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Greece & Rome, Vol. 57, No. 2, ©The Classical Association, 2010. All rights reserved
doi:10.1017/S0017383510000045
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THE GENERAL'S PRE-BATTLE EXHORTATION 305
Moreover, Hansen can ignore the statements of historians, including Thucydides and
Polybios, about their claims concerning their speeches: the ancient historians have not
only invented their speeches, they have inserted them into battle field accounts at places
entirely inappropriate. Mogens Herman Hansen can be placed in the vanguard of those
who believe that our histories contain a pack of lies.5
What is apparent in our sources is that the size of the force or,
more critically, the length of the battle line limited the scope for such
activities, but did not entirely preclude them.6 If the force were small
enough and the battle line less extensive, it was probably a common
practice to address the gathered troops at some length. Even though
Xenophon in his Constitution of the Lacedaemonians (13.9) reports how,
among the Spartans, words of encouragement were passed along the
battle line, 'for it is impossible for each ivœfjLoraprjs to make his voice
travel along the whole of his section [ivajfjborta] to the far end', in
the Cyropaedia (3.3.49-55), he has Cyrus disparage the effectiveness
of such speeches or exhortations, thus implying that they did occur.
Moreover, two Roman commanders of widely separated eras, Caesar
and Ammianus, make it clear that these pre-battle speeches were
commonplace. Caesar in his Commentaries calls such talks to the
troops prior to battle 'customary': 'exercitum cum militari more ad
pugnam cohortaretur' (B Civ. 3.90.1; cf. B Gall. 2.20.1). Perhaps the
best statement with respect to these pre-combat speeches is provided
by Ammianus Marcellinus. Ammianus comments, prior to Julian's
appeal to his troops already arrayed in formation before the battle at
Argentoratum, 'Quoniam alloqui pariter omnes nee longitudo spatiorum
extentay nee in unum coactae multitudinis permuterei (16.12.29). The
passage indicates that, had the numbers been fewer, a speech to the
entire army might have been given. Sound levels drop off precipitously
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306 THE GENERAL'S PRE-BATTLE EXHORTATION
7 D. M. Addington and D. L. Schodek, Smart Materials and Technologies in Architecture for the
Architecture and Design Professions (Oxford, 2005), 77.
8 Hansen, 'Battle Exhortation' (n. 1), 178.
9M. H. Hansen, 'How many Athenians attended the Ecclesia?', GRBS 17 (1976), 131.
Hansen believes, however, that the usual attendance was approximately 6000 (ibid., 123-4).
10 M. C. Leff, 'Agency, Performance, and Interpretation in Thucydides' Account of the
Mytilene Debate', in C. L. Johnstone (ed.), Theory, Text, and Context. Issues in Greek Rhetoric and
Oratory fAlbanv, NY, 1996), 126.
11 This is a very optimistic estimate on the part of Plato.
12 F. Sear, Roman Theatres. An Architectural Study (Oxford, 2006), 396.
13 H. Holzer (ed.), The Lincoln-Douglas Debates (New York, 1993), 40, 234.
14 W. E. Barton, Lincoln at Gettysburg. What He Intended to Say; What He Said; What He Was
Reported to Have Said; What He Wished He Had Said (New York, 1950), 190, cf. 181, 184, 187,
188, 190, 192, 202. On the numbers present, see W. W. Braden, Abraham Lincoln, Public Speaker
(Baton Rouge, LA, 1988), 81; G.Wills, Lincoln at Gettysburg (New York, 1992), 33.
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THE GENERAL'S PRE-BATTLE EXHORTATION 307
lower. Studies carried out at Epidaurus found that only a 72% word
articulation rate was achieved at the back of the theatre,15 and modern
indoor theatre design emphasizes that, for dramatic performances,
the audience should be no more than 32.8 yards (30 metres) from
the stage.16 In the theatre at Epidaurus, the maximum distance of
the audience from the stage is more than 72 yards (65 metres), with
the stage being approximately 11 yards (10 metres) from the closest
members of the audience.
Theatres, however, are designed to maximize the number of potential
listeners. In contrast, by how large a force arrayed for battle, in less
than ideal acoustical circumstances, could a commander reasonably be
expected to be heard, even if we accept what are probably exaggerated
crowd estimates in non-battlefield situations? The biggest limiting
factor is the length of the battle line.17 If we assume, purely for the
purposes of argument, that 20,000 is the maximum that under ideal
conditions could comprehend a speaker, then what would these ideal
conditions be? Sound waves emanate from their source roughly in
concentric, spherical waves or, in the case of human voice projection,
slightly oblong, hemispherical waves;18 given the design of the human
physical voice projection system, there exists an ideal cone for hearing
that projects at a 70° angle left and right from the speaker.19 Moreover,
many types of obstacles between the speaker and potential listeners
tend to absorb sound and prevent it from reaching those behind
these obstacles. Curiously enough, this is not so much the case with
human bodies per se, but rather is the result of the clothing worn.20
The more porous the material, the more sound it absorbs. On the
other hand, smooth and reflective surfaces (such as the metal found in
defensive armour) might to some degree amplify the sound, but would
also diffuse it, raising the ambient sound levels and making speech
less comprehensible.21 Consequently, the ideal arrangement for an
audience would be the form of a Greek theatre. Unfortunately, instead
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308 THE GENERAL'S PRE-BATTLE EXHORTATION
22 Polybius assigns 9 square Greek feet to each soldier, both in a Macedonian phalanx
(18.29.2) and in a Roman legion (18.30.8). The Olympic foot was 320 mm or 12.6 inches or
1.05 yards (S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth [eds.], The Oxford Classical Dictionary, third edition
[Oxford, 1996], 943). For comparison, seats in the Theatre of Dionysius in Athens gave each
member of the audience 0.45 yards (0.41 metres) of seating space (Sear [n. 12], 26).
23 Using Polybius' calculation of the area occupied by a single soldier, to find the width across
the front take the square root of the area. This yields 1.0488 or more simply 1.05 yards (0.96
metres) .
24 The radius of a semicircle containing 22,000 square yards (20,000 x 1.1 [see n. 23]) is
found by solving the following: r=V(2A/ro) (where A = the area of the semicircle).
25 The maximum number of soldiers is determined by dividing 1.05 into the sum of 8 x
225. For the maths purists, however, since the ideal form is a semicircle, the eighth rank has
to fit within that semicircle. Consequently, the length of the line might need to be adjusted
accordingly, if the lines are to remain a consistent length. This calculation is based on the
Pythagorean theorem. The radius (hypotenuse) is 1 18.5 yards, one leg of the triangle is 8.4 yards
(8 x 1.05 = 8.4); thus, the second leg is 118.2 yards. Doubling the last result, dividing by 1.05,
and rounding down to the next whole number (in this case, person) gives a result for the eighth
line of 225. In short, there would be no change from the original calculation in this particular
case, but with increasing numbers of ranks the calculation would place an additional limit on the
number of troops that could be included.
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THE GENERAL'S PRE-BATTLE EXHORTATION 309
26 A very quiet country setting or the equivalent of a 'very soft whisper' (M. Hirschorn, IAC
Noise Control Reference Handbook, revised edition [New York, 19891).
27 United States Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Noise Abatement and Control,
'Information on Levels of Environmental Noise Requisite to Protect Public Health and Welfare
with an Adequate Margin of Safety' (March 1974), Report 550/9-74-004, <http://www.nonoise.
org/library/levels74/levels74.htm>, accessed 5 May 2010, D-5, Table D-l.
28 Hansen, 'Grey Horse' (n. 1).
29 This figure is derived in the same manner as that for the previously assumed maximum.
30Leff (n. 10), 120-1.
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3 1 0 THE GENERAL'S PRE-BATTLE EXHORTATION
31 The cavalry probably numbered less than 1,000 (see A. W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary
on Thucydides, iii, The TenYears'War, Books IV-V 24 [Oxford, 1956], 564).
32 His speech was interrupted before completion by the onset of the Boeotian advance (Thuc.
4.96.1).
33 A. W. Gomme, ('The Speeches of Thucydides', in Essays in Greek History and Literature
[Oxford, 1937], 172-3; Commentary [n. 31], iii.565) believes that Hippocrates delivered
several speeches to the different units, which Thucydides has made into one. Hansen ('Battle
Exhortation' [n. 11. 169; 'Grey Horse' [n. 1]) agrees.
34 Thucydides does include in his narrative speeches given to troops in assembly (for example,
see Thuc. 5.9.1-10, 7.61.1-64.2, 7.66.1-68.3).
35 See Gomme (n. 31), iii. 561. A similar situation occurs after the great battle in the harbour
of Syracuse and the subsequent Athenian retreat. Nicias, while 'passing along the ranks' of the
retreating units, 'shouting' to make himself heard by as many as possible, delivers, despite this
description, a single speech (Thuc. 7.67).
36 Hansen, 'Battle Exhortation' (n. 1), 168.
37 Nicias had 5,100 total hoplites (Thuc. 6.43) but had placed half of them in reserve (Thuc.
6.67.1).
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THE GENERAL'S PRE-BATTLE EXHORTATION 3 1 1
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3 1 2 THE GENERAL'S PRE-BATTLE EXHORTATION
occur in his history. Only two speeches before large forces already
arrayed for battle are presented. Secondly, Thucydides implies that
some sort of exhortation to the troops before battle was common, but
not absolutely necessary (Thuc. 5.69.2).
The clearest testimony on the use of speeches prior to combat comes
from Xenophon, in his Anabasis. Here, even though more than twenty
army assembly meetings are recorded, often with extensive speeches,41
there is not a single pre-battle speech to a large army drawn up in line,
preparing for combat. Moreover, the difficulty of communicating with
large numbers of men is demonstrated by the frequent use of heralds
to give commands (5.2.18; cf. Hell. 6.2.34; 7.2.21), to summon troops
to assemble (5.7.3-4; cf. Hell. 4.5.7), and in general to address large
numbers of soldiers (2.2.20; 3.1.46; cf. Hell. 1.7.9; 2.4.20). Xenophon
does record four harangues to troops either preparing for combat or
returning from battle, but all of these are to small groups of soldiers.
While preparing to enter the land of the Carduchians, Xenophon
led a force of '300 picked hoplites' and an unknown number of
peltasts in an uphill attack (An. 3 A A3).42 At the start of the charge,
Xenophon, while riding along the ranks, spoke briefly encouraging
their assault (3.4.46). His encouraging words were interrupted before
completion by a comment from one of the hoplites and, as a result,
only amounted to a reported twenty-one words (3.4.47). The ultimate
size of Xenophon's force is unknown and the force was not drawn up
in formal line of battle. His second speech occurs shortly thereafter.
While returning from this previous assault, Xenophon encountered
Cheirisophus, one of the generals, and an unknown number of
soldiers who are themselves returning from the rescue of a number
of scattered Greek pillagers who were caught unawares by the Persian
forces. Xenophon rode along the squads of rescuers pointing out that,
while the king had forbidden the Greeks to burn any Persian property,
it was now the Persians themselves who were destroying their own
villages to keep them from the Greeks (An. 3.5.4-5). Even though the
address begins 'men of Greece5, it concludes with comments directed
specifically to Cheirisophus (3.5.6). It was probably, then, spoken only
to those who were gathered around their commander.
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THE GENERAL'S PRE-BATTLE EXHORTATION 3 1 3
In the land of the Colchians, while the army was being drawn up
into columns (An. 4.8. 14-1 5), Xenophon, moving (ámcov) across
the front of the gathering columns from right to left, addressed 'the
soldiers' in a speech of twenty-four words (An. 4.8.14). In the first
place, this was not an army drawn up for battle, and nor is it clear
which soldiers he may have been addressing.
In the last of these harangues, prior to an attack on the Bithynians,
Xenophon reports that he rode along the front of the 'phalanx' and
delivered a short speech to the soldiers (An. 6.5.23-5). The size of
the army at this point is not known, although we are told that all
soldiers over the age of forty-five had been left in the camp (6.5.4).
Furthermore, the troops had just crossed a ravine in no regular order
(6.5.22; cf. 6.5.12), and Xenophon was attempting to lead them
back into line and, consequently, may only have been addressing the
vanguard of the hurriedly assembling soldiers (6.5.25).
There remains one other speech in which the entire army is clearly
involved and, even though it is a speech that does not precede a battle,
it follows the army being arranged as if for battle. Before the walls of
Byzantium, Xenophon ordered the army to arrange itself in line of
battle, with the hoplites 'eight ranks deep' and the light-armed troops
gathered on the flanks (7.1.23). This force numbered approximately
8,000, of whom less than 7,600 were hoplites, but the hoplites
alone would have spread across approximately 997.5 yards (912.1
metres).43 Such a speech could therefore only have been heard by less
than a quarter of the assembled troops. However, Xenophon goes
on to say that the troops having formed up in ranks then grounded
their weapons, after which he called them together (ovyKaXeï) and
delivered his speech (7.1.24). Apparently the troops left their ranks
and gathered before Xenophon to hear what he had to say.44 No battle
was subsequently fought and the troops proceeded to hear others and
vote measures (7.1.33). What had begun as an army marshalled as for
battle became an army arranged in assembly. Given a semicircle with
a radius of 85 yards, an army of more than 10,300 could have heard
43 Only the hoplites were arranged in the eight ranks; the peltasts were collected on the wings
(An. 7 .1. 23). Given the rate of attrition from the original force of 1 1,700 (An. 1.2.3, 6, 9) to that
later in Colchis of 8,000 (An. 4.8.15), at Cerasus the total force numbered less than 8,600, with
probably 7,600 being hoplites (cf. An. 5.3.3). In the first encounter with the Bithynians, who had
been joined by Pharnabazus, the Greeks lost 500 men (An. 6.4.24).
44 In An. 6.3.11, Xenophon clearly uses the same verb to mean a gathering of the soldiers
around him.
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314 THE GENERAL'S PRE-BATTLE EXHORTATION
45 For example, Xen. Hell. 1.1.14, 28; 1.6.5-11; 1.7.16-33; 2.3.24-34, 35-49, 52-3; 2.4.12-
17, 20-2; 3.5.8-15; 4.1.32-3, 34-8; 4.8.4; 5.1.13-17; 5.2.12-19; 6.1.4-16; 6.3.4-6, 7-9, 10-17;
6.5.37, 38-48; 7.1.2-11, 12-14, 23-4, 44; 7.3.6, 7-11; 7.4.8.
46 Thrasybulus had moved to Piraeus from Phyle with 'about 1,000 troops', but on their
arrival had been joined by a large number of 'stone-throwers' from the surrounding area {Hell.
2.4.12).
47 See W. G. Forrest, A History of Sparta, 950-192 b.c. (London, 1968), 132-5; T. J. Figueira,
'Population Patterns in Late Archaic and Classical Sparta', TAPhA 115 (1986), 208; P. Cartledge,
Sparta and Lakonia. A Regional History 1300-362 bc (London, 2001), 263-4, 319. According to
Diodorus (15.72.3), 10,000 Arcadians were killed without the loss of a single Spartan.
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THE GENERAL'S PRE-BATTLE EXHORTATION 3 1 5
48 Amm. Marc. 14.10.4, 10-16; 15.8.4, 14; 17.1.2; 17.13.24-33; 20.4.14-18; 20.5.1-7;
20.9.6-7; 21.5.1-8; 21.13.9-15; 23.5.15-23; 24.3-8; 26.2.2-10; 27.6.5-13.
49 B Gall. 1.25.1; 2.20-26.1; 3.19.2; 3.24.5; 5.33.2; B Civ. 1.45.1; 2.34.5; 2.39.2-3; 2.41.2;
2.42.1; 3.90, 97.1.
50 B Gall. 1.40; 3.3; 5.28.2-30.3; 6.7.4, 8; 7.60.1; B Civ. 1.19.1; 1.67.1; 1.73.1; 1.78.2;
2.30.1-31.8; 2.38.1; 3.86.1-87.7.
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3 1 6 THE GENERAL'S PRE-BATTLE EXHORTATION
51 B Gall 5.49.4; 6.8.3-4; 7.40.4; 7.52.1-53.1; B Civ. 1.7; 1.19.1; 1.20.1-3; 2.32; 3.6.1;
3.41.5; 3.73.2-6; 3.76.2; 3.80.6; 3.82.1; 3.84.1; 3.85.4.
52 B Gall 2.21.1-4; 2.25.1; 7.17.4; B Civ. 1.76.1; 2.41.2.
53 B Gall. 1.25.1; 2.25.1; 5.33.2; 7.62.2; 7.86.3.
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THE GENERAL'S PRE-BATTLE EXHORTATION 317
('On his arrival, hope was brought to the soldiers and their courage
restored, while every one for his own part, in the sight of his general,
desired to exert his utmost energy'; B Gall. 2.25.3). This was also
the case with Alexander prior to Issus: after encouraging his officers
in conference (Arr. Anab. 2.7.3-4), he rode along the front of his
phalanx making his presence known and addressing individual soldiers
(Arr. Anab. 2.10.2). What is clear is that the pre-battle exhortation
was a common practice. Where numbers or just the general extent
of the battle line made it difficult for the commander to deliver a
single speech to the entire army, there were a number of options that
he might employ to accomplish the same goal. He could address his
troops in assembly prior to deployment, exhort the respective unit
commanders (who would in turn encourage their units), or speak
himself to each division individually. His appearance alone was meant
to have a heartening effect.
The general content of these exhortations has remained relatively
consistent over time. General George S. Patton, before Operation
Overlord, gave a speech to the Third Army that was remarkably similar
to those given by ancient commanders. He extolled the fighting qualities
of his men, and encouraged them to stand and fight honourably and
with thought for their fellow soldiers.54 Even the advice for proper
elocution is concordant from antiquity to the present day: speak from
the diaphragm, speak slowly, pronounce each syllable clearly. These
are the same, whether the advice is from Cicero or Quintillian,55
Thomas Sheridan, the Irish rhetorician, in 1762,56 or as found in the
current US Army Field Manual's instructions regarding the 'command
voice'.57
The point to be made is that commanders, either directly or
indirectly, typically did address their troops and, depending on the
situation, employed varying strategies to do so. Onasander (Strategikos
4.3, 23.1) recommends that the general encourage his troops in
assemblies and even riding along the line after deployment. While
Hansen is certainly correct that those speeches supposedly given to
large numbers of soldiers spread across half a mile or more are fictional,
a relatively small force could be and probably was addressed in tow.
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318 THE GENERAL'S PRE-BATTLE EXHORTATION
EDWARD ANSON
emanson@ualr. edu
58 Cyrus delivers a speech to his officers only (3.3.34-9). However, Xenophon has Cyrus
explain that he is not addressing the troops directly 'so they may try to please you, for you are
in touch with them, each in his own division' (39).
59 This work is intended more as a character study: 'Believing this man [Cyrus the Great]
to be deserving of all admiration, we have therefore investigated who he was in his origin, what
natural endowments he possessed, and what sort of education he had enjoyed, that he so greatly
excelled in governing men. Accordingly, what we have found out or think we know concerning
him we shall now endeavour to present' (Cyr. 1.1.6). In fact, Xenophon's description of the elder
Cyrus is probably an amalgam of the younger Cyrus and others whom Xenophon admired.
60 Hansen, 'Battle Exhortation' (n. 1), 170.
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