Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-42050-66 November 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH VII,
and PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS, NESTOR BAES, ELIAS L. GARCIA, SIMEON BUNDALIAN, JR., JOSEPH
C. MAISO, EDUARDO A. LIBORDO, ROMEO L. SUGAY, FEDERICO T. DIZON, GEORGE M. ALBINO,
MARIANO COTIA, JR., ARMANDO L. DIZON, ROGELIO B. PARENO, RODRIGO V. ESTRADA, ALFREDO
A. REYES, JOSE A. BACARRA, REYNALDO BOGTONG, and EDGARDO M. MENDOZA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-46229-32 November 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and
REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO, ELPIDIO ARPON, VICTOR EUGENIO Y ROQUE and ALFREDO
VERSOZA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-46313-16 November 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and JUANITO
DE LA CRUZ Y NUNEZ, SABINO BUENO Y CACAL, TIRSO ISAGAN Y FRANCISCO and BEN CASTILLO
Y UBALDO, respondents.

G.R. No. L-46997 November 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Samar, and
PANCHITO REFUNCION, respondents.

Jose L. Gamboa, Fermin Martin, Jr. & Jose D. Cajucom, Office of the City of Fiscal of Manila and the Office of
Provincial Fiscal of Samar for petitioners.
Norberto Parto for respondents Candelosas, Baes and Garcia.
Amado C. de la Marced for respondents Simeon Bundalian Jr., et al.
Manuel F. de Jesus for all the respondents in L-46229-32 and L-46313-16.
Norberto L. Apostol for respondent Panchito Refuncion.
Hon. Amante P. Purisima for and in his own behalf.

MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:

These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by
the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor
General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law.
These Petitions or appeals involve three Courts of First Instance, namely: the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch VII, presided by Hon. Amante P. Purisima (17 Petitions), the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
XVIII, presided by Hon. Maximo A. Maceren (8 Petitions) and, the Court of First Instance of Samar, with Hon.
Wenceslao M. Polo, presiding, (1 Petition).

Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly
weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges
mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before them — the details of which will be recounted below
— an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not
allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one
essential element of the crime.

Thus, are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of "illegal
possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9? This is the central
issue which we shall resolve and dispose of, all other corollary matters not being indispensable for the moment.

A — The Information filed by the People —

1. In L-42050-66, one typical Information filed with the Court presided by Judge Purisima follows:

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN,

accused.

Crim. Case No. 19639

VIOLATION OF PAR. 3, PRES. DECREE No. 9 OF PROCLAMATION 1081

INFORMATION

The undersigned accuses PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN of a violation of paragraph 3,

Presidential Decree No. 9 of Proclamation 1081, committed as follows:

That on or about the 14 th day of December, 1974, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his possession
and under his custody and control one (1) carving knife with a blade of 6-½ inches and a wooden
handle of 5-1/4 inches, or an overall length of 11-¾ inches, which the said accused carried outside
of his residence, the said weapon not being used as a tool or implement necessary to earn his
livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.

Contrary to law. (p. 32, rollo of L-42050-66)

The other Informations are similarly worded except for the name of the accused, the date and place of the
commission of the crime, and the kind of weapon involved.

2. In L-46229-32 and L-46313-16, the Information filed with the Court presided by Judge Maceren follows:

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO, accused.

CRIM. CASE NO. 29677 VIOL. OF PAR. 3,PD 9 IN REL. TO LOI No. 266 of the Chief Executive dated April 1,
1975
 INFORMATION

The undersigned accuses REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO of a VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 3,

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9 in relation to Letter of Instruction No. 266 of the Chief Executive
dated April 1, 1975, committed as follows:

That on or about the 28 th day of January, 1977, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly carry outside of his residence a
bladed and pointed weapon, to wit: an ice pick with an overall length of about 8½ inches, the
same not being used as a necessary tool or implement to earn his livelihood nor being used in
connection therewith.

Contrary to law. (p. 14, rollo of L-46229-32)

The other Informations are likewise similarly worded except for the name of the accused, the date and place of
the commission of the crime, and the kind of weapon involved.

3. In L-46997, the Information before the Court of First Instance of Samar is quoted hereunder:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant, versus PANCHITO REFUNCION, accused.

CRIM. CASE NO. 933 For: ILLEGAL POSSESSION OFDEADLY WEAPON
(VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9)

INFORMATION

The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Samar, accuses PANCHITO REFUNCION of
the crime of ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DEADLY WEAPON or VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9 issued
by the President of the Philippines on Oct. 2, 1972, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated
Sept. 21 and 23, 1972, committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of October, 1976, in the evening at Barangay Barruz, Municipality of
Matuginao, Province of Samar Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorabe Court, the
abovenamed accused, knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously carried with him outside of
his residence a deadly weapon called socyatan, an instrument which from its very nature is no
such as could be used as a necessary tool or instrument to earn a livelihood, which act committed
by the accused is a Violation of Presidential Decree No. 9.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 8, rollo of L-46997)

B. — The Orders of dismissal —

In dismissing or quashing the Informations the trial courts concurred with the submittal of the defense that one
essential element of the offense charged is missing from the Information, viz: that the carrying outside of the
accused's residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with
or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder.

1. Judge Purisima reasoned out, inter alia, in this manner:

... the Court is of the opinion that in order that possession of bladed weapon or the like outside
residence may be prosecuted and tried under P.D. No. 9, the information must specifically allege
that the possession of bladed weapon charged was for the purpose of abetting, or in furtherance
of the conditions of rampant criminality, organized lawlessness, public disorder, etc. as are
contemplated and recited in Proclamation No. 1081, as justification therefor. Devoid of this
specific allegation, not necessarily in the same words, the information is not complete, as it does
 not allege sufficient facts to constitute the offense contemplated in P.D. No. 9. The information in
these cases under consideration suffer from this defect.

xxx xxx xxx

And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to believe the murmurings of
detained persons brought to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D.
No. 9, that more than ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so heartless — now have
in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for extortion, what with the terrifying risk of
being sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair of scissors,
which only God knows where it came from. Whereas before martial law an extortion-minded
peace officer had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that could only convey the
coercive message of one year in jail, now anything that has the semblance of a sharp edge or
pointed object, available even in trash cans, may already serve the same purpose, and yet five to
ten times more incriminating than the infamous paltik.

For sure, P.D. No. 9 was conceived with the best of intentions and wisely applied, its necessity
can never be assailed. But it seems it is back-firing, because it is too hot in the hands of policemen
who are inclined to backsliding.

The checkvalves against abuse of P.D. No. 9 are to be found in the heart of the Fiscal and the
conscience of the Court, and hence this resolution, let alone technical legal basis, is prompted by
the desire of this Court to apply said checkvalves. (pp. 55-57, rollo of L-42050-66)

2. Judge Maceren in turn gave his grounds for dismissing the charges as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

As earlier noted the "desired result" sought to be attained by Proclamation No. 1081 is the
maintenance of law and order throughout the Philippines and the prevention and suppression of
all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion. It is therefore
reasonable to conclude from the foregoing premises that the carrying of bladed, pointed or blunt
weapons outside of one's residence which is made unlawful and punishable by said par. 3 of P.D.
No. 9 is one that abetssubversion, insurrection or rebellion, lawless violence, criminality, chaos
and public disorder or is intended to bring about these conditions. This conclusion is further
strengthened by the fact that all previously existing laws that also made the carrying of similar
weapons punishable have not been repealed, whether expressly or impliedly. It is noteworthy that
Presidential Decree No. 9 does not contain any repealing clause or provisions.

xxx xxx xxx

The mere carrying outside of one's residence of these deadly weapons if not concealed in one's
person and if not carried in any of the aforesaid specified places, would appear to be not unlawful
and punishable by law.

With the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 9, however, the prosecution, through Assistant
Fiscal Hilario H. Laqui, contends in his opposition to the motion to quash, that this act is now
made unlawful and punishable, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, regardless of the intention of
the person carrying such weapon because the law makes it "mala prohibita". If the contention of
the prosecution is correct, then if a person happens to be caught while on his way home by law
enforcement officers carrying a kitchen knife that said person had just bought from a store in order
that the same may be used by one's cook for preparing the meals in one's home, such person
will be liable for punishment with such a severe penalty as imprisonment from five to ten years
under the decree. Such person cannot claim that said knife is going to be used by him to earn a
livelihood because he intended it merely for use by his cook in preparing his meals.
 This possibility cannot be discounted if Presidential Decree No. 9 were to be interpreted and
applied in the manner that that the prosecution wants it to be done. The good intentions of the
President in promulgating this decree may thus be perverted by some unscrupulous law
enforcement officers. It may be used as a tool of oppression and tyranny or of extortion.

xxx xxx xxx

It is therefore the considered and humble view of this Court that the act which the President
intended to make unlawful and punishable by Presidential Decree No. 9, particularly by paragraph
3 thereof, is one that abets or is intended to abet subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless
violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder. (pp. 28-30, rollo of L-46229-32)

3. Judge Polo of the Court of First Instance of Samar expounded his order dismissing the Information filed before
him, thus:

... We believe that to constitute an offense under the aforcited Presidential decree, the same
should be or there should be an allegation that a felony was committed in connection or in
furtherance of subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence and public disorder. Precisely
Proclamation No. 1081 declaring a state of martial law throughout the country was issued
because of wanton destruction to lives and properties widespread lawlessness and anarchy. And
in order to restore the tranquility and stability of the country and to secure the people from violence
anti loss of lives in the quickest possible manner and time, carrying firearms, explosives and
deadly weapons without a permit unless the same would fall under the exception is prohibited.
This conclusion becomes more compelling when we consider the penalty imposable, which is
from five years to ten years. A strict enforcement of the provision of the said law would mean the
imposition of the Draconian penalty upon the accused.

xxx xxx xxx

It is public knowledge that in rural areas, even before and during martial law, as a matter of status
symbol, carrying deadly weapons is very common, not necessarily for committing a crime nor as
their farm implement but for self-preservation or self-defense if necessity would arise specially in
going to and from their farm. (pp. 18-19, rollo of L-46997)

In most if not all of the cases, the orders of dismissal were given before arraignment of the accused. In the
criminal case before the Court of (First Instance of Samar the accused was arraigned but at the same time
moved to quash the Information. In all the cases where the accused were under arrest, the three Judges ordered
their immediate release unless held on other charges.

C. — The law under which the Informations in question were filed by the People.

As seen from the Informations quoted above, the accused are charged with illegal possession of deadly weapon
in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9, Paragraph 3.

We quote in full Presidential Decree No. 9, to wit:

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9

DECLARING VIOLATIONS OF GENERAL ORDERS NO. 6 and NO. 7 DATED SEPTEMBER 22,
1972, AND SEPTEMBER 23, 1972, RESPECTIVELY, TO BE UNLAWFUL AND PROVIDING
PENALTIES THEREFORE.

WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, the Philippines has
been placed under a state of martial law;
WHEREAS, by virtue of said Proclamation No. 1081, General Order No. 6 dated September 22,
1972 and General Order No. 7 dated September 23, 1972, have been promulgated by me;

WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public
disorder mentioned in the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 are committed and abetted by the use
of firearms, explosives and other deadly weapons;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces

of the Philippines, in older to attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and
General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:

1. Any violation of the aforesaid General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 is unlawful and the violator shall,
upon conviction suffer:

(a) The mandatory penalty of death by a firing squad or electrocution as a Military,

Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct, it the firearm involved in the violation is unlicensed and is
attended by assault upon, or resistance to persons in authority or their agents in the performance
of their official functions resulting in death to said persons in authority or their agent; or if such
unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of crimes against persons, property or chastity
causing the death of the victim used in violation of any other General Orders and/or Letters of
Instructions promulgated under said Proclamation No. 1081:

(b) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twenty years to life imprisonment as a Military
Court/Tribunal/commission may direct, when the violation is not attended by any of the
circumstances enumerated under the preceding paragraph;

(c) The penalty provided for in the preceding paragraphs shall be imposed upon the owner,
president, manager, members of the board of directors or other responsible officers of any public
or private firms, companies, corporations or entities who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of
the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity concerned to be used in violation
of said General Orders Nos. 6 and 7.

2. It is unlawful to posses deadly weapons, including hand grenades, rifle grenades and other
explosives, including, but not limited to, "pill box bombs," "molotov cocktail bombs," "fire bombs,"
or other incendiary device consisting of any chemical, chemical compound, or detonating agents
containing combustible units or other ingredients in such proportion, quantity, packing, or bottling
that ignites by fire, by friction, by concussion, by percussion, or by detonation of all or part of the
compound or mixture which may cause such a sudden generation of highly heated gases that the
resultant gaseous pressures are capable of producing destructive effects on continguous objects
or of causing injury or death of a person; and any person convicted thereof shall be punished by
imprisonment ranging from ten to fifteen years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may
direct.

3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon such as "fan
knife," "spear," "dagger," "bolo," "balisong," "barong," "kris," or club, except where such articles
are being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood and while being used in
connection therewith; and any person found guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from five to ten years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.

4. When the violation penalized in the preceding paragraphs 2 and 3 is committed during the
commission of or for the purpose of committing, any other crime, the penalty shall be imposed
upon the offender in its maximum extent, in addition to the penalty provided for the particular
offenses committed or intended to be committed.
 Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of October in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
seventy-two.

(SGD) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

President
Republic of the Philippines
D. — The arguments of the People —

In the Comment filed in these cases by the Solicitor General who as stated earlier joins the City Fiscal of Manila
and the Provincial Fiscal of Samar in seeking the setting aside of the questioned orders of dismissal, the main
argument advanced on the issue now under consideration is that a perusal of paragraph 3 of P.D. 9 'shows that
the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities; that the act proscribed is essentially a malum
prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy.1

The City Fiscal of Manila in his brief adds further that in statutory offenses the intention of the accused who
commits the act is immaterial; that it is enough if the prohibited act is voluntarily perpetuated; that P.D. 9 provides
and condemns not only the carrying of said weapon in connection with the commission of the crime of subversion
or the like, but also that of criminality in general, that is, to eradicate lawless violence which characterized pre -
martial law days. It is also argued that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption
or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated
but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.2

E. — Our Ruling on the matter —

1. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. 3

Pursuant to the above, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly requires that for a complaint or
information to be sufficient it must, inter alia state the designation of the offense by the statute, and the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to
afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. 4

To comply with these fundamental requirements of the Constitution and the Rules on Criminal Procedure, it is
imperative for the specific statute violated to be designated or mentioned 4 in the charge. In fact, another
compelling reason exists why a specification of the statute violated is essential in these cases. As stated in the
order of respondent Judge Maceren the carrying of so-called "deadly weapons" is the subject of another penal
statute and a Manila city ordinance. Thus, Section 26 of Act No. 1780 provides:

Section 26. It should be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any bowie
knife, dirk dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: ... Any person violating the provisions of this
section shall, upon conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction, be punished by a fine not
exceeding five hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months, or both
such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.

Ordinance No. 3820 of the City of Manila as amended by Ordinance No. 3928 which took effect on December
4, 1957, in turn penalizes with a fine of not more than P200.00 or imprisonment for not more than one months,
or both, at the discretion of the court, anyone who shall carry concealed in his person in any manner that would
disguise its deadly character any kind of firearm, bowie knife, or other deadly weapon ... in any public
place. Consequently, it is necessary that the particular law violated be specified as there exists a substantial
difference between the statute and city ordinance on the one hand and P.D. 9 (3) on the other regarding the
circumstances of the commission of the crime and the penalty imposed for the offense.
We do not agree with petitioner that the above-mentioned statute and the city ordinance are deemed repealed
by P.D. 9 (3). 5 P. D. 9(3) does not contain any repealing clause or provision, and repeal by implication is not
favored. 6This principle holds true with greater force with regards to penal statutes which as a rule are to be
construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the accused. 7 In fact, Article 7 of the New Civil Code
provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and their violation or non- observance shall not be
excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

Thus we are faced with the situation where a particular act may be made to fall, at the discretion of a police
officer or a prosecuting fiscal, under the statute, or the city ordinance, or the presidential decree. That being the
case, the right becomes more compelling for an accused to be confronted with the facts constituting the essential
elements of the offense charged against him, if he is not to become an easy pawn of oppression and harassment,
or of negligent or misguided official action — a fear understandably shared by respondent Judges who by the
nature of their judicial functions are daily exposed to such dangers.

2. In all the Informations filed by petitioner the accused are charged in the caption as well as in the body of the
Information with a violation of paragraph 3, P.D. 9. What then are the elements of the offense treated in the
presidential decree in question?

We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or
pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of
carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion,
insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.

It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon, if concealed, outside of the scope
of the statute or the city ordinance mentioned above. In other words, a simple act of carrying any of the weapons
described in the presidential decree is not a criminal offense in itself. What makes the act criminal or punishable
under the decree is the motivation behind it. Without that motivation, the act falls within the purview of the city
ordinance or some statute when the circumstances so warrant.

Respondent Judges correctly ruled that this can be the only reasonably, logical, and valid construction given to
P.D. 9(3).

3. The position taken by petitioner that P.D. 9(3) covers one and all situations where a person carries outside
his residence any of the weapons mentioned or described in the decree irrespective of motivation, intent, or
purpose, converts these cases into one of "statutory construction." That there is ambiguity in the presidential
decree is manifest from the conflicting views which arise from its implementation. When ambiguity exists, it
becomes a judicial task to construe and interpret the true meaning and scope of the measure, guided by the
basic principle that penal statutes are to be construed and applied liberally in favor of the accused and strictly
against the state.

4. In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure — a presidential decree in these cases — the
primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling
factor, for in the words of this Court in Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, per Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, whatever is within
the spirit of a statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in
absurdity, injustice and contradictions. 8

There are certain aids available to Us to ascertain the intent or reason for P.D. 9(3).

First, the presence of events which led to or precipitated the enactment of P.D. 9. These events are clearly
spelled out in the "Whereas" clauses of the presidential decree, thus: (1) the state of martial law in the country
pursuant to Proclamation 1081 dated September 21, 1972; (2) the desired result of Proclamation 1081 as well
as General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are particularly mentioned in P.D. 9; and (3) the alleged fact that
subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, aid public disorder mentioned in
Proclamation 1081 are committed and abetted by the use of firearms and explosives and other deadly weapons.
The Solicitor General however contends that a preamble of a statute usually introduced by the word
"whereas", is not an essential part of an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers, or cure inherent defects in the
statute (p. 120, rollo of L-42050-66); that the explanatory note or enacting clause of the decree, if it indeed limits
the violation of the decree, cannot prevail over the text itself inasmuch as such explanatory note merely states
or explains the reason which prompted the issuance of the decree. (pp. 114-115, rollo of 46997)

We disagree with these contentions. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of
P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among
others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation
of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.

A "preamble" is the key of the statute, to open the minds of the makers as to the mischiefs which
are to be remedied, and objects which are to be accomplished, by the provisions of the statute."
(West Norman Timber v. State, 224 P. 2d 635, 639, cited in Words and Phrases, "Preamble";
emphasis supplied)

While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part thereof, it may, when the statute is in itself
ambiguous and difficult of interpretation, be resorted to, but not to create a doubt or uncertainty
which otherwise does not exist." (James v. Du Bois, 16 N.J.L. (1 Har.) 285, 294, cited in Words
and Phrases, "Preamble")

In Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, et al. v. The City of Cebu, et al. this Court had occasion to state that '(L)egislative
intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not of an isolated part or a
particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory construction. For taken in the abstract, a word or
phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident when the word
or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated. Thus, an apparently general provision may have
a limited application if read together with other provisions. 9

Second, the result or effects of the presidential decree must be within its reason or intent.

In the paragraph immediately following the last "Whereas" clause, the presidential decree states:

NOW, THEREFORE, I , FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of an the Armed Forces

of the Philippines, in order to attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and
General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:

xxx xxx xxx

From the above it is clear that the acts penalized in P.D. 9 are those related to the desired result
of Proclamation 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7. General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 refer to
firearms and therefore have no relevance to P.D. 9(3) which refers to blunt or bladed weapons.
With respect to Proclamation 1081 some of the underlying reasons for its issuance are quoted
hereunder:

WHEREAS, these lawless elements having taken up arms against our duly constituted
government and against our people, and having committed and are still committing acts of armed
insurrection and rebellion consisting of armed raids, forays, sorties, ambushes, wanton acts of
murders, spoilage, plunder, looting, arsons, destruction of public and private buildings, and
attacks against innocent and defenseless civilian lives and property, all of which activities have
seriously endangered and continue to endanger public order and safety and the security of the
nation, ...

xxx xxx xxx

 WHEREAS, it is evident that there is throughout the land a state of anarchy and lawlessness,
chaos and disorder, turmoil and destruction of a magnitude equivalent to an actual war between
the forces of our duly constituted government and the New People's Army and their satellite
organizations because of the unmitigated forays, raids, ambuscades, assaults, violence, murders,
assassinations, acts of terror, deceits, coercions, threats, intimidations, treachery, machinations,
arsons, plunders and depredations committed and being committed by the aforesaid lawless
elements who have pledged to the whole nation that they will not stop their dastardly effort and
scheme until and unless they have fully attained their primary and ultimate purpose of forcibly
seizing political and state power in this country by overthrowing our present duly constituted
government, ... (See Book I, Vital Documents on the Declaration of Martial Law in the Philippines
by the Supreme Court of the Philippines, pp. 13-39)

It follows that it is only that act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon with a motivation connected with or related
to the afore-quoted desired result of Proclamation 1081 that is within the intent of P.D. 9(3), and nothing else.

Statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be
remedied. (U.S. v. American Tracking Association, 310 U.S. 534, cited in LVN Pictures v.
Philippine Musicians Guild, 110 Phil. 725, 731; emphasis supplied)

When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind, and the statute
should be construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose. (Statutory Construction by
E.T. Crawford, pp. 604-605, cited in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipinas Compania de
Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055, 1060; emphasis supplied)

5. In the construction of P.D. 9(3) it becomes relevant to inquire into the consequences of the measure if a strict
adherence to the letter of the paragraph is followed.

It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable
consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly
susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious
consequences.9-a

It is to be presumed that when P.D. 9 was promulgated by the President of the Republic there was no intent to
work a hardship or an oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act of oppression, arming one person
with a weapon to impose hardship on another, and so on.10

At this instance We quote from the order of Judge Purisima the following:

And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to believe the murmurings of
detained persons brought to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D.
No. 9, that more than ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so heartless — now have
in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for extortion, what with the terrifying risk of
being sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair of scissors,
which only God knows where it came from. Whereas before martial law an extortion-minded
peace officer had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that could only convey the
coercive message of one year in jail, now anything that has the semblance of a sharp edge or
pointed object, available even in trash cans, may already serve the same purpose, and yet five to
ten times more incriminating than the infamous paltik. (pp. 72-73, rollo L-42050-66)

And as respondent Judge Maceren points out, the people's interpretation of P.D. 9(3) results in absurdity at
times. To his example We may add a situation where a law-abiding citizen, a lawyer by profession, after
gardening in his house remembers to return the bolo used by him to his neighbor who lives about 30 meters or
so away and while crossing the street meets a policeman. The latter upon seeing the bolo being carried by that
citizen places him under arrest and books him for a violation of P.D. 9(3). Could the presidential decree have
been conceived to produce such absurd, unreasonable, and insensible results?
6. Penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of an accused.

American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be "the tenderness of the law of the rights of
individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the
discretion of the court limited." 11 The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a
technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts. 12

Our own decisions have set down the same guidelines in this manner, viz:

Criminal statutes are to be construed strictly. No person should be brought within their terms who
is not clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not made clearly
so by the statute. (U.S. v. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243, 246)
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws, instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be
considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. (People v. Manantan, 5 SCRA
684, 692)

F. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective.

The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged in the Information in order that the latter
may constitute a sufficiently valid charged. The sufficiency of an Information is determined solely by the facts
alleged therein.13 Where the facts are incomplete and do not convey the elements of the crime, the quashing of
the accusation is in order.

Section 2(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the defendant may move to quash the complaint or
information when the facts charged do not constitute an offense.

In U.S.U. Gacutan, 1914, it was held that where an accused is charged with knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code, failure to allege in the Information that the judgment was
rendered knowing it to be unjust, is fatal. 14

In People v. Yadao, 1954, this Court through then Justice Cesar Bengzon who later became Chief Justice of the
Court affirmed an order of the trial court which quashed an Information wherein the facts recited did not constitute
a public offense as defined in Section 1, Republic Act 145. 15

G. The filing of these Petitions was unnecessary because the People could have availed itself of other available
remedies below.

Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court follow:

Rule 117, Section 7. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. — If the motion to quash is
sustained the court may order that another information be filed. If such order is made the
defendant, if in custody, shall remain so unless he shall be admitted to bail. If such order is not
made or if having been made another information is not filed withuntime to be specified in the
order, or within such further time as the court may allow for good cause shown, the defendant, if
in custody, shall be discharged therefrom, unless he is in custody on some other charge.

Rule 110, Section 13. Amendment. — The information or complaint may be amended, in
substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the defendant pleads; and thereafter
and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the
same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.

xxx xxx xxx

Two courses of action were open to Petitioner upon the quashing of the Informations in these cases, viz:
First, if the evidence on hand so warranted, the People could have filed an amended Information to include the
second element of the offense as defined in the disputed orders of respondent Judges. We have ruled that if the
facts alleged in the Information do not constitute a punishable offense, the case should not be dismissed but the
prosecution should be given an opportunity to amend the Information.16

Second, if the facts so justified, the People could have filed a complaint either under Section 26 of Act No. 1780,
quoted earlier, or Manila City Ordinance No. 3820, as amended by Ordinance No. 3928, especially since in most
if not all of the cases, the dismissal was made prior to arraignment of the accused and on a motion to quash.

Section 8. Rule 117 states that:

An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense
unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in section 2, subsections (f) and (h) of this
rule.

Under the foregoing, the filing of another complaint or Information is barred only when the criminal action or
liability had been extinguished (Section 2[f]) or when the motion to quash was granted for reasons of double
jeopardy. (ibid., [h])

As to whether or not a plea of double jeopardy may be successfully invoked by the accused in all these cases
should new complaints be filed against them, is a matter We need not resolve for the present.

H. — We conclude with high expectations that police authorities and the prosecuting arm of the government true
to the oath of office they have taken will exercise utmost circumspection and good faith in evaluating the particular
circumstances of a case so as to reach a fair and just conclusion if a situation falls within the purview of P.D.
9(3) and the prosecution under said decree is warranted and justified. This obligation becomes a sacred duty in
the face of the severe penalty imposed for the offense.

On this point, We commend the Chief State Prosecutor Rodolfo A. Nocon on his letter to the City Fiscal of Manila
on October 15, 1975, written for the Secretary, now Minister of Justice, where he stated the following:

In any case, please study well each and every case of this nature so that persons accused of
carrying bladed weapons, specially those whose purpose is not to subvert the duly constituted
authorities, may not be unduly indicted for the serious offenses falling under P.D. No. 9. 17

Yes, while it is not within the power of courts of justice to inquire into the wisdom of a law, it is however a judicial
task and prerogative to determine if official action is within the spirit and letter of the law and if basic fundamental
rights of an individual guaranteed by the Constitution are not violated in the process of its implementation. We
have to face the fact that it is an unwise and unjust application of a law, necessary and justified under prevailing
circumstances, which renders the measure an instrument of oppression and evil and leads the citizenry to lose
their faith in their government.

WHEREFORE, We DENY these 26 Petitions for Review and We AFFIRM the Orders of respondent Judges
dismissing or quashing the Information concerned, subject however to Our observations made in the preceding
pages 23 to 25 of this Decision regarding the right of the State or Petitioner herein to file either an amended
Information under Presidential Decree No. 9, paragraph 3, or a new one under other existing statute or city
ordinance as the facts may warrant.

Without costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5691 December 27, 1910

S. D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE MARTINEZ, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK, defendant-appellant.

Lionel D. Hargis for appellant.

Sanz and Oppisso for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:

The facts found by the trial court are undisputed by either party in this case. They are —

That on the 11th day of September, 1908, the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in a
carromata on Calle Real, district of Ermita, city of Manila, P.I., along the left-hand side of the street as
she was going, when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant used for the purpose of transportation
of fodder by the defendant, and to which was attached a pair of horses, came along the street in the
opposite direction to that the in which said plaintiff was proceeding, and that thereupon the driver of the
said plaintiff's carromata, observing that the delivery wagon of the defendant was coming at great speed,
crowded close to the sidewalk on the left-hand side of the street and stopped, in order to give defendant's
delivery wagon an opportunity to pass by, but that instead of passing by the defendant's wagon and
horses ran into the carromata occupied by said plaintiff with her child and overturned it, severely
wounding said plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her head, and also injuring the carromata itself and
the harness upon the horse which was drawing it.

xxx xxx xxx

These facts are not dispute, but the defendant presented evidence to the effect that the cochero, who
was driving his delivery wagon at the time the accident occurred, was a good servant and was considered
a safe and reliable cochero; that the delivery wagon had sent to deliver some forage at Paco Livery Stable
on Calle Herran, and that for the purpose of delivery thereof the cochero driving the team as defendant's
employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and then went back
inside of the wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered; that while unloading the
forage and in the act of carrying some of it out, another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a
whip and made some other noises, which frightened the horses attached to the delivery wagon and they
ran away, and the driver was thrown from the inside of the wagon out through the rear upon the ground
and was unable to stop the horses; that the horses then ran up and on which street they came into
collision with the carromata in which the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding.

The defendant himself was not with the vehicle on the day in question.

Upon these facts the court below found the defendant guilty of negligence and gave judgment against him for
P442.50, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the 17th day of October, 1908, and for
the costs of the action. The case is before us on an appeal from that judgment.
There is no general law of negligence in the Philippine Islands except that embodied in the Civil Code. The
provisions of that code pertinent to this case are —

Art. 1902. A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or
negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.

Art. 1903. The obligation imposed by preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.

The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the minors
who live with them.

Guardians are liable for the damages caused by minors or incapacitated persons who are under their
authority and live with them.

Owners of directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages caused by the
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their
duties.

The State is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damages should
have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the
provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.

Finally, masters or directors of arts and trades are liable for the damages caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody.

The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they
employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage.

Passing the question whether or not an employer who has furnished a gentle and tractable team and a trusty
and capable driver is, under the last paragraph of the above provisions, liable for the negligence of such driver
in handling the team, we are of the opinion that the judgment must be reversed upon the ground that the evidence
does not disclose that the cochero was negligent.

While the law relating to negligence in this jurisdiction may possibly be some what different from that in Anglo-
Saxon countries, a question we do not now discuss, the rules under which the fact of negligence is determined
are, nevertheless, generally the same. That is to say, while the law designating the person responsible for a
negligent act may not be the same here as in many jurisdictions, the law determining what is a negligent act is
the same here, generally speaking, as elsewhere. (Supreme court of Spain, 4 December, 1903; 16 May, 1893;
27 June, 1894; 9 April, 1896; 14 March, 1901; 2 March, 1904; 7 February, 1905; 16 June, 1905; 23 June, 1905;
13 April, 1903; 7 March, 1902; 12 June, 1900; 2 March, 1907; 18 March, 1898; 3 June, 1901.)

It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the damage were gentle and tractable;
that the cochero was experienced and capable; that he had driven one of the horses several years and the other
five or six months; that he had been in the habit, during all that time, of leaving them in the condition in which
they were left on the day of the accident; that they had never run away up to that time and there had been,
therefore, no accident due to such practice; that to leave the horses and assist in unloading the merchandise in
the manner described on the day of the accident was the custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise of
the character of that which was being delivered by the cochero of the defendant on the day in question, which
custom was sanctioned by their employers.

In our judgment, the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner described
by the evidence in this case, either under Spanish or American jurisprudence. (Lynch vs. Nurdin, 1 Q. B., 422;
Rumsey vs. Nelson, 58 Vt., 590; Drake vs. Mount, 33 N. J. L., 442; Hoboken Land and Improvement
Co. vs. Lally, 48 N. J. L., 604; Wasmer vs. D. L. & W. R. R. Co., 80 N. Y., 212.) lawphi1.net
In the case of Hayman vs. Hewitt (Peake N. P. Cas., pt. 2, p. 170), Lord Kenyon said:

He was performing his duty while removing the goods into the house, and, if every person who suffered
a cart to remain in the street while he took goods out of it was obliged to employ another to look after the
horses, it would be impossible for the business of the metropolis to go on.

In the case of Griggs vs. Fleckenstein (14 Minn., 81), the court said:

The degree of care required of the plaintiff, or those in charged of his horse, at the time of the injury, is
that which would be exercised by a person of ordinary care and prudence under like circumstances. It
can not be said that the fact of leaving the horse unhitched is in itself negligence. Whether it is negligence
to leave a horse unhitched must be depend upon the disposition of the horse; whether he was under the
observation and control of some person all the time, and many other circumstances; and is a question to
be determined by the jury from the facts of each case.

In the case of Belles vs. Kellner (67 N. J. L., 255), it was held that it was error on the part of the trial court to
refuse to charge that "it is not negligence for the driver of a quite, gentle horse to leave him unhitched and
otherwise unattended on the side of a public highways while the driver is upon the sidewalk loading goods on
the wagon." The said court closed its opinion with these words:

There was evidence which could have fully justified the jury in finding that the horse was quite and gentle,
and that the driver was upon the sidewalk loading goods on the wagon, at time of the alleged injury, and
that the horse had been used for years in that way without accident. The refusal of the trial court to charge
as requested left the jury free to find was verdict against the defendant, although the jury was convinced
that these facts were proven.lawphil.net

In the case of Southworth vs. Ry. Co. (105 Mass., 342), it was held:

That evidence that a servant, whom traders employed to deliver goods, upon stopping with his horse and
wagon to deliver a parcel at a house from fifty to a hundred rods from a railroad crossing, left the horse
unfastened for four or five minutes while he was in the house, knowing that it was not afraid of cars, and
having used it for three or four months without ever hitching it or knowing it to start, is not conclusive, as
a matter of law, of a want of due care on his part.

The duty, a violation of which is claimed to be negligence in the respect in question, is to exercise reasonable
care and prudence. Where reasonable care is employed in doing an act not itself illegal or inherently likely to
produce damage to others, there will be no liability, although damage in fact ensues. (Milwaukee Ry.
Co. vs. Arms, 91 U. S., 489; Parrott vs. Wells, 15 Wall., 524; Brown vs. Kendall, 6 Cushing, 292; Jackson
Architectural Iron Works vs.Hurlbut, 158 N. Y., 34 Westerfield vs. Levis, 43 La. An., 63; Niosi vs. Empire Steam
Laundry, 117 Cal., 257.)

The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was not unreasonable or imprudent.
Acts the performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have, therefore, been
acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they have ripened into custom, can not be held to be themselves
unreasonable or imprudent. Indeed the very reason why they have been permitted by society is that they
beneficial rather than prejudicial.itc-alf Accidents sometimes happen and injuries result from the most ordinary
acts of life. But such are not their natural or customary results. To hold that, because such an act once resulted
in accident or injury, the actor is necessarily negligent, is to go far. The fact that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
sometimes successfully invoked in such a case, does not in any sense militate against the reasoning presented.
That maxim at most only creates aprima facie case, and that only in the absence of proof of the circumstances
under which the act complained of was performed. It is something invoked in favor of the plaintiff before
defendant's case showing the conditions and circumstances under which the injury occurred, the creative reason
for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur disappears. This is demonstrated by the case of Inland and Seaboard Costing
Co. vs. Tolson (139 U.S., 551), where the court said (p. 554):
 . . . The whole effect of the instruction in question, as applied to the case before the jury, was that if the
steamboat, on a calm day and in smooth water, was thrown with such force against a wharf properly built,
as to tear up some of the planks of the flooring, this would be prima facie evidence of negligence on the
part of the defendant's agent in making the landing, unless upon the whole evidence in the case this prima
facie evidence was rebutted. As such damage to a wharf is not ordinarily done by a steamboat under
control of her officers and carefully managed by them, evidence that such damage was done in this case
was prima facie, and, if unexplained, sufficient evidence of negligence on their part, and the jury might
properly be so instructed.

There was presented in this case, and by the plaintiffs themselves, not only the fact of the runway and the
accident resulting therefrom, but also the conditions under which the runaway occurred. Those conditions
showing of themselves that the defendant's cochero was not negligent in the management of the horse, the prima
facie case in plaintiffs' favor, if any, was destroyed as soon as made.

It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice of merchants to deliver
merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the manner in which that was then
being delivered; and that it is the universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left at
the time of the accident. This is the custom in all cities. It has not been productive of accidents or injuries. The
public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for years without objection. Ought the public
now, through the courts, without prior objection or notice, to be permitted to reverse the practice of decades and
thereby make culpable and guilty one who had every reason and assurance to believe that he was acting under
the sanction of the strongest of all civil forces, the custom of a people? We think not.

The judgement is reversed, without special finding as to costs. So ordered.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988

YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN YEN, petitioners,
vs.
AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE, RODOLFO SY, and HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents.

Montesa, Albon, & Associates for petitioners.

De Lapa, Salonga, Fulgencio & De Lunas for respondents.

CORTES, J.:

Sy Kiat, a Chinese national. died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was then residing, leaving
behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth P300,000.00 more or less.

Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition for the grant of
letters of administration docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. C-699 of the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal Branch XXXIII, Caloocan City. In said petition they alleged among others that (a) they are the children of
the deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge Sy Mat died intestate; (c) they do not recognize Sy
Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him; and, (d) they nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for
appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased [Record on Appeal, pp. 4-9; Rollo, p. 107.]

The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen who alleged that: (a) Yao
Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on January 19, 1931 in China; (b) the other oppositors are the
legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee; and, (c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is
competent, willing and desirous to become the administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat [Record on Appeal, pp. 12-
13; Rollo, p. 107.] After hearing, the probate court, finding among others that:

(1) Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee [CFI decision, pp. 12-27; Rollo, pp. 49-64;]

(2) Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chun Yen are the legitimate children of Yao Kee with
Sy Mat [CFI decision, pp. 28-31; Rollo. pp. 65-68;] and,

(3) Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy are the acknowledged
illegitimate offsprings of Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego [CFI decision, pp. 27-28; Rollo, pp. 64- 65.]

held if favor of the oppositors (petitioners herein) and appointed Sze Sook Wah as the administratrix of the
intestate estate of the deceased [CFI decision, pp. 68-69; Rollo, pp. 105-106.]

On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying that of the probate court, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower Court is hereby MODIFIED and SET
ASIDE and a new judgment rendered as follows:
 (1) Declaring petitioners Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy- Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy
acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego, an unmarried
woman with whom he lived as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for many years:

(2) Declaring oppositors Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chun Yen, the acknowledged
natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with his Chinese wife Yao Kee, also known as Yui Yip,
since the legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Mat to Yao Kee in China had not been proven to
be valid to the laws of the Chinese People's Republic of China (sic);

(3) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Sy Kiat on December 7, 1976 in favor of Tomas Sy
(Exhibit "G-1", English translation of Exhibit "G") of the Avenue Tractor and Diesel Parts Supply
to be valid and accordingly, said property should be excluded from the estate of the deceased Sy
Kiat; and

(4) Affirming the appointment by the lower court of Sze Sook Wah as judicial administratrix of the
estate of the deceased. [CA decision, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 36- 37.]

From said decision both parties moved for partial reconsideration, which was however denied by respondent
court. They thus interposed their respective appeals to this Court.

Private respondents filed a petition with this Court docketed as G.R. No. 56045 entitled "Aida Sy-Gonzales,
Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy v. Court of Appeals, Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho
and Sy Chun Yen" questioning paragraphs (3) and (4) of the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision.
The Supreme Court however resolved to deny the petition and the motion for reconsideration. Thus on March 8,
1982 entry of judgment was made in G.R. No. 56045. **

The instant petition, on the other hand, questions paragraphs (1) and (2) of the dispositive portion of the decision
of the Court of Appeals. This petition was initially denied by the Supreme Court on June 22, 1981. Upon motion
of the petitioners the Court in a resolution dated September 16, 1981 reconsidered the denial and decided to
give due course to this petition. Herein petitioners assign the following as errors:

I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE

OF SY KIAT TO YAO YEE AS NOT HAVE (sic) BEEN PROVEN VALID IN ACCORDANCE WITH
LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING AIDA SY-

GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE AND RODOLFO SY AS NATURAL
CHILDREN OF SY KIAT WITH ASUNCION GILLEGO. [Petition, p. 2; Rollo, p. 6.]

I. Petitioners argue that the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese law and custom was
conclusively proven. To buttress this argument they rely on the following testimonial and documentary evidence.

First, the testimony of Yao Kee summarized by the trial court as follows:

Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on January 19, 1931 in Fookien, China; that
she does not have a marriage certificate because the practice during that time was for elders to
agree upon the betrothal of their children, and in her case, her elder brother was the one who
contracted or entered into [an] agreement with the parents of her husband; that the agreement
was that she and Sy Mat would be married, the wedding date was set, and invitations were sent
out; that the said agreement was complied with; that she has five children with Sy Kiat, but two of
them died; that those who are alive are Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Sze Chun Yen, the
eldest being Sze Sook Wah who is already 38 years old; that Sze Sook Wah was born on
November 7, 1939; that she and her husband, Sy Mat, have been living in FooKien, China before
he went to the Philippines on several occasions; that the practice during the time of her marriage
was a written document [is exchanged] just between the parents of the bride and the parents of
 the groom, or any elder for that matter; that in China, the custom is that there is a go- between, a
sort of marriage broker who is known to both parties who would talk to the parents of the bride-
to-be; that if the parents of the bride-to-be agree to have the groom-to-be their son in-law, then
they agree on a date as an engagement day; that on engagement day, the parents of the groom
would bring some pieces of jewelry to the parents of the bride-to-be, and then one month after
that, a date would be set for the wedding, which in her case, the wedding date to Sy Kiat was set
on January 19, 1931; that during the wedding the bridegroom brings with him a couch (sic) where
the bride would ride and on that same day, the parents of the bride would give the dowry for her
daughter and then the document would be signed by the parties but there is no solemnizing officer
as is known in the Philippines; that during the wedding day, the document is signed only by the
parents of the bridegroom as well as by the parents of the bride; that the parties themselves do
not sign the document; that the bride would then be placed in a carriage where she would be
brought to the town of the bridegroom and before departure the bride would be covered with a
sort of a veil; that upon reaching the town of the bridegroom, the bridegroom takes away the veil;
that during her wedding to Sy Kiat (according to said Chinese custom), there were many persons
present; that after Sy Kiat opened the door of the carriage, two old ladies helped her go down the
carriage and brought her inside the house of Sy Mat; that during her wedding, Sy Chick, the eldest
brother of Sy Kiat, signed the document with her mother; that as to the whereabouts of that
document, she and Sy Mat were married for 46 years already and the document was left in China
and she doubt if that document can still be found now; that it was left in the possession of Sy
Kiat's family; that right now, she does not know the whereabouts of that document because of the
lapse of many years and because they left it in a certain place and it was already eaten by the
termites; that after her wedding with Sy Kiat, they lived immediately together as husband and wife,
and from then on, they lived together; that Sy Kiat went to the Philippines sometime in March or
April in the same year they were married; that she went to the Philippines in 1970, and then came
back to China; that again she went back to the Philippines and lived with Sy Mat as husband and
wife; that she begot her children with Sy Kiat during the several trips by Sy Kiat made back to
China. [CFI decision, pp. 13-15; Rollo, pp. 50-52.]

Second, the testimony of Gan Ching, a younger brother of Yao Kee who stated that he was among the many
people who attended the wedding of his sister with Sy Kiat and that no marriage certificate is issued by the
Chinese government, a document signed by the parents or elders of the parties being sufficient [CFI decision,
pp. 15-16; Rollo, pp.
52-53.]

Third, the statements made by Asuncion Gillego when she testified before the trial court to the effect that (a) Sy
Mat was married to Yao Kee according to Chinese custom; and, (b) Sy Kiat's admission to her that he has a
Chinese wife whom he married according to Chinese custom [CFI decision, p. 17; Rollo, p. 54.]

Fourth, Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien issued in Caloocan City on October 3, 1972 where the following
entries are found: "Marital status—Married"; "If married give name of spouses—Yao Kee"; "Address-China; "Date
of marriage—1931"; and "Place of marriage—China" [Exhibit "SS-1".]

Fifth, Sy Kiat's Alien Certificate of Registration issued in Manila on January 12, 1968 where the following entries
are likewise found: "Civil status—Married"; and, 'If married, state name and address of spouse—Yao Kee
Chingkang, China" [Exhibit "4".]

And lastly, the certification issued in Manila on October 28, 1977 by the Embassy of the People's Republic of
China to the effect that "according to the information available at the Embassy Mr. Sy Kiat a Chinese national
and Mrs. Yao Kee alias Yui Yip also Chinese were married on January 19, 1931 in Fukien, the People's Republic
of China" [Exhibit "5".]

These evidence may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat. However, the same do
not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage in accordance with Chinese law or custom.
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social
rule, legally binding and obligatory" [In the Matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name
"Ozaeta, Romulo, de Leon, Mabanta and Reyes", July 30, 1979, SCRA 3, 12 citing JBL Reyes & RC Puno,
Outline of Phil. Civil Law, Fourth Ed., Vol. 1, p. 7.] The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact,
according to the rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.] On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a
local custom as a source of right can not be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly
established by competent evidence like any other fact" [Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).] The same
evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom.

The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code which states that:

Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were performed and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except bigamous, Polygamous, or incestuous marriages, as determined by Philippine law.
(Emphasis supplied.) ***

Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be
proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage
by convincing evidence [Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922).]

In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. With respect to an unwritten foreign law,
Rule 130 section 45 states that:

SEC. 45. Unwritten law.—The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled therein, is admissible as
evidence of the unwritten law of a foreign country, as are also printed and published books of
reports of decisions of the courts of the foreign country, if proved to be commonly admitted in
such courts.

Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132 section 25, thus:

SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.—An official record or an entry therein, when admissible
for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is
not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which
the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
authenticated by the seal of his office.

The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence like the testimony of a witness to prove the
existence of a written foreign law [Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher 110 Phil. 686, 700-701 (1961) citing
Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471 (1935).]

In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on
marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom on
marriage not only because they are
self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject
matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in
accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this
jurisdiction.

Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they are not duty bound to prove the Chinese
law on marriage as judicial notice thereof had been taken by this Court in the case of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia [16
Phil. 137 (1910).]
This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot
take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as any other fact [Yam Ka Lim v. Collector
of Customs, 30 Phil. 46, 48 (1915); Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 (1930).]

Moreover a reading of said case would show that the party alleging the foreign marriage presented a witness,
one Li Ung Bieng, to prove that matrimonial letters mutually exchanged by the contracting parties constitute the
essential requisite for a marriage to be considered duly solemnized in China. Based on his testimony, which as
found by the Court is uniformly corroborated by authors on the subject of Chinese marriage, what was left to be
decided was the issue of whether or not the fact of marriage in accordance with Chinese law was duly proven
[Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia, supra., at p. 160.]

Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Court has indeed taken judicial notice of the law of
China on marriage in the aforecited case, petitioners however have not shown any proof that the Chinese law or
custom obtaining at the time the Sy Joc Lieng marriage was celebrated in 1847 was still the law when the alleged
marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee took place in 1931 or eighty-four (84) years later.

Petitioners moreover cite the case of U.S. v. Memoracion [34 Phil. 633 (1916)] as being applicable to the instant
case. They aver that the judicial pronouncement in the Memoracion case, that the testimony of one of the
contracting parties is competent evidence to show the fact of marriage, holds true in this case.

The Memoracion case however is not applicable to the case at bar as said case did not concern a foreign
marriage and the issue posed was whether or not the oral testimony of a spouse is competent evidence to prove
the fact of marriage in a complaint for adultery.

Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same
as ours *** [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21076, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 552, 555.] Since Yao Kee
admitted in her testimony that there was no solemnizing officer as is known here in the Philippines [See Article
56, Civil Code] when her alleged marriage to Sy Mat was celebrated [CFI decision, p. 14; Rollo, p. 51], it therefore
follows that her marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction [Wong Woo Yiu v.
Vivo, supra., pp. 555-556.]

II. The second issue raised by petitioners concerns the status of private respondents.

Respondent court found the following evidence of petitioners' filiation:

(1) Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien where the following are entered: "Children if any:
give number of children—Four"; and, "Name—All living in China" [Exhibit "SS-1";]

(2) the testimony of their mother Yao Kee who stated that she had five children with Sy Kiat, only
three of whom are alive namely, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chin Yan [TSN, December
12, 1977, pp. 9-11;] and,

(3) an affidavit executed on March 22,1961 by Sy Kiat for presentation to the Local Civil Registrar
of Manila to support Sze Sook Wah's application for a marriage license, wherein Sy Kiat expressly
stated that she is his daughter [Exhibit "3".]

Likewise on the record is the testimony of Asuncion Gillego that Sy Kiat told her he has three daughters with his
Chinese wife, two of whom—Sook Wah and Sze Kai Cho—she knows, and one adopted son [TSN, December
6,1977, pp. 87-88.]

However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Mat according to the laws of China,
they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate children but only that of acknowledged natural children.
Petitioners are natural children, it appearing that at the time of their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry one another [See Art. 269, Civil Code.] And they are acknowledged
children of the deceased because of Sy Kiat's recognition of Sze Sook Wah [Exhibit "3"] and its extension to Sze
Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen who are her sisters of the full blood [See Art. 271, Civil Code.]

Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased's acknowledged natural children with Asuncion
Gillego, a Filipina with whom he lived for twenty-five (25) years without the benefit of marriage. They have in
their favor their father's acknowledgment, evidenced by a compromise agreement entered into by and between
their parents and approved by the Court of First Instance on February 12, 1974 wherein Sy Kiat not only
acknowleged them as his children by Asuncion Gillego but likewise made provisions for their support and future
inheritance, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

2. The parties also acknowledge that they are common-law husband and wife and that out of such
relationship, which they have likewise decided to definitely and finally terminate effective
immediately, they begot five children, namely: Aida Sy, born on May 30, 1950; Manuel Sy, born
on July 1, 1953; Teresita Sy, born on January 28, 1955; Ricardo Sy now deceased, born on
December 14, 1956; and Rodolfo Sy, born on May 7, 1958.

3. With respect to the AVENUE TRACTOR AND DIESEL PARTS SUPPLY ... , the parties
mutually agree and covenant that—

(a) The stocks and merchandize and the furniture and equipments ..., shall be
divided into two equal shares between, and distributed to, Sy Kiat who shall own
one-half of the total and the other half to Asuncion Gillego who shall transfer the
same to their children, namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy.

(b) the business name and premises ... shall be retained by Sy Kiat. However, it
shall be his obligation to give to the aforenamed children an amount of One
Thousand Pesos ( Pl,000.00 ) monthly out of the rental of the two doors of the
same building now occupied by Everett Construction.

xxx xxx xxx

(5) With respect to the acquisition, during the existence of the

common-law husband-and-wife relationship between the parties, of the real estates and
properties registered and/or appearing in the name of Asuncion Gillego ... , the parties mutually
agree and covenant that the said real estates and properties shall be transferred in equal shares
to their children, namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy, but to be administered
by Asuncion Gillego during her lifetime ... [Exhibit "D".] (Emphasis supplied.)

xxx xxx xxx

This compromise agreement constitutes a statement before a court of record by which a child may be voluntarily
acknowledged [See Art. 278, Civil Code.]

Petitioners further argue that the questions on the validity of Sy Mat's marriage to Yao Kee and the paternity and
filiation of the parties should have been ventilated in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.

Specifically, petitioners rely on the following provision of Republic Act No. 5502, entitled "An Act Revising Rep.
Act No. 3278, otherwise known as the Charter of the City of Caloocan', with regard to the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court:

SEC. 91-A. Creation and Jurisdiction of the Court.—

xxx xxx xxx

 The provisions of the Judiciary Act to the contrary notwithstanding, the court shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption, revocation of adoption, paternity and
acknowledgment;

(3) Annulment of marriages, relief from marital obligations, legal separation of spouses, and
actions for support;

(4) Proceedings brought under the provisions of title six and title seven, chapters one to three of
the civil code;

xxx xxx xxx

and the ruling in the case of Bartolome v. Bartolome [G.R. No. L-23661, 21 SCRA 1324] reiterated in Divinagracia
v. Rovira [G.R. No. L-42615, 72 SCRA 307.]

With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts were abolished. Their functions and jurisdiction are now vested with
the Regional Trial Courts [See Section 19 (7), B.P. Blg. 129 and Divinagracia v. Belosillo, G.R. No. L-47407,
August 12, 1986, 143 SCRA 356, 360] hence it is no longer necessary to pass upon the issue of jurisdiction
raised by petitioners.

Moreover, even without the exactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 we find in Rep. Act No. 5502 sec. 91-A last
paragraph that:

xxx xxx xxx

If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident in any case pending
in the ordinary court, said incident shall be determined in the main case.

xxx xxx xxx

As held in the case of Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L42615. August 10, 1976, 72 SCRA 307]:
xxx xxx xxx

It is true that under the aforequoted section 1 of Republic Act No. 4834 **** a case involving
paternity and acknowledgment may be ventilated as an incident in the intestate or testate
proceeding (See Baluyot vs. Ines Luciano, L-42215, July 13, 1976). But that legal provision
presupposes that such an administration proceeding is pending or existing and has not been
terminated. [at pp. 313-314.] (Emphasis supplied.)

xxx xxx xxx

The reason for ths rule is not only "to obviate the rendition of conflicting rulings on the same issue by the Court
of First Instance and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court" [Vda. de Baluyut v. Luciano, G.R. No. L-42215,
July 13, 1976, 72 SCRA 52, 63] but more importantly to prevent multiplicity of suits. Accordingly, this Court finds
no reversible error committed by respondent court.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

EN BANC

G.R. No. 124893 April 18, 1997

LYNETTE G. GARVIDA, petitioner,

vs.
FLORENCIO G. SALES, JR., THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ELECTION OFFICER
DIONISIO F. RIOS and PROVINCIAL SUPERVISOR NOLI PIPO, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

Petitioner Lynette G. Garvida seeks to annul and set aside the order dated May 2, 1996 of respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc suspending her proclamation as the duly elected Chairman of
the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte.

The facts are undisputed. The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections nationwide was scheduled to be held on
May 6, 1996. On March 16, 1996, petitioner applied for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Board of Election Tellers, however, denied her
application on the ground that petitioner, who was then twenty-one years and ten (10) months old, exceeded the
age limit for membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan as laid down in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution
No. 2824.

On April 2, 1996, petitioner filed a "Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataang Member and Voter" with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Bangui-Pagudpud-Adams-Damalneg, Ilocos Norte. In a decision dated April 18,
1996, the said court found petitioner qualified and ordered her registration as member and voter in the Katipunan
ng Kabataan. 1 The Board of Election Tellers appealed to the Regional Trial Court, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. 2 The
presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, however, inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due to his close
association with petitioner. 3

On April 23, 1996, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Chairman, Sangguniang
Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Province of Ilocos Norte. In a letter dated April 23,
1996, respondent Election Officer Dionisio F. Rios, per advice of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli
Pipo, 4 disapproved petitioner's certificate of candidacy again due to her age. 5 Petitioner, however, appealed to
COMELEC Regional Director Filemon A. Asperin who set aside the order of respondents and allowed petitioner
to run. 6

On May 2, 1996, respondent Rios issued a memorandum to petitioner informing her of her ineligibility and giving
her 24 hours to explain why her certificate of candidacy should not be disapproved. 7 Earlier and without the
knowledge of the COMELEC officials, private respondent Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a rival candidate for Chairman
of the Sangguniang Kabataan, filed with the COMELEC en banc a "Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of
Certificate of Candidacy" against petitioner Garvida for falsely representing her age qualification in her certificate
of candidacy. The petition was sent by facsimile 8 and registered mail on April 29, 1996 to the Commission on
Elections National Office, Manila.

On May 2, 1996, the same day respondent Rios issued the memorandum to petitioner, the COMELEC en
bancissued an order directing the Board of Election Tellers and Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo
to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in the event she won in the election. The order reads as follows:
 Acting on the Fax "Petition for Denial And/Or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy" by
petitioner Florencio G. Sales, Jr. against Lynette G. Garvida, received on April 29, 1996, the
pertinent allegations of which reads:

xxx xxx xxx

5. That the said respondent is disqualified to become a voter and a candidate for the SK for the
reason that she will be more than twenty-one (21) years of age on May 6, 1996; that she was
born on June 11, 1974 as can be gleaned from her birth certificate, copy of which is hereto
attached and marked as Annex "A";

6. That in filing her certificate of candidacy as candidate for SK of Bgy. San Lorenzo, Bangui,
Ilocos Norte, she made material representation which is false and as such, she is disqualified;
that her certificate of candidacy should not be given due course and that said candidacy must be
cancelled;

xxx xxx xxx

the Commission, it appearing that the petition is meritorious, hereby DIRECTS the Board of
Election Tellers/Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, to suspend
the proclamation of Lynette G. Garvida in the event she garners the highest number of votes for
the position of Sangguniang Kabataan [sic].

Meantime, petitioner is hereby required to submit immediately ten (10) copies of his petition and
to pay the filing and legal research fees in the amount of P510.00.

SO ORDERED. 9

On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against private respondent's votes of 76. 10 In
accordance with the May 2, 1996 order of the COMELEC en banc, the Board of Election Tellers did not proclaim
petitioner as the winner. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari was filed on May 27, 1996.

On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed petitioner the winner for the position of SK
chairman, Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. 11 The proclamation was "without prejudice to any
further action by the Commission on Elections or any other interested party." 12 On July 5, 1996, petitioner ran
in the Pambayang Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan for the municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. She
won as Auditor and was proclaimed one of the elected officials of the Pederasyon. 13

Petitioner raises two (2) significant issues: the first concerns the jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to act on
the petition to deny or cancel her certificate of candidacy; the second, the cancellation of her certificate of
candidacy on the ground that she has exceeded the age requirement to run as an elective official of the SK.

Section 532 (a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that the conduct of the SK elections is under
the supervision of the COMELEC and shall be governed by the Omnibus Election Code. 14 The Omnibus Election
Code, in Section 78, Article IX, governs the procedure to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy, viz:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before election.
 In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that a petition to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy for an elective office may be filed with the Law Department
of the COMELEC on the ground that the candidate has made a false material representation in his
certificate. The petition may be heard and evidence received by any official designated by the COMELEC
after which the case shall be decided by the COMELEC itself. 15

Under the same Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy lies with the
COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases before a Division may only be entertained by the COMELEC en
banc when the required number of votes to reach a decision, resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in the
Division. Moreover, only motions to reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in
Division are resolved by the COMELEC en banc. 16 It is therefore the COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can
hear and decide election cases. This is clear from Section 3 of the said Rules thus:

Sec. 3. The Commission Sitting in Divisions. — The Commission shall sit in two (2) Divisions to
hear and decide protests or petitions in ordinary actions, special actions, special cases,
provisional remedies, contempt and special proceedings except in accreditation of citizens' arms
of the Commission. 17

In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to any of its Divisions upon receipt of the
petition. It therefore acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it entertained the petition
and issued the order of May 2, 1996. 18

II

The COMELEC en banc also erred when it failed to note that the petition itself did not comply with the formal
requirements of pleadings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. These requirements are:

Sec. 1. Filing of Pleadings. — Every pleading, motion and other papers must be filed in ten (10)
legible copies. However, when there is more than one respondent or protestee, the petitioner or
protestant must file additional number of copies of the petition or protest as there are additional
respondents or protestees.

Sec. 2. How Filed. — The documents referred to in the immediately preceding section must be
filed directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the Commission personally, or, unless otherwise
provided in these Rules, by registered mail. In the latter case, the date of mailing is the date of
filing and the requirement as to the number of copies must be complied with.

Sec. 3. Form of Pleadings, etc. — (a) All pleadings allowed by these Rules shall be printed,
mimeographed or typewritten on legal size bond paper and shall be in English or Filipino.

xxx xxx xxx

Every pleading before the COMELEC must be printed, mimeographed or typewritten in legal size bond
paper and filed in at least ten (10) legible copies. Pleadings must be filed directly with the proper Clerk of
Court of the COMELEC personally, or, by registered mail.

In the instant case, the subject petition was not in proper form. Only two (2) copies of the petition were filed with
the COMELEC. 19 Also, the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution on the basis of the petition transmitted by
facsimile, not by registered mail.

A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic
matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each
area by a specified amount of electric current. 20 The current is transmitted as a signal over regular telephone
lines or via microwave relay and is used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental area in the
proper position and the correct shade. 21 The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device that produces a
printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile. 22

Filing a pleading by facsimile transmission is not sanctioned by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, much less
by the Rules of Court. A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving
all the marks of an original. 23 Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile
pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a
sham pleading. The uncertainty of the authenticity of a facsimile pleading should have restrained the
COMELEC en banc from acting on the petition and issuing the questioned order. The COMELEC en banc should
have waited until it received the petition filed by registered mail.

III

To write finis to the case at bar, we shall now resolve the issue of petitioner's age.

The Katipunan ng Kabataan was originally created by Presidential Decree No. 684 in 1975 as the Kabataang
Barangay, a barangay youth organization composed of all residents of the barangay who were at least 15 years
but less than 18 years of age. 24 The Kabataang Barangay sought to provide its members a medium to express
their views and opinions and participate in issues of transcendental importance. 25 Its affairs were administered
by a barangay youth chairman together with six barangay youth leaders who were actual residents of the
barangay and were at least 15 years but less than 18 years of age. 26 In 1983, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, then
the Local Government Code, raised the maximum age of the Kabataang Barangay members from "less than 18
years of age" to "not more than 21 years of age."

The Local Government Code of 1991 changed the Kabataang Barangay into the Katipunan ng Kabataan. It,
however, retained the age limit of the members laid down in B.P. 337 at 15 but not more than 21 years old. 27 The
affairs of the Katipunan ng Kabataan are administered by the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) composed of a
chairman and seven (7) members who are elected by the Katipunan ng Kabataan. 28 The chairman automatically
becomes ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Barangay. 29 A member of the SK holds office for a term of three
(3) years, unless sooner removed for cause, or becomes permanently incapacitated, dies or resigns from
office. 30

Membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan is subject to specific qualifications laid down by the Local Government
Code of 1991, viz:

Sec. 424. Katipunan ng Kabataan. — The katipunan ng kabataan shall be composed of all
citizens of the Philippines actually residing in the barangay for at least six (6) months, who are
fifteen (15) but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age, and who are duly registered in the list
of the sangguniang kabataan or in the official barangay list in the custody of the barangay
secretary.

A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may become a candidate for the Sangguniang Kabataan if he
possesses the following qualifications:

Sec. 428. Qualifications. — An elective official of the sangguniang kabataan must be a citizen of
the Philippines, a qualified voter of the katipunan ng kabataan, a resident of the barangay for at
least one (1) year immediately prior to election, at least fifteen (15) years but not more than twenty-
one (21) years of age on the day of his election, able to read and write Filipino, English, or the
local dialect, and must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.

Under Section 424 of the Local Government Code, a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan must be: (a) a
Filipino citizen; (b) an actual resident of the barangay for at least six months; (c) 15 but not more than 21 years
of age; and (d) duly registered in the list of the Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official barangay list. Section
428 of the Code requires that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b)
a qualified voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan; (c) a resident of the barangay at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the election; (d) at least 15 years but not more than 21 years of age on the day of his election; (e) able
to read and write; and (f) must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.

For the May 6, 1996 SK elections, the COMELEC interpreted Sections 424 and 428 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 in Resolution No. 2824 and defined how a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan becomes a
qualified voter and an elective official. Thus:

Sec. 3. Qualifications of a voter. — To be qualified to register as a voter in the SK elections, a

person must be:

a) a citizen of the Philippines;

b) fifteen (15) but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day that is, he must
have been born between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and

c) a resident of the Philippines for at least one (1) year and actually residing in the barangay
wherein he proposes to vote for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the elections.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 6. Qualifications of elective members. — An elective official of the SK must be:

a) a qualified voter;

b) a resident in the barangay for at least one (1) year immediately prior to the elections; and

c) able to read and write Filipino or any Philippine language or dialect or English.

Cases involving the eligibility or qualification of candidates shall be decided by the city/municipal
Election Officer (EO) whose decision shall be final.

A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may be a qualified voter in the May 6, 1996 SK elections if he
is: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) 15 but not more than 21 years of age on election day, i.e., the voter must be
born between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and (c) a resident of the Philippines for at least
one (1) year and an actual resident of the barangay at least six (6) months immediately preceding the
elections. A candidate for the SK must: (a) possess the foregoing qualifications of a voter; (b) be a
resident in the barangay at least one (1) year immediately preceding the elections; and (c) able to read
and write.

Except for the question of age, petitioner has all the qualifications of a member and voter in the Katipunan ng
Kabataan and a candidate for the Sangguniang Kabataan. Petitioner 's age is admittedly beyond the limit set in
Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. Petitioner, however, argues that Section 3 [b] of Resolution No.
2824 is unlawful, ultra vires and beyond the scope of Sections 424 and 428 of the Local Government Code of
1991. She contends that the Code itself does not provide that the voter must be exactly 21 years of age on
election day. She urges that so long as she did not turn twenty-two (22) years old, she was still twenty-one years
of age on election day and therefore qualified as a member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and as
candidate for the SK elections.

A closer look at the Local Government Code will reveal a distinction between the maximum age of a member in
the Katipunan ng Kabataan and the maximum age of an elective SK official. Section 424 of the Code sets a
member's maximum age at 21 years only. There is no further provision as to when the member shall have turned
21 years of age. On the other hand, Section 428 provides that the maximum age of an elective SK official is 21
years old "on the day of his election." The addition of the phrase "or the day of his election" is an additional
qualification. The member may be more than 21 years of age on election day or on the day he registers as
member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The elective official, however, must not be more than 21 years old on
the day of election. The distinction is understandable considering that the Code itself provides more qualifications
for an elective SK official than for a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. 31 The
courts may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances showing that the legislature intended a distinction
or qualification. 32

The qualification that a voter in the SK elections must not be more than 21 years of age on the day of the election
is not provided in Section 424 of the Local Government Code of 1991. In fact the term "qualified voter" appears
only in COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. 33 Since a "qualified voter" is not necessarily an elective official, then it
may be assumed that a "qualified voter" is a "member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan." Section 424 of the Code
does not provide that the maximum age of a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan is determined on the day of
the election. Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is therefore ultra vires insofar as it sets the age
limit of a voter for the SK elections at exactly 21 years on the day of the election.

The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more than 21 years of age on the day of his election
is very clear. The Local Government Code speaks of years, not months nor days. When the law speaks of years,
it is understood that years are of 365 days each. 34 One born on the first day of the year is consequently deemed
to be one year old on the 365th day after his birth — the last day of the year. 35 In computing years, the first year
is reached after completing the first 365 days. After the first 365th day, the first day of the second 365-day cycle
begins. On the 365th day of the second cycle, the person turns two years old. This cycle goes on and on in a
lifetime. A person turns 21 years old on the 365th day of his 21st 365-day cycle. This means on his 21st birthday,
he has completed the entire span of 21 365-day cycles. After this birthday, the 365-day cycle for his 22nd year
begins. The day after the 365th day is the first day of the next 365-day cycle and he turns 22 years old on the
365th day.

The phrase "not more than 21 years of age" means not over 21 years, not beyond 21 years. It means 21 365-
day cycles. It does not mean 21 years and one or some days or a fraction of a year because that would be more
than 21 365-day cycles. "Not more than 21 years old" is not equivalent to "less than 22 years old," contrary to
petitioner's claims. The law does not state that the candidate be less than 22 years on election day.

In P.D. 684, the law that created the Kabataang Barangay, the age qualification of a barangay youth official was
expressly stated as ". . . at least fifteen years of age or over but less than eighteen . . ." 36 This provision clearly
states that the youth official must be at least 15 years old and may be 17 years and a fraction of a year but should
not reach the age of eighteen years. When the Local Government Code increased the age limit of members of
the youth organization to 21 years, it did not reenact the provision in such a way as to make the youth "at least
15 but less than 22 years old." If the intention of the Code's framers was to include citizens less than 22 years
old, they should have stated so expressly instead of leaving the matter open to confusion and doubt. 37

Former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, the sponsor and principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991
declared that one of the reasons why the Katipunan ng Kabataan was created and the Kabataang Barangay
discontinued was because most, if not all, Kabataang Barangay leaders were already over 21 years of age by
the time President Aquino assumed power. 38 They were not the "youth" anymore. The Local Government Code
of 1991 fixed the maximum age limit at not more than 21 years 39 and the only exception is in the second
paragraph of Section 423 which reads:

Sec. 423. Creation and Election. —

a) . . . ;

b) A sangguniang kabataan official who, during his term of office, shall have passed the age of
twenty-one (21) years shall be allowed to serve the remaining portion of the term for which he
was elected.

The general rule is that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must not be more than 21 years
of age on the day of his election. The only exception is when the official reaches the age of 21 years
during his incumbency. Section 423 [b] of the Code allows him to serve the remaining portion of the term
 for which he was elected. According to Senator Pimentel, the youth leader must have "been elected prior
to his 21st birthday." 40 Conversely, the SK official must not have turned 21 years old before his election.
Reading Section 423 [b] together with Section 428 of the Code, the latest date at which an SK elective
official turns 21 years old is on the day of his election. The maximum age of a youth official must therefore
be exactly 21 years on election day. Section 3 [b] in relation to Section 6 [a] of COMELEC Resolution
No. 2824 is not ultra vires insofar as it fixes the maximum age of an elective SK official on the day of his
election.

In the case at bar, petitioner was born on June 11, 1974. On March 16, 1996, the day she registered as voter for
the May 6, 1996 SK elections, petitioner was twenty-one (21) years and nine (9) months old. On the day of the
elections, she was 21 years, 11 months and 5 days old. When she assumed office on June 1, 1996, she was 21
years, 11 months and 20 days old and was merely ten (10) days away from turning 22 years old. Petitioner may
have qualified as a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan but definitely, petitioner was over the age limit for
elective SK officials set by Section 428 of the Local Government Code and Sections 3 [b] and 6 of Comelec
Resolution No. 2824. She was ineligible to run as candidate for the May 6, 1996 Sangguniang Kabataan
elections.

The requirement that a candidate possess the age qualification is founded on public policy and if he lacks the
age on the day of the election, he can be declared ineligible. 41 In the same vein, if the candidate is over the
maximum age limit on the day of the election, he is ineligible. The fact that the candidate was elected will not
make the age requirement directory, nor will it validate his election. 42 The will of the people as expressed through
the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility. 43

The ineligibility of petitioner does not entitle private respondent, the candidate who obtained the highest number
of votes in the May 6, 1996 elections, to be declared elected. 44 A defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected
to the office. 45 Moreover, despite his claims, 46 private respondent has failed to prove that the electorate
themselves actually knew of petitioner's ineligibility and that they maliciously voted for her with the intention of
misapplying their franchises and throwing away their votes for the benefit of her rival candidate. 47

Neither can this Court order that pursuant to Section 435 of the Local Government Code petitioner should be
succeeded by the Sangguniang Kabataan member who obtained the next highest number of votes in the May
6, 1996 elections. 48 Section 435 applies when a Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman "refuses to assume office,
fails to qualify, 49 is convicted of a felony, voluntarily resigns, dies, is permanently incapacitated, is removed from
office, or has been absent without leave for more than three (3) consecutive months."

The question of the age qualification is a question of eligibility. 50 Being "eligible" means being "legally qualified;
capable of being legally chosen." 51 Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications
prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office. 52 Ineligibility is not one of the grounds
enumerated in Section 435 for succession of the SK Chairman.

To avoid a hiatus in the office of SK Chairman, the Court deems it necessary to order that the vacancy be filled
by the SK member chosen by the incumbent SK members of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte by
simple majority from among themselves. The member chosen shall assume the office of SK Chairman for the
unexpired portion of the term, and shall discharge the powers and duties, and enjoy the rights and privileges
appurtenant to said office.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed and petitioner Lynette G. Garvida is declared ineligible for being
over the age qualification for candidacy in the May 6, 1996 elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan, and is
ordered to vacate her position as Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui,
Ilocos Norte. The Sangguniang Kabataan member voted by simple majority by and from among the incumbent
Sangguniang Kabataan members of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte shall assume the office of
Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte for the unexpired portion of
the term.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 162155 August 28, 2007

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO in his official capacity as

Revenue District Officer of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati), Petitioners,
vs.
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC., Respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the August 1, 2003 decision 2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64782 and its February 9, 2004 resolution denying reconsideration. 3

On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied for the refund
or credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. In Yap's letter to petitioner revenue district officer Arturo V.
Parcero of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati) of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),4 he explained that the
increase in the cost of labor and materials and difficulty in obtaining financing for projects and collecting
receivables caused the real estate industry to slowdown. 5 As a consequence, while business was good during
the first quarter of 1997, respondent suffered losses amounting to ₱71,879,228 that year. 6

According to Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was not liable for income taxes. 7 Nevertheless,
respondent paid its quarterly corporate income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate sales
to the BIR in the total amount of ₱26,318,398.32.8 Therefore, respondent was entitled to tax refund or tax credit. 9

On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Y. Santos required respondent to submit additional documents to
support its claim.10 Respondent complied but its claim was not acted upon. Thus, on April 14, 2000, it filed a
petition for review11 in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).

On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period
for filing a judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit. 12 It invoked Section 229 of the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC):

Sec. 229. Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or Illegally Collected. -- No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in
any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or
illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum
alleged to have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has
been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax,
penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress.

In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date
of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after
payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even without a claim therefor, refund or credit any
tax, where on the face of the return upon which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have been
erroneously paid. (emphasis supplied)

The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to claim a refund
or credit commenced on that date.13
The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code which states:

Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three
hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours, and nights from sunset to
sunrise.

If the months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they
respectively have.

In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last included. (emphasis supplied)

Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of
judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year, respondent's petition, which
was filed 731 days14 after respondent filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary period. 15

Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied.16 Hence, it filed an appeal in the CA.17

On August 1, 2003, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA. 18 It ruled that Article 13 of the Civil
Code did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap year. According to the CA:

The rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the fact that a particular year is a leap year.19

In other words, even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the periods covered by April 15, 1998 to April 14, 1999
and April 15, 1999 to April 14, 2000 should still be counted as 365 days each or a total of 730 days. A statute
which is clear and explicit shall be neither interpreted nor construed. 20

Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied. 21 Thus, this appeal.

Petitioners contend that tax refunds, being in the nature of an exemption, should be strictly construed against
claimants.22 Section 229 of the NIRC should be strictly applied against respondent inasmuch as it has been
consistently held that the prescriptive period (for the filing of tax refunds and tax credits) begins to run on the day
claimants file their final adjusted returns. 23 Hence, the claim should have been filed on or before April 13, 2000
or within 730 days, reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted return.

The conclusion of the CA that respondent filed its petition for review in the CTA within the two-year prescriptive
period provided in Section 229 of the NIRC is correct. Its basis, however, is not.

The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the filing of the final adjusted return. 24 But how
should the two-year prescriptive period be computed?

As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is understood to
be equivalent to 365 days. In National Marketing Corporation v. Tecson,25 we ruled that a year is equivalent to
365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year. 26

However, in 1987, EO27 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I
thereof provides:

Sec. 31. Legal Periods. — "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty days,
unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the number of days
the specific month contains; "day", to a day of twenty-four hours and; "night" from sunrise to sunset. (emphasis
supplied)

A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may contain." 28 It
is the "period of time running from the beginning of a certain numbered day up to, but not including, the
corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient number of days in the next month,
then up to and including the last day of that month." 29 To illustrate, one calendar month from December 31, 2007
will be from January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be from
February 1, 2008 until February 29, 2008.30

A law may be repealed expressly (by a categorical declaration that the law is revoked and abrogated by another)
or impliedly (when the provisions of a more recent law cannot be reasonably reconciled with the previous
one).31Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987 states:

Sec. 27. Repealing clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulation, or portions thereof, inconsistent
with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

A repealing clause like Sec. 27 above is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate
the laws to be abolished.32 Thus, the provision above only impliedly repealed all laws inconsistent with the
Administrative Code of 1987.1avvphi1

Implied repeals, however, are not favored. An implied repeal must have been clearly and unmistakably intended
by the legislature. The test is whether the subsequent law encompasses entirely the subject matter of the former
law and they cannot be logically or reasonably reconciled. 33

Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal
with the same subject matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to
365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is
composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days
is irrelevant.

There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the Civil Code
and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori
derogat priori.

Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the two-year
prescriptive period (reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted return 34 on April 14, 1998) consisted
of 24 calendar months, computed as follows:

Year 1st calendar April 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998

1 month
2nd calendar May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998
month
3rd calendar June 15, 1998 to July 14, 1998
month
4th calendar July 15, 1998 to August 14, 1998
month
5th calendar August 15, 1998 to September 14,
month 1998
6th calendar September 15, to October 14, 1998
month 1998
7th calendar October 15, 1998 to November 14,
month 1998
8th calendar November 15, to December 14,
month 1998 1998
 9th calendar December 15, to January 14, 1999
month 1998
10th calendar January 15, 1999 to February 14, 1999
month
11th calendar February 15, 1999 to March 14, 1999
month
12th calendar March 15, 1999 to April 14, 1999
month
Year 13th calendar April 15, 1999 to May 14, 1999
2 month
14th calendar May 15, 1999 to June 14, 1999
month
15th calendar June 15, 1999 to July 14, 1999
month
16th calendar July 15, 1999 to August 14, 1999
month
17th calendar August 15, 1999 to September 14,
month 1999
18th calendar September 15, to October 14, 1999
month 1999
19th calendar October 15, 1999 to November 14,
month 1999
20th calendar November 15, to December 14,
month 1999 1999
21st calendar December 15, to January 14, 2000
month 1999
22nd calendar January 15, 2000 to February 14, 2000
month
23rd calendar February 15, 2000 to March 14, 2000
month
24th calendar March 15, 2000 to April 14, 2000
month

We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th
calendar month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the
reglementary period.

Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Tax Appeals which is
ordered to expeditiously proceed to hear C.T.A. Case No. 6113 entitled Primetown Property Group, Inc. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Arturo V. Parcero.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.

Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.

Camus and Delgado for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.

The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the
deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.

The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:

(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the
motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by the
Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the declaration that
the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of
partition and the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested
in reference to the Turkish laws.

The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of
Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they
are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other things, provides the following:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the
amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property
or the country in which it may be situated.

But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with the
Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter,
and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.
(Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)

It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he
desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of
the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony
requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.

The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. It is
discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity
to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this particular. There
is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the
testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and
executed. lawphil.net

Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.

In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee,
inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into consideration that such
exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which says:

Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been
conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand, having
resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of
the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and everything in
connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the
Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel
beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply
with this request.

The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect
the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance
with the laws of the Philippines.

If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the herein
oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is
prevented from receiving his legacy.

The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code provides
the following:

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed and
shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise
provide.

And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to
article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary
dispositions.

Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of
legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.

It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the condition
imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it
not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.

Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made in
such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition
submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any pronouncement as to costs.

So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\

In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated
September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied
her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen
of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their
residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975,
respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married
also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for
short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that
business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved
to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case
on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing
in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.

Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. certiorari
and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court.
However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and
whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and
to correct the error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then
lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition
filed in this case within the exception, and we have given it due course.

For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the
Philippines.

Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of
the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community
of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is
barred by prior judgment.

For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the
prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court
cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain
matters within its jurisdiction.

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between petitioner
and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in
person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who,
giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce
case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there
were neither community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he
executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the
divorce proceedings:

xxx xxx xxx

You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf
and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the
following:
 1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.

2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.

3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.

xxx xxx xxx 4

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue
petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not
valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind
either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the
law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as
well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As
he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be
just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed
in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.

Without costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,

vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH
EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed
by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional
rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at
Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple
lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April
20, 1980. 1

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de
facto between them.

After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent
initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January,
1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. 2

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case
No. 83-15866. 3

On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a
decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to
petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the
divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the
applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed
two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent,
petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus
Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation,
recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review,
the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for
adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two
branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil
and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the
respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed
as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7

On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of
respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James
Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State
Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department
of Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further
proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for review. 9

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further
proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No.
87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No.
87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment
and for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition
for review then pending before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated
September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner
and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal
of the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and
the former was ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered
a plea of not guilty. 14

On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.
The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of
adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant,
a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national
law prior to his filing the criminal complaint." 15

On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-
52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid
petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city
fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16

We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.

Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against
chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long
since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not
merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested
in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since
it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its
jurisdiction to try the case.

Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally
file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction,
rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and
concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and
successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and
concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the
aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents,
grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other
words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows
that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the
criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground
for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.

The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same
requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since criminal
actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the Philippines, the
offended party being merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those
which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended
spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a
matter exclusively within his power and option.

This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in
silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article
344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the
institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said
provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged
offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. 21

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the
action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as
of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by
his status beforeor subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but
ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We
would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal
capacity to do so.

To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when
precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be
commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with
reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal
action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing
at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.

American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields
the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute
proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive
right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a
divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a
conclusion. 22

In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —

'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.'
Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have
been committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant
insists that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly
said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the
 reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse
must be such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)

We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering
our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the
complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person
who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the
accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic
of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.

Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United States
court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court
here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an
accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this
Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. ...

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. ... 25

Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had
no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the
time he filed suit.

The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for
lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent
initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to
protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious
heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on
adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital
bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not
affect or cast obloquy on the other.

The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In
applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code,
which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the
lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it
should be made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and
unless she actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred
therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such declaration that the
marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from the beginning,
any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover,
what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the decision in said case is the situation where
the criminal action for adultery was filed beforethe termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its
nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage was
effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.

Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the same
fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and
seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was
resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any
issue determinative of the controversy herein.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one
entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary
restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G. R. No. 2935. March 23, 1909.]
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GEORGE I. FRANK, Defendant-
Appellant.

DECISI ON
JOHNSON, J.:
Judgment was rendered in the lower court on the 5th day of September, 1905. the Defendantappealed. On the
12th day of October, 1905, the Appellant filed his printed bill of exceptions with the clerk of the Supreme Court.
On the 5th day of December, 1905, the Appellant filed his brief with the clerk of the Supreme Court. On the 19th
day of January, 1906, the Attorney-General filed his brief in said cause. Nothing further was done in said cause
until on about the 30th day of January, 1909, when the respective parties were requested by this court to
prosecute the appeal under penalty of having the same dismissed for failure so to do; whereupon the Appellant,
by petition, had the cause placed upon the calendar and the same was heard on the 2d day of February, 1909.
The facts from the record appear to be as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary
First. That on or about the 17th day of April, 1903, in the city of Chicago, in the State of Illinois, in the United
States, the Defendant, through a representative of the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, entered into
a contract for a period of two years with the Plaintiff, by which the Defendant was to receive a salary of 1,200
dollars per year as a stenographer in the service of the said Plaintiff, and in addition thereto was to be paid in
advance the expenses incurred in traveling from the said city of Chicago to Manila, and one-half salary during
said period of travel.
Second. Said contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of its terms on the part of the Defendant,
he should become liable to the Plaintiff for the amount expended by the Government by way of expenses
incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila and the one-half salary paid during such period.
Third. The Defendant entered upon the performance of his contract upon the 30th day of April, 1903, and was
paid half-salary from the date until June 4, 1903, the date of his arrival in the Philippine Islands.
Fourth. That on the 11th day of February, 1904, the Defendant left the service of the Plaintiff and refused to
make a further compliance with the terms of the contract.
Fifth. On the 3d day of December, 1904, the Plaintiff commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of the
city of Manila to recover from the Defendant the sum of 269. 23 dollars, which amount the Plaintiff claimed had
been paid to the Defendant as expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila, and as half-salary for the
period consumed in travel.
Sixth. It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract that Laws No. 80 and No. 224 should
constitute a part of said contract.
To the complaint of the Plaintiff the Defendant filed a general denial and a special defense, alleging in his special
defense that the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended Laws No. 80 and No. 224 and had thereby
materially altered the said contract, and also that he was a minor at the time the contract was entered into and
was therefore not responsible under the law.
To the special defense of the Defendant the Plaintiff filed a demurrer, which demurrer the court sustained.
Upon the issue thus presented, and after hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the lower
court rendered a judgment against the Defendant and in favor of the Plaintiff for the sum of 265. 90 dollars. The
lower court found that at the time the Defendant quit the service of the Plaintiff there was due him from the
said Plaintiff the sum of 3. 33 dollars, leaving a balance due the Plaintiff in the sum of 265. 90 dollars. From this
judgment the Defendant appealed and made the following assignments of error: chanrobles virtualawlibrary
1. The court erred in sustaining Plaintiff’s demurrer to Defendant’s special defenses.
2. The court erred in rendering judgment against the Defendant on the facts.
With reference to the above assignments of error, it may be said that the mere fact that the legislative department
of the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended said Acts No. 80 and No. 224 by Acts No. 643 and
No. 1040 did not have the effect of changing the terms of the contract made between the Plaintiff and
the Defendant. The legislative department of the Government is expressly prohibited by section 5 of the Act of
Congress of 1902 from altering or changing the terms of a contract. The right which the Defendant had acquired
by virtue of Acts No. 80 and No. 224 had not been changed in any respect by the fact that said laws had been
amended. These acts, constituting the terms of the contract, still constituted a part of said contract and were
enforceable in favor of the Defendant.
The Defendant alleged in his special defense that he was a minor and therefore the contract could not be
enforced against him. The record discloses that, at the time the contract was entered into in the State of Illinois,
he was an adult under the laws of that State and had full authority to contract. The Plaintiff [the Defendant] claims
that, by reason of the fact that, under that laws of the Philippine Islands at the time the contract was made, made
persons in said Islands did not reach their majority until they had attained the age of 23 years, he was not liable
under said contract, contending that the laws of the Philippine Islands governed. It is not disputed — upon the
contrary the fact is admitted — that at the time and place of the making of the contract in question
the Defendant had full capacity to make the same. No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon
the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are determined b the law of the place where the contract
is made. (Scudder vs. Union National Bank, 91 U. S., 406.) cralaw Matters connected with its performance are
regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as the bringing
of suit, admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is
brought. (Idem.) cralaw
The Defendant’s claim that he was an adult when he left Chicago but was a minor when he arrived at Manila;
that he was an adult a the time he made the contract but was a minor at the time the Plaintiff attempted to enforce
the contract, more than a year later, is not tenable.
Our conclusions with reference to the first above assignment of error are, therefore.
First. That the amendments to Acts No. 80 and No. 224 in no way affected the terms of the contract in question;
and
Second. The Plaintiff [Defendant] being fully qualified to enter into the contract at the place and time the contract
was made, he cannot plead infancy as a defense at the place where the contract is being enforced.
We believe that the above conclusions also dispose of the second assignment of error.
For the reasons above stated, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12105 January 30, 1960

TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, deceased. PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., executor-appellee,

vs.
MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and MARY LYDIA BOHANAN, oppositors-
appellants.

Jose D. Cortes for appellants.

Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita for appellee.

LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Ramon San Jose, presiding, dismissing
the objections filed by Magdalena C. Bohanan, Mary Bohanan and Edward Bohanan to the project of partition
submitted by the executor and approving the said project.

On April 24, 195 0, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Rafael Amparo, presiding, admitted to probate a
last will and testament of C. O. Bohanan, executed by him on April 23, 1944 in Manila. In the said order, the
court made the following findings:

According to the evidence of the opponents the testator was born in Nebraska and therefore a citizen of
that state, or at least a citizen of California where some of his properties are located. This contention in
untenable. Notwithstanding the long residence of the decedent in the Philippines, his stay here was
merely temporary, and he continued and remained to be a citizen of the United States and of the state of
his pertinent residence to spend the rest of his days in that state. His permanent residence or domicile in
the United States depended upon his personal intent or desire, and he selected Nevada as his homicide
and therefore at the time of his death, he was a citizen of that state. Nobody can choose his domicile or
permanent residence for him. That is his exclusive personal right.

Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C. O. Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen of the
United States and of the State of Nevada and declares that his will and testament, Exhibit A, is fully in
accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada and admits the same to probate. Accordingly, the
Philippine Trust Company, named as the executor of the will, is hereby appointed to such executor and
upon the filing of a bond in the sum of P10,000.00, let letters testamentary be issued and after taking the
prescribed oath, it may enter upon the execution and performance of its trust. (pp. 26-27, R.O.A.).

It does not appear that the order granting probate was ever questions on appeal. The executor filed a project of
partition dated January 24, 1956, making, in accordance with the provisions of the will, the following
adjudications: (1) one-half of the residuary estate, to the Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. in trust only for the benefit of testator's grandson Edward George Bohanan, which consists of
several mining companies; (2) the other half of the residuary estate to the testator's brother, F.L. Bohanan, and
his sister, Mrs. M. B. Galbraith, share and share alike. This consist in the same amount of cash and of shares of
mining stock similar to those given to testator's grandson; (3) legacies of P6,000 each to his (testator) son,
Edward Gilbert Bohana, and his daughter, Mary Lydia Bohanan, to be paid in three yearly installments; (4)
legacies to Clara Daen, in the amount of P10,000.00; Katherine Woodward, P2,000; Beulah Fox, P4,000; and
Elizabeth Hastings, P2,000;

It will be seen from the above that out of the total estate (after deducting administration expenses) of P211,639.33
in cash, the testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and one-half of all shares of stock of several mining
companies and to his brother and sister the same amount. To his children he gave a legacy of only P6,000 each,
or a total of P12,000.

The wife Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children question the validity of the testamentary provisions
disposing of the estate in the manner above indicated, claiming that they have been deprived of the legitimate
that the laws of the form concede to them.

The first question refers to the share that the wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, should be entitled to
received. The will has not given her any share in the estate left by the testator. It is argued that it was error for
the trial court to have recognized the Reno divorce secured by the testator from his Filipino wife Magdalena C.
Bohanan, and that said divorce should be declared a nullity in this jurisdiction, citing the case of
Querubin vs.Querubin, 87 Phil., 124, 47 Off. Gaz., (Sup, 12) 315, Cousins Hiz vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 852,
Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855 and Gorayeb vs. Hashim, 50 Phil., 22. The court below refused to recognize
the claim of the widow on the ground that the laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen, allow him to
dispose of all of his properties without requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife. Section 9905
of Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925 provides:

Every person over the age of eighteen years, of sound mind, may, by last will, dispose of all his or her
estate, real and personal, the same being chargeable with the payment of the testator's debts.
Besides, the right of the former wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, to a share in the testator's estafa
had already been passed upon adversely against her in an order dated June 19, 1955, (pp. 155-159, Vol II
Records, Court of First Instance), which had become final, as Magdalena C. Bohanan does not appear to have
appealed therefrom to question its validity. On December 16, 1953, the said former wife filed a motion to withdraw
the sum of P20,000 from the funds of the estate, chargeable against her share in the conjugal property, (See pp.
294-297, Vol. I, Record, Court of First Instance), and the court in its said error found that there exists no
community property owned by the decedent and his former wife at the time the decree of divorce was issued.
As already and Magdalena C. Bohanan may no longer question the fact contained therein, i.e. that there was no
community property acquired by the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan during their converture.

Moreover, the court below had found that the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan were married on January 30,
1909, and that divorce was granted to him on May 20, 1922; that sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan
married Carl Aaron and this marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of the testator. Since no right to
share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada and since the court below had
already found that there was no conjugal property between the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan, the latter
can now have no longer claim to pay portion of the estate left by the testator.

The most important issue is the claim of the testator's children, Edward and Mary Lydia, who had received
legacies in the amount of P6,000 each only, and, therefore, have not been given their shares in the estate which,
in accordance with the laws of the forum, should be two-thirds of the estate left by the testator. Is the failure old
the testator to give his children two-thirds of the estate left by him at the time of his death, in accordance with
the laws of the forum valid?

The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in 1944, expressly provides that
successional rights to personal property are to be earned by the national law of the person whose succession is
in question. Says the law on this point:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the
extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property
and the country in which it is found. (par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code, which is the same as par. 2 Art. 16,
new Civil Code.)

In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out and it was decided that the testator was a citizen
of the State of Nevada because he had selected this as his domicile and his permanent residence. (See Decision
dated April 24, 1950, supra). So the question at issue is whether the estementary dispositions, especially hose
for the children which are short of the legitime given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid. It is not
disputed that the laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all his properties by will (Sec. 9905, Complied
Nevada Laws of 1925, supra). It does not appear that at time of the hearing of the project of partition, the above-
quoted provision was introduced in evidence, as it was the executor's duly to do. The law of Nevada, being a
foreign law can only be proved in our courts in the form and manner provided for by our Rules, which are as
follows:

SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for
any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy tested by the officer having
the legal custody of he record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. . . . (Rule 123).

We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that during the
hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the
foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws. was introduced in evidence by appellant's (herein)
counsel as Exhibits "2" (See pp. 77-79, VOL. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance). Again
said laws presented by the counsel for the executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing
of the case on January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (se Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1).
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws
of the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the pertinent law of
Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us,
without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.

As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed
by the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided and it is not disputed that the national law of the
testator is that of the State of Nevada, already indicated above, which allows a testator to dispose of all his
property according to his will, as in the case at bar, the order of the court approving the project of partition made
in accordance with the testamentary provisions, must be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.

Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila
dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089
therein.1äwphï1.ñët

The facts of the case are as follows:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife,
Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-
deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet
Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis;
and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes,
obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the
following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after
the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first
and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin
G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was
admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.

The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount
of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in
satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according
as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting
partial advances on account of their respective legacies.

On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's
Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of
the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies
of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of
P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last
Will and Testament — divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's
seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the
project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore,
compulsory heirs of the deceased.

Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the
registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor. 1

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30,
1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and
administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-
appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.

In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this
Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the
decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the
decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. 2 So that even assuming
Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the
same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the
law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are
found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be
presumed different from ours. 3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated,
they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate
or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of
successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They
provide that —

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely,
Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they
incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial
change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their
purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate
and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under
Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes,
Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically
chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the
other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate.
Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the
law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that
his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and
void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the
Civil Code states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under
the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision
of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.

ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-
appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.

M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.

Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.

LABRADOR, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in
Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among things the final accounts
of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her
to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the
property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be
payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward
E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:

3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard
Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No.
665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.

4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my above named
daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
 xxx xxx xxx

7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia,
about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not
in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all information I
have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen
Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One
Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest
which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..

xxx xxx xxx

12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young
Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my
property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever
situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and which may have come to me from any source
whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....

It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and project of partition
ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be
transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives
her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L -
11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of
opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order
of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural
children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law
that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of California alone, but
the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even
if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile
of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having
been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from
the time of her birth.

The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of
California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to
be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his property
in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re
McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in
page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for
reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.

The most important assignments of error are as follows:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT
THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND,
CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.

II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE
EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE
APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY
DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN
SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION
SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN
CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.

There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California
at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the
Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief:

In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the deceased Edward
E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the
Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport
"Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He
stayed in the Philippines until 1904.

In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the following nine
years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in Sacramento, California.

Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again
departed the Philippines for the United States and came back here the following year, 1929. Some nine
years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country, and came back to the Philippines the following
year, 1939.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved
by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not
covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the
Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but returned
to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as
Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21,
1953.)

In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the making of his
last will and testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on
March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)

In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact
that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since he came to the
Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and
considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would
indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of California.

Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary presence to the
most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote something more than mere physical
presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)

As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in
Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a
territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a
citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that
State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This
conclusion is in accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.

The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of permanent
abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled
in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a place where he has no domicile. The man
with two homes, between which he divides his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if
he went on business which would require his presence for several weeks or months, he might properly
be said to have sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he
treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his former
"home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise
of intention as well as physical presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in
a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's
domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary
presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper
one. (Goodrich, p. 29)

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which is as follows:

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term "national
law"is used therein.

There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States, each
state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The
"national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply
to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property? The decision
of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a
testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of
McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil
Code of California, which is as follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow
the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the
California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and
testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as
the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in
the abovecited case, should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of
Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant,
on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the
doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred
back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.

The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:

The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural
matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign
system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"

On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied
the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once having
determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference
back should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless chain
of references" which has so often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would
have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there
seems no compelling logical reason why the original reference should be the internal law rather than to
the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who
have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second reference
and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more consistent for
they look always to internal law as the rule of reference.

Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity
will result from adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is the fact that the only way to
achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the
legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both
accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated
above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against the woman; if the
suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the
woman. The same result would happen, though the courts would switch with respect to which would hold
liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.

The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in question, and
where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the
situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further
reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be
recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere.
(Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)

X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property in

Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as to how this property is to be distributed
among X's next of kin.

Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict of laws as to
intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the law of the deceased's last domicile. Since
by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do would be
to turn to French statute of distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a
distribution accordingly. An examination of French law, however, would show that if a French court were
called upon to determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the
national law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface
 of things the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the French
law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court and apply the Massachusetts
statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is what a French court would do. If it accepts the so-
called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus applying its own law.

This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers
to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the
forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is
'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)

After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a particular case,
the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also
to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has been considered by the courts in but a few
instances, has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine
involved has been descriptively designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the
"Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the question postulated
and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning the
main controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)

Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the doctrine
of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must take into account the
whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the
actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The
doctrine of the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)

The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a country explained
by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of
the article are quoted herein below:

The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as
incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict
of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a country' means the whole of its law.

xxx xxx xxx

Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900,
in the form of the following theses:

(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.

(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:

(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as regards
their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be determined by the law of the
domicile, or even by the law of the place where the act in question occurred.

(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of them is
necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a question to the same
system of law.

xxx xxx xxx

If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who
has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether
the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile,
 and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with the law of nationality
— that is the English law — he must accept this reference back to his own law.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re
Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be
enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply
to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California
but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters
with foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law
should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.

When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing the manner
of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the time of his death will be
looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as completely as the law of situs is consulted
in questions about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the
personal estate in case of intestate succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an
attempted testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect
beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the
Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate
succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the point: 'The
general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid
anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin in that international comity which was one
of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse and the process of accumulating
property take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more
apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is the
internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its
citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that
We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict
of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound
to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance
with the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and
its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.

It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where the property
is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and
that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the
deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited
above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California
Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's
domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a
decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of
the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable
of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states,
between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court
must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to
be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children while
the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally
acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo,
50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.)
cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons,
i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in
the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen,
a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the
validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed
by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of
California..

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court with
instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with
costs against appellees.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 142820 June 20, 2003

WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner,

vs.
MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of
Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

At the core of the present controversy are issues of (a) grave abuse of discretion allegedly committed by public
respondent and (b) lack of jurisdiction of the regional trial court, in matters that spring from a divorce decree
obtained abroad by petitioner.

In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner assails (a) the order 1 dated September 30, 1999 of public
respondent Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Presiding Judge of Makati Regional Trial Court, 2 Branch 149, in
Civil Case No. 96-1389 for declaration of nullity of marriage, and (b) the order 3 dated March 31, 2000 denying
his motion for reconsideration. The assailed orders partially set aside the trial court’s order dismissing Civil Case
No. 96-1389, for the purpose of resolving issues relating to the property settlement of the spouses and the
custody of their children.

Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent Carmen
Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified
on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. 4 Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra
Kristine on November 18, 1981 and October 25, 1987, respectively.

On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition 5 for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. On February 6, 1997, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, 6 but it was denied by
the trial court in its order7 dated May 28, 1997.

On June 5, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was also denied in an order 8 dated August 13,
1997. On September 5, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On November 27,
1998, the appellate court denied the petition and remanded the case to the RTC.

Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese,
promulgated on December 16, 1997.

The decree provides in part:

[T]he Court of First Instance, Hamburg-Blankenese, Branch 513, has ruled through Judge van Buiren of
the Court of First Instance on the basis of the oral proceedings held on 4 Nov. 1997:

The marriage of the Parties contracted on 11 December 1980 before the Civil Registrar of Hamburg-
Altona is hereby dissolved.

The parental custody for the children

Carolynne Roehr, born 18 November 1981

Alexandra Kristine Roehr, born on 25 October 1987

is granted to the father.

The litigation expenses shall be assumed by the Parties. 9

In view of said decree, petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1999 on the ground that the trial
court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or suit as a decree of divorce had already been
promulgated dissolving the marriage of petitioner and private respondent.

On July 14, 1999, Judge Guevara-Salonga issued an order granting petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Private
respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed for the purpose of
determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the properties between petitioner and private
respondent.

On August 18, 1999, an Opposition to the Motion for Partial Reconsideration was filed by the petitioner on the
ground that there is nothing to be done anymore in the instant case as the marital tie between petitioner Wolfgang
Roehr and respondent Ma. Carmen D. Rodriguez had already been severed by the decree of divorce
promulgated by the Court of First Instance of Hamburg, Germany on December 16, 1997 and in view of the fact
that said decree of divorce had already been recognized by the RTC in its order of July 14, 1999, through the
implementation of the mandate of Article 26 of the Family Code, 10 endowing the petitioner with the capacity to
remarry under the Philippine law.
On September 30, 1999, respondent judge issued the assailed order partially setting aside her order dated July
14, 1999 for the purpose of tackling the issues of property relations of the spouses as well as support and custody
of their children. The pertinent portion of said order provides:

Acting on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order dated July 14, 1999 filed by petitioner thru
counsel which was opposed by respondent and considering that the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code was included as an amendment thru Executive Order 227, to avoid the absurd situation
of a Filipino as being still married to his or her alien spouse though the latter is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse because he/she had obtained a divorce abroad which is recognized by his/her national
law, and considering further the effects of the termination of the marriage under Article 43 in relation to
Article 50 and 52 of the same Code, which include the dissolution of the property relations of the spouses,
and the support and custody of their children, the Order dismissing this case is partially set aside with
respect to these matterswhich may be ventilated in this Court.

SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration on October 19, 1999, which was denied by respondent judge
in an order dated March 31, 2000.12

Petitioner ascribes lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
judge. He cites as grounds for his petition the following:

1. Partially setting aside the order dated July 14, 1999 dismissing the instant case is not allowed by 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.13
2. Respondent Maria Carmen Rodriguez by her motion for Partial Reconsideration had recognized and
admitted the Divorce Decision obtained by her ex-husband in Hamburg, Germany.14
3. There is nothing left to be tackled by the Honorable Court as there are no conjugal assets alleged in
the Petition for Annulment of Marriage and in the Divorce petition, and the custody of the children had
already been awarded to Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr.15

Pertinent in this case before us are the following issues:

1. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing her order dated September
30, 1999, which partially modified her order dated July 14, 1999; and
2. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed and retained
jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree
from a German court.

On the first issue, petitioner asserts that the assailed order of respondent judge is completely inconsistent with
her previous order and is contrary to Section 3, Rule 16, Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:

Sec. 3. Resolution of motion - After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the
motion, or order the amendment of the pleading.
The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied upon is not
indubitable.
In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner avers that a court’s action on a motion is limited to dismissing the action or claim, denying the motion,
or ordering the amendment of the pleading.

Private respondent, on her part, argues that the RTC can validly reconsider its order dated July 14, 1999 because
it had not yet attained finality, given the timely filing of respondent’s motion for reconsideration.

Pertinent to this issue is Section 3 in relation to Section 7, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides:
 Sec. 3. Action upon motion for new trial or reconsideration.—The trial court may set aside the judgment
or final order and grant a new trial, upon such terms as may be just, or may deny the motion. If the court
finds that excessive damages have been awarded or that the judgment or final order is contrary to the
evidence or law, it may amend such judgment or final order accordingly.

Sec. 7. Partial new trial or reconsideration.—If the grounds for a motion under this Rule appear to the
court to affect the issues as to only a part, or less than all of the matters in controversy, or only one, or
less than all, of the parties to it, the court may order a new trial or grant reconsideration as to such issues
if severable without interfering with the judgment or final order upon the rest. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is clear from the foregoing rules that a judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet
attained finality. Considering that private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary
period, the trial court's decision of July 14, 1999 can still be modified. Moreover, in Sañado v. Court of
Appeals,16 we held that the court could modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory
whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and
circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become
final and executory17 and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events
warrant it.18 In our view, there are even more compelling reasons to do so when, as in this case, judgment has
not yet attained finality.

Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when she
partially set aside her order dated July 14, 1999, despite the fact that petitioner has already obtained a divorce
decree from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg, Germany.

In Garcia v. Recio,19 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,20 and Llorente v. Court of Appeals,21 we consistently held that a
divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid
according to the national law of the foreigner. Relevant to the present case is Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,22 where
this Court specifically recognized the validity of a divorce obtained by a German citizen in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany. We held in Pilapil that a foreign divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of
persons.

In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16, 1997 has not been challenged
by either of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of parental custody, even the trial court recognized said decree
to be valid and binding, thereby endowing private respondent the capacity to remarry. Thus, the present
controversy mainly relates to the award of the custody of their two children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine,
to petitioner.

As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction,
but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our
courts.23Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody
to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given
ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39,
Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:

SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this
jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with
respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely
constitutes prima facieevidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the
contrary.24

In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the judgment
of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of
petitioner to have parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in the German court were summary.
As to what was the extent of private respondent’s participation in the proceedings in the German court, the
records remain unclear. The divorce decree itself states that neither has she commented on the
proceedings25 nor has she given her opinion to the Social Services Office. 26 Unlike petitioner who was
represented by two lawyers, private respondent had no counsel to assist her in said proceedings. 27 More
importantly, the divorce judgment was issued to petitioner by virtue of the German Civil Code provision to the
effect that when a couple lived separately for three years, the marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved. The
decree did not touch on the issue as to who the offending spouse was. Absent any finding that private respondent
is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine
the issue of parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the children. This is in
consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the child’s welfare is always the
paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody. 28

On the matter of property relations, petitioner asserts that public respondent exceeded the bounds of her
jurisdiction when she claimed cognizance of the issue concerning property relations between petitioner and
private respondent. Private respondent herself has admitted in Par. 14 of her petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage dated August 26, 1996 filed with the RTC of Makati, subject of this case, that: "[p]etitioner and
respondent have not acquired any conjugal or community property nor have they incurred any debts during their
marriage."29 Herein petitioner did not contest this averment. Basic is the rule that a court shall grant relief
warranted by the allegations and the proof. 30Given the factual admission by the parties in their pleadings that
there is no property to be accounted for, respondent judge has no basis to assert jurisdiction in this case to
resolve a matter no longer deemed in controversy.

In sum, we find that respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue regarding the custody of the two
children born of the union between petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent erred, however, in
claiming cognizance to settle the matter of property relations of the parties, which is not at issue.

WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on September 30, 1999 and
March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction
over the issue between the parties as to who has parental custody, including the care, support and education of
the children, namely Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly
to the trial court for continuation of appropriate proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 146322 December 6, 2006

ERNESTO RAMAS UYPITCHING and RAMAS UYPITCHING SONS, INC., petitioners,

vs.
ERNESTO QUIAMCO, respondent.
 DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum cuique tribuere. To live virtuously, not to injure others and to
give everyone his due. These supreme norms of justice are the underlying principles of law and order in society.
We reaffirm them in this petition for review on certiorari assailing the July 26, 2000 decision 1 and October 18,
2000 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 47571.

In 1982, respondent Ernesto C. Quiamco was approached by Juan Davalan, 2 Josefino Gabutero and Raul
Generoso to amicably settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery3 filed by Quiamco against them. They
surrendered to him a red Honda XL-100 motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate of registration. Respondent
asked for the original certificate of registration but the three accused never came to see him again. Meanwhile,
the motorcycle was parked in an open space inside respondent’s business establishment, Avesco-AVNE
Enterprises, where it was visible and accessible to the public.

It turned out that, in October 1981, the motorcycle had been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by petitioner
Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc., a family-owned corporation managed by petitioner Atty. Ernesto Ramas
Uypitching. To secure its payment, the motorcycle was mortgaged to petitioner corporation. 4

When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments, Davalan assumed the obligation and continued the
payments. In September 1982, however, Davalan stopped paying the remaining installments and told petitioner
corporation’s collector, Wilfredo Veraño, that the motorcycle had allegedly been "taken by respondent’s men."

Nine years later, on January 26, 1991, petitioner Uypitching, accompanied by policemen, 5 went to Avesco-AVNE
Enterprises to recover the motorcycle. The leader of the police team, P/Lt. Arturo Vendiola, talked to the clerk in
charge and asked for respondent. While P/Lt. Vendiola and the clerk were talking, petitioner Uypitching paced
back and forth inside the establishment uttering "Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle."

On learning that respondent was not in Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, the policemen left to look for respondent in
his residence while petitioner Uypitching stayed in the establishment to take photographs of the motorcycle.
Unable to find respondent, the policemen went back to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises and, on petitioner Uypitching’s
instruction and over the clerk’s objection, took the motorcycle.

On February 18, 1991, petitioner Uypitching filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the
Anti-Fencing Law6 against respondent in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City. 7 Respondent
moved for dismissal because the complaint did not charge an offense as he had neither stolen nor bought the
motorcycle. The Office of the City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint 8 and denied petitioner Uypitching’s
subsequent motion for reconsideration.

Respondent filed an action for damages against petitioners in the RTC of Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental,
Branch 37.9 He sought to hold the petitioners liable for the following: (1) unlawful taking of the motorcycle; (2)
utterance of a defamatory remark (that respondent was a thief) and (3) precipitate filing of a baseless and
malicious complaint. These acts humiliated and embarrassed the respondent and injured his reputation and
integrity.

On July 30, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision 10 finding that petitioner Uypitching was motivated with malice
and ill will when he called respondent a thief, took the motorcycle in an abusive manner and filed a baseless
complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. Petitioners’ acts were found to be contrary
to Articles 1911 and 2012 of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial court held petitioners liable to respondent for P500,000
moral damages, P200,000 exemplary damages and P50,000 attorney’s fees plus costs.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification, reducing
the award of moral and exemplary damages to P300,000 and P100,000, respectively.13 Petitioners sought
reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, this petition.

In their petition and memorandum, petitioners submit that the sole (allegedly) issue to be resolved here is whether
the filing of a complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law in the Office of the City
Prosecutor warranted the award of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs in favor of
respondent.

Petitioners’ suggestion is misleading. They were held liable for damages not only for instituting a groundless
complaint against respondent but also for making a slanderous remark and for taking the motorcycle from
respondent’s establishment in an abusive manner.

Correctness of the Findings of the RTC and CA

As they never questioned the findings of the RTC and CA that malice and ill will attended not only the public
imputation of a crime to respondent14 but also the taking of the motorcycle, petitioners were deemed to have
accepted the correctness of such findings. This alone was sufficient to hold petitioners liable for damages to
respondent.

Nevertheless, to address petitioners’ concern, we also find that the trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that
the filing of the complaint was tainted with malice and bad faith. Petitioners themselves in fact described their
action as a "precipitate act."15 Petitioners were bent on portraying respondent as a thief. In this connection, we
quote with approval the following findings of the RTC, as adopted by the CA:

x x x There was malice or ill-will [in filing the complaint before the City Prosecutor’s Office] because Atty.
Ernesto Ramas Uypitching knew or ought to have known as he is a lawyer, that there was no probable
cause at all for filing a criminal complaint for qualified theft and fencing activity against [respondent]. Atty.
Uypitching had no personal knowledge that [respondent] stole the motorcycle in question. He was merely
told by his bill collector ([i.e.] the bill collector of Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc.)[,] Wilfredo Veraño[,] that
Juan Dabalan will [no longer] pay the remaining installment(s) for the motorcycle because the motorcycle
was taken by the men of [respondent]. It must be noted that the term used by Wilfredo Veraño in informing
Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching of the refusal of Juan Dabalan to pay for the remaining installment was
[‘]taken[’], not [‘]unlawfully taken[’] or ‘stolen.’ Yet, despite the double hearsay, Atty. Ernesto Ramas
Uypitching not only executed the [complaint-affidavit] wherein he named [respondent] as ‘the suspect’ of
the stolen motorcycle but also charged [respondent] of ‘qualified theft and fencing activity’ before the City
[Prosecutor’s] Office of Dumaguete. The absence of probable cause necessarily signifies the presence
of malice. What is deplorable in all these is that Juan Dabalan, the owner of the motorcycle, did not
accuse [respondent] or the latter’s men of stealing the motorcycle[,] much less bother[ed] to file a case
for qualified theft before the authorities. That Atty. Uypitching’s act in charging [respondent] with qualified
theft and fencing activity is tainted with malice is also shown by his answer to the question of Cupid
Gonzaga16 [during one of their conversations] - "why should you still file a complaint? You have already
recovered the motorcycle…"[:] "Aron motagam ang kawatan ug motor." ("To teach a lesson to the thief
of motorcycle.")17

Moreover, the existence of malice, ill will or bad faith is a factual matter. As a rule, findings of fact of the trial
court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive on this Court. We see no compelling reason to reverse
the findings of the RTC and the CA.

Petitioners Abused Their Right of Recovery as Mortgagee(s)

Petitioners claim that they should not be held liable for petitioner corporation’s exercise of its right as seller-
mortgagee to recover the mortgaged vehicle preliminary to the enforcement of its right to foreclose on the
mortgage in case of default. They are clearly mistaken.
True, a mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged property to enable it to enforce or protect its
foreclosure right thereon. There is, however, a well-defined procedure for the recovery of possession of
mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged property for its sale on
foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover such possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to
obtain judicial foreclosure.18

Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action necessary to acquire legal possession of the
motorcycle. Instead, petitioner Uypitching descended on respondent’s establishment with his policemen and
ordered the seizure of the motorcycle without a search warrant or court order. Worse, in the course of the illegal
seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner Uypitching even mouthed a slanderous statement.

No doubt, petitioner corporation, acting through its co-petitioner Uypitching, blatantly disregarded the lawful
procedure for the enforcement of its right, to the prejudice of respondent. Petitioners’ acts violated the law as
well as public morals, and transgressed the proper norms of human relations.

The basic principle of human relations, embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code, provides:

Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give every one his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right," prescribes that a person should not use his right
unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability. 19 It seeks to preclude the
use of, or the tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends.

There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another.20 The exercise of a right must
be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there
must be no intention to harm another.21 Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach.

In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners’ instance was not only attended by
bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory
statement, petitioners’ exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious
to respondent. On the other hand, the precipitate act of filing an unfounded complaint could not in any way be
considered to be in accordance with the purpose for which the right to prosecute a crime was established. Thus,
the totality of petitioners’ actions showed a calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and publicly ridicule
respondent. Petitioners acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of respondent. Contrary to law,
petitioners willfully caused damage to respondent. Hence, they should indemnify him.22

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The July 26, 2000 decision and October 18, 2000 resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47571 are AFFIRMED.

Triple costs against petitioners, considering that petitioner Ernesto Ramas Uypitching is a lawyer and an officer
of the court, for his improper behavior.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna and Garcia, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.

Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.

Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate planning and
serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public humiliation.

Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and
set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:

Dear Bet —

Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today.

Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That would only create a scandal.

Paquing

But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:

NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA

PAPA LOVE .

PAKING

Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.

Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced evidence
before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to
pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as
attorney's fees; and the costs.

On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for
new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut. But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the
parties and their attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the proceedings
the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that should any of them fail to appear "the petition
for relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution."
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following day his counsel filed a
motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants petition for relief. The counsel stated that he would
confer with defendant in Cagayan de Oro City — the latter's residence — on the possibility of an amicable
element. The court granted two weeks counted from August 25, 1955.

Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired on September 8, 1955
but that defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.

Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956 calling the parties and
their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however, defendant's counsel informed the court that
chances of settling the case amicably were nil.

On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition. Defendant has appealed to
this Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground
to set aside the judgment by default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no answer in the belief that
an amicable settlement was being negotiated.

A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, must be duly
supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.)
Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and valid
defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to
fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like this stating mere conclusions
or opinions instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P.
Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960.)

Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary, or a mere surplusage,
because the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it having been based on evidence adduced
before the clerk of court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court pointed
out that the procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by
Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did not
have to be obtained for he was declared in default and thus had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil.
787; Alano vs. Court of First Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).

In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment is contrary to
law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise
to marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated
in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable
wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions
that would have it so.

It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with
impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage."

The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage,
which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were
printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau,
party drsrses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of
honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were
given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was
then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes
it ... " He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff:
"Nothing changed rest assured returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not
an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and
publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably
and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.

Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were excessive. No question is raised
as to the award of actual damages. What defendant would really assert hereunder is that the award of moral and
exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.

Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases
mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that the same could not
be adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid
of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless
[and] oppressive manner." This Court's opinion, however, is that considering the particular circumstances of this
case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's judgment is hereby affirmed,
with costs.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners,

vs.
ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA," respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila Garden (Hotel Nikko)1 and Ruby Lim assail
the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 reversing the Decision 3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104, as well as the Resolution 4 of the Court of Appeals dated 09 July 2002
which denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages brought under the human relations provisions of
the New Civil Code. Plaintiff thereat (respondent herein) Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen
name "Amay Bisaya," alleged that at around 6:00 o’clock in the evening of 13 October 1994, while he was having
coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko,5 he was spotted by his friend of several years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then
approached him.6 Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a party at the hotel’s penthouse in celebration of the natal
day of the hotel’s manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka. 7 Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him for which she
replied: "of course."8Mr. Reyes then went up with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket of fruits which was
the latter’s present for the celebrant.9 At the penthouse, they first had their picture taken with the celebrant after
which Mr. Reyes sat with the party of Dr. Filart. 10 After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr.
Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by
petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof.11 In a loud
voice and within the presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at the buffet table,
Ruby Lim told him to leave the party ("huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang").12 Mr.
Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart. 13 Dr. Filart, who was within hearing distance, however,
completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and humiliation. 14 Not long after, while he was still recovering
from the traumatic experience, a Makati policeman approached and asked him to step out of the hotel. 15 Like a
common criminal, he was escorted out of the party by the policeman. 16 Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes asked for
One Million Pesos actual damages, One Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos attorney’s fees.17

Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not under the ignominious
circumstance painted by the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that she was the Hotel’s Executive Secretary for the past
twenty (20) years.18 One of her functions included organizing the birthday party of the hotel’s former General
Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka.19 The year 1994 was no different. For Mr. Tsuruoka’s party, Ms. Lim generated an
exclusive guest list and extended invitations accordingly. 20 The guest list was limited to approximately sixty (60)
of Mr. Tsuruoka’s closest friends and some hotel employees and that Mr. Reyes was not one of those invited. 21 At
the party, Ms. Lim first noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar counter ordering a drink. 22 Mindful of Mr. Tsuruoka’s wishes
to keep the party intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr. Boy Miller, the "captain waiter," to inquire as to the presence
of Mr. Reyes who was not invited.23 Mr. Miller replied that he saw Mr. Reyes with the group of Dr. Filart.24 As Dr.
Filart was engaged in conversation with another guest and as Ms. Lim did not want to interrupt, she inquired
instead from the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes. 25 Ms.
Lim then requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited.26 Mr. Reyes, however,
lingered prompting Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms. Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes did not want to leave. 27 When Ms.
Lim turned around, she saw Mr. Reyes conversing with a Captain Batung whom she later
approached.28 Believing that Captain Batung and Mr. Reyes knew each other, Ms. Lim requested from him the
same favor from Ms. Fruto, i.e., for Captain Batung to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not
invited.29 Still, Mr. Reyes lingered. When Ms. Lim spotted Mr. Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak to
him herself as there were no other guests in the immediate vicinity. 30However, as Mr. Reyes was already helping
himself to the food, she decided to wait. 31 When Mr. Reyes went to a corner and started to eat, Ms. Lim
approached him and said: "alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain,
ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo."32 She then turned around trusting that
Mr. Reyes would show enough decency to leave, but to her surprise, he began screaming and making a big
scene, and even threatened to dump food on her.33 1awphi1.nét

Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the lower court, also gave her version of the story
to the effect that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the party. 34 According to her, it was Mr. Reyes who volunteered
to carry the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he was likewise going to take the elevator, not to the
penthouse but to Altitude 49.35 When they reached the penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes to go down as he
was not properly dressed and was not invited. 36 All the while, she thought that Mr. Reyes already left the place,
but she later saw him at the bar talking to Col. Batung.37 Then there was a commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes
shouting.38 She ignored Mr. Reyes.39 She was embarrassed and did not want the celebrant to think that she
invited him.40
After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint,41 giving more credence to the testimony of Ms.
Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court likewise ratiocinated that Mr.
Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was uninvited:

Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was not a guest of Mr. Tsuruoka, the birthday celebrant.
He assumed the risk of being asked to leave for attending a party to which he was not invited by the host.
Damages are pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of
some right. Thus, no recovery can be had against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim because he himself
was at fault (Garciano v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 436). He knew that it was not the party of defendant
Violeta Filart even if she allowed him to join her and took responsibility for his attendance at the party. His action
against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim must therefore fail. 42

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found more commanding of belief the
testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in a loud voice within hearing distance of several
guests:

In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation, telling him that he should not finish his food and to leave
the place within the hearing distance of other guests is an act which is contrary to morals, good customs . . ., for
which appellees should compensate the appellant for the damage suffered by the latter as a consequence
therefore (Art. 21, New Civil Code). The liability arises from the acts which are in themselves legal or not
prohibited, but contrary to morals or good customs. Conversely, even in the exercise of a formal right, [one]
cannot with impunity intentionally cause damage to another in a manner contrary to morals or good customs. 43

The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Ms. Lim in approaching several people to inquire into
the presence of Mr. Reyes exposed the latter to ridicule and was uncalled for as she should have approached
Dr. Filart first and both of them should have talked to Mr. Reyes in private:

Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should have been done by appellee Lim was to approach
appellee Mrs. Filart and together they should have told appellant Reyes in private that the latter should leave the
party as the celebrant only wanted close friends around. It is necessary that Mrs. Filart be the one to approach
appellant because it was she who invited appellant in that occasion. Were it not for Mrs. Filart’s invitation,
appellant could not have suffered such humiliation. For that, appellee Filart is equally liable.

...

The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration
of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity. Under Article 20 of
the Civil Code, every person who violates this duty becomes liable for damages, especially if said acts were
attended by malice or bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports
a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty to some
motive or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud (Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, et al., 309 SCRA 603). 44

Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Ruby Lim and Dr. Violeta Filart the solidary
obligation to pay Mr. Reyes (1) exemplary damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000);
(2) moral damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); and (3) attorney’s fees in the
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000). 45 On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its
earlier decision as the argument raised in the motion had "been amply discussed and passed upon in the decision
sought to be reconsidered."46

Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim contend that the Court of Appeals seriously erred
in –

I.
… NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA CONSIDERING THAT BY ITS OWN
FINDINGS, AMAY BISAYA WAS A GATE-CRASHER

II.

… HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH DR. FILART FOR
DAMAGES SINCE BY ITS OWN RULING, AMAY BISAYA "COULD NOT HAVE SUFFERED SUCH
HUMILIATION," "WERE IT NOT FOR DR. FILART’S INVITATION"

III.

… DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ALLEGEDLY CAUSED THE HUMILIATION OF AMAY BISAYA

IV.

… IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS TREATED UNJUSTLY BECAUSE OF HIS POVERTY,
CONSIDERING THAT THIS WAS NEVER AN ISSUE AND NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED IN THIS
REGARD

V.

… IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE DEFECTS OF THE APPELLANT’S BRIEF, THEREBY
DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be
made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being embarrassed
and humiliated in the process) as he was a "gate-crasher."

The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury" 47 ) refers to
self-inflicted injury48 or to the consent to injury49 which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has
knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so. 50 As formulated by
petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find application to the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes
assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code,
were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.

Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. "Amay
Bisaya," to leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable under
Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so liable, whether or not Hotel Nikko,
as her employer, is solidarily liable with her.

As the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and irreconcilable conclusions concerning the same
facts and evidence of the case, this Court is left without choice but to use its latent power to review such findings
of facts. Indeed, the general rule is that we are not a trier of facts as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and
revising errors of law.51 One of the exceptions to this general rule, however, obtains herein as the findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court.52 The lower court ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her
right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him politely and discreetly. The appellate court, on the
other hand, held that Ms. Lim is liable for damages as she needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not
to finish his food and to leave the place within hearing distance of the other guests. Both courts, however, were
in agreement that it was Dr. Filart’s invitation that brought Mr. Reyes to the party.

The consequential question then is: Which version is credible?

From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the lower court’s findings of fact.
First, let us put things in the proper perspective.

We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star hotel,53 for-invitation-only, thrown for the hotel’s former
Manager, a Japanese national. Then came a person who was clearly uninvited (by the celebrant)54 and who
could not just disappear into the crowd as his face is known by many, being an actor. While he was already
spotted by the organizer of the party, Ms. Lim, the very person who generated the guest list, it did not yet appear
that the celebrant was aware of his presence. Ms. Lim, mindful of the celebrant’s instruction to keep the party
intimate, would naturally want to get rid of the "gate-crasher" in the most hush-hush manner in order not to call
attention to a glitch in an otherwise seamless affair and, in the process, risk the displeasure of the celebrant, her
former boss. To unnecessarily call attention to the presence of Mr. Reyes would certainly reflect badly on Ms.
Lim’s ability to follow the instructions of the celebrant to invite only his close friends and some of the hotel’s
personnel. Mr. Reyes, upon whom the burden rests to prove that indeed Ms. Lim loudly and rudely ordered him
to leave, could not offer any satisfactory explanation why Ms. Lim would do that and risk ruining a formal and
intimate affair. On the contrary, Mr. Reyes, on cross-examination, had unwittingly sealed his fate by admitting
that when Ms. Lim talked to him, she was very close. Close enough for him to kiss:

Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim approached you while you were at the buffet table? How
close was she when she approached you?

A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other.

Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was that close and she shouted?

A: Yes. She said, "wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado dito, bumaba ka na lang."

Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud voice?

...

A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many. 55

In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule
and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in
the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony
of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court
was correct in observing that –

Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the party was
made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could
have been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. It was plaintiff’s reaction to the request that
must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between them. . .

Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him out. 56

Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyes’s version of the story is that it is unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil
cases that he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes, however, had not presented any witness to back his story up. All
his witnesses – Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva - proved only that it was Dr. Filart who
invited him to the party.57

Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be
made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer,
Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employee. 58

Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, 59 is not a panacea
for all human hurts and social grievances. Article 19 states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.1awphi1.nét

Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be responsible."60 The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be
observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. 61 These standards
are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. 62 Its antithesis,
necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal
right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. 63 When
Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains
to damages arising from a violation of law64 which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her
right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on the other hand, states:

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Article 2165 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal;
(2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to
injure.66

A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, 67 and that is, the act complained of must be intentional. 68

As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by
animosity against him. These two people did not know each other personally before the evening of 13 October
1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lim’s alleged abusive conduct except the
statement that Ms. Lim, being "single at 44 years old," had a "very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes)
possibly influenced by her associates in her work at the hotel with foreign businessmen." 69 The lameness of this
argument need not be belabored. Suffice it to say that a complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code
must necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.

Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and humane
under the circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on the appellate court’s declaration that
Ms. Lim’s act of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited
Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action "predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one person,
which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity."70 Without proof of any ill-motive on
her part, Ms. Lim’s act of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct especially because she did
inquire from Mrs. Filart’s companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes. 71 If at all, Ms. Lim is
guilty only of bad judgment which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.

Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko be made
answerable for exemplary damages72 especially for the reason stated by the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals held –

Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt because of the latter’s lowly station in
life.l^vvphi1.net This has to be limited somewhere. In a democracy, such a limit must be established. Social
equality is not sought by the legal provisions under consideration, but due regard for decency and propriety
(Code Commission, pp. 33-34). And by way of example or correction for public good and to avert further
commission of such acts, exemplary damages should be imposed upon appellees. 73

The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is that it runs counter with the very facts of the case and
the evidence on hand.l^vvphi1.net It is not disputed that at the time of the incident in question, Mr. Reyes was
"an actor of long standing; a co-host of a radio program over DZRH; a Board Member of the Music Singer
Composer (MUSICO) chaired by popular singer Imelda Papin; a showbiz Coordinator of Citizen Crime Watch;
and 1992 official candidate of the KBL Party for Governor of Bohol; and an awardee of a number of humanitarian
organizations of the Philippines."74 During his direct examination on rebuttal, Mr. Reyes stressed that he had
income75 and nowhere did he say otherwise. On the other hand, the records are bereft of any information as to
the social and economic standing of petitioner Ruby Lim. Consequently, the conclusion reached by the appellate
court cannot withstand scrutiny as it is without basis.

All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered
through Ms. Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his
to bear alone.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its Resolution dated 09 July
2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.

Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.

Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set aside the
Decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October
1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503.
Presented is the issue of whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the
basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The antecedents of this case are not complicated:

On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a
complaint2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She
alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral
character and reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen
residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course
at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed
to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get
married after the end of the school semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private
respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20
August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she
began living with him; a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change;
he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a
confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint,
petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is
already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the
petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses
amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just
and equitable. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.

In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as averred
in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative
Defenses. He thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private
respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment;
he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived
him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of the
barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a
result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered
mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses
and P25,000.00 as moral damages.

After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order4 embodying the
stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:

1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the
defendant is single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City
since September 1, 1987 up to the present;

2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan City, College of
Medicine, second year medicine proper;

3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez Avenue,

Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school graduate;

4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the Mabuhay
Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.

After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a
decision5 favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and
attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:

IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant.

1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand (P20,000.00)
pesos as moral damages.

2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three thousand (P3,000.00)
pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay
the costs.

3. All other claims are denied.6

The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private respondent
were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits
to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private
respondent, d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e)
by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents — in accordance with Filipino customs
and traditions — made some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by
looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill
his promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine
hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full
credit to the private respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and courage
to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false. 7

The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence for the private
respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:

According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she never had a
boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few days after they first met. He later
proposed marriage to her several times and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of
marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same day he went with her to her hometown of Bañaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and inform them of their relationship
and their intention to get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of
defendant with members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that
occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that he intended to marry her
during the semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents thought he was good
and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to marry their daughter, and they likewise
allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that they were in
Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live
together in defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987, defendant would
tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock
in the morning that made her sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a result of
this live-in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort
the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to
marry her until he told her that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in
Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter
consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her
lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain went to talk to
defendant to still convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do so
because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the
parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.

Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed them of his desire
to marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the
reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends
to the forthcoming wedding. 8

Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the case as CA-
G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,9 he contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of
factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and
costs.

On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's
ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the following
analysis:

First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was already 29 years old
at the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin
 prior to her unfortunate experience with defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described
by the lower court, a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern urban life", and
certainly would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise made by the
defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant must
have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have thought because of the deception of
defendant, for otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to be photographed with defendant
in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E".
We cannot believe, therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a
waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he went to
plaintiff's hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on
February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the manager
and employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1,
1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her daughter (pp. 55-56,
tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he was involved in the serious study of
medicine to go to plaintiff's hometown in Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of
special relationship between them? And this special relationship must indeed have led to
defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff, communicated not only to her but also to
her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where plaintiff was working and
where defendant first proposed marriage to her, also knew of this love affair and defendant's
proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the reason why plaintiff resigned from
her job at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).

Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral character and must
think so low and have so little respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted that
when he studied in Bacolod City for several years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he
came to Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other
words, he also lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just like
what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or remorse in
pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order
to satisfy his lust on her. 11

and then concluded:

In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her
virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would
keep said promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part that
made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed
marriage. And as these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good
customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our
women, coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of our people
and taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our institutions of learning, defendant-
appellant should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to
compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower court
ordered him to do in its decision in this case. 12

Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises therein the single
issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13

It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral wrong or
injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private
respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs,
traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino
customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He
stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or
tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a
Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does
not posses good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as their
marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with
the private respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in
relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally,
petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private
respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the special
circumstances of the case. The mere breach of promise is not actionable. 14

On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and the petitioner had
filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.

As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear
that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in
this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the
latter court having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and
manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered,
might affect the result of the case. 15

Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of
substance or values which could alter the result of the case.

Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence
introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus,
in Medina vs.Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures
(Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of
discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590
Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellate and appellee
(Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of
Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based
(Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of
Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence
on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).

Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted exceptions in this case.
Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts must be respected.

And now to the legal issue.

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor
is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:

The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has
been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise
suits in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily
to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the
abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the American states. . .
. 19

This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of
torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20

As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:

But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by
positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many
victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral
injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the
proposed Civil Code the following rule:

Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.

An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old
daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl
becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years
of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though
the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and family have suffered
incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the
proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.

Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal
remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to
provide for specifically in the statutes. 21

Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.

is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict,
known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American
or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only
negligence, but international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and
deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible
for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed
by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the
Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21,
would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together
 with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil
wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's
promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation
to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual
congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme
or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could
justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the
fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is
essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy.

In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of
love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with
him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and
deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory
to their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished
possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by
the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal
seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private
respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.

Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry where
the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,25 this Court denied
recovery of damages to the woman because:

. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because
he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant — who was around thirty-six
(36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance
agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice
pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself"
to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a
fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.

In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had been moral
seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not convinced that such seduction existed. The
following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case:

The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code
Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had been seduced. The essential
feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise
of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of
confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura,
27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).

It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —

To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or

inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other
inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from
mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She must
be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts,
persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and
which result in her person to ultimately submitting her person to the sexual
embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
 And in American Jurisprudence we find:

On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or

deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient
to warrant a recovery.

Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire of
curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed
opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a
recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and
would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift
to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)

xxx xxx xxx

Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to
1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain intimate sexual relations with
appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of
seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been
deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of
the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without
exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual
relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his defendant did not intend to fulfill
his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no
other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in
dismissing the complaint. 27

In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from this Court,
opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be
recovered:

. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to mutual lust.
(Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7
Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words,
if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a
chance that there was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will prosper.
If it be the other way around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because here mutual
lust has intervened). . . .

together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the wedding
presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).

Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:

It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists, notwithstanding the
incorporation of the present article31 in the Code. The example given by the Code Commission is
correct, if there was seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of
deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying circumstance
of abuse of authority or influence, but the woman, already of age, has knowingly given herself to
a man, it cannot be said that there is an injury which can be the basis for indemnity.

But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the action lies. The court,
however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman under the
circumstances, because an act which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute
 deceit as to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act and
a resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable under the criminal
law and there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.

We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for argument's
sake, that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to
him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid
down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter
even goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their relationship,
it is primarily because of her own doing, 33 for:

. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner or later. Take
notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress
(TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can
give her economic security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53,
May 18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may have been
offered by the petitioner. 34

These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a
condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior
educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the
very beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so
circumstances could not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry
were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that
indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted
satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she
would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and
brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner
committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to
act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his obligations.

No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.

The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not have been
impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust,
but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode
for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not,
therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal
in guilt or in legal fault." 35At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.

Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression has
been brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the
original wrong principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud. 36

In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:

Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no action by one against
the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been interpreted as applicable only
where the fault on both sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is
literate or intelligent and the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).

We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that this Court
condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room
in their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their
daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, with
costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-17396 May 30, 1962

CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee.

Cecilio L. Pe for and in his own behalf as plaintiff-appellant.

Leodegario L. Mogol for defendant-appellee.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Plaintiffs brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover moral, compensatory,
exemplary and corrective damages in the amount of P94,000.00 exclusive of attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation.

Defendant, after denying some allegations contained in the complaint, set up as a defense that the facts alleged
therein, even if true, do not constitute a valid cause of action.

After trial, the lower court, after finding that defendant had carried on a love affair with one Lolita Pe, an unmarried
woman, being a married man himself, declared that defendant cannot be held liable for moral damages it
appearing that plaintiffs failed to prove that defendant, being aware of his marital status, deliberately and in bad
faith tried to win Lolita's affection. So it rendered decision dismissing the complaint.1äwphï1.ñët

Plaintiffs brought this case on appeal before this Court on the ground that the issues involved are purely of law.

The facts as found by the trial court are: Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the
time of her disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a married man
and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. He used to stay in the town of Gasan,
Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying with her parents in the same town.
Defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of Lolita's father. Because
of such fact and the similarity in their family name, defendant became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him
as a member of their family. Sometime in 1952, defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he
wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted
clandestine trysts not only in the town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school.
They exchanged love notes with each other the contents of which reveal not only their infatuation for each other
but also the extent to which they had carried their relationship. The rumors about their love affairs reached the
ears of Lolita's parents sometime, in 1955, and since then defendant was forbidden from going to their house
and from further seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a
Chinese national. The affair between defendant and Lolita continued nonetheless.

Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters at their residence at 54-B España
Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. After she left, her brothers and
sisters checked up her thing and found that Lolita's clothes were gone. However, plaintiffs found a note on a
crumpled piece of paper inside Lolita's aparador. Said note, written on a small slip of paper approximately 4" by
3" in size, was in a handwriting recognized to be that of defendant's. In English it reads:

Honey, suppose I leave here on Sunday night, and that's 13th of this month and we will have a date on
the 14th, that's Monday morning at 10 a.m.

Reply

Love

The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the NBI but up to the present there is no
news or trace of her whereabouts.

The present action is based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code which provides:

Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner which is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

There is no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on the fact that defendant, being a married
man, carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby causing plaintiffs injury in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy. But in spite of the fact that plaintiffs have clearly established that in illicit affair was
carried on between defendant and Lolita which caused great damage to the name and reputation of plaintiffs
who are her parents, brothers and sisters, the trial court considered their complaint not actionable for the reason
that they failed to prove that defendant deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection Thus, the trial
court said: "In the absence of proof on this point, the court may not presume that it was the defendant who
deliberately induced such relationship. We cannot be unmindful of the uncertainties and sometimes inexplicable
mysteries of the human emotions. It is a possibility that the defendant and Lolita simply fell in love with each
other, not only without any desire on their part, but also against their better judgment and in full consciousness
of what it will bring to both of them. This is specially so with respect to Lolita, being an unmarried woman, falling
in love with defendant who is a married man."

We disagree with this view. The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead,
to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the
extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita
on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to
the latter's family who was allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a
member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not
only in Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit
affairs reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house and even from
seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national.
Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home.
Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately,
but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit
relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that
he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the
sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigations. Costs against
appellee.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS, respondents.
Atencia & Arias Law Offices for petitioners.
Romulo C. Felizmena for private respondent.

CORTES, J.:

Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation
(GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering
operations manager. In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent
transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos.

According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the anomalies and reported them on
November 10, 1972 to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was
then the Executive Vice-President and General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY.

On November 11, 1972, one day after private respondent Tobias made the report, petitioner Hendry confronted
him by stating that he was the number one suspect, and ordered him to take a one week forced leave, not to
communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave the office keys.

On November 20, 1972, when private respondent Tobias returned to work after the forced leave, petitioner
Hendry went up to him and called him a "crook" and a "swindler." Tobias was then ordered to take a lie detector
test. He was also instructed to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature, and initials for examination by the
police investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies.

On December 6,1972, the Manila police investigators submitted a laboratory crime report (Exh. "A") clearing
private respondent of participation in the anomalies.

Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator, retired Col. Jose G. Fernandez, who
on December 10, 1972, submitted a report (Exh. "2") finding Tobias guilty. This report however expressly stated
that further investigation was still to be conducted.

Nevertheless, on December 12, 1972, petitioner Hendry issued a memorandum suspending Tobias from work
preparatory to the filing of criminal charges against him.

On December 19,1972, Lt. Dioscoro V. Tagle, Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner, after investigating
other documents pertaining to the alleged anomalous transactions, submitted a second laboratory crime report
(Exh. "B") reiterating his previous finding that the handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing in the checks
and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions were not those of Tobias. The lie detector tests
conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results.

Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the anomalies and the fact that the report of the
private investigator, was, by its own terms, not yet complete, petitioners filed with the City Fiscal of Manila a
complaint for estafa through falsification of commercial documents, later amended to just estafa. Subsequently
five other criminal complaints were filed against Tobias, four of which were for estafa through Falsification of
commercial document while the fifth was for of Article 290 of' the Revised Penal Code (Discovering Secrets
Through Seizure of Correspondence).lâwphî1.ñèt Two of these complaints were refiled with the Judge Advocate
General's Office, which however, remanded them to the fiscal's office. All of the six criminal complaints were
dismissed by the fiscal. Petitioners appealed four of the fiscal's resolutions dismissing the criminal complaints
with the Secretary of Justice, who, however, affirmed their dismissal.

In the meantime, on January 17, 1973, Tobias received a notice (Exh. "F") from petitioners that his employment
has been terminated effective December 13, 1972. Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
reversed the labor arbiter's decision. However, the Secretary of Labor, acting on petitioners' appeal from the
NLRC ruling, reinstated the labor arbiter's decision. Tobias appealed the Secretary of Labor's order with the
Office of the President. During the pendency of the appeal with said office, petitioners and private respondent
Tobias entered into a compromise agreement regarding the latter's complaint for illegal dismissal.

Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO). However,
petitioner Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed
by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty.

Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive,
and abusive acts of petitioners. Petitioner Hendry, claiming illness, did not testify during the hearings. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of
private respondent by ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages,
two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as
exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs. Petitioners appealed the
RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. On the other hand, Tobias appealed as to the amount of damages.
However, the Court of Appeals, an a decision dated August 31, 1987 affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied, the instant petition for review on certiorari was filed.

The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.

Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful exercise of their right to dismiss
private respondent.

On the other hand, private respondent contends that because of petitioners' abusive manner in dismissing him
as well as for the inhuman treatment he got from them, the Petitioners must indemnify him for the damage that
he had suffered.

One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic principles that are
to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order."
[REPORT ON THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39].
The framers of the Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code which merely stated the effects of th e
law, but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate
certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience" and which were also meant to serve as "guides
for human conduct [that] should run as golden threads through society, to the end that law may approach its
supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of justice" (Id.) Foremost among these principles is that
pronounced in Article 19 which provides:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's
duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty
and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms
of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or
granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a
rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide
a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.

Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law, provides that:
 Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.

However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law since they were
merely exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent. This does not, however, leave private
respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that:

Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs
helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury" [Id.] should "vouchsafe adequate
legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for
specifically in the statutes" [Id. it p. 40; See also PNB v. CA, G.R. No. L-27155, May 18,1978, 83 SCRA 237,
247].

In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid test which can be
applied. While the Court has not hesitated to apply Article 19 whether the legal and factual circumstances called
for its application [See for e.g., Velayo v. Shell Co. of the Phil., Ltd., 100 Phil. 186 (1956); PNB v.
CA, supra; Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. v. Espino, Jr., G.R. No. L-48250, December 28, 1979, 94 SCRA 953;
PAL v. CA, G.R. No. L-46558, July 31,1981,106 SCRA 391; United General Industries, Inc, v. Paler G.R. No. L-
30205, March 15,1982,112 SCRA 404; Rubio v. CA, G.R. No. 50911, August 21, 1987, 153 SCRA 183] the
question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article
20 or Article 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. And in the
instant case, the Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances, finds that
all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for
which the latter must now be indemnified.

The trial court made a finding that notwithstanding the fact that it was private respondent Tobias who reported
the possible existence of anomalous transactions, petitioner Hendry "showed belligerence and told plaintiff
(private respondent herein) that he was the number one suspect and to take a one week vacation leave, not to
communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave his keys to said defendant (petitioner
Hendry)" [RTC Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 232]. This, petitioners do not dispute. But regardless of whether or not it
was private respondent Tobias who reported the anomalies to petitioners, the latter's reaction towards the former
upon uncovering the anomalies was less than civil. An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has
committed dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action such as ordering an investigation and
directing the employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be expected
from such employer. But the high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for.
And this reprehensible attitude of petitioners was to continue when private respondent returned to work on
November 20, 1972 after his one week forced leave. Upon reporting for work, Tobias was confronted by Hendry
who said. "Tobby, you are the crook and swindler in this company." Considering that the first report made by the
police investigators was submitted only on December 10, 1972 [See Exh. A] the statement made by petitioner
Hendry was baseless. The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the
investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The
Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the
manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then
the employer is liable for damages to the employee [Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer and Plywood Inc., G.R.
No. L-38088, August 30, 1974, 58 SCRA 771; See also Philippine Refining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-21871,
September 27,1966, 18 SCRA 107] Under the circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to
exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages under
Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.

But petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. Several other tortious acts were committed by
petitioners against Tobias after the latter's termination from work. Towards the latter part of January, 1973, after
the filing of the first of six criminal complaints against Tobias, the latter talked to Hendry to protest the actions
taken against him. In response, Hendry cut short Tobias' protestations by telling him to just confess or else the
company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail. Hendry added that, "You Filipinos
cannot be trusted." The threat unmasked petitioner's bad faith in the various actions taken against Tobias. On
the other hand, the scornful remark about Filipinos as well as Hendry's earlier statements about Tobias being a
"crook" and "swindler" are clear violations of 'Tobias' personal dignity [See Article 26, Civil Code].

The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime in October 1974,
stating that Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Because of the letter, Tobias
failed to gain employment with RETELCO and as a result of which, Tobias remained unemployed for a longer
period of time. For this further damage suffered by Tobias, petitioners must likewise be held liable for damages
consistent with Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Petitioners, however, contend that they have a "moral, if not legal,
duty to forewarn other employers of the kind of employee the plaintiff (private respondent herein) was." [Petition,
p. 14; Rollo, p. 15]. Petitioners further claim that "it is the accepted moral and societal obligation of every man to
advise or warn his fellowmen of any threat or danger to the latter's life, honor or property. And this includes
warning one's brethren of the possible dangers involved in dealing with, or accepting into confidence, a man
whose honesty and integrity is suspect" [Id.]. These arguments, rather than justify petitioners' act, reveal a
seeming obsession to prevent Tobias from getting a job, even after almost two years from the time Tobias was
dismissed.

Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal complaints against Tobias. Petitioners contend
that there is no case against them for malicious prosecution and that they cannot be "penalized for exercising
their right and prerogative of seeking justice by filing criminal complaints against an employee who was their
principal suspect in the commission of forgeries and in the perpetration of anomalous transactions which
defrauded them of substantial sums of money" [Petition, p. 10, Rollo, p. 11].

While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort to the courts for
redress of wrongs and vindication of their rights [Buenaventura v. Sto. Domingo, 103 Phil. 239 (1958)], the right
to institute criminal prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and in bad faith [Ventura v. Bernabe, G.R. No.
L-26760, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 5871.] Hence, in Yutuk V. Manila Electric Co., G.R. No. L-13016, May 31,
1961, 2 SCRA 337, the Court held that the right to file criminal complaints should not be used as a weapon to
force an alleged debtor to pay an indebtedness. To do so would be a clear perversion of the function of the
criminal processes and of the courts of justice. And in Hawpia CA, G.R. No. L-20047, June 30, 1967. 20 SCRA
536 the Court upheld the judgment against the petitioner for actual and moral damages and attorney's fees after
making a finding that petitioner, with persistence, filed at least six criminal complaints against respondent, all of
which were dismissed.

To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a design to vex
and humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that the charges were
false and groundless [Manila Gas Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. L-44190, October 30,1980, 100 SCRA 602].
Concededly, the filing of a suit by itself, does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution [Inhelder
Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 52358, May 301983122 SCRA 576]. The mere dismissal by the fiscal of the criminal
complaint is not a ground for an award of damages for malicious prosecution if there is no competent evidence
to show that the complainant had acted in bad faith [Sison v. David, G.R. No. L-11268, January 28,1961, 1 SCRA
60].

In the instant case, however, the trial court made a finding that petitioners acted in bad faith in filing the criminal
complaints against Tobias, observing that:

xxx

Defendants (petitioners herein) filed with the Fiscal's Office of Manila a total of six (6) criminal
cases, five (5) of which were for estafa thru falsification of commercial document and one for
violation of Art. 290 of the Revised Penal Code "discovering secrets thru seizure of
correspondence," and all were dismissed for insufficiency or lack of evidence." The dismissal of
four (4) of the cases was appealed to the Ministry of Justice, but said Ministry invariably sustained
the dismissal of the cases. As above adverted to, two of these cases were refiled with the Judge
Advocate General's Office of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to railroad plaintiffs arrest and
 detention in the military stockade, but this was frustrated by a presidential decree transferring
criminal cases involving civilians to the civil courts.

xxx

To be sure, when despite the two (2) police reports embodying the findings of Lt. Dioscoro Tagle,
Chief Document Examiner of the Manila Police Department, clearing plaintiff of participation or
involvement in the fraudulent transactions complained of, despite the negative results of the lie
detector tests which defendants compelled plaintiff to undergo, and although the police
investigation was "still under follow-up and a supplementary report will be submitted after all the
evidence has been gathered," defendants hastily filed six (6) criminal cases with the city Fiscal's
Office of Manila, five (5) for estafa thru falsification of commercial document and one (1) for
violation of Art. 290 of the Revised Penal Code, so much so that as was to be expected, all six
(6) cases were dismissed, with one of the investigating fiscals, Asst. Fiscal de Guia, commenting
in one case that, "Indeed, the haphazard way this case was investigated is evident. Evident
likewise is the flurry and haste in the filing of this case against respondent Tobias," there can be
no mistaking that defendants would not but be motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to
harass, oppress, and cause damage to plaintiff.

xxx

[RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 235-236].

In addition to the observations made by the trial court, the Court finds it significant that the criminal complaints
were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case filed by Tobias against petitioners. This explains the
haste in which the complaints were filed, which the trial court earlier noted. But petitioners, to prove their good
faith, point to the fact that only six complaints were filed against Tobias when they could have allegedly filed one
hundred cases, considering the number of anomalous transactions committed against GLOBE MACKAY.
However, petitioners' good faith is belied by the threat made by Hendry after the filing of the first complaint that
one hundred more cases would be filed against Tobias. In effect, the possible filing of one hundred more cases
was made to hang like the sword of Damocles over the head of Tobias. In fine, considering the haste in which
the criminal complaints were filed, the fact that they were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case
against petitioners, the threat made by Hendry, the fact that the cases were filed notwithstanding the two police
reports exculpating Tobias from involvement in the anomalies committed against GLOBE MACKAY, coupled by
the eventual dismissal of all the cases, the Court is led into no other conclusion than that petitioners were
motivated by malicious intent in filing the six criminal complaints against Tobias.

Petitioners next contend that the award of damages was excessive. In the complaint filed against petitioners,
Tobias prayed for the following: one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) as actual damages; fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages; eight hundred thousand pesos (P800,000.00) as moral damages;
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney's fees; and costs. The trial court, after making a computation of
the damages incurred by Tobias [See RTC Decision, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 154-1551, awarded him the following:
eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages; two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral
damages; twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages; thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as
attorney's fees; and, costs. It must be underscored that petitioners have been guilty of committing several
actionable tortious acts, i.e., the abusive manner in which they dismissed Tobias from work including the
baseless imputation of guilt and the harassment during the investigations; the defamatory language heaped on
Tobias as well as the scornful remark on Filipinos; the poison letter sent to RETELCO which resulted in Tobias'
loss of possible employment; and, the malicious filing of the criminal complaints. Considering the extent of the
damage wrought on Tobias, the Court finds that, contrary to petitioners' contention, the amount of damages
awarded to Tobias was reasonable under the circumstances.

Yet, petitioners still insist that the award of damages was improper, invoking the principle of damnum
absque injuria. It is argued that "[t]he only probable actual damage that plaintiff (private respondent herein) could
have suffered was a direct result of his having been dismissed from his employment, which was a valid and legal
act of the defendants-appellants (petitioners herein).lâwphî1.ñèt " [Petition, p. 17; Rollo, p. 18].
According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not constitute a violation of a
legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable [Escano v. CA, G.R. No. L-47207, September 25, 1980,
100 SCRA 197; See also Gilchrist v. Cuddy 29 Phil, 542 (1915); The Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw, G.R. No. L-
18805, August 14, 1967, 20 SCRA 987]. This principle finds no application in this case. It bears repeating that
even granting that petitioners might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which
that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the
damage incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive manner in which he was dismissed but
was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners.

Petitioners next question the award of moral damages. However, the Court has already ruled in Wassmer v.
Velez, G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964, 12 SCRA 648, 653, that [p]er express provision of Article 2219
(10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code."
Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no error in awarding moral damages to Tobias.

Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners. Although Article 2231 of the Civil Code
provides that "[i]n quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence," the Court, in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., G.R. No. L- 28589, January 8, 1973, 49
SCRA 1, ruled that if gross negligence warrants the award of exemplary damages, with more reason is its
imposition justified when the act performed is deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad faith. As in
the Zulueta case, the nature of the wrongful acts shown to have been committed by petitioners against Tobias
is sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages to the latter.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09055
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 132344 February 17, 2000

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner,

vs.
ROMEO A. JADER, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

May an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a student into believing that the latter
had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case? This is the issue in the instant
petition for review premised on the following undisputed facts as summarized by the trial court and adopted by
the Court of Appeals (CA),1 to wit:

Plaintiff was enrolled in the defendants' College of Law from 1984 up to 1988. In the first semester of his
last year (School year 1987-1988), he failed to take the regular final examination in Practice Court I for
which he was given an incomplete grade (Exhibits "2", also Exhibit "H"). He enrolled for the second
semester as fourth year law student (Exhibit "A") and on February 1, 1988 he filed an application for the
removal of the incomplete grade given him by Professor Carlos Ortega (Exhibits "H-2", also Exhibit "2")
 which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after payment of the required fee. He took the
examination on March 28, 1988. On May 30, 1988, Professor Carlos Ortega submitted his grade. It was
a grade of five (5). (Exhibits "H-4", also Exhibits "2-L", "2-N").1âwphi1.nêt

In the meantime, the Dean and the Faculty Members of the College of Law met to deliberate on who
among the fourth year students should be allowed to graduate. The plaintiff's name appeared in the
Tentative List of Candidates for graduation for the Degree of Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) as of Second
Semester (1987-1988) with the following annotation:

JADER ROMEO A.

Def. Conflict of Laws — x-1-87-88, Practice Court I Inc., 1-87-88 C-1 to submit transcript with S.O.
(Exhibits "3", "3-C-1", "3-C-2").

The 35th Investitures & Commencement Ceremonies for the candidates of Bachelor of Laws was
scheduled on the 16th of April 1988 at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, and in the invitation for that occasion
the name of the plaintiff appeared as one of the candidates. (Exhibits "B", "B-6", "B-6-A"). At the foot of
the list of the names of the candidates there appeared however the following annotation:

This is a tentative list Degrees will be conferred upon these candidates who satisfactorily complete
requirements as stated in the University Bulletin and as approved of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (Exhibit "B-7-A").

The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies at F. dela Cruz Quadrangle, U.E., Recto Campus, during
the program of which he went up the stage when his name was called, escorted by her (sic) mother and
his eldest brother who assisted in placing the Hood, and his Tassel was turned from left to right, and he
was thereafter handed by Dean Celedonio a rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of the Law Diploma.
His relatives took pictures of the occasion (Exhibits "C" to "C-6", "D-3" to "D-11").

He tendered a blow-out that evening which was attended by neighbors, friends and relatives who wished
him good luck in the forthcoming bar examination. There were pictures taken too during the blow-out
(Exhibits "D" to "D-1").

He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He took a leave of absence without pay from his
job from April 20, 1988 to September 30, 1988 (Exhibit "G") and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in
Far Eastern University. (Exhibits "F" to "F-2"). Having learned of the deficiency he dropped his review
class and was not able to take the bar examination. 2

Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered moral shock, mental anguish,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights when he was not able to take
the 1988 bar examinations arising from the latter's negligence. He prayed for an award of moral and exemplary
damages, unrealized income, attorney's fees, and costs of suit.

In its answer with counterclaim, petitioner denied liability arguing mainly that it never led respondent to believe
that he completed the requirements for a Bachelor of Laws degree when his name was included in the tentative
list of graduating students. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant ordering the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
SEVENTY PESOS (P35,470.00) with legal rate of interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid,
the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees and the cost of suit.

Defendant's counterclaim is, for lack of merit, hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.3
which on appeal by both parties was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) with modification. The dispositive
portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the lower Court's Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that defendant-appellee, in addition to the sum adjudged by the lower court in favor of
plaintiff-appellant, is also ORDERED to pay plaintiff-appellant the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
(P50,000.00) PESOS for moral damages. Costs against defendant-appellee.

SO ORDERED.4

Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner UE elevated the case to this Court on a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, arguing that it has no liability to respondent Romeo A. Jader,
considering that the proximate and immediate cause of the alleged damages incurred by the latter arose out of
his own negligence in not verifying from the professor concerned the result of his removal exam.

The petition lacks merit.

When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning institution, a contract of education is entered into
between said institution and the student. The professors, teachers or instructors hired by the school are
considered merely as agents and administrators tasked to perform the school's commitment under the contract.
Since the contracting parties are the school and the student, the latter is not duty-bound to deal with the former's
agents, such as the professors with respect to the status or result of his grades, although nothing prevents either
professors or students from sharing with each other such information. The Court takes judicial notice of the
traditional practice in educational institutions wherein the professor directly furnishes his/her students their
grades. It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information
to each and every student as to whether he or she had already complied with all the requirements for the
conferment of a degree or whether they would be included among those who will graduate. Although
commencement exercises are but a formal ceremony, it nonetheless is not an ordinary occasion, since such
ceremony is the educational institution's way of announcing to the whole world that the students included in the
list of those who will be conferred a degree during the baccalaureate ceremony have satisfied all the
requirements for such degree. Prior or subsequent to the ceremony, the school has the obligation to promptly
inform the student of any problem involving the latter's grades and performance and also most importantly, of
the procedures for remedying the same.

Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination, particularly at a time when
he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence
of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for
abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking
undue advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of the law, together with the absence of
all information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious. 5 It is the school that has access
to those information and it is only the school that can compel its professors to act and comply with its rules,
regulations and policies with respect to the computation and the prompt submission of grades. Students do not
exercise control, much less influence, over the way an educational institution should run its affairs, particularly
in disciplining its professors and teachers and ensuring their compliance with the school's rules and orders. Being
the party that hired them, it is the school that exercises general supervision and exclusive control over the
professors with respect to the submission of reports involving the students' standing. Exclusive control means
that no other person or entity had any control over the instrumentality which caused the damage or injury. 6

The college dean is the senior officer responsible for the operation of an academic program, enforcement of
rules and regulations, and the supervision of faculty and student services. 7 He must see to it that his own
professors and teachers, regardless of their status or position outside of the university, must comply with the
rules set by the latter. The negligent act of a professor who fails to observe the rules of the school, for instance
by not promptly submitting a student's grade, is not only imputable to the professor but is an act of the school,
being his employer.
Considering further, that the institution of learning involved herein is a university which is engaged in legal
education, it should have practiced what it inculcates in its students, more specifically the principle of good
dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code which states:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.

Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of
moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law. 8 In civilized society,
men must be able to assume that others will do them no intended injury — that others will commit no internal
aggressions upon them; that their fellowmen, when they act affirmatively will do so with due care which the
ordinary understanding and moral sense of the community exacts and that those with whom they deal in the
general course of society will act in good faith. The ultimate thing in the theory of liability is justifiable reliance
under conditions of civilized society.9 Schools and professors cannot just take students for granted and be
indifferent to them, for without the latter, the former are useless.

Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for the latter
to inquire from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the person/persons
who may be affected by his act or omission can support a claim for damages. 10 Want of care to the conscious
disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to produce
them would make the erring party liable. 11 Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the essence in the
performance of its obligation to inform respondent of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that respondent will not
prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B.
graduate. It failed to act seasonably. Petitioner cannot just give out its student's grades at any time because a
student has to comply with certain deadlines set by the Supreme Court on the submission of requirements for
taking the bar. Petitioner's liability arose from its failure to promptly inform respondent of the result of an
examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he had satisfied all requirements for the course. Worth
quoting is the following disquisition of the respondent court:

It is apparent from the testimony of Dean Tiongson that defendant-appellee University had been informed
during the deliberation that the professor in Practice Court I gave plaintiff-appellant a failing grade. Yet,
defendant-appellee still did not inform plaintiff-appellant of his failure to complete the requirements for
the degree nor did they remove his name from the tentative list of candidates for graduation. Worse,
defendant-appellee university, despite the knowledge that plaintiff-appellant failed in Practice Court
I, again included plaintiff-appellant's name in the "tentative list of candidates for graduation which was
prepared after the deliberation and which became the basis for the commencement rites program. Dean
Tiongson reasons out that plaintiff-appellant's name was allowed to remain in the tentative list of
candidates for graduation in the hope that the latter would still be able to remedy the situation in the
remaining few days before graduation day. Dean Tiongson, however, did not explain how plaintiff
appellant Jader could have done something to complete his deficiency if defendant-appellee university
did not exert any effort to inform plaintiff-appellant of his failing grade in Practice Court I. 12

Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its own negligence that led to the delayed relay of
information to respondent. When one of two innocent parties must suffer, he through whose agency the loss
occurred must bear it.13 The modern tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is abuse
of right, even when the act is not illicit.14 If mere fault or negligence in one's acts can make him liable for damages
for injury caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. A person should be
protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in
good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. 15

However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to respondent for the latter's actual damages,
we hold that respondent should not have been awarded moral damages. We do not agree with the Court of
Appeals' findings that respondent suffered shock, trauma and pain when he was informed that he could not
graduate and will not be allowed to take the bar examinations. At the very least, it behooved on respondent to
verify for himself whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations.
As a senior law student, respondent should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs,
specifically those pertaining to his academic achievement, are in order. Given these considerations, we fail to
see how respondent could have suffered untold embarrassment in attending the graduation rites, enrolling in the
bar review classes and not being able to take the bar exams. If respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure
to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements including his
school records, before preparing himself for the bar examination. Certainly, taking the bar examinations does
not only entail a mental preparation on the subjects thereof; there are also prerequisites of documentation and
submission of requirements which the prospective examinee must meet.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is
ORDERED to PAY respondent the sum of Thirty-five Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with
legal interest of 6% per annum computed from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid; the amount of
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees; and the costs of the suit. The award of moral damages is
DELEIED.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 151866 September 9, 2004

SOLEDAD CARPIO, petitioner,

vs.
LEONORA A. VALMONTE, respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:
Assailed in the instant petition for review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
69537,1promulgated on 17 January 2002.2 The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision denying
respondent’s claim for damages against petitioner and ordered the latter to pay moral damages to the former in
the amount ofP100,000.00.

Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Michelle del Rosario and Jon Sierra engaged her
services for their church wedding on 10 October 1996. At about 4:30 p.m. on that day, Valmonte went to the
Manila Hotel where the bride and her family were billeted. When she arrived at Suite 326-A, several persons
were already there including the bride, the bride’s parents and relatives, the make-up artist and his assistant, the
official photographers, and the fashion designer. Among those present was petitioner Soledad Carpio, an aunt
of the bride who was preparing to dress up for the occasion.

After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite carrying the items needed for the wedding rites and
the gifts from the principal sponsors. She proceeded to the Maynila Restaurant where the reception was to be
held. She paid the suppliers, gave the meal allowance to the band, and went back to the suite. Upon entering
the suite, Valmonte noticed the people staring at her. It was at this juncture that petitioner allegedly uttered the
following words to Valmonte: "Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta?
Ikaw lang and lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha." Petitioner then ordered one of the ladies to search
Valmonte’s bag. It turned out that after Valmonte left the room to attend to her duties, petitioner discovered that
the pieces of jewelry which she placed inside the comfort room in a paper bag were lost. The jewelry pieces
consist of two (2) diamond rings, one (1) set of diamond earrings, bracelet and necklace with a total value of
about one million pesos. The hotel security was called in to help in the search. The bags and personal belongings
of all the people inside the room were searched. Valmonte was allegedly bodily searched, interrogated and
trailed by a security guard throughout the evening. Later, police officers arrived and interviewed all persons who
had access to the suite and fingerprinted them including Valmonte. During all the time Valmonte was being
interrogated by the police officers, petitioner kept on saying the words "Siya lang ang lumabas ng kwarto."
Valmonte’s car which was parked at the hotel premises was also searched but the search yielded nothing.

A few days after the incident, petitioner received a letter from Valmonte demanding a formal letter of apology
which she wanted to be circulated to the newlyweds’ relatives and guests to redeem her smeared reputation as
a result of petitioner’s imputations against her. Petitioner did not respond to the letter. Thus, on 20 February
1997, Valmonte filed a suit for damages against her before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch
268. In her complaint, Valmonte prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay actual, moral and exemplary damages,
as well as attorney’s fees.

Responding to the complaint, petitioner denied having uttered words or done any act to confront or single out
Valmonte during the investigation and claimed that everything that transpired after the theft incident was purely
a police matter in which she had no participation. Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for the
court to adjudge Valmonte liable on her counterclaim.

The trial court rendered its Decision on 21 August 2000, dismissing Valmonte’s complaint for damages. It ruled
that when petitioner sought investigation for the loss of her jewelry, she was merely exercising her right and if
damage results from a person exercising his legal right, it is damnum absque injuria. It added that no proof was
presented by Valmonte to show that petitioner acted maliciously and in bad faith in pointing to her as the culprit.
The court said that Valmonte failed to show that she suffered serious anxiety, moral shock, social humiliation, or
that her reputation was besmirched due to petitioner’s wrongful act.

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court erred in finding that petitioner did not
slander her good name and reputation and in disregarding the evidence she presented.

The Court of Appeals ruled differently. It opined that Valmonte has clearly established that she was singled out
by petitioner as the one responsible for the loss of her jewelry. It cited the testimony of Serena Manding,
corroborating Valmonte’s claim that petitioner confronted her and uttered words to the effect that she was the
only one who went out of the room and that she was the one who took the jewelry. The appellate court held that
Valmonte’s claim for damages is not predicated on the fact that she was subjected to body search and
interrogation by the police but rather petitioner’s act of publicly accusing her of taking the missing jewelry. It
categorized petitioner’s utterance defamatory considering that it imputed upon Valmonte the crime of theft. The
court concluded that petitioner’s verbal assault upon Valmonte was done with malice and in bad faith since it
was made in the presence of many people without any solid proof except petitioner’s suspicion. Such unfounded
accusation entitles Valmonte to an award of moral damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00 for she was publicly
humiliated, deeply insulted, and embarrassed. However, the court found no sufficient evidence to justify the
award of actual damages.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that the appellate court’s conclusion that she publicly humiliated respondent does not
conform to the evidence presented. She adds that even on the assumption that she uttered the words complained
of, it was not shown that she did so with malice and in bad faith.

In essence, petitioner would want this Court to review the factual conclusions reached by the appellate court.
The cardinal rule adhered to in this jurisdiction is that a petition for review must raise only questions of law, 3 and
judicial review under Rule 45 does not extend to an evaluation of the sufficiency of evidence unless there is a
showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly
erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion. 4 This Court, while not a trier of facts, may review the
evidence in order to arrive at the correct factual conclusion based on the record especially so when the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals are at variance with those of the trial court, or when the inference drawn by the
Court of Appeals from the facts is manifestly mistaken. 5

Contrary to the trial court’s finding, we find sufficient evidence on record tending to prove that petitioner’s
imputations against respondent was made with malice and in bad faith.

Petitioner’s testimony was shorn of substance and consists mainly of denials. She claimed not to have uttered
the words imputing the crime of theft to respondent or to have mentioned the latter’s name to the authorities as
the one responsible for the loss of her jewelry. Well-settled is the rule that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear
and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit no weight in law and cannot be given greater
evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. 6

Respondent, however, has successfully refuted petitioner’s testimony. Quite credibly, she has narrated in great
detail her distressing experience on that fateful day. She testified as to how rudely she was treated by petitioner
right after she returned to the room. Petitioner immediately confronted her and uttered the words "Ikaw lang ang
lumabas ng kwarto. Nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw ang kumuha." Thereafter, her body
was searched including her bag and her car. Worse, during the reception, she was once more asked by the hotel
security to go to the ladies room and she was again bodily searched.7

Sereña Manding, a make-up artist, corroborated respondent’s testimony. She testified that petitioner confronted
respondent in the presence of all the people inside the suite accusing her of being the only one who went out of
the comfort room before the loss of the jewelry. Manding added that respondent was embarrassed because
everybody else in the room thought she was a thief. 8 If only to debunk petitioner’s assertion that she did not utter
the accusatory remarks in question publicly and with malice, Manding’s testimony on the point deserves to be
reproduced. Thus,

Q After that what did she do?

A Then Leo came out from the other room she said, she is (sic) the one I only saw from the comfort
room.

Q Now, what exact word (sic) were said by Mrs. Carpio on that matter?

A She said "siya lang yung nakita kong galing sa C.R."

Q And who was Mrs. Carpio or the defendant referring to?

A Leo Valmonte.

Q Did she say anything else, the defendant?

A Her jewelry were lost and Leo was the only one she saw in the C.R. After that she get (sic) the paper
bag then the jewelry were already gone.

Q Did she confront the plaintiff Mrs. Valmonte regarding that fact?

A Yes.

Q What did the defendant Mrs. Carpio tell the plaintiff, Mrs. Valmonte?

A "Ikaw yung nakita ko sa C.R. nawawala yung alahas ko."

Q When the defendant Mrs. Carpio said that to plaintiff Mrs. Valmonte were there other people inside
the room?

A Yes, sir.

Q Were they able to hear what Mrs. Carpio said to Mrs. Valmonte?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was your thinking at that time that Mrs. Carpio said that to Mrs. Valmonte?

A "Nakakahiya kasi akala ng iba doon na talagang magnanakaw siya. Kasi marami na kaming
nandodoon, dumating na yung couturier pati yung video man and we sir.

Q Who was the person you [were] alleging "na nakakahiya" whose (sic) being accused or being
somebody who stole those item of jewelry?

A "Nakakahiya para kay Leo kasi pinagbibintangan siya. Sa dami namin doon siya yung
napagbintangan."

Q And who is Leo, what is her full name?

A Leo Valmonte.

Q Did the defendant tell this matter to other people inside the room?

A Yes, the mother of the bride.

Q And who else did she talk to?

A The father of the bride also.

Q And what did the defendant tell the mother regarding this matter?

A "Nawawala yung alahas ko." Sabi naman nung mother baka naman hindi mo dala tignan mo munang
mabuti.

Q Who was that other person that she talked to?

 A Father of the bride.9

Significantly, petitioner’s counsel elected not to pursue her cross-examination of the witness on this point
following her terse and firm declaration that she remembered petitioner’s exact defamatory words in answer to
the counsel’s question.10

Jaime Papio, Security Supervisor at Manila Hotel, likewise contradicted petitioner’s allegation that she did not
suspect or mention the name of respondent as her suspect in the loss of the jewelry. 11

To warrant recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action, for a wrong inflicted by the defendant, and
the damage resulting therefrom to the plaintiff. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not
constitute a cause of action.12

In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or omission, whether done willfully or
negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse to obtain relief for the damage or injury he sustained.
Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of equity but also universal moral precepts which are
designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience and which are meant to
serve as guides for human conduct.13 First of these fundamental precepts is the principle commonly known as
"abuse of rights" under Article 19 of the Civil Code. It provides that "Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and
good faith." To find the existence of an abuse of right, the following elements must be present: (1) there is a legal
right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent or prejudicing or injuring another.14 When
a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is
committed for which the actor can be held accountable. 15 One is not allowed to exercise his right in a manner
which would cause unnecessary prejudice to another or if he would thereby offend morals or good customs.
Thus, a person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is when he acts
with prudence and good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.16

Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the provisions of Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code which
read, thus:

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals or
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The foregoing rules provide the legal bedrock for the award of damages to a party who suffers damage
whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal provision, or an act which though not constituting
a transgression of positive law, nevertheless violates certain rudimentary rights of the party aggrieved.

In the case at bar, petitioner’s verbal reproach against respondent was certainly uncalled for considering that by
her own account nobody knew that she brought such kind and amount of jewelry inside the paper bag. 17 This
being the case, she had no right to attack respondent with her innuendos which were not merely inquisitive but
outrightly accusatory. By openly accusing respondent as the only person who went out of the room before the
loss of the jewelry in the presence of all the guests therein, and ordering that she be immediately bodily searched,
petitioner virtually branded respondent as the thief. True, petitioner had the right to ascertain the identity of the
malefactor, but to malign respondent without an iota of proof that she was the one who actually stole the jewelry
is an act which, by any standard or principle of law is impermissible. Petitioner had willfully caused injury to
respondent in a manner which is contrary to morals and good customs. Her firmness and resolve to find her
missing jewelry cannot justify her acts toward respondent. She did not act with justice and good faith for
apparently, she had no other purpose in mind but to prejudice respondent. Certainly, petitioner transgressed the
provisions of Article 19 in relation to Article 21 for which she should be held accountable.
Owing to the rule that great weight and even finality is given to factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals which
affirm those of the trial court,18 we sustain the findings of the trial court and the appellate court that respondent’s
claim for actual damages has not been substantiated with satisfactory evidence during the trial and must
therefore be denied. To be recoverable, actual damages must be duly proved with reasonable degree of certainty
and the courts cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork. 19

Respondent, however, is clearly entitled to an award of moral damages. Moral damages may be awarded
whenever the defendant’s wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury20in the cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code.21 Though no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be adjudicated, courts
are mandated to take into account all the circumstances obtaining in the case and assess damages according
to their discretion.22 Worthy of note is that moral damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant,23 or to
enrich a complainant, but to enable the latter to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to
alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of defendant’s culpable action. In any case, award of
moral damages must be proportionate to the sufferings inflicted.24

Based on the foregoing jurisprudential pronouncements, we rule that the appellate court did not err in awarding
moral damages. Considering respondent’s social standing, and the fact that her profession is based primarily on
trust reposed in her by her clients, the seriousness of the imputations made by petitioner has greatly tarnished
her reputation and will in one way or the other, affect her future dealings with her clients, the award of
₱100,000.00 as moral damages appears to be a fair and reasonable assessment of respondent’s damages.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.

Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in its Civil
Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation and one
million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and
Mena,1 all surnamed "Escaño," respectively. 2

The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:

Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City, where she
was then enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-
do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage
vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock, without
the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo
in the said city. The marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local
civil register.

Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply in love.
Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out their marital future
whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they started saving money in a piggy bank. A few
weeks before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the engagement ring and
accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they
reconciled. This time they planned to get married and then elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had
brought some of her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting place.

Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however, materialize because
when Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who got wind of the intended nuptials,
was already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that she had already
married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escaño were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente,
and were disgusted because of the great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp.
1105-06). The following morning, the Escaño spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a
recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to
the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage.
The recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid,
whose name he claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college students
and disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter
to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the house
of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job
in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's welfare, was not as
endearing as her previous letters when their love was aflame.

Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly accepted
her being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents from communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1 -
Escaño"), but her letters became less frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were
already estranged (Exh. "2-Escaño"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the
scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator
Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed
without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").

On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her application that
she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to
return after two years. The application was approved, and she left for the United States. On 22 August 1950,
she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the
State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character."
On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.

In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage
to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him
in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.

But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño,
whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her
affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the
annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed
a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her
parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.

The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife and to
acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño
for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00,
and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.

The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:

1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escaño liable for damages and
in dismissing the complaint;.

2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doña Mena Escaño liable for
damages;.

3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant parents on their
counterclaims; and.

4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.

That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee, Vicenta
Escaño, were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly established by the
record before us. Both parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise qualified; and both consented
to the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent
witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.

The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as required by
Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation of Church and State but also because
Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at the time) expressly provided that
—

SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting
parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied)

The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and, therefore, not essential
to give the marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage act, which provided the
following:

SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid because of
the absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was performed, the spouses
or one of them believed in good faith that the person who solemnized the marriage was actually
empowered to do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal.

The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be presumed until
the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It
is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the solemnizing priest arose only after
the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very
act of Vicenta in abandoning her original action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an
admission that her marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.

Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the undue influence of
Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for
argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent was vitiated by fraud and
undue influence, such vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the marriage
remained valid until annulled by a competent civil court. This was never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for
annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis was dismissed for non-prosecution.

It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño
remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that
the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County,
State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." At the time the divorce decree
was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. 4 She was then subject to Philippine
law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly
provided:

Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and
in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the
preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the
husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book
1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed"
(Art. 106, subpar. 1).

For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce
betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, specially in view of
the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or
by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to
an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of our
polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.

From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the Nevada
divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil Code,Art.
17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-resident consort cannot confer
jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).

From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this jurisdiction
Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to
plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to
perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a
wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code,
Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the
husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with
Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine
Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of
adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).

The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce are in accord with the
previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly those that were rendered under our laws
prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal
history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and the
present Civil Code of the Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies
on the subject prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act
above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of
particular interest. Said this Court in that case:

As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of Dr. Mory and
Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations; and the circumstance that
they afterwards passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal
significance. The claims of the very children to participate in the estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore
be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural children.
The children of adulterous relations are wholly excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941
of the Civil Code cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis
supplied)

Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage to Leo Moran
after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for the proposition that
such union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal separation on the part of
the innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial
court committed error.

True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person (whether divorced or
not) would depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind are not new in the
Philippines, and the answer to them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:

The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to the members of the
Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by Legislature if they are
constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)

The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.

However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and his wife, the late Doña
Mena Escaño, alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct toward her husband are not
supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the Escaño's animosity toward him
strikes us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own letters written before this
suit was begun (Exh. "2-Escaño" and "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly
apologized to the defendants for "misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive
blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escaño house to visit
and court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that he would not have been accepted to marry Vicente
had he openly asked for her hand, as good manners and breeding demanded. Even after learning of the
clandestine marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected event, the parents of Vicenta proposed and
arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in strict conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice that
the previous one was canonically defective. If no recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was not due
to defendants Mamerto Escaño and his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses
Escaño did not seek to compel or induce their daughter to assent to the recelebration but respected her decision,
or that they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation of affections. Neither does the fact
that Vicenta's parents sent her money while she was in the United States; for it was natural that they should not
wish their daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in her decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am.
Jur. 130-132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her original suit for
annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently, and being of age, she was
entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly
cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not
been shown, good faith being always presumed until the contrary is proved.

SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The law distinguishes between the right of a parent
to interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a stranger to intermeddle
in such affairs. However, such distinction between the liability of parents and that of strangers is only in
regard to what will justify interference. A parent isliable for alienation of affections resulting from his own
malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he
is not liable unless he acts maliciously, without justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable
where he acts and advises his child in good faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the interest
of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating his right and liberty to interest himself
in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and happiness, even where his conduct and advice
suggest or result in the separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where
he acts under mistake or misinformation, or where his advice or interference are indiscreet or unfortunate,
although it has been held that the parent is liable for consequences resulting from recklessness. He may
in good faith take his child into his home and afford him or her protection and support, so long as he has
not maliciously enticed his child away, or does not maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay away,
from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been applied in the case of advice given to a
married daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of advice given to a son.

Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and with having
exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and
anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the
charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not
established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen.

In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant Vicente
Escaño, it is proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable claim for a million pesos in damages,
that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized by publicity or undue
humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived together; and (c) that there is evidence that
appellant had originally agreed to the annulment of the marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid,
being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact
is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open
eyes rather than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion that appellant should
recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's fees.

With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño, by
the court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this unfounded suit must have wounded
said defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their
reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society.
What is important, and has been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that said defendants
were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the
damages awarded to P5,000 only.

Summing up, the Court rules:

(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil
Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage
contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to
validity in the country;

(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitle
the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to recover
damages;

(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of
proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta
F. Escaño;

(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000
for damages and attorneys' fees;

(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the
deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

Neither party to recover costs.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 165661 August 28, 2006

SPS. MARIO & CORAZON VILLALVA, Petitioners,

vs.
RCBC SAVINGS BANK, Respondent.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

This case involves a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which
seeks to reverse the decision of the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. SP No. 76574.

The facts.

In June 1993, petitioner spouses issued forty-eight (48) checks totaling P547,392.00 to cover installment
payments due on promissory notes executed in favor of Toyota, Quezon Avenue (TQA) for the purchase of a
’93 Toyota Corolla. 1 The promissory notes were secured by a Chattel Mortgage executed by the petitioner
spouses on the vehicle in favor of TQA. 2 Under the Deed of Chattel Mortgage, petitioner spouses were to insure
the vehicle against loss or damage by accident, theft and fire, and endorse and deliver the policies to the
mortgagor, viz.:
The MORTGAGOR covenants and agrees that he/it will cause the property(ies) hereinabove mortgaged to be
insured against loss or damage by accident, theft and fire for a period of one year from date hereof with an
insurance company or companies acceptable to the MORTGAGEE in an amount not less than the outstanding
balance of the mortgage obligations and that he/it will make all loss, if any, under such policy or policies, payable
to the MORTGAGEE or its assigns as its interest may appear and deliver such policy to the MORTGAGEE
forthwith. The said MORTGAGOR further covenants and agrees that in default of his/its effecting such insurance
and delivering the policies so endorsed to the MORTGAGEE on the day of the execution of this mortgage, the
MORTGAGEE may at its option, but without any obligation to do so, effect such insurance for the account of the
MORTGAGOR and that any money so disbursed by the MORTGAGEE shall be added to the principal
indebtedness, hereby secured and shall become due and payable at the time for the payment of the first
installment to be due under the note aforesaid after the date of such insurance and shall bear interest and/or
finance charge at the same rate as the principal indebtedness. The MORTGAGOR hereby irrevocably authorizes
the MORTGAGEE or its assigns to procure for the account of the MORTGAGOR the insurance coverage every
year thereafter until the mortgage obligation is fully paid and any money so disbursed shall be payable and shall
bear interest and/or finance charge in the same manner as stipulated in the next preceding sentence. It is
understood that MORTGAGEE has no obligation to carry out aforementioned authority to procure insurance for
the account of the MORTGAGOR. 3

On June 22, 1993, the promissory notes and chattel mortgage were assigned to Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation (RCBC). 4 They were later assigned by RCBC to RCBC Savings Bank. 5 In time, all forty-eight (48)
checks issued by the petitioner spouses were encashed by respondent RCBC Savings Bank. 6

The evidence shows that the petitioner spouses faithfully complied with the obligation to insure the mortgaged
vehicle from 1993 until 1996. 7 For the period of August 14, 1996 to August 14, 1997, 8 petitioner spouses
procured the necessary insurance but did not deliver the same to the respondent until January 17, 1997. 9 As a
consequence, respondent had the mortgaged vehicle insured for the period of October 21, 1996 to October 21,
1997 and paid a P14,523.36 insurance premium. 10 The insurance policy obtained by respondent was later
cancelled due to the insurance policy secured by petitioner spouses over the mortgaged vehicle, and respondent
bank was reimbursed P10,939.86 by Malayan Insurance Company. 11 The premium paid by respondent bank
exceeded the reimbursed amount paid by Malayan Insurance Company by P3,583.50.

On February 10, 1999, respondent sent a letter of demand to the petitioners for P12,361.02 allegedly
representing unpaid obligations on the promissory notes and mortgage as of January 31, 1999. In lieu thereof,
respondent demanded that petitioner spouses surrender the mortgaged vehicle within five days from
notice. 12 The petitioner spouses ignored the demand letter.

On April 5, 1999, respondent, in order to get the ’93 Toyota Corolla, filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession
with Replevin with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City, which was raffled to Branch 45 thereof. 13 Two
weeks later, or on April 19, 1999, the respondent caused the enforcement of a writ of replevin and recovered
possession of the mortgaged vehicle. 14 On June 18, 1999, petitioner spouses filed their Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim for moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. 15 Petitioners asserted that they
insured the mortgaged vehicle in compliance with the Deed of Chattel Mortgage.

On June 28, 2002, the Metropolitan Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners and ordered respondent
to pay petitioner spouses P100,000.00 in moral damages, P50,000.00 in exemplary damages, P25,000.00 in
attorney’s fees, and the costs and expenses of litigation. 16 Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied
on September 16, 2002. 17

Respondent appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City on October 3, 2002. 18 The case
was raffled to Branch 114. On March 21, 2003, the Regional Trial Court affirmed the judgment of the Metropolitan
Trial Court in toto. 19

Undaunted, the respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Rule 42 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the March 21, 2003 decision of the Regional Trial Court. 20 On July 8, 2004,
the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. It ordered petitioner spouses to pay
respondent P3,583.50 within thirty days of finality of the decision, and issued a writ of replevin as regards the
mortgaged vehicle. 21 Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied, hence, the present petition for
certiorari.

The petitioners alleged that in ruling against them, the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to consider two
pieces of evidence: (1) an Acknowledgment Receipt dated January 17, 1997, which shows that the premium for
the second insurance policy had been refunded to the respondent bank; and (2) an Endorsement by the Malayan
Insurance Company dated June 11, 1997, which shows that petitioners handed the required insurance policy to
the respondent. The petitioners also point out that the respondent was furnished a copy of the insurance policy
on January 17, 1997. 22

On the other hand, respondent contends that petitioners seek a review of factual findings which the Supreme
Court cannot do as it is not a trier of facts. 23 It further argues that no reversible errors were made by the Court
of Appeals, and to set aside its decision would result in the unjust enrichment of the petitioners. 24

We rule for the petitioners.

The key issue is whether petitioners failed to comply with their obligation to insure the subject vehicle under the
Deed of Chattel Mortgage. The Deed of Chattel Mortgage requires that the petitioners (1) secure the necessary
insurance and (2) deliver the policies so endorsed to the respondent on the day of the execution of this mortgage.

We hold that petitioners did not default in the performance of their obligation. As a rule, demand is required
before a party may be considered in default. 25 However, demand by a creditor is not necessary in order that
delay may exist: (1) when the obligation or the law expressly so declares; (2) when from the nature and the
circumstances of the obligation it appears that the designation of the time when the thing is to be delivered or
the service is to be rendered was a controlling motive for the establishment of the contract; or (3) when demand
would be useless, as when the obligor has rendered it beyond his power to perform. None of the exceptions are
present in this case. It is clear from the records that the first and third exceptions are inapplicable. The second
exception cannot also be applied in light of our ruling in Servicewide Specialists, Incorporated v. Court of
Appeals. 26 In that case, this Court observed that the Deed of Chattel Mortgage required that two conditions
should be met before the mortgagee could secure the required insurance: (1) default by the mortgagors in
effecting renewal of the insurance, and (2) failure to deliver the policy with endorsement to mortgagee. The
mortgagee contended that notice was not required due to the nature of the obligation, and that it was entitled to
renew the insurance for the account of the mortgagors without notice to the latter should the mortgagors fail to
renew the insurance coverage. To substantiate its claim, the mortgagee relied on the Chattel Mortgage provision
that the car be insured at all times. This Court rebuffed the mortgagee’s arguments:

If petitioner was aware that the insurance coverage was inadequate, why did it not inform private respondent
about it? After all, since petitioner was under no obligation to effect renewal thereof, it is but logical that it should
relay to private respondents any defect of the insurance coverage before itself assuming the same. 27

Due to the mortgagee’s failure to notify the mortgagors prior to application of the latter’s payments to the
insurance premiums, this Court held that the mortgagors had not defaulted on their obligation to secure insurance
over the mortgaged vehicle, and affirmed the Regional Trial Court’s decision dismissing the mortgagee’s
complaint for replevin.

In the case at bar, the respondent failed to demand that petitioners comply with their obligation to secure
insurance coverage for the mortgaged vehicle. Following settled jurisprudence, we rule that the petitioners had
not defaulted on their obligation to insure the mortgaged vehicle and the condition sine qua non for respondent
to exercise its right to pay the insurance premiums over the subject vehicle has not been established.

The respondent further contends that its payment of the insurance premiums on behalf of the petitioners unjustly
enriched the latter. Respondent adverts to the provisions on quasi-contractual obligations in the New Civil
Code. 28Enrichment consists of every patrimonial, physical or moral advantage, so long as it is appreciable in
money. It may also take the form of avoidance of expenses and other indispensable reductions in the patrimony
of a person. It may also include the prevention of a loss or injury. 29 In the case at bar, petitioner spouses were
not enriched when respondent obtained insurance coverage for the mortgaged vehicle as the petitioner spouses
had already obtained the required insurance coverage for the vehicle from August 14, 1996 to August 14, 1997. 30

Finally, we are aware of the rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are given great weight by this Court.
Nevertheless, it is this Court’s duty to carefully review factual findings where the appreciation of the appellate
court and the trial court differ from each other. In the case at bar, the findings of the appellate court are clearly
not borne out by the evidence of the parties and necessarily, we have to reject to them.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on July 8, 2004 and its resolution promulgated on September 28, 2004 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The June 28, 2002 decision and September 16, 2002 resolution of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasay
City, Branch 45, as well as the March 21, 2003 decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City, Branch 114, are
REINSTATED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-46061 November 14, 1984

ST. LOUIS REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CONRADO J. ARAMIL, respondents.

Romeo Z. Comia for petitioner.

Roman R. Bersamin for private respondent.

AQUINO, J.:

This case is about the recovery of damages for a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday Times where Saint Louis
Realty Corporation misrepresented that the house of Doctor Conrado J. Aramil belonged to Arcadio S. Arcadio.

St. Louis Realty caused to be published with the permission of Arcadio S. Arcadio (but without permission of
Doctor Aramil) in the issue of the Sunday Times of December 15, 1968 an advertisement with the heading
"WHERE THE HEART IS". Below that heading was the photograph of the residence of Doctor Aramil and
the Arcadio family and then below the photograph was the following write-up:

Home is where the heart is. And the hearts of MR. AND MRS. ARCADIO S. ARCADIO and their
family have been captured by BROOKSIDE HILLS. They used to rent a small 2-bedroom house
in a cramped neighborhood, sadly inadequate and unwholesome for the needs of a large family.
They dream(ed) of a more pleasant place free from the din and dust of city life yet near all facilities.
Plans took shape when they heard of BROOKSIDE HILLS. With thrift and determination, they
bought a lot and built their dream house ... for P31,000. The Arcadios are now part of the friendly,
thriving community of BROOKSIDE HILLS... a beautiful first-class subdivision planned for
wholesome family living.

The same advertisement appeared in the Sunday Times dated January 5, 1969. Doctor Aramil a
neuropsychiatrist and a member of the faculty of the U. E. Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Hospital, noticed the
mistake. On that same date, he wrote St. Louis Realty the following letter of protest:

Dear Sirs:

This is anent to your advertisements appearing in the December 15, 1968 and January 5, 1969
issues of the Sunday Times which boldly depicted my house at the above-mentioned address
and implying that it belonged to another person. I am not aware of any permission or authority on
my part for the use of my house for such publicity.

This unauthorized use of my house for your promotional gain and much more the apparent
distortions therein are I believe not only transgression to my private property but also damaging
to my prestige in the medical profession I have had invited in several occasions numerous medical
colleagues, medical students and friends to my house and after reading your December 15
advertisement some of them have uttered some remarks purporting doubts as to my professional
and personal integrity. Such sly remarks although in light vein as "it looks like your house," "how
much are you renting from the Arcadios?", " like your wife portrayed in the papers as belonging
to another husband," etc., have resulted in no little mental anguish on my part.

I have referred this matter to the Legal Panel of the Philippine Medical Association and their final
advice is pending upon my submission of supporting ownership papers.

I will therefore be constrained to pursue court action against your corporation unless you could
satisfactorily explain this matter within a week upon receipt of this letter.

The letter was received by Ernesto Magtoto, an officer of St. Louis Realty in charge of advertising. He stopped
publication of the advertisement. He contacted Doctor Aramil and offered his apologies. However, no rectification
or apology was published.

On February 20, 1969, Aramil's counsel demanded from St. Louis Realty actual, moral and exemplary damages
of P110,000 (Exh. D). In its answer dated March 10, St. Louis Realty claimed that there was an honest mistake
and that if Aramil so desired, rectification would be published in the Manila Times (Exh. 3).
It published in the issue of the Manila Times of March 18, 1969 a new advertisement with the Arcadio family and
their real house. But it did not publish any apology to Doctor Aramil and an explanation of the error.

On March 29, Aramil filed his complaint for damages. St. Louis Realty published in the issue of the Manila
Times of April 15, 1969 the following "NOTICE OF RECTIFICATION" in a space 4 by 3 inches:

This will serve as a notice that our print ad 'Where the Heart is' which appeared in the Manila
Timesissue of March 18, 1969 is a rectification of the same ad that appeared in the Manila
Times issues rectification of the same ad that appeal of December 15, 1968 and January 5, 1969
wherein a photo of the house of another Brookside Homeowner (Dr. Aramil-private respondent)
was mistakenly used as a background for the featured homeowner's the Arcadio family.

The ad of March 18, 1969 shows the Arcadio family with their real house in the background, as
was intended all along.

Judge Jose M. Leuterio observed that St. Louis Realty should have immediately published a rectification and
apology. He found that as a result of St. Louis Realty's mistake, magnified by its utter lack of sincerity, Doctor
Aramil suffered mental anguish and his income was reduced by about P1,000 to P1,500 a month. Moreover,
there was violation of Aramil's right to privacy (Art. 26, Civil Code).

The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as attorney's
fees. St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals.

The Appellate Court affirmed that judgment, with Acting Presiding Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan as ponente, and
Justices Sixto A. Domondon and Samuel F. Reyes concurring.

The Appellate Court reasoned out that St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21
and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did not belong
to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by that contretemps.

In this appeal, St. Louis Realty contends that the Appellate Court ignored certain facts and resorted to surmises
and conjectures. This contention is unwarranted. The Appellate Court adopted the facts found by the trial court.
Those factual findings are binding on this Court.

St. Louis Realty also contends that the decision is contrary to law and that the case was decided in a way not in
conformity with the rulings of this Court. It argues that the case is not covered by article 26 which provides that
"every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons". "Prying into the privacy of another's residence" and "meddling with or disturbing the private life or
family relations of another" and "similar acts", "though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce
a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief".

The damages fixed by Judge Leuterio are sanctioned by Articles 2200, 2208 and 2219 of the Civil Code. Article
2219 allows moral damages for acts and actions mentioned in Article 26. As lengthily explained by Justice
Gatmaitan, the acts and omissions of the firm fan under Article 26.

St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely
circulated publication like the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written apology and
explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ".

Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the distorted, lingering impression that he
was renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was
mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income and mental anguish.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 179736 June 26, 2013
SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING, Petitioners,
vs.
ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

"The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for one's personality as a
unique individual whose claim to privacy and non-interference demands respect."1

This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the July 10, 2007 Decision 3 and
the September 11, 2007 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473.

Factual Antecedents

On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Mandaue City a Complaint5 for Injunction and Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), docketed as Civil Case MAN-5223 and raffled to
Branch 28, against respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy.

Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot 1900-B) covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42817 situated in Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue, Cebu; 6 that respondents are
the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located at Lots 1901 and 1900-C, adjacent to the
property of petitioners;7 that respondents constructed an auto-repair shop building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on
Lot 1900-C; that in April 2005, Aldo filed a case against petitioners for Injunction and Damages with Writ of
Preliminary Injunction/TRO, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-5125;8 that in that case, Aldo claimed that
petitioners were constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the said construction would destroy the wall
of its building, which is adjacent to petitioners’ property;9 that the court, in that case, denied Aldo’s application
for preliminary injunction for failure to substantiate its allegations;10 that, in order to get evidence to support the
said case, respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally set-up and installed on the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec
two video surveillance cameras facing petitioners’ property; 11 that respondents, through their employees and
without the consent of petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners’ on-going construction;12 and that the acts of
respondents violate petitioners’ right to privacy. 13 Thus, petitioners prayed that respondents be ordered to
remove the video surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance. 14

In their Answer with Counterclaim,15 respondents claimed that they did not install the video surveillance
cameras,16nor did they order their employees to take pictures of petitioners’ construction. 17 They also clarified
that they are not the owners of Aldo but are mere stockholders. 18

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Order19 granting the application for a TRO. The dispositive portion of
the said Order reads:

WHEREFORE, the application for a Temporary Restraining Order or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is granted.
Upon the filing and approval of a bond by petitioners, which the Court sets at ₱50,000.00, let a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction issue against the respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy. They are hereby
directed to immediately remove the revolving camera that they installed at the left side of their building
overlooking the side of petitioners’ lot and to transfer and operate it elsewhere at the back where petitioners’
property can no longer be viewed within a distance of about 2-3 meters from the left corner of Aldo Servitec,
facing the road.

IT IS SO ORDERED.20

Respondents moved for a reconsideration21 but the RTC denied the same in its Order22 dated February 6,
2006.23Thus:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Issue a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction in consonance with the Order dated 18 October 2005.

IT IS SO ORDERED.24

Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari 25 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
application for a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decision 26 granting the Petition for Certiorari. The CA ruled that the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion because petitioners failed to show a clear and
unmistakable right to an injunctive writ.27 The CA explained that the right to privacy of residence under Article
26(1) of the Civil Code was not violated since the property subject of the controversy is not used as a
residence.28 The CA alsosaid that since respondents are not the owners of the building, they could not have
installed video surveillance cameras. 29 They are mere stockholders of Aldo, which has a separate juridical
personality.30 Thus, they are not the proper parties.31 The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us GRANTING the petition
filed in this case. The assailed orders dated October 18, 2005 and February 6, 2006 issued by the respondent
judge are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.32

Issues

Hence, this recourse by petitioners arguing that:

I.

THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE THE ORDERS
OF THE RTC DATED 18 OCTOBER 2005 AND 6 FEBRUARY 2006 HOLDING THAT THEY WERE ISSUED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

II.

THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER SPOUSES

HING ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ON THE GROUND THAT
THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL RIGHT TO PRIVACY DESPITE THE
FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE RTC, WHICH RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY FAILED TO REFUTE, THAT THE
ILLEGALLY INSTALLED SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS OF RESPONDENTS CHOACH[U]Y WOULD
CAPTURE THE PRIVATE ACTIVITIES OF PETITIONER SPOUSES HING, THEIR CHILDREN AND
EMPLOYEES.

III.

THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT SINCE THE OWNER OF THE
BUILDING IS ALDO DEVELOPMENT AND RESOURCES, INC. THEN TO SUE RESPONDENTS
CHOACHUY CONSTITUTES A PURPORTEDLY UNWARRANTED PIERCING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL.

IV.

THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT IGNORED THE SERIOUS FORMAL

DEFICIENCIES OF BOTH THE PETITION AND THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED 15
MARCH 2006 OF RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY AND GAVE X X X THEM DUE COURSE AND
CONSIDERATION.33

Essentially, the issues boil down to (1) whether there is a violation of petitioners’ right to privacy, and (2)
whether respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

Petitioners’ Arguments

Petitioners insist that they are entitled to the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction because respondents’
installation of a stationary camera directly facing petitioners’ property and a revolving camera covering a
significant portion of the same property constitutes a violation of petitioners’ right to privacy. 34 Petitioners cite
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, which enjoins persons from prying into the private lives of others. 35 Although the
said provision pertains to the privacy of another’s residence, petitioners opine that it includes business offices,
citing Professor Arturo M. Tolentino.36 Thus, even assuming arguendo that petitioners’ property is used for
business, it is still covered by the said provision. 37

As to whether respondents are the proper parties to implead in this case, petitioners claim that respondents
and Aldo are one and the same, and that respondents only want to hide behind Aldo’s corporate fiction. 38 They
point out that if respondents are not the real owners of the building, where the video surveillance cameras were
installed, then they had no business consenting to the ocular inspection conducted by the court. 39

Respondents’ Arguments

Respondents, on the other hand, echo the ruling of the CA that petitioners cannot invoke their right to privacy
since the property involved is not used as a residence. 40 Respondents maintain that they had nothing to do
with the installation of the video surveillance cameras as these were installed by Aldo, the registered owner of
the building,41as additional security for its building.42 Hence, they were wrongfully impleaded in this case.43

Our Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.

The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution 44 and in our laws. It is defined as "the right to be free from
unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause
humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities."45 It is the right of an individual "to be free from unwarranted
publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily
concerned."46 Simply put, the right to privacy is "the right to be let alone." 47
The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s right to privacy and protects them against the State’s abuse of power.
In this regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their houses. No one, not even the
State, except "in case of overriding social need and then only under the stringent procedural safeguards," can
disturb them in the privacy of their homes.48

The right to privacy under Article 26(1)

of the Civil Code covers business offices

where the public are excluded

therefrom and only certain individuals

are allowed to enter.

Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individual’s right to privacy and provides a legal
remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by other individuals. It states:

Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause
of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;

xxxx

This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be denied or even
restricted by others. It includes "any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into the residence of
another without the consent of the latter."49 The phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s residence," however,
does not mean that only the residence is entitled to privacy. As elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino:

Our Code specifically mentions "prying into the privacy of another’s residence." This does not mean, however,
that only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers also "similar acts." A business office is
entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and only such individuals as are allowed to
enter may come in. x x x50 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his house or
residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them access. The
phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s residence," therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations
which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may
not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the Civil
Code only to residences.

The "reasonable expectation of

privacy" test is used to determine
whether there is a violation of the right
to privacy.

In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the
expectation has been violated.51 In Ople v. Torres,52 we enunciated that "the reasonableness of a person’s
expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an
expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable." Customs,
community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individual’s "reasonable expectation of
privacy."53 Hence, the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-
case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case.54

In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the protection and safety
of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover places where there is reasonable
expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was
obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of another’s residence or business office as
it would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-
Wiretapping Law.

In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for Preliminary Injunction, ruled that:

After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for a temporary restraining order. The operation
by respondents of a revolving camera, even if it were mounted on their building, violated the right of privacy of
petitioners, who are the owners of the adjacent lot. The camera does not only focus on respondents’ property or
the roof of the factory at the back (Aldo Development and Resources, Inc.) but it actually spans through a good
portion of the land of petitioners.

Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why petitioner Hing was so unyielding in asserting that
the revolving camera was set up deliberately to monitor the on[-]going construction in his property. The monitor
showed only a portion of the roof of the factory of Aldo. If the purpose of respondents in setting up a camera at
the back is to secure the building and factory premises, then the camera should revolve only towards their
properties at the back. Respondents’ camera cannot be made to extend the view to petitioners’ lot. To allow the
respondents to do that over the objection of the petitioners would violate the right of petitioners as property
owners. "The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third
person."55

The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in their property, whether
they use it as a business office or as a residence and that the installation of video surveillance cameras directly
facing petitioners’ property or covering a significant portion thereof, without their consent, is a clear violation of
their right to privacy. As we see then, the issuance of a preliminary injunction was justified. We need not belabor
that the issuance of a preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of the court taking cognizance of the case
and should not be interfered with, unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the court.56 Here, there
is no indication of any grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the CA erred in finding that petitioners are not entitled
to an injunctive writ.

This brings us to the next question: whether respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

A real party defendant is one who has a

correlative legal obligation to redress a
wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of
the defendant's act or omission which
had violated the legal right of the
former.

Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. — A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these
Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.

A real party defendant is "one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by
reason of the defendant’s act or omission which had violated the legal right of the former." 57
In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA reasoned that since they do not own the building,
they could not have installed the video surveillance cameras. 58 Such reasoning, however, is erroneous. The fact
that respondents are not the registered owners of the building does not automatically mean that they did not
cause the installation of the video surveillance cameras.

In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed the video surveillance cameras in order to fish
for evidence, which could be used against petitioners in another case. 59 During the hearing of the application for
Preliminary Injunction, petitioner Bill testified that when respondents installed the video surveillance cameras,
he immediately broached his concerns but they did not seem to care, 60 and thus, he reported the matter to the
barangay for mediation, and eventually, filed a Complaint against respondents before the RTC. 61 He also
admitted that as early as 1998 there has already been a dispute between his family and the Choachuy family
concerning the boundaries of their respective properties. 62 With these factual circumstances in mind, we believe
that respondents are the proper parties to be impleaded.

Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and distinct from its stockholders, records show
that it is a family-owned corporation managed by the Choachuy family. 63

Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding their claim that they are not owners of the building,
allowed the court to enter the compound of Aldo and conduct an ocular inspection. The counsel for respondents
even toured Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap inside the building and answered all her questions regarding the set-up
and installation of the video surveillance cameras. 64 And when respondents moved for reconsideration of the
Order dated October 18, 2005 of the RTC, one of the arguments they raised is that Aldo would suffer damages
if the video surveillance cameras are removed and transferred. 65 Noticeably, in these instances, the personalities
of respondents and Aldo seem to merge.

All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that respondents are merely using the corporate
fiction of Aldo as a shield to protect themselves from this suit. In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents
are the proper parties to this suit.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 10, 2007 and the Resolution dated
September 11, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Orders dated October 18,2005 and February 6, 200[6] of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-5223 are hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners,
vs.
ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The individual's desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is an equally powerful desire.
Thus each individual is continually engaged in a personal adjustment process in which he balances the desire
for privacy with the desire for disclosure and communication of himself to others, in light of the environmental
conditions and social norms set by the society in which he lives.

- Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)

The Case

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 19 of
A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC,1 otherwise known as the "Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data." Petitioners herein assail the
July 27, 2012 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City (RTC) in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB,
which dismissed their habeas data petition.

The Facts

Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were, during the period material,
graduating high school students at St. Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while
changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several
others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded
by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her Facebook3 profile.

Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher at STC’s high school department,
learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist
up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they knew who the girls in the photos are.
In turn, they readily identified Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among others.

Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal Facebook accounts and
showed her photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and
smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing
that show virtually the entirety of their black brassieres. What is more, Escudero’s students claimed that there
were times when access to or the availability of the identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’
Facebook friends,4but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user. 5

Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student’s Facebook page, showed the
photosto Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action. Thereafter, following an
investigation, STC found the identified students to have deported themselves in a manner proscribed by the
school’s Student Handbook, to wit:

1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;

2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;

 3. Smoking and drinking alcoholicbeverages in public places;

4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;

5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity; contains sexually suggestive
messages, language or symbols; and 6. Posing and uploading pictures on the Internet that entail ample
body exposure.

On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures in question, reported, as
required, to the office of Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe (Sr. Purisima), STC’s high school principal and
ICM6 Directress. They claimed that during the meeting, they were castigated and verbally abused by the STC
officials present in the conference, including Assistant Principal Mussolini S. Yap (Yap), Roswinda Jumiller, and
Tigol. What is more, Sr. Purisima informed their parents the following day that, as part of their penalty, they are
barred from joining the commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012.

A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a Petition for
Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Cebu City against STC, et al., docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
38594.7In it, Tan prayed that defendants therein be enjoined from implementing the sanction that precluded
Angela from joining the commencement exercises.

On March 25, 2012,petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia, joined the fray as an intervenor.
On March 28, 2012, defendants inCivil Case No. CEB-38594 filed their memorandum, containing printed copies
of the photographs in issue as annexes. That same day, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO)
allowing the students to attend the graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a motion for reconsideration.

Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students from participating in the
graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of the commencement exercises, its adverted motion for
reconsideration on the issuance ofthe TRO remained unresolved.

Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data, docketed as
SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB8 on the basis of the following considerations:

1. The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken for posterity before they
changed into their swimsuits on the occasion of a birthday beach party;

2. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at "Friends Only." They, thus, have
a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.

3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to have known of laws that
safeguard the right to privacy. Corollarily, respondents knew or ought to have known that the girls,
whose privacy has been invaded, are the victims in this case, and not the offenders. Worse, after
viewing the photos, the minors were called "immoral" and were punished outright;

4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their
consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by
subsequently showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of petitioners’ children
were intruded upon;

5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and digital
images happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory; and

6. All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly broadcasted by respondents through
their memorandum submitted to the RTC in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594. To petitioners,
the interplay of the foregoing constitutes an invasion of their children’s privacy and, thus, prayed that:
(a) a writ of habeas databe issued; (b) respondents be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court
 all soft and printed copies of the subjectdata before or at the preliminary hearing; and (c) after trial,
judgment be rendered declaring all information, data, and digital images accessed, saved or stored,
reproduced, spread and used, to have been illegally obtained inviolation of the children’s right to
privacy.

Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through an Order dated July 5, 2012, issued the
writ of habeas data. Through the same Order, herein respondents were directed to file their verified written return,
together with the supporting affidavits, within five (5) working days from service of the writ.

In time, respondents complied with the RTC’s directive and filed their verified written return, laying down the
following grounds for the denial of the petition, viz: (a) petitioners are not the proper parties to file the petition;
(b) petitioners are engaging in forum shopping; (c) the instant case is not one where a writ of habeas data may
issue;and (d) there can be no violation of their right to privacy as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy
on Facebook.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for habeas data. The dispositive portion
of the Decision pertinently states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.9

To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors’ right
to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data. Moreover, the court a quoheld
that the photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who may view them, lost their
privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC noted, STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a
legal purpose, that is, the implementation of the school’s policies and rules on discipline.

Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule on
Habeas Data.10

The Issues

The main issue to be threshed out inthis case is whether or not a writ of habeas datashould be issued given
the factual milieu. Crucial in resolving the controversy, however, is the pivotal point of whether or not there was
indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors
involved in this case.

Our Ruling

We find no merit in the petition.

Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas Data

The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home
and correspondence of the aggrieved party. 11 It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the
image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce
one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information
regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means
in order to achieve unlawful ends.12

In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to informational privacy,
among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas dataas "a procedure designed to
safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age." 13 The writ, however, will not issue on the basis
merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a person.Availment of the writ requires the
existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the
other.14 Thus, the existence of a person’s right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial
evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are
indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be extended. 15

Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational privacy, a habeas datapetition will
not prosper. Viewed from the perspective of the case at bar,this requisite begs this question: given the nature of
an online social network (OSN)––(1) that it facilitates and promotes real-time interaction among millions, if not
billions, of users, sans the spatial barriers,16 bridging the gap created by physical space; and (2) that any
information uploaded in OSNs leavesan indelible trace in the provider’s databases, which are outside the control
of the end-users––is there a right to informational privacy in OSN activities of its users? Before addressing this
point, We must first resolve the procedural issues in this case.

a. The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances

Contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas Datawas not enacted solely for the purpose of
complementing the Writ of Amparoin cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data. However, in cases
of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by:

(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children and parents;
or

(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degreeof
consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph. (emphasis supplied)

Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to cases of extralegal killings or
enforced disappearances, the above underscored portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance of habeas data
situations, would not have been made.

Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age." 17 As
such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances only. In fact, the
annotations to the Rule preparedby the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, after explaining that
the Writ of Habeas Data complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed out that:

The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s right to privacy,
more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies against the violation of such right can include
the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or files in possession or in
control of respondents.18 (emphasis Ours) Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Datamay also be
availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information

Respondents’ contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against STC, it not being an entity engaged in
the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence
of the aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous.

To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only against
abuses of a person or entity engaged in the businessof gathering, storing, and collecting of data. As provided
under Section 1 of the Rule:

Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis Ours)

The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas data is a
protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private individuals or entities engaged in
gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or
her family. Such individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data.

To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To "engage" means "to do or take
part in something."19 It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What
matters is that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the
aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one
pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at
all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity.

To agree with respondents’ above argument, would mean unduly limiting the reach of the writ to a very small
group, i.e., private persons and entities whose business is data gathering and storage, and in the process
decreasing the effectiveness of the writ asan instrument designed to protect a right which is easily violated in
view of rapid advancements in the information and communications technology––a right which a great majority
of the users of technology themselves are not capable of protecting.

Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed to the core of the controversy.

The right to informational privacy on Facebook

a. The Right to Informational Privacy

The concept of privacyhas, through time, greatly evolved, with technological advancements having an influential
part therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s speech, The
Common Right to Privacy,20 where he explained the three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or
situational privacy;21(2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy. 22 Of the three, what is relevant to the
case at bar is the right to informational privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals to control information
about themselves.23

With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data sharing nowadays, not to mention
each system’s inherent vulnerability to attacks and intrusions, there is more reason that every individual’s right
to control said flow of information should be protected and that each individual should have at least a reasonable
expectation of privacy in cyberspace. Several commentators regarding privacy and social networking sites,
however, all agree that given the millions of OSN users, "[i]n this [Social Networking] environment, privacy is no
longer grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in some theoretical protocol better known as wishful
thinking."24

It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial remedies that would allow a
summary hearing of the unlawful use of data or information and to remedy possible violations of the right to
privacy.25 In the same vein, the South African High Court, in its Decision in the landmark case, H v.
W,26promulgated on January30, 2013, recognized that "[t]he law has to take into account the changing realities
not only technologically but also socially or else it will lose credibility in the eyes of the people. x x x It is imperative
that the courts respond appropriately to changing times, acting cautiously and with wisdom." Consistent with this,
the Court, by developing what may be viewed as the Philippine model of the writ of habeas data, in effect,
recognized that, generally speaking, having an expectation of informational privacy is not necessarily
incompatible with engaging in cyberspace activities, including those that occur in OSNs.

The question now though is up to whatextent is the right to privacy protected in OSNs? Bear in mind that
informational privacy involves personal information. At the same time, the very purpose of OSNs is socializing–
–sharing a myriad of information,27 some of which would have otherwise remained personal.

b. Facebook’s Privacy Tools: a response to the clamor for privacy in OSN activities

Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact and to stay connected to other
members of the same or different social media platform through the sharing of statuses, photos, videos, among
others, depending on the services provided by the site. It is akin to having a room filled with millions of personal
bulletin boards or "walls," the contents of which are under the control of each and every user. In his or her bulletin
board, a user/owner can post anything––from text, to pictures, to music and videos––access to which would
depend on whether he or she allows one, some or all of the other users to see his or her posts. Since gaining
popularity, the OSN phenomenon has paved the way to the creation of various social networking sites,
includingthe one involved in the case at bar, www.facebook.com (Facebook), which, according to its developers,
people use "to stay connected with friends and family, to discover what’s going on in the world, and to share and
express what matters to them."28

Facebook connections are established through the process of "friending" another user. By sending a "friend
request," the user invites another to connect their accounts so that they can view any and all "Public" and "Friends
Only" posts of the other.Once the request is accepted, the link is established and both users are permitted to
view the other user’s "Public" or "Friends Only" posts, among others. "Friending," therefore, allows the user to
form or maintain one-to-one relationships with other users, whereby the user gives his or her "Facebook friend"
access to his or her profile and shares certain information to the latter. 29

To address concerns about privacy, 30 but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with different
privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile31 as well as information uploaded by the
user. In H v. W,32 the South Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users to "customize their privacy
settings," but did so with this caveat: "Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes every effort to protect
a user’s information, these privacy settings are not foolproof." 33

For instance, a Facebook user canregulate the visibility and accessibility of digital images(photos), posted on
his or her personal bulletin or "wall," except for the user’sprofile picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired
privacy setting:

(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;
(b) Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook user;
and
(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.

The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up barriers to broaden or limit the
visibility of his or her specific profile content, statuses, and photos, among others, from another user’s point of
view. In other words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the availability of their Facebook activities
reflect their choice as to "when and to what extent to disclose facts about [themselves] – and to put others in the
position of receiving such confidences." 34 Ideally, the selected setting will be based on one’s desire to interact
with others, coupled with the opposing need to withhold certain information as well as to regulate the spreading
of his or her personal information. Needless to say, as the privacy setting becomes more limiting, fewer Facebook
users can view that user’s particular post.
STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy

Without these privacy settings, respondents’ contention that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in
Facebook would, in context, be correct. However, such is not the case. It is through the availability of said privacy
tools that many OSN users are said to have a subjective expectation that only those to whomthey grant access
to their profile will view the information they post or upload thereto. 35

This, however, does not mean thatany Facebook user automatically has a protected expectation of privacy inall
of his or her Facebook activities.

Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that said user, in
this case the children of petitioners,manifest the intention to keepcertain posts private, through the employment
of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. 36 And this intention can materialize in cyberspace
through the utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the
manifestation,in cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to informational privacy. 37

Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access to his or her post
orprofile detail should not be denied the informational privacy right which necessarily accompanies said
choice.38Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a feckless exercise, such that if, for instance, a user
uploads a photo or any personal information to his or her Facebook page and sets its privacy level at "Only Me"
or a custom list so that only the user or a chosen few can view it, said photo would still be deemed public by the
courts as if the user never chose to limit the photo’s visibility and accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not
only strip these privacy tools of their function but it would also disregard the very intention of the user to keep
said photo or information within the confines of his or her private space.

We must now determine the extent that the images in question were visible to other Facebook users and whether
the disclosure was confidential in nature. In other words, did the minors limit the disclosure of the photos such
that the images were kept within their zones of privacy? This determination is necessary in resolving the issue
of whether the minors carved out a zone of privacy when the photos were uploaded to Facebook so that the
images will be protected against unauthorized access and disclosure.

Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their children’s privacy right being violated, insist that Escudero
intruded upon their children’s Facebook accounts, downloaded copies ofthe pictures and showed said photos to
Tigol. To them, this was a breach of the minors’ privacy since their Facebook accounts, allegedly, were under
"very private" or "Only Friends" setting safeguarded with a password. 39 Ultimately, they posit that their children’s
disclosure was only limited since their profiles were not open to public viewing. Therefore, according to them,
people who are not their Facebook friends, including respondents, are barred from accessing said post without
their knowledge and consent. Aspetitioner’s children testified, it was Angelawho uploaded the subjectphotos
which were only viewable by the five of them, 40 although who these five are do not appear on the records.

Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit 41 that "my students showed me some pictures of girls cladin
brassieres. This student [sic] of mine informed me that these are senior high school [students] of STC, who are
their friends in [F]acebook. x x x They then said [that] there are still many other photos posted on the Facebook
accounts of these girls. At the computer lab, these students then logged into their Facebook account [sic], and
accessed from there the various photographs x x x. They even told me that there had been times when these
photos were ‘public’ i.e., not confined to their friends in Facebook."

In this regard, We cannot give muchweight to the minors’ testimonies for one key reason: failure to question the
students’ act of showing the photos to Tigol disproves their allegation that the photos were viewable only by the
five of them. Without any evidence to corroborate their statement that the images were visible only to the five of
them, and without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other students were able to view the photos, their
statements are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.42

It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her students, who are the
minors’ Facebook "friends," showed her the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show
that no special means to be able to viewthe allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s
students,43 and that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1)
their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.

Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is"Public," it can be surmised that the photographs in
question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited
the disclosure of the photograph. If suchwere the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to
informational privacy. The ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez44 is most instructive:

[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights
to such imagery, particularly under circumstances suchas here, where the Defendant did not employ protective
measures or devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.45

Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that "[t]he more open the method of transmission is, the less privacy one
can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large inthe chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from
correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy."

That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not necessarily bolster the petitioners’ contention. In this
regard, the cyber community is agreed that the digital images under this setting still remain to be outside the
confines of the zones of privacy in view of the following:

(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the tools to interact
and share in any conceivable way;"47

(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total strangers; 48

(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and

(4) A user’s Facebook friend can "share"49 the former’s post, or "tag"50 others who are not Facebook
friends with the former, despite its being visible only tohis or her own Facebook friends.

It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to "Friends" is no assurance that
it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content. The
user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of
whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared
or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was
tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at "Friends."

To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B are not Facebook friends. If C, A’s
Facebook friend, tags B in A’s post, which is set at "Friends," the initial audience of 100 (A’s own Facebook
friends) is dramatically increased to 300 (A’s 100 friends plus B’s 200 friends or the public, depending upon B’s
privacy setting). As a result, the audience who can view the post is effectively expanded––and to a very large
extent.

This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of Facebook’s proclivity towards user interaction and
socialization rather than seclusion or privacy, as it encourages broadcasting of individual user posts. In fact, it
has been said that OSNs have facilitated their users’ self-tribute, thereby resulting into the "democratization of
fame."51Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even a post, with visibility set at "Friends Only" cannot easily,
more so automatically, be said to be "very private," contrary to petitioners’ argument.

As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’ Facebook friends,
respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook
friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not
resort to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had
legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough,
however, neither the minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the students who showed
the images to Escudero.

Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents reproduced and broadcasted the
photographs. In fact, what petitioners attributed to respondents as an act of offensive disclosure was no more
than the actuality that respondents appended said photographs in their memorandum submitted to the trial court
in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594.52 These are not tantamount to a violation of the minor’s
informational privacy rights, contrary to petitioners’ assertion.

In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more precise, the photos of minor students
scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the minors
enrolled in a conservative institution. However, the records are bereft of any evidence, other than bare assertions
that they utilized Facebook’s privacy settings to make the photos visible only to them or to a select few. Without
proof that they placed the photographs subject of this case within the ambit of their protected zone of privacy,
they cannot now insist that they have an expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.

Had it been proved that the access tothe pictures posted were limited to the original uploader, through the "Me
Only" privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few, through
the "Custom" setting, the result may have been different, for in such instances, the intention to limit access to
the particular post, instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes
more manifest and palpable.

On Cyber Responsibility

It has been said that "the best filter is the one between your children’s ears." 53 This means that self-regulation
on the part of OSN users and internet consumers ingeneral is the best means of avoiding privacy rights
violations.54 As a cyberspace communitymember, one has to be proactive in protecting his or her own privacy.55 It
is in this regard that many OSN users, especially minors, fail.Responsible social networking or observance of
the "netiquettes"56 on the part of teenagers has been the concern of many due to the widespreadnotion that
teenagers can sometimes go too far since they generally lack the people skills or general wisdom to conduct
themselves sensibly in a public forum. 57

Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on good cyber citizenship in its curriculum to
educate its students on proper online conduct may be mosttimely. Too, it is not only STC but a number of schools
and organizations have already deemed it important to include digital literacy and good cyber citizenshipin their
respective programs and curricula in view of the risks that the children are exposed to every time they participate
in online activities.58 Furthermore, considering the complexity of the cyber world and its pervasiveness,as well
as the dangers that these children are wittingly or unwittingly exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities
in cyberspace, the participation of the parents in disciplining and educating their children about being a good
digital citizen is encouraged by these institutions and organizations. In fact, it is believed that "to limit such risks,
there’s no substitute for parental involvement and supervision." 59

As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its students to beresponsible in their
dealings and activities in cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, whenit enforced the disciplinary actions specified in
the Student Handbook, absenta showing that, in the process, it violated the students’ rights.

OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to whenever they engage incyberspace
activities.1âwphi1 Accordingly, they should be cautious enough to control their privacy and to exercise sound
discretion regarding how much information about themselves they are willing to give up. Internet consumers
ought to be aware that, by entering or uploading any kind of data or information online, they are automatically
and inevitably making it permanently available online, the perpetuation of which is outside the ambit of their
control. Furthermore, and more importantly, information, otherwise private, voluntarily surrendered by them can
be opened, read, or copied by third parties who may or may not be allowed access to such.
It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings and activities and
must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from the courts, as
here, requires that claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a right which they allege to have been
violated. These are indispensable. We cannot afford protection to persons if they themselves did nothing to place
the matter within the confines of their private zone. OSN users must be mindful enough to learn the use of privacy
tools, to use them if they desire to keep the information private, and to keep track of changes in the available
privacy settings, such as those of Facebook, especially because Facebook is notorious for changing these
settings and the site's layout often.

In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors' privacy rights, We find no cogent reason
to disturb the findings and case disposition of the court a quo.

In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other assigned errors.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated July 27, 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is hereby AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 183805 July 3, 2013

JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, PETITIONER,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
Decision1 dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution2 dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 30444.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City in an Information which reads:

On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused
being previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and without said marriage having been
legally dissolved or annulled, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage
with Shirley G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.

Contrary to law.3

Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for
declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2)
in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and
(3) the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial
question in the instant criminal case.

Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC of Pasig City, in view of the filing of the
Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by petitioner.

In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity of the
second marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a subsequent marriage
contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the beginning.

Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of the
criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second marriage between him and private
respondent had already been declared void by the RTC.

In an Order4 dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City granted petitioner’s Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss,
to wit:

The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case should be dismissed as a decision dated December 1,
2004 had already been rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 01 -
6043 (entitled: "Karla Medina-Capili versus James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo," a case for declaration
of nullity of marriage) nullifying the second marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo and
said decision is already final.

In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the motion, it was stated, among others, that the issues raised
in the civil case are not similar or intimately related to the issue in this above-captioned case and that the
resolution of the issues in said civil case would not determine whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue and arguments of the parties, this Court is of the humble
opinion that there is merit on the Motion to dismiss filed by the accused as it appears that the second marriage
between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo had already been nullified by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 72 of Antipolo City which has declared "the voidness, non-existent or incipient invalidity" of the said
second marriage. As such, this Court submits that there is no more bigamy to speak of.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.

Thus, in a Decision5 dated February 1, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 07 July 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 152 in Crim. Case No. 128370 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court
for further proceedings. No costs.

SO ORDERED.6

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said decision, but the same was denied in a
Resolution[7] dated July 24, 2008.

Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari alleging that:

THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DISREGARD EXISTING

JURISPRUDENCE PRONOUNCED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AND TO REVERSE
THE ORDER DATED JULY 7, 2006 OF THE TRIAL COURT (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY,
BRANCH 152) ISSUED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 128370 GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE
CASE OF BIGAMY AGAINST PETITIONER, INASMUCH AS THE ISSUANCE OF THE SAID ORDER
IS BASED ON THE FINDINGS AND/OR FACTS OF THE CASE IN THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 AND THE
CONCLUDING AND DISPOSITIVE PORTION IN THE SAID DECISION WHICH STATES THAT, AFTER
PERUSAL OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES X X X, THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT
SHIRLEY G. TISMO, IS HEREBY NULL AND VOID.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO BY THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN ITS DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043, IS
ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS BIGAMOUS IN NATURE, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY SUCH
FINDINGS OR FACTS ON WHICH IT IS BASED IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14 OF
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND IN CONCLUDING THAT THE SAID DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF THE BIGAMY CASE AGAINST THE
PETITIONER, WHICH RULING IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FACTS OF THE CASE OF THE
SAID DECISION AND WHICH IS CONTRARY TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE.

THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. IT IS AN EXCEPTION TO

EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE AND IS
APPLICABLE ONLY TO THE SET OF FACTS IN THE SAID CASE, AND THE GROUND FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, HENCE, THERE IS
NO LEGAL BASIS FOR ABANDONING EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AS WHERE IN THE INSTANT
CASE THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE
3 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 4 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE USE BY RESPONDENT
SHIRLEY G. TISMO OF THE SURNAME "CAPILI" IS ILLEGAL INASMUCH AS THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043
DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY
G. TISMO HAD LONG BECOME FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE AS OF THE DATE OF THE SAID
DECISION ON DECEMBER 1, 2004 AND DULY RECORDED IN THE RECORDS OF ENTRIES IN THE
CORRESPONDING BOOK IN THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASIG CITY AND THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE.8
In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground
for dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.

We rule in the negative.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as follows:

Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second
or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage
has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that
the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 9

In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when the Information
was filed on June 28, 2004.

It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was contracted on December
8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted
on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second
marriage between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second
marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.

Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even
if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still
subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.

In Jarillo v. People,10 the Court affirmed the accused’s conviction for bigamy ruling that the crime of bigamy is
consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage without the previous one having been judicially
declared null and void, viz.:

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only
delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his
previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We
cannot allow that.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon
the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required
for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted.

Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first
marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first
marriage was annulled.11

In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned case and ruled that what makes a
person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence
of a valid first marriage. It further held that the parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. 12

Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense,
and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law. 13 It is clear then that the
crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from the time he contracted the second marriage with private
respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s second marriage does not impede
the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against him.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 1, 2008 and
Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 172060 September 13, 2010

JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, Petitioner,
vs.
MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 20
March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.

The Antecedent Facts

The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals’ decision:

On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated
parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415, before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC Quezon City).

On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City,
Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L.
Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the
ground of psychological incapacity.

On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City
on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between
the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a
bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.

The Decision of the Trial Court

The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 2005 3 holding that the pendency of the case before the
RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The RTC
Quezon City held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the injuries sustained by respondent
and whether the case could be tried even if the validity of petitioner’s marriage with respondent is in question.
The RTC Quezon City ruled:

WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings On the [Ground] of the
Existence of a Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit, DENIED.

SO ORDERED.4

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order, 5 the RTC Quezon City denied the
motion.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order before the Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August 2005 Orders of the RTC
Quezon City.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that in
the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced the commission of the
crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for
annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be
declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged
acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that
all that is required for the charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the
marriage is still subsisting.

Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals’ decision.

The Issue

The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial
question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.

Civil Case Must be Instituted

Before the Criminal Case

Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure6 provides:

Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In this case,
the Information7 for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25
October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case
No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No.
04-7392 on 7 February 2005.8 Respondent’s petition 9 in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004
and was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal
case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.

Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question

in Criminal Case for Parricide

Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the
criminal action.

There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the
civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case.10 A prejudicial question is defined as:

x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and
the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from
the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.11
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, 12 which punishes
any person "who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants
or descendants, or his spouse."13 The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime
of parricide from murder14 or homicide.15 However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or
intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender
and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether
the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is
whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will. 16 At the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their
marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that
was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner
and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of
the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.1avvphi1

We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals17 that "the judicial declaration of the nullity
of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage
insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x." First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the
judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a
criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled
in Tenebro that "[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab
initio, may still produce legal consequences."18 In fact, the Court declared in that case that "a declaration of the
nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as
the State’s penal laws are concerned."19

In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals. The trial in Criminal Case No.
Q-04-130415 may proceed as the resolution of the issue in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is not determinative of the
guilt or innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 91867.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004

VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration of the nullity of a
second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an individual’s criminal liability for
bigamy. We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws
are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence
of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second
marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April
10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro
and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro
informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous
marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going
to cohabit with Villareyes.1

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before
Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15.2 When Ancajas learned of this third
marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten
letter,3 Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.

Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. 4 The Information,5 which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads:
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage with Hilda
Villareyes, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously contract a second marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of
the accused has all the essential requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty". 6

During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two
children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage
ceremony took place to solemnize their union.7 He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable
her to get the allotment from his office in connection with his work as a seaman.8 He further testified that he
requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any marriage at all between
him and Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage. 9

On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
and sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. 10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.

Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE
IN THIS APPEAL – WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A
QUOCONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-
EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.

II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE
CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT. 11

After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed judgment.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:

(1) that the offender has been legally married;

(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 12

Petitioner’s assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of his first
marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites
for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated. 13 Hence, petitioner argues that
all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal. 14

Petitioner’s defense must fail on both counts.

First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the
first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy
of a marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the
document, was solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and
certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila; 15 and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas
dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married. 16

To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification issued by the National
Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995; 17 and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated
February 3, 1997.18 Both these documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage
celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.

To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the marriage contract, which in
itself would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes.

All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant
to public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court reads as follows:

Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the original of a document is in
the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours).

This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was
admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was
celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and
credence given to public documents.

Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National Statistics Office on October
7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither
document attests as a positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and
Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the respective issuing
offices have no record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different
from documentary evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the
invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.

The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents testifying
merely as to absence of any record of the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement
in the law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the
validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided
all requisites for its validity are present. 19 There is no evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that
the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving
testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes’ letter, Ancajas’ testimony that
petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and petitioner’s own conduct, which would all
tend to indicate that the first marriage had all the requisites for validity.

Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the first marriage to
Villareyes by requesting his brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is significant to note that the
certifications issued by the National Statistics Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7,
1995 and February 3, 1997, respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after the accused’s marriage to
his second wife, private respondent in this case.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the first and
second requisites for the crime of bigamy.

The second tier of petitioner’s defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial declaration 20 of the nullity
of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage
to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the
crime of bigamy was not committed.21

This argument is not impressed with merit.

Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no
moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.

As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to
Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s
psychological capacity or incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract
a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A
plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of
the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent
reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or
subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity,
at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The State’s penal laws protecting the institution of
marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and punish an
individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which
petitioner has undoubtedly done.

Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not
an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the
validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties
and their consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer)23 and formal (authority of the
solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their
agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).24 Under Article 5
of the Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned in Articles 37 25 and 3826 may contract marriage.27

In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and
Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the
required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of
at least two witnesses.

Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts
to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is
significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived
or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate.28 There is therefore
a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise
would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure
that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting
multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.

As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in this case, and affirm
the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while
his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination
of the accused’s guilt for purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard
for the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract,
the key characteristic of which is its permanence. When an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting
the foundation of the State’s basic social institution, the State’s criminal laws on bigamy step in.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of bigamy is prision mayor,
which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision
correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals
correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court which sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy
and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in
toto.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 126746 November 29, 2000

ARTHUR TE, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA CHOA, respondents.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals Tenth
Division, dated 31 August 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 239711 and CA-G.R. SP No. 261782 and the Resolution dated
October 18, 1996 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rites on September 14, 1988. They
did not live together after the marriage although they would meet each other regularly. Not long after private
respondent gave birth to a girl on April 21, 1989, petitioner stopped visiting her. 3

On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting, petitioner contracted a second
marriage with a certain Julieta Santella (Santella). 4

On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent sometime in June 1990, when she learned about
petitioner’s marriage to Santella, an information charging petitioner with bigamy was filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City on August 9, 1990. 5 This case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409.6

Meanwhile, on July 20, 1990, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an action for the annulment of his
marriage to private respondent on the ground that he was forced to marry her. He alleged that private respondent
concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of their marriage and that she was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.7
On November 8, 1990, private respondent also filed with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) an
administrative case against petitioner and Santella for the revocation of their respective engineering licenses on
the ground that they committed acts of immorality by living together and subsequently marrying each other
despite their knowledge that at the time of their marriage, petitioner was already married to private respondent.
With respect to petitioner, private respondent added that he committed an act of falsification by stating in his
marriage contract with Santella that he was still single. 8

After the prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence with
leave of court and motion to inhibit the trial court judge for showing antagonism and animosity towards petitioner’s
counsel during the hearings of said case.

The trial court denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence in an Order dated November 28, 1990 which stated that
the same could not be granted because the prosecution had sufficiently established a prima facie case against
the accused.9 The RTC also denied petitioner’s motion to inhibit for lack of legal basis. 10

Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court judge, Judge Cezar C. Peralejo, for (1) exhibiting antagonism and animosity towards
petitioner’s counsel; (2) violating the requirements of due process by denying petitioner’s [motion for
reconsideration and] demurrer to evidence even before the filing of the same; (3) disregarding and failing to
comply with the appropriate guidelines for judges promulgated by the Supreme Court; and (4) ruling that in a
criminal case only "prima facie evidence" is sufficient for conviction of an accused. This case was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 23971.11

Petitioner also filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC (PRC Board), where the administrative case
for the revocation of his engineering license was pending, a motion to suspend the proceedings therein in view
of the pendency of the civil case for annulment of his marriage to private respondent and criminal case for bigamy
in Branches 106 and 98, respectively of the RTC of Quezon City. 12 When the Board denied the said motion in its
Order dated July 16, 1991,13 petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari, contending
that the Board gravely abused its discretion in: (1) failing to hold that the resolution of the annulment case is
prejudicial to the outcome of the administrative case pending before it; (2) not holding that the continuation of
proceedings in the administrative case could render nugatory petitioner’s right against self-incrimination in this
criminal case for bigamy against him; and (3) making an overly-sweeping interpretation that Section 32 of the
Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals does not allow the suspension
of the administrative proceeding before the PRC Board despite the pendency of criminal and/or administrative
proceedings against the same respondent involving the same set of facts in other courts or tribunals. This petition
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 26178.14

The two petitions for certiorari were consolidated since they arose from the same set of facts.

On 31 August 1994, the Court of Appeals, Tenth Division, rendered the assailed decision in the consolidated
petitions. The appellate court upheld the RTC’s denial of the motion to inhibit due to petitioner’s failure to show
any concrete evidence that the trial court judge exhibited partiality and had prejudged the case. It also ruled that
the denial of petitioner’s motion to suspend the proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question was in accord
with law.15 The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the RTC’s denial of the demurrer to evidence filed by petitioner
for his failure to set forth persuasive grounds to support the same, considering that the prosecution was able to
adduce evidence showing the existence of the elements of bigamy. 16

Neither did the appellate court find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Board’s Order denying petitioner’s
motion to suspend proceedings in the administrative case on the ground of prejudicial question. Respondent
court held that no prejudicial question existed since the action sought to be suspended is administrative in nature,
and the other action involved is a civil case. 17

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals but the same was
denied.18
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following issues:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN REFUSING TO SUSPEND THE

LEGAL [CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE] PROCEEDINGS DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF THE
CIVIL CASE FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.

II

PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED AN ERROR OF

LAW IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN DUE
COURSE.

III

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
TRIAL JUDGE A QUO SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED HIMSELF.19

The petition has no merit.

While the termination of Civil Case No. Q-90-6205 for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent
has rendered the issue of the propriety of suspending both the criminal case for bigamy before the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 98 and the administrative case for revocation of petitioner’s engineering license before the
PRC Board moot and academic, the Court shall discuss the issue of prejudicial question to emphasize the
guarding and controlling precepts and rules. 20

A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the
criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. 21 The rationale behind the principle of
suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. 22

The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of marriage filed
by petitioner against private respondent did not pose a prejudicial question which would necessitate that the
criminal case for bigamy be suspended until said civil case is terminated.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon
the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required
for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted.23Petitioner’s argument that the nullity of his marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first
in the civil case before the criminal proceedings could continue, because a declaration that their marriage was
void ab initio would necessarily absolve him from criminal liability, is untenable. The ruling in People vs.
Mendoza24 and People vs. Aragon25 cited by petitioner that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a marriage which is void ab initio has been overturned. The prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of
the Family Code, which was already in effect at the time of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent in
September 1988. Said article states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for
purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, under the
law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding.26 In Landicho vs. Relova,27 we held that:

Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and
so long as there is no such declaration the presumption of marriage exists. 28
It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private
respondent did not give rise to a prejudicial question which warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the
criminal case for bigamy since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, their marriage was, under the
law, still valid and subsisting.

Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the administrative proceedings
before the PRC Board. As discussed above, the concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal
case. We have previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the
other is civil.29

Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals
of the PRC Board expressly provides that the administrative proceedings before it shall not be suspended
notwithstanding the existence of a criminal and/or civil case against the respondent involving the same facts as
the administrative case:

The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in the courts or an administrative case in another judicial
body against an examinee or registered professional involving the same facts as in the administrative case filed
or to be filed before the Board shall neither suspend nor bar the proceeding of the latter case. The Board shall
proceed independently with the investigation of the case and shall render therein its decision without awaiting
for the final decision of the courts or quasi-judicial body.

It must also be noted that the allegations in the administrative complaint before the PRC Board are not confined
to the issue of the alleged bigamous marriage contracted by petitioner and Santella. Petitioner is also charged
with immoral conduct for continued failure to perform his obligations as husband to private respondent and as
father to their child, and for cohabiting with Santella without the benefit of marriage. 30 The existence of these
other charges justified the continuation of the proceedings before the PRC Board.

Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court’s denial of his demurrer to
evidence in the criminal case for bigamy, arguing that the prosecution failed to establish the existence of both
the first and second marriages beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner claims that the original copy of marriage
contract between him and private respondent was not presented, the signatures therein were not properly
identified and there was no showing that the requisites of a valid marriage were complied with. He alleges further
that the original copy of the marriage contract between him and Santella was not presented, that no proof that
he signed said contract was adduced, and that there was no witness presented to show that a second marriage
ceremony participated in by him ever took place. 31

We are not persuaded. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial
court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion. 32 In
this case, the Court of Appeals did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, which
based its denial of the demurrer on two grounds: first, the prosecution established a prima facie case for bigamy
against the petitioner; and second, petitioner’s allegations in the demurrer were insufficient to justify the grant of
the same. It has been held that the appellate court will not review in a special civil action for certiorari the
prosecution’s evidence and decide in advance that such evidence has or has not yet established the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. 33 In view of the trial court’s finding that a prima facie case against petitioner
exists, his proper recourse is to adduce evidence in his defense. 34

The Court also finds it necessary to correct petitioner’s misimpression that by denying his demurrer to evidence
in view of the existence of a prima facie case against him, the trial court was already making a pronouncement
that he is liable for the offense charged. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the order of the RTC denying
the demurrer was not an adjudication on the merits but merely an evaluation of the sufficiency of the
prosecution’s evidence to determine whether or not a full-blown trial would be necessary to resolve the
case.35 The RTC’s observation that there was a prima facie case against petitioner only meant that the
prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to sustain its proposition that petitioner had committed the offense
of bigamy, and unless petitioner presents evidence to rebut the same, such would be the conclusion. 36 Said
declaration by the RTC should not be construed as a pronouncement of petitioner’s guilt. It was precisely
because of such finding that the trial court denied the demurrer, in order that petitioner may present evidence in
his defense and allow said court to resolve the case based on the evidence adduced by both parties.

Lastly, petitioner contends that his motion to inhibit Judge Peralejo in Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409 should
have been granted since said judge exhibited partiality and bias against him in several instances. First, when
petitioner manifested that he would file a motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to suspend the
proceedings in said case, the judge said such motion was dilatory and would be denied even though the motion
for reconsideration had not yet been filed. Second, when petitioner’s counsel manifested that he had just
recovered from an accident and was not physically fit for trial, the judge commented that counsel was merely
trying to delay the case and required said counsel to produce a medical certificate to support his statement.
Third, when petitioner manifested that he was going to file a demurrer to evidence, the judge characterized the
same as dilatory and declared that he would deny the same. According to petitioner, the judge’s hostile attitude
towards petitioner’s counsel as shown in the foregoing instances justified the grant of his motion to inhibit.

We agree with the appellate court that the grounds raised by petitioner against Judge Peralejo did not
conclusively show that the latter was biased and had prejudged the case.37 In People of the Philippines vs. Court
of Appeals,38this Court held that while bias and prejudice have been recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary
inhibition of a judge under Section 1, Rule 137, the rudimentary rule is that the mere suspicion that a judge is
partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality. 39

Furthermore, since the grounds raised by petitioner in his motion to inhibit are not among those expressly
mentioned in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, the decision to inhibit himself lay within the
sound discretion of Judge Peralejo. Said provision of law states:

Section 1. Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or
child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party
within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to
the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in
which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written
consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in the case, for just and valid
reasons other than those mentioned above.

Thus, it was not mandatory that the judge inhibit himself from hearing and deciding the case.

This Court does not find any abuse of discretion by respondent judge in denying petitioner’s motion to inhibit.
The test for determining the propriety of the denial of said motion is whether petitioner was deprived a fair and
impartial trial.40 The instances when Judge Peralejo allegedly exhibited antagonism and partiality against
petitioner and/or his counsel did not deprive him of a fair and impartial trial. As discussed earlier, the denial by
the judge of petitioner’s motion to suspend the criminal proceeding and the demurrer to evidence are in accord
with law and jurisprudence. Neither was there anything unreasonable in the requirement that petitioner’s counsel
submit a medical certificate to support his claim that he suffered an accident which rendered him unprepared for
trial. Such requirement was evidently imposed upon petitioner’s counsel to ensure that the resolution of the case
was not hampered by unnecessary and unjustified delays, in keeping with the judge’s duty to disposing of the
court’s business promptly.41

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 137110 August 1, 2000

VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO, petitioner,

vs.
CONSUELO TAN, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally
contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty
of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as "void."

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the July 14, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA)1 in CA-GR CR No. 19830 and its January 4, 1999 Resolution denying reconsideration. The assailed
Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 13848,
which convicted herein petitioner of bigamy as follows:

"WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Dr. Vincent Paul G. Mercado a.k.a. Dr. Vincent G. Mercado of the
crime of Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code to have been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, [the court hereby renders] judgment imposing upon him a prison term of three (3) years, four
(4) months and fifteen (15) days of prision correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate sentence, to eight (8)
years and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties provided by law.

Costs against accused."2

The Facts

The facts are quoted by Court of Appeals (CA) from the trial court’s judgment, as follows: "From the evidence
adduced by the parties, there is no dispute that accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo
Tan got married on June 27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge Gorgonio J. Ibañez [by reason of]
which a Marriage Contract was duly executed and signed by the parties. As entered in said document, the status
of accused was ‘single’. There is no dispute either that at the time of the celebration of the wedding with
complainant, accused was actually a married man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a
marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo B. Cañares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per
Marriage Certificate issued in connection therewith, which matrimony was further blessed by Rev. Father Arthur
Baur on October 10, 1976 in religious rites at the Sacred Heart Church, Cebu City. In the same manner, the civil
marriage between accused and complainant was confirmed in a church ceremony on June 29, 1991 officiated
by Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod City. Both marriages were consummated when
out of the first consortium, Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two children, while a child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired
by accused with complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan.

"On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel with the City
Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present case before this Court
against said accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated January 22, 1993.

"On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutor’s Office,
accused filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu
City, and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva
was declared null and void.

"Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code for having contracted a second
marriage with herein complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991 when at that time he was previously
united in lawful marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City, without said first marriage
having been legally dissolved. As shown by the evidence and admitted by accused, all the essential elements of
the crime are present, namely: (a) that the offender has been previously legally married; (2) that the first marriage
has not been legally dissolved or in case the spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contract[ed] a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the
second or subsequent marriage ha[d] all the essential requisites for validity. x x x

"While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s], accused posited the defense that his previous
marriage ha[d] been judicially declared null and void and that the private complainant had knowledge of the first
marriage of accused.

"It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was entered into with Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991,
accused’s prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was subsisting, no judicial action having yet been initiated or
any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva. Since no
declaration of the nullity of his first marriage ha[d] yet been made at the time of his second marriage, it is clear
that accused was a married man when he contracted such second marriage with complainant on June 27, 1991.
He was still at the time validly married to his first wife." 3

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Agreeing with the lower court, the Court of Appeals stated:

"Under Article 40 of the Family Code, ‘the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes
of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.’ But here, the final
judgment declaring null and void accused’s previous marriage came not before the celebration of the second
marriage, but after, when the case for bigamy against accused was already tried in court. And what constitutes
the crime of bigamy is the act of any person who shall contract a second subsequent marriage ‘before’ the former
marriage has been legally dissolved."4

Hence, this Petition.5

The Issues

In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:

"A
 Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in order to convict petitioner.

"B

Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
punishing bigamy, in relation to Articles 36 and 40 of the Family Code, negates the guilt of petitioner.

"C

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on the basis of reasonable doubt." 6

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is not meritorious.

Main Issue:Effect of Nullity of Previous Marriage

Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:

"The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings."

The elements of this crime are as follows:

"1. That the offender has been legally married;

2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;

4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity." 7

When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the elements of bigamy were present. It is undisputed
that petitioner married Thelma G. Oliva on April 10, 1976 in Cebu City. While that marriage was still subsisting,
he contracted a second marriage, this time with Respondent Ma. Consuelo Tan who subsequently filed the
Complaint for bigamy.

Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab initio. Unlike voidable marriages which are considered valid
until set aside by a competent court, he argues that a void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at
all.8 Thus, he concludes that there is no first marriage to speak of. Petitioner also quotes the commentaries9 of
former Justice Luis Reyes that "it is now settled that if the first marriage is void from the beginning, it is a defense
in a bigamy charge. But if the first marriage is voidable, it is not a defense."

Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the first marriage was declared null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code, but she points out that that declaration came only after the Information had been filed. Hence, by
then, the crime had already been consummated. She argues that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void previous
marriage must be obtained before a person can marry for a subsequent time.

We agree with the respondent.

To be sure, jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage has
been characterized as "conflicting."10 In People v. Mendoza,11 a bigamy case involving an accused who married
three times, the Court ruled that there was no need for such declaration. In that case, the accused contracted a
second marriage during the subsistence of the first. When the first wife died, he married for the third time. The
second wife then charged him with bigamy. Acquitting him, the Court held that the second marriage was void ab
initio because it had been contracted while the first marriage was still in effect. Since the second marriage was
obviously void and illegal, the Court ruled that there was no need for a judicial declaration of its nullity. Hence,
the accused did not commit bigamy when he married for the third time. This ruling was affirmed by the Court
in People v. Aragon,12which involved substantially the same facts.

But in subsequent cases, the Court impressed the need for a judicial declaration of nullity. In Vda de Consuegra
v. GSIS,13 Jose Consuegra married for the second time while the first marriage was still subsisting. Upon his
death, the Court awarded one half of the proceeds of his retirement benefits to the first wife and the other half to
the second wife and her children, notwithstanding the manifest nullity of the second marriage. It held: "And with
respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observes that although the second marriage can be presumed
to be void ab initioas it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial
declaration of such nullity."

In Tolentino v. Paras,14 however, the Court again held that judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage was
not necessary. In that case, a man married twice. In his Death Certificate, his second wife was named as his
surviving spouse. The first wife then filed a Petition to correct the said entry in the Death Certificate. The Court
ruled in favor of the first wife, holding that "the second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during
the lifetime of the first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree
is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage."

In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy,15 the Court stressed the need for such declaration. In that case, Karl Heinz Wiegel filed
an action for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lilia Olivia Wiegel on the ground that the latter had a
prior existing marriage. After pretrial, Lilia asked that she be allowed to present evidence to prove, among others,
that her first husband had previously been married to another woman. In holding that there was no need for such
evidence, the Court ruled: "x x x There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior
marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still
needs, according to this Court, a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would
still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel;
x x x."

Subsequently, in Yap v. CA,16 the Court reverted to the ruling in People v. Mendoza, holding that there was no
need for such declaration of nullity.

In Domingo v. CA,17 the issue raised was whether a judicial declaration of nullity was still necessary for the
recovery and the separation of properties of erstwhile spouses. Ruling in the affirmative, the Court declared:
"The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense; in
fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse
who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity
of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy." 18

Unlike Mendoza and Aragon, Domingo as well as the other cases herein cited was not a criminal prosecution for
bigamy. Nonetheless, Domingo underscored the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage on
the basis of a new provision of the Family Code, which came into effect several years after the promulgation
of Mendoza and Aragon.

In Mendoza and Aragon, the Court relied on Section 29 of Act No. 3613 (Marriage Law), which provided:

"Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse
shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
 (a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;

(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, the marriage as contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void
by a competent court."

The Court held in those two cases that the said provision "plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by
any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is
necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable marriages."19

The provision appeared in substantially the same form under Article 83 of the 1950 Civil Code and Article 41 of
the Family Code. However, Article 40 of the Family Code, a new provision, expressly requires a judicial
declaration of nullity of the previous marriage, as follows:

"ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void."

In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a final judgment declaring such marriage void was necessary.
Verily, the Family Code and Domingo affirm the earlier ruling in Wiegel. Thus, a Civil Law authority and member
of the Civil Code Revision Commitee has observed:

"[Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court that the marriage of a person may be
null and void but there is need of a judicial declaration of such fact before that person can marry again; otherwise,
the second marriage will also be void (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, Aug. 19/86, 143 SCRA 499, Vda. De Consuegra
v. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315). This provision changes the old rule that where a marriage is illegal and void from its
performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish its validity (People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People
v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033)."20

In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling in Mendoza and Aragon – that there is no need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage -- has been cast aside by Article 40 of the Family Code. Such declaration
is now necessary before one can contract a second marriage. Absent that declaration, we hold that one may be
charged with and convicted of bigamy.

The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncement in Terre v. Terre,21 which involved an administrative
Complaint against a lawyer for marrying twice. In rejecting the lawyer’s argument that he was free to enter into
a second marriage because the first one was void ab initio, the Court ruled: "for purposes of determining whether
a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and
void ab initio is essential." The Court further noted that the said rule was "cast into statutory form by Article 40 of
the Family Code." Significantly, it observed that the second marriage, contracted without a judicial declaration
that the first marriage was void, was "bigamous and criminal in character."

Moreover, Justice Reyes, an authority in Criminal Law whose earlier work was cited by petitioner, changed his
view on the subject in view of Article 40 of the Family Code and wrote in 1993 that a person must first obtain a
judicial declaration of the nullity of a void marriage before contracting a subsequent marriage:22

"It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy
charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage before
contracting the second marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code states that x x x. The Code Commission believes
that the parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void, even if such is the
fact, but must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage before they should be allowed to marry
again. x x x."
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration of
nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after
complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the
first was still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat,
the crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in the
prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and
invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.

Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge against him.

Damages

In her Memorandum, respondent prays that the Court set aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals insofar as it
denied her claim of damages and attorney’s fees. 23

Her prayer has no merit. She did not appeal the ruling of the CA against her; hence, she cannot obtain affirmative
relief from this Court.24 In any event, we find no reason to reverse or set aside the pertinent ruling of the CA on
this point, which we quote hereunder:

"We are convinced from the totality of the evidence presented in this case that Consuelo Tan is not the innocent
victim that she claims to be; she was well aware of the existence of the previous marriage when she contracted
matrimony with Dr. Mercado. The testimonies of the defense witnesses prove this, and we find no reason to
doubt said testimonies.

xxx xxx xxx

"Indeed, the claim of Consuelo Tan that she was not aware of his previous marriage does not inspire belief,
especially as she had seen that Dr. Mercado had two (2) children with him. We are convinced that she took the
plunge anyway, relying on the fact that the first wife would no longer return to Dr. Mercado, she being by then
already living with another man.

"Consuelo Tan can therefore not claim damages in this case where she was fully conscious of the consequences
of her act. She should have known that she would suffer humiliation in the event the truth [would] come out, as
it did in this case, ironically because of her personal instigation. If there are indeed damages caused to her
reputation, they are of her own willful making."25

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 145226 February 06, 2004

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision1 dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment 2 dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo
y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months
of prision correccionalas minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed
in this petition is the resolution 3 of the appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigo’s motion for
reconsideration.

The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:

Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran
City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).

After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.

In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former
replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.

In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they
maintained constant communication.

In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada.
Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina
Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.

On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.
 On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against
appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.

On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago4 at the Virgen sa Barangay
Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.

On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others,
the declaration of nullity of accused’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony
actually took place.

On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information 5 filed by the City Prosecutor
of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. 6

The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification
of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but
subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case,
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter
ensued.

On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day
of Prision Mayoras maximum.

SO ORDERED.7

In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner’s claim that his first marriage to Lucia was null
and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,8 the trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage
ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume
that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their
marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.

Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,9 which held that the court
of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort merely
for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As
such, a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucio’s defense of good
faith in contracting the second marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v. Bitdu,10 everyone is
presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law
does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.

Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.

Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the appellate court, the
trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab
initiosince no marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then
became final and executory.

On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.11
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subsequent declaration of
nullity of Lucio’s marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is
sought to be punished by Article 349 12 of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage
before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from
the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.

The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court could
not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15 13 of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is
contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 17 14 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy
cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, contending that the doctrine in Mendiola
v. People,15 allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be
a basis for good faith.

On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit. 16 However, the denial was by a
split vote. The ponente of the appellate court’s original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S.
Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first
marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the
nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never
married, he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.

The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:

A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN
CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN
INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONER’S LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE
CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.

B.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN
PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.

C.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT
EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE
TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.17

To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his
defense of good faith is valid.

The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the
Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly and publicly, which a person
intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to
a conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the
Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete
defense. He stresses that there is a difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate
the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to
an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the instant case is a
convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,18 which
held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article
4019 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not
the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG
counters that petitioner’s contention that he was in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the
Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Lucia.

Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first determine whether
all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,20 we laid down the elements of
bigamy thus:

(1) the offender has been legally married;

(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;

(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and

(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.

Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700,
the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of the
marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol
and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage
contract.

SO ORDERED.21

The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a
solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the
presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with
Articles 322 and 423 of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it,
"This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the
date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration
of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under
the eyes of the law, never married."24 The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial
court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory.

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this
case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to
speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never
married "from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to
its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the
marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of
the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first
marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.

The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.25 In the latter case, the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already
celebrated. We held therein that:
 A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be
legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes
as "void."26

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just once, but twice:
first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest
in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared
void ab initio.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing
officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of
signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of
nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which
petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts
a subsequent marriage.

The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused
and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the
circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that
we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now
moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated September 25, 2000,
denying herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio
Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven
with moral certainty.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 148595 July 12, 2004

SPOUSES ANTONIO S. PAHANG and LOLITA T. PAHANG, petitioners,

vs.
HON. AUGUSTINE A. VESTIL, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court- Branch 56, Mandaue City,
DEPUTY SHERIFF, Regional Trial Court-Branch 56 and METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST
COMPANY, respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Spouses Antonio and Lolita Pahang, for the
nullification of the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59157.

The Antecedents

On January 5, 1996, the petitioners, Spouses Antonio and Lolita Pahang, received a short-term loan of one
million five hundred thousand pesos (P1,500,000.00) from the respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company
payable on December 27, 1996. The loan was covered by Non-Negotiable Promissory Note No. 190601 3 and
was, likewise, secured by a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 29607.4 As the petitioners failed to pay the loan, the interest and the penalties due thereon, the
respondent foreclosed the real estate mortgage extrajudicially. As a consequence, the mortgaged property was
sold at public auction on January 8, 1998 to the respondent bank as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was
executed by Pasnonito D. Antiporda as Ex-Officio Sheriff in favor of the respondent on January 14, 1998 and
was registered with the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City on January 27, 1998.

On December 29, 1998, the respondent wrote the petitioners that the one-year redemption period of the property
would expire on January 27, 1999.5 Instead of redeeming the property, the petitioners filed, on January 19, 1999,
a complaint for annulment of extrajudicial sale against the respondent bank and the Sheriff in the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu (Mandaue City), Branch 56, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-3454.6 Therein, the petitioners
alleged that the respondent bloated their obligation of P1,500,000.00 to P2,403,770.73 by including excessive
past due interest, penalty charges, attorney’s fees and sheriff’s expense. They claimed that such exorbitant
charges were made to frustrate their chance to pay the loan, and to ensure that the respondent bank would be
the highest bidder during the auction sale. They also asserted that the respondent failed to remit to the Sheriff
the purchase price of the property and was, likewise, guilty of fraud, collusion, breach of trust or misconduct in
the conduct of the auction sale of their property. Besides praying for injunctive relief, the petitioners prayed for
the following alternative reliefs:

3. After trial on the merits, and after determination of plaintiffs’ true obligation with defendant bank, to
declare the foreclosure on the subject property as null and void, and to allow the plaintiffs to pay the
same; as alternative prayer, to allow the plaintiffs to redeem the subject real property based on the
amount determined and established as true and exact obligation of plaintiffs to defendant bank.7
After the expiration of the one-year redemption period, the respondent consolidated its ownership over the
foreclosed property. Consequently, TCT No. 44668 was issued by the Register of Deeds in its name. On July
23, 1999, the respondent filed a Petition for Writ of Possession before the RTC of Mandaue City (Branch 56),
docketed as LRC Case No. 3.8

The petitioners, citing the ruling of this Court in Belisario v. The Intermediate Appellate Court,9 opposed the
petition on the ground that the core issue in their complaint in Civil Case No. MAN-3454 constituted a prejudicial
question, which warranted a suspension of the proceedings before the court. The petitioners averred that the
filing of their complaint within the period to redeem the foreclosed property was equivalent to an offer to redeem
the same, and had the effect of preserving such right. They also asserted that the respondent acted in bad faith
in procuring the title over the property despite the pendency of their complaint in Civil Case No. MAN-3454.

On March 28, 2000, the RTC of Mandaue City, Branch 56, rendered a decision in LRC Case No. 3 granting the
petition and ordering the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the respondent.10

Citing the case of Javelosa v. Court of Appeals,11 and Gawaran v. Court of Appeals,12 the RTC ruled that since
the petitioners failed to redeem the property within one year from the foreclosure, the respondent was entitled to
a writ of possession as a necessary consequence of the readjudication of ownership and the corresponding
issuance of the original certificate.13 The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, but the
court issued an order denying the motion, stating that it was merely its ministerial function to issue a writ of
possession.14

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59157 for
the nullification of the March 28, 2000 Decision and the May 19, 2000 Order of the RTC. Thepetitioners alleged
that the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in granting the
petition of the respondent bank for a writ of possession in LRC Case No. 3 instead of suspending the proceedings
therein based on the ruling of this Court in Belisario vs. The Intermediate Appellate Court.15

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Finding that the RTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of the writ of possession,
the CA rendered a decision on March 2, 2001, dismissing the petition. 16 Citing the rulings of this Court in Vda.
de Jacob v. Court of Appeals17 and Navarra v. Court of Appeals,18 the CA explained that the pendency of a
separate proceeding questioning the validity of the mortgage and the extrajudicial foreclosure thereof cannot bar
the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser at public auction. The appellate court ruled that
after a title on the property has been consolidated in the mortgagee, the issuance of a writ of possession
becomes a ministerial act of the trial court. Furthermore, the right of the respondent bank to possess the property
was based on its right of ownership as a purchaser of the properties in the foreclosure sale. The CA explained
that the ruling in the Belisariocase was inapplicable because it involved a complaint to enforce the repurchase
of the foreclosed property within the period of redemption, whereas, the complaint filed by the petitioners in Civil
Case No. MAN-3454 was for the annulment of the mortgage or extrajudicial sale which was not equivalent to an
offer to redeem the property.19

The Present Petition

The motion for reconsideration of the petitioners of the decision, having been denied by the appellate court, the
petitioners filed this instant petition, assigning the following errors:

1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING PETITIONERS’ RIGHT OF

REDEMPTION OVER THEIR FORECLOSED PROPERTY AS HAVING EXPIRED ON JANUARY 26,
1999, IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR PENDING COMPLAINT TO ANNUL THE FORECLOSURE FILED
BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF THE ONE-YEAR REDEMPTION PERIOD, ON THE GROUND OF
FRAUD, AND CONSIDERING FURTHER THEIR SPECIFIC PRAYER THEREOF FOR
DETERMINATION OF THEIR TRUE OBLIGATION WITH PRIVATE RESPONDENT, AND TO ALLOW
THEM TO PAY THE SAME AND/OR TO REDEEM THEIR FORECLOSED PROPERTY. 20
 2. PETITIONERS’ COMPLAINT FOR ANNULMENT OF THE FORECLOSURE OF THEIR PROPERTY
WITH A PRAYER FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND INJUNCTION TO STOP THE
ISSUANCE OF A DEFINITE DEED OF SALE AND CONSOLIDATION OF TITLE OF THEIR PROPERTY
IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT, WHILE GIVING PREFERENCE AND ACTING WITH
DISPATCH ON PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF POSSESSION
ON THE SAME PROPERTY, BY GRANTING THE WRIT OF POSSESSION THEREON THEREBY
RENDERING MOOT AND ACADEMIC PETITIONERS’ PRAYERS IN THEIR COMPLAINT FOR
ANNULMENT OF FORECLOSURE.21

3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE DECISION OF THIS

HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF BELISARIO VS. THE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, G.R. NO. L-73503, WHEREBY "THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT TO
ENFORCE REPURCHASE WITHIN THE PERIOD FOR REDEMPTION IS EQUIVALENT TO AN OFFER
TO REDEEM AND HAS THE EFFECT OF PRESERVING THE RIGHT OF REDEMPTION"
INAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE OF PETITIONERS. 22

4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE FACT THAT THE
ISSUE OR ISSUES JOINED IN THE COMPLAINT FOR ANNULMENT BEFORE RESPONDENT JUDGE
DOCKETED AS CIVIL CASE NO. MAN-4353 (sic) IS A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION TO THE ISSUE
RAISED IN THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF POSSESSION IN LRC CASE NO. 3. 23

5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HAVING FAILED TO CONSIDER THE VALID
CAUSES OF ACTION OF PETITIONERS IN THEIR COMPLAINT FOR ANNULMENT IN CIVIL CASE
NO. MAN-4354 (sic).24

The threshold issues are as follows: (a) whether or not the complaint of the petitioners in Civil Case No. MAN-
3454 for annulment of extrajudicial sale is a prejudicial question to the petition of the respondent bank for the
issuance of a writ of possession in LRC Case No. 3; and, (b) whether or not the RTC committed a grave abuse
of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in granting the petition of the respondent in LRC Case
No. 3 and in issuing the writ of possession in its favor.

The issues being interrelated, the Court shall resolve the same simultaneously.

The petitioners contend that their complaint in Civil Case No. MAN-3454 and the respondent’s petition for a writ
of possession in LRC Case No. 3 were raffled to Branch 56 of the RTC. Although their complaint in Civil Case
No. MAN-3454 was for the nullification of the extrajudicial sale at public auction on the ground of fraud, they also
prayed, as an alternative remedy, that they be allowed to redeem the property based on the amount to be
determined by the court after trial. Hence, they assert, the filing of their complaint before the expiry of the
redemption period to enforce their right of redemption was equivalent to a formal offer to redeem the property
and had the effect of preserving their right of redemption. They argue that the RTC should have suspended the
proceedings in LRC Case No. 3 pending the final resolution of Civil Case No. MAN-3454 so as not to render
moot and academic the latter case, conformably with the ruling of the Court in Belisario vs. The Intermediate
Appellate Court,25 after all, the two cases were pending before the same court. The petitioners, thus, aver that
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in granting the
petition of the respondent bank for a writ of possession in LRC Case No. 3. They, likewise, aver that the Court
of Appeals erred when it affirmed the decision of the trial court and declared, thus:

Further, as to the applicability of the case of Belisario vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. No. L-73503,
Aug. 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 101, 108), suffice it to say, that the cause of action therein was to enforce the
repurchase of the foreclosed property within the period of redemption, which the Supreme Court held
that it has the effect of preserving the right of redemption. Whereas, Civil Case No. MAN-3454 filed by
the petitioners is for the annulment of mortgage or extrajudicial sale, which is not in effect an offer to
redeem. Verily, the pendency of said civil case does not preserve the right of redemption of the petitioners
after the period of redemption.26

The Court’s Ruling

The contentions of the petitioners have no merit.

A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes into play in a
situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue that
must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in
the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.27

In the present case, the complaint of the petitioners for Annulment of Extrajudicial Sale is a civil action and the
respondent’s petition for the issuance of a writ of possession of Lot No. 3-A, Block 1, Psd-07-021410, TCT No.
44668 is but an incident in the land registration case and, therefore, no prejudicial question can arise from the
existence of the two actions.28 A similar issue was raised in Manalo vs. Court of Appeals,29 where we held that:

At any rate, it taxes our imagination why the questions raised in Case No. 98-0868 must be considered
determinative of Case No. 9011. The basic issue in the former is whether the respondent, as the
purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, may be compelled to have the property
repurchased or resold to a mortgagor’s successor-in-interest (petitioner); while that in the latter is merely
whether the respondent, as the purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, is entitled to a writ
of possession after the statutory period for redemption has expired. The two cases, assuming both are
pending, can proceed separately and take their own direction independent of each other. 30

The focal issue in Civil Case No. MAN-3454 was whether the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
executed by the petitioners in favor of the respondent bank and the sale of their property at public auction
for P2,403,770.73 are null and void, whereas, the issue in LRC Case No. 3 was whether the respondent bank
was entitled to the possession of the property after the statutory period for redemption had lapsed and title was
issued .

Our ruling in Belisario has no application in this case because in the said case, no prejudicial question was
involved. We merely held therein that the filing of an action to enforce redemption within the period of redemption
is equivalent to a formal offer to redeem, and should the Court allow the redemption, the redemptioner should
then pay the amount already determined. In fine, the filing of an action by the redemptioner to enforce his right
to redeem does not suspend the running of the statutory period to redeem the property, nor bar the purchaser
at public auction from procuring a writ of possession after the statutory period of redemption had lapsed, without
prejudice to the final outcome of such complaint to enforce the right of redemption. 31

The remedy of the petitioners from the assailed decision of the RTC in LRC Case No. 3 was to appeal by writ of
error to the Court of Appeals. 32 However, instead of appealing by writ of error, the petitioners filed their petition
for certiorari. Certiorari is not proper where the aggrieved party has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law.
Moreover, the error of the trial court in granting the respondent bank a writ of possession, if at all, was an error
of judgment correctible only by an ordinary appeal.

It bears stressing that the proceedings in a petition and/or motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, after
the lapse of the statutory period for redemption, is summary in nature. 33 The trial court is mandated to issue a
writ of possession upon a finding of the lapse of the statutory period for redemption without the redemptioner
having redeemed the property. It cannot be validly argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it merely
complied with its ministerial duty to issue the said writ of possession. 34

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. The assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59157 is AFFIRMED.

Cost against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970

CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA
CABILIN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.
Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs-appellants.
Godardo Jacinto for defendant-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte (Judge Onofre Sison
Abalos, presiding), in its Civil Case No. 1590, dismissing a complaint for support and damages, and another
order denying amendment of the same pleading.

The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows:

Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court below. In her complaint it
was averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and confidential relations; that
defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force
and intimidation, and without her consent; that as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs
supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month,
damages and attorney's fees.

Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege
that the child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and
dismissed the complaint.

Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later
given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable,
since the original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.

We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is
given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article
40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors,
particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to
dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn,
may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his
testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if
such child should be born after the death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code).

ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by those persons
who would legally represent them if they were already born.
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct
line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
 shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are
not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual,
without prejudice to the right of 'representation.

It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation
of parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40
aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is true that Article 40
prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further
"provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the
time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to
the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and
ineffective. Manresa, in his Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the corresponding Article 29 of the Spanish Civil Code,
clearly points this out:

Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son simples expectativas, ni aun en el sentido tecnico
que la moderna doctrina da a esta figura juridica sino que constituyen un caso de los propiamente
Ilamados 'derechos en estado de pendenci'; el nacimiento del sujeto en las condiciones previstas
por el art. 30, no determina el nacimiento de aquellos derechos (que ya existian de antemano),
sino que se trata de un hecho que tiene efectos declarativos. (1 Manresa, Op. cit., page 271)

A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman not his wife
to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of
his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines:

ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:
ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....

Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of action
for damages under the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action
was doubly in error.

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961

ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.

Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.

A.P. Salvador for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a woman, who voluntarily
procured her abortion, could recover damages from physician who caused the same.

The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo, the of Nita
Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of the complaint upon the
evidence adduced, the trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and against defendant Geluz, ordering
the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. On appeal, Court of
Appeals, in a special division of five, sustained the award by a majority vote of three justices as against two, who
rendered a separate dissenting opinion.

The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:

Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 — through her aunt
Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally married.
Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself
aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was
then employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had
herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became
pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida,
she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three
met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of
the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan,
campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the
abortion.

It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of damages. Upon
application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.

The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of P3,000.06 upon the
provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This we believe to be error,
for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of
an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. Under the system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva
no alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en consscuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-
Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights and obligations.

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one
injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on
account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact,
even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal
death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical
capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived
child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits
such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided
it be born later with the condition specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that
the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.

The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that recovery can not had
for the death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs. Northampton,
52 Am. Rep. 242; and numerous cases collated in the editorial note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639).

This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be those
inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to
life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect either help, support or services from an unborn
child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of
the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the
disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the
circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals have not found any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference
to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was
unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The lower court expressly found, and the
majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that the appellee was aware of the second abortion;
and the probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event,
he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment of
the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken
interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been
directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and
P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly
exaggerated.

The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:

It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels outraged by the abortion which
his wife has deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be highminded rather than mercenary;
and that his primary concern would be to see to it that the medical profession was purged of an unworthy
member rather than turn his wife's indiscretion to personal profit, and with that idea in mind to press either
the administrative or the criminal cases he had filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in favor of a
civil action for damages of which not only he, but also his wife, would be the beneficiaries.

It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without medical necessity
to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too severely condemned; and the
consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does
not justify an award of damage that, under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.

The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board of Medical Examiners for
their information and such investigation and action against the appellee Antonio Geluz as the facts may warrant.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948

ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner,

vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased, respondent.

Angel Limjoco, Jr. and Delfin L. Gonzales for petitioner.

Bienvenido A. Tan for respondent.

HILADO, J.:

Under date of May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission, through Deputy Commissioner Fidel Ibañez,
rendered its decision in case No. 4572 of Pedro O. Fragante, as applicant for a certificate of public convenience
to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal, whereby said commission held that the evidence
therein showed that the public interest and convenience will be promoted in a proper and suitable manner "by
authorizing the operation and maintenance of another ice plant of two and one-half (2-½) tons in the municipality
of San Juan; that the original applicant Pedro O. Fragante was a Filipino Citizen at the time of his death; and
that his intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service". The commission, therefore,
overruled the opposition filed in the case and ordered "that under the provisions of section 15 of Commonwealth
Act No. 146, as amended a certificate of public convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of the deceased
Pedro Fragante, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the
proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of
two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from said plant in the
said Municipality of San Juan and in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and in Quezon City", subject to the
conditions therein set forth in detail (petitioner's brief, pp. 33-34).

Petitioner makes four assignments of error in his brief as follows:

1. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not in accordance with law.

2. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not reasonably supported by evidence.
 3. The Public Service Commission erred in not giving petitioner and the Ice and Cold Storage Industries
of the Philippines, Inc., as existing operators, a reasonable opportunity to meet the increased demand.

4. The decision of the Public Service Commission is an unwarranted departure from its announced
policy with respect to the establishment and operation of ice plant. (Pp. 1-2, petitioner's brief.)

In his argument petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the commission to allow the substitution of
the legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the case then
pending before the commission, and in subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied for, which is
said to be in contravention of law.

If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no question that he would have had the right to prosecute his
application before the commission to its final conclusion. No one would have denied him that right. As declared
by the commission in its decision, he had invested in the ice plant in question P 35,000, and from what the
commission said regarding his other properties and business, he would certainly have been financially able to
maintain and operate said plant had he not died. His transportation business alone was netting him about P1,440
a month. He was a Filipino citizen and continued to be such till his demise. The commission declared in its
decision, in view of the evidence before it, that his estate was financially able to maintain and operate the ice
plant. The aforesaid right of Pedro O. Fragante to prosecute said application to its conclusion was one which by
its nature did not lapse through his death. Hence, it constitutes a part of the assets of his estate, for which a right
was property despite the possibility that in the end the commission might have denied application, although
under the facts of the case, the commission granted the application in view of the financial ability of the estate to
maintain and operate the ice plant. Petitioner, in his memorandum of March 19, 1947, admits (page 3) that the
certificate of public convenience once granted "as a rule, should descend to his estate as an asset". Such
certificate would certainly be property, and the right to acquire such a certificate, by complying with the requisites
of the law, belonged to the decedent in his lifetime, and survived to his estate and judicial administrator after his
death.

If Pedro O. Fragrante had in his lifetime secured an option to buy a piece of land and during the life of the option
he died, if the option had been given him in the ordinary course of business and not out of special consideration
for his person, there would be no doubt that said option and the right to exercise it would have survived to his
estate and legal representatives. In such a case there would also be the possibility of failure to acquire the
property should he or his estate or legal representative fail to comply with the conditions of the option. In the
case at bar Pedro O. Fragrante's undoubted right to apply for and acquire the desired certificate of public
convenience — the evidence established that the public needed the ice plant — was under the law conditioned
only upon the requisite citizenship and economic ability to maintain and operate the service. Of course, such
right to acquire or obtain such certificate of public convenience was subject to failure to secure its objective
through nonfulfillment of the legal conditions, but the situation here is no different from the legal standpoint from
that of the option in the illustration just given.

Rule 88, section 2, provides that the executor or administrator may bring or defend actions, among other cases,
for the protection of the property or rights of the deceased which survive, and it says that such actions may be
brought or defended "in the right of the deceased".

Rule 82, section 1, paragraph (a), mentions among the duties of the executor or administrator, the making of an
inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which shall come to his possession
or knowledge, or to the possession of any other person for him.

In his commentaries on the Rules of Court (Volume II, 2nd ed., pages 366, 367) the present chief Justice of this
Court draws the following conclusion from the decisions cited by him:

Therefore, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, any action affecting the property
or rights (emphasis supplied) of a deceased person which may be brought by or against him if he were
alive, may likewise be instituted and prosecuted by or against the administrator, unless the action is for
recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, or unless, by its very nature, it cannot survive, because
death extinguishes the right . . . .
It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a certificate of public convenience before the Public Service
Commission is not an "action". But the foregoing provisions and citations go to prove that the decedent's rights
which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel of the assets of his estate
which, being placed under the control and management of the executor or administrator, can not be exercised
but by him in representation of the estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the
heirs of the decedent. And if the right involved happens to consist in the prosecution of an unfinished proceeding
upon an application for a certificate of public convenience of the deceased before the Public Service
Commission, it is but logical that the legal representative be empowered and entitled in behalf of the estate to
make the right effective in that proceeding.

Manresa (Vol. III, 6th ed., p. 11) says that No. 10 of article 334 and article 336 of the Civil Code, respectively,
consider as immovable and movable things rights which are not material. The same eminent commentator says
in the cited volume (p. 45) that article 336 of the Civil Code has been deficiently drafted in that it is not sufficiently
expressive of all incorporeal rights which are also property for juridical purposes.

Corpus Juris (Vol. 50, p. 737) states that in the broad sense of the term, property includes, among other things,
"an option", and "the certificate of the railroad commission permitting the operation of a bus line", and on page
748 of the same volume we read:

However, these terms (real property, as estate or interest) have also been declared to include every
species of title, inchoate or complete, and embrace rights which lie in contract, whether executory or
executed. (Emphasis supplied.)

Another important question raised by petitioner is whether the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is a "person" within
the meaning of the Public Service Act.

Words and Phrases, First Series, (Vol. 6, p, 5325), states the following doctrine in the jurisdiction of the State of
Indiana:

As the estate of the decedent is in law regarded as a person, a forgery committed after the death of the
man whose name purports to be signed to the instrument may be prosecuted as with the intent to defraud
the estate. Billings vs. State, 107 Ind., 54, 55, 6 N. E. 914, 7 N. E. 763, 57 Am. Rep. 77.

The Supreme Court of Indiana in the decision cited above had before it a case of forgery committed after the
death of one Morgan for the purpose of defrauding his estate. The objection was urged that the information did
not aver that the forgery was committed with the intent to defraud any person. The Court, per Elliott, J., disposed
of this objection as follows:

. . . The reason advanced in support of this proposition is that the law does not regard the estate of a
decedent as a person. This intention (contention) cannot prevail. The estate of the decedent is a person
in legal contemplation. "The word "person" says Mr. Abbot, "in its legal signification, is a generic term,
and includes artificial as well as natural persons," 2 Abb. Dict. 271; Douglas vs. Pacific, etc. Co., 4 Cal.
304; Planters', etc., Bank vs. Andrews, 8 Port. (Ala.) 404. It said in another work that 'persons are of two
kinds: natural and artificial. A natural person is a human being. Artificial persons include (1) a collection
or succession of natural persons forming a corporation; (2) a collection of property to which the law
attributes the capacity of having rights and duties. The latter class of artificial persons is recognized only
to a limited extent in our law. "Examples are the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person." 2 Rapalje &
L. Law Dict. 954. Our own cases inferentially recognize the correctness of the definition given by the
authors from whom we have quoted, for they declare that it is sufficient, in pleading a claim against a
decedent's estate, to designate the defendant as the estate of the deceased person, naming him. Ginn
vs. Collins, 43 Ind. 271. Unless we accept this definition as correct, there would be a failure of justice in
cases where, as here, the forgery is committed after the death of a person whose name is forged; and
this is a result to be avoided if it can be done consistent with principle. We perceive no difficulty in avoiding
such a result; for, to our minds, it seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as
an artificial person. It is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be
properly made, and, although natural persons as heirs, devises, or creditors, have an interest in the
 property, the artificial creature is a distinct legal entity. The interest which natural persons have in it is not
complete until there has been a due administration; and one who forges the name of the decedent to an
instrument purporting to be a promissory note must be regarded as having intended to defraud the estate
of the decedent, and not the natural persons having diverse interests in it, since ha cannot be presumed
to have known who those persons were, or what was the nature of their respective interest. The fraudulent
intent is against the artificial person, — the estate — and not the natural persons who have direct or
contingent interest in it. (107 Ind. 54, 55, 6 N.E. 914-915.)

In the instant case there would also be a failure of justice unless the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is considered
a "person", for quashing of the proceedings for no other reason than his death would entail prejudicial results to
his investment amounting to P35,000.00 as found by the commission, not counting the expenses and
disbursements which the proceeding can be presumed to have occasioned him during his lifetime, let alone
those defrayed by the estate thereafter. In this jurisdiction there are ample precedents to show that the estate of
a deceased person is also considered as having legal personality independent of their heirs. Among the most
recent cases may be mentioned that of "Estate of Mota vs. Concepcion, 56 Phil., 712, 717, wherein the principal
plaintiff was the estate of the deceased Lazaro Mota, and this Court gave judgment in favor of said estate along
with the other plaintiffs in these words:

. . . the judgment appealed from must be affirmed so far as it holds that defendants Concepcion and
Whitaker are indebted to he plaintiffs in the amount of P245,804.69 . . . .

Under the regime of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, the heirs of a
deceased person were considered in contemplation of law as the continuation of his personality by virtue of the
provision of article 661 of the first Code that the heirs succeed to all the rights and obligations of the decedent
by the mere fact of his death. It was so held by this Court in Barrios vs. Dolor, 2 Phil., 44, 46. However, after the
enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, article 661 of the Civil Code was abrogated, as held in Suiliong & Co.
vs. Chio-Taysan, 12 Phil., 13, 22. In that case, as well as in many others decided by this Court after the
innovations introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of estates of deceased persons, it has been
the constant doctrine that it is the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by the decedent, instead
of the heirs directly, that becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive after his
demise.

The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the decedent's personality simply by legal fiction, for
they might not have been flesh and blood — the reason was one in the nature of a legal exigency derived from
the principle that the heirs succeeded to the rights and obligations of the decedent. Under the present legal
system, such rights and obligations as survive after death have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of
the deceased. And if the same legal fiction were not indulged, there would be no juridical basis for the estate,
represented by the executor or administrator, to exercise those rights and to fulfill those obligations of the
deceased. The reason and purpose for indulging the fiction is identical and the same in both cases. This is why
according to the Supreme Court of Indiana in Billings vs. State, supra, citing 2 Rapalje & L. Dictionary, 954,
among the artificial persons recognized by law figures "a collection of property to which the law attributes the
capacity of having rights and duties", as for instance, the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person.

Petitioner raises the decisive question of whether or not the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante can be considered a
"citizen of the Philippines" within the meaning of section 16 of the Public Service Act, as amended, particularly
the proviso thereof expressly and categorically limiting the power of the commission to issue certificates of public
convenience or certificates of public convenience and necessity "only to citizens of the Philippines or of the
United States or to corporations, copartnerships, associations, or joint-stock companies constituted and
organized under the laws of the Philippines", and the further proviso that sixty per centum of the stock or paid-
up capital of such entities must belong entirely to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States.

Within the Philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying reason for the legal fiction by which, for certain
purposes, the estate of the deceased person is considered a "person" is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice
resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent
as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged. Substantially the same reason is assigned to support
the same rule in the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana, as announced in Billings vs. State, supra, when the
Supreme Court of said State said:

. . . It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial person. it is the
creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly made . . . .

Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to cite just one example, under the bill of rights it
seems clear that while the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to natural persons, the
term "person" used in section 1 (1) and (2) must be deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, for otherwise
these latter would be without the constitutional guarantee against being deprived of property without due process
of law, or the immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures. We take it that it was the intendment of the
framers to include artificial or juridical, no less than natural, persons in these constitutional immunities and in
others of similar nature. Among these artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons. Hence,
we hold that within the framework of the Constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an
artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course,
include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those
obligations of his which survived after his death. One of those rights was the one involved in his pending
application before the Public Service Commission in the instant case, consisting in the prosecution of said
application to its final conclusion. As stated above, an injustice would ensue from the opposite course.

How about the point of citizenship? If by legal fiction his personality is considered extended so that any debts or
obligations left by, and surviving, him may be paid, and any surviving rights may be exercised for the benefit of
his creditors and heirs, respectively, we find no sound and cogent reason for denying the application of the same
fiction to his citizenship, and for not considering it as likewise extended for the purposes of the aforesaid
unfinished proceeding before the Public Service Commission. The outcome of said proceeding, if successful,
would in the end inure to the benefit of the same creditors and the heirs. Even in that event petitioner could not
allege any prejudice in the legal sense, any more than he could have done if Fragrante had lived longer and
obtained the desired certificate. The fiction of such extension of his citizenship is grounded upon the same
principle, and motivated by the same reason, as the fiction of the extension of personality. The fiction is made
necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors and heirs, solely by reason of his death to the
loss of the investment amounting to P35,000, which he has already made in the ice plant, not counting the other
expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding, from the Public Service Commission of this Court.

We can perceive no valid reason for holding that within the intent of the constitution (Article IV), its provisions on
Philippine citizenship exclude the legal principle of extension above adverted to. If for reasons already stated
our law indulges the fiction of extension of personality, if for such reasons the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante
should be considered an artificial or juridical person herein, we can find no justification for refusing to declare a
like fiction as to the extension of his citizenship for the purposes of this proceeding.

Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in view of the evidence of record, he
would have obtained from the commission the certificate for which he was applying. The situation has suffered
but one change, and that is, his death. His estate was that of a Filipino citizen. And its economic ability to
appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was the same that it received from
the decedent himself. In the absence of a contrary showing, which does not exist here, his heirs may be assumed
to be also Filipino citizens; and if they are not, there is the simple expedient of revoking the certificate or enjoining
them from inheriting it.

Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the
Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante
must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony
with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.

Decision affirmed, without costs. So ordered.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-27956 April 30, 1976

DIONISIO DUMLAO, in his own behalf and in his capacity as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the
late Pedro Oria; FAUSTA DUMLAO, AMADO DUMLAO, and BENJAMIN DUMLAO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
QUALITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, INC., defendant-appellee.

Castillo & Castillo for appellants.

Eugenio T. Estavillo for appellee.

AQUINO, J.:p

On February 28, 1962 the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Civil Case No.
T-662 rendered a judgment ordering defendants Vicente Soliven, Pedro Oria, Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino
Sumalbag and Juana Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastic Products, Inc. the sum of P3,667.03 plus the legal
rate of interest from November, 1958. The lower court directed that in case the defendants failed to pay the said
amount before its decision became final, then Quality Plastic Products, Inc. "is hereby authorized to foreclose
the bond, Exhibit A, in accordance with law, for the satisfaction of the judgment". (Under that bond the four
sureties bound themselves to answer solidarity for the obligations of the principal, Vicente Soliven and certain
real properties of the sureties were "given as security for" their undertaking).

Upon defendants' failure to pay the amount of the judgment and after the decision had become final, the lower
court, on motion of Quality Plastic Products, Inc., ordered the "foreclosure" of the surety bond and the sale at
public auction of the land of Pedro Oria which he had given as security under the bond. Oria's land, which was
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an area of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied
upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962. The sale was confirmed by the lower court
in its order of November 20, 1962.

It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960 when the action was filed. Oria's death
was not known to Quality Plastic Products, Inc. Nor were the representatives of Quality Plastic Products, Inc.
aware that in the same Tayug court Special Proceeding No. T-212, Testate Estate of the deceased Pedro Oria,
was pending.

The summons and copies of the complaint for the five defendants in Civil Case No.
T-662 had been personally served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff on Soliven, the principal in the bond,
who acknowledged such service by signing on the back of the original summons in his own behalf and again
signing for his co-defendants.

On March 1, 1963 Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in
Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc., also in the Tayug court for the annulment of the
judgment against Oria and the execution against his land. (Dionisio Dumlao also sued in his capacity as
administrator of Oria's testate estate).

The ground for annulment was lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased Oria (Civil Case No. T- 873).
It was only when Quality Plastic Products, Inc. received the summons in Civil Case No. T-873 that it learned that
Oria was already dead at the time the prior case, Civil Case No. T-662, was filed.

Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in its answer alleged that Oria's heirs were aware of the suit against Soliven and
his sureties and that the said heirs were estopped to question the court's jurisdiction over Oria.

After hearing the lower court held that it acquired jurisdiction over Soliven and the other defendants in Civil Case
No. T-662 by reason of their voluntary appearance. It reasoned out that Soliven acted in bad faith because he
did not apprise the court that Oria was dead. It specifically ruled that "it had acquired jurisdiction over the person"
of Oria and that the judgment was valid as to him. From that decision the plaintiffs appealed.

The four assignments of error of appellants Dumlao may be boiled down to the issue as to the validity of the
lower court's judgment against the deceased Pedro Oria who, being already in the other world, was never served
with summons.

There is no difficulty in resolving that issue. Since no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, the judgment against
him is a patent nullity (Ang Lam vs. Rosillosa and Santiago, 86 Phil. 447; Asuncion vs. Nieto, 4 Phil. 97;
Gorostiaga vs. Sarte, 68 Phil. 4).

As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's judgment against him in Civil Case No. T-662 is void for lack of
jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have been, validly served with summons. He had no
more civil personality. His juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost
through death. (Arts. 37 and 42, Civil Code).

The lower court erred in ruling that since Soliven's counsel also appeared as counsel for Oria, there was a
voluntary appearance which enabled the court to acquire jurisdiction over Oria, as contemplated in section 23,
Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. Soliven's counsel could not have validly appeared for a dead co-
defendant. Estoppel has no application to this case.

But from the fact that appellants Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in order to annul the judgment
against Oria, it does not follow that they are entitled to claim attorney's fees against that corporation. The parties
herein agreed in their stipulation of facts that Quality Plastic Products, Inc. was unaware of Oria's death.
Appellants Dumlao in effect conceded that the appellee acted in good faith in joining Oria as a co-defendant.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its judgment in Civil Case No. T-662 against
Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's land covered by OCT No. 28732
is also void. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 183110 October 7, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUGAS, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

"It is universally accepted that a State, in extending the privilege of citizenship to an alien wife of one of its citizens
could have had no other objective than to maintain a unity of allegiance among the members of the family." 1

This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 assails the May 23, 2008 Decision 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) G.R. CV
No. 00523, which affirmed the January 31, 2005 Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29,
Zamboanga del Sur that granted the Petition for Naturalization 5 of respondent Azucena Saavedra Batuigas
(Azucena).

Factual Antecedents

On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur. The
case was docketed as Naturalization Case No. 03-001 and raffled to Branch 29 of said court.

Azucena alleged in her Petition that she believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; that she
has conducted herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the period of her stay in the Philippines, as
well as in her relations with the constituted Government and with the community in which she is living; that she
has mingled socially with the Filipinos and has evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace their customs,
traditions, and ideals; that she has all the qualifications required under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications
enumerated in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 (CA473); 6 that she is not opposed to organized
government nor is affiliated with any association or group of persons that uphold and teach doctrines opposing
all organized governments; that she is not defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal
assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of men’s ideas; that she is neither a polygamist nor
believes in polygamy; that the nation of which she is a subject is not at war with the Philippines; that she intends
in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and
fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to China; and that she will reside
continuously in the Philippines from the time of the filing of her Petition up to the time of her naturalization.

After all the jurisdictional requirements mandated by Section 9 7 of CA 473had been complied with, the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Motion to Dismiss 8 on the ground that Azucena failed to allege that she is
engaged in a lawful occupation or in some known lucrative trade. Finding the grounds relied upon by the OSG
to be evidentiary in nature, the RTC denied said Motion.9 Thereafter, the hearing for the reception of Azucena’s
evidence was then set on May 18, 2004. 10

Neither the OSG nor the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor appeared on the day of the hearing. Hence,
Azucena’s counsel moved that the evidence be presented ex-parte, which the RTC granted. Accordingly, the
RTC designated its Clerk of Court as Commissioner to receive Azucena’s evidence. 11 During the November 5,
2004 ex-parte hearing, no representative from the OSG appeared despite due notice. 12

Born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on September 28, 1941 to Chinese parents, 13 Azucena has never
departed the Philippines since birth. She has resided in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur from 1941-1942; in
Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur from 1942-1968; in Bogo City for nine months; in Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur
from 1969-1972; in Talisayan, Misamis Oriental from 1972-1976; and, in Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur,
thereafter, up to the filing of her Petition.
Azucena can speak English, Tagalog, Visayan, and Chavacano. Her primary, secondary, and tertiary education
were taken in Philippine schools,i.e., Margosatubig Central Elementary School in 1955, 14 Margosatubig
Academy in1959,15 and the Ateneo de Zamboanga in 1963,16 graduating with a degree in Bachelor of Science
in Education. She then practiced her teaching profession at the Pax High School for five years, in the Marian
Academy in Ipil for two years, and in Talisayan High School in Misamis Oriental for another two years. 17

In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married Santiago Batuigas 18 (Santiago),a natural-born Filipino citizen.19 They
have five children, namely Cynthia, Brenda, Aileen, Dennis Emmanuel, and Edsel James. 20 All of them studied
in Philippine public and private schools and are all professionals, three of whom are now working abroad. 21

After her stint in Talisayan High School, Azucena and her husband, as conjugal partners, engaged in the retail
business of and later on in milling/distributing rice, corn, and copra. As proof of their income, Azucena submitted
their joint annual tax returns and balance sheets from 2000-200222 and from 2004-2005.23 The business name
and the business permits issued to the spouses’ store, ‘Azucena’s General Merchandising,’ are registered in
Santiago’s name,24 and he is also the National Food Authority licensee for their rice and corn business.25 During
their marital union, the Batuigas spouses bought parcels of land in Barrio Lombog, Margosatubig.26

To prove that she has no criminal record, Azucena submitted clearances issued by the Philippine National Police
of Zamboanga del Sur Provincial Office and by the National Bureau of Investigation. 27 She also presented her
Health Examination Record28 declaring her as physically and mentally fit.

To further support Azucena’s Petition, Santiago and witnesses Eufemio Miniao and Irineo Alfaro testified.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On January 31, 2005, the RTC found that Azucena has amply supported the allegations in her Petition. Among
these are her lack of a derogatory record, her support for an organized government, that she is in perfect health,
that she has mingled with Filipinos since birth and can speak their language, that she has never had any
transgressions and has been a law abiding citizen, that she has complied with her obligations to the government
involving her business operations, and that the business and real properties she and Santiago own provide
sufficient income for her and her family. Thus, the RTC ruled:
x x x In sum, the petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to be admitted as citizen of
the Philippines in accordance with the provisions of the Naturalization Law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby granted.
SO ORDERED.29
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which
it is aimed.1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than
one year immediately preceding the election." 2 The mischief which this provision — reproduced verbatim from
the 1973 Constitution — seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the
conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that
community."3

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following information
in item no. 8:4

RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY

PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of
Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"5 with the
Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his
petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency
requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in
Voter Registration Record 94-No. 33497726 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be
issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy." 7

On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven"
months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate. 8 On the same day, the Provincial Election
Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:

[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the ground
that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed on March
20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on or before
the March 20, 1995 deadline.9

Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head Office
in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the head
office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original
Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding
the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition
seeking her disqualification, she noted that:

When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in
Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed
her intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of
Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa following
completion of her six month actual residence therein, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC
to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued such a
move up to the Supreme Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent
in the congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte
Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative district to remove the town of Tolosa
out of the First District, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having
failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same objective, as it is
obvious that he is afraid to submit along with respondent for the judgment and verdict of the
electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on
May 8, 1995. 12

On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came
up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2)
striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her
original Certificate of Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the validity of amending the original
Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's
compliance with the one year residency requirement, the Second Division held:

Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word "Seven" (months)
was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an
amendment should subsequently be allowed. She averred that she thought that what was asked
was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the
First Legislative District, to which she could have responded "since childhood." In an
accompanying affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First
District, to which she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has never
abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of
disqualification by alleging that she has been a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte
since childhood, although she only became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven
months. She asserts that she has always been a resident of Tacloban City, a component of the
First District, before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.

Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa, respondent
announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the
District. However, this intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election Officer of
Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never
disputed this claim and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.

This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake." Besides,
the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she
was quite aware of "residence of origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious why
she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought
what was asked was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because
there is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of
Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected
immediately preceding the election." Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive.

From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation, therefore, is

devoid of merit.

To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she cited the case
of Alialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is
misplaced. The case only applies to the "inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the result
of the election, or deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure timely and orderly
conduct of elections." The Supreme Court in that case considered the amendment only as a
matter of form. But in the instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form
or an inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of residence in the place
where respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial matter which determines her qualification
as a candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate material representation in the
original certificate which adversely affects the filer. To admit the amended certificate is to condone
the evils brought by the shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of the detriment of the integrity
of the election.

Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in order to
prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed before
this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent indicated
in her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's Registration Record
accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte for 6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is further
buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994,
requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that
she can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3)
different documents show the respondent's consistent conviction that she has transferred her
residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited period of time, starting in
the last week of August 1994 which on March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The
Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe in the respondent's contention that it was
an error.

xxx xxx xxx

Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be admitted by

this Commission.
xxx xxx xxx

Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that respondent has
not complied with the one year residency requirement of the Constitution.

In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with
"domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence
in-that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one
intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban,
226 SCRA 408). In respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the
residence she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus
revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.

This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District since
childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of qualification where she is otherwise
constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts admitted by the
respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and worked for some years after
graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband was
elected Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered
voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978,
she served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of Manila and
later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have served these positions if
she had not been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of
candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro
Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter with the election officer
of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the permanent list
of voters that she may be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These
facts manifest that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the
time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places,
including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she
was a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.

In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile.
She registered as a voter in different places and on several occasions declared that she was a
resident of Manila. Although she spent her school days in Tacloban, she is considered to have
abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in other different places. In the case
of Romualdez vs. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by
choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention to
remain there; and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must basically
be animus manendi with animus non revertendi. When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and
later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and
expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned
Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.

Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be conduct indicative of
such intention. Respondent's statements to the effect that she has always intended to return to
Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her
choice of residence. Respondent has not presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one
year prior the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was that
prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila.

It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of Leyte
"since childhood."
 To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First District of
Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995 respondent
registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her
Voter Registration Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months.
This may be inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers only to her residence in
Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District of Leyte prior to
her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she had been a resident of the
district for six months only. 15

In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position
of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely
stated:

After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to DENY it, no
new substantial matters having been raised therein to warrant re-examination of the resolution
granting the petition for disqualification. 18

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results of
the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District
of Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing
that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes. 19

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the
elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass
completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed
that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy
of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.

On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the First District
of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for
relief.

Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may be classified
into two general areas:

I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a
period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

II. The Jurisdictional Issue

a) Prior to the elections

Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner outside
the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of
the said Code.

b) After the Elections

Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction
over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.

I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the application
of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in
agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with
domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence,
a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House
of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the
qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the
domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept
of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose
intent." 21Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence
in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.

Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the
physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence
and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has
taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's
intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is
residence. 22 It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places.
However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his
domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:

There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place
and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the
intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose
at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally
his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without
intention of remaining will constitute domicile.

For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws.
As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that
residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.

In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which imports not
only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative
of such intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the
respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held
that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than
in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So settled is the concept (of domicile)
in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an
individual from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change
of domicile.

The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions have placed
beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means
only "domicile" to wit:

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of
residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile
or constructive residence?
 Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are
concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, "and a resident thereof", that
is, in the district for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was
in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile. 29

xxx xxx xxx

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has
raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather
than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.

Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go back to actual
residence rather than mere intention to reside?

Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision
in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted
by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical
residence. 30

In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the framers of the 1987
Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as having
the same meaning as domicile. 32

In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency
requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned
entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as
seven (7) months?

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining
whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said
statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or
hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to
deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her
disqualification.

It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in
the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the
questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the
period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was "since
childhood" in the space provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's
Second Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner
announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District, private
respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City.
Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which
she subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would reveal the
possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for
residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks election thus:

7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
 8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years
and Seven Months.

Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of
petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her legal residence
or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 — the first requiring actual residence and the second
requiring domicile — coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa
obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake
should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established
by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.

We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.

In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of Leyte, the
Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time
when (petitioner) studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in
Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to
be any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution,
petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965,
following the election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as
a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro
Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the
COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.

We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and
maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given
place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to
do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the
assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the
time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of
settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for
election law purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:

[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house wherein he lives
with his family in a municipality without having ever had the intention of abandoning it, and without
having lived either alone or with his family in another municipality, has his residence in the former
municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in the other municipality in
question and having been a candidate for various insular and provincial positions, stating every
time that he is a resident of the latter municipality.

More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:

A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying goes, to
improve his lot, and that, of course includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or
engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve
his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business
reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from his professional or business
activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not
willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government
especially in national elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to
his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the
registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient
to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the natural desire and
longing of every person to return to his place of birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the
place of one's birth must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition that
petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was
obviously referring to petitioner's various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only
ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission
but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35

What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of petitioner's domicile, which
we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution: 36

In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in
Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938
to 1949 when she graduated from high school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's
College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education.
Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to
Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House
of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a
congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected
Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where
she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected President of the Republic of
the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel,
Manila.

[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to
Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for
election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she
indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.

Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner held
various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally
point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in
Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her
adulthood there and eventually established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even
during her husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to
her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important
personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and
hometown, and establishing a political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power
either through the ballot or by appointment, always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized
ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country.
Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know
what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.

Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin because she
did not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned
her residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely
expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.

First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained,
it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin
by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte
contrary to private respondent's averments.

37
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one;
and
 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to
continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity
or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one
cannot have two legal residences at the same time. 38 In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private
respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of
domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the
voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one
of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).

In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as
a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established
distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." 39 The presumption that the wife
automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use
of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts
are well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:

In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both terms
imply relations between a person and a place; but in residence, the relation is one of fact while in
domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the necessity of physical presence. 40

Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife
from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.

A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the
female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses
her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence upon marriage.

Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:

La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los Tribunales,
sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su
residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.

Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which means wherever
(the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence
because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further
strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the same provision which means,
"when the husband shall transfer his residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the family to
another home or place of actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which
is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to another not
only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance more consistent with
the concept of actual residence.

The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and
unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of
origin). This difference could, for the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a
single place of actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which
obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:

Art. 109. — The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and
fidelity and render mutual help and support.

The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This takes into
account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of the petitioner). If the husband
has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they
may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence."
Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for
professional or other reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:

Residence and Domicile — Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to particular
matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision
must be made from a consideration of the purpose and intent with which the word is used.
Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times they are distinguished from one another.

xxx xxx xxx

Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a
place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city
residence. Residence is acquired by living in place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without
actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been
established in one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also
established in some other
place. 41

In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the marriage is not an
iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a common matrimonial residence, our
jurisprudence has recognized certain situations 42 where the spouses could not be compelled to live with each
other such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence different from that of her husband or, for
obviously practical reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De
la Vina vs.Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from
that of her husband during the existence of the marriage where the husband has given cause for divorce." 44 Note
that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In
instances where the wife actually opts, .under the Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking
new residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be compelled to
live with her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:

Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the province of the
courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal
rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action
for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine
that an order, enforcible (sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of
the purely personal right of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose
than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and he experience of those countries
where the courts of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows
that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly the
Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of either
husband or wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it, that court would make a mandatory
decree, enforceable by process of contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent
party to live with the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized
even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52),
decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of
 the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on the subject was not the
same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree
for the restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could
not be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment against the
practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a
decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case of disobedience may
serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the
character of alimony.

In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can discover,
has ever attempted to make a preemptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the other;
and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had
changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La.
Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the
Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been
fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing
cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).

In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order
of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in
the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a particular disposition of certain money and
effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband, as administrator of the ganancial
property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from the property which she
had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this order for
the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the
consequences that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her property;
and it does not appear that her disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed
by imprisonment for contempt.

Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged — by
virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code — to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The
problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Juan,
Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's
residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner
gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.

On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been incorporated, as a
result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code.
To underscore the difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term
residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in
meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept
of women's rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement
between the spouses. 46

Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil
Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-
affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife — the term residence should only be interpreted to mean
"actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is
that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a
new home, not a domicilium necessarium.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only
acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country
clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by
operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of
the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and
Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our
homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living
in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the
PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair,
having been previously looted by vandals. Her "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of
Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from
our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin or
chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to assume that she
cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one
where situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from
her husband.

In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to this point, we are
persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's
claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.

II. The jurisdictional issue

Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the assailed
resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in violation of Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of
Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.

It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed
to be merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that
if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between a mandatory
and a directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by several
American authorities, this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51

The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on grounds of
expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than
enforcing the letter of the law.

In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a limitation of
thirty (30) days within which a decree may be entered without the consent of counsel, it was held
that "the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity, without affecting
the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing
that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the
essential act." Thus, in said case, the statute under examination was construed merely to be
directory.

The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from rendering a decision
after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts
and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to
reach a decision within a given or prescribed period.

In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is
evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification
case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of
petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole
judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only
after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of
the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.

It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either to ignore or
deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a
distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many established principles of law, even of election laws
were flouted for the sake perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals,
including the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established principles of principles of law to deny
an individual what he or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the
mistakes of the past.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a
seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated
April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed
to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First
District of Leyte.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999

ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner,

vs.
EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of
the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the election
were as follows:

Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853

Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894

Gabriel V. Daza III 54,2751

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by
a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the
United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, 2 the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and
ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual
citizen and, under §40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from
running for any elective position. The COMELEC's Second Division said:

What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of Eduardo Barrios
Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998 elections.
The petition is based on the ground that the respondent is an American citizen based on the
record of the Bureau of Immigration and misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.

In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he is registered
as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632
and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a
Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco, California, September 14, 1955,
and is considered in American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an
American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.

Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is born a Filipino and
a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.

The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position for which
he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he seeks to be elected?

Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective local position.

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano
DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.

On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.3 The motion remained pending even until
after the election held on May 11, 1998.

Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the COMELEC, the board of
canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the proclamation of the winner.

On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. 4 Petitioner's motion was opposed
by private respondent.

The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution.
Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second
Division and declared private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998
elections.5 The pertinent portions of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc read:

As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the
principle ofjus soli.

He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his
father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought
him to the Philippines using an American passport as travel document. His parents also registered
him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of
registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not
renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States.
 It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself
as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his
US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.

At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May
7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest number of votes among
the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering one hundred three thousand eight
hundred fifty three (103,853) votes over his closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one
hundred thousand eight hundred ninety four (100,894) votes, or a margin of two thousand nine
hundred fifty nine (2,959) votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty four thousand two
hundred seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor
of the popular choice than be embroiled in complex legal issues involving private international law
which may well be settled before the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257
SCRA 727).

WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the Second
Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of the respondent's certificate of
candidacy.

We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a candidate for the
position of vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998, elections.

ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers, upon proper
notice to the parties, to reconvene and proclaim the respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano
as the winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.

Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the evening of August 31,
1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati.

This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to
declare private respondent disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of Makati City. Petitioner contends that
—

[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:

A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:

1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when
he was already 37 years old; and,

2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a

voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.

B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati;

C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division adopted on 7
May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner even
assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the
City of Makati.

We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent Manzano — whether petitioner
Mercado his personality to bring this suit considering that he was not an original party in the case for
disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioner's motion for leave to intervene granted.

I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT

Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC in support
of his claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore, cannot bring this suit to set aside the ruling
denying his motion for intervention:

Sec. 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. — Any person allowed to initiate
an action or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an action or proceeding, be permitted
by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene in such action or proceeding, if he has legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by such action or proceeding.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 3. Discretion of Commission. — In allowing or disallowing a motion for intervention, the

Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and
whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.

Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an interest
to protect because he is "a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be
proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final
and executory judgment."

The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the proceedings before
the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest
for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only second to private respondent. The fact, however,
is that there had been no proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting
private respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC,6 reiterated
in several cases,7 only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the question is
whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case,
at the time petitioner filed a "Motion for Leave to File Intervention" on May 20, 1998, there had been no
proclamation of the winner, and petitioner's purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified "from
running for [an] elective local position" under §40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted
the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was
petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.

Nor is petitioner's interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for intervention only on
May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have garnered the highest number of votes among
the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the
disqualification against private respondent is clear from §6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral
Reform Law of 1987, which provides:

Any candidate who his been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing
of action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during
the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong.

Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there
has yet been no final judgment rendered.

The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner's motion for intervention was tantamount to a denial
of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead
decided the merits of the case, the present petition properly deals not only with the denial of petitioner's motion
for intervention but also with the substantive issues respecting private respondent's alleged disqualification on
the ground of dual citizenship.

This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano possesses dual citizenship
and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.

II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION

The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under §40 of the Local Government Code of
1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as "disqualified from running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those
with dual citizenship." This provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati. 8

Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who sides with him in this case,
contends that through §40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has "command[ed] in explicit terms the
ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective office."

To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said states.9 For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens
of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli.
Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both
states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of
citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle
of jus soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their father's'
country such children are citizens of that country;

(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are considered citizens,
unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a
citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on
citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some
positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individual's volition.

With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, §5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical
to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." This provision was included in the 1987 Constitution at
the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as follows: 10

. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I have circulated
a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a dual allegiance — and I reiterate
a dual allegiance — is larger and more threatening than that of mere double citizenship which is
seldom intentional and, perhaps, never insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed
marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at all.

What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance of the problem
of dual allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in the triennial elections of the
Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce which consists of about 600 chapters all
over the country. There is a Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact
 chat the Filipino-Chinese community is represented in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of
China in Taiwan. And until recently, sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the People's
Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative Council for overseas Chinese wherein
all of Southeast Asia including some European and Latin countries were represented, which was
dissolved after several years because of diplomatic friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were
also represented in that Overseas Council.

When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of allegiance of
Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be said to be bound by
a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also took close note of the concern expressed
by some Commissioners yesterday, including Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned
about the lack of guarantees of thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion
who has always been worried about minority claims on our natural resources.

Dull allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore, China or
Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the great commercial places in downtown Taipei
are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese — it is of common knowledge in Manila. It can
mean a tragic capital outflow when we have to endure a capital famine which also means
economic stagnation, worsening unemployment and social unrest.

And so, this is exactly what we ask — that the Committee kindly consider incorporating a new
section, probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which will read as follows: DUAL
ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO
LAW.

11
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with dual allegiance, thus:

. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual citizenship in the
sense that it implies a double allegiance under a double sovereignty which some of us who spoke
then in a freewheeling debate thought would be repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades the
Constitution and to citizenship itself which implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the
Constitution is defined in terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that citizenship including, of
course, the obligation to rise to the defense of the State when it is threatened, and back of this,
Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the concern for national security. In the course of those
debates, I think some noted the fact that as a result of the wave of naturalizations since the
decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China was made in 1975,
a good number of these naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to Taipei every October 10; and it
is asserted that some of them do renew their oath of allegiance to a foreign government maybe
just to enter into the spirit of the occasion when the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is
commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine and deep concern about double citizenship,
with its attendant risk of double allegiance which is repugnant to our sovereignty and national
security. I appreciate what the Committee said that this could be left to the determination of a
future legislature. But considering the scale of the problem, the real impact on the security of this
country, arising from, let us say, potentially great numbers of double citizens professing double
allegiance, will the Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the proper time that will
prohibit, in effect, or regulate double citizenship?

Clearly, in including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with
dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even
after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854,
§20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do
not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict
process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if,
upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws
of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission,
pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on
citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether she is considered a citizen
of another country is something completely beyond our control." 12

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of
which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of
view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship.
That is of no moment as the following discussion on §40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly
shows: 13

SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: "Any person
with dual citizenship" is disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under the present
Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father
is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural
born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.

On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the country of
his or her father and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation
disqualify the person to run for a local government position?

SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he
would want to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.

SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or
the country of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can renounce.
There are such countries in the world.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect, be
an election for him of his desire to be considered as a Filipino citizen.

SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an election.
Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen
without any overt act to claim the citizenship.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentleman's
example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to question.
So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in the Certificate of
Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship."

SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He
will always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the
Constitution of the Republic.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that he
also acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under this disqualification.

This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce "all allegiance and fidelity to
any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty" 14 of which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he
can be issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines. In Parado v. Republic, 15 it was held:

[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounce, his
loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and compiled with. The
determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our
Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter
 should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law
may or should interfere with its operation and application. If the requirement of the Chinese Law
of Nationality were to be read into our Naturalization Law, we would be applying not what our
legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but what a foreign government has thought
or intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be resisted by all means and at all cost. It
would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic.

III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September 4, 1955, of
Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the United States follows
the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of
the United States. However, the COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992,
1995, and 1998, private respondent "effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law," so that now
he is solely a Philippine national.

Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not sufficient
evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made when private respondent
was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been made when he reached the age of majority.

In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American citizenship, the
COMELEC must have in mind §349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the United States, which provided
that "A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality
by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine
the sovereignty over foreign territory." To be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk 16 as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign
relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent
elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. Private respondent's certificate
of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the following statements made under oath:

6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF "NATURAL-BORN" OR "NATURALIZED")

NATURAL-BORN

xxx xxx xxx

10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN LORENZO,

CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR.

11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.

12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND
DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND
ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES
PROMULGATED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY,
WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT
THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE.

The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was held: 17

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity
of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local
Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local position?" We answer
 this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really
STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for
governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long
abandoned his American citizenship — long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless
in the interim — when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was
repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."

On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:

By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship
when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for
Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an
oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government.

These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of
1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the
Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or
arbitrariness or abuse.

There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner's contention that the oath of allegiance contained in private respondent's
certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation that, to be effective, such renunciation should
have been made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority since no law requires the election of
Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.

Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as an American citizen in
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American passport which he used in his last
travel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit in this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy
on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion
of his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar
v. COMELEC 18 applies mutatis mundatis to private respondent in the case at bar:

. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the mere
fact that he has a Certificate staring he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino.
. . . [T]he Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino,
possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation
here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship.
When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express,"
it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no
renunciation, either "express" or "implied."

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and
bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has,
as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything
which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that
he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken
part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray
that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in
appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, 19 we sustained the denial of entry into the country of
petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his
Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese
national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his
foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 104654 June 6, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ROSALIO G. DE LA ROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 28,
MANILA and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.

G.R. No. 105715 June 6, 1994

RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.

G.R. No. 105735 June 6, 1994

RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner in G.R. No. 104654.

Yolando F. Lim counsel for private respondent.

QUIASON, J.:

In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (1989), this Court declared private respondent, Juan G.
Frivaldo, an alien and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon.

Once more, the citizenship of private respondent is put in issue in

these petitions docketed as G.R. No.104654 and G.R. No. 105715 and G.R. No. 105735. The petitions were
consolidated since they principally involve the same issues and parties.

G.R. No. 104654

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and
Section 25 of the Interim Rules, filed by the Republic of the Philippines: (1) to annul the Decision dated February
27, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, in SP Proc. No. 91-58645, which re-admitted private
respondent as a Filipino citizen under the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 63 as amended by C.A. No.
473); and (2) to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by private respondent on February 27, 1992.

On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization captioned: "In the Matter of Petition of Juan
G. Frivaldo to be Re-admitted as a Citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63" (Rollo, pp. 17-
23).

In an Order dated October 7, 1991 respondent Judge set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed
the publication of the said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for
three consecutive weeks, the last publication of which should be at least six months before the said date of
hearing. The order further required the posting of a copy thereof and the petition in a conspicuous place in the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Manila (Rollo, pp. 24-26).

On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule," where he
manifested his intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. He alleged that the deadline for filing
the certificate of candidacy was March 15, one day before the scheduled hearing. He asked that the hearing set
on March 16 be cancelled and be moved to January 24 (Rollo, pp. 27-28).

The motion was granted in an Order dated January 24, 1992, wherein the hearing of the petition was moved to
February 21, 1992. The said order was not published nor a copy thereof posted.

On February 21, the hearing proceeded with private respondent as the sole witness. He submitted the following
documentary evidence: (1) Affidavit of Publication of the Order dated October 7, 1991 issued by the publisher of
The Philippine Star (Exh. "A"); (2) Certificate of Publication of the order issued
by the National Printing Office (Exh. "B"); (3) Notice of Hearing of Petition (Exh. "B-1"); (4) Photocopy of a Citation
issued by the National Press Club with private respondent’s picture (Exhs. "C" and "C-2"); (5) Certificate of
Appreciation issued by the Rotary Club of Davao (Exh. "D"); (6) Photocopy
of a Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Republican College, Quezon City (Exh. "E"); (7) Photocopy of a Plaque
of Appreciation issued by the Davao-Bicol Association (Exh. "F"); (8) Certification issued by the Records
Management and Archives Office that the record of birth of private respondent was not on file (Exh. "G"); and
(8) Certificate of Naturalization issued by the United States District Court (Exh. "H").

Six days later, on February 27, respondent Judge rendered the assailed Decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO, is re-admitted as a

citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization, thereby vesting upon him, all the rights
and privileges of a natural born Filipino citizen (Rollo, p. 33).

On the same day, private respondent was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before respondent Judge (Rollo,
p. 34).

On March 16, a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit Motion for Reconsideration" was filed by
Quiterio H. Hermo. He alleged that the proceedings were tainted with jurisdictional defects, and prayed for a new
trial to conform with the requirements of the Naturalization Law.

After receiving a copy of the Decision on March 18, 1992, the Solicitor General interposed a timely appeal directly
with the Supreme Court.

G.R. No. 105715

This is a petition for certiorari, mandamus with injunction under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation
to Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution with prayer for temporary restraining order filed by Raul R. Lee
against the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and private respondent, to annul the en banc Resolution of
the COMELEC, which dismissed his petition docketed as SPC Case No. 92-273. The said petition sought to
annul the proclamation of private respondent as Governor-elect of the Province of Sorsogon.

Petitioner was the official candidate of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) for the position of governor
of the Province of Sorsogon in the May 1992 elections. Private respondent was the official candidate of the
Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats (Lakas-NUCD) for the same position.

Private respondent was proclaimed winner on May 22, 1992.

On June 1, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation of private respondent as
Governor-elect of the Province of Sorsogon on the grounds: (1) that the proceedings and composition of the
Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in accordance with law; (2) that private respondent is an alien, whose
grant of Philippine citizenship is being questioned by the State in G.R. No. 104654; and (3) that private
respondent is not a duly registered voter. Petitioner further prayed that the votes case in favor of private
respondent be considered as stray votes, and that he, on the basis of the remaining valid votes cast, be
proclaimed winner.

On June 10, the COMELEC issued the questioned en banc resolution which dismissed the petition for having
been filed out of time, citing Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166. Said section provides that the period to appeal a ruling
of the board of canvassers on questions affecting its composition or proceedings was three days.

In this petition, petitioner argues that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it ignored the
fundamental issue of private respondent’s disqualification in the guise of technicality.

Petitioner claims that the inclusion of private respondent’s name in the list of registered voters in Sta. Magdalena,
Sorsogon was invalid because at the time he registered as a voter in 1987, he was as American citizen.

Petitioner further claims that the grant of Filipino citizenship to private respondent is not yet conclusive because
the case is still on appeal before us.

Petitioner prays for: (1) the annulment of private respondent’s proclamation as Governor of the Province of
Sorsogon; (2) the deletion of private respondent’s name from the list of candidates for the position of governor;
(3) the proclamation of the governor-elect based on the remaining votes, after the exclusion of the votes for
private respondent; (4) the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin private respondent from taking
his oath and assuming office; and (5) the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the COMELEC to resolve
the pending disqualification case docketed as SPA Case No. 92-016, against private respondent.

G.R. No. 105735

This is a petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to Section 5(2) of Article
VIII of the Constitution, with prayer for temporary restraining order. The parties herein are identical with the
parties in G.R. No. 105715.

In substance, petitioner prays for the COMELEC’s immediate resolution of SPA Case No. 92-016, which is a
petition for the cancellation of private respondent’s certificate of candidacy filed on March 23, 1992 by Quiterio
H. Hermo, the intervenor in G.R. No. 104654 (Rollo, p. 18).

The petition for cancellation alleged: (1) that private respondent is an American citizen, and therefore ineligible
to run as candidate for the position of governor of the Province of Sorsogon; (2) that the trial court’s decision
re-admitting private respondent as a Filipino citizen was fraught with legal infirmities rendering it null and void;
(3) that assuming the decision to be valid, private respondent’s oath of allegiance, which was taken on the same
day the questioned decision was promulgated, violated Republic Act No. 530, which provides for a two-year
waiting period before the oath of allegiance can be taken by the applicant; and (4) that the hearing of the petition
on February 27, 1992, was held less than four months from the date of the last publication of the order and
petition. The petition prayed for the cancellation of private respondent’s certificate of candidacy and the deletion
of his name from the list of registered voters in Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon.

In his answer to the petition for cancellation, private respondent denied the allegations therein and averred: (1)
that Quiterio H. Hermo, not being a candidate for the same office for which private respondent was aspiring, had
no standing to file the petition; (2) that the decision re-admitting him to Philippine citizenship was presumed to
be valid; and (3) that no case had been filed to exclude his name as a registered voter.

Raul R. Lee intervened in the petition for cancellation of private respondent’s certificate of candidacy (Rollo, p.
37.).

On May 13, 1992, said intervenor urged the COMELEC to decide the petition for cancellation, citing Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides that all petitions on matters involving the cancellation of a
certificate of candidacy must be decided "not later than fifteen days before election," and the case of Alonto v.
Commission on Election, 22 SCRA 878 (1968), which ruled that all pre-proclamation controversies should be
summarily decided (Rollo,
p. 50).

The COMELEC concedes that private respondent has not yet reacquired his Filipino citizenship because the
decision granting him the same is not yet final and executory (Rollo, p. 63). However, it submits that the issue of
disqualification of a candidate is not among the grounds allowed in a
pre-proclamation controversy, like SPC Case No. 92-273. Moreover, the said petition was filed out of time.

The COMELEC contends that the preparation for the elections occupied much of its time, thus its failure to
immediately resolve SPA Case No. 92-016. It argues that under Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, it is excused from deciding a disqualification case within the period provided by law for reasons
beyond its control. It also assumed that the same action was subsequently abandoned by petitioner when he
filed before it a petition for quo warranto docketed as EPC No. 92-35. The quo warranto proceedings sought
private respondent’s disqualification because of his American citizenship.

II

G.R. No. 104654

We shall first resolve the issue concerning private respondent’s citizenship.

In his comment to the State’s appeal of the decision granting him Philippine citizenship in G.R. No. 104654,
private respondent alleges that the precarious political atmosphere in the country during Martial Law compelled
him to seek political asylum in the United States, and eventually to renounce his Philippine citizenship.

He claims that his petition for naturalization was his only available remedy for his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. He tried to reacquire his Philippine citizenship through repatriation and direct act of Congress.
However, he was later informed that repatriation proceedings were limited to army deserters or Filipino women
who had lost their citizenship by reason of their marriage to foreigners (Rollo, pp. 49-50). His request to Congress
for sponsorship of a bill allowing him to reacquire his Philippine citizenship failed to materialize, notwithstanding
the endorsement of several members of the House of Representatives in his favor (Rollo, p. 51). He attributed
this to the maneuvers of his political rivals.

He also claims that the re-scheduling of the hearing of the petition to an earlier date, without publication, was
made without objection from the Office of the Solicitor General. He makes mention that on the date of the hearing,
the court was jam-packed.

It is private respondent’s posture that there was substantial compliance with the law and that the public was well-
informed of his petition for naturalization due to the publicity given by the media.
Anent the issue of the mandatory two-year waiting period prior to the taking of the oath of allegiance, private
respondent theorizes that the rationale of the law imposing the waiting period is to grant the public an opportunity
to investigate the background of the applicant and to oppose the grant of Philippine citizenship if there is basis
to do so. In his case, private respondent alleges that such requirement may be dispensed with, claiming that his
life, both private and public, was well-known. Private respondent cites his achievement as a freedom fighter and
a former Governor of the Province of Sorsogon for six terms.

The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines is meritorious. The naturalization
proceedings in SP Proc. No. 91-58645 was full of procedural flaws, rendering the decision an anomaly.

Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised
Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by the said law. It is not for an applicant to
decide for himself and to select the requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case
and discard those which be believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish
between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does not
provide a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the
repatriation of a woman who had lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien.

The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of private respondent. The
proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken therein, are null and void for
failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law.

Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be
published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation
respondent cites his achievements as a freedom fighter and a former Governor of the Province of Sorsogon for
six terms.

The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of

the Philippines is meritorious. The naturalization proceedings in SP Proc.
No. 91-58645 was full of procedural flaws, rendering the decision an anomaly.

Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised
Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by the said law. It is not for an applicant to
decide for himself and to select the requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case
and discard those which he believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish
between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does not
provide a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the
repatriation of a woman who had lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien.

The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of private respondent. The
proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken therein, are null and void for
failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law.

Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be
published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general
circulation. Compliance therewith is jurisdictional (Po Yi Bo v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]). Moreover, the
publication and posting of the petition and the order must be in its full test for the court to acquire jurisdiction (Sy
v. Republic, 55 SCRA 724 [1974]).

The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by Sections 2 and 6 of the Revised Naturalization
Law, particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of good moral character; (2) that he resided continuously in the
Philippines for at least ten years; (3) that he is able to speak and write English and any one of the principal
dialects; (4) that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition until his
admission to Philippine citizenship; and (5) that he has filed a declaration of intention or if he is excused from
said filing, the justification therefor.
The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition (Po Yi Bi v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]).

Likewise, the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons who vouched for the good
moral character of private respondent as required by Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law. Private
respondent also failed to attach a copy of his certificate of arrival to the petition as required by Section 7 of the
said law.

The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the hearing of the petition was
set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and
the petition itself; (2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition; (3) petitioner
was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and (4) petitioner took his oath of
allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period.

A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from its promulgation and, insofar as
the Solicitor General is concerned, that period is counted from the date of his receipt of the copy of the decision
(Republic v. Court of First Instance of Albay, 60 SCRA 195 [1974]).

Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall be
executory until after two years from its promulgation in order to be able to observe if: (1) the applican t has left
the country; (2) the applicant has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession; (3) the applicant
has not been convicted of any offense or violation of government promulgated rules; and (4) the applicant has
committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the country or contrary to government announced policies.

Even discounting the provisions of R.A. No. 530, the courts cannot implement any decision granting the petition
for naturalization before its finality.

G.R. No. 105715

In view of the finding in G.R. No. 104654 that private respondent is not yet a Filipino citizen, we have to grant
the petition in G.R. No. 105715 after treating it as a petition for certiorari instead of a petition for mandamus. Said
petition assails the en banc resolution of the COMELEC, dismissing SPC Case No. 92-273, which in turn is a
petition to annul private respondent’s proclamation on three grounds: 1) that the proceedings and composition
of the Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in accordance with law; 2) that private respondent is an alien,
whose grant of Filipino citizenship is being questioned by the State in G.R. No. 104654; and 3) that private
respondent is not a duly registered voter. The COMELEC dismissed the petition on the grounds that it was filed
outside the three-day period for questioning the proceedings
and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166.

The COMELEC failed to resolve the more serious issue — the disqualification of private respondent to be
proclaimed Governor on grounds of lack of Filipino citizenship. In this aspect, the petition is one for quo warranto.
In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (1989), we held that a petition for quo warranto,
questioning the respondent’s title and seeking to prevent him from holding office as Governor for alienage, is not
covered by the ten-day period for appeal prescribed in Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. Furthermore,
we explained that "qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only
at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire tenure; once any of
the required qualification is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged."

Petitioner’s argument, that to unseat him will frustrate the will of the electorate, is untenable. Both the Local
Government Code and the Constitution require that only Filipino citizens can run and be elected to public office.
We can only surmise that the electorate, at the time they voted for private respondent, was of the mistaken belief
that he had legally reacquired Filipino citizenship.

Petitioner in G.R. No. 105715, prays that the votes cast in favor of private respondent be considered stray and
that he, being the candidate obtaining the second highest number of votes, be declared winner. In Labo, Jr. v.
COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 (1989), we ruled that where the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes
is later declared to be disqualified to hold the office to which he was elected, the candidate who garnered the
second highest number of votes is not entitled to be declared winner (See also Geronimo v. Ramos, 136 SCRA
435 [1985]; Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 [1912]).

G.R. No. 105735

In view of the discussions of G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No. 105715, we find the petition in G.R. No. 105735
moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No. 105715 are both GRANTED while the petition in
G.R. No. 105735 is DISMISSED. Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore
DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as GOVERNOR of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to VACATE
his office and to SURRENDER the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision
becomes final and executory. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.

CONCURRING OPINION

DISSENTING OPINION

KAPUNAN, J.:

The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement
that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen."1

Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April
27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. 2

On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence,
he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign
country." Said provision of law reads:

SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. – A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the
following ways and/or events:

xxx

(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed of a foreign country: Provided, That
the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign
country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances
is present:

(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with said foreign
country; or

(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said
service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that
he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country; And provided, finally, That any
Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country
under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be Republic of the Philippines
during the period of his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge
from the service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his
civil and politically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil political rights as a Filipino citizen x x x.

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a
U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.

On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic
Act No. 2630.3 He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the
May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III,
who was then running for reelection.1âwphi1.nêt
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House
of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the
Constitution.4

On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision 5 dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz
the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET
likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000. 6

Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the following grounds:

1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction,
when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he
had ceased being such in view of the loss and renunciation of such citizenship on his part.

2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction,
when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact he did not validly
acquire his Philippine citizenship.

3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET
committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it
dismissed the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore
his natural-born status.7

The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen,
can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost h is
Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by
repatriation. He insists that Article citizens are those who are from birth with out having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect such citizenship.

Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as natural-born citizen when he was
repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn
characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.

The petition is without merit.

The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follow:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mother, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority, and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. 8

There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring
citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person
who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.9

As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship." 10
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization,
generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which
repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an
applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications 12 and none of the disqualification 13 provided by
law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two
(2) years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has
(1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted
of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest
of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.14

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law.
Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress. 15

Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially
acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the
other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act
No. 63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess
certain qualifications17and none of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473. 18

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:
(1) desertion of the armed forces;19 services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;20 (3) service
in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,21 (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; 22 and
(5) political economic necessity.23

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place
where the person concerned resides or last resided.

In Angat v. Republic,24 we held:

xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring to
reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had
to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the
civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the
original.25

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. 26 This means that a naturalized Filipino
who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if
he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the
United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:

Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the
United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the
place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil
Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed
to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of
a Filipino father.27 It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original
status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to
regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born
citizen" was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:

Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen birth
and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were not considered
natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973, 38 of Filipino mothers
who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not
considered natural-born obviously because they were not Filipino at birth and had to perform an act to acquire
Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectively of the 1973 Constitution were likewise
not considered natural-born because they also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippines citizenship.

The present Constitution, however, now consider those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining
who re natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only
naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are
citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born
and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not
have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is natural-born Filipino.
Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine
citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be
natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed
by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through
naturalization proceeding in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he
possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.

A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House.29 The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET
is merely to check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. 30 In the absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its
corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgement for that of the latter
for the simple reason that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed
decision.31 There is no such showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 178831-32 July 30, 2009

JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NAPOLEON N. CAMERO and RENALD F. VILLANDO, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 179120 July 30, 2009

LOUIS C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. PROSPERO NOGRALES, Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the
Philippines, and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. Nos. 179132-33 July 30, 2009

OLIVIA P. PARAS, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. PROSPERO NOGRALES, in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives; HON.
ROBERTO NAZARENO, in his capacity as Secretary General of the House of Representatives; HON.
RHODORA SEVILLA, in her capacity as Deputy Secretary General for Finance of the House of
Representatives; THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. Nos. 179240-41 July 30, 2009

RENALD F. VILLANDO, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PERALTA, J.:

The instant motion with prayer for oral argument filed by Louis C. Biraogo, petitioner in G.R. No. 179120, seeks
a reconsideration of the Court’s April 1, 2009 Decision, which granted Jocelyn D. Sy Limkaichong’s petition
forcertiorari in G.R. Nos. 178831-32. The Court dismissed all the other petitions, including Biraogo’s petition, and
reversed the Joint Resolution of the Commission on Election’s (COMELEC) Second Division dated May 17, 2007
in SPA Nos. 07-247 and 07-248 disqualifying Limkaichong from running as a congressional candidate in the First
District of Negros Oriental due to lack of citizenship requirement.

Biraogo prefaced his motion by stating that justice and constitutionalism must remain entrenched in Philippine
case law. To achieve this end, he maintained that the Court should reconsider its April 1, 2009 Decision. He also
prayed for an oral argument, which he posited, would help the Court in the just and proper disposition of the
pending incident.

After an assiduous review of the motion for reconsideration, we resolve that the same should be denied for lack
of merit.

Most of the arguments advanced by Biraogo are a mere rehash of his previous arguments, which we have all
considered and found without merit in the Decision dated April 1, 2009. Nonetheless, in order to lay to rest once
and for all Biraogo's misgivings, we shall discuss only the relevant issues and revalidate our Decision by ruling
on his motion as follows:

The core issue in the consolidated petitions is the qualification of Limkaichong to run for, be elected to, and
assume and discharge, the position of Representative for the First District of Negros Oriental. The contention of
the parties who sought her disqualification is that she is not a natural-born citizen, hence, she lacks the
citizenship requirement in Section 6, 1 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In the election that ensued, she was
voted for by the constituents of Negros Oriental and garnered the highest votes. She was eventually proclaimed
as the winner and has since performed her duties and responsibilities as Member of the House of
Representatives.

Indeed, the citizenship requirement was enshrined in our Constitution in order to ensure that our people and
country do not end up being governed by aliens. 2 With this principle in mind, we have said in Aquino v.
COMELEC3 that if one of the essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of Representatives
is lacking, then not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters would substitute for a requirement
mandated by the fundamental law itself. Hence assuming, time constraints notwithstanding, and after proper
proceedings before the proper tribunal be had, that Limkaichong would prove to be an alien, the court of justice
would tilt against her favor and would not sanction such an imperfection in her qualification to hold office. But,
first things first.

The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a natural-born citizen because her
parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. They went on to claim that the proceedings for the
naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to procedural and substantial defects.

In our Decision, We held that:

However, in assailing the citizenship of the father, the proper proceeding should be in accordance with Section
18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 which provides that:

Sec. 18. Cancellation of Naturalization Certificate Issued. - Upon motion made in the proper proceedings by
the Solicitor General or his representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal, the competent judge may
cancel the naturalization certificate issued and its registration in the Civil Register:

1. If it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or illegally;

2. If the person naturalized shall, within five years next following the issuance of said naturalization
certificate, return to his native country or to some foreign country and establish his permanent residence
there: Provided, That the fact of the person naturalized remaining more than one year in his native country
or the country of his former nationality, or two years in any other foreign country, shall be considered
as prima facie evidence of his intention of taking up his permanent residence in the same:

3. If the petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention;

4. If it is shown that the minor children of the person naturalized failed to graduate from a public or private
high school recognized by the Office of Private Education [now Bureau of Private Schools] of the
Philippines, where Philippine history, government or civics are taught as part of the school curriculum,
through the fault of their parents either by neglecting to support them or by transferring them to another
school or schools. A certified copy of the decree canceling the naturalization certificate shall be forwarded
by the Clerk of Court of the Department of Interior [now Office of the President] and the Bureau of Justice
[now Office of the Solicitor General];

5. If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a dummy in violation of the
constitutional or legal provisions requiring Philippine citizenship as a requisite for the exercise, use or
enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege. (Emphasis supplied)
As early as the case of Queto v. Catolico, where the Court of First Instance judge motu propio and not in the
proper denaturalization proceedings called to court various grantees of certificates of naturalization (who had
already taken their oaths of allegiance) and cancelled their certificates of naturalization due to procedural
infirmities, the Court held that:

x x x It may be true that, as alleged by said respondents, that the proceedings for naturalization were tainted
with certain infirmities, fatal or otherwise, but that is beside the point in this case. The jurisdiction of the court
to inquire into and rule upon such infirmities must be properly invoked in accordance with the procedure laid
down by law. Such procedure is the cancellation of the naturalization certificate. [Section 1(5), Commonwealth
Act No. 63], in the manner fixed in Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, hereinbefore quoted, namely,
"upon motion made in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representatives, or by the proper
provincial fiscal." In other words, the initiative must come from these officers, presumably after previous
investigation in each particular case. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated by statute, that may
question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization
proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by private persons in an election case involving the
naturalized citizen’s descendant.

Accordingly, it is not enough that one's qualification, or lack of it, to hold an office requiring one to be a natural-
born citizen, be attacked and questioned before any tribunal or government institution. Proper proceedings must
be strictly followed by the proper officers under the law. Hence, in seeking Limkaichong's disqualification on
account of her citizenship, the rudiments of fair play and due process must be observed, for in doing so, she is
not only deprived of the right to hold office as a Member of the House of Representative but her constituents
would also be deprived of a leader in whom they have put their trust on through their votes. The obvious rationale
behind the foregoing ruling is that in voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final judgment during
the election day, the people voted for her bona fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the
honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of
the powers of government.4lavvphil

These precepts, notwithstanding, Biraogo remained firm in his belief that this Court erred in its Decision and that
the COMELEC Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007 disqualifying Limkaichong should have been affirmed. He
even went to a great extent of giving a dichotomy of the said Joint Resolution by stating that it was composed of
two parts, the first part of which is the substantive part, and the second, pertains to the injunctive part. For this
purpose, the dispositive portion of the said COMELEC Joint Resolution is reproduced below:

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are GRANTED and Jocelyn D. Sy-Limkaichong is declared as DISQUALIFIED from
her candidacy for Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.

The Provincial Supervisor of the Commission on Elections of Negros Oriental is hereby directed to strike out the
name JOCELYN SY-LIMKAICHONG from the list of eligible candidates for the said position, and the concerned
Board of Canvassers is hereby directed to hold and/or suspend the proclamation of JOCELYN SY-
LIMKAICHONG as winning candidate, if any, until this decision has become final.

SO ORDERED.5
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.

ROMERO, J.:p

The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G.
Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit
Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in
office and ignorance of the law.

First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn
F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.

Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G.
del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has
jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was
solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his
jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from
the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.

In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that the office and name
of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly
concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private person. The same person had earlier filed
Administrative Matter No 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and
Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still
pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized
the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating
that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact
that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. 1 With respect to the second
charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate
Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent
member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.

The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted were considered
sufficient for a resolution of the case. 2

Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not been sufficiently
proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice
and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance.

The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's
civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge.
He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and
sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. 3 The affidavit was not
issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In their
affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Peñaranda in
September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Peñaranda left the
conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years,
thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead.

In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida Peñaranda's
presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do not agree.

Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:

A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under
the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse. (Emphasis added.)

There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple. Even
if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding
for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory
requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages
where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or
presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.

In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's
presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Peñaranda. Whether wittingly or
unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted
by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage.
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, " The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those
bigamous . . . marriages not falling under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction, covered by
Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:

Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge or in open court, in
the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the
case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death
or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the
solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place
designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.

Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having solemnized the marriage
between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted
provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following
instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both
parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was
at the point of death or in the remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent
judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario. 4

More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge.
Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article
7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's
jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does
not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance
herewith will not invalidate the marriage.

A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only
within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court
has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the
requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate
in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not
affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. 5

Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not
clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8
and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again
demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.

Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles
applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude
that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law.

The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn
to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying
the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant
case. 6 It is not too much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the system of justice
rests on a shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While
magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge
exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married
persons.

The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a
subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.

The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month suspension
and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering
that one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the
necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be
more circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period
of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.

FIRST DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390 April 11, 2002

(Formerly IPI No. 01-1049-MTJ)

MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.

PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law via a sworn Letter-
Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her
late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is
outside his territorial jurisdiction.

They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband passed away.
However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner's right to inherit the "vast properties" left by Orobia was not
recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the
Philippine Navy.1âwphi1.nêt

Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical
misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.

On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting Court Administrator
Zenaida N. Elepaño for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court Administrator required
respondent judge to comment.

In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo
on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000. Having been assured that
all the documents to the marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that
Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25
kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage
in Nabua, to which request he acceded.

Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents
submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage
license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to another date. However, due to the
earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded
to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might
aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated
the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the
marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the
afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the
latter only gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.

Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid despite the
absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due
to her own fault and negligence.

On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with the Office of the
Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize her marriage due to the
want of a duly issued marriage license and that it was because of her prodding and reassurances that he
eventually solemnized the same. She confessed that she filed this administrative case out of rage. However,
after reading the Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered
by her conscience.

Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for Marriage
License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage license shall be issued on 17
January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.

It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has no record of such
marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the
Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no record of their marriage.

On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could communicate with the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of her marriage license. Respondent
judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said
office, Grace T. Escobal, informed respondent judge that their office cannot issue the marriage license due to
the failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous spouse.

The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15 November 2000, found the
respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside
his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed on respondent judge.

We agree.

Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and
judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the
Supreme Court.1âwphi1.nêt

The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,1 respondent judge held office and had
jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. However, he solemnized
a wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall within the jurisdictional
area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held that:

"A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is authorized to
do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a
Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the
venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to
specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a
judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the
formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage,
may subject the officiating official to administrative liability."2 (Emphasis supplied.)

In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act of solemnizing a
marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We further held that:

"The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they
are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in
understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles
like the ones involved in the instant case. x x x While magistrates may at times make mistakes in
judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary
provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons."3

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore
is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the
law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability
for violating the law on marriage.

Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license.
In People vs. Lara,4 we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and
that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage.
Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to
solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of
petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.1âwphi1.nêt
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has
consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal
effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice,
as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be undermined. 5 Disciplinary actions of this nature do not
involve purely private or personal matters. They can not be made to depend upon the will of every complainant
who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a
complainant in a matter which involves the Court's constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that
power may be put to naught, undermine the trust character of a public office and impair the integrity and dignity
of this Court as a disciplining authority. 6

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.