adults with family memberships at the Kohl

Children’s Museum. During a two-week period, patrons at the museum were asked to participate

in a brief survey. As an incentive, all participants were promised entry into a lottery where they

could win a free one-year membership renewal to the museum upon the expiration of their

current membership. Given that they were patrons and interested in obtaining a free

membership, we assumed that those who were willing to complete the study felt generally

positive about their membership.

Participants (one per family) were randomly presented with one of two different surveys

to complete by hand. Those assigned to the happiness frame were instructed to consider their

happiness with their museum membership, while those in the satisfaction frame were asked to

consider their satisfaction with their membership. Next, we asked participants to list the

thoughts that crossed their minds when reflecting on their happiness [satisfaction] with their

membership. As our dependent variable judgment of interest, all participants indicated their

likelihood to renew their membership on a scale ranging from 1 (―very unlikely‖) to 9 (―very

likely‖). Demographic information was also collected, but since these variables did not produce

any cross-condition differences, they will not be discussed further.

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Results

Consistent with our prediction, participants in a happiness frame (M = 8.3) were more

likely to renew their membership than participants in a satisfaction frame (M = 7.7); t(98) = 2.05,

p = .04. This finding provides initial evidence that happiness versus happiness frames can

influence subsequent product-related judgments.

To examine the relationship between frames and processing type, we examined the

valence of thoughts that participants listed when reflecting on either their satisfaction or

happiness with their museum membership. These thoughts were coded as positive or negative

by two independent coders (α > .90) who were blind to condition; disputes were resolved

through discussion. We computed a Valence Index for each participant by subtracting the

number of negative thoughts listed from the number of positive thoughts listed, and then dividing

this value by the total number of thoughts that were listed. The range of the Valence Index was

-1 to 1, with scores close to zero indicating more mixed valence cognitions and extreme scores

indicating more one-sided cognitions. As predicted, the Valence Index was greater for

participants in a happiness frame (M = .96), compared to those in a satisfaction frame (M = .85);

t(81) = 2.06, p = .04. As another indication of the difference in processing prompted by the two

frames, only 5% of participants in a happiness frame listed at least one negative thought whereas

21% of participants in a satisfaction frame expressed a negative thought; χ2(1) = 3.61, p = .05.

Furthermore, participants who expressed positive thoughts only (M = 8.2) were more likely to

renew their membership than participants who expressed mixed-valence thoughts (M = 7.1);

t(79) = 2.2, p = .03.

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To test whether processing type was responsible for the effect of frame on renewal

likelihood, we conducted a mediation analysis by using the Valence Index as a proxy for

processing type. By conducting a series of regressions, we determined that the relationship

between frame type and renewal likelihood was fully mediated by type of processing, as

illustrated in figure 2. The standardized regression coefficient between frame and renewal

likelihood was no longer significant after controlling for processing type. The other conditions

of mediation, as specified by Baron and Kenny (1986), were also met: frame was a significant

predictor of renewal likelihood and of processing type, and processing type was a significant

predictor of renewal likelihood while controlling for frame type. Finally, a Sobel test indicated

that this reduction in the framing effect was reliable (z = 1.62, p = .05 one-tailed).

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Insert figure 2 about here

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Discussion

The results of experiment 1 provide evidence that happiness and satisfaction frames can

have different effects on product-related judgments. In a field setting, we show that happiness

frames lead to more favorable behavioral intentions than satisfaction frames for a positively

valenced consumption experience. Additionally, results of the mediation analysis are consistent

with our proposition that happiness and satisfaction frames are more likely to induce different

types of information processing.

In experiment 2, we provide additional evidence for our theory that different processing
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types arise from marked and unmarked frames (i.e., happiness vs. satisfaction), thereby leading

to disparate product judgments. If the happiness versus satisfaction framing effect is due to

differences in information processing, limiting the availability of cognitive resources should

attenuate the effect. We examine this proposition in experiment 2.

EXPERIMENT 2

The objective of experiment 2 was to provide additional evidence that different

information processing, arising from marked and unmarked frames, is responsible for the

happiness versus satisfaction framing effect by showing that the effect is attenuated if cognitive

resources are unavailable. The product that consumers evaluated in experiment 2 was their own

television set.

Method

This study used a 2 (frame: satisfaction vs. happiness) x 2 (processing resources: high vs.

low) between-participant design. A total of 155 online participants reflected on either their

happiness or their satisfaction with their television set. Availability of processing resources was

manipulated beforehand using a procedure that has been used widely in the literature (Shiv and

Fedorikhin 1999; Swann et al. 1990). Prior to evaluating their television, participants were given

a purportedly unrelated memory task where they were asked to remember either a seven-digit

number (low processing resources) or a two-digit number (high processing resources) for the
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remainder of the experimental session.

Subsequently, frame type was manipulated by asking participants to consider their

happiness or their satisfaction with their television for at least one full minute. To ensure that

they had a specific television set in mind when completing the study, participants were asked to

provide the brand and age of the television that they owned. As our dependent variable of

interest, all participants indicated their likelihood to recommend their television set to a friend by

adjusting an unnumbered slider anchored at ―extremely unlikely‖ and ―extremely likely.‖ Slider

position was later translated into a number between 0 and 100, with higher numbers indicating

more positive evaluations.

Results

A pre-test involving 70 participants drawn from the same pool as the main experiment

revealed that participant evaluations of their televisions were positive. In the pre-test,

participants indicated their likelihood to recommend their television set to a friend on a 100-point

scale. The mean recommendation likelihood provided by pre-test participants was 67.1, which is

significantly higher than the midpoint of the entire scale (i.e., 50); t(69) = 5.25, p < .001.

The results from experiment 2 align with our prediction that participants’ likelihood to

recommend depends on both frame type and availability of processing resources. A 2 x 2

ANOVA on recommendation likelihood produced no main effects but revealed a significant

interaction between frame type and processing resources (F(1,151) = 3.93, p < .05). As

illustrated in figure 3, among participants with high processing resources, those in a happiness
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frame were more likely to recommend their television set than those in a satisfaction frame;

(MHappiness = 76.2 vs. MSatisfaction = 62.3; t(151) = 2.28; p < .03). However, when processing

resources were low, likelihood to recommend did not differ for participants in a happiness frame

versus those in a satisfaction frame (MHappiness = 69.0 vs. MSatisfaction = 71.9; t(151) = .49; p > .62).

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Insert figure 3 about here

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Discussion

In experiment 2, we again show that when participants have sufficient cognitive

resources available, they evaluate positive products more favorably in a happiness frame

compared to a satisfaction frame. Moreover, we show the attenuation of the happiness versus

satisfaction framing effect under conditions of low processing resources. This supports our

claim that marked and unmarked frames lead to different types of information processing and

this underlies the effect on judgment.

The general pattern of results attained in the first two experiments is consistent with our

proposed markedness explanation but opposite to the pattern predicted by the competing

threshold hypothesis. Another explanation, however, which can be referred to as the

associationist hypothesis, is also consistent with the data reported in experiments 1 and 2. This

explanation, which has been offered previously to explain other framing effects (Levin 1987;

Levin and Gaeth 1988), suggests that the valence of a label leads individuals to focus

disproportionately on similarly valenced attributes of a target. Because happiness is more

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positively valenced than satisfaction, reflecting on one’s happiness with a product may bring to

mind more positive associations than reflecting on one’s satisfaction.

In order to test more fully our theorizing that markedness and not merely associationism

is responsible for the happiness versus satisfaction framing effect, we choose a product in

experiments 3A and 3B towards which some consumers feel positively and others feel

negatively. When product valence is negative, our markedness explanation makes different

predictions than the more basic associationist hypothesis with regard to the direction of the

happiness versus satisfaction framing effect. The associationist hypothesis would predict an

effect in the same direction as experiments 1 and 2; that is, even for negative products, happiness

frames should result in more favorable judgments than satisfaction frames because happiness

produces more positive associations than satisfaction. Our markedness explanation predicts that

marked frames bias evaluations in the same direction as the target. Thus, happiness frames are

expected to generate less favorable product judgments than satisfaction frames for negatively

valenced products. We test these competing predictions by measuring product valence in

experiment 3A and by manipulating it in experiment 3B.

EXPERIMENT 3A

The objective of experiment 3A was to examine whether the effect of happiness versus

satisfaction frames on subsequent product-related judgment depends on product valence. We

predict that for positive targets, the likelihood of recommending a product will be greater if

consumers are in a happiness (versus a satisfaction) frame. However, for negative targets, the
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likelihood to recommend will be lower if consumers are in a happiness (versus a satisfaction)

frame because marked frames polarize judgments in the direction of the target’s valence. The

competing associationist hypothesis predicts a main effect whereby targets will be judged more

favorably by those in a happiness frame versus a satisfaction frame, irrespective of the target’s

valence.

Method

In experiment 3A, a total of 110 car owners were recruited through an online service that

provides access to a diverse population of paid participants. Experiment 3A employed a 2

(frame: happiness vs. satisfaction) x 2 (product valence: positive vs. negative) between-

participants design, with product valence as a measured variable. In order to ensure that they had

a specific vehicle in mind when completing the study, participants were first asked to provide the

make and model of the car that they owned. Next, they provided an evaluation of their car in the

absence of a framing manipulation. Participants indicated their likelihood to recommend their

car to a friend using an unnumbered slider with anchors at ―extremely unlikely‖ and ―extremely

likely.‖ The starting slider position was exactly centered between the two anchors. Slider

position was later translated into a number between 0 and 100, with higher numbers indicating

higher likelihood to recommend. Products were considered negatively valenced if participants

moved the slider from the initial neutral starting position toward the less favorable anchor.

Conversely, products were considered positively valenced if participants moved the slider toward

the more favorable anchor. After providing a frame-free estimate of likelihood to recommend,
 21

participants were subject to the framing manipulation. Depending on condition, participants

were asked to reflect on either their happiness or satisfaction with their car and to write down all

the thoughts that came to mind as they did so. Having considered their happiness [satisfaction]

with their car, participants were given the opportunity to revise their response to the earlier

―likelihood to recommend‖ question if they wished to do so. Using the same scale that they had

encountered earlier (with the same anchors and starting slider position), participants were again

asked to indicate how likely they would be to recommend their car to a friend.

Results

Based on their frame-free estimate of likelihood to recommend, 76 of the 110 participants

were classified in the positive valence condition, whereas 33 were in the negative valence

condition. The single neutral (i.e., likelihood to recommend = 50) participant in the sample was

excluded from subsequently reported analyses. Initial recommendation likelihood was, by

definition, higher for participants in the positive attitude condition (M = 79.0) and lower for

participants in the negative attitude condition (M = 28.3). Also, initial recommendation

likelihood did not differ for participants in satisfaction (M = 62.7) versus happiness (M = 65.0)

frames; F(1,105) = .004, p > .94. Given that the manipulation of frame type had not occurred at

the time when participants provided their initial recommendation likelihood, this finding

suggests only that the randomization of participants to conditions was successful. Thus, the

interaction between frame type and product valence was also a non-significant predictor of initial

recommendation likelihood; F(1,105) = .08, p > .77.

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However, the results of a 2 x 2 ANOVA on the final recommendation likelihood that

participants reported following the framing manipulation revealed a different data pattern. For

positively valenced products, we had predicted that likelihood to recommend would be greater

for participants in a happiness (versus a satisfaction) frame. For negatively valenced products,

we had predicted that likelihood to recommend would be greater for participants in a satisfaction

(versus a happiness) frame. Consistent with our theorizing, there was a significant interaction

between frame type and product valence; F(1, 105) = 6.68, p = .01. When products were

considered positively valenced, recommendation likelihood was greater for happiness

participants (M = 84.3) compared to satisfaction participants (M = 74.8); t(105) = 2.30, p = .02.

However, when products were considered negative, recommendation likelihood was

significantly lower for happiness participants (M = 25.7) compared to satisfaction participants (M

= 35.8) although this difference did not attain statistical significance; t(105) = 1.59, p = .11.

We controlled for within-subject variance by examining how likelihood to recommend

had changed following the framing manipulation. As expected, there was an ever stronger

interaction between frame type and product valence on change in recommendation likelihood;

F(1, 105) = 14.01, p < .001. For products that were considered positively valenced, change in

recommendation likelihood was significantly greater for participants in a happiness frame (M = +

4.6) compared to those in a satisfaction frame (M = -3.7); t(105) = 3.24, p < .01. However, for

negatively valenced products, change in recommendation likelihood was significantly smaller for

participants in a happiness frame (M = -2.1) compared to those in a satisfaction frame (M =

+7.2); t(105) = 2.36, p = .02. Furthermore, as illustrated in figure 4, the direction of change in

recommendation likelihood is consistent with our predictions.

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Insert figure 4 about here

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Experiment 3A also allows us to test whether happiness and satisfaction frames are

orthogonal in their influence on judgments, since all participants made a ―frame-free‖ evaluation

prior to the framing manipulation. For each of the four conditions in the experiment, we

conducted a paired comparison of frame-free evaluations with evaluations that were made after

the framing manipulation. For participants in the happiness condition, change in

recommendation likelihood was significantly positive (M = +4.6) for those whose initial

evaluation had been positive; paired t(32) = 2.73, p = .01. Conversely, change in

recommendation likelihood was negative (M = -2.1) for those whose initial evaluation had been

negative, although this effect was not significant; paired t(12) = 1.06, p = .31. For participants in

the satisfaction condition, change in recommendation likelihood was significantly negative (M =

-3.7) for those whose initial evaluation had been positive; paired t(42) = 2.15, p < .04.

Conversely, change in recommendation likelihood was significantly negative (M = -7.2) for

those whose initial evaluation had been negative; paired t(19) = 2.24, p < .04. The fact that three

of the four paired comparisons achieved statistical significance suggests that happiness and

satisfaction frames may indeed affect judgments orthogonally.

Discussion

In experiment 3A, we show that the influence of happiness versus satisfaction frames on
 24

judgments is moderated by the valence of the target. For products that are perceived as relatively

positive, happiness frames lead to more favorable behavioral intentions than satisfaction frames.

However, when products are perceived as relatively negative, happiness frames lead to less

favorable behavioral intentions than satisfaction frames. The demonstration of an interaction

between product valence and frame type is inconsistent with the associationist hypothesis and

suggests that the relationship between frames and subsequent judgments also depends on the

target’s valence.

In order to provide another test of our proposed theory, we manipulate product valence in

experiment 3B rather than measuring it. Our contention is that markedness biases judgments by

evoking one-sided cognitions that match the valence of the target. A major goal of experiment

3B is to provide evidence that differences in information processing may be responsible for the

interaction between product valence and frame type.

EXPERIMENT 3B

The primary objective of experiment 3B was to demonstrate an interaction between

product valence and frame type following a manipulation of both factors. We also hoped to

implicate differences in processing type as a driver of this interaction.

Method

Experiment 3B utilized a 2 (frame: satisfaction vs. happiness) x 2 (product valence:

 25

positive vs. negative) between-subjects design. Participants were 133 undergraduates at a large

American University who completed experiment 3B online. In all conditions, participants

imagined that they needed a new camcorder and read a brief product review of a fictional

camcorder that had purportedly been written by an owner of a camcorder. The review of the

camcorder either depicted the product as very positive (i.e., the review included a bulleted list of

7 positive attributes and 3 negative attributes) or very negative (i.e., the review included a

bulleted list of 3 positive attributes and 7 negative attributes). While reading the description of

the camcorder, participants were instructed to reflect on either their likely happiness or their

likely satisfaction with the camcorder, depending on their experimental condition. Next, all

participants indicated the maximum price that they would be willing to pay (WTP) for the

camcorder. To test if participants had carefully read the review that we had provided, we also

asked them if they could recall the name of the camcorder. Finally, in order to assess

information processing, participants were asked to list as many positive and negative attributes

about the camcorder as they could remember. Based on our theorizing, we expected respondents

to recall more positive (and fewer negative) attributes in a happiness frame relative to a

satisfaction frame, but only when the camcorder was positively valenced. Conversely, when the

camcorder was negatively valenced, we expected respondents to recall more negative (and fewer

positive) attributes in a happiness frame relative to a satisfaction frame.

Results

Two-factor analysis of variance (ANOVA) of WTP revealed a significant main effect of

 26

product valence. Consistent with our theorizing, we also found a significant interaction between

frame type and product valence, F(1,126) = 4.05, p < .05, which is illustrated in figure 5. When

the camcorder was negative, participants in the satisfaction condition were willing to pay an

average of $126, whereas those in the happiness condition were willing to pay $98. However,

when the camcorder was positive, participants in the happiness condition were willing to pay

more (M = $169) than participants in the satisfaction condition (M = $147). When the product

was positively valenced, participants in a happiness frame were willing to pay more than

participants in a satisfaction frame, although this difference was only marginally significant;

t(126) = 1.7, p < .05 (one-tailed). Conversely, when the product was negatively valenced,

participants in a happiness frame were willing to pay significantly more than participants in a

satisfaction frame; t(126) = 2.1, p < .05.

-------------------------------------

Insert figure 5 about here

-------------------------------------

As another comparison, participants in a happiness frame were willing to pay

significantly more for the positively valenced camcorder compared to the negatively valenced

one; t(126) = 4.4, p < .001. However, this difference was not significant for participants in a

satisfaction frame; t(126) = 1.4, p > .18. Thus, planned contrasts provide additional support for

our claim that happiness frames result in more polarized judgments whereas satisfaction frames

produce more moderate judgments.

In an effort to more directly test for differences in information processing, we calculated

a Valence Index for each participant by subtracting the number of recalled negative attributes
 27

from the number of recalled positive attributes, and then dividing this value by the total number

of attributes that were recalled. The range of the Valence Index was -1 to 1, with scores close to

zero indicating more mixed valence cognitions and extreme scores indicating more one-sided

cognitions. We conducted a two-factor ANOVA of Valence Index, with frame type and product

valence serving as independent variables in the analysis. We found a significant interaction

between frame type and product valence; F(1, 124) = 7.87, p < .01. Planned contrasts were also

consistent with our processing type hypothesis. That is, when the product was positively

valenced, participants in a happiness frame (M = .23) had a more positive Valence Index than

participants in a satisfaction frame (M = .04); t(124) = 2.2, p < .04. Conversely, when the

product was negatively valenced, participants in a happiness frame (M = -.33) had a more

negative Valence Index than participants in a satisfaction frame (M = -.18); t(124) = 1.8, p = .07.

Discussion

In experiment 3B, our manipulation of product valence provides corroborative evidence

that the impact of happiness and satisfaction frames on product-related judgments is dependent

on product valence. When the product is positive, consumers in a happiness frame tend to

evaluate it more positively than consumers in a satisfaction frame. However, when the product

is negative, the converse is true.

Experiment 3B also demonstrates the robustness of the happiness versus satisfaction

framing effect. Unlike earlier studies, consumers in experiment 3B considered a hypothetical

product rather than their own product and reflected on their anticipated happiness or satisfaction,
 28

as opposed to their actual happiness or satisfaction. Furthermore, instead of indicating how

likely they would be to recommend or renew a product, participants in experiment 3B provided a

WTP estimate for the target product. Despite these methodological differences, the happiness

versus satisfaction framing effect remained intact.

Moreover, the attribute recall data from experiment 3B provides additional process

evidence for our theorizing that different types of information processing may underlie the

framing effect. The cumulative evidence generated in the first three experiments provide clear

support for the markedness explanation that we have proposed.

In order to extend our theory even further, we deduce an original hypothesis regarding

the consequences of markedness. According to the theory developed earlier, unmarked frames

result in different types of information processing than marked frames. Extensive research both

in perception and pragmatics suggests that individuals strive to find meaning when processing

information or interacting with others (Broadbent 1958; Grice 1975). However, since marked

frames already convey implied meaning, we suspect that individuals may be relatively less

engaged in attending to contextual cues to find additional meaning. On the other hand, since

unmarked frames are endowed with relatively less presuppositional information, individuals may

be more attentive to contextual cues as a way of finding meaning. Thus, we predict that when

consumers evaluate a target within a marked frame, they will generate relatively more internal

cognitions, whereby thoughts strictly about the target come to mind. However, when consumers

evaluate a target within an unmarked frame, we expect that they will generate relatively more

external cognitions, whereby thoughts about standards by which to compare the target come to

mind. If unmarked frames predispose consumers to generate external cognitions, it stands to

 29

reason that they should be affected by a salient external standard of comparison to a greater

degree than consumers in marked frames. Thus, marked frames, such as happiness, should be

relatively insensitive to influence from contextual cues such as salient external standards. On the

other hand, unmarked frames, such as satisfaction, may encourage comparison to these salient

external standards.

In experiment 4, we test the hypothesis that when an extremely positive external standard

is made salient, judgments of another product (i.e., the target) will contrast further away from the

positive standard if participants are in a satisfaction frame (vs. a happiness frame). The notion

that extreme comparison standards prompt contrast effects is consistent with prior work on

assimilation and contrast (Mussweiler, Rüter, and Epstude 2004). Our contention is that these

contrast effects will be amplified for satisfaction frames and attenuated for happiness frames

based on the relative presence of external and internal cognitions, respectively. If our theorizing

is correct, extremely negative standards of comparison should also produce greater contrast for

satisfaction frames versus happiness frames. This leads to the following hypothesis.

H4: Relative to product-related judgments made by consumers in happiness frames,

judgments of consumers in satisfaction frames are more likely to contrast away

from an extreme standard of comparison.

EXPERIMENT 4

The objective of experiment 4 was to test whether extremely positive and extremely

negative standards of comparison would lead to greater contrast effects for participants in
 30

satisfaction frames as compared to those in happiness frames.

Method

In experiment 4, a total of 196 car owners were recruited through an online service.

Experiment 4 employed a 2 (frame type: satisfaction vs. happiness) x 2 (standard of comparison:

positive, negative) between-participants design. Under the guise of a reading comprehension

study, participants first read a short excerpt from a magazine article describing the McClaren F1

(extreme positive standard), which had purportedly been named the ―best car of the millennium‖

or the Yugo (extreme negative standard), which had been named the ―worst car of the

millennium.‖ After answering a few questions about the article they had read and engaging in an

unrelated filler task, participants completed an ostensibly unrelated study where they evaluated

their own vehicle. In order to ensure that they had a specific vehicle in mind when completing

the study, participants were first asked to provide the make and model of the car that they owned.

Next, they were subject to a framing manipulation. Depending on condition, participants were

asked to reflect on either their happiness or satisfaction with their car for a full minute; however,

participants were not asked to list their thoughts. Finally, having considered their happiness

[satisfaction] with their car, all participants indicated how likely they would be to repurchase the

same brand of car that they currently owned using an unnumbered slider with anchors at

―extremely unlikely‖ and ―extremely likely.‖ Slider position was later translated into a number

between 0 and 100, with higher numbers indicating higher likelihood to recommend.
 31

Results

We predicted that judgments of a target made by participants in a satisfaction frame

would contrast further away from an extreme standard than the judgments of those in a happiness

frame. Consistent with our theorizing, there was a significant interaction between frame type and

the valence of the standard; F(1, 192) = 10.72, p < .001, as shown in figure 6. When the

standard of comparison was extremely positive, recommendation likelihood was significantly

higher for happiness participants (M = 73.3) compared to satisfaction participants (M = 59.2);

t(192) = 2.2, p = .03. However, when the standard of comparison was negative, recommendation

likelihood was significantly lower for happiness participants (M = 67.3) compared to satisfaction

participants (M = 82.3); t(192) = 2.5, p = .01. As direct support for hypothesis 4, the valence of

the standard of comparison had a significant effect on participants in a satisfaction frame (t(192)

= 3.8, p < .001) but no effect on those in a happiness frame (t(192) = .93, p > .32).

-------------------------------------

Insert figure 6 about here

-------------------------------------

Discussion

Experiment 4 provides support for our hypothesis that satisfaction frames will be more

sensitive to extreme standards of comparison than happiness frames. We contend that this result

is due to the markedness of happiness frames, which prompts more internal cognitions and less

external cognitions than satisfaction frames.

 32

In an additional unreported experiment, we generated process-based evidence that

different types of processing may be responsible for the differential sensitivity of happiness and

satisfaction frames to external comparison standards. Participants in this additional study

considered either their happiness or satisfaction with their own cell phone after being shown an

extremely positive standard of comparison (i.e., an Apple iPhone). As predicted, when an

extremely positive external standard of comparison was made salient, subsequent evaluations of

their own phones were less favorable for participants in a satisfaction frame compared to those in

a happiness frame. We also found process-based evidence for our hypothesis that happiness and

satisfaction frames lead to different types of information processing by examining the extent to

which participants in each frame reported that they had made comparisons to other products (i.e.,

external cognitions) while evaluating their phone.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

We have examined how considering one’s happiness versus one’s satisfaction with a

product differentially influences subsequent product-related judgments (e.g., likelihood to

recommend, likelihood to repurchase, willingness to pay). Although happiness and satisfaction

frames have been used arbitrarily or interchangeably by academic researchers and marketing

practitioners, we show that these two frames lead to systematically different judgments.

Specifically, judgments made by participants in a happiness frame are often more extreme,

whereas judgments of participants in a satisfaction frame are typically more moderate. We argue

that the happiness versus satisfaction framing effect is due to differences in the lexical
 33

markedness, or implied meaning, of the two frames.

Our theory suggests that unmarked and marked frames lead to different types of

information processing. Unmarked frames lead to mixed valence cognitions (i.e., positive and

negative thoughts). Marked frames result in one-sided cognitions (i.e., positive or negative

thoughts), with cognition valence determined in part by the valence of the target. When a target

is positively [negatively] valenced, marked frames foster cognitions that are more positive

[negative] than unmarked frames. As a result, for positively valenced targets, a marked positive

frame (e.g., happiness) produces more favorable evaluations than an unmarked positive frame

(e.g., satisfaction). However, for negatively valenced targets, a happiness frame generates less

favorable evaluations than satisfaction frames.

Across four experiments, we find converging evidence for our theoretical framework.

Our first two experiments focus on positively valenced targets. In experiment 1, we show that

processing type, represented by the valence of thoughts listed by participants during a product

evaluation task, mediates the happiness versus satisfaction framing effect. Experiment 2

demonstrates that the framing effect is dependent on the availability of cognitive resources.

When resources are unavailable, the happiness versus satisfaction framing effect is attenuated.

In experiments 3A and 3B, we respectively measure and manipulate the valence of a target. In

accordance with our proposed theory, we find that happiness frames result in less favorable

target evaluations than satisfaction frames in both studies. In addition to finding that judgments

of those in happiness versus satisfaction frames differ from one another, we also show that

happiness and satisfaction frames exert unique and opposite effects relative to a frame-free

judgment. In particular, the data presented in experiment 3B suggests that satisfaction and
 34

happiness frames may respectively moderate and polarize frame-free judgments.

In the final experiment of this article, we extend our theoretical framework in a new

direction by introducing a novel hypothesis that can also be derived from the markedness

construct. We propose that unmarked [marked] frames will produce more external [internal]

cognitions, which will result in greater [lesser] sensitivity to extreme standards of comparison.

Therefore, in the presence of a salient standard of reference, judgments of a target made by

participants in a satisfaction frame should contrast further away from an extreme standard than

the judgments of those in a happiness frame. In experiment 4, we find support for the hypothesis

that satisfaction frames invite greater comparison than happiness frames. Across experiments,

this article provides evidence of a robust happiness versus satisfaction framing effect in product

judgments and implicates markedness as a driver of this effect.

In the experiments described in this article, we have attempted to rule out alternative

explanations that would have predicted a different pattern of results than we actually attained,

such as the threshold hypothesis. By finding an interaction effect between frame type and

product valence, we also rule out competing explanations that would have predicted only a main

effect of frame type, such as the associationist hypothesis. Two other explanations could be

offered that may appear to compete with our markedness account. The heuristic processing

hypothesis suggests that happiness, on account of being more affective and less cognitive than

satisfaction (Brief and Roberson 1989; McKennell 1978; Organ and Near 1985), may lead those

in a happiness frame to engage in heuristic processing and therefore make extreme judgments.

The hedonic intensity hypothesis suggests that happiness, on account of being more positive than

satisfaction, leads those in a happiness frame to amplify their initial responses to a target thereby
 35

resulting in polarized judgments. Our view on these two hypotheses is that they are merely

descriptive of the phenomenon under investigation but do not provide a theoretical basis for why

happiness polarizes and satisfaction moderates subsequent judgments. We believe that lexical

markedness provides a theoretical justification that is more defensible. As an additional

rejoinder to the heuristic processing hypothesis in particular, we might note that across

experiments, we found no evidence that participants in a happiness frame were processing

information less systematically than those in a satisfaction frame. In all thought listing tasks, for

example, neither the number of thoughts listed nor task duration differed based on happiness

versus satisfaction framing. However, the valence of cognitions that were listed did differ, as

predicted by our markedness explanation.

This research makes several theoretical contributions to a number of diverse literatures.

First, our research introduces an important new framing effect. Happiness and satisfaction

frames are commonly used to elicit attitudinal self-reports in social psychology and marketing.

Furthermore, these frames are often used arbitrarily or interchangeably, both inside and outside

of academic contexts. Our research suggests that happiness and satisfaction frames lead to

different types of information processing, which may produce disparate product-related

judgments. In addition, the demonstration of a novel framing effect using two positive frames

(i.e., happiness and satisfaction) is significant since much of the extant work on framing has

focused on antonymous frames.

Second, this research provides new insights about the mechanisms underlying framing

effects. By in large, the psychological reasons underlying framing effects are not well

understood (Druckman 2001). Explanations for framing effects that involve oppositely valenced
 36

frames have typically focused on simple valence differences between the two frames. For

example, the associationist hypothesis claims that the valence of a frame leads individuals to

focus disproportionately on similarly valenced object attributes. We propose a new theoretical

framework that may be able to explain other framing effects, in addition to the particular effect

examined in this research. Specifically, we derive an explanation which focuses on differences

in the markedness, or implied meaning, of various frames. Our claim is that framing effects are

jointly determined by a frame’s markedness and a target’s valence. In the context of happiness

and satisfaction frames, our markedness explanation is more parsimonious than the associationist

hypothesis, which cannot account for the interaction we find between product valence and frame

type. Thus, incorporating the concept of markedness into the framing literature provides a richer

and more complete description of how framing works.

Third, we contribute to linguistic theory by applying the construct of lexical markedness

to similarly valenced word pairs. Historically, markedness has been used primarily to

distinguish between polar opposites (e.g., good-bad, lion-lioness, etc.) and has been described in

absolute terms (i.e., marked vs. unmarked). We challenge the notion that words are marked or

unmarked based solely on essential and static lexical properties. Instead, we provide support for

an emerging view of markedness that is much more context-specific and relative. We find that

two words that share the same valence can be relatively more or less marked, based on

established criteria of markedness. Therefore, even if happiness and satisfaction are both

unmarked relative to their negatively-valenced polar opposites (i.e., unhappiness and

dissatisfaction, respectively), happiness can still be more marked than satisfaction. As we show,

this difference in relative markedness can have important consequences for subsequent
 37

judgments. By taking a broader perspective, our research enhances the applicability and

usefulness of markedness theory.

Fourth, by relating the construct of markedness to consumer behavior, which has not

been done previously, we develop a rich theory to explain how markedness affects judgments.

We show that the markedness of words can alter consumer judgments because of differences in

information processing; relatively marked words lead to one-side thoughts and relatively

unmarked words result in more mixed-valence thoughts. Linking the relative markedness of

words to differences in information processing is an important theoretical advance because it

allows new predictions to be formed, such as our novel hypothesis that unmarked frames may be

particularly sensitive to external standards of comparison.

A final theoretical contribution of this article is to shed light on how satisfaction differs

from happiness. Researchers, in particular those who study subjective well-being, are interested

in more fully understanding the constructs of happiness and satisfaction (Diener et al. 1985;

Diener, Suh, and Oishi 1997). Our work, which shows how happiness versus satisfaction frames

can affect information processing, may help inform these lines of research.

In conclusion, we highlight the practical implications of this research by noting that our

findings may be broadly applicable to persuasive contexts. For example, an advertisement that

prompts consumers to imagine ―how happy you will be‖ versus ―how satisfied you will be‖

might result in different purchase intentions. We focused on question frames because the

customer satisfaction survey is ubiquitous in the marketplace, and many firms use the

information derived from satisfaction research to make firm-level decisions regarding sales,

marketing, product management, and corporate strategy. The studies presented in this article
 38

suggest that satisfaction frames lead consumers to make mixed-valence cognitions, which may

sometimes influence downstream consumer behavior (e.g., repurchases) in ways that the firm

may not prefer. Thus, from a managerial perspective, this article can help marketers determine

whether to use satisfaction or happiness frames when conducting market research or

communicating with customers. For managers who are using market research mainly as a

vehicle to persuade consumers to purchase or use their product, our research offers a

prescription as to whether they should continue using satisfaction frames in their messages.

Relative to satisfaction frames, happiness frames may lead to more favorable evaluations from

consumers under conditions when products are generally positive or when positively valenced

external standards of comparison are salient. However, satisfaction (versus happiness) frames

may lead to more favorable evaluations when products are generally negative or when negatively

valenced external standards of comparison are salient.

It remains to be seen if happiness frames have greater predictive power (in terms of

determining actual customer loyalty, defection, etc.) than questions that use satisfaction frames.

It is very possible that research on framing can serve as a valuable tool to help solve the long-

standing managerial puzzle of why traditional satisfaction measures are sometimes surprisingly

poor predictors of customer-level behavior and firm-level performance (Chandrashekaran et al.

2007; Reichheld 1996, 2003). Thus, we encourage further research which explores the

predictive validity of marked versus unmarked frames.

 39

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 45

TABLE 1: EVIDENCE THAT HAPPINESS IS RELATIVELY MORE MARKED

THAN SATISFACTION

Determinant Prediction Empirical Support

Syncretization Happiness has Examination of the number of morphological
Lack of fewer variants using the Oxford English Dictionary
Morphological combinations and identified only 12 variants of happiness (happy,
Variation extensions than unhappy, etc.) compared to 30 variants of
satisfaction satisfaction (satisfied, dissatisfied, unsatisfied, etc.).
Specificity Happiness is more A total of 91 online respondents rated each word on
Specific Semantic specific and three dimensions: evaluation, potency, and activity
Meaning specialized than (Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum 1957). For all
satisfaction dimensions, mean ratings on 7-point scales were
closer to one of the scale anchors for happiness and
closer to the midpoint for satisfaction:
 On the evaluation factor, participants considered
the word happiness (M = 6.6) to be more positive
than satisfaction (M = 5.9); t(89) = 2.94, p < .01.
 On the potency factor, happiness (M = 6.0) was
rated as being stronger than satisfaction (M =
5.5), t(89) = 2.22, p < .03.
 On the activity factor, happiness (M = 5.4) was
rated as being more active than satisfaction (M =
4.8), t(89) = 2.07, p = .04.
Prototypicality Happiness is less A Google search for the exact phrase ―product
Frequency of frequent and more satisfaction survey‖ produced 152,000 unique
Usage, unusual than results compared to zero results for ―product
satisfaction in happiness survey.‖ Similarly, a Google search for
Naturalness
product contexts the exact phrase ―product satisfaction‖ produced
167,000 unique results compared to only 7,700
results for ―product happiness.‖ was searched.
 46

FIGURE 1: THE IMPACT OF MARKEDNESS ON THE EVALUATION OF

VALENCED TARGETS (PROPOSED THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK)
 47

FIGURE 2: MEDIATION OF FRAMING EFFECT BY PROCESSING TYPE

(EXPERIMENT 1)

* p < .05

Note—A mediation analysis was conducted to examine the role of processing type following
Baron and Kenny’s (1986) procedure: First, a regression analysis showed that participants’ frame
type (satisfaction = 0, happiness = 1) significantly predicted their subsequent likelihood to renew
their museum membership (β = .20, p < .05). A second regression showed that frame was a
significant predictor of processing type (β = .22, p < .05); larger numbers indicate more one-
sided (positive) cognitions. A third regression showed that processing type predicted renewal
likelihood (β = .31, p < .01). Finally, when both frame and processing type were included in the
model to predict renewal likelihood, the effect of frame type was no longer significant (β = .11, p
> .33) while the effect of processing type remained significant (β = .28, p = .01). A Sobel test (z
= 1.62, p = .05 one-tailed) confirmed that the effect of frame type on renewal likelihood was
mediated by processing type.
 48

FIGURE 3: MODERATION OF FRAMING EFFECT BY AVAILABILITY OF

PROCESSING RESOURCES (EXPERIMENT 2)

80

76.2

75
Likelihood to Recommend

71.9

70 69.0 Happiness Frame

Satisfaction Frame

65

62.3

60
High Processing Resources Low Processing Resources
 49

FIGURE 4: INTERACTION OF FRAMING EFFECT WITH MEASURED

PRODUCT VALENCE (EXPERIMENT 3A)

8
7.2

6
Change in Likelihood to Recommend

4.6
4

2
Happiness Frame
0 Satisfaction Frame

-2
-2.1
-4
-3.7

-6
Positively Valenced Target Negatively Valenced Target
 50

FIGURE 5: INTERACTION OF FRAMING EFFECT WITH MANIPULATED

PRODUCT VALENCE (EXPERIMENT 3B)

$180
$169

$160
Willingness to Pay (WTP)

$147

$140

$126 Happiness Frame

$120 Satisfaction Frame

$100 $98

$80
Positively Valenced Target Negatively Valenced Target
 51

FIGURE 6: INTERACTION OF FRAMING EFFECT WITH VALENCE OF

COMPARISON STANDARD (EXPERIMENT 4)

90

82.3

80
Likelihood to Repurchase

73.3

70 67.3 Happiness Frame

Satisfaction Frame

59.2
60

50
Extremely Positive Extremely Negative
Standard of Comparison Standard of Comparison